· · · Case Studies in

Organi~tiop.al
Commun1cation
Ethical Perspectives and Practices
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Edited by
Steve May
University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill

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 CASE STUDY 21

Purifying an lmage
Baxter lnternational and the Dialyzer Crisis

Julie A. Davis

Thís case examines product líabílíty regardíng a blood fílter produced by

H ealth and safety are the main products medica! supply compa-
nies have to sell. However, when these organizations face
product liability problems, instead of offering improved health, the
products leave death and disability behind them. This is the type of cri-
sis Baxter International, a medica! supply company based in Deerfield,
Illinois, faced in the summer and fall of 2001. 1 By the time this crisis
was resolved, 53 dialysis patients had died, two lines of dialyzers
(a type of blood filler) were discontinued, two plants that manufac-
tured the filters implicated in the deaths were closed, and Baxter took
a charge to earnings of $189 million. Despite the high number of

349
350 CASE STUDIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION Case Study 21: Purifying an lmage: Baxter and the Dialyzer Crisis · 351

deaths, the campany' s quick actions, along with outside circumstances, treatrnent. Hmvever, within a week, a total of 11 patie¡lls died in Spain
kept the story from receiving the quantitative and qualitative amounts soon after using the filters. A few weeks !afer, 21 people died in Croatia.
of press coverage endured by organizations facing crises with much By mid-October, when Baxter issued a worldwide recall of the devices
lower death and injury rates. the deaths df 53 people in seven countries, including 4 in the United
The patient deaths placed Baxter in an ethical morass, seeking States, were linked to the filters ("Baxter's Harry Kraemer: '! don't
answers to a variety of questions: When should an organization inform golf,"' 2002; Hammonds, 2002; Peterson & Daly, 2001). Criminal inves-
customers of potential problems with a product? When should an orga- tigations into Baxter's role in the deaths were opened in Spain,
nization act in the face of incomplete infarmation to accept responsi- Sweden, and Croatia. By Novernber, Baxter faced what it called "the
bility far a problem? How much responsibility should an organization worst crisis in its 80-year history" (Firn, 2001, p. 34).
take on far a crisis that could have plausibly been the result of Within days of the first reported deaths in Spain, Baxter began an
severa! organizations' actions? What are the ethical implications of investigation into the filters and poss'ible causes of death and issued
an organization's actions to preven! a tragedy's reoccurrence if !hose a recall far the lot of filters implicated in the deaths. New products
actions cause harm to innocents, including their own employees and were not shipped to suppliers after these deaths (Greising, 2001). On
customers? Can an organization attempt to be too ethical? To under- October 9, Baxter announced the results of interna] tests and !hose of
stand Baxter's attempts to answer these ethical questions, an examina- an independent group of analysts, neither of which provided conclu-
tion of the organization and the dialyzer crisis, Baxter's responses to sive evidence about why the patients died.
the deaths, and circumstances that allowed the organization to avoid Yet, later that week nearly two dozen deaths in Croatia were being
negative media attention about the crisis and its aftermath is in arder. blamed on the devices. Renal Division president Alan Heller feared
a problem with the filters. "! knew that there was too much there to be
a coincidence" (Harnmonds, 2002, n.p.). Imrnediately, a team of Baxter
•:• ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY investigators flew to the scene. The next day, the cornpany issued a
OF BAXTER INTERNATIONAL worldwide recall far these lines of filters and a distribution hold far fil-
ters already produced. Anyone possessing these filters was asked to
Befare a discussion of the dialyzer crisis can be undertaken, a brief return them far credit, ata cost to Baxter of about $10 rnillion (Greising,
overview of the organization as a whole will be helpful. Baxter Inter- 2001; Hammonds, 2002).
national is a $7.7 billion healthcare products organization headquar- Continued investigation faund the presence of a perfluorohydro-
tered in Deerfield, Illinois, outside Chicago. The company began in carbon-based fluid in sorne of the dialyzers ("Baxter's A and AF series
1931, faunded by Dr. Don Baxter, as a manufacturer and distributor of dialyzers," 2001). This fluid was used to test filters that required leak
intravenous solutions (Harnmonds, 2002). Its product line is divided repairs. Although the fluid was supposed to be removed from filters
into three divisions: Bioscience, which produces vaccines and biophar- befare shipping, dialyzers frorn the Rornney Plant in Sweden had left
maceuticals; Medication Delivery, facusing on dispensing medications the plant containing trace amounts of the fluid. While nontoxic at room
to patients; and Renal, where Baxter is the leading supplier of products temperature, when heated to body temperature in a patient's blood-
assisting patients with kidney disease. At this writing, the company stream, the liquid turned into a gas, causing fatal pulmonary
employs approximately 50,000 people in over 100 countries worldwide embolisms. By early November, Baxter's interna! tests indicated that
(Baxter International, n.d.). the fluid in the filters caused the deaths. Baxter CEO Harry Kraemer
As best as can be determined, Baxter's problems began on August 15, decided to perrnanently discontinue making the filters and clase the
2001, when two dialysis patients in Spain died within hours of receiv- Rornney Plant as well as another Althin plant in Florida, taking a
ing treatrnent using dialyzers produced by Althin, one of Baxter's charge of $189 million to cover settlements to the victirns' farnilies and
subsidiaries. A t first, these deaths, while tragic, did not receive undue clase the plants. This charge lowered Baxter's 2001 net income 17%
attention. The patients had been elderly and ill befare beginning from the previous year ("Baxter's Harry Kraerner: "'! don't golf,' 2002).
352 CASE STUDIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION Case Study 21: Purifying an·-1mage: Baxter ~nd the Dialyzer Crisis- 353

When facing attacks from the Croatian press and the victims' strategies, or expend different amounts of resources on the strategies,
families, coupled with its own sense of ethics, Baxter relied on image "the basic options are the same for both ihdividual and corporate image
restoration strategies to solve the problem and maintain its reputation. repair efforts" (p. 177). The following sections will examine both the
The following section will examine Baxter's rhetoric during this time to crisis response strategies that Baxter chose to use and the strategies it
determine which image restoration strategies the organization chose, rejected when purifying its image in the aftermath of the dialyzer deaths.
or declined, to use.
Crisis Response Strategies Baxter Used

•:• BAXTER'S RESPONSE TO THE DIALYZER DEATHS Baxter lnternational was forced to choose from a variety of crisis
response strategies to explain both the dialyzer crisis itself and its
When faced with a public threat to it reputation, as Baxter did in 2001, actions during it. ln this situation, Baxter selected two strategies from
an organization must use crisis response strategies to defend itself. the category of crisis response strategies designed to reduce the per-
Much of modern crisis response theory stems from Ware and ceived offensiveness of the event (Benoit, 1997; Benoit & Czerwinski,
Linkugel's (1973) discussion of the apologetic genre. These authors 1997). While these strategies accept responsibility for the event, they
argue that apologia, or speeches of apology, occur during "the ques- attempt to convince audience members that the event was not as seri-
tioning of a person's moral nature, motives, ar reputation" (p. 274, empha- ous as originally thought. Specifically, Baxter used the strategies of
sis in the original). They delineate these types of ethical questions from compensation and corrective action to purify an image polluted by
mere attacks on an individual's policies. Over time, other theorists palien! deaths.
have added to Ware and Linkugel's typology. The first of these strategies, compensation, offers the victims sorne
Apologia, Benoit's (1995, 1997) extensions of it, and Coombs's form of reparation to repay them for the offensive action (Benoit &
(2000) adjustment of the categories, need not be limited to individuals Czerwinski, 1997). This strategy hopes that "offering to compensate
speaking to clear their reputations of allegations of moral wrongdoing. the injured party may function to reduce the act's offensiveness, and
McMillan (1986) posits that while organizations lack human attributes the damage to the accused's image" (Benoit & Brinson, 1994, p. 77).
such as thinking, abstracting, and feeling, "there is a social pre sence Compensation attempts to right a wrong by providing restitution for
about an organization to which it is possible to assign definite the victims' loss.
traits and qualities that are readily verifiable" (p. 22). These traits are Baxter ímmediately pledged to compensate the victims' families for
revealed through symbol use, which "presents an image of the organi- the deaths of their loved ones. Once the problem with the fluid carne to
zation that its constituents have come to know and recognize" (p. 22). light, Baxter immediately took a charge to earnings, in par! to pay set-
This image, just Jike an individual's face or reputation, can be attacked tlements to the families of patients who died. As early as November, a
and is vigorously defended. Benoit and Brinson (1994) comment: Baxter spokesperson was quoted as saying, "Baxter will compensate
those families affected by this inciden!" (Japsen, 2001a, n.p.).
There can be no doubt that government agencies, corporations, By the end of 2001, Baxter had made good on this promise, settling
and other bodies are as concerned as individuals with their image with the families of Spanish victims for approximately $292,000 apiece
or reputation, and for good reason. Since the early 1970s, organi- (Daly, 2001). An attorney representing sorne of these victims' families
zations have become more aware of their responsibility for also applauded Baxter's actions, saying,
contributing to society in economic, social, environmental, and
political ways. (p. 76) We feel that the settlement each family reached with Baxter is
fair and reasonable. Baxter has treated the families with great
Benoit (1995) argues that while individuals and organizations may respect during this unusually difficult time. The families are com-
use different image restoration strategies, use different combinations of forted in knowing that Baxter continues looking into the science
354 CASE STUDIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION Case Study 21: Purifying an lmage: Baxter and the Dialyzer Crisis , 355

surrounding these tragic events to ensure it will never happen future deaths, rÍot only for their own customers but a!so for their com-
again. (Baxter Intemational !ne., 2001, n.p.) petitors. For instance, the October 15, 2001, release about the Croatian
deaths stres~es how Baxter's concern for safety drives its actions:
Baxter refused to release the terms of this settlement, or the settle-
ment it made with the Croatian victims. The only lawsuit involving Ali testing by Baxter, as well as independent testing by TÜV
an American victim had also settled. The plaintiff's attomey in this Product Service, has continued to demonstrate the safety of these
case said that Baxter "behaved responsibly and appropriately" dialyzers. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution Baxter has
(Hammonds, 2002, n.p.). Plaintiffs' lawyers in these cases were satis- put a global hold on distribution of this series of dlalyzers and
fied with the compensation Baxter offered. is advising customers worldwide to temporarily discontinue use,
While monetary settlements in product liability suits are nothing pending the evaluation by an expert commission. Baxter will work
new, Baxter's statements surrounding these settlements were. Baxter with customers to find suitable alternative dialyzers to use in the
chairman and CEO, Harry Kraemer, commented in the November 28, interim. (Baxter International, 2001a, n.p.)
2001, release announcing the Spanish settlement:
This quotation talks about how Baxter, in the absence of com-
Our goal is to do the right thing. While nothing we do will replace pelling evidence, voluntarily asked its customers to stop using its
the loss these families have experienced, we understand their need products, and switch to !hose of its competitors, until the original dia-
to bring closure to this tragedy. Our hope is that this settlement lyzers can be proven safe. This strategy sought to protect Baxter' s
helps to minimize the distress to the families involved. (Baxter patients at its own expense. Rarely will organizations voluntarily help
Intemational, 2001d, n.p.) 2 their customers shift to competitors' products.
Baxter also aided its competition by informing them of the reason for
This statement recognizes that while compensation is a relatively the deaths. After the dialyzer crisis, Baxter not only explained its investi-
weak strategy in situations where people are killed, as it cannot retum gation and findings to the Food and Drug Administration and regulatory
to the situation as it existed before the offensive act, it nonetheless agencies in the affected countries, but also apprised 3M, the manufacturer
provides some respite to !hose affected by the offensive act. of the fluid left in the filters, and rival competitors that could use the same
Another strategy accused individuals and organizations may use manufacturing process that could leave them vulnerable to the same
is corrective action, which occurs when the accused promises to correct
/1
problems (Hanunonds, 2002). Not only did Baxter take steps to ensure
the problem" when faced with threats to their image (Benoit & that a similar crisis never affected them again, they also attempted to keep
Czerwinski, 1997, p. 44). This strategy can take two forms: (1) the a related problem from affecting their competitors.
accused attempts to retum the situation to the state it was in before the Yet, Baxter went one step further, ceasing production of the entire
offensive action, or (2) the accused takes steps to prevent the offen- line of filters implicated in· the deaths. Baxter CEO Harry Kraemer
sive action from recurring. Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) differentiate commented in a November 5 press release that
this strategy from compensation, arguing, "Unlike compensation,
which seeks to pay for a problem, corrective action seeks to preven! or We are greatly saddened by the patient deaths and I would like
corree! it." (p. 77). Since Baxter could not return the patients who were to extend my personal sympathies to family members of !hose
killed by the defective dialyzers to life, it used the second set of correc- patients. We have a responsibility to make public our findings
tive action strategies to convince its audience that no other patients irnmediately and take swift action, even though confirmatory
would be injured by the dialyzers. studies remain under way.... While a small number of our A and
Throughout the entire crisis, from the first press release issued fol- AF dialyzers appear to have played a role in sorne of these tragic
lowing the Croatian deaths to the recent retrospective articles on the events, we believe there remain substantive gaps in information
crisis published by the business press, Baxter officials have emphasized about the facts associated with many of the patient deaths. Therefore,
the process aspect of their investigations and their attempts to preven! we have decided that in the interest of patient safety, the most
356 CASE STUDIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION Case Study 21: Purifying an lmage: Baxter and the Dialyzer Crisis . 357

prudent course of action is to permanently cease manufacturing When discússing the dialyzer crisis with the media, Baxter decided
these dialyzers. (Baxter, 2001b, n.p.) to use strategies aimed at reducing the offensiveness of the eveni-
compensation and corrective action. However, the strategies Baxter
While sorne industry analysts considered closing the plants decided to use were not the only interesting decisions it made. Equally
"overkill" (Birchard, 2002, p. 38), Baxter's emphasis on safety and on important are the strategies the company decided not to use.
keeping the problem from recurring required that the filters be dis-
continued. Kraemer stated, when asked if the filters could have been
Crisis Response Strategies Baxter Did No! Use
produced safely, "Were we 100% confident? ... No. We didn't know"
(Hanunonds, 2002, n.p.). One of the lead investigators in Spain and During its crisis response rhetoric, Baxter chose not to use a variety
Croa tia summed up Baxter' s investigation this way: "This made us of tempting and common strategies. At no time did Baxter deny either
second-guess systems that we' d used far 20 years and that had always that the dialyzers were responsible far the patient deaths or claim that
worked." Another investigator concluded, "What we know far sure is, other actors could have contributed to the crisis. Both of the strategies
this problem will never happen again" (Hammonds, 2002, n.p.). While fall within a category of strategies that Benoit (1997) labels denial. This
they may never understand why the problem arase when it did, they category is divided into two separate strategies: simple denial, where !he
took steps to prevent its recurrence, which is a clear example of correc- "firm may deny that the act has occurred, that the firm perfarmed the
tive action. In this case, Baxter jettisoned a product that accounted far act, or that the act was harrnful to anyone" (p. 179); and shift the blame,
30% of its dialyzer sales, and the $20 million in revenue it brought in, which argues "that another person or organization is actually respon-
which likely could have been salvaged, to protect its customers. sible far !he offensive act" (p. 180).
Another way Baxter used the strategy of corrective action involved Despite plausible arguments, Baxter refused to engage in the strat-
the extent of the investigation it pursued into the problems. As one egy of shifting blame. They could easily have blamed 3M, who made
of Baxter's investigators explained in the October 15 release, "Patient !he fluid used in testing !he filters; or Althin, the filters' producer,
safety is our highest priority.... That is why we feel it is critica! that ali which Baxter had acquired the March befare the crisis began. They also
aspects of the hernodialysis treatment be thoroughly investigated" did not blame Croatian and Spanish officials who opted not to cooper-
(Baxter, 2001a, n.p.). Although earlier tests had exonerated the filters, ate with the investigation; Baxter never received the Croatian filters far
Baxter continued to investigate its products in an effort to prevent the testing (Greising, 2001). Baxter refused to use these strategies, because
problem from recurring. In the November 5 letter to customers, Baxter as Kraemer stated, "If you live in a world of Jet' s find somebody to
also emphasized the importance of safety, and how it used its investi- blame, then you're into a Ford-Firestone thing .... The reality of it is,
gation to guarantee it: we're responsible" (Greising, 2001, n.p.). In taking responsibility far the
incidents, Baxter limited itself to strategies that would reduce the offen-
Given our utrnost concern far palien! safety, we continued our siveness of the original act (compensation) and attempt to prevent
intensive investigation, even after exhausting ali standard interna- future problems (corrective action).
tionally recognized safety and toxicity tests. We diligently pursued In sum, Baxter used corrective action and compensation to rebuild
every potential lead based on the facts available to us and even its image both during and after the dialyzer crisis. Equally as important
began pursuing other less obvious courses of investigation in are the available strategies it decided not to use. In accepting responsi-
search of what could be the cause of the unexplained deaths. bility far this event, Baxter declined to shift the blame to 3M, maker of
(Baxter International, 200lc, n.p.) the fluid faund in the dialyzers, or Althin' s original management. After
evaluating these strategies, this paper will examine how the circum-
The investigative process Baxter used to find the cause of the prob- stances surrounding the crisis and Baxter's responses to it helped the
lem and preven! future instances was so thorough that it continued the company avoid the withering public scrutiny common to many fatal-
investigation past the limits normally imposed on organizations. product liability cases.
358 CASE STUDIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION Case Study 21: Purifying an lmage: Baxter and the Dialyzer Crisis 159

•!• HOW BAXTER AVOIDED NEGATIVE MEDIA COVERAGE Baxter's response and its reliance on corrective action helped
. it recover.
from the crisis. Benoit and Brinson (1994) highlight the importance of a
Most of the image restoration cases researchers study involve widely speedy response to crisis situations. In Baxter's case, the speed with
publicized events where an organization faces a serious threat to its which it began the investigation, issued the·hold, and ordered the recall
reputation, if not its continued existence (Benoit & Brinson, 1994; · may have saved more lives and limited the corporation's potential lia-
Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Boyd, 2001; Sellnow, 1993; Sellnow & bility: "They didn't look like theywere trying to hide anything.... The
Ulmer, 1995; Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998). However, the organiza- recall was las! month ... and that is moving fairly quickly far an inter-
tions would, in most if not ali of the cases, have considered that their national company" (Japsen, 200la, n.p.). Rather !han waiting far con-
crisis responses were more successful had they been able to limit the clusive evidence of responsibility from an independent agency, which
media coverage of the events in the first place. Baxter reached this goal they never received, and risking more deaths in the meantime, Baxter
of avoiding media coverage of the dialyzer crisis through a combina- took immediate steps to salve the problem and protect patients.
tion of its situation and its use of crisis response strategies. In moving quickly, Baxter implemented corrective actions designed
Severa! situational variables prevented the media from paying close to preven! future occurrences of the dialyzer contamination. Closing
attention to this situation. Early in the crisis, the deaths occurred the plan! and discontinuing the production of an entire line of products
overseas-the first cluster of deaths took place in Spain. By the time were actions designed to "corree! the problem" (Benoit, 1997, p. 181).
the filters were recalled in mid-October, ali but four of the deaths had However, corrective action can also leave an organization vulnerable
taken place outside the United States. Under the bes! of circumstances, to lawsuits. Chicago-area attomeys commented that Baxter "has sor! of
American media sources subscribe to the "all news is local news" motto confessed" and this action "makes it [litigation] easier, but also brings in
and lavish attention on stories occurring in the United States or that more competing firms" (Klein, 2001, n.p.). Benoit (1997) noticed this
affect large numbers of Americans. The four American deaths, two each contradiction between image restoration and limiting liability when he
in Texas and Nebraska, were not enough to catch the press's attention. stated, "image restoration concerns may, admittedly, conflict with a
Par! of the reason the American news media <lid not spend much desire to avoid lawsuits, and the firm mus! decide whether it is more
time or ink on the Baxter case was due to other news stories. Less !han importan! to restare its image or avoid litigation" (pp. 183--184). Sellnow,
one month after the first death on August 15, 2001, the World Trade Ulmer, and Snider (1998) admit, "we do [not] assume that corrective
Center attacks consumed the media's, and much of the news-consuming action should be taken without consideration of the legal consequences"
public's, attention. Fifty-three deaths caused by medica! devices sud- (p. 64). Despite this concem, Baxter seems to have settled the lawsuits
denly seemed less importan!, by comparison. By the time the media related to this case in spite of its early acceptance of responsibility.
returned to business news, Baxter had completed its investigation, Benoit (1997) affirms that accepting responsibility quickly when al
accepted responsibility, and begun settlements with victims. There was fault is "morally the corree! thing to do" (p. 184). Without concern far
little left to report. litigation, Baxter used this sintegy, even in the absence of conclusive
As well as paling beside the September 11, 2001, tragedies, Baxter evidence, and won adrnirers for its crisis management. Lawsuits were
also paled beside the size and scope of the domestic corporate scandals settled, stock prices went up soon after the crisis, renal product sales
making headlines. The Enron, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Anderson, rose, and members of the public familiar with the situation were
and WorldCom scandals had a greater impact on the pocketbooks and impressed by Baxter's performance. Hammonds (2002) commented,
consciousness of the American public. Hence, the media devoted more "The message to CEOs: Investors like honesty, including public apolo-
attention to the larger business stories. gies. (Kraemer visited New York to apologize in person to the presi-
However, Baxter's successful navigation of the crisis cannot be den! of Croatia.) So, it turns out, do employees" (n.p.). Owning up to a
credited entirely to the media's divided attentions. Its investors, and problem and taking quick action to lessen its impact and preven! its
certainly its employees, paid clase attention to the crisis. Baxter's strate- recurrence allowed Baxter Intemational to defuse a potentially devas-
gic choices, in many ways, kept the story from escalating: The speed of tating crisis and emerge stronger than ever.
360 CASE STUDIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION Case Study 21: Purifying an lmage: Baxter and the Dialyzer Crisis 361

•:• AFTERMATH OF DIALYZER CRISIS In mid-March 20Ó3, the Justice Department subpoenaed Baxter's records
about the dialyzer crisis, possibly reopening' the issue. These problems
Despite facing potential legal liability and damage to its reputation, in the led Kraemer t~ resign his position as chairman and CEO in January of
short term Baxter seemed to have weathered the storrn of the dialyzer cri- 2004 (Japsen & Miller, 2004). While Baxter initiallyended the dialyzer cri-
sis successfully. Both the finances and the prestige of the organization sis with its reputation intact, these later financia! problems indicate that
irnproved after the crisis, and Baxter's response to it, became public. This organizations cannot res! on past ·ethical behavior, but mus! constantly
section will examine Baxter's reputation after the crisis by studying its continue to update and revise their practices to remain viable.
stock price and its standing in the medica! supply community.
In one of the most widely recognized measures of organizational Discussion Questions
success, stock price, Baxter initially suffered a loss as news of the
charge against earnings and potential lawsuits rattled investors. l. What responsibilities do organizations have to consumers who
However, as the company began to settle the lawsuits and amid assur- rely on a line of products, one of which has exhibited a fatal, but
ances that the initial charge against earnings would cover any potential potentially solvable, defect?
liability, stock prices began to rebound (Japsen, 2001b). By the end 2. Did Baxter accept responsibility for the deaths too quickly?
of 2001, Baxter's stock had risen 23% while its companions on the
Standard and Poor's health care index dropped 13% ("Baxter's Harry 3. How personally responsible is a CEO for a localized product-
liability issue?
Kraemer: 'I don'! golf."' 2002). The dialyzer crisis did not preven!
Baxter from outperforming similar health care stocks operating in the 4. Was Baxter ethically obligated to close the Romney Plant?
same economic environment.
5. Could Baxter have ethically attempted to shift blame for the
Stock prices jumped and Baxter' s standing in the medica! commu-
dialyzer defects to 3M or to the organization that owned the
nity scored its greatest coup in late November 2001, when the Bush
Romney Plan! a few months before the crisis?
administration awarded the company, in a joint contrae! with Acambis
PLC, the $428 million contrae! to be the federal government's sole 6. What ethical responsibility did Baxter owe to the employees at
provider of 155 million doses of smallpox vaccine. This contrae! not the Romney Plant that it closed in the wake of the dialyzer crisis?
only provided a financia! boon for the organization, but also a rhetori-
cal shot in the arm, as Baxter was selected over pharmaceutical giants
Merck and GlaxoSmithKline. Baxter was moving up in the pharmaceu- •:• NOTES
tical market and closer to its goal of becoming a worldwide producer
with $1 billion in annual sales by the end of the decade (Japsen, 2001b). l. The information for this case carne from publicly accessible news
Despite the crisis, and the loss of a $20 million product, Baxter accounts, press releases, statements available on Baxter Intemational's Web
site, and published statements from its officers.
remained number one worldwide in renal care products with sales of
2. This and other releases frorn Baxter International were accessed from
$1.94 billion ("Baxter's Harry Kraemer: 'I don'! golf,"' 2002). Not only
the organization's Web site, www.baxter.com. While these documents are no
did Baxter rise above other renal care providers, it was also recognized
longer available online, the author has retained copies and would be happy to
by industry publications for ethical behavior. For instance, Business share them as requested.
Ethics awarded the company spots on its list of "100 Bes! Corporate
Citizens" in 2001and2002. Baxter's environrnental policies also earned
it head-of-the-class honors in service to the environment. •!• REFERENCES
However, recen! years have been more difficult for Baxter. It has
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Baxter International. (2001b, November 5). Following extensíve investigation, Japsen, B. (200la, November 6). Baxter links its filters to deaths. Chicago
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