LESSonS To BE LEARnT FRoM BRIDGE FAILURES

V.n. HEGGADE
Sr. Vice President & Member
Board of Management of
Gammon India Limited

He has more than 30 years of experience of Designing and Constructing Bridges, energy structures
like Chimneys & Cooling towers, Marine Structures and Hydraulic Structures etc. He is a first engineer
to receive ‘IABSE-Prize’ (International Association for Bridge & Structural Engineering, Zurich,
Switzerland) from developing countries in addition to National Awards like Pt Jawaharlal Nehru
Centenary Award from IRC; Pre Stressed Concrete Design Award from Institution of Engineers
and ICI Awards for best Publications. He has more than 85 papers to his credit and is a member
of various IRC (Indian Roads Congress) and BIS (Bureau of Indian Standards) Committees. He is
also a member of Indian Member Committee of Federation Internationale Du Beton, IMC fib. He
has been an invited and a keynote speaker in National and International Seminars, Symposiums
and Congresses. He has a passion for tall and long structures and he is an ardent advocate of
sustainability and aesthetics in construction.

Key words: Bridge collapse, robustness, causes of structural collapses come out as the
extrapolation, accident during construction, disasters involve human and property casualties
cantilever construction, sequence of construction. and the investigations are invariably under
subjudice. As such in the paper below only those
Summary aspects of the bridge failures with in the public
Bridge collapses around the world particularly in domain are discussed from the angle of learning
United States of America and Germany have been lessons that too from Indian context.
quite rampant and well recorded in literature in all
categories viz. failure during construction, failure 1. Introduction
in service without external action, failure due to Structural failures invariably culminate in injury
impact of ship collision, failure due to impact from and loss of life as such structural safety is of
traffic under the bridge, failure due to flooding, primary importance right from the inception of
ice floes, floating timber and hurricane, failure conceptual design and should not be calibrated
due to fire or explosion, failure due to seismic by other objectives like cost, aesthetics and
activity and failure of falsework. Among this political pressures to complete the job in hurry,
category of failures, from the literature it can be etc. The failures and partial failures in majority
observed that failure in service without external of cases are caused by one non-vigilant mistake
action, failure during construction and failure arising because a vital problem has not been
of false works account for lion’s share in the
recognized, has been underestimated or
descending order. However, in the last decade
recklessly treated.
there is an alarming trend of maximum bridge
collapses shifting to Asian countries. In a way In this era of engineering science other load
there could be a relationship between economic bearing structures like machines, say for example
growth and bridge collapses analogous to the car makers can run a pilot series of simulated
relationship between infrastructure development load testing to remedy defects before going into
and increase in GDP. Very seldom, the primary mass production, but the one-off nature and

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 11

size of bridge structures make it impossible to and constantly breaking new ground in actual
test their load bearing capacity in entirety and projects, creating something new and there is
remove defects before construction. Laboratory no law to restrict tallness, length and largeness
load testing is normally displacement oriented and find stretched solutions under constrained
where the behaviour of the test specimen is situation. In the absence of restrictive controls in
not brittle, the ultimate load is hardly evident the form of laws, professional self-control based
because testing can be smoothly continued on knowledge, experience, balanced judgment
into the de-strengthening stage and the failure and responsibility attains paramount importance.
process appears to be quite harmless. In reality, Control and self-control are the two poles between
structures are mostly “load controlled’’ and the which the practice of designing innovative load-
collapse of scaffolding or of an entire structure bearing structures moves, particularly when the
is always a dramatic and tragic event with very area of technology involved is in a state of rapid
serious consequences. development. These professional self-controls
are honed by lessons learnt by set-backs. Thus
Continuing with the causes of accidents, either
the documentation of failures is the corner stone
the possibilities of failure werenever visualised,
for future innovative designs.
conditions were not thoroughly investigated or
that in some way rashness was predominant Despite the importance of documentation for
during design or construction. Also on some future innovative designs and in spite of huge
occasions, successful structures have been coverage in the press and the Internet, it is difficult
the cause of failure in later structures when to get hard facts about the failed structures. The
seemingly unimportant changes, such as in news item in the papers released invariably
size or slenderness, turned secondary factors satisfy the general public’s appetite for sensation
into major influences. Currently in vogue safety but those involved avoid frank statements for
theory based on a probability approach, which fear of possible legal consequences. Incidentally
is the basis for all new standards internationally, for avoiding any legal consequences, extra
is unlikely to reduce the failures and collapse precaution is taken in this article to mention only
of structures as the causes are not statistically those details which are in the public domain as
distributed, but are rather errors that do not fit many illustrations are matter of subjudice. For
into any probabilistic distribution. this reason, many times the real cause of the
failure is never known. In the recent past the
Another issue is engineers’ quest for increasingly
incidence of bridge failure has shifted to the Asian
challenging load-bearing structures such as
continent. This is explained by the enormous
bridges with wider spans and of lighter design,
economic growth in many Asian countries and
cranes of higher lifting capacity and taller
the pressing need for roads and bridges to be
pylons and towers, it can happen that due to
built fast. There are a number of extremely large-
the limitations of their standard of knowledge,
scale projects under construction. It is always the
they fail to identify hitherto unknown phenomena
construction schedule which is more important
and dangers. The designers often extrapolate
than safety regulations and accident prevention.
secondary affects arising out of scale effects.
This unfortunate development seems to continue
The secondary affects in small structures may
for few more years.
not govern the design as such in standard
designing practice might have been ignored but No bridge is designed and built by a single
when the structures become taller, slimmer, engineer. Competent team members must
wider, longer and larger, these secondary cooperate and be absolutely willing to cooperate
effects may govern the design as such may not for successful bridge building. Any conflict or
deserve to be ignored as extrapolation. In this misunderstanding between the professionals
context it is interesting to note that Construction involved can be critical and must be resolved
is always in a state of continuous development, before the project is continued and construction
progressing through emergency situations commences. Every stage of every job must

12 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

be carefully organised with clear definition of 2.1 Failure of Bridge Foundations
the areas of responsibility and the boundaries
Improper soil investigation, scour estimation and
between different activities. At the same time
consequent conception of foundation may cause
every person involved must be prepared to
hazardous ramification in terms of economy
support his colleagues even beyond his own
and time. There are instances where artesian
particular field of action. The team member
conditions were not taken into cognizance while
especially chief designer and project manager
conceiving the foundation, which had led to the
should have the ability to visualise accident
disappearance of the well foundation (Fig. 1)
scenario and communicate to each other before
during construction.There is abundant scope
the commencement of each critical activity.
of mitigating hazards and durability problems
by addressing constructability issues during
2. Risks involved in Bridge Building
design solution stage. Inappropriate choice of
From the structural engineering point of view, foundations that are not construction friendly
the life of the structure incepts from initial not only warrants huge time and expenditure but
construction stages to the point till the structure also prone to mishaps, the instances are:
is destroyed and planned again by the planner or
designer. During the intervening period structure
experiences various stages such as construction
state, service state, rehabilitation state, etc. and
also exposed to different hazards which can
be categorized into ‘Man made hazards’ and
‘Natural hazards’.
Manmade hazards consist of mistakes such as:
Improper estimation of loading Fig. 1: Artesian Conditions for a Bridge in Nepal

Improper geotechnical assessment Adopting open foundations in river or creek

Improper planning which warrant cofferdam on undulating
Accidents & fire exposed rocky strata where controlling water
see page is almost impossible (Fig. 2).
Collision and fatigues
Choice of the contractor
Extended duration of construction
In appropriate methods of construction/
erection
Inadequate foundations for false works & Fig. 2: Left: Open Footings in a Creek!?. Right: Well
removal of support Foundations for a Flyover in Busy Area!?.
Defective workmanship and material
Adopting well foundations in a busy area for
Mechanical and electrical breakdown flyovers where there is always a danger of
Inadequate site management adjacent buildings and roads sinking due to
Defective temporary works and its design sand blowing in the wells (Fig. 2).
Inadequate permanent structure design
The natural hazards involve wind, earthquake,
floods, tsunami, avalanche, land sliding,
extremes of temperatures, inclement weather,
excessive rainfall and acceptability by local Fig. 3: Left: Joghigopa Bridge on Brahmaputra Right:
residents. Signature P23 Foundation on Yamuna

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 13

 Adopting well foundations on a sloping rock presented below which perhaps will in future help
when deep foundations are envisaged and the designers in avoiding the failure of bridge at
later change the entire design concept as conception stage itself.
the well sinking cannot be controlled on a
sloping rock. The design changes adopted
in the form of a special hybrid foundation
of wells being integrated with piles
(Fig. 3) would have already taken its toll on
the project in terms of cost and time. In one
case the entire project of a railway bridge on
river Yamuna in Delhi had been abandoned
since 2005 when similar foundation problems
were encountered (Fig. 4).

Fig. 6: Bridge conceived with Founding Level at RL

103.40 m through Conglomerate

Well No. Duration in M Sinking Avg. Rate of

Sinking m/M
P1 24 Months 21 m 0.875
Fig. 4: Abandoned Bridge since 2005 on River
Yamuna at Delhi due to Foundation Problem P2 36 Months 22 m 0.611
P3 84 Months 19 m 0.226
The Indian standards specify the scour depth P4 96 Months 14.7 m 0.153
calculations to be based on Lacey’s formula even P5 36 Months 25.30 m 0.711
for boulder and conglomerate strata. The Lacey’s P6 34 Months 30.0 m 0.882
empirical formula is based on studies in alluvial
channels and as such the abuse of the same The PSC cantilever bridge of 701.5 m, with the
may be making him turn in his grave. In many cantilever spans of 117m was conceived with
of the projects, the silt size used for calculating well foundations with the calculated scour depths
the silt factor to be used in Lacey’s formula are using Lacey’s equation working out to be at RL
of the size of a fully grown man as could be seen 118.3 m which in fact corresponds to silt size of
from the Fig. 5. As the scour depth and founding 0.2mm to 0.5 mm as per IRC codes. As per the
levels are based on this formula, the foundations recommendation of the same codes, the well
foundations necessarily have to have the grip/
embedded length of 1/3rd the height between
HFL and Founding level from the scour depth
meaning founding levels would be at RL 103.4m
for these foundations.
Well Gel Used Detonator Sinking Explosive
No. in Kg Used Achieved Used per
Fig. 5: Boulders from Wells P3 & P4 of Passighat
Nos. meter
bridge sinking
P1 784 2570 30.19 m 25.97
humanly cannot be installed up to founding levels
P2 45 1437 26.07 m 17.10
even up to 20 years despite the continuous efforts
P3 459 1514 19.02 m 24.13
culminating in enormous emissions and energy
P4 399 1304 14.73 m 27.08
consumptions apart from scouring of valuable
P5 1571 5789 30.34 m 51.78
resources in terms of Men, Materials, Machines
P6 891 3296 35.80 m 24.89
and Money. The curious but painstaking case of
raising of Passighat Bridge foundation levels is The soil strata in reality varied and differed

14 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

violently. The strata encountered while sinking while calculating scour depth using Lacey’s
was found to be of densely compacted rock equation with the exception that they used actual
strata containing 75% boulders ranging from geo-technical strata encountered during sinking.
200 mm to 3000 mm in size. Thus Passighat
wells were sunk through hard rock from 1987
to 2006 under ferociously trying circumstances
(Table1). Unexpected variation in strata led
to usage of extensive blasting which was not
envisaged at tender stage (Table 2). In any case
such extensive use of explosives in the dredge
hole had detrimental effect on the steining and
kerb. Extensive efforts put in for sinking the
wells including deployment of huge resources
yielded very poor progress in sinking. Pneumatic • FoR CLEAR WATER ConDITIonS,
Dse/b = 0.66(b/d)-0.25 (D/d)0.16 {(U-uc2)/∆γs/p*d)}0.4α-0.3
sinking has its limitations. As per IS - 4138 the Where average critical velocity
(Uc2/ ∆γs/p*d) = 0.88(b/d)-0.11 (D/d)0.16
maximum working pressure is limited to 3.4 kg/ Opening ratio α is given by
α=(B-b)/B where B = c/c spacing of piers.

cm2. It was experienced while sinking well no P6 • FoR LIVE BED ConDITIonS,
dse/b = 0.88(b/d)-0.33 (D/d)0.4 α-0.3
(in pneumatic condition) that at cutting edge at
RL 125, the working pressure touched 3.4 kg/ Fig. 7: Kothyari-Garde-Ranga Raju method
cm2. This practically leaves no room or cushion
for pressure fluctuation margin. • Maximum flood discharge = 41,450 cumecs
• High Flood level = 164.0 m
Table 3 : Deployment of Plants/Resources for
Sinking • Average bed level = 144.0 m
Well Type of Crane Gen. Comp. Fuel Labour Diving • River slope = 1.5*10^-3
No. Sinking Hours Hours Hours Consump Man days Hours

P1 Conv. 371 –– –– 2355 511 8599 477 • Low water level = 153.50 m
Pneumatic –– 6726 5261 11494 ––

P2 Conv. –– –– –– –– –– –– • Velocity of water at HFL = 8.0 m/s

Pneumatic –– 4168 2804 7758 8095 ––

p3 Conv. 1758 –– –– 1230 2815 2649

• River c/s at HF = 12,050 m^2
Pneumatic –– –– –– –– –– ––

P4 Conv. 2932 –– –– 1509 1704 2032

• Pier size & geometry = As per Fig. 6.
Pneumatic –– –– –– –– –– ––

P5 Conv. 650 –– –– 3904 1779 1724

• River bed soil strata = As encountered
Pneumatic –– 3728 2760 6829 856 ––
As per Kothyari et al Horse shoe vortex and
P6 Conv. –– –– –– –– –– ––
Pneumatic –– 5644 4533 9310 10580 –– associated affects as shown in the Fig. 7 causes
The intensive efforts of sinking (Table 3) by scour and they had proposed the empirical
blasting, pneumatic method and open grabbing model as depicted in the same Fig. Based on
had given very little yield as demonstrated. The these Kothyari et al proposed computations for
strata conspicuously consisted of boulders up temporal scour depths.The method proposed by
to the diameter of 2.0 m (Fig. 6) which could be them considered,
hardly dislodged. Despite being subjected to Pier shape,size and distances between them
unprecedented floods, the scour observed was
Flow of depth & velocity of water
negligible. It was decided to realistically assess
the scour depth by analytical model study and Soil stratification effects.
the same was entrusted to eminent persons in
The method was claimed to have been
the field of ‘Roorkee University’.
successfully tested for field data of 17 bridges in
Kothyari and Ranga Raju of University of India, 55 bridges in USA, 7 bridges in Newzeland
Roorkee carried out the analytical model studies & 5 bridges in Canada. The bore-log data below
for the data as was used during the tender stage bed level of 144.0m was idealized into 3 layers

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 15

with 3 mean particle size (Fig. 8). For the input data Well p2 142.73 144.86
conservative values in terms of lowest bed level, Well p3 141.35 143.61
pier diameter, average flow velocity and river Well p4 140.17 142.55
slope was used. As clear water conditions gave Well p5 144.165 146.15
conservative estimate, equilibrium scour depth Well p6 148.70 150.23
for the same was computed using the equations.
For both clear water & Live bed conditions Bottom : Scour depth as per IRC assuming
temporal variation of scour depth was calculated a = 200 mm (on conservative side) & Linerar
using algorithm as shown in Fig. 8 and also Waterway = 650 m
computation time was extended to correspond to Temporal variation for Live-bed condition is
equilibrium conditions. The following conditions considered when finer bed material is transported
of bed stratification areconsidered while using to scour hole from upstream flow.
the said algorithm for temporal variation.
On the basis of these study result as projected
in Table 4 (top) after 18 years of tireless sinking
of wells, it was decided to raise the founding
level to RL 125 m i.e. almost 22 m above the
original calculated founding levels. It is also very
interesting to note that hypothetically in IRC
equation, if the size of the silt is considered 200
mm dia as shown in the Table 4 (bottom), the
scour depths are almost matching with the results
of analytical model study carried out for Passighat
Bridge. The very fact that almost all foundations
were subjected to scouring actions for minimum
Fig. 8: Left : Algorithm used for Temporal Variation, 15 years including an unprecedented flood and
Right : Mean Sizes of Boulders the actual scour was matching with scour depths
shown in Table 4, it is strongly recommended
CONDITION A : Mean diameter of 0.95 for that for bouldary and conglomerate strata, the
whole depth silt factors should be provided up to diameter of
CONDITION B: Layered sediment as in 500 mm as a modified Lacey equation in IRC.
idealization.
2.2 Failure due to Choice of Location and
CONDITION C : Top 2 layered bed with the Construction Agencies
average sediment size of 1.068m
Conditions Max Scour
Depth Level

Clearn-water scour Equilibrim scour 2.95 141.05

Temporal variation of scour depth
CONDITION A 3.2 140.80
CONDITION B 2.81 141.19
CONDITION C 3.0 141.0
Live bed scour Temporl variation of 2.80 141.20
scour depth

Table 4

Top : Summary of anlytical model studies as
per Kothyari et al
Location Normal Scour Seismic Scour Fig. 8: Top: Final GAD of Anjikhad Bridge Bottom
Well p1 145.50 147.35 Approach Foundations Completed Prior to Sop the work

16 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

In the hilly terrain, the location of the bridge 2.3 Failure due to Flooding, Cyclone and
selection shall be devoid of the protruding overloading
unstable rock mass, which may be hazardous to
The subcontinent is full of rivers and creeks
human life and bridge itself. The unstable rock
and is vulnerable to floods and cyclonic attacks.
mass itself may cause landslide. The decision
Floods and cyclones create havoc during
on the location of the bridge in hilly terrain
construction (Fig.10) and otherwise too affect
warrants very detailed geotechnical investigation
human and property losses. The number of
including the study of seismic shear zones, the
failures due to this cause is even greater in an
absence of the same had led to abandoning of
area where extreme rainfalls are very intense but
the projects half way through in many instances
infrequent and spatially highly variable. Water
as has happened in the case of Anjikhad bridge
depths in some rivers may vary from zero to 15
(Fig. 8 ) due to treacherous geological conditions
– 20 m in a few days or even within 24 hours.
encountered during execution.
Velocities may attain 8 m/s and flow directions
may change considerably within a channel
during a flood, particularly near river bends. It
is often impossible to predict the consequences
of flooding. They cannot be codal practices to
help in the design and erection of flood-resistant
structures because every case is unique. A
better solution would be to improve the training
of engineers in hydrology and the hydraulics of
Fig. 9 : Bridges for which Contractors have to be waterways. It is said that “Man who overlooks
changed, Top : Bassien Creek at Mumbai
water under bridge will find bridge under water.”
Bottom : Pamban Bridge at Rameswaram

Many a times, the choice of the agencies/

contractors without proper pre-qualification
criteria had led to the abandonment of contracts
in midway of the project, before some other
competent contractor completed the project.
There are many classical examples in Indian
bridge building context in this regard such as
Bassein Creek Bridge, Pamban Bridge (Fig. 9) Fig. 11 : Staging Collapse of a Bridege due to Flash
and a bridge in Goa, which took 20 years from Flood
conception to completion stage, changing 3
contractors during the intervening period and In case of Ganga Bridge at Patna the bed gantries
finally third competent contractor completed the which were used for pre casting and stacking
project in just two years. were affected by cyclone. On one of the gantries

Fig. 10 : Havoc due to Flood and Cyclone Fig. 12 : Scaffolding Failure Due to Over Design

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 17

the operator saw the cyclone coming from far clandestinely take heavy consignments weighing
and left the gantry without locking to the rails as up to 400 to 600t leading to catastrophes. On
such when the cyclone came gantry travelled 24th August 2014 a 100-year-old bridge collapsed
on its own for some distance before collapsing in Solan district of Himachal Pradesh, officials
(Fig. 10). said that the bailey bridge, believed to be more
than a century old, collapsed after a truck loaded
Many times bridges are built on scaffolding on
with apples tried to cross it despite a warning that
riverbed and there are instances where due to
the bridge could not take such a heavy load. In
unexpected flash floods before the spans had
Gujarat on 22nd August 2009 a bridge collapsed
become self-sustaining, the false work were
for hauling a very heavy boiler unit for a power
washed away (Fig. 11). The meticulous planning
plant (Fig. 14).
and implementation of the same can avoid such
bridge disasters during construction. During the
construction of Narmada aqueduct, the staging
collapsed during construction ( Fig. 12 ) as the
same could not with stand the very high wind
speed ironically due to overdesign of scaffolding
to support the span.
Fig. 14 : Left : A Bridge in HP Right : A Bridge in
Gujarat Collapsed Due to Overweight Hauling

2.4 Accidents during construction

Construction is full of high-risk activities such
as prestressing, erection of heavy components
Fig. 13 : Left : A Bridge on the River Gaula in and floating equipment that warrants meticulous
Uttarakhand, floods in july 2008 Right : A Bridge planning and system design to avoid accidents.
Damaged Due to the Floods in Srinagar The incidents like sinking of barge mounted
batching plant, concrete pump and placer beam,
Many bridges are being washed out due to
the collapse of PSC beams at casting yards,
unprecedented floods which could be due the
accident during launching, tower crane collapse
consequence of climate change arising out
during erection, damage due to staging failure,
unsustainable development all around; recent etc.could be unforeseeable or could be attributed
examples are from Uttarakand, Karnataka and to carelessness or oversight.
Kashmir (Fig. 13). The most important factors
leading to this type of disaster are: A decade back, the bridge collapses during
construction were quite rampant in USA and
Lack of hydrological data upon which to European countries particularly in Germany.
base estimates of the magnitude of floods for However, during the last decade, the accidents
design purposes
Ignorance of the hydraulics of flow in alluvial
rivers and flow through bridge waterways
and around bridge piers
Lack of reliable methods for estimating scour
at bridge piers Fig. 15 : Mishaps during Chennai Metro Elevated
Transport Corridor Construction
Inability to predict the occurrence of impact
and accumulation of debris against the
during construction seem to have shifted to
bridgestructure
Asian subcontinent, particularly rampant for the
Despite the warnings about the load carrying construction of elevated transportation sectors
capacity of bridges, sometimes transporters try to like metro, monorail and elevated roads. The

18 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

main causes of failure during construction are St Thomas Mount Metro Rail project site. Metro
of such significance that they can justifiably be Rail officials said the welding was weak and
summarized as follows: unable to withstand the load (Fig.15). In another
incident the girder came down crashing near
Unscheduled overload
Alandur during construction.
Underestimation of wind load effect
Defects in design, structural analysis and
construction
Unknown or unrecognized phenomenon
Unrecognized risk, in general
Unrecognized/disregarded instability
Irresponsibility during construction
Material defects incl. concrete strength
Failure of a machine or one of its parts Fig. 18: Left : 2000 t Barge Damaged, Sinks Right:
All the above causes in some or the other way Winch Failure Due to Faulty Operation
connected to pressures to complete the job
Mumbai witnessed bridge collapses during
hastily, either due to the ignorance or indifference.
construction for metro station, elevated road at
Haste is by far the most important cause of failure
Sahara and monorail construction as depicted
occurrences during construction especially in
in Fig. 16. In case of monorail construction a
case of metro construction in Mumbai, Delhi and
portion of the bridge fell due to the failure of
Chennai.
launching girder while in metro station under
construction slab of a staircase collapsed. A
35-metre concrete girder, which was part of
the Sahar Elevated Road, collapsed while the
workers were carrying out concreting.
Delhi also witnessed spurt of accidents during
Fig. 16: Mishaps in the construction of Delhi metro (Fig. 17). In most
Mumbai Left Top : A of these recent accidents, it is possible to infer
Metro Station, Right:
the causes on the basis of information which is
Elevated Road at
Sahar, Left bottom: available in public domain in the form of media
Monorail Construction news etc. as the matter is invariably under judicial
investigations, till the investigations are over, the
As reported in the paper a major accident was real cause of accident might not be known.
averted as the scaffolding to build a 15-feet-long
The construction of bridges involves proper
pier arm on one of the pillars on the busy 100
utilization of plants and equipment and the same
feet road at Vadapalani collapsed when liquid
seldom have to be used in deep water sea and
concrete was being poured into it at Koyambedu-
often at very high levels. In a case where the deep
sea water concreting for a caisson foundations
were to be carried out, the entire arrangement
of concreting including Batching Plant, Concrete
Pump and Placer Boom – 60 m3/hr. were
mounted on 2000t capacity barge (Fig. 18). Due
Fig. 17: Metro accidents at Delhi Left : Zamradpur, to perhaps un-envisaged leakage in the barge,
Right : Lamnagar East Delhi. the entire arrangement started sinking which

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 19

had to be salvaged. During 2nd Hooghly Bridge of the joint of suspender bars which had been
pylon (Fig.18) erection a derrick was installed in prescribed as part of the design for suspension
the middle of a trussed beam could be slewed of the deck of the FOB with the main arch. As
to left or right alternatively to add segments to per the report, the cause of the collapse could
the pylons. It was located by winches at each be asymmetrical loading more than permissible
end of the beam: one winch was pulled and level which resulted into overstressing of joint
the other released. By mistake the operator set connecting the deck slab with the suspenders
both winches to pull. This resulted in a built up that were imported from UK. The report further
of tension, which tore out the trussing ties and said that detailed design of the suspender with
caused the support beam to buckle, fortunately the deck of the FOB in terms of asymmetric
it remained on its bearings but the derrick had to loading and rotation of the gusset plate was not
be replaced. done.
Under Construction Bridge across river Chambal
on Kota bypass (Fig. 20) collapse in December
2009 was most incredible and bizarre failure
during construction. As reported in media during
the free cantilever cast in situ construction of
the cable stay bridge, cantilever decking started
drooping and simultaneously the pylon started
tilting towards the river. The form traveler was
seen to sag towards downstream side.The pylon
and cantilever arm continued to sag till form
Fig. 19 : CWG Foot Over Bridge Collapse at Delhi traveler hit the ground. The back span which
was providing counterweight for free cantilever
During the preparation of common wealth games construction was catapulted 100 m away from its
in Delhi, a foot over bridge (Fig. 19) of 95 meter original position.
which was supposed to be a show piece in
There are alarming trend of under construction
front of Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium collapsed
bridge collapses in last 3 years (Fig. 21)
during construction. At that time reason was
like; 98-metre long under construction bridge
said to be the wrong orientation of gusset plates
collapse over a stream of Baghmati and Lakhani
during erection. However probe committee
rivers in Muzaffarpur district of Bihar, the bridge
later attributed the failure to the methodology of
connecting Uri town to Kamalkote near the Line of
construction adopted to complete the job in hurry
Control in Baramulla, 100 kms from Srinagar and
under construction bridge over the Alaknanda
river in Uttarakhand's Pauri Garhwal District.

Fig. 21 : Under
Construction Bridge
Collapses in last 3 years
Top left : Bridge at Bihar
Top right : Bridge at
Fig. 20 : View of collapsed Kota Bridge at Chambal
Srinagar Bottom : Bridge
at Uttarakhand
for common wealth games. The probe panel
said the collapse took place because of failure After having served its lifetime of more than

20 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

100 years, perhaps due to poor maintenance specialists of other disciplines, supervisors, etc.
ironically some of the bridges collapsed in last is crucial for the success of safety and economy.
3 years adding to the talley of number of bridge
collapses in the last decade (Fig. 22). Among 3. Failures due to Inability to Visualize
them note worthy are the 110-year-old bridge Accident Scenario
collapsed today at Sadhupul near Kandaghat, The series of accidents in the very near past
a culvert bridge along the Dharavi 60-ft road at of last decade were attributed mainly to design
Mumbai and The 120-year-old Cochin Bridge deficiencies among the other reasons by
which connected Shoranur Municipality in investigation committees that are somewhat an
Palakkad district with Vallathol Nagar panchayat alarming trend. Among the other reasons failure
in Thrissur district due to inability of structural engineers during
design stage to visualise accident scenario
appear to be the major cause for accidents in
these spectacular bridge failures. Other reasons
are:
Improper selection of the designers and
absence of 3rd party checking
In adequate time and resource allocation for
Fig. 22 : Bridge collapses
After Service Life of 100
completion of design ( Haste in design due to
years in last 3 years project completion pressures )
Top left : At Kandaghat Changes in the design concept and change
Top right : At Dharavi of designers
Bottom : At Cochin
Absence of robustness in the design
The natural calamities like earthquake to the Complex structures and analysis rather than
tune of 8 on Richter scale in Gujarat and recent simplicity in design
earthquake by product Tsunami are the biggest
Extrapolation in design assumptions
obstacles in the path of national development.
neglecting scale effects
It has been widely reported that most of the
disasters during Bhuj earthquake is due to the Reliance on computers & soft wares for
non-adherence of the applicable standards for analysis, design and detailing without
earthquake resistance in terms of designing, experience
detailing and construction. Unconstructive design

Safety is not the exclusive realm of structural

designer. The decisions on the structural safety
shall be made during the planning stage itself,
ideally by qualitative evaluation of hazard scenario
including the efforts of imagination especially for
natural hazards. The hazards can be avoided
by changes in the overall design and location,
can be mitigated by measures of management,
supervision and auxiliary technical devices, can
be overcome by general robustness provision
and also can be accepted as inevitable. The
best recourse is well-balanced combination of
the above that is termed as “Safety Plan”. While
the structural designer plays an important role in
laying down the “Safety Plan”, the communication Fig. 23 : Over Toppling of a Curved Span for a
of the same in common language to managers, Flyover in Surat

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 21

3.1 Structural Safety and Verification glance what the safety values are in the parts of
the structure and for the stages of construction
In Surat Flyover collapse the curved span with
which are most at risk. Such summary requires
a very small radius of curvature was simply
mastery of the unique structural behaviour and
supported and the span was designed as straight
forces the experienced engineer to think through
span with the bearings layout to suit straight
the structural calculation separating the vital
span as reported in newspaper (Fig. 23) as per
from the secondary. It is hard to imagine that
the investigation committee report. Due to the
the basic stability calculation would have been
facts of the case as reported in the media, the
omitted in the present case and in the case of
bridge failure in question belongs to the category
Ultadanga flyover collapse in Kolkata (Fig. 24)
of accidents caused by an oversight arising
if such a summary had been in existence and
out of an experience, by neglecting to perform
proof checking by 3rd party had been carried out.
important calculations, i.e. in the widest sense
In case of Ultadanga flyover, it is said that the
by calculation errors. It is not that there are never
designed bearings were misplaced in their layout
calculation errors, but the fact is that they have
leading to toppling of the span during traffic, if
rarely led to the failure of a structure is because
so the construction management is also equally
tension and bending members imbibe so much
responsible for not visualising the scenario of
“Factor of Safeties” not taken into account
accident by wrong positioning of bearings.
when the degree of safety is calculated that
the structure can cater for calculation errors of 3.2 Consequences and Risks of Computer ‘Cut
even up to 100% under certain conditions. This and Paste’
is quite different in a number of stability cases
concerning the areas of buckling, overturning Normally metro line passes through the
and lateral torsional buckling, as demonstrated meandering existing road and the alignment
again and again by structural failures. Here the warrants regular, portal and cantilever piers
“Factor of Safeties” is minimal and sometimes depending upon the positioning of the piers
non-existent; with the result the calculated factor (Fig. 25). While arriving from Delhi airport to the
of safety suggests a limit load that is too high. town,
Though our structural calculations over the last
decade have become very much extensive,one
is afraid that the engineer can no longer see the
interplay of forces vital for the structure because
of all the secondary stress values. The failure
can be avoided by providing for every structural
calculation, or at least those which exceed a certain

Fig. 25 : Various Configuration of Piers for Metro

Construction Depending Upon Alignment

one can see series of cantilever piers

(Fig. 26) which are jacketed making it look bulkier.
Following an accident involving a cantilever pier
many of the piers had to be jacketed to reduce the
Fig. 24 : Over toppling of a Curved Span for cantilever effect in metro construction that were
Ultadanga Flyover at Kolkata executed by various contractors and designed by
different consultants. It is ironical that so many
number of pages, with a very clear summary of consultants could be making same mistakes.
the calculation. This summary should give at a These cantilever piers had to be jacketed as

22 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

there were detailing deficiencies at the junction having certain rotational capacity as shown in the
of the pier cap and pier in terms of continuity of Fig 28. During the construction, naturally the
moment transfer. The same mistake made by so deck supported on free spherical bearings need
many consultants clearly indicate that the use to be restrained for translation as well as rotation.
of computers and cut and paste culture could Here it is incumbent on the designer to ensure
create havoc by repetition of originally deficient the robustness by visualising various accident
detailing by cut and paste later by others using scenarios.
computers. Every structural engineer welcomes
The possibility of failure of rotational &
the fact that the use of computers makes his work
translational restraints provided due to
much easier and uses them. As with many of the
unexpected loads
blessings of technology, the advantages and the
dangers inherent in computers are only divided The mechanical failure of form traveller during
by a very thin line as could be demonstrated in concreting and consequence on stability
this case. The designer should weigh the possibility of
avoiding the free spherical bearings to support
the pylon integrated decking as it is difficult to
evaluate the forces for which the restraints
have to be designed as there could be always
unforeseen forces in such constructions. It is to
be noted that for whatever the reasons, if these
restraints fail during construction the catastrophe
will be unimaginable. It is always possible to
integrate the deck with pier increasing the
robustness.

Fig. 26 : Left : Before Jacketing Right : After

Jacketing

3.3 Lack of Robustness in design

Robustness in the design is the ability to visualise
permutation and combination of accident scenario
and catering for the same and which is very much
essential for the design of safe structures.It is
a questionhere of an unwillingness to consider
unscheduled and unlikely actions, which
cannot be completely ruled out or of keeping Fig. 27 : Free Cantilever Construction of a Cable
the damaging effects of incalculable actions to Stay Bridge with Pylon Integrated with Deck
a tolerable limit at reasonable cost. This also
could be a chain reaction making a small fault Once again it is not very uncommon that during
into a large failure, unless you can afford a fail- cantilever construction, the form traveller fails
safe design, where sufficient residual support is due to mechanical failure. AASHTO specifies
available when one component fails. Robustness that for precast segmental erection, twice
for design is illustrated below by an example. It the weight of moving part of the gantry and
is not very uncommon to conceptualise a central precast segment should be considered as static
single plane cable stay bridge with a pylon equivalent of dynamic force when there is a
integrated to deck adopting free cantilever cast free release of precast segment and traveler.
in situ construction methodology as shown in In case of precast segmental erection, it is
the Fig. 27. Seldom these days is the integrated quite possible that the precast segment being
deck supported by spherical free bearings handled by lifter is suddenly released or freed

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 23

accidentally. Normally such free release without 3.4 The Risk of Extrapolation
imparting impact on cantilever results in dynamic
Joachim Scheer in his book titled ‘Failed
augmentation with the magnitude of lesser
Bridges’1 avers while talking about extrapolation
than or equal to 2 as investigated by different that “enlarging or slenderizing tried and tested
softwares. However, in case of free / balanced designs when the ‘protective cover’ of experience
cast-in-situ cantilever construction as shown in is overstepped, hitherto insignificant influences
Fig. 27, the form traveler is anchored to previous become predominant.” In load-bearing structures,
segment by High Tensile Anchor bars, the cast- the geometric parameters, the dimensions and
in-situ concrete is being poured into formwork or their relationships are decisive for extrapolation,
shuttering as such in case of accidental brittle because one feature of the development of
failure of anchor bars, the free release of form structural engineering was and is the tendency
traveler and green concrete which is not attached towards ever larger and more slender structures.
self-sufficiently to previous segment is highly Innovative structures are more difficult to assign
improbable. This is highly improbable because to a “continuation of relationships beyond the
all the anchor bars cannot fail simultaneously area in which they are defined".
at once as such the release of the weight of
concrete and form traveler is not similar to that In each case of extrapolation one can identify
a situation where, in early examples of the
of sudden release of precast segment from the
structural form, a certain factor was of secondary
lifter.
importance with regard to stability or strength.
With increasing scale, however, this factor
became of primary importance and led to failure.
The accidents happened not because the
engineer neglected to provide sufficient strength
as prescribed by the accepted design approach,
but because of the unwitting introduction of a
new type of behaviour. Up to certain magnitude
of the structure, the secondary effects may not
be so important and don’t govern the design as
such are neglected. However such practice has
Fig. 28 : Pylon Integrated with Deck on Spherical limits of validity up to certain scale of structure.
Bearings
Following a period of successful construction
a designer, perhaps a little complacent simply
In case of cast-in-situ cantilever construction,
extended the design method once too often
where the anchor bars of form traveler don’t fail
leading to failure.
simultaneously, say fail on one side initially, the
formwork and the mass of concrete from that side
starts falling down while the other side of form
traveler is still hanging to the cantilever. Thus
moving mass acts as an impact on the cantilever.
The dynamic augmentation of such impact
is much larger than free release of load from
cantilever. For robust design it is very imperative
for the designer to consider higher dynamic
augmentation due to the fall of form traveler
along with green concrete as one of the failure
scenario. The vulnerability to catastrophe is
further augmented when this higher unexpected
dynamic force acts on the restraints provided Fig. 29 : Launching Truss Failure Due to Lateral
that is not designed for these unforeseen forces. Instability in Roop Narayan Bridge

24 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

The danger of extrapolation can be illustrated by also widened to 1676 mm. Launching completed
the classical beam collapses of Roop Narayan successfully thereafter.
Bridge on National Highway No.6, where the
In his paper “A study of the failures during
span to width ratio 50 followed the depth to width
launching of precast prestressed concrete
ratio of 3 satisfying the IRC codal requirements
beams of the Roop Narayan Bridge on National
for lateral stability. However during the erection,
Highway No. 6”, while deliberating on Guyon’s
the beam collapsed first during erection due
contention that for the beams depth of 5 to 8 ft.,
to lateral instability resulting in the collapse of
the thickness of the flanges should never be less
launching girder along with.
than 0.1 of the depth and width of the flanges
Typical span 54 m consisting of hammerhead should not be less than 0.40 of the depth for
and prestressed concrete suspended span of 46 symmetrical I-beams, Mr. Seetharaman through
m had five precast prestressed beams per span. his investigation concludes that the span to depth
Aluminum launching truss (Fig. 29) of capacity ratio should be 15 and depth to width ratio should
180t was used for launching. The first outer beam be less than 3 for transverse rigidity of precast
launching started in September 1966. During beams. The latest IRC 112 requires investigating
jacking up from rear end trolley for transferring lateral instability of precast bridge girders before
the weight to the launching truss, the beam tilted it becomes a part of the finished bridge system,
& fell sideways breaking into pieces. during casting, transportation and erection. It
Second beam launching started within 15 days, specifies l/300 as casting geometric imperfection
beam was about to be lowered by sand jacks, for unbraced conditions where l = total length
from which it was suspended at that instant a of beam.While carrying out investigation for
member of the link assembly at the front end lateral instability, the 2nd order effects could be
snapped, followed immediately by the snapping neglected on fulfillment of following empirical
of the other end link assembly member. The conditions.
beam thus severed, fell down & crumbled on the
ground.
Third beam launching started in October 1966
moving the Beam forward suspended from the
launching truss, lowering actually started. During
the process of lowering the beam suddenly
cracked at three sections, the four resultant
pieces were hanging upside down, held together
only by the prestressing tendons. Release of
the broken beam from the launching truss was
attempted by severing the sand jack connections.
While the flame cutting was being done at both Fig. 30 : Long PSC Beam Collapses Due to Lateral
ends, one end gave way and struck the ground Instability
I 50
in persistent situations: 0t
first and thereafter the rear end snapped. Due I 0t 50 b h / b 1/ 3
and h/b 2.5
• in persistent situations: be
in persistent situations:
h/b
e
and h/b 2.5
1/ 3 and h/b ≤
to the impact while the beam was still hanging
2.5
from the rear end, the launching truss was badly
I 0t 70
twisted and damaged. • transient :
situations:
I 0t :
70 be h / b 1/ 3 and h/b
≤3.5 be h / b 1/ 3
The failure of the three beams were thoroughly
investigated, the successive failures pointed to a  I0t is the distance between torsional restraints 2
be
design inadequacy of the beam. The beam was be
2 250 ,
d
 h is the total250depth
d
,
of beam in central part of
too slender in the lateral direction, lacking lateral
lot
rigidity. For subsequent operations, the top
flange of T- beams were widened from 914 mm  be is the effective width of compression
100b
2
2
flange 100b to 25b or c
, 
to 1676 mm, already precast beam flanges were to 25b or c
d
,  c
d
c

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 25

 I 0t 70
:
be h / b 1/ 3
I 0t 70
:
The IRC:112 proposes the clear bdistance e h / b 1 / 3to be progressively constructed with the free
between the restraints of 60 be or 250 be ,
2
cantilevering as specified by the designer in the
d construction sequence drawings. There are many
whichever is the lesser, for the lateral stability
instances where the sequence of construction as
2
of simple or continuous beams, where b ‘d’ is specified by the designer is violated due to the
250 e , of the
the effective depth ‘be’ is the breadth d pressures of completing the job early resulting
compression flange of the beam midway between 100bcin disaster.2

to 25bcor , 
restraints. For cantilevers with lateral restraint d
There are numerous cases abroad of large
provided only at the support, the clear distance
number of collapses (Fig. 31) during cantilever
from the free end of the cantilever to face of erection having following primary causes:
2
100bc
the support is limited to 25bc or to 25bcor ,,  Failure of a compression member
d
O

whichever is the lesser. O

Failure of support trestle under cantilever
The above empirical expressions either by O
Failure of a tension member
Guyon, Seetharaman or by IRC: 112 seem to O
Danger through oscillation for cable stayed
be applicable for non-pre stressed beams. The
pre stressed beams have more complexities
O
Failure of bearing cross-beam
due to induced pre stress resulting in locked up O
Failure of temporary pylon
compressive and flexural stresses in beams. As O
Failure of lower flange in compression
such the extrapolating these empirical guidance
to the long prestressed girders may lead to lateral
O
Failure due to not following design procedure
stability problems during casting, transporting O
Failure due to forced correction of bridge
or erection as could be witnessed from long form
prestressed bridge beam collapses in the recent O
Failure due to false configuration of web
times (Fig. 30). stiffeners
3.5 Unscheduled procedure of construction The Kasheli pipeline creek bridge (Fig. 32)3&4 was
being constructed using cantilever construction
In innovative construction especially in case of
method which is normally adopted for long span
cantilever construction and cable supported
railway truss bridges. This method of construction
bridges particular sequence of construction as
is quite popular using crane for handling truss
specified by the designer has to be followed for
members during erection for long span truss
which he would have carried out construction
bridges. In this method during the erection the
stage analysis. For example, for the cable stay
bottom chord comes under compression which
bridge as shown in the Fig. 27, the back spans
otherwise is a tension member during service
have to be cast in advance depending upon the
condition. On the basis of construction stage
analysis, the construction sequence is decided and

Fig. 31 : Top left : Bridge over

the Bluestone River 1949;
failure of Tension Member. Top
right: Friedens Bridge, Frankfurt
over River Main. 1994, Failure
Due to Compression Member.
Bottom: Bridge over Burrard Bay
in Vancouver. 1958, Failure of
Support Trestle Under Cantilever
Fig. 32 : The Collapse of a Truss Bridge During
counterweight requirement and the pylon has Crection Due to Change in Sequence of Construction

26 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer

the bottom transverse bracings are provided method was used to construct superstructure of
to keep the compression member with in its the bridge. The grouted prestressing cables were
slenderness limits to avoid buckling effects. passing through the deck slab at the top of the
However, during the erection the cantilever pier which was the state of the art at that point
span collapsed pulling down the back span of time and not permitted by Indian codes now.
too as it was connected at top through tension The cracks in wearing coats observed in 1975
member during construction. Later, the reason and progressive distress in wearing coat and
for failure was said to be the change in the deck slab observed thereafter until 1986. There
sequence of construction by additional extension were complains in areas under the bridge during
of cantilevering bottom chord over specified in the rains just like roofs leaking in modern RCC
design without transverse bracings to hasten the buildings. The bridge was already under repair in
span erection to fifteen days which was taking January 1986 when a gaping hole was observed
forty five days. in the deck slab somewhere midway along the
bridge length. The corroded pre stressed cables
3.6 Failure in Service Without External Actions were visible. Once the corroded cables snapped
The majority of the bridge accidents during or gave way and some of the concrete segment
service without the external actions are due to came down from one side of the pier, the other
the inadequate durability measures as the state side being unbalanced, topped over along with
of the art technology available at that point of the top portion of the cellular concrete pier.It
time or the lack of maintenance and repairs in was also observed that the corrosion had set in
time after the warning of distress. the construction joints at the successive lifts of
the hollow cellular Piers cast by the jump –form
In his paper ‘Famous bridge failures’ Prof B.P. method. The collapse of one span pulled down
Nansi states that The Mandovi Bridge in Goa the adjacent span as the same was connected
collapsed (Fig. 33)4 in 1986, within 16 years of through deck slab.
the service. The faulty design of the balanced
cantilever bridges was the prime cause for the 4. Conclusions
collapse.
Learning from the experience and recommending
that the others make use of the insight gained
is the very invaluable aspect of education.
However, in the case of accidents as casualties
and related legalities are involved, the real and
primary causes are not presented by those who
have really experienced as such invaluable
experience as a learning tool is wasted quite
often. Notwithstanding the same on the basis
of information available in public domain, the
Fig. 33 : The Mandovi Bridge in Goa collapsed in case illustrations of bridge foundation failures,
1986, after 16 years of the service
accident during construction and in ability to
The investigations carried out by judicial visualise accidents scenario during design
committee headed by justice Rege and high level conception are discussed as in recent years,
case studies have come to be recognised as
technical committee set up by Govt of India as
a source of understanding our present state of
a sequel to Rege commission showed that the
technology and its limitations.
deteriorated parts were either not maintained/
repaired for a long time or were left unattended There is no limitation or legal constraints in
till the collapse. The bridge was constructed adventuring in to ever taller, larger and slimmer
between 1964 and 1970. The segmental structure, where hitherto secondary effects that
balanced cantilever prestressed concrete are generally neglected in the time tested designs

The Bridge and Structural Engineer Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 27

will start governing for such adventurism. Much Wilhelm Ernst & Sohn, Verlagfu¨ r Architektur
improvement of our design concepts in terms und Technische Wissenschaften GmbH
of robustness, extrapolation and durability has & Co. KG, Rotherstraße 21, 10245 Berlin,
been possible from a study of failures; these Germany.
provide an invaluable source of information
2. S.A.Reddi, Geotechnical Problems in
about design limitations. Design is a process of
Bridges – Case Studies, Indian Geotechnical
the anticipation of failure and as such the more
Society, Indore, 5th October 2008.
knowledgeable the designer is about failures,
the more reliable his designs will be. 3. S.A.Reddi, Risk Management & Dispute
Avoidance, CIDC Goa, 14th September 2007.
5. Acknowledgements
4. S.A. Reddi, Major Accidents in Civil
Most of the illustrations in this paper including Engineering Projects, NIA Pune, 31st August
photographs are taken from Prof S.A. Reddi’s 2007.
(Former Deputy Managing Director of Gammon
5. V.N. Heggade, Sustainability Challenges
India Ltd) various presentations. The others
& Opportunities in Bridge Building, Indian
are taken from public domain in the form of
Highways, Vol. 41 No. 5, May 2013, pp 41-
newspaper and Television Reports. Prof Reddi
56.
and newspaper reports are acknowledged to be
the main contributors of this paper. 6. V.N. Heggade, A Vision of Modern Structural
Code of Practice: Bridge Between Code
References Making and Practice, The Bridge & Structural
1. Joachim Scheer, Failed Bridges Case Engineer, Volume 44_Number 2_June 2014.
Studies, Causes and Consequences, 2010 7. Newspapers & TV Reports from Internet.

28 Volume 44 Number 4 December 2014 The Bridge and Structural Engineer