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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------x : CHEVRON CORPORATION, : : Plaintiff, : : v. CASE NO. 11-CV-0691 (LAK) : : STEVEN DONZIGER, et al., : : Defendants. : -------------------------------------x
CHEVRON CORPORATIONS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO ADMIT JOHN W. KEKER PRO HAC VICE
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166-0193 Telephone: 212.351.4000 Facsimile: 212.351.4035 Attorneys for Chevron Corporation
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 1 I. II. III. IV. Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Violated an Order of This Court.................. 1 Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Violated This Courts Local Rules and Individual Practices............................................................................................ 4 Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Filed Frivolous Papers ................................. 4 Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Made Repeated Misrepresentations to This Court........................................................................................ 7 A. B. The Bribery Solicitation Scandal ............................................................................ 7 The Cabrera Fraud .................................................................................................. 9
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 11
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd and modified on appeal, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002)....................................................................................................................... 4 Belue v. Aegon USA, Inc., No. 08-cv-3830-GRA, 2009 WL 2257607 (D.S.C. July 27, 2009) .......................................... 11 Belue v. Aegon USA, Inc., No. 7:08-cv-3830-GRA, 2010 WL 680340 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2010)......................................... 11 E.E.O.C. v. Lockheed Martin, Nos. 05-00479-DAE-LEK, 05-00496-DAE-LEK, 2007 WL 4468658 (D. Haw. Dec. 18, 2007)........................................................................................................................... 10 Erbacci v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ........................................................................................... 10 Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc v. Natl Farmers Org., 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971) .................................................................................................. 2, 3 Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2004) ....................................................................................................... 2 Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1957) ........................................................................................................ 1 United States v. Gutierrez, No. 94 Crim. 565 (LAK), 1994 WL 593773 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1994)............................... 1, 10 Rules Rule 15 of the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges, Southern District ......................................................................................................................... 5 S.D.N.Y. L. Civ. R. 1.6(a) .............................................................................................................. 5 S.D.N.Y. L. Civ. R. 6.1(b) .............................................................................................................. 4
ii
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff Chevron Corporation (Chevron) respectfully submits this opposition to the motion of Elliot Peters to admit John W. Keker pro hac vice to appear in this Court as counsel for Defendant Steven Donziger. This is the first opposition to a motion to admit an attorney pro hac vice that the undersigned has ever filed in 30 years of practice. But the series of contumacious acts that Mr. Keker and his firm, Keker & Van Nest LLP, already have committed in their short time on this case including their intentional defiance of an order of this Court, their violations of the Courts Local Rules and Your Honors Individual Practices, their submission of frivolous court filings, and their repeated misrepresentations that any reasonable pre-filing diligence should have preventedcompels this opposition. Admission pro hac vice is not a right but a privilege, the granting of which rest[s] in the sound discretion of the presiding judge. United States v. Gutierrez, No. 94 Crim. 565 (LAK), 1994 WL 593773, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1994) (Kaplan, J.) (quoting Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957)). The conduct of Mr. Keker and his law firm provides ample grounds to deny him that privilege. However, if in its discretion the Court extends the privilege of pro hac vice admission to Mr. Keker, Chevron respectfully submits that he and his law firm should be admonished to familiarize themselves with the Local Rules, the Individual Practices of this Court, and the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct, and to refrain from further violations going forward. ARGUMENT I. Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Violated an Order of This Court At the February 18, 2011 hearing before this Court on Chevrons application for a preliminary injunction, Mr. Keker requested an opportunity to file briefs and present evidence in opposition to the application on behalf of Donziger, even though the deadline for any such filings had long since passed. Ex. 3 at 2:1225; 79:1013; Ex. 5; see also Dkt. 77 (February 9, 2011
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order setting a February 11, 2011 deadline for opposition papers).1 This Court denied the request in terms that were crystal clear: [H]e had until the date I gave him to file papers. He didnt, its over. The motion is being decided on this record unless I agree to accept something on the appealability and enforceability [of the Ecuadorian judgment] point. . . . The motion is submitted as of this moment except in that respect. Over. Closed. Ex. 3 at 79:1720, 80:45. Thus, by the Courts express ruling, there was to be no brief or other filing from Donziger, except an expert submission on the limited appealability and enforceability issue. But Mr. Keker and his firm went ahead and filed a 35-page brief, an attorney declaration, and 33 supporting exhibits. See Dkts. 137142. That filing alone constitutes intentional disobedience of a direct order of this Court without any attempt whatsoever to comply, and would suffice to support a finding of contempt. See Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 655 (2d Cir. 2004) (listing the requirements for contempt). Indeed, although Mr. Keker and his firm could have moved for leave to file, or at least submitted to this Court a letter renewing their request to file a belated opposition, the firm willfully proceeded to electronically file the documents out of time, without warning, and without permission (making their untimely, improper opposition papers part of the public record), even though expressly directed by this Court not to do so just one week earlier. The Keker firms claim that its willful violation is excused by Donzigers need for an opportunity to respond to Chevrons complaint and application for a preliminary injunction falls flat. See Dkt. 137 at 58. Donziger principally relies on Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc v. Natl Farmers Org., 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971), but the facts in that case are far afield from the situation here. This Court conducted the preliminary injunction hearing 15 days after signing the Order to Show Cause, see Dkt. 4 at 6, and 14 days after Chevron served its motion papers on Donziger, see Dkt. 75 3, 8, 11. By contrast, the preliminary injunction hearing in Marshall
1 Unless otherwise noted, all exhibit references are to the Declaration of Kristen L. Hendricks
in Support of Chevron Corporations Opposition to the Motion to Admit John W. Keker Pro Hac Vice, dated March 5, 2011.
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Durbin Farms was held a week after the filing of the complaint and the preliminary injunction motion, which were only first served on some of the defendants the day before the hearing. See id. at 35455. And at the hearing itself, the plaintiffs introduced 68 new affidavits that had not been attached to their preliminary injunction motion. Id. at 355. Thus, this Court afforded Donziger more than the few days that the court in Marshall Durbin Farms believed would have been necessary for the defendants to adequately prepare for the preliminary injunction hearing. Id. at 358. Moreover, it strains credulity for Donziger to claim some special disability when it comes to securing counsel. Two of Donzigers Ecuadorian co-defendantsor at least the two Lago Agrio plaintiffs (Hugo Gerado Camacho Naranjo and Javier Piaguaje Payaguaje) who have apparently been chosen by that groups lawyers (Patton Boggs LLP and its co-counsel) to appear here as defendants, while the many other Lago Agrio plaintiffs stay away yet continue to be represented by the same lawyers in other, active U.S. litigationhave managed to retain counsel and submit timely responsive papers to this Court. See Dkts. 60, 61, 80, 81, 82. And Donziger himself, backed by money from wealthy investors, including the Burford Group and internetgambling tycoon Russell DeLeon, has significant legal resources at his disposal. In the past he has consulted with or been represented by Gerald Lefcourt, Bruce Kaplan, and Michael Ross, and he has testified that he expects his personal legal fees, at least those incurred in the Section 1782 discovery process, to be covered by the investors as a case expense. See Ex. 4 at 3611:133612:4; 4143:194144:4; 217:12218:18; In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 10mc-00002-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) Dkt. 9. Finally, as part of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs legal team, Donziger has had access to Patton Boggs, Motley Rice LLC, and Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP. The notion that he needs special accommodation to search high and low for counsel outside the Southern District of New York is not credible. And it surely provides no justification for the Keker firm to defy this Courts order.
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II.
Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Violated This Courts Local Rules and Individual Practices The Keker firms decision to file an opposition brief after the deadline for any such filing
not only violated this Courts February 18 ruling, it also violated this Courts Local Rules. See S.D.N.Y. L. Civ. R. 6.1(b) (Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule . . . or unless otherwise ordered by the court in an individual rule or in a direction in a particular case[:] . . . . On all civil motions, petitions, applications, and exceptions other than those [under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 inclusive and 45(c)(3)], and other than petitions for writs of habeas corpus, . . . any opposing affidavits and answering memoranda shall be served within fourteen (14) days after service of the moving papers). The conduct also violated Your Honors Individual Practices, which require that requests for extensions of time be made in writing with copies to all counsel and received in chambers not less than two business days before the scheduled time. Hon. Lewis A. Kaplan Individual Practices at 3, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=judge_info&id=121. The Keker firm made no such request in writing after this Courts February 18 order denying an extension. Nor did it provide all counsel with notice of its intention to file its untimely Opposition. And the firm exceeded the two business day requirement by 16 days. Though it could have sought to comply with this Courts basic requirements, the Keker firm simply ignored them. III. Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Filed Frivolous Papers After filing opposition papers in contravention of this Courts February 18 order, the Keker firm filed a frivolous application to transfer this case to the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, contending that it is related to Aguinda, et al. v. Texaco, et al., 93-cv-07527-JSRa case against Texaco which was dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in 2001. See Dkt. 160 at 12; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 53637 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd and modified on appeal by Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 47273, 480 (2d Cir. 2002). That applicationlike the letter Mr. Keker presented to the Court at the February 18, 2011 hearing, Ex. 5, and the February 8, 2011 letter from Steven Donziger, Ex. 6, which the Keker firms papers parrotis legally baseless and littered with false allegations of judicial bias and misconduct. In 4
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short, it could not have been made for any proper purpose. The Local Rules in this jurisdiction expressly provide: It shall be the continuing duty of each attorney appearing in any civil or criminal case to bring promptly to the attention of the clerk all facts which said attorney believes are relevant to a determination that said case and one or more pending civil or criminal cases should be heard by the same judge, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of judicial effort. S.D.N.Y. L. Civ. R. 1.6(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Rule 15(c) of the Southern Districts Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges states: When a civil case is being filed or removed, the person filing or removing shall disclose on an appropriate form, to be furnished by the Clerks Office, any contention of relatedness. A copy of such form shall be served with the complaint or notice of removal. A case filed or removed and designated as related shall be forwarded to the judge before whom the earlier filed case is then pending who shall accept or reject the case in his or her sole discretion. Rule 15(c) of the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges, Southern District (emphasis added). In addition, Civil Cover Sheet Form JS44C/SDNY, which must be submitted with the complaint, along with a Rule 1.6 Related Case Explanation (all of which Chevron filed together), asks whether counsel claim[s] this case is related to a civil case now pending in S.D.N.Y. Ex. 7 (emphasis added). Chevron disclosed the Donziger Section 1782 action currently pending before this Court, which is related to this action, as explained in the Rule 1.6 Related Case Explanation. See id. Chevron thus fully complied with the rules. It did not list the Aguinda v. Texaco case that was dismissed in 2001 for the simple reason that it was no longer pending. Not to be deterred, however, the Keker firm presses its frivolous application by criticizing Chevron for taking comfort from the fact that Local Civil Rule 1.6, and the civil cover sheet form JS44C/SDNY, only calls [sic] out for the disclosure of related cases that are currently pending. Dkt. 160 at 67. But Chevron takes no comfort from binding rules; it simply follows them. The Keker firms insistence that this case should have been assigned to Judge Rakoff ignores the close relationship between the subject matter of this case and Chevrons Section 1782 proceedings pending before this Court, as well as the marked differences between this case and
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the Aguinda case that was filed against Texaco in 1993 and dismissed in 1996 and again in 2001.2 Moreover, it disregards the fact that, barely a year ago, when the Republic of Ecuador filed an action against Chevron in this District (Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company, No. 09-cv-9958), the case was not assigned to Judge Rakoff as being related to Aguinda v. Texaco within the meaning of the rules. There is another curious aspect to the Keker firms attempt to get this case reassigned to Judge Rakoff. Donziger, the firms client, has openly criticized Judge Rakoff as biased and corrupt, and even appeared on a mandamus petition seeking to force Judge Rakoff to recuse himself from Aguinda v. Texaco because of a supposed appearance of partiality, In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 197, 199 (2d Cir. 2001). Unsurprisingly, that mandamus petition was denied. Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 20607. But that did not stop Donziger from railing afterwards. In the Crude outtakes, Donziger minced no words, calling Judge Rakoff corrupt; totally biased against us; so bad; and a dishonest judge. Exs. 1, 2.3 It is hard to imagine how the Keker firm could have made this application to transfer the case in good faith had it known these facts, and the firms apparent ignorance of them reinforces its lack of due diligence here. Hence, the Keker firms application is even contradicted by its own clienta contradiction that the Keker firm should have discovered with any reasonable investigation. Even more egregious are the baseless allegations of judicial bias and misconduct that Donziger and the Keker firm have now made in this transfer application and related letters. While Chevron will make a comprehensive response in its opposition to this application, it suf2 It is simply not credible for Donziger and his counsel to contend that the long-concluded
Aguinda case that determined only a procedural issue (forum non conveniens) is somehow more related to this civil RICO case than the pending Section 1782 actions through which Chevron has uncovered the evidence of the fraudulent scheme now being prosecuted in this RICO action. 3 It turns out that intimidating the judge off a case is Donzigers modus operandi. He celebrated doing so in his personal notes. See Dkt. 28-9 at DONZ00036281 (I believe we have, via intimidation, put an end to two lawsuitsthe one about the Havoc inspections, and Caminos lawsuit against me.). And he is caught on tape doing so in the Crude outtakes, plotting to falsely claim that the judge in the Camino lawsuit called him a gringo. Ex. 1, 2. Untroubled about whether it was true, Donziger says, Well just make it up. Id.
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fices now to note that the Keker firms insinuations of bias, Dkt. 160 at 12, Appx., and disrespect, id. at 10, are completely unfounded.4 IV. Mr. Keker and His Law Firm Already Have Made Repeated Misrepresentations to This Court Mr. Keker and his firm have demonstrated, in two short weeks, a penchant for misleading and misrepresenting in their signed pleadings. Below are just two examples of this recidivist behavior. A. The Bribery Solicitation Scandal The untimely opposition to Chevrons application for a preliminary injunction asserts that Chevrons hands are anything but clean because, supposedly, in 2009 Chevron participated in an effort to corrupt the system for its own benefit. Dkt. 137 at 30. That assertion is false. Chevron had no involvement in the meetings in which Ecuadorian officials solicited bribes from would-be remediation contractors Diego Borja and Wayne Hansen, some of which Messrs. Borja and Hansen secretly recorded. Contrary to the Keker firms assertion, Mr. Borja was not a Chevron employee, id., although he did perform unrelated logistical services as a contractor. Unbeknownst to Chevron, Mr. Borja met with Carlos Patricio Garcia Ortega, an official within Ecuadors ruling political party, Alianza PAIS, who solicited a bribe$1 million for Judge Juan Nunez, then presiding over the Lago Agrio case, $1 million for the Presidency, and $1 million for the Lago Agrio plaintiffsand Mr. Borja secretly recorded some of their exchanges. See Ex. 8 at 14; see also Exhibit 10 at 6.5 Messrs. Borja and Hansen also met twice with Judge Nunez, first in his chambers in Lago Agrio and then at a Holiday Inn in Quito. He confirmed on tape that there would soon be a huge judgment against Chevron and that remediation contracts would flow thereafter. See Ex. 11 at 19 (Nunez: I am at your service gentlemen); Ex. 12 at 1517, 2834; Ex. 8 at 18; see also Ex. 10 at 6, 1213, 1922.
4 The Keker firms submission of this baseless transfer application also implicates counsels
obligations under New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 5 Garcias assistant at the Alianza PAIS office subsequently emailed to Mr. Borja instructions for wire transferring the solicited bribe to a bank in Galveston, Texas. See Ex. 9.
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Chevron only first learned of these meetings when Borja contacted Chevron and disclosed the recordings. The same cannot be said of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs counsel, who learned almost immediately of these contacts at the time they first occurred in May 2009 apparently from either the judge or their ruling-party political allies. See Ex. 4 at 3110:11 3112:23; Ex. 13. Shortly after Chevron completed its due diligence on Mr. Borja and his recordings, it turned the recordings over to the U.S. Department of Justice and Ecuadorian authorities and publicly disclosed them. After the disclosure, in early September 2009, one of Donzigers Ecuadorian co-counsel, Juan Pablo Saenz, wrote to Donziger and told him that sources at the government tell us theyre actively looking for [those involved in the scandal], to cut their heads off. We should focu[s] on Borja and Hansen, since theyre the Chevron stooges. Correa and his cronies will take care of the rest. Dkt. 30-22. Donziger and his co-conspirators then proceeded to make a series of false public accusations against Chevron, including allegations based on distortions of Mr. Borjas subsequent communications with a fellow Ecuadorian, Santiago Escobar. Mr. Keker and his law firm now recklessly repeat those false allegations, apparently without inquiring into the truth of what they assert. But the Keker firm had ready access through its client, Donziger, to the work and findings of its predecessor counsel on this very issue. Aitan Goelman, a former S.D.N.Y. A.U.S.A. and now partner at Zuckerman Spader LLP, who, along with his partner William Taylor, served as counsel to Donziger and the Lago Agrio plaintiffs regarding this issue, explained to Donziger in a December 2009 memorandum their findings that the Borja-Escobar communications touted by Donziger and his co-conspirators do not discredit Chevron itself, and in fact corroborate them in a couple important respects. Ex. 14 at 2. Mr. Goelman further stated that it seems clear from the tapes that Chevron is telling the truth when they claim not to have instructed Borja to make the first 3 tapes and not to have even known about these conversations until June. . . . And the tapes make it seem that, rather than Chevron setting out to use Borja and Hansen to derail the litigation, Borja and Hansen set out to use Chevron. Id. For the Keker firm to have perpetuated a version of the story that its own client knows
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to be falseand that basic research into Donzigers case records would have refutedshows a fundamental disregard for the duty of candor that it owes to this Court. B. The Cabrera Fraud The untimely opposition papers also contain a bad faith attempt to justify the Cabrera fraud, the details of which are by now well-known. See Dkt. 5 at 1726. Unwilling to abandon the corrupt Lago Agrio scheme, Donziger now uses the Keker firm as his vehicle for vouching for Cabrera and smearing Chevron: Donziger submits that the Aguinde [sic] plaintiffs conduct with respect to Mr. Cabrera was not unlawful and was consistent with custom and practice in Ecuador regarding experts appointed by the courts. See Peters Decl., Ex. 10 (Declaration of Pablo Fajardo Mendoza, filed in Chevron v Stratus, Civ Action 10-CV-00047MSK (D. Colo)). Chevron similarly hired and interacted with numerous experts in connection with the Aguinda litigation in Ecuador. Dkt. 137 at 31. Those assertions are preposterous and could not have been made in good faith. Donziger knows it, and the Keker firm ought to have known it. Chevrons review of Donzigers recently produced hard drives has revealed an April 16, 2010 letter from Donziger to Fellow Counsel, in which Donziger admitted: The traditional Ecuadorian law perspective . . . would hold that . . . all court-appointed experts in Ecuador should be independent. By working so closely with our local counsel and Stratus [Consulting], Cabrera violated his duties to the court. Ex. 15 at 12. Even Donzigers Ecuadorian coconspirators openly warned Donziger in a March 30, 2010 e-mail that the revelation of their collusion with Cabrera would be potentially devastating in Ecuador (apart from destroying the proceeding, all of us, your attorneys, might go to jail). Dkt. 9-6. Moreover, the Keker firms attempt to analogize Chevrons supposed incidental contacts with any other expert to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs wholesale corruption of the global damages expert process is ludicrous. Even attorneys from Patton Boggs, the firm now orchestrating the Lago Agrio plaintiffs enforcement efforts, admonished Donziger that any such attempted comparison would not be legitimate: We are not sure that Pablos attempt to compare what Chevron supposedly did vis 9
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a vis certain experts to what allegedly happened with plaintiffs and Cabrera works. If my understanding of the roles of the various experts described is correct, I dont think the comparison is legitimate. Ex. 16 at 1 (emphasis added). Thus, there is no legitimate comparison of Chevrons alleged incidental contacts with experts performing discrete roles to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs gross misconduct with Cabrera as the courts global damages expert. 6 The Keker firm would have realized that, had it done the diligence required of it before making such misrepresentations to the Court. **** It appears that Defendant Steven Donziger has now found counsel willing to take dictation and repeat anything the client says, no matter how demonstrably false or contrary to law. But that does not mean this Court must endorse the choice, especially given the abuses Mr. Keker and his firm already have committed in just the past two weeks. See E.E.O.C. v. Lockheed Martin, Nos. 05-00479-DAE-LEK, 05-00496-DAE-LEK, 2007 WL 4468658, at *5 (D. Haw. Dec. 18, 2007) ([A] court must balance the defendants interest in retaining counsel of his choice against the publics interest in the prompt, fair and ethical administration of justice. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Keker firm appears willing to advance Donzigers contentions, regardless of the facts, the requirements of applicable local rules, and this Courts orders. In the Southern District of New York, more is required of counsel seeking the privilege of appearing pro hac vice. Gutierrez, 1994 WL 593773 at *2; see also Erbacci v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 482, 48586 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ([B]efore this Court will admit an attorney to practice pro hac vice, this Court must have some reasonable assurance that such attorney is familiar with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules for the Southern District of New York, this Courts Individual
6 Indeed, Donziger wrote to his co-conspirators at the time of Cabreras installation that it was
the seminal moment in the case. See Ex. 17 (The perito [expert] got sworn into after all those visits to the court the 120-[day] clock is ticking, this is huge for us, WE ARE GOING TO END THE TRIAL!!!!!!!). Donziger also admitted, in this same June 13, 2007 email, that pressing the judge to proceed resulted in this victor[ious] appointment. Id. (Congratulations. that visit to the judge last week was a huge help.).
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Rules, and the customs and practices of this Court.); Belue v. Aegon USA, Inc., No. 08-cv-3830GRA, 2009 WL 2257607 (D.S.C. July 29, 2009) (revoking attorneys admissions pro hac vice on the grounds that they filed a dilatory motion for recusal and other bad faith motions and did not know the local rules); Belue v. Aegon USA, Inc., No. 08-cv-3830-GRA, 2010 WL 680340, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2010) (denying a motion for reconsideration) (A district court cannot afford to abrogate its authority to out-of-state attorneys who reside more than seven hundred miles from the courthouse. Attorneys cannot be allowed to fly in, commit violations of the district courts rules, and fly back to their home offices with complete impunity.). By his course of conduct over the past two weeks, Mr. Keker has shown that that privilege should not be extended to him here. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth here, Chevron respectfully requests that the motion to admit John W. Keker pro hac vice be denied. Dated: March 4, 2011 New York, New York Respectfully submitted, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP By:__s/Randy M. Mastro______________ Randy M. Mastro 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166-0193 Telephone: 212.351.4000 Facsimile: 212.351.4035 Scott A. Edelman 2029 Century Park East Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: 310.552.8500 Facsimile: 310.551.8741 Andrea E. Neuman 3161 Michelson Drive Irvine, California 92612 Telephone: 949.451.3800 Facsimile: 949.451.4220
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William E. Thomson 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213.229.7891 Facsimile: 213.229.6891 Attorneys for Chevron Corporation
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