Nation-building

A Key Concept for Peaceful

Conflict Transformation?

Edited by Jochen Hippler

Translated by Barry Stone

Pluto P Press
LONDON • ANN ARBOR, MI
In association with the
Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn

Hippler 00 pre iii 4/5/05 9:23:13 am

 First published in German 2004 as Nation-Building – Ein Schlüsselkonzept für
friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung?, by Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH, Bonn

First published in English 2005 by Pluto Press

345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA
and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

www.plutobooks.com

Published with the support of the German Ministry for Economic

Cooperation and Development.

Copyright © Development and Peace Foundation 2004, 2005

The right of the individual contributors to be identified as the author of

this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 7453 2336 7 hardback

ISBN 0 7453 2335 9 paperback

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 Contents

List of Abbreviations ix
Preface xi

Part I Concepts and Theoretical Aspects of

Nation-building
1. Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and
Nation-building – Terminology and Political Concepts 3
Jochen Hippler
Nation-building: earlier discussions 4
Clarification of the concept 6
Elements of nation-building 7
Nation, state and social mobilisation 10
Nation-building as a concept 13

2. Globalisation and Nation-building –

Not a Contradiction in Terms 15
Rainer Tetzlaff
Globalisation and the contradictory twofold nature of
the international system after 1989 16
Politicisation of cultural differences in the search for
national security 18
Variants of nationalism that actually exist in the
non-European world as reactions to outside rule and
globalisation 20
Second wave of national liberation and the dilemma of
dependence: external sovereignty annuities rather
than national fiscal capacities 22
Conclusion: taking away the underlying poverty and
despair from the furies of nationalism 24

3. Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided

Societies’ 28
Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka
Three models of national unity 29
‘Divided societies’, nation-building and democratic
models 32
Assessment of the models 38

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 vi Nation-building

4. Shaping the Nation – Ideological Aspects of

Nation-building 42
Claudia Derichs
Performance criteria for successful nation-building 43
Centrality and extent 44
Association with other issues on the agenda 46
Connecting with the experiences of target groups 48
Narrative familiarity 49
Flexibility and openness to change 51
Concluding remarks 52

Part II Case Studies

5. Deconstruction of States as an Opportunity for
New Statism? The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 57
Wolfgang Heinrich and Manfred Kulessa
Nation-saving? 57
Sovereignty, legitimacy and statism 58
Construction and deconstruction of states 59
From deconstruction to reconstruction 60
Somalia: a state in deconstruction 61
Reconstruction of the state 63
The example of Somaliland 65
Prospects for Somalia 66
Summary 67
6. Afghanistan: Nation-building in the Shadow of the
Warlords and the ‘War on Terror’ 70
Rangin Dadfar Spanta
The government in Kabul: a fragile structure 70
Economic activities 73
International intervention and state-building in
Afghanistan 74
Destruction of the traditional legitimation of Afghan
society 75
Inadequate approaches by external political players 77
Prospects for conflict management and peace 78
7. Nation-building by Occupation? – The Case of Iraq 81
Jochen Hippler
Kurdish autonomy endeavours 83
Necessity and difficulty of nation-building 84
Washington’s postwar planning 87

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 Contents vii

US occupation policy and nation-building 88

Nation-building through war and occupation? 94

8. Between Self-determination and Multiethnicity –

International Actors and Nation-building in Bosnia
and Kosovo 98
Dušan Reljiç
Interim appraisal of the former Yugoslavia 99
Structure and justification of fragmentation 102
External nation-building as a state of limbo 105
The EU and US as ‘nation-builders’ in the Balkans 106

9. Nigeria: The Oil State and the Crisis of

Nation-building in Africa 111
Cyril I. Obi
Conceptual issues: oil, the state and the nation 114
The Nigerian oil state from a historical perspective 116
The crisis of the Nigerian oil state 117
Prospects for Nigeria and other petro-states in Africa 120

Part III The Politics of Nation-building

10. Between Projectitis and the Formation of
Countervailing Power – NGOs in Nation-building
Processes 125
Jeanette Schade
Nation-building and NGOs in (post-)conflict situations 126
NGOs, reconstruction and nation-building 128
NGOs as part of the markets 128
NGOs, governments and state-building 130
NGOs and national policy objectives 132
Are NGOs essential for nation-building? 133

11. External Nation-building vs Endogenous

Nation-forming – A Development Policy Perspective 137
Ulrike Hopp and Adolf Kloke-Lesch
Nation-building from the development policy viewpoint 140
How does development policy contribute to
nation-forming? 141
Support for nation-forming: examples from
German development activities 142
Development policy support for nation-forming:
risks and open questions 146

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 viii Nation-building

What principles should external support follow? 147

Instead of taking stock – what support does
nation-forming actually need? 149

12. Nation-building: A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation

and Conflict Prevention 151
Helmut van Edig
Objectives, contents and players involved in regional
stabilisation 151
Nation-building: risk and opportunity for regional
stability 153
Options for action 156

13. Nation-building: Possibilities and Limitations of

External Military Contributions 164
Heinz-Uwe Schäfer
World order, terrorism and nation-building 165
Security interests and nation-building 166
On the role of external forces in nation-building 167
Limitations of external military contributions to
nation-building 169
Summary 171
14. Nation-states for Export? Nation-building between
Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and
Development Policy 173
Jochen Hippler
Nation-building from outside? 175
Fundamental problems of imperial nation-building 180
Difficulties and conditions for success in nation-building 183
Starting points for nation-building 185
Summary 188

Notes on the Contributors 191

Index 195

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 List of Abbreviations

ACA Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority

APA Afghanistan Peace Association
AU African Union
CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilisation
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
EAC East African Community
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FES Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Frelimo Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican
Liberation Front)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISAF International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan
KAS Konrad Adenauer Foundation
KDP Kurdish Democratic Party
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO)
LPI Life and Peace Institute, Sweden
MIFTAH Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global
Dialogue and Democracy
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs non-governmental organisations
PUK Patriotic Union Kurdistan
Renamo Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican
National Resistance)
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAP Stabilisation and Association Process
SCIRI Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SEF Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council, Myanmar

ix

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 x Nation-building

SPDC State Peace and Development Council (previously

SLORC), Myanmar
SRP Somalia Rehabilitation Programme
TANU Tanganyika African National Union
TNG transitional national government
UÇK Kosovo Liberation Army
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US United States of America
USDA Union Solidarity and Development Association,
Myanmar
USIP United States Institute of Peace

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 Preface

The conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq and the attempts to establish

new state systems there have caused the term ‘nation-building’ to
become so popular that it is now even used by ministers and heads
of governments. In a time characterised by economic and political
globalisation plus, at the same time, numerous ethnic conflicts,
failing and failed states, humanitarian interventions, peace-keeping
operations and ‘liberal protectorates’ (Ignatieff), the question of
building new nation-states is taking on exceptional importance.
Nation-building has occupied an important place in the debate on
foreign, security and development policy since the failed intervention
in Somalia. Today, the term is used in the context of regional
stabilisation, imperial control, conflict management and prevention,
as well as development policy without its specific meaning being
clarified in each case.
This book hopes to contribute towards broadening and
systematising our understanding of nation-building processes. The
processes of social and political fragmentation and reintegration are
not only of crucial importance for promoting stability in potential
conflict regions; they are also essential for avoiding and overcoming
violent conflict.
The first part of the book is a compilation of chapters dealing with
the general and conceptional problems of nation-building. This is
followed by an analysis of important case examples from Africa, the
Near and Middle East, and the Balkans. The third part then focuses
on questions of dealing with nation-building in political terms.
The editor would like to thank all the authors for their fruitful
and kind cooperation. This book would hardly have been possible
without them and the positive cooperation of the Development
and Peace Foundation (SEF) in Bonn, Germany. My gratitude, in
particular, to Michèle Roth, the Foundation’s Executive Director,
Burkhard Könitzer, and Thomas Siebold. I would also like to thank
the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
for supporting the English edition of this book.

Jochen Hippler
Duisburg, March 2005

xi

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 Part I
Concepts and Theoretical Aspects
of Nation-building

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0-7453-1854-1-14index.qxd 28/04/2005 11:24 Page 208
 1
Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention
and Nation-building – Terminology
and Political Concepts
Jochen Hippler

A large number of foreign policy discussions since the end of the

East–West conflict have been determined by a series of regional
conflicts – in addition to the dissolution and restructuring processes
in the former Eastern bloc. Those that have stood out most include
Iraq (Gulf War 1991, Iraq War 2003), Somalia, the wars during the
breakup of the former Yugoslavia (particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo),
Afghanistan, plus the wars and violent excesses in Africa (Rwanda,
Burundi, Congo, Liberia and others). The perspective had been shifting
since the early 1990s because it was no longer possible to squeeze
each conflict into the simple schema of the Cold War. The internal
causes of conflict came more to the fore, with new modes appearing,
such as culturalistic interpretations (clash of civilisations) or knee-
jerk ascriptions to ‘ethnic’ causes. In addition to other concepts – for
example that of failed states – the term ‘nation-building’ emerged
more and more in the Anglo-Saxon debate, in particular. This was
noticeable in the political discussion, e.g. in the case of former US
Secretary of State Alexander Haig and UN Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali (Haig 1994; UN Chronicle 1994), in the media, e.g. Newsweek
and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ 1994; Newsweek 1994),
as well as in scientific analysis, e.g. through the work of Eriksen
(1993) and Lenhart (1992). At the beginning, there was frequent
discussion concerning the processes and problems of nation-building
or its failure, though the term itself was avoided. In the meantime,
the term has been used more and more, but hardly explained or
addressed in theoretical terms.
In the second half of the 1990s, the term ‘nation-building’ gained
acceptance on a broad front and became a natural part of both the
political and scientific debate. The experience of the international
community in places like Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan and
Iraq made it clear that breakdown of the state and the fragmentation

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 4 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

of societies can trigger violent conflicts or make them insoluble.

Such situations can, in the longer term, cause economic, social
and political development to fail, give rise to major humanitarian
disasters, destabilise entire regions and even turn them into sources of
transnational terrorism – also generally affecting distant countries and
calling Western political objectives into question. It is especially in
these contexts that nation-building is discussed at international level:
either as a preventive political option to avoid the breakup of the
state and social fragmentation, as an alternative to military conflict
management, as part of military interventions or as an element
of post-conflict policies. Accordingly, a policy of nation-building
constitutes a hinge between foreign, development and military policy
for the purpose of preventing or managing violent conflicts, achieving
local and regional stability, and facilitating development.
Nation-building is, however, neither easy nor without problems.
The chances of achieving this objective from the outside are assessed
very differently and often with scepticism; the paths and instruments
to success are frequently unclear and it is questionable in many
instances whether external players will be able to stay the course long
enough in terms of time and financial commitment. External nation-
building can drag outside players into local power struggles from
which they find it very difficult to extricate themselves. Questions of
legality are also difficult to answer in many cases because, although the
principle of non-interference under the UN Charter is often ignored,
it does still exist – and for good reason. Finally, it is frequently not
clear what nation-building is actually supposed to mean.

NATION-BUILDING: EARLIER DISCUSSIONS

‘Nation-building’ is an old term that has already flourished and

declined. Nation-building was a key concept of foreign, security and
development policy in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular. At that
time, it was closely related to the modernisation theories fashionable
during those years, which viewed the development process in the
Third World in terms of catching up with Western models. Societies
were to be ‘modernised’, that is their structures adapted to the
industrialised countries through ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’ societies
being turned into ‘modern’ nation-states, with the European model
implicitly or explicitly intended as the goal.
Nationality and the nation-state were fundamental categories,
with economic and political development regarded as promising

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 Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building 5

success only in this context. In Rivkin’s words (1969:156) relating

to Africa:

Nation-building and economic development ... are twin goals and intimately
related tasks, sharing many of the same problems, confronting many
of the same challenges, and interrelating at many levels of public policy
and practice.

Economic development was perceived to imply a market economy,

and political development a nation-state. Political development as
a component of or prerequisite for economic development was thus
regarded above all as a nation-building process. The two together, that
is accomplishment of the market mechanism and the nation-state,
were regarded as being closely linked and as ‘modernisation’.
It is evident that this view of ‘development’ – modernisation,
nation-state and nation-building – applied European experiences to
the Third World in a rather schematic manner. In some cases, Western
state-building processes were even reappraised in explicit terms in
order to learn lessons for nation-building in the Third World (after
Lipset 1963).
Nation-building also took place in the 1950s and 1960s in the
context of the East–West conflict and constituted a Western strategy
for containing socialism and the Soviet Union in the Third World.
In the same way as other concepts, it was intended to represent an
alternative to the victory of liberation movements and the ‘revolution’.
Looking back, the head of the US development agency USAID, Brian
Atwood (1994:11), summed this up in the following terms:

Thirty years ago, nation building was largely a postcolonial phenomenon,

an ambitious program to help newly independent countries acquire the
institutions, infrastructure, economy, and social cohesion of more advanced
nations. Nation building was a strategic and competitive enterprise, part of the
Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The term ‘nation-building’ almost vanished into oblivion during the

1970s. Compromised by the constant emphasis on it in the Vietnam
War, its association with military strategies and its conceptional link
with markedly brutal political forms of ‘pacifying’ the country, it
became unfashionable both politically and academically. As already
pointed out, it was not until a generation later that it found favour
again by being revived – first more by accident and then systematically

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 6 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

– in the context of complex violent conflicts, especially where these

displayed strong ethnic dimensions or elements of the breakdown
of the state.

CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT

The term ‘nation-building’ is used today in a markedly vague and

inconsistent manner. To simplify matters, we can distinguish between
several uses of the term, which are either directed at the real course,
description or analysis of (past or present) historical-social processes
or are normatively oriented and focus on a system of objectives or
political strategies (Hippler 2002). The two frequently overlap in
day-to-day usage.

• Nation-building is, on the one hand, a process of sociopolitical

development, which ideally – usually over a longer historical time
span – allows initially loosely linked communities to become
a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it.
Such a process can get off the ground as a result of political,
economic, social, cultural and other dynamics. However, it is
not automatic that such nation-building processes will proceed
successfully. They can involve extremely different dimensions
and instruments, such as economic integration, cultural
integration, political centralisation, bureaucratic control,
military conquest or subjugation, creation of common interests,
democratisation and establishment of common citizenship or
repression and acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’.
There have been rather peaceful and particularly bloody
nation-building processes, both in Europe and the Third World.
They are thus not peaceful or conducive to constructive conflict
management per se, nor are they necessarily violent. These
processes combine ‘natural’ developments of an economic,
political or cultural nature which can hardly be controlled by
individual players with strategic decisions and active politics
of key players who incorporate the developments for which
they are not answerable and take advantage of them for
themselves.
• Nation-building can, on the other hand, be a political objective
as well as a strategy for reaching specific political objectives.
Internal or external players strive to create or strengthen a
political and social system constituted under a nation-state

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 Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building 7

where this appears to serve their interests, where it fulfils

particular functional requirements to a greater degree than a
previously existing arrangement, or where it strengthens their
power or weakens that of their opponents.
In such a context, the term ‘nation-building’ has a
programmatic or conceptional character rather than serving
to describe or analyse social and political processes. Either
internal players strive to assert nation-state models of power
or external players pursue the same objective. In both cases,
this can ensue for functional reasons, such as improving social
stability or economic development opportunities, though
also in order to gain dominance and control in the relevant
society. Nation-building can therefore be a development or
imperial strategy depending on the political circumstances and
players concerned.

Both variants of usage of the term ‘nation-building’, that is the

descriptive or analytical vs the normative-strategic, are very
multifaceted and heterogeneous. This is especially evident in the
second form, given that nation-building can be handled very
differently in strategic terms as far as the specific objectives, players,
instruments and results are concerned. For this reason, the two uses of
the term not only imply differing views of the same subject, they also
comprise very different dimensions with regard to the time factor,
mechanisms and results. However, there are certain core elements in
all nation-building processes without which the process could hardly
proceed successfully over the long term.

ELEMENTS OF NATION-BUILDING

A distinction can be drawn between three central elements of

successful nation-building, which are closely interlinked in most
cases: a unifying, persuasive ideology, integration of society and a
functional state apparatus.

• Nation-building will only be successful in the long term if it

stems from an integrative ideology or produces this from a certain
point on. Fundamental restructuring of politics and society
requires special legitimation with regard to justification of
policy as well as social mobilisation for its ends. The different
variations of ‘nationalism’ clearly have to be regarded as the

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 8 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

classic ideology of nation-building – with ‘nationalism’ here

meaning everything ranging from the meaningful development
of a common national identity up to and even including violent
disassociation from other national or ethnic groups. Nation-
building necessarily presupposes the forming of a ‘nation’,
which can, however, be constituted in extremely different
ways. As long as people in a region define themselves primarily
as Pashtuns, Maronites, Bavarians, Yussufzai (a Pashtun tribe),
Ismailites or members of a particular clan, nation-building has
either not been concluded or has failed. The existence of the
respective identities is not in itself the problem but, rather,
their relationship with a ‘national’ identity covering all groups.1
It is quite possible for someone to be a Pakistani or Afghan
and a Pashtun or Shiite at the same time if the two are made
possible ideologically, just as someone can simultaneously be a
Bavarian, Muslim and German. However, as long as the primary
identity and loyalty lies with the tribe, clan or an ethnic or
ethnoreligious group and the ‘national’ identity level remains
subordinate or is missing, a nation-state will continue to be
precarious. It is not absolutely essential, though, for such an
integrating ideology forming the basis for nation-building to
always and automatically be ‘nationally’ oriented. It can also be
replaced by other value and identity models, at least for a time:
constitutional patriotism – ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ – secular
ideologies (for example socialism) or religion can assume the
same function or auxiliary functions. The cases of the founding
of the states of Pakistan and Israel are illustrative in this respect:
when states were founded for the ‘Muslims of India’ and ‘the
Jews’, these originally religious classifications were increasingly
reinterpreted in a ‘national’ way.
• The second prerequisite for a successful nation-building process
involves the integration of a society from the loosely associated
groups that existed previously. Pashtuns, Baluchis and Punjabis
must not only be convinced that they belong to a common
nation, this notion must also be founded in the social reality. To
achieve this, the patterns of communication between the social
groups need to be intensified to the extent that communication
does not principally take place within the groups. Even though
the internal communication of the (ethnic, religious and other)
groups may remain stronger than that between them, a certain
degree of close communication among them is a requirement

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 Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building 9

for successful and enduring nation-building. However, apart

from the political-cultural aspect, there are also practical
requirements for this: nation-building needs a ‘national’
infrastructure. Transport and communication infrastructures,
the development of a ‘national economy’ from regional or local
economic areas, plus nationwide mass media for establishing a
national political and cultural discourse are key variables.
• A crucial component of nation-building is the development of
a functional state apparatus that can actually control its national
territory. This implies, firstly, that the corresponding society
has constituted itself as a political society, which corresponds
to the two processes outlined above, especially the formation
of a common society with its own self-awareness. In this way,
the state becomes the political organisational form of a society
that is able to act – if it did not already exist before playing
a key role in the social integration process. State-building is
a core aspect of successful nation-building. It presupposes
a range of practical capabilities, such as creating a financial
basis for a functioning state apparatus, that is an effective fiscal
system, as well as an organised police and legal system and
an administrative apparatus that are effective and accepted
throughout the country. The state needs loyal personnel that do
not identify primarily with individual social, ethnic or religious
communities but, rather, with the state and the ‘nation’. In
particular, the state apparatus must assert its monopoly of force
over the entire national territory in order to be successful over
the long term.

For successful nation-building, this results, altogether, in a triangle

formed from the highly complex individual elements of state-
building, social integration and ideological legitimation. Certain
components can be provided relatively easily from outside, such
as parts of the infrastructure, while others are very difficult or even
impossible to furnish from outside, as in the case of ideological
nation-building. In the end, however, it is only engagement with
each other, providing mutual strength, that will decide the success or
failure of nation-building. As a rule, external players will consequently
make nation-building easier or harder, but hardly ever be able to force
it or completely prevent it where the internal factors stand in the
way of this.

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 10 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

NATION, STATE AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION

The core political elements of nation-building comprise the nation-

state plus a high level of social mobilisation and political integration.
The state is not the central element solely by virtue of its modern,
nation-state form being one of the most important results of nation-
building; it is also the decisive player for the most part.
Contrary to the view prevailing in Germany since the Age of
German Romanticism that a nation exists a priori and must – or
should – eventually be constituted in a state, most historical processes
have been considerably more complex and frequently even gone in
the opposite direction. ‘Nations’ do not just exist, rather they emerge
like many other social phenomena in a difficult and inconsistent
process – or simply do not. And in most countries, the existence
of a state preceded that of a nation, even in the classic examples of
European nation-states like France and England (Greenfeld 1992).
For merely practical reasons, it was not rare for a state apparatus to
create, intentionally or rather incidentally, a nation corresponding
to itself: the old monarchies were hardly ever based on ethnic or
national borders but, instead, on religious or charismatic legitimation
mechanisms and compulsion. They adopted their later form through
conquest or marriage with other ruling houses and not through any
defined right of self-determination of the nations, which did not yet
exist. And it was only via what were often long historical processes
that the state apparatuses, which were becoming stronger and more
bureaucratic, were able to form a nation from diverse social groups,
e.g. through repression of local rulers, legal regulation of social
relations and the fiscal system increasingly affecting everyone, the
pressure of homogeneity for a common religion and, later, through
nationwide education systems or general military conscription.
In many multiethnic (proto)societies, the impetus for pushing
through social integration and creating a nation-state came and comes
from the state apparatus itself, using methods like material incentives
(financial, economic, public service employment etc.), cultural means
(language policy, education system, policy on religion) or compulsion.
In many cases, there was and is a link between internal and external
causes in this regard, such as the attempt of a weak or rudimentary
government to consolidate its position in its own society (and extend
its tax base or repress local power factors) and to be able to better
overcome foreign policy challenges, especially those of a military
nature. The interest in having a fiscal system independent of the

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 Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building 11

local nobility or warlords plus a well-organised and powerful military

has represented a particularly important impetus for developing and
relegitimising systematised state apparatuses. In this sense, most cases
of nation-building would have been dominated from the top down
rather than the nation-state evolving naturally from society. And,
almost always, this type of state-induced nation-building has given
rise to complex dialectics between the state apparatus and social
groups (as well as between different parts of the state apparatus and
between different social groups).
At the same time, nation-building has always signified a process
of social mobilisation, either from the bottom up or from the top
down. This especially applies to the constituting phase in many
instances. The ideological and political process of the shaping of a
nation implies its members being involved in its politics, with large
numbers of people entering into the political sphere. While politics
– and therefore power – was reserved for a small group or stratum of
privileged persons over long periods of history and the population
was the object of politics, this situation is undergoing fundamental
change. The constitution of a ‘nation’ means that ideologically (in
principle) all its members now first become political subjects instead
of being subservient and tolerant of the politics of the rulers. In
this sense, nation-building takes on a democratic potential because
belonging to the nation is defined by citizenship or common ethnic-
national interests rather than by noble birth or religious position.
The power now no longer lies, at least as far as is claimed, with a king
chosen by the grace of God but, rather, with the newly constituted
society. The fact that it does not necessarily have to exercise what
is in principle its sovereignty in a democratic way and can often be
organised in a clientelistic, elitist and dictatorial manner is most
regrettable, but changes nothing with regard to the legitimatory bond
between power and the ‘nation’, i.e. what is at least claimed to be an
all-inclusive community. Nation-building thus opens up democratic
potential, but not necessarily the door to actual democracy; on the
contrary, power ‘in the name’ of the nation can be more repressive
than feudalism or the doctrine of divine right, not to mention
‘traditional’ forms of rule.
Nation-building therefore makes the members of a nation political
subjects in principle, even if the exercising of participatory rights is
often denied in reality. Nation-building ‘politicises’ the population
into a nation, mobilising broad sections of society in the constituting
process, in particular. This mostly implies specific social prerequisites,

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 12 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

for example presupposing a significant degree of communication

within the society, which is aided, in turn, by a high level of literacy
and appropriate mass and communication media (in certain phases
of history this was the invention of printing and, later, newspapers,
radio and television).
The process of constituting the nation plus the greater participation
of and ability to politically mobilise the population that has become
the ‘nation’ does, however, mean that conflicts previously lying
dormant in the society and which had little chance of being articulated
by virtue of the population being excluded from politics can be
effectively intensified. This is all the more true if the determination
of who actually belongs to the ‘nation’ has not been settled or is
disputed, especially in multiethnic or multireligious societies that
cannot agree on common citizenship as a community criterion. If
belonging to the nation is to be determined according to language,
ethnic origin or religion rather than on the basis of civil equality,
this can easily have two problematic consequences. First, there is
a danger that ethnicising the political discourse in the context of
latent conflicts and social mobilisation will lower the threshold for
violence and trigger violent conflicts which are ethnically structured.
Secondly, such a context transforms the nation-building process:
instead of striving for or achieving the integration of society as a
whole, the alternative then arises of conducting nation-building
either as a repressive project of hegemony by one ethnic group over
others or bringing about a situation of competition between different
nation-building projects conducted by the various ethnic groups.
Both lead to the intensification of existing conflicts and the risk of
these being waged in a violent manner in the future.
Each nation-building process involves the creation of new
political and social structures and mechanisms while overcoming
and destroying old ones at the same time. For this reason, it is always
and necessarily associated with the redistribution of power. Nation-
building has winners and losers in political, economic and social
terms – so it can also be used as a means of obtaining advantages for
one’s own political or social group.
Pushing through a central government where there were
perhaps only regional or local rulers or extensively autonomous
rural communities beforehand and bureaucratically regulating
a political system formerly based on personal ties, clientelistic
relations or charismatic rule are not simply elements of a more
technical ‘modernisation’ of social structures; rather they represent

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 Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building 13

a redistribution of power which is perceived as positive by some

groups and as a threat by others. Nation-building is thus always
a contentious process, fought out in a political, cultural, social,
economic or military setting. As soon as a society in this situation is
divided in ethnic or religious terms besides the economic, social and
other lines of conflict, a further dimension is added to the existing
potential for conflict, which can then intensify the course of the
conflict as well as give it a completely new structure. Distribution and
power conflicts can, for example, be ideologised in an ethnoreligious
way, which further increases the degree of social mobilisation and
makes pragmatic solutions more difficult. This also applies, of course,
to cases where nation-building is attempted principally as a strategy
by external players. Regardless of whether their intentions are of
a humanitarian or imperial nature, in the target country nation-
building has to bring about passive or active resistance and a shift
in the balance of power.

NATION-BUILDING AS A CONCEPT

When nation-building is discussed nowadays as an element of

crisis prevention and a means of post-conflict policies, the general
mechanisms, experiences and problems relating to nation-building
should not be ignored. It goes without saying that stable, functioning
nation-states can, compared with fragmenting societies and failing
states, better provide for the security of their citizens, as well as
social and economic development and regional stability. Cautious
and intelligent policies for supporting nation-building processes
do, therefore, serve a purpose. However, we should guard against
thinking of the concept as a simple solution that can be applied
everywhere regardless of local conditions. The risks and resources
that need to be allocated are just too high (see Hippler, concluding
chapter of this book).
Furthermore, it is not helpful to rid the nation-building concept
of its essence and use it merely as a collective category for all non-
military political instruments or as a synonym for peace-keeping,
which is what frequently happens. The process of integration or
fragmentation of societies and states is too important a matter
in foreign, development and peace policy terms for it to be lost
sight of through schematic usages of the term. As presently used,
‘nation-building’ can be a euphemism for imperial control, an empty
entreaty formula to conceal one’s own helplessness or a key concept

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 14 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

of development policy and crisis prevention. In the latter case, it is

however necessary to give the term meaning, be aware of its limitations
and traps, sound out its chances and shape it into a concept that can
be applied. It is for these purposes that the contributors to this book
would like to throw light on a number of background factors and
outline associated problems and suggestions. This first part focuses
on important general conditions and issues, while the second part
looks at current case examples of nation-building. The third and final
part discusses questions of possible political approaches.

NOTE

1. Re the significance and change of political identities, see Hippler (2001).

REFERENCES

Atwood, J. Brian (1994) ‘Nation Building and Crisis Prevention in the Post-
Cold War World’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 11–17.
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1993) ‘A Future-Oriented, Non-Ethnic Nationalism?
– Mauritius as an Exemplary Case’, Ethnos, Vol. 58, pp. 197–221.
FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) (1994) ‘Mit und bald ohne Aristide taumelt
Haiti wieder ins Ungewisse’, FAZ, 16 December 1994, p. 8.
Greenfeld, Liah (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge).
Haig, Alexander M. (1994) ‘Nation Building: A Flawed Approach’, Brown
Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 7–10.
Hippler, Jochen (2001) ‘Kultur und Wissen: Trends und Interdependenzen’, in
Development and Peace Foundation, Globale Trends 2002 – Fakten, Analysen,
Prognosen, ed. by Ingomar Hauchler, Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler
(Frankfurt/M.), pp. 135–55.
Hippler, Jochen (2002) Ethnicity, State, and Nation-Building – Experiences, Policies
and Conceptualization, Manuscript: <www.jochen-hippler.de/Aufsatze/
Nation-Building/nation-building.html>.
Lenhart, Lioba (1992) ‘Indonesien: Die Konzeption einer nationalen Kultur im
Kontext des nation building’, Orientierungen – Zeitschrift zur Kultur Asiens,
special edition on Indonesia, pp. 83–103.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1963) The First New Nation: The United States in
Historical and Comparative Perspective (London).
Newsweek (1994) ‘Can Haiti be Saved? – Nation-Building: Clinton is
Avoiding the Term, but That’s the Job He’s In’, Newsweek, 3 October 1994,
pp. 16ff.
Rivkin, Arnold (1969) Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects (New
Brunswick).
UN Chronicle (1994) published by the United Nations Organization (New
York, June).

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 2
Globalisation and Nation-building –
Not a Contradiction in Terms
Rainer Tetzlaff

Globalisation and nationalism by no means have to be perceived as

distinct opposites or harmonious partners per se. They appear, rather,
as two unequal forces in a global match of interests and identities
which, however, have to be precariously balanced through political
endeavours. It has always been the exclusive mandate of the nation-
state to set frontiers, defend borders and property and increase the
individual’s possibilities of self-development for the good of society;
and there are no indications that it will cease to be able to exercise
this responsibility – though it must adapt to do so. This chapter
therefore supports the thesis that all the current popular talk of the
alleged end of the nation-state in the non-European world has little
foundation and that the disappearance of the national Leviathan
would also not be desirable (Tetzlaff 2001).
What has changed, however, is the claim to exclusivity: the state
can now only perform its core functions in coordination with other
decision-makers, together forming a transnational multilevel system
made up of local, national and global players of state and non-state
provenance (Zürn 1998; Wagner 2001).
What the reaction of national governments or social movements
is to the representatives and influences of globalisation – aggressive
rejection or a more receptive and expectant attitude – will likely
depend on the specific development opportunities and prospects
for the society concerned. There are already considerable differences
in the national discourses conducted by the elites in the domains
of power, education and the economy in the diverse global and
cultural regions regarding their views on what is perceived as the
challenge of globalisation (Tetzlaff 2000). What some see as a
welcome opportunity to assert themselves in terms of international
competition (for example China and South Korea), others find to
be a threat to their own institutions and interests which has to be

15

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 16 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

averted (Hindu nationalism in India or Sharia apologists in Muslim-

Arab states).
Governments and state classes have an important function with
regard to the winners and losers in the globalisation process, even
if only in political-ideological terms in some cases. The regulative
idea of national sovereignty assumes a greater role for postcolonial
societies in which the trauma of colonisation and outside domination
still exists than for the countries of the European Union, for example,
whose national sovereignty has been extended in part to pan-
European levels, thereby making it virtually multilateral.

GLOBALISATION AND THE CONTRADICTORY TWOFOLD NATURE

OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER 1989

At first sight, globalisation and nationalism could appear to be a

logical contradiction: if globalisation, as generally assumed, is an
expression for the removal of national borders (denationalisation)
and the transnational integration of exchange relations, the
emergence or maintaining of sovereign nation-states with fixed
borders and their own identity must then appear anachronistic and
‘inappropriate’. Accordingly, the continued existence of nation-states
would be poorly suited to a transnational global society in which
transcontinental and transcultural migration is very much on the
increase, which is proud of its common international institutions
(such as the International Criminal Court) and which insists on
universally valid values like democracy, the rule of law and human
rights. Would it not be possible in the future for supranational state
structures or transnationally networked societies to completely or
partially replace the classic nation-state in the world outside Europe?
Is the Israeli military historian, Martin van Creveld (1999), perhaps
on the right track with his theory of the impending ‘demise’ of the
nation-state that has evolved over centuries – as a consequence of
the internationalisation of technology and the excessive demands
placed on the national welfare state?
On closer consideration, it quickly becomes evident that such a
linear notion of the development of a global society and its nation-
state elements towards increasing political homogenisation ending
in the forming of one global culture encompassing all nations is
false (Hippler 2001; Wagner 2001). It is not linear progress towards
a specifiable goal (for example a global state) that characterises the
reality of international relations but, much more so, the simultaneity

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 Globalisation and Nation-building 17

of contradictory courses in regionally and culturally different arenas

of world politics which have shown amazing persistence. The
systemic international competitiveness of national production and
accumulation ‘sites’ with an innovative local culture is the central
idea of economic neoliberalism.
There are, naturally enough, winners and losers in a worldwide
market system with its omnipresent global players such as transnational
companies and banks. While the fast-developing Asian countries,
for example, have displayed a positive developmental nationalism, in
states cut off from the substantial profit possibilities of the global
market – those excluded economically from the global society – a
more aggressive nationalism against the ‘unjust’ international world
around them can be expected. Arab nationalism since the founding
of the state of Israel can be cited as a prominent example in this
respect (Kepel 2002).
The attitude towards globalisation differs greatly in regional and
social terms due to the fact that, besides the (desired) acceleration and
intensification of all types of exchange relationships, globalisation
also brings about an (unintended but accepted) polarisation into
rich and poor, which stirs up national aversions to outside influences
and competitors. Breaches perceived as ‘injustices’ can be seen and
experienced more today in a globalised public domain than was
previously the case. Cooperation between national economies, states
and societies, global players and locally established players has led
only very partially to more growth and freedom for those involved,
frequently causing, on the contrary, increasing social inequality and
injustice – which provokes emotional reactions among groups of
losers. ‘Political antidotes’ (Beck 1997) are therefore needed.
The number, duration and ferocity of ‘new wars’ and ethnic
conflicts in Africa and Asia indicate that there is – in the political
sense – no such thing as a global village because villages generally
have public order structures, market policing, a local judge and civil
self-control mechanisms. The international system in its globalised
form is only beginning to become acquainted with mechanisms for
governing beyond what have been classic nation-states for the last
200 years – for example transnational regimes.
The road to an institutionalised rational global domestic policy – and
it is towards this utopia of a non-violent world with civil coexistence
of heterogeneous peoples and cultures on the basis of humanitarian
intervention and just reconciliation of interests that we should be
orientating ourselves – is still a long one. To be successful, it also

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 18 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

needs, above all, national agents to prepare the necessary change

and structure it in a socially acceptable manner, thus legitimising it
to the domestic public.
This theory of the indispensability of the national factor can be
substantiated by the contradictory twofold nature of the international
system. There is already such a close transnational interrelation in
the economic, ecological and scientific-technical respect that we
can rightly speak of a structurally interdependent global economy,
a global risk society (Beck 1997) or a globalised modern age. The ‘One
World’ at the beginning of the twenty-first century is thus becoming
increasingly interlinked through global players from the economic
and scientific domains, which social scientists refer to as ‘structural
interdependence’; at the same time, however, globalisation is, in the
form of rapid socioeconomic change, also giving rise to uprooting at
an individual level as a result of the fragmentation and dissolution
of evolved orders.
This being torn out of one’s roots forces the individual to search for
inner security, which they can find in the cultural-religious or ethnic-
national milieu. These are the two main forms in which identity can
nowadays be found (or invented) as a reaction to globalisation.

POLITICISATION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

IN THE SEARCH FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

In many supposedly ‘postmodern’, ‘postcolonial’ societies, ethnic

awareness, conceptions of the world influenced by ethnic-religious
factors and ethnically determined action by individuals, parties,
groups and movements are a political fact that is to be expected,
especially in view of distribution conflicts and crisis situations.
They have an increasing need to be sure of themselves and have a
secured identity, which is often to be achieved by disassociation from
potential or real rivals. The search for a culturally defined identity
becomes important and elemental in such times.
Generally, such manifestations of political culture act as a social
control mechanism. Ethnicity – first instrumentalised by the European
colonial rulers for purposes of power – still performs orientational
functions in African societies, in particular. On the one hand, it
promises individuals and self-defined ‘we’ groups emotional support
and cognitive orientation, while it can, on the other hand – as a
player acting collectively – release huge potential for violence, as
shown by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for example.

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 Globalisation and Nation-building 19

This was not a spontaneous outburst of collective rage or ethnic

feelings of hatred but, rather, the calculation of a modern elite
encompassing all occupational groups which saw the preservation
of its power jeopardised by the growing ethnopolitical opposition
– including the threat posed by an ethnic minority of exiles in
neighbouring Uganda (the Tutsis). In this existential borderline
situation, it decided on the extreme – the mass murder of brothers,
cousins and neighbours, who were at the same time economic and
political rivals – with the strategy of a collective crime involving as
many players as possible pursued as a perverted act of nation-building.
What is disturbing is that the politically constructed national entity,
which lays claim to a state of its own, can again and again, as a
constructed cultural identity, develop such monstrous importance
for resolving non-ethnic conflicts that cultural differences are
instrumentalised as a ‘political weapon’ by partners in dialogue.
We should bear in mind that ethnically defined identity in
‘postcolonial’ situations may not be underestimated or played
down as an anachronistic relic of the uncivilised premodern age
that will die out in the end but, rather, something to be regarded
as an artificial, non-contingent concomitant in societies torn out of
their foundations by the turbulences of globalisation. The weaker
the traditional nation-state becomes, the greater the chances are
of politicised ethnicity partially taking its place. A development of
this kind towards ethnic segmentation would, in the light of all the
experience gathered so far, proceed in an extremely violent manner
‘since citizenship and ethnicity are two contradictory principles of
democratic political legitimacy’ (Castells 2003:113).
The politicisation of cultural differences by rival groups is a popular
phenomenon nowadays in almost all regions of the world, in
both rich and poor countries, even if the causes are different. The
politicisation of ethnicity or ethnonationalism is only one variant
of the politicisation of cultural differences; another lies in the
politicisation of religious creeds, which can eventually culminate in
fundamentalism. What the two have in common is the difference
between content and form. The instrumentalisation of cultural
difference stems in most cases from the temptation of power-
conscious leaders to justify differences of position in the struggle
for material advantages or for defending ‘inherited privileges’ or to
assert material claims against ‘others’ – that is those less entitled and
less worthy from the viewpoint of the perpetrators.

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 20 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

VARIANTS OF NATIONALISM THAT ACTUALLY EXIST IN THE NON-EUROPEAN

WORLD AS REACTIONS TO OUTSIDE RULE AND GLOBALISATION

Resistance to colonial outside rule was – seen in historical terms

– the context for the emergence of nationalism in the Third World,
beginning with charismatic leaders like Mahatma Gandhi in India and
Sun Yat-sen in China. Invoking the ideal of the French Revolution and
the right of national self-determination proclaimed by US President
Woodrow Wilson back in World War I as a regulatory concept for a
peaceful world of sovereign states, this anti-imperialistic liberational
nationalism also displayed its effect in those places where nations did
not even exist as yet in the sense of a community of common origin
or a politically organised community with a common will (following
European models). National movements led by intellectuals with
experience of the West sufficed to ignite the idea of freedom and
self-determination even among an ethnically fragmented colonial
population. As the foundations were often missing – that is the
transformation of ethnocultural communities, via a common
internal market, into societies based on shared interests and solidarity
facilitated by the state – the nation-states becoming sovereign nations
mostly remained rather weak structures. Only good leadership – as
in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, for example – was able to
transform fictive assertions into reality (Schubert 2000; Castells
2003:267ff.).
Postcolonial nationalism still exists today, appearing in at least
two functional variations as economically inspired developmental
nationalism and as defensive nationalism fed by cultural-religious
factors. In frequent cases, the two have also served to strengthen each
other. Communist China – the biggest nation on Earth – has so far been
the most convincing example of this and, at the same time, the one
with historically the most powerful effect. Gunter Schubert pointed
out that, in post-Maoist China, both the culturally traditionalist
intellectuals and the enlightened, democratic representatives of the
educated elite in modern Chinese nationalism

saw an answer from China to the challenge of the West and unavoidable
national conflicts of interest in the course of globalisation. Nationalism was
to close the ranks of the Chinese behind their state as the champion of the
nation’s fundamental interests. The legitimation of state rule and state action
was, as a rule, confined to a successful modernisation policy, which required
a strong state. (Schubert 2002:253; emphasis in the original)

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 Globalisation and Nation-building 21

One would hardly be mistaken in assuming that this state-based

developmental nationalism was and is regarded as a model by numerous
elitist groups of other Third World countries. However, only a small
number of countries have had the chance of translating this ideal of
the nationally strong developing state into reality. Developmental
nationalism signifies the strategy of a patriotic state class and power
elite to stimulate, consolidate and symbolically legitimise social hopes
and endeavours for a better life for the population in competition
with other populations. It is the special relationship between the
active state and a population which can be mobilised that has made
the great achievements of the developing state in Asia possible.
In its second variation, nationalism appears in the form of mostly
substate, partial defensive nationalism – as a defensive reaction to
disappointed hopes of modernisation, as a protest against economic
exclusion and/or cultural ‘swamping’. It is often associated with a
desperate search for a new cultural identity or reestablishment of
one’s own cultural values and notions of order, with the possibility of
hatred playing a constituent role between ethnic groups – especially
in India and sub-Saharan Africa. In India, for example, a partly
xenophobic, aggressive Hindu nationalism has emerged in the course
of globalisation which has come out against the visible symbols of
globalisation – against multinational companies like Coca-Cola and
Kentucky Fried Chicken.
The most significant reaction worldwide to the ambivalent
challenges of globalisation, starting with European colonialism and
continuing with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, is taking
place in the area of Islamic culture. The only major countermovement
against the globalisation of Western origin has emerged there – an
international ‘cultural struggle’ of major significance in world history
from the viewpoint of many Islamists since 1991.
In the Muslim world, a religiously inspired Islamic fundamentalism
developed after 1967 from the ruins of Nasser-style (socialist) Arab
nationalism which turned away from the classic nationalism of the
individual (Arab) states and attempted to build a new non-national
identity in the Islamic faith – with little prospect of lasting success,
in the view of the French researcher of Islam, Gilles Kepel (though
prior to September 11, 2001). In his book entitled The Black Book of
the Jihad – a crusade by the losers of modernisation conducted against
the presumptuous culture of the West – he interprets the fascination
of Islamism as follows:

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 22 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

The ambiguity of its message, in which both the bearded capitalist and the
person living in the slums can find themselves, makes it easier to spread ...
By promising to restore the just society from the primeval times of Islam
– the state established by the Prophet in Medina – Islamism embodies a
utopia which holds all the more attraction as it opposes regimes that have
gone downhill prematurely through corruption, economic and moral decline,
claim to absolute authority and suppression of basic civil rights – the norm
at that time in the Islamic world. (Kepel 2002:29)

The projection of the unique Islamic religious community still gains

its strength today from the awareness – no doubt further nourished
by the second Iraq war – that, as a Muslim, one is surrounded by a
hostile world.
This overview of the manifestations and historical contexts for the
emergence of nationalism in the non-European world may suffice to
reinforce the belief that neither the nation-state nor nationalism has
been doomed to demise everywhere in the world. Although it may
be that ‘the majority of new states in Asia and Africa present a pitiful
sight’ (Crefeld 1999:365), both the successes and misfortunes of the
postcolonial developing state (up to and including breakdown of the
state) have made us aware of the political significance of national
emotions and yearnings. This theory is also supported by the long-
continued existence of a number of political parties in Africa which
see themselves as a symbol of the nation (for example the TANU
in Tanzania).

SECOND WAVE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AND THE DILEMMA OF

DEPENDENCE: EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY ANNUITIES RATHER THAN
NATIONAL FISCAL CAPACITIES

In conclusion – following the thesis of the national reaction to external

stimuli – an issue needs to be addressed which often poses a major
dilemma for the elites in countries encumbered with high debt levels:
the compulsion to adopt structural adjustment policies imposed by
creditors in order to retain creditworthiness at international level.
Where such compulsion to adapt to international power structures
goes beyond the limit of what can reasonably be expected nationally,
resistance can be anticipated which may take on national forms. There
are not only ‘postnational’ constellations in the globalised world, as
Jürgen Habermas (1998) contended with regard to Europe. We may
even have to reckon with a second wave of national liberation here and

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 Globalisation and Nation-building 23

there. Whereas the first wave of national liberation movements was

directed against colonial foreign rule by the whites and subsequently
towards the realisation of national development utopias, today’s
national protest by established governments is opposed to two
manifestations of global players: to ‘foreign infiltration’ by the ‘white
devils’ in the form of global business enterprises and their political
backers as well as the politically insensitive conditions imposed for
the granting of loans by the Bretton Woods twins, the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It is the latter, in particular, that have caused uproar in very
recent times. The partly concealed, partly publicly stage-managed
national struggle by government elites against a structural adjustment
policy that is perceived as socially unjust or excessively severe and
the pursuance of which is demanded of indebted Third World
governments by the World Bank and the IMF has become a principal
area of conflict in North–South relations. Where economy and reform
measures called for from outside are perceived as national humiliation
in the developing or transitional country (which are often objectively
logical in essence), broad solidarity among the political public against
the external trouble-makers, the ‘neocolonialists’, can be expected.
National honour is supposedly at stake.
On the other hand, the political class in numerous poorer
developing countries in Asia and especially Africa is dependent to a
very great extent on so-called sovereignty annuities – that is donations
from abroad mostly in the context of international development
cooperation, which gives rise to a dilemma regarding what action
should be taken.
The single fact of belonging to the government and being able
to represent the state recognised under international law vis-à-vis
the outside world – regardless of how state power was gained and
is maintained – gives the political class greater leeway for action
to pursue selfish goals. We are therefore confronted in numerous
cases with a ‘national’ sovereignty of the elite supported from outside
– in contrast to a democratically representative form of government
founded on sovereignty of the people.
Any reduction of such annuity payments threatened or actually
enforced as a result of a disagreement with the Bretton Woods
twins can have a politically destabilising effect. In extreme cases, it
can even lead to the collapse of the state – as occurred in the early
1990s in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. If the state budget to be
distributed becomes so small that only sections of the ruling elite

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 24 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

coalition can obtain sinecure and position, there is a threat that the
‘bonding’ which served to integrate the society up to that point in
time will crumble, with the result that the national political class will
disintegrate into a narrow ethnonationalistic section rallying around
the state president and his security apparatus with the remainder
bitterly defending the state’s power, while also fragmenting into
several subnational (ethnic) rebel formations. After the breakdown
of the state’s monopoly of force, there will be ethnic militias and
other forms of privatised force fighting on both sides. Where these
want to capture state power for themselves in order to be in receipt
of and enjoy the state’s sovereignty annuities or are satisfied with
occupying a diamond or gold mine producing foreign exchange
revenues – the national project of the first decades of independence
will have failed. Bringing it back to real life with broadly established
expectations of a better common future is difficult but not impossible,
as in the example of previously successful Mozambique, which is,
with external assistance, recovering from one of Africa’s civil wars
involving the heaviest casualties and now growing together again.
Global players act here as indispensable catalysts and sponsors of
second-phase nation-building.
The prototype of protesting nationalism against unreasonable
international demands is portrayed by the President of Malaysia,
Mahathir bin Mohamad. During the Asian crisis, he defied the
‘recommendations’ of the Bretton Woods institutions, which
would have logically resulted in further impoverishment of the
middle classes. Despite the objections coming from Washington, he
imposed a ban on the export of foreign exchange and stabilised the
economy in a comparatively successful manner by means of foreign
exchange management and foreign trade control. This prestigious
success – which attracted much attention in the specialist literature
(Schubert 2000) – often accompanied by anti-imperialistic rhetoric
in Asia, underlines the importance of governments’ ability to take
action at national level, especially in times of crisis, to intervene
in the socially blind market economy for the benefit of one’s own
national interests.

CONCLUSION: TAKING AWAY THE UNDERLYING POVERTY

AND DESPAIR FROM THE FURIES OF NATIONALISM

Although economic globalisation (in the form of the neoliberal

market and borrowing systems) can, with its opportunities for action

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 Globalisation and Nation-building 25

and existential risks, undermine governments’ options for political

control (especially in relation to foreign trade policy), it does not
displace nationalism as a historically effective social force.
The substantial ongoing successes in the development of Taiwan
and South Korea, Singapore and the People’s Republic of China cannot
be understood without a profound developmental nationalism (with
or without the stimulant of belief in ‘Asian values’). In these cases,
globalisation – that is the politically desired opening-up of world
markets for manufactured Asian products and processed agricultural
goods from selected (pro-Western) countries – has accelerated the
process of economic growth and modernisation steered by the nation-
state. Japan has played a role as a model in this regard, while elitist
political vanguard parties with universally propagated emblems
of national sovereignty have been (and are) the vehicle by which
excessive propagandist developmental nationalism is cultivated.
What is more astonishing is the fact that the national will for self-
assertion does not come to a standstill in the case of economic failures
or even the breakdown of the state. The most recent development on
the former state territory of Zaire (now known again as Congo), whose
raw materials have been fought over by the ‘sovereign’ neighbouring
states of Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, has led to an amazing
will for self-assertion on the part of the Congolese in a number of
regions with high proportions of foreigners (soldiers from Rwanda
and Uganda). However, there have also been conflicting processes
in very recent times with transnational alliances emerging in order
to be able to survive under conditions of war. Nevertheless, this
huge land, which is only weakly integrated, has so far not fallen
apart entirely and the endeavours for national reunification of the
government and regional rebel groups are continuing despite great
difficulties. The prospect of collecting sovereignty and development
aid annuities from abroad may be playing a decisive role, though this
presupposes the restoration of statism. The players involved will, in
this respect, weigh up the anticipated annuity revenues against the
advantages they gain from legal and illegal exports of raw materials
from war zones.
To summarise, it can be said that, in a world with a substantial and
growing disparity of power between states and developing regions as
a result of economic globalisation, national governments are losing
some of the classic type of economic sovereignty (gauged against
their ability to decide autonomously on budget expenditure and
productive investment, as the first postcolonial generation of leaders

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 26 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

was still able to do). Depending on the imperatives of globalisation,

however, new opportunities are also emerging with increasing wealth
for shaping the state in a way that can serve national ambition as a
seedbed. There are at least three core areas that remain the preserve
of the national state and which justify and legitimise its rule both
internally and externally. These are:

• maintaining the state’s monopoly of force and a state under the

rule of law; this is and remains the only interlocutor regarding
the protection of human rights;
• securing international competitiveness of the national location
through infrastructure and education policy measures (transport
systems; human capital) and defensive reactions against
undesirable global market effects;
• reintegration of the weaker members of society and potential
losers of globalisation, the ‘new poor’, into national or regional,
formal or informal economic cycles. The nation-state is and
remains the arena for the struggle to achieve greater social
justice, especially in the face of transnational irritations.

The real problem – as already indicated – can be expected on the part

of those losing out to globalisation. It is therefore to be anticipated
that governments will play the ‘national card’ and employ steered
nationalistic emotions as a political resource where they themselves,
for reasons of holding onto power or because of sheer despair over
ruined development opportunities, see no way out other than to let
loose the furies of nationalism against supposed rivals in order to
realise their own objectives.

REFERENCES

Beck, Ulrich (1997) Was ist Globalisierung? (Frankfurt/M.).

Castells, Manuel (2003) Das Informationszeitalter: Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft,
Kultur, Vol. III: Jahrtausendwende (Opladen).
Creveld, Martin van (1999) Aufstieg und Untergang des Staates (Munich).
Habermas, Jürgen (1998) Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays
(Frankfurt/M.).
Hippler, Jochen (2001) ‘Kultur und Wissen: Trends und Interdependenzen’, in
Development and Peace Foundation, Globale Trends 2002 – Fakten, Analysen,
Prognosen, ed. by Ingomar Hauchler, Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler
(Frankfurt/M.), pp. 135–55.
Kepel, Gilles (2002) Das Schwarzbuch des Dschihad. Aufstieg und Niedergang des
Islamismus (Munich/Zurich).

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 Globalisation and Nation-building 27

Schubert, Gunter (2000) ‘Die Asienkrise als Grenzmarkierung der Globalisie-

rung? Bewertungen aus der Region’, in Rainer Tetzlaff (ed.), Weltkulturen
unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten
(ONE World series of the Development and Peace Foundation No. 9, Bonn),
pp. 120–50.
Schubert, Gunter (2002) Chinas Kampf um die Nation. Dimensionen nationalisti-
schen Denkens in der VR China, Taiwan und Hongkong an der Jahrtausendwende
(IFA, Hamburg).
Tetzlaff, Rainer (ed.) (2000) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen
und Antworten aus den Kontinenten (ONE World series of the Development
and Peace Foundation No. 9, Bonn).
Tetzlaff, Rainer (2001) ‘Ist der fragmentierte Staat in Afrika entbehrlich?
Fragmentierte Gesellschaften zwischen Staatszerfall und sozialer Anomie,
Kriegsherrentum und privater Organisation von Überlebenssicherheit’,
in L. Marfaing and B. Reinwald (eds), Afrikanische Beziehungen (Hamburg/
Berlin/London), pp. 201–28.
Wagner, Bernd (ed.) (2001) Kulturelle Globalisierung. Zwischen Weltkultur und
kultureller Fragmentierung (series of publications by the Hessian Society for
Democracy and Ecology 13, Essen).
Zürn, Michael (1998) Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Globalisierung und
Denationalisierung als Chance (Frankfurt/M.).

Hippler 01 chap01 27 4/5/05 9:23:03 am

 3
Democratisation and Nation-building
in ‘Divided Societies’
Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka1

In the mid 1970s, two processes of global scope began virtually

simultaneously. Numerous countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia
and Europe were caught in the maelstrom of far-reaching political
reforms of the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington 1991). In
aspiring to nation-building, many governments adopted democratic
institutional designs through constitutional reforms. At the same
time, growing civil society movements were giving expression to the
global recognition of democratic values. Since then, working towards
democratic reforms not only has a high degree of legitimacy in the
West; the expectations placed in such reforms are high.
The challenges faced by a large number of countries since that
time include a second global phenomenon, referred to in general
and simplified terms as ‘ethnic conflict’. Whether ethnic conflicts
have only escalated since the 1970s and what is understood by them
is the subject of heated debates. Whatever the case, they attract
worldwide attention in the media, political think-tanks and scientific
research. Ethnicity has become a successful mobilisation formula
and a permanent element of political communication. It would
appear that today’s ethnic leaders can fall back on global experiences
with regard to how ethnic mobilisation should be organised and
political discourse conducted so as to gain public attention and
political ground as well as have themselves invited to negotiations
by governments.
In numerous countries (postsocialist states, Latin America, Southern
Asia), it is becoming apparent that ethnic categories are recognised,
at least in part, as a mode of social integration and ethnic demands
acknowledged as a matter of concern to minorities in the course of
nation-building processes. This normally necessitates far-reaching
institutional reforms and a new conceptualisation of the respective
‘nation’. Ethnic leaders or representatives of minorities are becoming
increasingly involved in the preparation of new constitutions. Many

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 29

of the constitutions adopted in the 1990s now also recognise the

ethnic diversity within the state’s borders in addition to universal
franchise, separation of powers and freedom of information and
assembly. The reforms are intended to overcome ethnic conflicts and
permanently secure peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups.
However, ethnic conflicts can easily erupt in phases of radical
democratic change in particular. The democratic promise of equal
opportunities can encourage the ethnicisation of politics (Wimmer
2002), provoke vehement power struggles for state resources (Hippler,
Chapter 1, this volume; Wimmer 2002) and give rise to the ethnicisation
of political communication (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2001). The supporters of
democratic mobilisation are ethnically and/or according to religious
allegiance of heterogeneous composition in many places, and their
expectations are growing rapidly. The emergence of democracy is
seen by many as a favourable opportunity to convey demands; the
feeling of unjustness is intensifying. Therefore, although democratic
reforms can – as will be shown – contribute towards abating conflicts,
they can also cause them to escalate.

THREE MODELS OF NATIONAL UNITY

While currently in the debates surrounding national unity many

scholars’ attention lies on the potentially centrifugal nature of
minority demands, a number of authors stress that a differentiated
mode of integrating minorities was already inherent in earlier
attempts at nation-building. Indeed, many countries have gone
through three stages in the course of nation-building, that is from
(1) ethnically complex and hierarchically organised state societies to
(2) nations negating their cultural diversity to (3) today’s pluralistic-
egalitarian models, which now conceptualise national unity that
would nevertheless recognise diversity.
A brief examination of these three models can be useful in assessing
the new democratic designs for two reasons: it enables an insight
into the dynamics of the formation of ‘we-groups’ (Elwert 1997)
and, in particular, the mutually dependent processes of nationalist
and ethnic closure. It will also be shown that many of the minority
demands expressed nowadays can be seen as a response to previous
institutional arrangements and are often reactions to past national
structures which have caused ethnic conflicts to flare up. The decisive
character of the democratic forms of organisation applied in the

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 30 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

third model for transforming ethnic conflicts is expressed against

the background of the two previous models.

First model: imperium

The first model sees national unity as an imperium (Gellner 1983).
This type of predemocratic or rudimentarily democratic states
comprised a religiously and culturally distinct population within
the country’s borders with partially semi-autonomous administrative
units and, frequently, a hierarchic order. The class orders, colonial or
caste hierarchies, provided for superordination and subordination,
segregation and a more or less pronounced division of labour.
The legal systems differentiated between groups and ranks. A low
hierarchic status restricted the rights of the collective and excluded
its members from deriving benefits. The continuity of customs,
languages and religions of the sections of the population was,
however, hardly affected.
Whoever ruled, it was their religion that dominated in many
places. Once the religious-cultural framework had been defined, the
rulers were in no way concerned with persuading the population to
adopt their culture or convert to their faith. There was no desire to
create a unified culture or encourage communication among one’s
subjects (Gellner 1983). It was indeed useful to emphasise differences
in order to set oneself apart from the lower ranks.
It is a known fact that such principles of hierarchic order imply
two possibilities. The boundaries between individual groups can – as
in the racism of National Socialism in 1930s and 1940s Germany, the
apartheid system of South Africa or the racial segregation of North
America – be completely sealed off in order to prevent intermixing
or ‘contagion’. On the other hand, hierarchic orders of this type
provide ample scope for distance, religious-cultural autonomy and
– contradictory as this may sound – mutual convergence. This
model made room for ‘integration through difference’ maintained
by hierarchic means.

Second model: culturally homogeneous nation of the modern age

Paradoxically, the implementation of the second, assimilatory model,
which conceived nations as culturally homogeneous entities, divided
the populations in many countries. This political form, shaped by
Western modernity and dominant in a large number of developing
countries in the postcolonial phase was based – though often merely in

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 31

terms of rhetoric – on the modern principles of democracy, citizenship,

sovereignty of the people, rationally organised administration and
politics, equality of all individuals before the law, and guarantees of
status in the welfare state system.
In many countries, the doctrine of neutrality of the state in
relation to religion and culture was interpreted in such a way that
cultural and religious forms of expression were kept away from the
public domain, though this did not apply to the national culture,
to which great importance was attached as a defining characteristic.
The modernisation endeavours in numerous countries ‘of the South’
combined the idea of social progress with redefining the key notions
seen as constituting national unity. The state elites were preoccupied
with the question how the national culture could be shaped to serve
progress. The discourse on modernisation was understood by many as
a catchup development, also in the sense of steered cultural change.
Related to developing countries, it served to focus attention on the
nation-building processes underpinned by regulated norms (cf.
Hippler, Chapter 1, this volume). Communication among society
as a whole was encouraged so as to develop a national force and
strength united in striving for progress.
In most places, the culture of the national elites was declared
the binding culture, while minority cultures and religions deemed
to be backward or even dissident were actively discouraged. The
protagonists of modernisation even predicted that cultural barriers
would disappear anyway with the development of productive forces.
If the maintaining of minority cultures was permitted at all, they
were confined to the private sphere. There was no place for minority
symbols in national representations, with official rhetoric even
occasionally denouncing them as damaging. Minority languages
were systematically ignored, ‘backward’ religious practices derided
and the contribution of minorities to the nation’s history negated.
The thesis forwarded in ethnicity research that ethnicisation
processes can in no way be regarded as retrogressive dynamics steeped
in tradition undermining the modern age has been illustrated by
many examples (Anderson 1996). They should be seen more as the
result of the ethnicisation beginning in the first phase of European
nation-building when national entities were thought of as quasi-
ethnic identities. Subsequently, the mode of nationalistic integration
was professed to be a ‘modern’ script for ethnic mobilisation. Wimmer
(2002) goes even further by contending that, in particular, modern
welfare-state status guarantees became a factor for excluding those

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 32 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

persons and groups not regarded as true members of the nation. It

was thus precisely in the process of democratic development that the
drawbacks of modern nation-building made themselves felt.

Third model: pluricultural2 integration

Exclusion from public representative bodies, pejorative portrayals
of minority cultures, plus obstacles to participating in politics and
administration for members of minorities lacking the necessary
cultural, social or economic capital was, in many countries, turned
into a negative integration matrix against which increasing resistance
started to build up. The ethnicisation of politics, in the course of
attempts to democratise, varied in degree and intensity from country
to country.
Discrimination against and oppression of minorities were
multifarious in the past, and the matters of concern raised by
themselves and their advocates today are correspondingly numerous.
It is, in the first instance, a question of official representations and, in
particular, a matter of enhancing the presence of one’s own culture
in the public sphere. There is also a struggle for recognition of rights
to cultural and religious freedom, which concern both the public
(establishment of buildings of worship) and private (family law)
spheres. Secondly, political representation is demanded and with
it the lowering of barriers preventing members of minorities from
participating in public administration. Thirdly, it is a matter of the
(re)distribution of economic resources and opportunities of access
to public institutions, such as schools. Regions that are, in the main,
ethnically homogeneous demand greater competences in disposing
of locally produced resources.
The constitutions adopted in many countries in the course of
the third wave of democratisation established the ‘multiethnic’ and
‘multilingual’ character of national societies, thus taking account
of cultural and religious diversity. In other countries, members of
minorities and other marginalised groups are making ever more
frequent demands for constitutional recognition of their specific
matters of concern.

‘DIVIDED SOCIETIES’, NATION-BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC MODELS

Ethnic conflicts can prove real tests for countries in which democratic
reforms are just getting going. Demands put forward by ethnic leaders

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 33

put a strain on what are often fragile nation-building processes.

It is extensively recognised, at the same time, that the building
of democracy cannot be achieved without making provisions to
transform ethnic conflicts and safeguard peaceful coexistence between
majorities and minorities. How effective the different models are is,
however, disputed.
Reynolds (2002) speaks of a partially new ‘architecture’ of
democracy consisting of both political and administrative institutions
established to overcome conflict and facilitate peaceful coexistence.
Some of these designs, which have since been adopted de jure in many
countries and implemented with greater or lesser success, represent
important reforms of previous legal and political institutions. The
fact that they normally counteract centralist and/or assimilatory
tendencies produces more scope for ethnically differentiated and
institutional solutions adapted to specific interests. In turning away
from the individualistic-universalistic body of thought of liberalism,
collective categories are once again playing an important role.
A minority of scholars embrace the view that developing democratic
designs is without consequence for the creation of peaceful existence
in ‘divided societies’. Interdisciplinary research dominated by political
science proceeds to an ever-increasing extent from the standpoint
that political institutions influence the logic and effectiveness of
democratic politics. Economic upturn alone does not provide an
adequate basis for democratisation. Guarantees of status would be
required additionally for weak members of society, also under tough
economic conditions. If these were not granted nowadays, it would
have delegitimising effects for the given governments as well as the
international players involved.
In the following, we will concentrate on the most important
democratic innovations for transforming conflicts and securing peace
in ‘divided societies’ – concordance, local representation, federalism and
cultural autonomy.

Concordance
The concordance model allows the representatives of all important
groups to participate in the political decision-making process and
especially in the executive (Lijphart 2002). Instead of the majority
making the decisions, in this model the central issues are settled,
where possible, by consensus and through compromises between
the communities regarded as forming constituent parts of the state.
The model can assume a considerable variety of institutional forms: a

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 34 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

large coalition cabinet made up of ethnic parties (e.g. in the context

of the Malaysian and South African parliamentary systems), a large
coalition cabinet according to quotas (e.g. linguistic, as in Belgium),
quotas corresponding to the percentage allocation of the population
when filling ministerial positions (India), representation of the largest
parties in the executive (e.g. the Swiss Bundesrat (Government) is
made up of the four largest parties, with the cantons they belong to
and, therefore, their language also taken into account when electing
its members (ministers)), or determining the most important posts
in the executive (president, prime minister, speaker of the house of
representatives) according to ethnic and/or religious affiliation (as
in Lebanon and Cyprus) (Lijphart 2002).
Lijphart (2002) sees the most important advantages of this model
in the settling of ethnic differences through the forming of coalitions
and commitment to cooperation between the elites. He stresses that
concordance offers the only option for the minority parties prepared
to form a coalition to take a place in the cabinet and remain in it.
In ‘divided societies’, the potential of the concordance approach
is seen by the relevant literature to be greatest where there is no
strong majority. In contrast, if an ethnic majority leader knows he
has 60 per cent of the population behind him, his willingness to
make political concessions to minority leaders has to be rated as
low (Horowitz 2002). In this constellation he will prefer a majority
system. Majorities and minorities naturally have different interests
in joining together to form a coalition.

Local representation
In some ‘divided societies’ electoral systems are geared in such a way as
to guarantee the broadest and most diverse representation of minorities
possible in the political bodies. The models vary: one provides for
minorities being represented by their ‘own’ representatives, ideally
in proportion to the percentage of the minorities among the overall
population. This can be done by ‘tailoring’ the electoral system
accordingly or through special forms of representation. Another
model is aimed at the political integration of minorities rather than
direct representation.
Well-known examples of electoral systems organised according
to ethnic criteria can be found in Cyprus, India and Fiji. Local
representation has been introduced in several countries – especially
on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but also in China and

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 35

Samoa. Such systems differ, as in the case of concordance, by virtue

of their ‘national character’. In India, for example, there are electoral
quota systems for the so-called ‘scheduled castes’ and ‘scheduled
tribes’. On the island of Cyprus, Great Britain introduced a system of
local representation under which the 50-seat house of representatives
was made up of 35 Greeks and 15 Turks each elected by the members
of their ‘own’ groups. The legislative assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina
comprises equal numbers of locally elected representatives of the
Croatians, Bosnians and Serbs (Ghai 2002).
The advantage of this arrangement is that the matters of concern
and goals of even small minorities can be represented through the
local procedures (though a 3–5 per cent quota normally has to be
exceeded). In the run-up to elections, this system can offer an
incentive for the leadership of ethnic groups to join together. In this
way, minority elites fearing an unfavourable election result can
display their willingness to compromise to smaller groups so as to
form pools of votes (Lijphart 2002). In order to be able to win the
votes of smaller groups, the larger groups must, however, show that
they are receptive to the goals of their smaller counterparts, which
can lead to conflict within their own ranks, causing them to break
up into factions (Horowitz 2002). Minority representatives who join
stronger parties can, on the other hand, adapt to such an extent that
they no longer adequately represent the interests of their own
communities.
The problems of this model are considerable, however. Firstly,
quotas often lead to feelings of resentment, especially – though
not exclusively – on the part of the minorities. Secondly, where
parliamentary seats are distributed in line with local quotas, as in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the parties’ policies are extensively dominated
by narrowly defined ethnic interests, boosting the success of
extremist parties (Ghai 2002). Thirdly, ethnic differences, especially
local prejudices, can be accentuated during the election campaign.
Furthermore, mobilising ethnic votes, which highlights particularistic
objectives, can turn attention away from the interests of society as
a whole. Too little heed is often paid to the common interests of
weak members of minority groups while, fourthly, ethnic elites are
presented with a vehicle for political advancement. Norris (2002)
presents empirical evidence against the thesis according to which
electoral systems based on proportional representation have generated
more support for the political system among ethnic minorities.

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 36 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

Federalism
In the search for institutional designs aimed at transforming ethnic
conflicts, federalist structures are regarded as the best institutional
option. The ideal of federalism is for all regions to have equal power
and authority, with their relationship with the central political
apparatus following identical rules. Still, asymmetric federalist
systems are frequently designed to overcome ethnic conflicts.
Territorial autonomy is an asymmetrical form of federalism and
represents a special case in which one region is favoured vis-à-vis
others. The aim of territorial autonomy is to allow ethnic and other
groups to themselves resolve those matters that are of particular
interest to them, while the interests of society as a whole are managed
at a higher level (Ghai 2002). A special variant of asymmetric
structures are the reservations for indigenous groups in the US,
Canada, Australia and Scandinavia.
The advantages of the federal model lie in democratic participation,
the sharing of sovereignty, greater flexibility in the political decision-
making process and implementation of such decisions, plus the
decentralisation of power. From the multicultural perspective,
there is more scope in federal states for the goals of minorities to be
articulated and more potential for them to be realised. Minorities are
also often said to feel more secure in such a system.
In the multiculturalistic variant of federalism, experts recommend
that the country be divided up into small territorial units to enable
the administrative boundaries to coincide with ethnic boundaries.
In the case of heterogeneous territorial units, the need to make
compromises at a lower administrative level can provide valuable
experience for political socialisation, which encourages people’s
readiness to recognise the political system. In the course of progressive
regionalisation, the federal units can also be integrated at suprastate
level and still remain members of the state (Ghai 2002).
The danger of secession is considered to be one of the problems
of federalism. Where ethnic, religious or linguistic boundaries
coincide with federal administrative units, the granting of partial
autonomy can give rise to demands for greater autonomy. Gurr (1993)
asserts, however, that empirical findings have suggested a different
conclusion, i.e. that regional autonomy provides an effective means
of overcoming regional conflicts, with endeavours towards separatism
tending to be aroused more if partial autonomy is not granted. As
with the other models, territorial divisions carried out along ethnic
lines can, however, exacerbate the drawing of ethnic borders. With

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 37

ethnic intermixing, in contrast, there is a risk of other minorities

being subordinated to the ‘majority minority’.

Cultural autonomy
Cultural autonomy can be an element of territorial autonomy or
be institutionalised on a non-territorial basis (also referred to as
‘corporate autonomy’). In both cases it comprises – as in China and
India, for instance – a range of special provisions that may even differ
within the national context. Cultural autonomy is accomplished
within the framework of local commissions and committees – where
politics is organised locally – as well as in the form of protection
afforded to the collective. In many – for example postsocialist
– countries, cultural committees have been set up to look after the
interests of the various groups. These committees have the authority
to collect taxes from the members and also receive public funds in
many instances. The most important objective of such organisations
is to preserve and strengthen the identity of the respective minorities,
which is why special attention is paid to nurturing language, religion
and customs.
A central constituent of cultural autonomy is what languages are
raised to the standing of official languages, what religions receive
official status and what school curricula content is decided upon.
Legal pluralism is considered an important element, especially in
the area of civil law, which can be regulated under customary or
religious law. The recognition of traditional legal codes in addition
to the dominant legal system can constitute an important measure
for strengthening the rights of minorities. All in all, this approach
helps – according to its advocates – to satisfy the players involved
by enabling them to organise their affairs themselves, which is seen
as conducive to a stable democracy.
Rules and regulations that deny protection of their culture to
those members who do not belong to a minority are the subject of
controversial discussion. A well-known example of this can be found
in Canada with the restrictions imposed vis-à-vis the English language
in Quebec. Internal rules of exclusion are equally controversial, for
example in the case of the Mennonites, who may disinherit children
marrying outside the group. On the other hand, cultural autonomy
is seldom conceptualised as being binding for all members of society.
Conversely, systems whose laws are strongly oriented towards
individualist-universalist models (Germany, Switzerland) grant
special provisions for members of religious or cultural minorities

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 38 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

(for example exemption from swimming classes for female Muslim

pupils) (Barry 2000).
Cultural autonomy models are criticised because they can exacerbate
differences. Traditionalist-autocratic structures that go hand in hand
with cultural autonomy and which deny rights to internal minorities
and women are seen as problematic, with the power of definition
remaining with the traditional elites. The models of cultural autonomy
(like concordance) are considered suitable, at best, for the phase of
de-escalating ethnic conflicts (Horowitz 2002).

ASSESSMENT OF THE MODELS

Although most of the democratic forms of organisation presented

here are not new, they have only recently been applied in a large
number of nation-state contexts. In many places, the implementation
phases are too short to enable adequate evaluation of their success.
What is certain is that the national constellations vary, with the size
of the country, its geographical location, the proportions between
majorities and minorities, their regional distribution, the historical
course of their coexistence and past forms of social integration
possibly exerting a decisive influence. For this reason, it is impossible
to present uniform recipes or best practices that could be reapplied
to other national contexts. Where democratic designs have proved
successful, as in Northern Ireland for instance, these combine different
institutions and practices. Horowitz (2002) points out that in young
democracies like Bulgaria, for example, new state constitutions tend
to be very eclectic and inconsistent, resulting already for this very
reason in a mix of institutions.
The institutional models discussed here are viewed by their
supporters as ways of reducing the potential for conflict. As
Lijphart (2002) stresses, strong cohesion of internal groups and the
drawing of more distinct boundaries do not necessarily lead to an
escalation of conflict. The designs outlined lay claim to counteracting
cultural and religious discrimination. It can therefore be assessed
as something positive that implementation of these designs gives
rise to demands for the recognition of culturally differing forms of
thought, speech, action and measures against exclusion, assimilation
and disparagement.
In the processes of building modern states (cf. the second model),
little scope was left for the shaping and public recognition of cultural
and religious diversity. The ‘tyranny of the majorities’, which was

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 39

underpinned ideologically by state neutrality in matters of culture,

was expressed – among other things – in the majority culture
dominating the minorities. If the assimilatory logics of modernisation
are now rejected, this is based on the insight that the discriminatory
practices with which minorities were confronted in this phase of
nation-building fanned the flames of their readiness for conflict
and are, furthermore, incompatible with democratic principles and
guarantees of status in relation to human rights. Recognition of the
matters of concern of minorities – although not necessarily of the
rights of minorities – within the international community now offers
minorities (or at least their elites) the possibility to upset the balance
of power dominated by majorities.
Our examination shows at the same time that democratic reforms
without any further ethnic mobilisation can even encourage secession
or ethnic segregation. Although institutional reforms outlining group
boundaries can be perfectly justified in democratic terms, they can,
however, run counter to democratisation. It is therefore necessary
to ask to what extent such reforms involve the risk of intensifying
interethnic barriers. The list of questions to be resolved is long:

• Are mutual resentments stirred up (including minority

complexes on the part of the majorities)?
• Are identities in flux reinforced; does this result in compulsion
towards internal homogenisation?
• Are the elites favoured?
• Is political and cultural conservatism encouraged?
• Are the matters of concern of weak members of minorities
marginalised by emphasising ‘ethnic objectives’?
• Are individual rights restricted and is collective pressure to
adapt increased?
• Are internal minorities oppressed, does a male bias emerge?
• Are particularistic goals emphasised while matters concerning
society as a whole are pushed to the bottom of political agendas;
is there a lack of incentives for solidarity among society as a
whole?
• Is the development of an identity ‘in itself’ (formation of ‘we-
groups’) among loosely integrated groups encouraged which
shares ethnic characteristics (Norris 2002)?
• Do leaders of ethnic minorities strive for fragmentation of
political and administrative entities?

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 40 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

In view of the weaknesses of models referred to, which accentuate

group boundaries, and of the not inconsiderable potential for intra-
and interethnic conflict, the role of these models in processes of
democratisation has to be described as ambivalent. Democratic
organisational models that institutionalise ethnic boundaries can
perform important functions in democratisation processes. However,
over the long term they can also undermine the dynamics of
democratisation and interfere with the building of a nation-state.
Antidiscrimination, cultural recognition and incentives for
making political compromises are important achievements of young
democracies in the course of nation-building. Both the settlement
of conflicts and securing a lasting peace require appropriate
institutionalised mechanisms for resolving conflicts. It is questionable,
however, whether mechanisms and models oriented according to
ethnic criteria are the optimum path to take. It would be better,
rather, to strive for the pluricultural integration of the late modern
age, which does not favour ethnic categories in its guarantees of
democratic status over other criteria of oppression or marginalisation.
In the current debates, social conflicts continue to be defined as
‘ethnic’ in a far too sweeping manner. Accordingly, many architects
of nation-building processes search for solutions that take account
of assumed ethnicisation while other legitimate matters of concern
are crossed off the political agenda and kept away from the focus of
global public attention.

NOTES

1. The author thanks Isabelle Werenfels and Markus Kaiser for their very
useful comments and Simone Katter for her word-processing skills.
2. ‘Pluricultural’ refers here to the general perception of cultural-religious
diversity. ‘Multicultural’, in contrast, relates to representative bodies
and institutions that emphasise the collective group identity and ethnic
boundaries.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Benedict (1996) Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins

and Spread of Nationalism (London).
Barry, Brian (2000) Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism
(Cambridge).
Elwert, Georg (1997) ‘Boundaries, Cohesion and Switching. On We-Groups
in Ethnic National and Religious Forms’, in Hans-Rudolf Wicker (ed.),

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 Democratisation and Nation-building in ‘Divided Societies’ 41

Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity. The Struggle for Meaning and Order in
Europe (Oxford/New York), pp. 251–72.
Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism (Oxford).
Ghai, Yash Pal (2002) ‘Constitutional Asymmetries. Communal Representation,
Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy’, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The
Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and
Democracy (New York), pp. 141–70.
Gurr, Ted (1993) Minorities at Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts
(Washington, DC).
Horowitz, Donald L. (2002) ‘Constitutional Design. Proposal versus Processes’,
in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (New York), pp. 15–36.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (Norman, OK).
Lijphart, Arend (2002) ‘The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy’, in Andrew
Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict
Management, and Democracy (New York), pp. 37–54.
Norris, Pippa (2002) ‘Ballots Not Bullets. Testing Consociational Theories
of Ethnic Conflicts, Electoral Systems, and Democratization’, in Andrew
Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict
Management, and Democracy (New York), pp. 206–47.
Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna (1999) ‘Debating the State of the Nation’, in Joanna
Pfaff-Czarnecka, Ashis Nandy, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake and
Edmund T. Gomez, Ethnic Futures. State and Identity in Four Asian Countries
(New Delhi), pp. 41–98.
Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna (2001) ‘Distanzen und Hierarchien. Kampf um
ethnische Symbole in Nepals Öffentlichkeiten’, in Alexander Horstmann
and Günther Schlee (eds), Integration durch Verschiedenheit (Bielefeld),
pp. 235–67.
Reynolds, Andrew (ed.) (2002) The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional
Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy (New York).
Wimmer, Andreas (2002) Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict. Shadows of
Modernity (Cambridge).

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 4
Shaping the Nation –
Ideological Aspects of Nation-building
Claudia Derichs

Understood in neutral terms and without the association of fearful

doctrines of political history, ideologies are systems of thought
and fundamental philosophies that explain the past, present and
future according to certain value models. The notion that a nation
represents something that is fundamentally worth striving for is also
part of the domain of ideology. In the optimum sense of economic
marketing, this ideology has to be presented to the target group that
needs to be convinced and which is supposed to ‘buy’ it. The idea
that seeing themselves collectively as a nation will result in a good
future for all those involved – normally the population of a state
territory and its government – has to be presented to the average
citizen as a product.
Nation-building involves many of the elements seen in an
economic transaction at the ideological level. The main difference,
however, lies in the fact that the product is not physically tangible,
visible or perceptible; rather it comprises ideas that are meant to
appear plausible to the ‘buyers’ and which they should prefer to other
ideas. National cohesion must be a product that clearly surpasses
the idea of separation in a divided state. Delivering the ingredients
for the product design – the recipe for national identity, so to speak
– is essentially the task of the government. It is responsible for
spreading the ‘national’ idea among society because only it has the
possibilities, via the central administrative machinery, to disseminate
its ideas throughout the entire country in a controlled manner – with
the help of the media, of course. It is quite obvious that there are
organisations with competing nation-building recipes aside from
the government. The government must stand its ground against
these by way of better proposals (ingredients), clearly pointing out
that it receives its legitimation precisely from those to whom it is
now submitting its policy. As the representative of the people, the
government can conceive of nation-building as a political mandate.

42

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 Ideological Aspects of Nation-building 43

This chapter examines what (market) criteria the contents of a nation-

building concept presented by the government have to meet in the
ideological production process.
Different historical, economic, social, as well as domestic and
foreign policy conditions apply in each state for initiating, continuing
or concluding a nation-building process.1 Even in clearly ‘established’
nations like France, England and Germany, it is still necessary to
foster the national consciousness via a large number of different
mechanisms of symbolic integration which go far beyond the flag and
national anthem and include economic, sporting, political, historical
and other elements. It is therefore questionable whether and when
we can talk of an actual conclusion of nation-building. Furthermore,
nation-building cannot be analysed by recording ‘the state of the
nation’ at a certain point in time because a nation is a dynamic
phenomenon and is therefore subject to constant change. A review
of the various meanings and implications assumed by the ‘nation’
concept since 1789 – when the Third Estate in France was declared
a nation by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1789) – shows this in a quite
impressive way. What can be examined for different epochs and
different nation-states, however, is the way in which governments
have ‘sold’ the concept of a nation to their respective populations.

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESSFUL NATION-BUILDING

In this respect, I would like to cite particular criteria that permit

such an examination. In order to do this in a systematic rather than
an arbitrary manner, we can borrow from the field of sociology
which, although it does not have any theory on nation-building,
has produced a method of examination known as ‘framing’.2 This
approach can be described as a successful set of aspects that make it
possible to analyse how the convictions of a small group of people can
convince a large number of people through the use of specific courses
of action. Applied to the subject of nation-building, this approach
thus enables an insight into those things that a government should
take into consideration if it wants to convince its people of the need
for a national identity.3
A first step in this direction is to diagnose what already exists or has
been achieved. In many postwar countries – for example Afghanistan
or Iraq – this analysis is a sobering one: what state structures and
institutions do exist are mostly relics from the time that caused
deep wounds and a profound distrust of the state. The diagnosis of

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 44 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

‘confidence in state institutions destroyed’ should, therefore, lead to

the prognosis of a better and more secure future (for all concerned).
And things can only get better and more secure for everyone in terms
of a ‘national’ logic if national cohesion is also guaranteed in times
of crisis. Various quality characteristics are required to translate this
prognosis (prospect for the future) into reality and promote national
cohesion. Not least of all, the population itself has to be motivated
to become involved in creating, supporting and shaping the nation.
The concept of the nation therefore needs to be credible in different
respects. It should

• occupy a central position among the political needs of the target

groups, i.e. the population;
• have adequate scope, i.e. also play a role in the day-to-day life
of the population;
• be linked to important issues on the public agenda, e.g. different
policy areas;
• relate to the experiences of the target groups, e.g. incorporate
traditional forms of social organisation;
• arouse narrative intimacy, i.e. have recourse to a cultural
repertoire (literature, art, rituals, etc.) familiar to the people,
and
• be simultaneously flexible and open to change.

If we remain with our succinct image of ideological nation-building

as an economic transaction, the prognosis that ‘everyone will be
better off’ if there is national cohesion will then become a product
that the government as a vendor will offer to the population as a
selected customer. This is an item that is not always easily available
by virtue of its being a product that requires the cooperation of the
customer before it can be made into ‘what it says on the label’. This
makes nation-building an interactive undertaking in a value-added
process, the end-product of which has a name and vague contours,
but still lacks a specific shape.

CENTRALITY AND EXTENT

A government will not be able to successfully convince its people

if nation-building represents only one – and possibly a secondary
– issue among many others occupying the population’s attention. The
subject of nation-building should, rather, occupy a central position

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 Ideological Aspects of Nation-building 45

in people’s everyday political and social lives; it needs to be present,

and the positive declaration of belief in a nation should be regarded
as a conditio sine qua non for a better future. Applied to multiethnic
states, this means, for example, convincing the population that
material prosperity, inner security and a peaceful future will only
be guaranteed if all ethnic groups contribute towards this and are
treated as equal. A government can support this shaping of awareness
via different policies.
The headwords in this regard are centrality and extent. For a
population, centrality is generally given to the issue that has priority
for the majority of people in the state. The nation is more a marginal
rather than a central theme where different groups in society have
quite different priorities which they cannot associate with the nation
– a good school education for their children for some, more places
for performing religious rituals for others, etc. In associating the
priorities with the concept of the ‘nation’ – a national language
and national cultural studies in the school syllabus, profession to
a national religion, etc. – the issue of nation-building is assigned a
central status.
The conditions to which governments have to adapt differ from state
to state: in a Muslim country, it is not possible to sell pork hamburgers,
no matter how appetising you make the adverts. Analogously, it is of
secondary importance in many developing and threshold countries
whether democracy actually is the most commendable of all political
systems. The strategy of extolling nation-building as a component for
the establishment of democracy will not arouse any burning national
enthusiasm if two thirds of the people of a nation are threatened with
starvation under democratic conditions. Or, to demonstrate this using
an example: the prospect of an effective mine-clearing programme
in Angola, bringing with it the possibility for families of all ethnic
and social origins to farm the land again afterwards – i.e. a national
effort with the government providing the resources – would make a
nation-building programme more meaningful and credible than a
promise to hold democratic elections.
This notion inevitably leads to the aspect of extent. Democracy
is certainly a form of system that is welcomed in many societies
and regarded as desirable for one’s own state. However, the extent
of longing for democracy often ends in the polling booth when
the voters have to decide whether to elect the party that offers
their children a sound school education and their families a secure
income or a party that promises them democratic participation in the

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 46 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

formulation of policies. The phenomenon of single-party dominance

in numerous postcolonial countries provides clear evidence of such
voting behaviour.

ASSOCIATION WITH OTHER ISSUES ON THE AGENDA

Although nation-building can occupy the number one spot on a

government’s political agenda, it can never stand alone, isolated in
that position. The idea of associating ideological nation-building
with areas of policy that can be enriched with ideological factors
suggests itself, given that, in particular, nation-building does not
itself represent an autonomous policy area that can be delimited; it
is, rather, an extensive process that includes a large number of policy
measures and which can come to the fore in quite different policy
areas. Actually establishing this integration with different areas of
policy is something that can be achieved, once again, primarily by
the government and secondarily by the population as players in the
process. A ‘classic’ example of associating nation-building with an
important policy area is education policy. In multiethnic states with
different linguistic groups, the choice of language in which lessons
are taught at state schools is, for example, one of the most important
decisions that a government has to make and which a population
accepts or rejects: either by dismissing this decision through sending
the younger generations to private schools teaching in their mother
tongue (or not sending them to school at all), thus expressing their
disapproval, or by accepting what is offered.
Although the government’s decision to opt for a particular language
as the ‘national language’ will rarely meet with undivided approval,
justifying the choice with arguments that present as few discriminatory
elements as possible and more rationally comprehensible aspects
can help to decrease dissent. East Timor is a prime example of this
problematic choice in that the country decided on two languages,
one of which (Portuguese) is mastered only by the elite in exile and
the other (Tetum) by just a minority of the population. The majority
of the people (brought up in the Indonesian language) are therefore
excluded from official political communication and their frustration
is correspondingly high.4 Determining the national language can
thus be something far-reaching in its extent as it may exclude a
number of social groups from certain forms of participation in the
political process. The Arab States, on the other hand, have introduced
another measure which is evidently more effective. Using modern

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 Ideological Aspects of Nation-building 47

standard Arabic as the lingua franca requires all dialectal and regional
linguistic groups – with Syrian, Egyptian, Maghreb dialects, etc. – to
learn that language. There is no group that speaks standard Arabic
as its native language, with the result that everyone has to make
the effort.
Criteria similar to those for language also apply in education policy
in relation to the religious-ethical canon or for classes in regional and
cultural studies. However, security, economic and social policy are
likewise domains of great importance for the creation of a national
identity. Allowing national defence to rest primarily on the shoulders
of the politically dominant ethnic group would appear to be just as
counterproductive as quota systems which do not do justice to reality
and are therefore preferably circumvented. In Malaysia, for example,
the much-implored quota arrangement quickly led to evasive action.
The rule provides for the ethnic Malays to be given preference for
company licences and business loans. So the more business-minded
ethnic Chinese (more than 30 per cent of the population) simply
looked around for Malay partners who were prepared to hand over
their names but did not want to be bothered with management. The
government’s plan to turn the Malays into efficient entrepreneurs
through privileges came off only in a small number of cases, virtually
making nonsense of the ideology of (economic) equality for all
through the introduction of quotas.
An erroneous strategic decision taken by a government can, as in
this case, be tolerated over the long term and does not inevitably
have to give rise to instability or other harmful consequences. It
can, though, also cause a tragic backlash, as displayed by a different
Malaysian example. The introduction of a favourable quota for
Malays to gain access to state universities produced anything but
the effect intended, with private colleges then recruiting the most
able students denied entry to a state institution because of the quota.
Given that the number of ‘quota free-riders’ is increasing at the state
universities, the stoic retention of the quota system will not serve
national integration in the long run or enhance national ‘brain gain’,
especially with many graduates and academics leaving the country
due to their frustration over the country’s education policy. The
ideology of equality is dictated to government officials in such an
insistent manner in the form of the quota system it has developed
into that all sight is lost of the negative consequences. Examples like
this show that nation-building reaches directly into essential policy

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 48 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

domains of state and institution-building in many areas, with the

result that it cannot be regarded as an isolated task.

CONNECTING WITH THE EXPERIENCES OF TARGET GROUPS

In politics and in the business world, it is considered wise to

‘collect’ those who are to be convinced of something or induced
to do something ‘from where they are’. People with quite different
backgrounds cannot suddenly be inspired by an idea, the sense of
which they cannot grasp. National identity can only appear useful,
meaningful or desirable as an unknown product if it links up with
experiences felt to be positive in the (collective) memory of the target
groups. The experience of togetherness, for instance, is associated
with positive qualities in most societies. The world religions generate
a sense of community by offering everyone equality before God,
common striving for enlightenment or collective feeding of the
faithful as a sensuous, spiritual experience.
In countries where nation-building does not proceed successfully,
governments are mostly regimes without any spiritual strength or
charisma, and opposition movements use this as an opportunity to
fill the gap themselves. This mechanism has been used not only in
Islamic states, which have attracted greater public attention over the
past few decades, but also in Buddhist, Christian, Taoist and Hindu-
oriented countries lacking in national cohesion. In Myanmar, the
opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, is the person on whom Burmese
and members of other ethnic groups alike pin both their spiritual and
political hopes. The military junta there has never had such charisma.
This raises the question of why the junta has paid so little attention
to its Buddhist-dominated neighbour, Thailand.
In Thailand, parties and prime ministers have governed for decades
in the certainty that the monarch (King Bumipol) satisfies the people’s
yearning for spiritual leadership. Integrating the monarchy into
the modern constitutional state with democratic institutions and
thus connecting with the experiences, traditions and customs of
the population can be seen as a strategically expedient measure.
Myanmar, Algeria, China (in relation to Tibet, though also to the
Cultural Revolution) and many other countries are examples of
failed attempts at nation-building with policies detached from the
experiences of the people.
It can rightly be asked what possibilities exist for connecting
with positive experiences if the latter are something that the entire

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 Ideological Aspects of Nation-building 49

population or the majority does not have. What can you connect to in
a country like present-day Iraq with a Shiite majority which endured
particular suffering under the national politics of Saddam Hussein,
leading to exceptionally negative experiences, without discriminating
against the non-Shiites at the same time? One experience with which
all sides can surely associate something positive in this case is, above
all, justice. If justice is accepted as a positive experience, a government
can then convincingly ensure the emergence of a legal system under
which people are treated justly regardless of their ethnic, religious
or cultural affiliations. In ideological terms, the value of justice
confronts the principle of the law of the jungle. Achieving legal
certainty therefore requires a lot of convincing through combined
effort, especially among those who are supposedly stronger. It goes
almost without saying that the media and a large number of creative
non-state players must be given appropriate scope and the possibility
to participate in this regard.

NARRATIVE FAMILIARITY

Political institutions and decision-making procedures are essentially

guided by what is referred to scientifically as rational choice and
appears to be supported by numerous theories – the best-known
example being game theory. However, there is little about a nation
that is ‘rational’. It can, at least, not be institutionalised – i.e. its
existence decided on or its development implemented – on the spot
by a government, because this requires the approval of those who are
to embody the nation in question. A nation emerges as a conceived
community irrationally, as it were, since ‘reason’ would suggest that
each member of society should look after him or herself and accept an
individual or, if need be, particular (cultural, religious, ethnic, social)
identity. A government wanting to sell nation-building as a recipe on
the basis of rational understanding must therefore make a huge effort
to get it across to the population that a national identity is intended
to emerge alongside the identities that already exist (or even replace
them). In brief, it must be able to demonstrate that national identity
can be something very meaningful viewed in rational terms.5
What does a national identity provide according to rational
criteria? At first sight, it does not produce wealth, glory or power
and for those sacrificing themselves for the nation it can actually
mean death. Nevertheless, soldiers of the national armed forces
are presented in all states as those who put their lives at stake to

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 50 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

defend national goals and interests, with such readiness portrayed as

laudable, meaningful and necessary. The fallen soldiers receive praise
posthumously, while power and perhaps even riches are bestowed on
their generals. The essence of this – in reality, ‘irrational’ sacrificial
behaviour being accepted, justified in rational terms (‘security’) and
even deemed worthwhile and desirable by the ‘nations’ affected – lies
in a narrative based on heroism and sacrifice. The narrative turns
irrationality into reason, not least of all in relation to justice, where
desertion, regarded by many perhaps as ‘reasonable and rational’, is
condemned in accordance with rational juridical criteria. Virtually
every culture, religion, literature and art makes use of heroes and
victims (or martyrs). Studying the effect produced by this narrative
is a highly interesting exercise in terms of psychology and ideational
history. Its aura and capacity to arouse national feelings gives it a
great appeal.
Exploiting this narrative and using it to make declaration of support
for the nation into a rational matter (for example via corresponding
legal codifications) is one of the most difficult steps in the process
of providing the ideological interface for nation-building. PR work
and persuasion of this magnitude is not something that can be
done by the vendor, that is the state government, alone. It requires
support from all sections of the population, the support of non-state
players such as intellectuals, non-governmental organisations and
representatives of the media. These are, like the rest of the population,
both the subject and object of nation-building and have to carry the
process in the true sense of our metaphorical image. In this process,
a narrative serves to offer options for action that are familiar to the
target groups. A look at Singapore illustrates this point very clearly:
the extreme economic nationalism which the government there had
tried hard to establish since independence (1965) did not stem from
Adam Smith but, rather, from a narrative very familiar to the ethnic
Chinese – and therefore 90 per cent of the population – i.e. ‘the
Chinese’ as people with good business acumen. The media, schools as
well as private and public education institutions made an important
contribution towards nation-building in Singapore by virtue of their
ability to communicate familiar narratives and incorporate these
into the work of national integration. They performed a central
role as mediator between the government and the population at
large. The most important player, however, was the population itself
which became involved in the economy. One of the most puzzling
examples of unsuccessful nation-building, on the other hand, is South

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 Ideological Aspects of Nation-building 51

Africa under the apartheid regime, where virtually all the narratives
familiar to the majority population were either ignored or degraded
by the government.

FLEXIBILITY AND OPENNESS TO CHANGE

This final aspect is hugely important because a government cannot

control a state in isolation from influences of the international system
or without regard to social, political and economic change internally.
Change is even taking place in a country as cut off from the outside
world as North Korea. The concept of nation-building founded in
the promise of a better future – that is the political programme
for building a nation – must be able to adapt to changes as it will
otherwise lose its credibility and the motivation to work together in
establishing a national identity will rapidly diminish. Theory refers
in this context to ‘bridging’, that is building bridges between the
government’s political agenda and the potentially new ideational
needs of society. One example of the success and, to a considerably
more frequent extent, lack of success of bridging is the wave of
Islamisation that has taken place since the 1970s in virtually all
entirely or mainly Muslim societies. A number of states, including
Malaysia, managed to integrate Islamisation and nation-building
comparatively well, with Islamisation becoming embedded in the
modernisation process to such an extent that no dichotomy arose
between Islam and the modern age in the first place. Other countries,
for example Algeria, triggered a complete erosion of confidence in the
government by repressing the desire of society for a stronger Islamic
identity. The protestation that such repression was ‘in the national
interest’ was not very convincing.
A final but no less important criterion for the observations made
here involves the possibility of also completely transforming the
ideological framework of the ‘nation’ concept if need be – referred to
as ‘frame extension’ in theoretical terminology. One example of non-
transformation in this context is the case of Iran after 1979. While
the population placed its confidence in the mullah government
during and after the Islamic revolution with hopes of national
prosperity being distributed more fairly and a ‘better future for the
entire nation’, their expectations were not, however, fulfilled. Up
to now, the ruling mullahs have still not been able to establish a
political and ideological system with which the vast majority of the
population (including those Iranians living in exile) can identify.

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 52 Concepts and Theoretical Analyses of Nation-building

The different national leaders since Khomeini have not found any
way of fundamentally transforming a system which is meeting with
increasing disapproval. Although this has strengthened national
awareness within the population ex negativo (‘together against the
government’), no common (national) identity of the clerics and
society at large has emerged. The protests held in summer 2003
emphasised this point once again.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The ability to sell the product ‘nation’ successfully depends on

several ‘comparative cost benefits’. A government which has not yet
discredited itself through breach of trust or confidence has advantages
over a government that has already ‘cheated’ its people on different
occasions. It has to invest less in the credibility factor because it has
not yet amassed any liabilities in this respect. To that extent, the
chances for the implementation of successful nation-building were
not at all bad in a large number of postcolonial countries at the time
of attaining independence. Even though the national borders had
been determined and arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers, it
was possible for an attractive and plausible concept of a nation to
bring about the integration of different ethnic groups and cultural
communities within those borders. Especially in those places where
independence was preceded by a struggle for liberation there were
hopes of a new beginning with a high degree of motivation to
strengthen the national identity and self-assertion (‘resilience’).
However, the situation was and is different in countries whose
populations have never yet had a genuine interest in forming a nation
within the given territorial borders but have, on the contrary, been
burdened for many years by fierce conflicts within their respective
societies, even including civil war in some cases. The latter is true,
unfortunately, for the majority of countries in which the nation-
building process has proved extremely difficult up to the present
time – if it is taking place at all. Orienting a nation-building strategy
at least at government level to the performance criteria discussed
above can be a help but cannot in itself guarantee that the process
will be successful. The ideological product of ‘a nation’ with which
the population can identify and in which it can see meaning and
purpose is a product that the emergent nation creates for itself. The
government should offer plausible reasons for working together on
this product.

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 Ideological Aspects of Nation-building 53

NOTES

1. The process-type nature of nation-building cannot be overemphasised. One

of the most apposite comments made in this regard comes from Walker
Connor (1990:99–100): ‘The delay – stretched out over centuries in some
cases – between the appearance of a national consciousness among those
belonging to the elite and the spreading of this among the population at
large reminds us of the evident but all too frequently ignored fact that
nation-building is a process, and not a phenomenon or an event.’
2. A brief introduction to and discussion of this approach can be found in
Hellmann and Koopmans (1998).
3. Derichs (2003) offers an example of the application of this approach to a
nation-building process.
4. Portuguese and Tetum are the official languages of East Timor. Tetum is
mastered by around only 30 per cent of the population. Indonesian and
English are permitted as working languages.
5. Cf. Homi Bhabha’s comment (1990:2): ‘Shaping the nation’s political
“reason” as a form of narrative-textual strategies, metaphorical shifts,
partial texts and figurative strategies has its own history.’

REFERENCES

Bhabha, Homi K. (ed.) (1990) Nation and Narration (London).

Connor, Walker (1990) ‘When is a nation?’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 13,
No. 1, pp. 92–100.
Derichs, Claudia (2003) ‘Nation-Building in Malaysia: A Sociological Approach
and a Political Interpretation’, in Mohd Hazim Shah, K.S. Jomo and
Phua Kai Lit (eds), New Perspectives in Malaysian Studies (Bangi, Selangor),
pp. 226–48.
Hellmann, Kai-Uwe and Ruud Koopmans (eds) (1998) Paradigmen der
Bewegungsforschung (Opladen).
Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1789) Qu’est-ce que le tiers état? (place of publica-
tion not shown).

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 Part II
Case Studies

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Hippler 01 chap01 56 4/5/05 9:23:07 am
 5
Deconstruction of States as an
Opportunity for New Statism?
The Example of Somalia and Somaliland
Wolfgang Heinrich and Manfred Kulessa

Destructive wars within individual societies have reached frightening

dimensions. With the peoples affected and world peace threatened
by a growing number of failed states, this is a situation that demands
the attention of all countries and the international community
(German Parliament, document 14/9623; Debiel 2003). The ability
of a society to deal with conflicts constructively depends not least
of all on its relationship with the ‘state’. The breakdown of the state
can also provide opportunities to create new, workable structures.
These chances need to be recognised and taken advantage of for new
construction. Somalia provides an example in this regard.

NATION-SAVING?

In a much-quoted article, Heldman and Ratner (1993) supported

the thesis that the international community must prepare itself ‘...
to consider a novel, expansive – and desperately needed – effort by
the UN to undertake nation-saving responsibilities’. This displays a
lack of differentiation in analysing complex social processes as well
as a fundamental weakness with regard to recognising the systemic
factors underlying the phenomenon of the failed state. The terms
‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘nation-state’ are used extensively as synonyms.
Heldman and Ratner speak of ‘nation-saving’, whereas what they
really mean is ‘state-saving’ (Alger 1998). They assume that the cause
of state failure lies in the rapid establishment of nation-states in the
former colonies after the end of World War II. In fact, one of the
causes for most of these crises was the creation of state structures
with arbitrary borders by external players in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The phenomenon of the weak and ultimately
failing state is however and above all a problem of the present system
of international relations (Alger 1998). In the context of this system

57

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 58 Case Studies

and the role of the state in it, the failed state and the failure of any
effective control of force therefore also have to be analysed.

SOVEREIGNTY, LEGITIMACY AND STATISM

According to Soerensen (1998), the political community – within the

context of the nation-state in Europe, which served as a model for
the creation of states on other continents – is based on material and
immaterial factors. The material factors include the welfare system and
guarantees of security and order by the state. The central immaterial
factor is the notion of a national community substantiated by myths,
historical interpretation and ideology. This political community is
based on two forms of legitimacy:

• Vertical legitimacy denotes the relationship between society and

the state and results from a general understanding that the state
elite and state institutions have the right to rule on the basis of
recognised values and norms in the sense of a social contract.
• Horizontal legitimacy defines the affiliation to the political
community and marks out its boundaries (Holsti 1996).
Ideally, two elements of the nation converge here: a territorially
defined society within demarcated borders and the normative
idea of a nationally defined community. These are the basic
elements of what Holm defines as a state’s ‘internal sovereignty’
(Holm 1998).

In Europe, this nation-state was the result of a long political

development. In contrast, the African states were created by
the colonial powers. The ‘peoples’ to whom the United Nations
guaranteed the right to self-determination in 1960 lived within
borders that had been drawn by others. Their notion of nation was
defined in negative terms through resistance against colonial rule.
Having become independent, the majority of the new states did
not have any established positive concept of political community.
The various attempts to construct nations subsequently proved to
be failures in most cases. It was not easy to bring different groups
with different languages, cultures, faiths and lifestyles together
under a single national identity. Furthermore, the new state elites
were very quickly tied into the political interests of their former
colonial rulers or the superpowers. Staying in power and satisfying
the particular interests of the groups supporting them became the

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 The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 59

primary motivation for the majority of them (Clapham 1996). The

consequence of this was that the new states relied almost entirely
on ‘external sovereignty’ resulting from recognition given by other
governments. They lacked most or even all the characteristics of the
much more important ‘internal sovereignty’ which develops from the
state’s success in guaranteeing human security to its citizens.

CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION OF STATES

States are constructed by way of social processes and politics in

concrete terms. And they can be ‘deconstructed’ in just the same way.
Looking at things this way focuses on the fact that the actors bringing
a state to the point of breakdown or failure act with instrumental
rationality. ‘Weak’ or failed states are states in different phases of
deconstruction. Ernst Hillebrand (1994) distinguishes between two
processes with their respective principal actors which lead to the
destruction of states: a ‘top down’ destruction by the state elites,
and the ‘bottom up’ process by the members of the predominantly
agrarian society who are mainly oriented towards small solidarity
groups. For Rainer Tetzlaff (1999) the actual mechanism that brings
about the breakdown of the state is the reciprocally reinforcing effects
of these two processes.
There are three categories of actors that play a particular part in
state deconstruction processes:

• The government elite has a crucial influence on the course and

outcome of nation-building processes. What is decisive is
whether the government’s action has a constructive impact and
creates ‘human security’ for the citizens of the state as defined
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or
whether state authority, institutions and resources are misused
by the members of the government elite for personal enrichment
or to satisfy particular group interests. The latter erodes vertical
legitimacy and weakens the state’s internal sovereignty.
• The active civil society and political forces since the early 1990s
have displayed increasing involvement, reclaiming the right
of political participation. They often feel excluded from the
privileges of power or involvement in processes that have a
sustained effect on their lives. In many cases, these players are
motivated by democratic-participative visions and the desire
for public monitoring of the government’s actions. Experience

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shows, however, that violent disputes in the name of such ideals

often do not result in any higher degree of freedom, justice or
participation (Anderson 1999).
• The non-politically active (majority of the) population – especially
in the rural regions of Africa – has only very rarely been able to
boast any positive experiences with the state. Essential social
services have frequently been provided by private bodies or
within the context of self-help. The conventional security
sector too often has been characterised by arbitrary arrests,
human rights violations and corruption to such an extent
that the citizens have had to protect themselves against the
state rather than it protecting them. It is therefore no surprise
when broad sections of the population decide to use the ‘exit
option’, seeking to avoid contact with the state institutions and
withdrawing into the private sphere and the informal sector
(Cheru 1988).

FROM DECONSTRUCTION TO RECONSTRUCTION

Crisis, as in the Chinese scripture, is formed from elements of risk

and opportunity and can, in positive cases, lead to a constructive new
beginning that leaves behind the legacy of colonial and postcolonial
eras, and enables the community to organise its affairs in a more
dependable and participative manner. Besides chaos, the destruction
stage can also trigger processes of reflection and liberation. If
deconstruction of the state is the result of instrumentally rational
action, it is then obvious that such processes cannot be reversed by
a simple ‘reconstruction’ of the state, that is a return to the status
quo ante. The challenge is, rather, that of renewed construction of
society and the state, which can establish a national identity and
constitute internal sovereignty.
Comparative studies in crisis regions have shown that people do
not live in a political and administrative vacuum after the breakdown
of state structures and functions; rather communities fall back on
other structures and mechanisms in order to resolve necessary matters
of common concern (Bryden 1995; Anderson 1999). Traditional
ways are rekindled or other institutions such as local groups and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) take on political and
administrative responsibilities.
It is generally easier to establish the bond of loyalty that unites
citizens at the local and regional level. At the national level it is

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 The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 61

essential for the vast majority of the population not to have any doubts
or reservations about belonging to the state’s political community
(Rustow 1970). The national identity must permit differentiation, e.g.
according to religious, ethnic or social criteria, though these do not
have to lead to the political community being called into question
in fundamental terms.

SOMALIA: A STATE IN DECONSTRUCTION

Soon after the Italian and British colonial territories in Somalia

had achieved their independence in 1960, they voluntarily joined
together to form the Republic of Somalia. The colonial era had
bestowed the modern centralised state on Somalian society. The new
form of social organisation conflicted sharply with the traditional,
radically egalitarian social structure of the Somalis, which Lewis
(1961) described as a ‘pastoral democracy’. In contrast to most settled
societies, it has virtually no formally institutionalised authority.
Beyond the family unit, relations within society are very flexible
and depend on the situation. The social structure of the Somalis
can be described as a network of extensively autonomous family
units integrated into alliances at many levels (clans, subclans and
further subdivisions).
In the initial years of independence, Somalia was regarded as a
model democracy in Africa, with numerous parties standing for
election, mostly on a clan basis. Between 1961 and 1969, various
elected governments alternated with each other. Like no other
country in Africa, Somalia was seen as a nation-state whose citizens
belonged predominantly to one people with the same language
and religion. On the other hand, the young state’s foreign policy
was characterised from the outset by the desire to unite all regions
inhabited by Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, which led to
conflicts with the neighbouring countries, the effects of which are
still felt today.
On 21 October 1969, General Siad Barre came to power as the
result of a coup d’état. His government’s declared goal was to create
a modern nation-state based on the socialist model. A single-party
system was introduced and clan loyalty denounced as backward and
primitive. Over the years, the ruling party built up a comprehensive
system of control and an authoritarian, overcentralised governmental
regime. Somalia’s citizens increasingly experienced the state as a
repressive system offering no framework for identification. Observers

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were reminded of a colony under foreign military occupation (Lewis

1991). As a result the Somalis turned more and more to their clan
groups that ensured survival rather than the state’s social systems.
Although it condemned clan loyalty, the Siad Barre government was
founded on a clan basis from the very outset; and it was Siad Barre’s
clan in particular that benefited from development aid and foreign
trade relations. With growing dissatisfaction and opposition, the
regime’s political base narrowed to an ever-increasing extent.
In 1978, opposition groups in north-west Somalia, the former
British protectorate, began to organise resistance against the repressive
central government. In an effort to destroy their organisational base,
the regime waged a brutal war against the civilian population. Towns
and villages were bombarded, wells and waterholes poisoned and
destroyed, cattle seized and human rights violated in a grave and
systematic manner. During the civil war, the official economy almost
completely collapsed.
The Siad Barre regime is a classic example of a policy that placed
state preservation before nation-building – practising the former
with ruthless force where deemed necessary. Whereas the regime
had initially pursued a policy of modernising the state and society
via extending the education system and providing social services and
a modern administration, over the years it was the preservation of
power itself that became the core of its policy. The regime attempted
to achieve this via clan loyalty and integration into the geopolitical
interests of the superpowers. However, the state’s internal sovereignty
eroded to a point where the government could only stay in power
through external support, the cooperation of other clans and the
use of massive force.
The opposition forces eventually managed to drive the government
army out of the north-west. On 27 January 1991, Siad Barre’s military
dictatorship finally collapsed. This ended the formal existence of the
state of Somalia which had, however, already become an empty shell
many years before, providing its citizens with neither security nor
social services. It had been able to exist for many years only because
other governments recognised the despotic regime and supported it
regardless of its systematic and massive violation of human rights.
A time of chaos followed the collapse of the dictatorship in which
warlords and their militias fought for territories, supremacy and control
of economic resources. The forces that had ousted Siad Barre and his
regime from power were not able to form a new government.

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 The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 63

International intervention, initially under the leadership of the

USA and then in the form of a UN mission (UNOSOM), proved
ineffective to a great extent and was discontinued after three years.
The world community had to realise that state-building after war
required the cooperation of local communities and their structures
and could only be successful if pursued ‘from the bottom up’.

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE

Although a number of warlords are still struggling for power over a

decade after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, there are also numerous
regions where local communities have ended violence and where
local and semi-state authorities are functioning effectively (Menkhaus
1996). In the north, two autonomous regional entities have emerged
– the Republic of Somaliland and Puntland – which have functioning
administrations and a considerable measure of security. The situation
is similar for parts of the region of south-west Somalia (Heeger
2003:216).
During the time of the UN intervention, a local administration
was set up under an Islamic-Somalian court in the northern part of
the capital, Mogadishu, which was successful in creating a relatively
peaceful zone. This is the base of the transitional national government
(TNG) established by a peace conference in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000
which, although it claims to be national, has not been able to achieve
recognition throughout the entire country.
Further conferences on reconciliation and national rapprochement
have taken place in Kenya. The neighbouring countries officially
supporting the peace negotiations under the umbrella of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are, however,
pursuing their own interests, which by no means always correspond
to the aspirations of the Somali people for a unified nation. It is
possible that the solution of the Somalia problem will only be found
in the long term within the framework of a union of states in the
Horn of Africa. But the chances of this happening are not particularly
favourable at present.
It is important to note here that the civil war was fought most
intensively at the interfaces of international trade, that is in the
ports where fuel, electronics and weapons enter the country, in
those areas where goods are produced for export, and in the capital,
Mogadishu. In other regions, traditional persons of authority assumed
responsibility for security and the survival of the local communities.

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 64 Case Studies

This accomplishment should not be underestimated in view of a

deeply divided society and the lack of state authority (Farah 1994).
More than a dozen peace conferences have been held since 1992
with international assistance. Most of these conferences followed
the classic diplomatic model involving only the representatives of
the parties actively involved in waging war. There is one important
exception: in March 1993, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy
Mohamed Sahnoun was able to persuade the UN to involve a large
number of representatives of Somalian civil society as observers in
the peace conference held in Addis Ababa. Their participation was
supported by non-governmental organisations, especially the Swedish
Life and Peace Institute (LPI). Outside the official negotiations the
representatives of civil society were able to exert influence on the
discussion and the outcome of the conference. Although signed by the
warring parties only, the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1993 did
provide the framework for establishing administrative structures at
local, district and provincial level as part of a provisional government
structure. The building of these new self-administration structures
is so far the only concrete result of the numerous peace conferences
organised by the UN.
LPI and UNOSOM followed Somalian tradition when they invited
the leading personalities of the communities concerned (chiefs, elders,
religious leaders) to public meetings at which the establishment of
administrative councils were to be discussed and decided on. The
bodies set up in this way are not, however, a reproduction of the
‘traditional’ Somali structure of rule, which does not have any
formally institutionalised authority. An attempt was made, rather, to
combine the requirements of a modern state system with traditional
forms of decision-making (Heinrich 1997).
Occasionally, the elders and traditional leaders became members
of the councils, though in most cases they preferred to remain on the
outside as independent authorities. In the Republic of Somaliland, the
elders form a type of constitutional court in the Guurti in addition
to the government institutions. In a few cases the new councils
have also contributed to conflicts, e.g. in the dispute surrounding
the involvement of local groups or concerning the influence of the
warring parties, which have sometimes interfered to a great extent.
On occasions, literate refugees from the capital managed to capture
dominant positions. In the majority of cases, however, the councils
are proving to be effective institutions for participative management
of local matters, though traditional clan authorities continue to be

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 The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 65

entrusted with the settlement of local conflicts in accordance with

the old customs. In the meantime, the councils have become the
centrepiece of a functioning system of local self-administration.
Starting points and partners can be found here for international
development cooperation, from the UNDP’s wide-ranging Somalia
Rehabilitation Programme (SRP) to NGO activities.

THE EXAMPLE OF SOMALILAND

Somaliland, ‘the nation that nobody knows’ (The Economist, 14.4.2001),

quite evidently meets the conditions of modern statism. It was formed
in 1993 on the basis of a broad participatory process. The state and
its institutions have internal sovereignty through the approval of the
population numbering 2 million people. The state bodies safeguard
peace and a relatively high degree of human security. The two
chambers of parliament are constituted by democratic election and
the government and the opposition have developed relationships of
constructive political competition. There is an independent judiciary,
an active civil society, a critical press and security forces that are
subject to public control. The state has its own currency and central
bank, an international airport and seaport, as well as a flourishing
private economy extensively free of regulation.
Nonetheless, the Republic of Somaliland has not yet been recognised
by any other country. The so-called international community argues
that it is impossible to change the colonial borders and that the
‘national unity’ of Somalia has to be protected. The lack of conceptual
clarity referred to above has a fatal impact in this case because what
the international community is concerned with here is not a matter
of ‘national’ unity but, rather, the preservation of territorial unity.
The line of argument put forward by the government of Somaliland
in this context is well-founded in historical terms. It argues that
after the disintegration of the unified state, the people of the former
British colonial territory are back to the situation during the days
of independence when Somaliland, having been freed from British
rule, existed as an independent state for four days in June 1960
before joining together with the region of the former Italian colony
to constitute the Republic of Somalia as the result of a voluntary
resolution passed by its parliament.
There is good reason to assume that international recognition of
Somaliland would be beneficial for peace and development in Somalia

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 66 Case Studies

as well as the entire region. A state has been built there, the structure
of which is based on a successful combination of tradition and
modern democratic structures, thus enabling it to enjoy a high degree
of internal sovereignty – very much in contrast to the transitional
national government in Mogadishu, which entirely lacks internal
sovereignty and is exclusively dependent on being recognised and
supported by foreign states. It would therefore be in the interests of
long-term peaceful development in the region for the Republic of
Somaliland to be recognised internationally in parallel with the peace
endeavours for Somalia and to receive aid and economic cooperation
– also in view of the forthcoming elections.

PROSPECTS FOR SOMALIA

Negotiations to resolve the stalemate in Somalia have been going

on again in Kenya since October 2002 mediated by the Kenyan
government on behalf of IGAD. It can hardly be expected that these
talks will result in a breakthrough leading to an agreement that would
provide the basis for a widely accepted government and the building
of a new state of Somalia, even though a capable mediator has been
found in the person of the experienced Kenyan diplomat Bethuel
Kiplagat. There are three main reasons for this scepticism regarding
success: the lack of representativeness of the parties involved, the
lack of readiness by the powers-that-be to accept an overall concept,
and political interests on the part of the neighbouring countries and
the USA.
The development of the private sector has amazed many observers
(Heeger 2003:224). Somalian entrepreneurs have demonstrated that
shipping, telecommunications and airlines can evidently be organised
without state structures – as long as there is no interference from an
outside government. The Somalis felt the full force of the latter when
the US administration froze the assets of the largest employer, al
Barakaat, a finance and trading company, and thousands of Somalis
were deprived of their incomes. The Somalian diaspora used to remit
around €500 million a year to their families via this company. Even
though the owners of al Barakaat were able to have their accounts
freed by US courts, thus avoiding an economic catastrophe, Somalia
is repeatedly suspected of harbouring terrorists because of prejudices
and the fact that Islam is practised there (Aden 2002, 2003).

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 The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 67

The Somalis cannot do without building a new state. This is also

something that should seriously interest its neighbours and the
international community. The experience of the past few years has
shown that no international conference will be able to formulate a
solution that fulfils the high expectation of the Somalis as long as only
or primarily the ‘war actors’ are involved in the negotiations. What
is needed, as Aden (2000:109) puts it, are ‘visionary realists’ because
the need here is to support developed and developing approaches
towards a new form of statism. The Republic of Somaliland deserves
international recognition, assistance, advice and encouragement on
the way to establishing a federal constitution which can promote
peaceful relations – just like the other regional structures and local
councils in Somalia.

SUMMARY

After extensive deconstruction of the state, a distinction has to

be made between nation-building and state-building. The case of
Somalia shows that, before the state can be constructed again, the
society has to be built to form a ‘political community’ in the sense of
Soerensen (1998): ‘National identity establishes a bond of loyalty, it
helps create the minimum of national unity which is at the core of the
political community.’ If ‘national identity’ is a bond of loyalty that
binds together the citizens of a state to form a community, a certain
measure of national consciousness is then a necessary prerequisite
for the construction of a state and building a democratic system of
governance.
Political and administrative structures performing state functions
must be built on the basis of a ‘political community’. Procedures for
the establishment of institutions and the selection of personnel will
only be workable if they are based on the fundamental consensus
of a ‘political community’. At the same time, protection and further
development of the ‘national identity’ in the sense of a generally
shared consciousness of being part of the political community, are a
necessary addition for the development and preservation of effective
state structures and institutions.
The deconstruction phase of a state can lead to a building period.
Civil society actors and economic initiatives can make important
contributions in this regard. International diplomacy and political
science can obtain important insights from the experience of the
Somalis into how a new beginning can grow out of crisis.

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REFERENCES

Aden, Abdurahman (2000) Von der Trommel zum Handy (Bad Honnef).
Aden, Abdurahman (2002) ‘Somalia ist nicht Bin Ladens Land’, epd-
Entwicklungspolitik No. 1/2002, pp. 36–8.
Aden, Abdurahman (2003) ‘Vor Allah sind alle Somali gleich’, Le Monde
Diplomatique/TAZ (January).
Alger, Chadwick F. (1998) Failed States and the Failure of States: Self-Determination,
States, Nations and Global Governance (Paper presented at the International
Conference ‘Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects, and
Consequences’, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25–27 February).
Anderson, Mary B. (1999) Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War
(Boulder, CO).
Bryden, Matt (1995) ‘Somalia: The Wages of Failure’, Current History, Vol. 49,
No. 591, pp. 145–51.
Cheru, Fantu (1988) Beyond the Debt Crisis: Rethinking Development in Africa
(International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology) (place of
publication not shown).
Clapham, Christopher (1996) Africa and The International System. The Politics
of State Survival (Cambridge).
Debiel, Tobias (2003) ‘Staatsversagen, Gewaltstrukturen und blockierte
Entwicklung: Haben Krisenländer noch eine Chance?’, Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, No. 13–14/2003, pp. 15–23.
Farah, Ahmed Yussuf (1994) The Roots of Reconciliation. Peace Making Endeavours
of Contemporary Lineage Leaders: A Survey of Grassroots Peace Conferences in
‘Somaliland’ (London).
Heeger, Carsten (2003) ‘Somaliland (Somalia): Staatszerfall, Staatenbildung
und Friedenskonsolidierung’, in Mir A. Ferdowsi and Volker Matthies
(eds), Den Frieden gewinnen. Zur Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in
Nachkriegsgesellschaften (ONE World series from the Development and
Peace Foundation No. 15, Bonn), pp. 208–37.
Heinrich, Wolfgang (1997) Building The Peace. Experiences of Collaborative
Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993–1996 (Horn of Africa Series 3, Life and Peace
Institute, Uppsala).
Heldman, Gerald B. and Steven R. Ratner (1993) ‘Saving Failed States’, Foreign
Policy, Vol. 89, pp. 3–20.
Hillebrand, Ernst (1994) ‘Zivilgesellschaft und Demokratie in Afrika’,
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 1, pp. 57–71.
Holm, Hans-Henrik (1998) The Responsibility That Will Not Go Away. Weak
States in the International System (Paper presented at the International
Conference ‘Failed States and International Security: Causes, Prospects,
and Consequences’, Purdue University, West Lafayette, 25–27 February).
Holsti, Kalevi J. (1996) The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge).
Lewis, I.M. (1991) ‘The Recent Political History of Somalia’, in Kim Barcik and
Sture Normark (eds), Somalia – A Historical, Cultural And Political Analysis
(Uppsala).
Lewis, I. M. (1961) A Pastoral Democracy (London).
Life and Peace Institute (1991) Somalia (Uppsala).

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 The Example of Somalia and Somaliland 69

Menkhaus, Ken (1996) ‘Putting It Back Together Again’, New Routes, Vol. 1,
No. 3, pp. 18–21.
Rustow, Dankwart A. (1970) ‘Transitions to Democracy’, Comparative Politics,
Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 337–65.
Soerensen, Georg (1998) Democratization in the Third World. The Role of Western
Politics and Research (Paper presented at the Conference ‘Failed States and
International Security: Causes, Prospects, and Consequences’, Purdue
University, West Lafayette, 25–27 February).
Tetzlaff, Rainer (1999) ‘Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt in den Staaten
Afrikas’, Die Friedenswarte, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 307–30.

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 6
Afghanistan: Nation-building
in the Shadow of the Warlords
and the ‘War on Terror’
Rangin Dadfar Spanta

Reporting on Afghanistan currently focuses on the successes of the

Afghan government and international politics since the fall of the
Taliban – and, indeed, the situation in Afghanistan is certainly better
today than it was. In 2003, there were 5 million Afghan children
attending school; around 150 publications have established themselves
as daily newspapers or periodicals in Kabul; assistance is provided by
more than 1,200 registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
and international security troops attempt to guarantee calm and
order in Kabul within the framework of the International Security
Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF).
These changes are elements of an overall problem that is more
complex than is often perceived in the web of hegemonic US interests
and the international community’s pressure to provide justification.
The declared policy presently being pursued in relation to Afghanistan
displays an abundance of deficiencies, indicating a great lack of
properly thought-out postwar concepts. This chapter examines the
essential features of the political, economic and social situation as
well as the problems of state-building in Afghanistan.

THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL: A FRAGILE STRUCTURE

Since June 2002, the new government in Kabul has been known as
the ‘Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan’. It is led by
Hamid Karzai and is made up of the different groups that took part
in the first Petersberg Afghanistan Conference held in December
2001. It comprises more than 40 persons holding ministerial or
equivalent positions plus a number of representatives of the President
and his advisers.
The justification for these groups sharing power lies in the
assumption that they still have heavily armed squads or are members

70

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of the ‘American team’ (see below) representing the interests of their

ethnic groups. This politicisation of the ethnic factor in Afghanistan
is pursued both by the warlords and the international players. In the
absence of democratic legitimation and a countrywide power base,
it is extremely problematic to explain the power of the warlords
through anything other than military strength.
In the Afghan government, a distinction can be made – in simplified
terms – between four factions, though these do not have uniform
internal structures:

The ‘American team’: the Afghan exiles

The ‘American team’ predominantly consists of Afghan exiles who
have returned from the US and have the American government to
thank for their positions. This group plays a more important role
at the international level and in the diplomatic arena than it does
inside the country. With many Afghans assuming that this faction
was the only alternative to the Islamists within the government or the
warlords, it initially had the sympathy of the population. However,
as it became clear that it was unable to ensure the stability and
reconstruction of the country, its popularity waned. This group is
not able to assert itself against the warlords and Islamists. Its position
is being substantially weakened by the absence of its own military
and organisational possibilities, the long period spent in exile by
its members, as well as the reduction of the ‘war on terror’ to the
military option.

The ‘Supervisory Council’ faction: the group of the former commander,

Ahmad Shah Masoud
The ‘Supervisory Council’ (Shura-i Nezar) was established by
Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud during the Afghan resistance
against the Soviet Union (1979–89) as a coordinating body for the
military activities of the Mujaheddin in the Panshir valley region, the
areas to the north of Kabul and a number of provinces in northern
Afghanistan. It consisted for the most part of Mujaheddin of the ‘Islamic
society’ (Jemat i Islami Afghanistan), the party of the subsequent state
president, Rabani. The ‘Supervisory Council’ became increasingly
significant and formed the main force in the northern alliance after
the Mujaheddin government had been driven out of Kabul by the
Taliban in 1996. Following the Petersberg Afghanistan Conference,
leading personalities of the ‘Supervisory Council’ constituted the most
important pillar of the Afghan transitional government.

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The group is a military and political organisation that emerged

from the radical Islamist movement of Afghanistan and which,
although it conducts itself moderately at times and moves away from
fundamentalist positions, continues to insist on the establishment of
a state founded on Islamic law. It controls the Ministries of Defence,
Foreign Affairs, Education and Higher Education, as well as the secret
service and other key positions. Its representatives have good military
organisations at their disposal, asserting their interests by means of
intimidation and force. The ‘Supervisory Council’ is one of the main
factors in the fragmentation of Afghanistan today. Its organisational
possibilities, its strong position in the government and its influence
in the regions run by the warlords enable it to consolidate its power
base. While the Minister of Defence heads the ‘Commission for the
Formation of an Impartial Army’, he is at the same time recruiting
former Mujaheddin fighters under the name of ‘Holy War Squads’
(Ghundha-i Jehadi) for a paramilitary group following the Iranian
model of the guardians of the revolution. Paradoxically, he also
benefits from financial assistance through the ‘antiterror alliance’.

Representatives of regional and local warlords in the central government

The representatives of local warlords, who are close to the faction
referred to above, form a pact with the powerful faction of the
Mujaheddin within the government while the militarily less powerful
representatives of the militia, belonging more to the Hazara and
Uzbek ethnic groups, move closer to either of the groups mentioned
depending on the situation. They act as the long arms of the powerful
and less powerful decentralised warlords, who come mainly from the
regions of central and eastern Afghanistan and are not particularly
influential in the capital, Kabul.

Regional and local warlords

The real rulers outside Kabul are the warlords and they have
constantly extended their military power since the fall of the Taliban.
The so-called disarmament process, which is being carried out very
hesitantly, primarily benefits the more powerful warlords, who are
gaining ever-greater control of their territories and recruiting their
own armed units.
The paradox of the policy pursued by the international players lies
in the fact that it calls for and wants to help strengthen the central
government while, at the same time, supporting the warlords by
way of financial benefits. The example of the Khost region – where

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the governor nominated by the Karzai government is engaged in a

struggle with his predecessor who, on the other hand, is supported
financially by the US – demonstrates that the US first gears its policy
to the military requirements of the war on terror and, second, does
not have any long-term strategy for the country. This conflicting
policy can be observed in all regions of Afghanistan. Propagating
respect for human rights on the one hand, the US simultaneously
supports the warlords in the north of the country, who are known
to have committed war crimes.
This intensifies the asymmetry of power between Kabul and the
regions as a source of conflict, with the positions of the ‘top dogs’
(Galtung 1997:63), that is the warlords and the Mujaheddin faction
in the government, being strengthened vis-à-vis the ‘underdogs’.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Warfare is still a lucrative occupation in Afghanistan. A generation

that grew up in a war and has learnt nothing other than to wage war
is only too pleased to place its military skills at the disposal of the
warlords and the ‘antiterror alliance’. Both these ‘employers’ pay their
soldiers and fighters more than a university professor gets, for example.
Despite the talk of disarmament, a ‘political economy of arms’ has
emerged: carrying weapons and using them to demonstrate power
has become something quite natural, although the ordinary people
would like to be freed from the ‘shadow of the Kalashnikov’.
The production of opium and opium derivatives has increased
again in Afghanistan. According to a report by the BBC (26.6.2003),
opium production for 2003 was predicted to be 19 times higher
than that in 2001. The fight against drugs is unsuccessful owing to
the government’s executive possibilities being limited and because
it does not have control of many parts of the country. The ongoing
war on terror in the south creates opportunities for opium production
and a large number of the local rulers also make money from the
trafficking of drugs. There is a broad network of international drug
dealers whose contacts extend via Iran and Central Asia to the
European continent.
The smuggling of luxury goods is another source of income. They
are imported into Afghanistan via the Arab Emirates, subjected to
very low customs duty and then exported as contraband mainly to
Pakistan, earning money for the Afghan dealers, the warlords and
the central government. This means that, in addition to the warlords

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and drug barons, those dealing in consumer and luxury goods also
have a superior position – a fact that political observers do not take
appropriate account of.
Despite the huge presence of international organisations and
grand proclamations by international politicians, nothing has so far
been done with regard to reconstructing the extensively devastated
industrial sector. Agricultural production is still below capacity,
suffering from the consequences of a four-year drought, destruction
of the irrigation systems, the laying of mines in large areas of the
country and a lack of qualified workers. Food production is also
unattractive for the population in view of the lucrative drug trade
luring farmers to cultivate poppies rather than edible crops. On top of
this, prices for agricultural products are being squeezed as a result of
the international programmes to combat hunger and the distribution
of food to returning Afghan refugees.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND STATE-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

In the discourse on failed states, the terms ‘state-building’ and

‘nation-building’ are frequently used synonymously. However, they
are not one and the same thing. The lack of clarity of the terminology
leads to confusion in defining other terms such as ‘state-nation’,
‘cultural nation,’ ‘nation’ as a people’s community or ‘nation’ as a
legal definition, i.e. as a society of citizens.
In the debate relating to Afghanistan, it is, in my view, a matter
of establishing a nation-state, ensuring the state’s monopoly of
force over the entire territory and building an efficient national
economy. Furthermore, establishment of the rule of law and extensive
democratisation of the state can also be put on the agenda where a
normative approach is applied.
The state-building project has been underway since the end of
2001. The international players include, in descending order of their
relevance, the US, the UN, the neighbouring states of Afghanistan, the
NGOs and the European Union. The basic idea according to which
the government was put together at the first Petersberg Conference
in 2001 was that Afghanistan was a multiracial state and the military
groups, warlords and Afghan exiles sharing in government were to
represent their ethnic groups or, as frequently formulated in the
media, their tribes. The ‘multiethnic government’ resulted. Its
democratic legitimation was to be underpinned by the inclusion of

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the tribal council, the loya jirga, meeting in Kabul in June 2002 as
the traditional institution of the Afghan tribes.
In fact, this construct does not take account of the social change that
has taken place in Afghan society over the past 30 years and possesses
a somewhat distorted view of its realities. It also misunderstands the
population’s real expectations. This is the reason for the social basis
and social legitimation of the state being and remaining so fragile
and weak.

DESTRUCTION OF THE TRADITIONAL LEGITIMATION OF AFGHAN SOCIETY

The traditional tribal structures of Afghanistan have been

permanently damaged; their instruments – like the traditional loya
jirga – are not suitable for solving modern conflicts or for state-
building. Afghanistan’s local traditions have never been embedded
countrywide. The traditional loya jirga has never been an instrument
for expressing the will of the people; it is, rather, a power-stabilising
mechanism with local and tribal legitimation. Nonetheless, conditions
have been created through the holding of the loya jirga which have
normative power.
Like the course of the war and the resistance, the consequences of
these have also been inconsistent over the last 24 years. Despite the
huge devastation, Afghanistan’s society has become emancipated in
a number of respects.
The reforms undertaken by the ‘Democratic People’s Party of
Afghanistan’ (1978–92) and the Soviet invasion (1979–89) met with
resistance from the country’s traditional structures and authorities.
According to the Soviet communist version, Afghanistan was a feudal
society that needed to be transformed. The proclaimed class struggle
grew in intensity and brutality with the state interventions following
the April coup of 1978. The state authority was supposed to change
and reorganise production conditions and ownership rights (Sigrist
1986; Grevemeyer 1987; Dadfar Spanta 1993). The fact was, however,
that the class conditions postulated by the Soviet communists did
not exist in Afghanistan. Their policy was therefore out of touch
with reality, while the attempts to implement it regardless were all
the more brutal.
Land reform failed because Afghanistan did not have the large-scale
land-holding tradition encountered in feudal societies (Roy 1985;
Grevemeyer 1987). A class confrontation mobilising the peasants
under the banner of Soviet communist reform methods did not take

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place because traditional and kinship loyalties were stronger than class
antagonism. Literacy failed because those concerned would not allow
themselves to be made mere objects of a campaign. In a country where
values like ‘honour’ stand above everything else, it was impossible
to send peasant women to ideologically oriented literacy classes by
decree in order to establish a Soviet–Afghan brotherhood.
In attempting to snatch control of society’s interests away from
the traditional leadership, the Afghan state exceeded its limitations.
Traditional consensus, which had come about through an historically
evolved, political and social sharing of tasks between the decentralised
tribal powers and the central government, collapsed. The initial
spontaneous uprisings by the population transpired primarily on
the basis of traditional loyalties.
The traditional elites were either eliminated by the political
interventions of the ‘Democratic People’s Party of Afghanistan’
and the Soviet army or they proved to be incompetent during the
resistance. Over the course of the war, a new leadership class formed,
with skills that were indispensable for modern warfare. Qualities
like organisational talent and propaganda skills were of special
significance in this respect. The dominance of the traditional elite
was thus undermined and partially done away with. This social policy
development is of particular relevance for the attempt at conflict
management and state-building in today’s Afghanistan.
Given that the traditional institutions are severely damaged and
out of accord with the new balance of power, all endeavours aimed at
state-building in Afghanistan with the principal help of the tradition
that has remained are faced with the fact that it is not primarily the
tribal leadership but, rather, a new military and political elite that now
has the say. These new elites do not necessarily have any traditional,
tribal legitimation; most of the leaders are not representatives of
their ethnic groups. They lack both traditional as well as modern
legitimation in that they do not represent their ‘tribes’ or have any
ethnically related organisations or political representations that
express the common political interests of the respective ethnic
groups. Most of the factions and persons sharing power do not
comprise traditional tribal leaders; instead they are made up of
military commanders, leaders of Islamic parties or representatives
of foreign lobbies. This also applies to President Karzai as well as his
rivals inside and outside the government.

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INADEQUATE APPROACHES BY EXTERNAL POLITICAL PLAYERS

The state-building endeavours of the international players in

Afghanistan suffer from conceptional problems and do not display
any uniform strategy. While the US makes its overall policy dependent
on the military requirements of the war on terror – also seeking close
cooperation with the warlords in this respect – and sees the state-
building project as pushing through the principles of a neoliberal
market economy, the Europeans, especially Germany, place their
faith in the NGOs. This means that an attempt is being made to
accomplish state-building with inappropriate instruments and players
acting against each other.
Furthermore, coordination between the policy of the international
peace-keeping forces, US military action and the civil activities
referred to as peace-building is far from adequate. Peace-keeping and
peace-building activities are frequently carried out side by side, with
the result that their effect is lost.
The declared goal of the international community is to strengthen
the central government, enabling it to assert its monopoly of force
throughout the country and carry out its responsibilities. However,
its power is very limited, restricted primarily by that of the warlords,
who are paradoxically supported by the US. US state-building policy
in Afghanistan is evidently secondary to the requirements of the
military actions against al Qaeda and the remaining Taliban.
However, a policy aimed at bringing about reconstruction mainly
through NGOs also causes problems that impede the state-building
process. Development cooperation funding is privatised when routed
mostly via NGOs. The NGOs from the north are performing an
increasing number of public functions which are the classic domain
of a government. Resources for necessary long-term undertakings are
used by NGOs for projects with a short time span. Larger projects
of particular importance for the national economy – road-building,
education, healthcare, dam construction, power stations and mining
projects – have up to now been the classic responsibilities of the state.
As long as the NGOs spend most of the reconstruction funding on
their small and local projects, the country’s devastated infrastructure
will remain weak or dysfunctional.
The presence of the NGOs in Afghanistan is, nonetheless, essential.
Despite all the justified criticism (Medico International 2002), they
carry out remarkable work in fighting hunger and disasters as well as
in the area of human rights protection. What they cannot accomplish,

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nor can it be expected of them, are the tasks of state-building and

the setting-up of state institutions.
Afghan society is being permanently paralysed by ethnic
fragmentation, corruption and nepotism, as well as the toleration
of private armies. There is broad consensus that these factors have
become the most significant obstacles to state-building. It should
be equally clear that strengthening the political power elite in the
present government or the warlords cannot be the solution to
the problems.

PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE

In order to reduce the warlords’ possibilities for asserting their

power interests and strengthen the central government’s chances
for exerting administrative control, it is important to break the
dominance of the former and reorganise the composition of the latter.
The state-building process will not be able to succeed without the
comprehensive disarmament of the military groups of Afghanistan’s
different rulers and militias or without the social integration of those
who see warfare as a normal job.
The country urgently needs an impartial and non-partisan
transitional government which stands above the ethnic groups
and has the necessary professional as well as political and moral
competence. Creating the conditions for a functioning state could
be possible in a transitional phase with a government of capable,
democratically oriented technocrats backed up by the international
community, including the presence of ISAF in the cities and major
towns. Without these conditions and in the absence of disarming
and getting rid of the private armies, standardising legal norms and
extending the state’s monopoly of force over the entire territory,
elections and other political mechanisms will only serve to strengthen
the power of the warlords and encourage denationalisation of the
state of Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the country urgently needs the development
of democratic structures. Without the creation of participative
possibilities for the population and the furthering of organisational
opportunities for its citizens, Afghanistan will increasingly develop
into a place of enrichment for individuals and the repressive
safeguarding of interests and privileges enjoyed by the warlords and
Mujaheddin parties. Building state structures and strengthening
the central government with its executive bodies are of particular

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importance. This process can only be successful, however, if civil

society is supported and strengthened at the same time. It is therefore
essential to promote the involvement of the population in building
the country. Despite the forced politicisation of the ethnic factor, there
is no separatist movement in Afghanistan. This and the will of many
citizens for their own Afghanistan are positive elements that facilitate
reorganisation of the Afghan nation within a federal structure.
State-building in Afghanistan is directly linked to stability,
development and ensuring peace. It must be clearly evident that
peace is something worthwhile. This requires an overall strategy that
takes equal account of the elements of state-building, the economy,
the social situation, the environment and peace. Any one-sided
emphasis on a single component will create further problems now
and for the future.
The US and its allies were successful in the war against the Taliban
and al Qaeda in the first phase; now, however, they run the risk of losing
the ‘big one at Hindu Kush’ (Kleveman 2002:254). The superpower has
justified its intervention with the objectives of eradicating terrorism
as well as stabilising, reconstructing and democratising the country.
Afghanistan should not, as the Bush administration put it, remain a
base for terrorism and fundamentalism.
More than two years have passed since then and developments are
now going in a different direction. Military incursions and acts of
sabotage by the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda in the south and east
of the country are constantly on the increase. Groups operating from
Pakistan carry out attacks on Afghan soil and then use the country as
a retreat. The latest elections in the border regions between Pakistan
and Afghanistan were won by the Pakistani Islamists. Pakistan, the
only atomic power among the Islamic nations, is more unstable than
ever, with the country’s political elite deeply divided by different
ethnic and ideological orientations. Islam as the principal ideological
element for justifying the existence of the Pakistani nation is no
longer able to guarantee the unity of that country.
Afghanistan is a conglomerate of ethnic groups which maintain
close relations with the same ethnic groups in the bordering countries
of Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. These are
postcolonial states displaying all the relevant concomitants, with
the Central Asian states – allies of the US in the war on terror –
representing prime examples of contemporary tyranny without
democratic legitimation. They have unstable state structures with
Islamist and ethnically oriented opposition movements as well as

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major economic and social problems. Furthermore, the struggle for

power in this region is concentrated between the US, Russia, China
and Iran. Any collapse of Afghanistan would trigger a crisis directly
threatening all the neighbouring countries. If the Afghanistan crisis
were to escalate further, the conflicts in the neighbouring states
and the whole of Central Asia would threaten stability and world
peace more than ever. Nation-building and the establishment of
a functioning nation-state in Afghanistan will therefore decide
not only the future of the Afghans, but that of the entire region.
There is still time for the international community to correct its
dubious course.

REFERENCES

Dadfar Spanta, Rangin (1993) Afghanistan, Entstehung der Unterentwicklung,

Krieg und Widerstand (Frankfurt/M.).
Galtung, Johan (1997) ‘Theorien des Friedens’, in Berthold Meyer (ed.), Formen
der Konfliktregelung (Opladen), pp. 55–64.
Grevemeyer, Jan-Heeren (1987) Afghanistan. Sozialer Wandel und Staat im 20.
Jahrhundert (Berlin).
Kleveman, Lutz (2002) Der Kampf um das Heilige Feuer (Berlin).
Medico International (2002) circular 1, pp. 8–11.
Roy, Olivier (1985) L’Afghanistan. Islam et modernité politique (Paris) [Persian
version: Sarweghad Moghadam. Maschhad 1990].
Sigrist, Christian (1986) ‘Der lange afghanische Krieg’, Das Argument, Vol. 28,
No. 157, pp. 378–90.

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 7
Nation-building by Occupation? –
The Case of Iraq
Jochen Hippler

Iraq is one of the large number of multiethnic countries in the

Third World whose borders were drawn by former colonial powers.
After World War I, France and England shared a large part of the
bankrupt estate of the Ottoman Empire and created the countries
of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq – with the latter
awarded to England and officially administered as a trust territory of
the League of Nations at that time. Its population was and remains
heterogeneous, with over 70 per cent Arab and around one quarter
Kurdish, plus smaller minorities, the largest of which is the Turkmen
community. However, these groups are not homogeneous, either,
with Sunni and Shiite Arabs opposing each other then as now, in
addition to other Arab groups of lesser significance (for example the
‘Marsh Arabs’ in the south-east, with urban–rural differences and
tribal structures also playing a role).
The Kurds, too, are not a unified entity: in the northern autonomy
zone (established after the 1991 Gulf War), a war broke out between
the two most important parties in the mid 1990s, which led to the
emergence of two small Kurdish quasi-states which were not officially
recognised. Up to 800,000 Kurds living in Baghdad are mostly of
the Shiite faith, whereas those living in the main Kurdish area are
mainly Sunnis. The political structures of Iraq have been weak since
the founding of the state and initially even anachronistic: governed
by Arab Sunnis whose power was supported by big land-owners
and other power elites. Even the Iraqi king once remarked that his
country was actually ungovernable. Faisal I stated the following in
a confidential memorandum in 1933:

(T)here is still – and I say this with a heart full of sorrow – no Iraqi people
but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea,
imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common

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tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against
any government whatever. (Batatu 1982:25)

The years from 1958 to 1968 were a period of great instability, with
the revolution followed by a decade of coups and countercoups and
the first wave of Kurdish rebellions. Iraq had not been a ‘nation’ up
to that time but, rather, a combination of heterogeneous social and
ethnoreligious subsystems held together in a makeshift manner by
an inadequately established state apparatus.
Following an initial, bloody and swiftly unsuccessful coup in
1963, the Arab-nationalist Baath party seized power in 1968 and
did not relinquish it again until the Iraq War in 2003. Its extremely
brutal dictatorship – Saddam Hussein formally took power in 1979
– represented an equally unscrupulous and ambitious attempt at
nation-building. The country’s previous instability was ended
violently and through the greatly increased oil revenues of the 1970s
and its multiethnic reality was to be compulsorily homogenised and
Arabised. The infrastructure was modernised and partly developed
in an exemplary manner with oil money, the previously weak state
machinery was converted into an all-dominating power apparatus
and the country was armed to an unprecedented level. Iraq laid
claim to the role of leader in the Arab camp. A high-ranking
representative of the regime told the author in 1991: ‘We are happy
to sacrifice one or two generations of Iraqis to make Iraq a great and
powerful country.’
The war against Iran (1980–88) and the conquest of Kuwait were
part of this context: the rival Iran was to be quickly defeated and
eliminated as a competitor at a time of weakness (following the Islamic
revolution) and, if possible, the oil-rich province of Khuzistan (with its
Arab minority) snatched away from it. The conquest of Kuwait would
not only have provided Iraq with further, substantial oil fields, its war-
related foreign debts would likewise have been drastically reduced,
with the country also acquiring an efficient port on the Persian Gulf.
In both cases, however, these calculations of power politics came to
nothing: although the war against Iran was won after severe setbacks
and great effort, the country had been extremely weakened by heavy
losses of people and infrastructure and through its war-related
debts. The Gulf War defeat (1991) at the hands of a broad-based
coalition led by the US, together with the subsequent international
sanctions which lasted up to the Iraq War of 2003, ruined the country
completely. A prosperous oil-producing country of the late 1970s

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had, before the turn of the millennium, been turned into a large
slum with just a few small islands of affluence. The original recipe
conceived by the Baath dictatorship of achieving stability through
a combination of social, economic and infrastructure benefactions
accompanied by brutal repression, of making Iraq a strong state and
an international power player and of generally managing a successful
Arab nation-building project had failed by the 1990s. From the
combination of money and repression, only the latter was left to
save the regime. One result of this development was that Iraqi society
(with the exception of the Kurdish autonomous region in the north
dealt with below) suffocated politically: all political work outside
the dictatorship died or was pushed into exile and the cohesion of
Iraqi society was hugely weakened. The different elements of society
were held together virtually by the dictatorship alone, while all other
political mechanisms of integration and articulation were repressed
or smashed.

KURDISH AUTONOMY ENDEAVOURS

The Baathist nation-building project in Iraq clashed increasingly with

a second undertaking which took shape in the 1960s and was close
to being realised in the 1990s: the attempt to form Iraq into an Arab
nation-state could only meet with opposition from the non-Arab
minorities and especially from the Kurds. Kurdish resistance was first
aimed predominantly at repelling outside tutelage and dominance
by the central state, while an independent Kurdish national
consciousness started to spread slowly in the course of the disputes.
The dialectic of oppression and – also violent – resistance has led
increasingly to the strengthening of a national Kurdish identity over
the past few decades and, in political terms, to demands for autonomy
or an independent state. This trend has, however, been repeatedly
undermined by contradictions in the Kurdish camp, especially
between the KDP and PUK parties (Kurdish Democratic Party and
Patriotic Union Kurdistan respectively) as well as by overwhelming
influence from the neighbouring countries (particularly Turkey and
Iran), who have successfully played the two parties off against each
other on repeated occasions and threatened military intervention
(for the history of Iraqi Kurdistan, see Hippler 1990).
Kurdish sovereignty and nation-building have thus been
thwarted by internal disunity, the government in Baghdad and the
threats of neighbouring countries, while these factors have further

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strengthened the common identity and the population’s aspiration

to independence. When, however, a protection zone for the Kurds
against Saddam Hussein was established in northern Iraq (in which
around 60 per cent of the Iraqi Kurds were living) after the 1991 Gulf
War, action was taken to form one and then two Kurdish protostates,
which had their own governments, their own military, their own
parliaments and their own currency up to 2003 and were, in reality,
independent, even though not recognised under international law.
This fact emphatically underlines the failure of the Baathist nation-
building project, which was intended to make the entire country of
Iraq a strong, Arab nation-state.

NECESSITY AND DIFFICULTY OF NATION-BUILDING

When the 2003 Iraq War brought down the dictatorship, all the
mechanisms of social integration and the state apparatus collapsed
with it. Unexpectedly and contrary to the experience in the 1991
Kurdish and Shiite revolt, the state apparatus disintegrated almost
completely in the last few days of the war and just after. The vast
majority of the military as well as the police, ministries and other
authorities disappeared overnight, civil servants did not turn up for
work any more and their offices were systematically looted and even
burned down. At the end of the war, Iraq was a deeply traumatised
and, outside the Kurdish autonomous zone, a stateless society with
an extensively devastated infrastructure and economy, balancing
on the extreme edge of chaos. The absence of political institutions,
social integration mechanisms, functioning security authorities plus
the countless instances of attacks and looting indicated that the war
against Iraq had turned an all-powerful, repressive state into a failed
state within an extremely short period of time.
Nation-building was not put on the agenda because Washington
wanted or planned for it. Control of Iraq and ‘regime change’
were dominating political thinking in the US, not reshaping and
integrating Iraqi society and rebuilding the state apparatus from
scratch. Nation-building became crucial by default, not by design.
Controlling and ruling a society of 25 million people, rebuilding
the country and providing security and the required infrastructure,
plus preparing it for some kind of Iraqi self-rule could all not be
achieved without functioning state structures and related political

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mechanisms. And it all required systematic and effective ways to

stop social fragmentation.
The starting position for a new attempt at nation-building proved
to be very difficult after the war. The group of Sunni Arabs that had
dominated the country up to the war (or a section of that part of
the population) could only fear that they would lose most of their
influence. This group had been oppressed to a lesser degree by the
dictatorship, with most of the cadres and supporters recruited from
it, and it was its members that derived the most benefit from the
rule of Saddam Hussein in political and economic terms. With such
a privileged position ruled out for the future, dissatisfaction with the
new order was greatest and most immediate among this group. At the
same time, the Sunni Arabs (or Arab Sunnis, depending on their own
definition of themselves) did not have a leadership capable of action
or any political organisations to speak of. This group of the population
was fragmented, without leadership and politically almost impotent,
which intensified the feeling of helplessness even further.
The situation was different among the Shiites. Despite their
majority among the population, they had remained extensively
excluded from power under Saddam (and in the preceding decades)
and had – like the Kurds – suffered particularly under the brutality of
the dictatorship. Now they could reckon with occupying an overall
dominant position by putting up a united front vis-à-vis the other
groups. The initial position of the Shiite Arabs (or Arab Shiites; leaving
the special role of the Shiite Kurds in the greater Baghdad region out of
consideration here) was characterised by the fact that, although their
political organisations had been hit heavily and severely repressed by
the dictatorship, their religiously inspired parties still existed in exile
(and underground to a lesser degree). This means that they had an
important political edge after the fall of the dictatorship, with quick
and easy access to efficient political structures, money and their own
armed militias on their return from Iran.
In contrast, the secular wing of Shiite Arabs was (despite strong
potential) extensively disorganised and virtually incapable of political
action. The previously significant Communist Party, which had been
brutally smashed by Saddam, attempted to reorganise but lacked the
financial resources and foreign support that the religious Shiite parties
had at their disposal. For this reason, the politics of the Shiite Arabs
were structured in a distinctly religious way despite their considerable
secular instincts. There was therefore huge rivalry in the religious
sector between the parties and currents, as well as between the distinct

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Iranian influences and the existence of an ‘Iraqi’ interpretation of

the Shia.
For the Kurdish population, especially in the Kurdish autonomous
zone, the situation was fundamentally different to that in the rest
of the country. The Kurds still had functioning political structures
(the two parties and their protostate government authorities) and
an extensively intact infrastructure, which had been developed over
the period since 1991. Although a reorganisation of the political
landscape in Iraqi Kurdistan can be expected in the medium
term owing to the considerable and, since the fall of the Saddam
dictatorship, constantly growing dissatisfaction of large sections of
the population as a result of corruption, nepotism and the dictatorial
behaviour of the two parties, it is not yet clear whether this will
give rise to a ‘third force’ of younger, more modern forces or to any
fundamental reform of the KDP and PUK. However, the stability and
capacity for political action of the Kurdish autonomous region have
remained at a high level despite this factor of uncertainty, especially
compared with the remainder of the country. Nonetheless, there is a
huge leaning among the Kurdish population and its parties in favour
of independence from Iraq, though this is not demanded publicly
for pragmatic reasons.
Kurdish policy therefore presses strongly for the federalisation
of Iraq and actual Kurdish autonomy as minimum conditions for
remaining in Iraq, though this could then be extended to sovereignty
should the course of events prove unsatisfactory. At the same time,
there are strong tendencies towards integrating the Kurdish areas
outside the old autonomous zone into the Kurdish sphere of control
as well as making the important oil city of Kirkuk and the area around
Mosul Kurdish (again), something which harbours considerable
potential for conflict vis-à-vis the Arab and Turkmen sections of
the population.
However, an interethnic civil war is unlikely in the foreseeable
future despite this constellation. Although occasional ethnic or
interconfessional acts of violence can hardly be prevented at the local
level, for example in the regions in and around Mosul and Kirkuk,
this is not expected to spread over a large area for the time being. In
particular, a new Kurdish–Arab war is not on the agenda, in spite of
the potential for conflict that exists locally – the Kurdish side has no
interest, anyway, while the Sunni and Shiite Arabs would not be in a
position to pursue this line in the foreseeable future; in addition, most
Shiites would find such an idea absurd. The relationship between the

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Arab Shiites and the Kurds is more one of reserve, not hostility, with an
informal coalition of the secular Kurds and the religious Shiite parties
against the Sunnis even forming after the fall of the dictatorship. This
Kurdish–Shiite link was weakened considerably in 2004, first because
of the negotiation process in regard to a provisional constitution,
and because of the military escalation in both Arab Sunni and Shiite
areas in the spring of 2004. Still, if any larger-scale violence were to
occur in the future, this would presumably be most likely directed
against the occupation or take place within the Shiite population in
the course of a struggle for political supremacy.
Seen against this background, nation-building is an extremely
complex and difficult undertaking. The main political problems are
the tendency of the only stable part of the country (the Kurdish
autonomous zone) to break away from the state, the political paralysis
and fragmentation of the Sunni Arabs as the traditional political elite,
as well as the conflictive and religiously distorted political structure
among the Arab Shiites. Added to this are the serious weaknesses
of social and political integration mechanisms and the disastrous
situation in the economic, social, security and infrastructure
domains, which are giving rise to understandable dissatisfaction and
considerable potential for conflict.

WASHINGTON’S POSTWAR PLANNING

Postwar planning began in August 2002 when a member of the National

Security Council was instructed to recruit the appropriate competent
specialists (Washington Post 2003a). The US State Department played
a key role in the planning. However, on 20 January 2003, only weeks
before the start of the war, President Bush decided that the Defense
Department should be responsible for postwar planning.

The State Department and other agencies spent many months and millions
of dollars drafting strategies on issues ranging from a post-war legal code to
oil policy. But after President Bush granted authority over reconstruction to
the Pentagon, the Defense Department all but ignored State and its working
groups. And once Baghdad fell, the military held its post-war team out of Iraq
for nearly two weeks for security reasons, and then did not provide such
basics as telephones, vehicles and interpreters for the understaffed operation
to run a traumatized country of 24 million. (Washington Post 2003a)

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The Pentagon’s planning was carried out using limited personnel

resources and over a comparatively short period; it was conducted
by an Office of Special Plans, which worked so discretely that even
Jay Garner, who had been appointed in January 2003 as the future
civil administrator, also with responsibility for postwar planning,
only learnt of its existence some weeks later. All the same, it was this
office that stipulated the guidelines.

Garner worked closely with Rumsfeld and Feith and met about once a week
with national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Only seven weeks before
the war began, Garner’s staff members could be counted on one hand, but
he eventually assembled a staff that drew from a number of agencies. … By
March, after Garner arrived at a staging site in Kuwait, members of his own
team believed that the administration had poorly prepared both Iraqis and
Americans for what was to come. One U.S. official recalled, ‘My uniformed
friends kept telling me, “We’re not ready. We’re going into the beast’s
mouth.”’ (Washington Post 2003a)

The postwar planning was not only characterised by bureaucratic

struggles, lack of personnel and improvisation; it was also based on
misjudgements. It was assumed, for example, that the Iraqi population
would enthusiastically welcome the US troops ‘with flowers’. This
is also why Garner told his staff that they should make themselves
superfluous in Iraq ‘within 90 days’ (Washington Post 2003b). The
passiveness and lack of preparation on the part of the occupying
authorities contributed to many pressing tasks not being dealt with at
all or only very unsatisfactorily. The rapid replacement of Jay Garner
by Paul Bremer was evidence of this failure.

US OCCUPATION POLICY AND NATION-BUILDING

The US occupation policy was, especially in the first few months,

characterised less by targeted planning than by improvisation and
trial and error. The Pentagon had expected to be able to take over
and use the effective Iraqi state apparatus (including its police force)
more or less intact. Nation-building was not a declared objective
of the occupying authorities and, for this reason, they were hardly
prepared for it. The US authorities were geared up, in particular, to
assume control, combat humanitarian crises (hunger, refugees) and
hand over formal governmental authority (not necessary real power)

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to a new Iraqi government, the core of which was to be flown in

from exile.
In this context, the Pentagon felt – in open conflict with the State
Department and the CIA – that the prime choice for leader should
be Ahmed Chalabi, who had close personal contacts with Vice-
President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others. The
idea of preserving the Iraqi state apparatus and simply providing
it with a new, handpicked leadership quickly proved unrealistic,
however: the authorities broke up virtually overnight, the police
stayed at home, and Chalabi met with very strong disapproval from
the Iraqi population. After the prompt handover of power to a group
of acceptable exiles had failed and the state apparatus hardly existed
any more, the task of state- and nation-building arose of its own
accord. A functioning state system was indispensable for tackling the
practical problems of a society of 24 million inhabitants, not least of
all in order to control the population and ensure security. In addition,
the uncertain situation within and between the different groups of
the population necessitated political integration mechanisms that
first had to be created.
These tasks were made substantially more difficult by the fact
that living conditions in most of the country (with the exception
of the Kurdish autonomous zone) were deteriorating severely under
the occupying regime: the security situation immediately became
dramatically worse, as the wave of looting in many towns and cities
clearly illustrated. The US troops were playing an extremely dubious
role in this context: in many cases, they refused, despite emphatic
requests, to protect even hospitals or the national museum from
looters while, in other instances, eye-witnesses reported that they
actually encouraged looting. The German Embassy in Baghdad, for
example, was first looted after a US tank had flattened the gate and
US soldiers encouraged the perpetrators.1
One reason for the initially chaotic security situation was that the
US had practically no military police at its disposal when the war in
Iraq ended, which had particularly dramatic consequences in view
of the ensuing looting. After the war, the US authorities in Iraq were,
in particular, to

• ensure security for their own personnel and the Iraqi popula-
tion;
• restore normal living conditions through reconstructing
the technical, social and economic infrastructure, especially

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electricity and water supplies plus medical and social

facilities;
• safeguard the social cohesion of Iraq and prevent tendencies
towards disintegration; and
• establish a new political system to which political power could
be transferred in the medium term without harming their own
interests.

The first two tasks, the fulfilment of which was necessary in order to
stabilise the country in the short term, to legitimise the occupation
and to create conditions for control and nation-building, were tackled
with alarming cluelessness. The US authorities could only establish
the security of their own troops to a very limited extent, with more
US soldiers killed in attacks by the summer of 2003 than during the
actual war, and the situation further deteriorating since the spring of
2004. More significant in political terms, however, was the fact that
the Iraqi civil population was even far less secure than the occupiers,
with spontaneous and organised violent crime, political intimidation
and force, plus general lawlessness developing into a daily threat for
the population at large. For this reason, the criticism was frequently
levelled that: ‘The US troops are very interested in security – but only
in their own, not ours.’2
Reestablishment of the civil infrastructure also proceeded at an
astonishingly sluggish pace and without success in the first few
months, with the electricity supply in Baghdad functioning only
seven to eight hours a day and just two to four hours a day in
cities like Mosul, according to the complaints of local residents.
Even in March of 2004 Baghdad residents still complained of the
power supply being cut four times a day for two to three hours each
time. Without electricity, other public services are also restricted;
no electricity means no water supply because the pumps cannot
work. In intense heat (up to 60°C in summer 2003), restrictions of
this nature had an especially grave and direct impact on the health
situation – especially under conditions of makeshift medical care
services. One high-ranking US official commented on the problem
as follows at the beginning of July 2003:

‘Power is the central issue,’ a senior U.S. official here said. ‘Without it, you
don’t have security. You don’t have an economy. You don’t have trust in
what we’re doing. What you do have is more anger, more frustration, more

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violence. We’re not going to solve anything here until we first find a way to
get more electricity to the people.’ (Washington Post 2003c).

Criticism of the severe shortcomings in the areas of security and

infrastructure was already widespread in the summer of 2003 and
increasing well into in 2004 (outside the better-organised Kurdish
autonomous zone), with differences principally evident in terms of
how they were assessed politically: one part of the population pleaded
for patience, while others became increasingly louder in their demand
for the withdrawal of the occupying troops and for responsibility to
be handed over to Iraqi bodies.
Serious problems also soon surfaced in relation to the introduction
of new social and political integration mechanisms and state-building.
For example, a further 15,000–30,000 civil servants were, contrary
to the original plans, dismissed by the US civil administrator, Paul
Bremer, on political grounds (because of actual or alleged links with
the dictatorship) (Washington Post 2003c) while, at the same time,
high-ranking officials of the Saddam regime were promoted to key
positions, such as the new governor of Mosul, an incriminated army
general. Local elections were prepared in numerous towns and cities
but then stopped by Bremer at the last minute because an acceptable
election outcome could not be guaranteed (New York Times 2003a;
Washington Post 2003d).
The impression thus emerged that, although the US spoke of
democracy, it did not want to permit it unless it had complete
control of the process. Where Jay Garner had already promised at the
beginning of May 2003 that there would be a new Iraqi government
the same month (New York Times 2003b), this was no longer the
case just a few weeks later. This situation was underlined by the
formation and handling of the ‘Provisional Governing Council’
and the subsequently appointed ministers: contrary to the original
promises, the Council was not chosen by a large ‘National Assembly’
of Iraqis; it was determined exclusively by the occupying power (New
York Times 2003b). The Council was not given responsibility for
government, rather only advisory functions. Despite the uncertain
security situation, the US troops even declined to provide the
Governing Council the 100 rifles requested for their bodyguards (four
for each member), saying that these could be acquired elsewhere.
(They were eventually obtained from the Kurdish military.) The
‘Governing Council’ was not allowed any influence on practical
policy-making, e.g. in the domains of security, infrastructure or

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the awarding of contracts to companies for reconstruction. It was

predominantly a PR exercise designed to symbolise the hope for a
subsequent takeover of power by the Iraqis. The reality was different.
US civil administrator Bremer stated with gratifying clarity: ‘As long
as we are here, we are the occupying power. It’s an ugly word, but
it’s the truth’ (Washington Post 2003e).
The Iraqi population reacted to the situation of occupation
in different ways. The vast majority of the Kurds had welcomed
Washington’s war against Iraq because it was seen as the only way
of bringing down the dictatorship. The US troops were and continue
to be accepted and are being asked to stay permanently because only
they can guarantee security against the threats coming from Turkey
and Iran, who are both extremely suspicious of Kurdish autonomy
or even independence in Iraq for internal political reasons. US
presence is also seen as an insurance against attempts by subsequent
governments in Baghdad to regain control of Kurdistan, even though
there is widespread distrust of Washington. The Arab Sunni regions
have the least hopes of anything positive emerging from the US
occupation, and have hardly anything to gain from it. It was no
surprise that military resistance to the occupation started in Arab
Sunni areas, with a broad-based insurgency in Falluja becoming
a symbol of this resistance. The heavy-handed tactics of the US
occupation forces greatly contributed to this resistance. Among
the Shiite Arab population there has been a distinct ambivalence
in regard to US occupation. On the one hand, Shiites were relieved
and thankful that Saddam Hussein had been toppled. At the same
time, however, they were very suspicious of US policy, accusing it
of striving for supremacy in the region and control of the Iraqi oil
deposits. Many Shiites already felt cheated by the US by summer and
autumn 2003: promises were not kept and living conditions were
difficult to endure. Among Arab Sunnis and Shiites, such growing
antipathies sometimes gave rise to absurd conspiracy theories, for
example speculation on whether the US was possibly responsible
for the bomb attacks on the UN Headquarters and the Imam Ali
mosque in Najaf.
At the time of writing, the political mood in Iraq had deteriorated
for two reasons. First, the population’s patience diminished with the
continuing situation of lawlessness and disastrous living conditions,
thus lessening the political credit of the US; second, the unresolved
security problem (and the US response to it) had severe political
consequences: the numerous attacks on US soldiers forced the

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occupying troops to distance themselves more from the population

and be suspicious of Iraqi civilians, acting towards them in a security-
centred manner. The desired image of liberators had increasingly
turned into one of mere occupiers, at least in the Arab territories.
When violence and resistance to the occupation in the Sunni
triangle became complemented by similar practices in the Shiite
areas, Washington’s position became politically fragile. Arab Sunni
violence was a nuisance, but could have been kept under control
over time, if it would have been occurring in a context of a peaceful
north and south, that is Kurdish and Shiite areas. But with parts
of the Iraqi Shiites joining military resistance to the occupation, it
increasingly became questionable whether occupation was feasible
in the long run. Shiite insurgency was not a general uprising of Iraqi
Shiites, but organised by one Shiite group which was in the danger
of being politically marginalised, Muqtada Sadr’s ‘Mahdi Army’. The
majority of Shiites and of Shiite parties still did not feel the need
for violent resistance when the fighting began. For them, peaceful
struggle still seemed the most attractive option, since power would
necessarily fall to the Shiites in a framework of elections because
of their constituting the majority of the population. But because
of the increasing resentment of US occupation the Shiite clergy
and parties like Dawa and SCIRI were put in an awkward situation:
being hostile towards Muqtada Sadr’s movement and their tactics,
but not being able to confront them out of fear of appearing as
collaborators in the occupation. As a result Muqtada’s support in the
Shiite community increased.
The fragile situation of the occupation put the question of transfer
of power to an Iraqi government at the top of the agenda. The need
for transfer increased with the worsening of the security situation,
with the loss of acceptance and of prestige of the US occupation,
while the chances of a peaceful, orderly and well-designed transfer
weakened. Instability, insecurity, together with the weakening of
Washington’s political strength in Iraq and its lack of planning made
the handover of power more and more difficult, while delaying it
would have fanned resistance to the occupation even more. Nation-
building and state-building became more urgent then ever, but the
US capacity to control and shape it had diminished. US tactics
now rediscovered the United Nations as an actor in Iraq. Lakhdar
Brahimi, the UN representative to Iraq was declared to have a free
hand in drawing up a plan for the transition of power and selecting
suitable personnel. In the meantime it became more obvious that

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internal dynamics had started a realignment of political forces in

Iraq: even US-appointed and pro-US politicians and parties had to
distance themselves more and more from Washington in order not
to appear as mere US puppets and lose any credibility inside Iraq.
As a result, neither the UN nor the US could force their candidates
for the jobs of prime minister and president of the future Iraqi
government. The US-appointed Governing Council prevailed in
selecting the key positions, thereby demonstrating a weakening
foreign influence and its intention to secure jobs for most of its
members despite their lack of public support. The selection process
of the new government constituted a double minicoup of artificially
selected politicians with a limited public base against their foreign
masters and the aspirations of their own population. In the context
of both Iraqi nation-building and stabilisation, the transfer of power
from the US occupation authorities to an Iraqi government on 30
June 2004 was an ambiguous affair: on the one hand it was the only
way forward, since further occupation would become increasingly
untenable. On the other hand, it was still less than clear whether
the US designs for a power transfer could work: Washington started
from the assumption that the new, ‘sovereign’ government should
neither have command over its own military forces (much less a
say in regard to continuing US military operations), nor the right to
change or pass any laws. This would have installed a government
without the ability to actually govern. Such a design would easily
have turned the Iraqi population against such a government, since
it would have been perceived merely as a US-inspired PR exercise to
shift the blame for its policies to Iraqis, without giving them actual
power. In the process of negotiating a new UN resolution to legitimise
the new setup in Iraq, Washington had to compromise and the role
of the new government got strengthened. But it sill is too early to
judge whether the new design has a chance to succeed.

NATION-BUILDING THROUGH WAR AND OCCUPATION?

The US’s nation-building experiment in Iraq was in a state of crisis

after six months, and bordering on failure after a year. Too little and
very slow headway was being made with the reconstruction and
reestablishment of the most necessary infrastructure, the security
situation remained strained and was deteriorating even further.
The handover of power to an Iraqi government was a complex and
poorly planned affair with an uncertain outcome. The newly created

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bodies of Iraqi politics – especially the Provisional Governing Council

and the ministers appointed by it – had few if any administrative
functions and were being kept away from real power by the US
occupation. The US troops on the ground principally focused their
concentration, for obvious reasons, on the military security of their
own units, which, however, repeatedly lead to unintended victims
among the civil population or even Iraqi policemen and increased
the scepticism shown towards the occupiers. The scandal over torture
of Iraqi prisoners in US-run prisons did not make things better. To
ensure a successful policy, the US urgently needed an ‘Iraqisation’ of
the security system which did not work satisfactory. However, it also
wanted to keep a firm grip on this ‘Iraqisation’, which gave the new
institutions a colonial flavour and lead to allegations of collaboration
by their staff. This will undermine the legitimacy of the occupation
over the long term.
The fact that Washington never developed any recognisable
concept for Iraqi nation-building and was instead intent on resolutely
muddling its way through is another significant problem. This exists
for two reasons: first, because any role by the military in nation-
building continues to be rejected (although this stance is being eased
in view of the actual requirements) and, second, because there is an
almost irresolvable conflict of objectives between the requirements
of military occupation and imperial control on the one hand and
those of a transfer of power to civilian protagonists and medium-term
nation-building on the other hand.
But the main stumbling block for an orderly transfer of power
was the problem that the occupation forces had very few attractive
options as regards to whom to transfer power. Many of the pro-US
actors were hardly more than artificial creations of the US itself,
and thereby tainted as tools of the occupation with little backing
inside Iraq. The Kurdish parties did have political support in the
Kurdish areas, but none further south, and they were only tactically
supporting Iraqi nation-building because their main interest was
building their own state, outside or only loosely connected to Iraq.
And the religiously inspired Shiite parties were deeply distrusted by
Washington and were difficult to instrumentalise by the United States
because of their own agendas.
If we apply the three main criteria for successful nation-building,
that is state-building, integrating society, and an integrative ideology
(see Hippler, Chapter 14, this volume), the results of US-led policies
in Iraq in 2004/05 are less than impressive. One, Washington was

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mostly responsible for turning an all-powerful and oppressive state

into a failed state. Two, it was neither conceptionally nor materially
prepared to deal with this situation it had created. Three, the slow
speed and incompetence in rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure and
the heavy-handed military occupation taxed the patience of the
population with foreign troops and policies and dramatically reduced
US credibility. The result was deep mistrust against the occupation
in the Arab areas and its nation-building attempts. Four, internal
conditions for nation-building in Iraq are highly complex, since it
requires a careful rebalancing of ethnic and religious parts of the
population, without ‘ethnicising’ the political process. The Arab
Shiite groups are expecting the lion’s share of power, which will be
difficult for many Sunni Arabs, given their tradition of dominance.
And the Kurdish parties can only be bribed to remain inside Iraq
with a highly disproportional share of power in Baghdad, which will
trigger resentment among Arabs.
The US occupation experiment may have legally ended in July
2004, but for most practical purposes it will continue as long as
US troops militarily dominate Iraq. It has not yet failed, but it is in
dangerous waters. Success or failure cannot be reliably predicted as
yet, but both are possible scenarios. However, in 2004 US-dominated
nation-building for Iraq was on its way down. The Kurdish parties
were discreetly pushing for their own version of nation-building, as
were the Shiite parties, with the US forces increasingly less able to
unilaterally shape Iraqi politics.

NOTES

1. Accounts related to the author by witnesses, Baghdad, August 2003.

2. Statements made to the author in Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf, August
2003 and March 2004.

REFERENCES

Batatu, Hanna (1982) The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements
of Iraq (Princeton, NJ).
Hippler, Jochen (1990) ‘Kurdistan – Ein ungelöstes Problem im Mittleren
Osten’, Vereinte Nationen, December, pp. 202–5.
New York Times (2003a) ‘Iraqis were Set to Vote, but U.S. Wielded a Veto’, New
York Times, Internet edition of 19 June.
New York Times (2003b) ‘In Reversal, Plan for Iraq Self-Rule Has Been Put off’,
New York Times, Internet edition of 17 May.

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 The Case of Iraq 97

Washington Post (2003a) ‘Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors’, Washington Post,

24 July, p. A01.
Washington Post (2003b) ‘Reconstruction Planners Worry, Wait and Re-
Evaluate’, Washington Post, 2 April, p. A01.
Washington Post (2003c) ‘Blackout Return, Deepening Iraq’s Dark Days’,
Washington Post, 3 July, S. A01.
Washington Post (2003d) ‘Plan to Secure Post-war Iraq Faulted’, Washington
Post, 19 May, p. A01.
Washington Post (2003e) ‘Occupation Forces Halt Elections throughout Iraq’,
Washington Post, 28 June, p. A20.

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 8
Between Self-determination and
Multiethnicity – International Actors and
Nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo
Dušan Reljiç

The outcome of nation-building in the conflict regions of the West

Balkans over the past 15 years has – since the beginning of the
disintegration of Yugoslavia – been determined exclusively by the
West and principally by the US. In the end, the external effect has left
little sign of the initial intentions of the local political leaders whose
nationalistic politics had led to ethnopolitical conflicts and war.
The two most important ‘national projects’ occupying the political
scene in place of the Titoist model of multiethnic ‘brotherhood and
unity’ during the period of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia,
that is the dreams of a ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Croatia’, failed,
for example, as a result of outside intervention. Other nationalist
movements have also found it impossible to realise their maximum
objectives, at least up to now: the Muslims have not risen to become
the dominant titular nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an Albanian-
dominated Kosovo still has to overcome some uncertain ground
before attaining actual independence, and whether the emergence
of a ‘Greater Albania’ will one day find its way onto the international
agenda is something that is still written in the stars.
At the same time, external state actors intervening in the conflicts
in various forms were also transformed by the armed clashes that
took place in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999. It was,
for example, Germany which, after a half-century of ‘abstinence’
following World War II, activated the military component of foreign
policy by taking part in armed interventions in the former Yugoslavia.
Russia proved to be a ‘paper tiger’ – unable to project power outside
the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. Moscow has, in the
meantime, completely withdrawn its peace-keeping troops from
Bosnia and Kosovo.
Only the US has so far been able to chalk up any distinct successes
in the fragmented Yugoslavia, with Washington strengthening both

98

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 International Actors and Nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo 99

its claim to leadership within NATO and its ‘credibility’ as a global

decision-maker by leading the West’s military interventions on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia and then also stipulating the
essential terms of the peace settlements in Croatia and Bosnia as
well as for Kosovo. A pax Americana has come about on the territory
of the former Yugoslavia. The European Union, although it wanted to
play a leading role – especially at the beginning of the armed phase
of the conflict in 1991 – has not been able to assert its ideas. With
the US having turned its attention towards the ‘war on terror’, the
EU is now acting increasingly in this region with a type of general
power of attorney granted by Washington.1
Before examining the performance of the international actors
in greater detail, let us first take a look at the current situation.
How stable is this post-Yugoslavian peace framework imposed
‘from outside’? How do things look in the region with regard to
democracy and socioeconomic progress as central areas of the nation-
building process?

INTERIM APPRAISAL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

The three wars waged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia

since 1991 in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, together with the 1998
rebellion in Kosovo and the NATO attacks on Bosnian Serbs in 1995
and then on Serbia itself in 1999, cost tens of thousands of lives
and caused deep divisions between the ethnic groups in the region.
It took just one decade for the territory of the former Yugoslavia to
fragment – a state which had previously endured for seven decades,
even enjoying a certain degree of importance in world politics as the
most powerful country in its region.
The interventions by the West have so far mainly served to stop
the bloodshed and protected the region against any further spread
of the chaotic conditions that broke out as a result of the dissolution
of state structures. However, no workable regional state order with
effective internal and external security structures has yet developed,
even though no other region in the world has had so many influential
external state and non-state actors present for over a decade, all trying
to promote or directly establish stability and democracy.
The situation is worst in Kosovo, where the external intervention
has been greatest; even four years after the arrival of the NATO-
led international peace-keeping troops, there is still no elementary
security for members of minority groups. Consequently, there are

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ever fewer people from minorities living there – of the 230,000 Serbs
and other non-Albanians who fled to safety before the international
peace-keeping troops arrived only a small number have returned
to Kosovo. Even the majority ethnic group is threatened by terror,
corruption and organised crime. The international protectorate itself
is increasingly proving to be the opposite of a model for democracy.
In the words of the Council of Europe’s human rights envoy, Alvaro
Gil-Robles, commenting on the state of the UN administration at the
end of 2002: ‘... it is clear that the very structure of the international
administration as well as certain powers retained by its various
branches, substantially deviate from international human rights
norms and the accepted principles of the rule of law’ (Gil-Robles
2002:4).
A former justice expert of the international administration in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Dr Axel Schwarz, spoke in his
analysis of the power structures of the UN administration in Kosovo
(UNMIK) of a ‘return of absolutism’ (Schwarz 2002:527).
Nor do the social, political and economic structures in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in any way fulfil the expectations and needs there, and
this despite huge financial allocations and the long-term work of
a large number of Western aid organisations. The UN protectorate
administrator, Paddy Ashdown, and his predecessors have taken major
decisions by decree, from the ‘ethically neutral design’ of the new
national flag to the removal of high-ranking democratically elected
politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the political institutions
created by the West have not produced the desired results. As an
independent state, Bosnia-Herzegovina depends on the presence of
the West. Political heteronomy and outside military presence will
undoubtedly continue for a number of years.
The lack of internal consolidation in the former conflict regions of
ex-Yugoslavia goes hand in hand with uncertain prospects in relation
to linking these entities to European integration processes in the near
future. While substantial progress has been made on the continent
over the last decade in the area of political and economic integration,
particularly by way of the recent accession of a number of Central
and Eastern European countries to the EU, the new states of South-
east Europe (with the exception of Slovenia) remain in an unstable
state with uncertain prospects. Further national fragmentation
(e.g. disintegration of the entity of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ or the
secession of Kosovo) is at least just as likely as the forging of closer
links to the EU in the short term.

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Since the beginning of Western interventions in the former

Yugoslavia, which also signalled the start of the emergence of new
nation-states in the region, the number of new political subjects
claiming independent status under international law in that region
has constantly increased. There are now nine political entities on
the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
– or even more depending on whether Serbia and Montenegro are
referred to as one or two states, Kosovo is still counted as part of
Serbia, Bosnia is regarded as being divided in two or three and the
predominantly Albanian-settled regions of west Macedonia are
deemed already detached from Skopje or, indeed, indications of the
outlines of an all-Albanian state are recognised. What all of the post-
Yugoslavian autonomies that actually do exist have in common is
their severely restricted sovereignty: there are UN protectorates in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo, while Macedonia and
Montenegro are extensively dependent on the West, and Serbia,
Croatia and Slovenia need the goodwill of Western centres of power
in every respect. As long as the new states remain so weak, both
in terms of their dependence on centres of power in the West and
their limited ability to perform internal state functions, it will hardly
be possible to make headway in establishing regional stability and
democratisation or furthering economic and social development.
In economic and social terms, the region has fallen apart since
the demise of the former Yugoslavia, setting it back several decades.
Only Slovenia has been able to regain the economic power that
it enjoyed in 1989; Serbia, the most populous former constituent
republic of Yugoslavia now generates just half the gross national
product of that year, when the violent process of disintegration was
imminent. In Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statistics are
even more disastrous. Seven new currencies (including the euro in
Montenegro) have emerged to replace the Yugoslav dinar. On the
important former pan-Yugoslavian north–south highway (E70),
the fastest link between Central Europe and the Near East, there
are now customs checks every 300–400 kilometres. The change in
the region has so far taken the form of a general step backwards in
economic and social terms compared with the period prior to 1991.
Deindustrialisation, unemployment and depopulation are only a few
of the disheartening processes that are destroying social cohesion
in the region over the long term, thus ruining the foundations for
nation-building.

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STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION OF FRAGMENTATION

The beginning of the West’s nation-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Kosovo and the other parts of the former Yugoslavia was undoubtedly
marked by local ethnopolitical conflicts. They were an expression of
failed modernisation and numerous other weaknesses in the political
and economic development of the southern Slavic state since 1918.
The nationalist outbursts that occurred in the former Yugoslavia in the
late 1980s were inflamed even more by the change in world politics
during the demise of the Soviet Union. The failure of the power elite
– after the death of the absolute dictator for many years, Josip Broz
Tito (1980), in what was already a fragmented state – to manage
economic and political change as long as there was still stability in
the international environment had disastrous consequences.
Virtually from the outset, however, it was no longer possible
to speak of any local ownership in the political dynamics that
developed during the course of the demise of Yugoslavia. The local
actors only had prospects of success insofar as they were able to
win the outside protecting powers over to their side. The primary
concern of the national leaders was to gain recognition of their
political claims and find powerful external allies against their
opponents within Yugoslavia. In this way, the local political actors
inevitably became clients of external protecting powers to an ever-
greater extent. States of dependence developed which left the local
partners little scope for action. The Croatian, Serbian and Muslim
political leaders, for example, eventually signed the peace agreement
for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dayton in 1995, which did not meet the
war objectives of any of the three sides. Four years later, an interim
solution for Kosovo was set out in UN Resolution 1244. Neither the
Albanian rebels nor the government in Belgrade were involved in this
coming about. The real actors engaged in the ethnopolitical conflicts
had only minor roles in the end game with hardly any other choice
than to accept the will of the West – and, in particular, of the US.
In this context, the demand for self-determination is the
central concept of nationalist politics. The ‘death’ of Yugoslavia in
ethnopolitical conflicts and wars was brought about in the name of
the nation, as the birth of the right to national self-determination.
However, it was not the monoethnic creations (ethnically pure
nations) longed for by the nationalistic obstetricians that arose from
this bloody act of procreation.2 In the end, most of the nationalist
projects in the former Yugoslavia were thwarted by the intervention

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of outside powers. This occurred unexpectedly insofar as the external

intervention in the initial phase (1989–92) was carried out primarily
in the name of the people’s right of self-determination. The support
for the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was, especially in newly
reunited Germany, justified in 1990 on the grounds of the paramount
importance of the right of self-determination. The abandonment
of the common, multiethnic state was deemed necessary to enable
the individual southern Slavic nations to exercise their right of self-
determination. The nationalist principle, condensed in the endeavour
to establish one’s identity between ethnic and political boundaries,
was given priority. The ethnic pluralism in the constituent republics
of Yugoslavia was to be taken account of by the states with the help
of laws to protect the minorities. The fact was totally ignored in this
respect that the ‘new’ minorities had previously lived in a common
state for 70 years and now, overnight, had to become citizens of a state
that was hostile to them, given that the ‘national ideology’ in the new
states was generally based on stirring up rejection and hatred towards
the ‘other’ nations (the new minorities). Nevertheless, the right to
self-determination was – with the help of the West – interpreted as
the right of nationalist movements to form nation-states in place of
a multinational federation. This provided, in essence, support for
the force- and war-oriented policy of the nationalist movements,
into which the communist power institutions in the constituent
republics of Yugoslavia had transformed themselves after the end
of one-party rule.
In Germany, in particular, there was a widespread national-romantic
view of the conflict situation. This was expressed in the axiomatic
call that Germany, which had regained its unity on the basis of
the right to self-determination, could on no account refuse support
for Slovenia and Croatia, which were also demanding the right to
self-determination. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl even spoke of
a ‘particularly intensive relationship between the Germans and the
Croatians’ which had ‘very much to do with history’ (Federal Press
Office, 16.1.1992). The media had already printed an observation
by the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, according to which there
existed ‘as it were a genetic predisposition to friendship between the
Russian and Serbian peoples’. In both cases, this gave expression to an
effusively romantic view of the situation that bore no relation to the
actual political developments, which were primarily concerned with
questions regarding control over ethnically ‘cleansed’ territories.

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A view of the Yugoslav conflict fixed solely on the right of self-

determination of the peoples tended to overlook the fact that the
political borders within Yugoslavia were, with few exceptions, not
identical to ethnic borders, with this especially the case in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The right of self-determination of the peoples
as a priority for intervention by the West came to an abrupt end
the moment Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ‘most Yugoslavian’ of
all the constituent republics by virtue of being almost completely
multiethnic and having no titular nation, became embroiled in a
three-way civil war in 1992/93.3 The bloodshed was halted in 1995
by the military intervention, led by the US, against the Bosnian Serbs.
A year earlier at meetings in Bonn and Washington, the Bosnians
(Muslims) and Croats were forced into a joint federation under the
most enormous political pressure. The results of the West’s political
and military intervention were transformed politically into the
Dayton Peace Accord.
Washington and the Western allies declared their readiness from
that point on to recognise a new ethnic entity – Republika Srpska – as
a consideration for the willingness of the Bosnian Serbs to remain
in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of a decentralised
state. This thwarted the plans of Croat and Serb nationalists to split
up Bosnia and annex the captured areas to the ‘motherland’. The
Dayton Accord did, however, permit the Bosnian Serbs and Croats
vaguely defined ‘special relations’ with Serbia and Croatia, through
which the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina was partially set aside
forthwith. With the dividing-up of this former constituent republic
of Yugoslavia into cantons at the lowest structural level and the
Muslim–Croat federation constituting the reformed state together
with Republika Srpska, the creators of the Dayton Accord wanted to
take account of the ethnopolitical division of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but leave the external borders unchanged – a plan equivalent to the
proverbial squaring of the circle.
In the spring of 2003, the British historian, Timothy Garton Ash,
wrote in relation to the problem of self-determination: ‘As so often,
we can only twist and turn helplessly when confronted with the
subject of “self-determination”’ (Die Welt, 31.03.2003). The occasion
for this opinion was the refusal of the West to support the Kurds in
Iraq and Turkey in their autonomy endeavours while, according to
Ash, it was in the process of helping the Kosovo Albanians to gain
independence from Serbia.

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EXTERNAL NATION-BUILDING AS A STATE OF LIMBO

A number of constructs unprecedented under international law have

emerged as a result of the West’s nation-building endeavours in the
former Yugoslavia. In view of the fact that, even eight years after
the peace agreement reached in Dayton, the complex constitution
in Bosnia-Herzegovina can only be maintained – as in Kosovo
since 1999 – by a ‘proconsul’ in the name of the UN possessing
all the power and also using it, the number of voices demanding
that the Dayton Accord be revised is increasing. However, nobody
dares to make any really serious move in this direction because
the consequences for the fragile peace in the entire region could
be incalculable. Furthermore, the attention of the US following the
events of September 11, 2001 could well be focused squarely on the
‘war on terror’ for quite some time yet. Bosnia-Herzegovina thus
remains an incomplete attempt to take hold again of the nationalist
spirit which the West essentially encouraged by supporting the
transformation of the Yugoslav constituent republics of Slovenia
and Croatia into independent nation-states. The contemplation of
multiethnicity has come too late.
In the case of Kosovo, the inconsistency of the West’s action has
been fully revealed. The military intervention led by the US ended
the affiliation of the previously autonomous province to Serbia in
practical terms in 1999 without, however, formally establishing any
definite new situation under international law. At the same time, in
no other part of the former Yugoslavia was ethnic homogenisation as
far reaching as in Kosovo after the West’s intervention: the Albanians
are now extensively living among themselves, without any significant
prospect of the non-Albanians that fled returning. Nevertheless, in the
runup to the US attack on Iraq, the West’s nation-building endeavours
in Kosovo were often cited as an ‘example of relative success’ and
something to be emulated in other failed states (Rice 2003:6). On the
other hand, the example of Bosnia led the US Assistant Secretary of
State, Paul D. Wolfowitz, to stress that it could be dangerous to hold
democratic elections in Iraq straight away in order to simply prove
that democracy was taking root there. According to the influential
strategist, ‘dangerously divisive leaders’ could come to power (in an
interview with the New York Times, 21.05.2003).
A further consequence of the ethnic homogenisation that occurred
in Kosovo after 1999 is the emergence of an extended Albanian
monoethnic region in the south west of the Balkan Peninsula which,

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in addition to the southern Serbian province, also covers western

Macedonia and Albania. The political borders between four countries
still remain. The West – and now, in particular, the EU – does not dare
to address this inconsistency because there is a fear that any union
of the Albanian nation would give rise to an uncontrollable domino
effect for the rest of the region: how could the Croats and Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina then be stopped from demanding unification
with their ‘mother nations’? Would the state of Macedonia, held
together through a great effort on the part of the EU and US, then
promptly perish?
The ‘Albanian question’ awaits an answer, which, as expressed very
sensitively in a recent report by the United States Institute of Peace,
‘will almost surely require more extensive regional arrangements
than exist today’ (USIP 2002:4). The process of removing previous
state structures in the region and establishing new political entities
has evidently not been completed by any means. The outcome of
the external military-political interventions that have taken place in
the former Yugoslavia over the past decade is thus still open in many
respects. At present, the Albanian pressure for secession in Kosovo
and Macedonia is only restrained by huge threats from the West.
In Montenegro, the faction of politicians striving for independence
around Prime Minister Milo Ðukanoviç has temporarily put its
intentions on ice solely because of the West’s disapproval. All in all,
it has to be assumed that the transformation of the ethnopolitical
conflicts in the region will continue to proceed in the future under
considerable and decisive influence from outside.

THE EU AND US AS ‘NATION-BUILDERS’ IN THE BALKANS

Since 2001, the European Union has gradually taken over the initiative
(and predominant responsibility) for the long-term pacification of the
former Yugoslavia from the US. The West’s nation-building activities
in the former Yugoslavia are presently being carried out – in terms of
the main features involved – as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy. The forced birth of Serbia and Montenegro in 2002/03
took place at the behest of the EU, personified by its foreign policy
representative, Xavier Solana, who, on 14 March 2002, forced the top
politicians in Belgrade and Podgorica to sign an agreement on the
transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the entity
of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’, with no more precise definition under
constitutional law. (No surprise then when the new creation was

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promptly dubbed ‘Solania’.) At the same time, the EU assumed central

security responsibilities in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Together with the loans from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, the monies provided by the EU (for example via
the reconstruction programme, CARDS, plus the European Agency
for Reconstruction) are the most important source of finance for the
Yugoslav succession states, which suffer from excessive debt, high
foreign trade deficits and a lack of direct foreign investment.
Has the EU taken on too much in the former Yugoslavia financially
and politically? Will its commitment as a ‘nation-builder’ in the region
end in disgrace? There is strong endorsement for the independence of
Kosovo both in the US Congress and in numerous Washington think-
tanks. It is not clear to an important section of the political class in
the US capital why war was waged against Serbia in 1999 if the Kosovo
Albanians are, nevertheless, not constitutionally allowed to leave
Serbia. The prevailing view among diplomats and political scientists
in the EU, however, is that an independent Kosovo would form the
nucleus of a Greater Albania. For this reason, Brussels is at pains to
defer the question of the final status for Kosovo for as long as possible
and on no account permit the separation of Montenegro so as to
prevent the Albanian political leaders from using the independence
of Montenegro as an opportunity for the secession of Kosovo. The
EU places its faith in regional integration processes, which it is hoped
will pacify the region of the former Yugoslavia to such an extent that
accession to the EU would even be possible eventually. It is hoped that
this will preclude any further fragmentation, which would most likely
be accompanied by new armed conflicts. As a political instrument,
the EU has established the so-called Stabilisation and Association
Process (SAP). The SAP does not, however, comprise any guarantee
for future membership of the EU. It is hoped that a stabilising effect
will be brought about by the prospect of possible membership alone.
In concrete terms, it is hoped to steer the political goals of the actors
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro towards the SAP,
which also places great emphasis on regional cooperation, and
away from self-determination in the sense of establishing their own
monoethnic states.
This EU instrument does not appear to offer sufficient incentives at
present, especially with regard to financial assistance or for boosting
the economy and employment and gaining access to the international
market. It is also evident that the EU strategists have developed the
SAP under the assumption that they are dealing with developed

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nations and states. What we have in the West Balkans, however, are
either weak states or state-type entities, like Kosovo, which first wish
to attain clarification of their status before wanting or being able to
enter into transnational unions.
It is therefore not surprising that the political leaders in Priština
and Podgorica are still seeking support among politicians in the US
who are favourably disposed towards them. These include important
foreign-policy figures in the US Congress like Henry Hyde, Tomas
Lantos, Joseph Biden and the Mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg.
The Kosovo Albanians fundamentally reject political negotiations
with the Serbian side without US involvement. They are hoping that
the US will exercise its authority again, as it did in 1995 in Croatia and
Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. Although the present US government
has so far shown no indications of being prepared to go it alone, the
differences of opinion in the political communities of the US and
Western Europe with regard to Kosovo are huge. Over the long term,
the advocates of a more strongly proactive Western policy on the
matter of the final status of Kosovo could gain strength – especially
if the impression were to be reinforced that the work of the UN
administrators in Bosnia and Kosovo is fruitless. This possibility
was pointed out by, among others, the Paris Institute for Security
Studies – a body close to the EU – in March 2003 in a summary
concerning the consequences of the impending reduction of the US
military presence in the Balkans (Triantaphyllou 2003:2). There is
the possibility of a conflict looming once again between the US and
the EU, which could, in particular, cause severe harm to the delicate
growth of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The US had already actively torpedoed the efforts of the EU envoys
to the former Yugoslavia once before, i.e. between 1991 and 1993,
when the EU was attempting to find a political solution for the region.
In the words of the US Secretary of State at the time, James Baker:

Some Europeans – certain that political and monetary union was coming and
would create a European superpower – were headstrong about asserting
a European defense identity in which America’s role on the Continent was
minimized. We had been fighting this for some time, and trying to get them
to recognize that, even with a diminished Soviet threat, they still needed an
engaged America. But our protestations were overlooked in an emotional
rush for a unified Europe. The result was an undercurrent in Washington,
often felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeans step

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 International Actors and Nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo 109

up to the plate and show that they could act as a unified power. Yugoslavia
was as good a first test as any. (Baker 1995:637)

Not much has changed in this respect since then: the former
Yugoslavia is still a test of the EU’s ability to ‘export’ peace, democracy,
social cohesion and economic growth in its immediate surroundings,
i.e. to prove itself as an effective international player and ‘nation-
builder’. At the same time, it is a test of the ability of the US and EU
to develop and implement joint concepts for the transformation
of conflicts, thus also preserving the transatlantic partnership. The
‘objects’ of nation-building have, as always, little scope for asserting
their ambitions. However, the rule of thumb still appears to apply
that whoever maintains the best relations with the strongest external
partner, the US, has the best prospects of realising at least part of its
own goals.
The EU does, though, certainly have the power to take over the
helm: it should summon up the courage to set a firm change of
strategy in motion in relation to the West Balkans. Instead of the
vague promise to examine, after a stabilisation and association process
of indeterminate length, whether the countries of the region can be
included in the group of EU candidates, an unambiguous assurance
of admission should be given. The new strategy would gain credibility
through financial resources being made available and EU structures
adapted for the accelerated admission of the countries of the West
Balkans. If there is clarity that the countries of the West Balkans are
irreversibly on their way to joining the EU, it could then be much
easier to stop any further territorial fragmentation and consolidate
the existing political entities, thus enabling the outstanding ‘national’
problems to be resolved.

NOTES

1. This apposite description comes from the South-East Europe correspondent

of Süddeutsche Zeitung (23 June 2003), Bernhard Küppers, in a commentary
on the outcome of the EU Summit held in Thessaloniki on 19–21 June
2003, at which the ‘Europeans’ declined to grant the ‘West Balkan States’
the status of accession candidates.
2. Nationalists are, following the definition by Ernest Gellner (1983:1), those
people that wish to bring about an identity between political and ethnic
boundaries.
3. In his memoirs relating to the outbreak of the armed conflict, Hans-
Dietrich Genscher (1995:966) attributes the responsibility for the decision
to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina under international law to the US: ‘The

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war in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the second Yugoslav war – began later, and the
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not come about on our initiative
– on the contrary. At the beginning of March 1992, Washington proposed
that the USA and the European Community should act together.’

REFERENCES

Baker, James A., III (with Thomas M. DeFrank) (1995) The Politics of Diplomacy,
Revolution, War & Peace, 1989–1992 (New York).
Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY).
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich (1995) Erinnerungen (Berlin).
Gil-Robles, Alvaro (2002) Kosovo: The Human Rights Situation and the Fate of
Persons Displaced from their Homes (Report by the Commissioner for Human
Rights, Council of Europe, CommDH 11, October, Strasbourg).
Rice, Susan E. (2003) The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States
(The Brookings Institution Policy Brief No. 116, February, Washington,
DC).
Schwarz, Axel (2002) ‘Rückkehr des Absolutismus? – Machtstrukturen in
UNMIK’s Kosovo’, Südosteuropa, Vol. 51, No. 10–12, pp. 527–42.
Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios (2003) Balkans: The Transition from a reduced US
Commitment (Institute Note, Institute for Security Studies, March, Paris).
USIP (United States Institute of Peace) (2002) Taking Stock and Looking Forward,
Intervention in the Balkans and Beyond (Special Report, February, Washington,
DC).

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 9
Nigeria: The Oil State and the
Crisis of Nation-building in Africa
Cyril I. Obi

At the height of the oil boom in the 1970s, a Nigerian military head
of state allegedly boasted that money was no longer the country’s
problem, but how to spend it. This statement, whose veracity is
shrouded in the realm of conjecture, nonetheless aptly captures the
euphoria and sense of boundless wealth and power that petrodollars
bestowed upon the Nigerian ruling class that had won a gruelling
30-month civil war in 1970. The Nigerian civil war, which was
ostensibly fought to preserve the unity of the nation-state, was also
partly provoked by the struggle between the political elite of the
secessionist Biafra (Eastern region) and the rest of Nigeria (Northern,
Western and Midwestern regions), over the control of the oil resources
of the Niger Delta.
Before going further, it is important to explain that Nigeria is a
multiethnic country. With an estimated population of 120 million
people and over 250 ethnic groups of which three – the Hausa-
Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo – are clearly demographically preponderant,
politicised ethnicity has a profound impact on the oil state.
In spite of the victory of the forces of an integrative national(ist)
ideology, divisive ethnicity reemerged in the context of economic
and political crises following the collapse of global oil prices in the
1980s and 1990s and questioned the legitimacy of the oil-buoyed
nation-state project. These protests were intensified by the harsh
social consequences of the structural adjustment programme, military
authoritarianism, and the passions unleashed by the annulment of
the 12 June 1993 presidential elections. The elections were allegedly
won by Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba man from the South-west, but
were annulled by General Ibrahim Babangida, military head of state
and a Nupe from the North. The crisis was further deepened with the
ethnification of the postannulment protests, and the November 1993
coup, leading to the formation of various ethnic militia such as the
O’Odua People’s Congress (Yoruba), Arewa People’s Congress (Hausa-

111

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Fulani), and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign

State of Biafra (Igbo). Ethnoregional sociopoliticocultural elite
organisations such as the Afenifere (Yoruba), the Arewa Consultative
Forum (Hausa-Fulani) and the Ohaneze Ndigbo (Igbo) among others,
(re)emerged to mobilise their ethnic constituents to support their
competing agenda for the Nigerian state. In spite of Nigeria’s return
to democracy in May 1999, pressures have continued to build up
along ethnic, communal, regional and even religious lines thereby
deepening the crisis of the nation-state.
The state became a site, as well as an actor in the struggles
between factions of the various ethnic elites. In this regard, the three
preponderant ethnic groups have largely controlled power at the
centre since independence, while most of the minorities have either
taken up the politics of protest, or aligned with one of the ‘big three’
to gain access to state patronage and resources. This is however not a
new phenomenon given Nigeria’s colonial history, and the divisions
between the North and South which were administered by the British
separately until the amalgamation of 1914. Equally relevant are the
divisions between the North, the East and the West as factions of
the emerging elite struggled for positions of advantage in a future
independent Nigerian state by exploiting their ethnic and regional
bases. At the heart of these divisions was the distrust and fear of
domination of one by the other. These laid the foundations for the
contradictions among the ‘big three’ in postcolonial Nigeria.
Since the mid 1990s, a faction of the Yoruba are demanding the
decentralisation of federal power, alienated by the annulment of
the 12 June 1993 presidential elections won by Abiola who was
subsequently incarcerated and died in detention. This is impelled
by their position that federal power has been allegedly monopolised
by the Hausa-Fulani of the North to the disadvantage of the Yoruba.
Factions from the ethnic minorities and the Igbo have also been
demanding local autonomy and the convening of a sovereign national
conference which is expected to provide them with a platform to
negotiate for the devolution of power (and resources) to the various
ethnic groups that are being emasculated by a highly centralised
form of federalism.
It is, however, important to caution that reducing Nigerian politics
to the level of ethnic determinism would be simplistic and wrong.
For Nigerian politics is much more complex, with ethnic appearances
masking deeper class, historical, personality, and economic interests.
Ethnic politics is very fluid, with complex inter, intra and transclass

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alliances being forged and dissolved on the basis of political benefits

and liabilities. In fundamental terms a lot depends on the exigencies
of power and the determination to retain and gain control of state
power.
Oil is the factor that cements Nigeria’s ethnic pluralities and
sociocultural diversities, just as struggles over oil threaten nation-
building with the spectre of disintegration (Obi 2002:533–50). The
post-civil war hegemonic national elite has stoutly resisted any
attempt to restructure the Nigerian nation-state in order to protect
its monopoly of oil power, best assured by the centralisation of state
power and the politics of patronage. Thus, in spite of the protests of
the excluded groups, their calls for decentralisation and a sovereign
national conference in order to renegotiate the very basis of the
Nigerian union, the hegemonic elite, fearful that giving in to such
demands may lead to the unravelling of the Nigerian nation-state,
but, more fundamentally, lead to the loss of their monopoly over
oil power, continues to resist any real transfer of power and defends
the integrative nationalist ideology.
This chapter critically examines the impact of Nigeria’s total
dependence on oil on the nation-building project. It explores the
multiplicity of possibilities that revolve around the nexus between
oil and the nation-state as a political and economic construct
based on a European model, but largely controlled by an ethnically
heterogeneous and oil-rentier political class. Perhaps the most critical
of such possibilities relates to how relations of inclusion and exclusion
from ‘oil power’ are constructed around a geography of power defined
within the territorial space of the Nigerian state and reproduced
by the global-national oil partnership. Thus, the oil sharpens the
struggles between those who seek a radical redefinition of Nigeria in
ways that respond to their demands for access to power and resource
control, and a pan-Nigerian politicomilitary elite intending to defend
its control of the petro-state at any cost.
The analysis that follows is arranged in four broad sections. A
conceptual section explores the oil-state–nation nexus. It is followed
by a historical background of Nigeria’s emergence as a petro-state
and its implications for the national question. The third section
examines the internal and external dimensions of the Nigerian oil
state and the crisis of nation-building, while the concluding section
discusses the prospects for nation-building in the Nigerian and other
African petro-states.

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CONCEPTUAL ISSUES: OIL, THE STATE AND THE NATION

Oil, once described as ‘the devil’s excrement’ (Karl 1999:32, quoting

Juan Pablo Pérez, OPEC’s founder), occupies a central position in the
economics and politics of all oil-rich societies. This can be gleaned
from the strong connection between the state as a specific modality
of class domination and the economy in oil-rich contexts. It has been
observed that oil tends to foster highly centralist and monopolistic
political (and economic) forms (Morse 1999:14). As Dorraj argues
(1995:125), drawing on cases of the petro-states of the Middle East
and North Africa:

While the influx of the petrodollar into the region since the 1960’s has
brought new wealth and progress, it has also emboldened the authoritarian
regimes, supplying them with a new and sophisticated means of coercion
and control, thus rendering them (in many cases), more autonomous from
their societies.

It is apposite to place the petro-state in this context as one that

is entirely dependent on rents or receipts from oil production and
export. Due to the highly capital-intensive and enclave character
of the oil industry in the developing world, and the domination of
the production process and consumption by vertically integrated
oil multinationals and the G8 countries, oil states are, in the main,
reduced to being rent collectors and distributors. Therefore, in contexts
like Nigeria, where Ake (1985:9) notes that ‘the state is institutionally
constituted in such a way that it enjoys little independence from the
social classes, particularly the hegemonic classes’, those who control
the state also control oil. To a large extent, control of the Nigerian oil
state bestows a lot of (unearned) wealth on the hegemonic classes,
who then seek to retain power at any cost. Such power is often
reinforced through patrimonial networks lubricated and reproduced
through the distribution of oil largesse, while the ‘opposition’ is either
bought off or repressed. The processes of inclusion and exclusion are
primarily determined by access to state power, public office and the
‘power of representation’.
From the foregoing it can be argued that in so far as substantive
petro-dollars continue to flow into the coffers of the petro-state,
that there is no incentive for the decentralisation of state power,
accountability or any real development. Power remains concentrated
in the hands of an oil bourgeoisie: national and global, more so as

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no real productive activity takes place outside of the enclave oil

industry. Emphasis is on distributive or allocative activities, which
are dictated more by control of the oil state rather than by merit,
developmental or entrepreneurial productive activities. Oil is more
of a booty or unearned income, further accentuated by the state’s
non-reliance on a local taxation base (Obi 2001:5).
The pervasive ‘petrolisation’ of politics and economics has
implications for the nation. Apart from spawning centralised regimes
that impose their sense of the nation on the state, it precludes the
emergence of a genuine national capitalist class that will lead the
process of an indigenous industrial revolution. By the same logic, it
also precludes any real democratisation of society. The local dominant
elite, while appropriating local symbols and discourses to legitimise
its rule, remains dependent on external economic forces. To a large
extent, power in oil states is highly personalised, thus fuelling a
politics underscored by authoritarianism, distrust, instability and the
use of coercive state power to keep any competition or the opposition
in check. While this is obvious in the petro-states of North Africa,
the Middle East and the Gulf, the situation in sub-Saharan Africa,
particularly Nigeria, is a little more complex.
In Nigeria, although the post-civil war hegemonic class has imposed
its sense of national unity on the country, the tensions between the
heterogeneous and multiethnic nation and the state continue to pose
challenges to the nation-state’s legitimacy. The notion of a post-civil
war homogeneous Nigerian nation (in the name of national unity) is
being contested as a result of the intra-ruling class struggles for the
control of oil and the alienation of the people by the Nigerian state.
In this regard, the question of ‘whose state’ is coterminous with the
questions of ‘whose nation’ and ‘whose oil’. Thus, intraclass and
ethnic divisions within the elite suggest that it has not been able
to fully impose its hegemony on the Nigerian state. Therefore in
the ensuing intraclass struggles, ‘each faction gives itself a separate
identity and mobilizes mass support using primordial loyalties such
as ethnicity and religion’ (Ake 1996:26–7).
Nationalist ideology is a legitimising tool in the hands of a
hegemonic elite in petro-states. Due to the nexus between state and
oil, any sudden interruption in oil flows or the fall in global oil
prices is bound to send shock waves through the petrolised society.
In such contexts, the refraction of global oil into the oil-rich social
formation invariably leads to greater struggles over shrinking oil
revenues, economic crises and the retreat of the welfare state, which

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undermine the legitimacy of the hegemonic nationalist ideology.

The tensions between the state and the nation are exacerbated
by either ethnicity or religion, or both, as groups jostle to gain to
access to power and (oil) resources in a redefined national space
and transformed social contract. Issues of equity, citizenship, public
morality and culture define the struggles as new forces emerge to
(re)claim the national space.
Oil is therefore central to understanding the crisis of nation-
building in a multinational and multicultural context like Nigeria.
The crisis of nation-building is characterised by the interrogation of
the legitimacy and relevance of the nation-state by its constituent
‘nations’ and social groups. In this regard, the Nigerian state appears
to be an imposition upon an ethnically heterogeneous society, trying
hard to force through a project of national unity or homogenisation.
In real terms, the project of homogenisation has not adopted rep-
resentative or equitable methods; rather it has been imposed from
above by relying on state power and centrally controlled institu-
tions of national integration. Citizenship has thus been problematic
as ‘Nigerianhood’ is mediated by ethnic origin, tagging ‘excluded
Nigerians’ in contexts of competition, as strangers, settlers or non-
indigenes. The agitation of the ethnic minorities of the oil-producing
Niger Delta region for resource control and local autonomy, the
communal conflicts over contested boundaries or shared natural
resources including those involving indigenes versus settlers, the
protests against marginalisation by almost every group, the demands
for the adoption of Sharia law by predominantly Islamic states and
the calls for a national conference to decentralise the Nigerian nation-
state, all typify the tensions seething within Nigeria. In all this, elites
of the diverse ethnic nations use identity as a bargaining chip or a
weapon in the bid to renegotiate their position vis-à-vis access to
power and oil and control of the nation-state. While the notion of
an integrative nation-state project in Nigeria has been complicated
by the class struggles around oil, the solution lies with a new and
equitable national bargain involving all groups, based on the recogni-
tion of their local autonomy and the decentralisation of power.

THE NIGERIAN OIL STATE FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The foundation of the Nigerian petro-state was laid by British colonial

legislation of 1889, 1907 and 1914 that granted the monopoly of
oil concessions in Nigeria to British and British-allied capital. It was

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under the 1914 Mineral Act that Shell was granted an oil exploration
licence in 1938 covering the entire Nigerian mainland. Shell struck
oil in 1956 and commenced oil exports in 1958 (Soremekun and
Obi 1993). In 1959, more multinational oil corporations joined
Shell in exploring for and producing oil in Nigeria, largely for the
world market. Starting from 1958, when oil production was about
5,000 barrels a day, by 1974 it had risen to 2.26 million, with oil
revenue far exceeding budgetary needs. At the peak of the oil boom
in 1979, Nigeria produced 2.3 million barrels a day, before the oil
shock (1981) forced cuts in production levels. Today, Nigeria produces
about 2 million barrels of oil, but oil sales are at prices far below those
of the oil-boom years. The expansion of Nigeria’s oil production
from the mid 1960s onwards was as a result of the high quality of
Nigeria’s crude oil and its proximity to the oil markets of Europe
and North America.
Since the 1970s, oil has become the fiscal basis of the Nigerian
state, providing over 95 per cent of its export earnings and 80 per
cent of the revenues of the Nigerian state. The state became totally
dependent on oil multinationals and the global oil market, with
direct implications for Nigeria. Those who controlled the oil state
concentrated power in themselves, and by doing so spawned zero-
sum politics characterised by ‘treachery, blackmail, violence and
avarice’ as they sought to reinforce their control of the state (Obi
2002a:535). The top echelon of the military also used their capture
of the petro-state to become a part of the ruling class and thereby
militarised politics. It is the push and pull – within factions of the
national elite and between competing groups defined in terms of
their ethnic or religious identity – over oil that lie at the heart of the
threats to the Nigerian nation-state.

THE CRISIS OF THE NIGERIAN OIL STATE

The European model of the centralised nation-state forcefully imposed

on Africa through colonial imperialism in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries is in crisis. Ibrahim (2003:115) notes that in
‘many parts of the world, the nation is finding it difficult and/or
impossible to co-exist with the state. Nationalist, regional, ethnic and
religious sentiments are rising, and the state is being challenged by
these forces’. While Gana and Egwu (2003:xv) link the crisis of the
nation-state project in Africa to the forces unleashed by globalisation,
market reforms and democratisation, it would appear that the roots

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of the current crisis lie deeper in Africa’s history, particularly in

its colonial and decolonisation phases, which in turn account for
the alienation of the postcolonial nation-state from the collective
aspirations of its people. Describing the phenomenon as the curse
of the nation-state, Davidson (2000:290) argues that:

The state was not liberating and protective of its citizens, no matter what
its propaganda claimed: on the contrary, its gross effect was constricting and
exploitative, or else it simply failed to operate in any social sense at all.

At independence in 1960, the Nigerian nation-state had emerged

in the legal sense, largely through the nationalist struggle and the
indigenisation of a British-modelled colonial state. The Nigerian state
was an imposition and not the outcome of a voluntary union of the
multiethnic nations in Nigeria. The British did not integrate the
various precolonial social formations they forced into the colonial
state of Nigeria, rather they created division and distrust among
Nigerians through indirect rule and different administrative policies
towards Northern and Southern Nigeria.
The elite that led the decolonisation process in the relatively short
time of nine years, 1951 to 1960, won an independent Nigerian
nation-state in which Nigerians did not have a well-developed vision
of nationhood, even as the adopted federal system hinged upon
strong ethnoregional units and a weak centre. Thus, the Nigerian
nation-state at independence was more apparent than real, with
the state only beginning to impose its will on the nation(s). As
Gana argues (2003:18–19), ‘national integration was never on the
agenda of the Nigerian successors to the state apparatus’. In his view,
the ‘national question was not posed until the Biafran crisis’, thus
lending credence to the earlier view that the shift from agrarian
cash crop to oil-based accumulation also had a profound impact on
nation-building in Nigeria. It was with the advent of oil as a vital
contributor to the country’s revenues that the regionalised political
elite began to take on board ‘a totalizing state-centred project based
on the integrative needs of the nation state’ (Mustapha 1998:27).
Two factors were behind this: firstly, the coups of January and July
1966, which brought the military to power and led to the transfer
of its centralising and commandist ethos to the Nigerian polity.
Secondly, the decline of the agrarian economy which was strong in
the erstwhile three regions that also coincided with the ‘big three’
(Northern-Hausa-Fulani, Eastern-Igbo and Western-Yoruba). The

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rise of the oil economy that was largely concentrated in the ethnic
minority areas of the Niger Delta meant that in the absence of an
economic base for the ethnopolitical elite in the three regions, Niger
Delta oil became a unifying locus for Pax Nigeriana. It also meant
that the post-civil war hegemonic elite had to take control of the oil
in the ethnic minority areas outside of their own regions in order to
reproduce themselves as a national ruling class. This explains how
oil became the fuel of a centralised unifying nation-state project,
which received a boost with the victory of federalist forces at the end
of the civil war. By this victory, Nigeria’s military rulers succeeded
in their bid to control the petro-state. This was legitimised through
an ideology of national development – building a strong and united
Nigeria, clearly reminiscent of the slogan of the civil war: ‘To Keep
Nigeria One is a Task that Must be Done’.
The impact of oil on nation-building in Nigeria after the war was
that the (centralised) state became the ultimate prize in politics.
Using the slogan of national development the Nigerian state became
central to oil-based accumulation and allocation. Partly to weaken
the regions as loci of power (and possible opposition to federal
might), the military abolished the four regions and replaced them
incrementally with 12, 19, 21 and eventually 36 states (regions) that
were virtually dependent on the centre for oil largesse. While this
was partly designed to move the locus of struggle between factions
of the elite from the centre to other tiers of the federation, it was also
meant to reinforce the formidable power wielded by the oil state over
the heterogeneous nation, so that the former would homogenise the
latter through integrative nation-building.
The fall in oil receipts from an average of 10 billion dollars
annually in the 1970s to about 5 billion in the 1980s and 1990s
had a devastating impact on Nigeria. It led to intensified pressures
for the redistribution of shrinking oil revenues by those who were
marginalised from power. Ethnic and religious identities were
reinforced and used to challenge the legitimacy of a homogenising
nation-state project. Olukoshi and Agbu (1996:75) note that in the
1990s, Nigeria’s unity could no longer be taken for granted, as groups
demanded the restructuring of the Nigerian federation to promote
‘greater autonomy and provide for a politically and financially weaker
centre’. Of note were the calls by the ethnic minorities and social
movements of the Niger Delta for autonomy and redistribution of oil
in their favour as those who contributed the most – through oil to the
Nigerian purse. They interrogated the logic of ‘national unity’ which

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denied them access to and control of the oil produced from their
region, and waged a local and global struggle against the Nigerian
state. This directly threatened the legitimacy of the state and its role
in oil accumulation and distribution, leading to the repression of
protest movements in the Niger Delta.
The external dimension of the crisis of nation-building is linked
to the dependence of the Nigerian petro-state on foreign oil
multinationals and the global oil market. The limited autonomy of
the Nigerian state in relation to external extractive (and pollutive)
forces also implies that the state is not free from the struggle between
these forces of economic globalisation and those of local resistance
in the Niger Delta. In this regard, the petro-state alienates some
of its own citizens (nationals) and sides with oil multinationals in
exploiting and repressing them. This often portrays the state to the
oil minorities as not being representative of their interests, wherefore
its predatory instincts should be curtailed by the decentralisation of
the hegemonic nation-state project.

PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA AND OTHER PETRO-STATES IN AFRICA

The steady fall in oil prices has fuelled crises in African petro-states
with varying degrees of intensity. In Nigeria, in spite of the existence
of several homogenising federal institutions and policies, the unity of
the country remains a contested terrain. The reconstruction of ethnic
and regional identities, numerous clan and communal conflicts, some
of which pitch indigenes versus settlers (Mustapha 1998:47) continue
to undermine the process of national integration. This crisis can also
be explained in part by the politics of a rich ‘politicomilitary elite’
that has captured the Nigerian state and widened the gap between
it and the nation. This elite – a coalition of civilian politicians and
(ex-)military officers – has not been able to homogenise its own
nationalism beyond imposing a centralised logic of accumulation
and the appropriation of oil rents, while it manipulates ethnicity
and religion in its factional politics, thus contributing to conflict
and crises.
Across Africa, petro-states appear to be immersed in the cycle of
‘permanent transitions’ (White and Taylor 2001:323), marked by
non-transitions, truncated transitions, manipulated transitions and
the lack of democracy. In the well-known case of Algeria, the military
annulled elections in 1992, when it appeared that an Islamist party
that would desecularise the Algerian state and gain control of oil power

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was heading for electoral victory. A year later, the Nigerian military
annulled the 1993 presidential elections, when the politicomilitary
elite had reservations about the alleged winner. In Libya and Gabon,
no political transitions have taken place for a long time, while Angola
is only just recovering from three decades of civil war.
The prospects for the petro-state in promoting a crisis-free
nation-building project appear to be problematic. The international
community will likely continue to tolerate permanent transitions and
the volatile fallouts of the crises of the African petro-states and their
lack of real democracy and development, in so far as oil keeps flowing
into the global markets, thus pushing further away the possibilities
for the resolution of the national question.

REFERENCES

Ake, Claude (1985) ‘The Nigerian State: Antimonies of a Periphery Formation’,

in Claude Ake (ed.), Political Economy of Nigeria (London/Lagos).
Ake, Claude (1996) ‘The Political Question’, in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.),
Governance and Development in Nigeria. Essays in Honour of Billy J. Dudley
(Ibadan).
Davidson, Basil (2000) The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the
Nation-State (Ibadan).
Dorraj, Manochehr (1995) ‘State, Petroleum and Democratisation in the
Middle East and North Africa’, in Manochehr Dorraj (ed.), The Changing
Political Economy of the Third World (Boulder, CO).
Gana, Aaron (2003): ‘Federalism and the National Question in Nigeria: A
Theoretical Exploration’, in Aaron Gana and Samuel Egwu (eds), Federalism
in Africa, Volume One: Framing the National Question (Lawrenceville, NJ/
Asmara).
Gana, Aaron and Samuel Egwu (2003) ‘The Crisis of the Nation-State in
Africa and the Challenge of Federalism’, in Aaron Gana and Samuel
Egwu (eds), Federalism in Africa, Volume One: Framing the National Question
(Lawrenceville, NJ/Asmara).
Ibrahim, Jibrin (2003) ‘Ethno-Religious Limits to the Construction of
Federalism in Africa: Yugoslavia and Nigeria Compared’, in Aaron Gana and
Samuel Egwu (eds), Federalism in Africa, Volume One: Framing the National
Question (Lawrenceville, NJ/Asmara).
Karl, Terry (1999) ‘The Perils of the Petro-state: Reflections on the Paradox of
Plenty’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Fall), p. 32.
Morse, Edward (1999) ‘A New Political Economy of Oil?’, Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 1–48.
Mustapha, Abdul (1998) ‘Identity Boundaries, Ethnicity and National
Integration in Nigeria’, in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed.), Ethnic Conflicts in Africa
(Dakar).
Obi, Cyril (2001) The Changing Forms of Identity Politics in Nigeria under
Economic Adjustment: The Case of the Oil Minorities of the Niger Delta (Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, Research Report No. 119).

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Obi, Cyril (2002) ‘Ethnic Minority Agitation and the Specter of National
Disintegration’, in Toyin Falola (ed.), Nigeria in the Twentieth Century
(Durham, NC).
Olukoshi, Adebayo and Osita Agbu (1996) ‘The Deepening Crisis of Nigerian
Federalism and the Future of the Nation-State’, in Adebayo Olukoshi
and Liisa Laakso (eds), Challenges to the Nation-State in Africa (Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet in cooperation with Institute of Development Studies,
University of Helsinki, Uppsala).
Soremekun, Kayode and Cyril Obi (1993) ‘The Changing Pattern of Private
Foreign Investments in the Nigerian Oil Industry’, African Development,
Vol. XVIII, No. 3.
White, Gregory and Scott Taylor (2001) ‘Well-Oiled Regimes: Oil and
Uncertain Transitions in Algeria and Nigeria’, Review of African Political
Economy, No. 89. pp. 323–44.

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 Part III
The Politics of Nation-building

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 10
Between Projectitis and the Formation
of Countervailing Power – NGOs in
Nation-building Processes
Jeanette Schade

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 1 play a central role

in many of the nation-building concepts initiated by the
international community and its players. The United Nations, its
special organisations as well as state and regional institutions for
emergency aid and development cooperation work together with
NGOs to implement their humanitarian assistance and long-term
development programmes and consult with each other. Meant by
nation-building in this context are, primarily, the maintaining of
peace and reconstruction.
The aim is for NGOs to contribute towards nation-building by
promoting social and political integration. They can, for example,
help with the reintegration of civil war refugees by being involved
in repatriation programmes or with the stabilisation of the social
situation by providing basic services for the population in
(post-)conflict situations; establishing infrastructures quickly and
flexibly for reconstruction work; setting up schools and training
centres to avoid losing valuable human resources; influencing the
form of a new political order by lending their support for the
processing of war crimes, legal and political consideration of mar-
ginalised groups, equal rights and equal treatment of women, land
rights or transparent and democratic state structures, thus helping
to overcome social rifts.
The reason for donors increasingly enlisting the assistance of NGOs
for parts of the nation-building process lies mainly in the fact that
NGOs offer an alternative to the often dysfunctional state structures
in failed states or post-conflict countries. However, it also reflects
the general trend since the end of the East–West conflict towards
granting development cooperation resources increasingly to NGOs
rather than to the governments of the target countries – whether to
avoid corruption and mismanagement, to promote pluralism and

125

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human rights or to exert specific influence on political development.

This change of paradigm makes NGOs a central component of the
international aid and development industry, granting them previously
unknown access to material and political resources.
Nation-building does, however, have another, historically older
dimension that stands in the way of international reconstruction
endeavours: wars are likewise part of the nation-building process and
NGOs and, in particular, the instrumentalisation of their resources
can also play a role in these.

NATION-BUILDING AND NGOs IN (POST-)CONFLICT SITUATIONS

NGOs in (post-)conflict situations are viewed almost exclusively in

the literature from the point of view of emergency refugee aid and
their role in the prevention of humanitarian disasters. Literature has
now also been published in relation to negative effects of the aid
and development industry for social stability and peace processes.
The criticism focuses on the instrumentalisation of aid for political
and military purposes, its interaction with the war economy, the
prolonging of conflicts as well as the exacerbation and cementing
of emergency humanitarian situations (e.g. Anderson 1999). This
literature clearly shows that, despite the humanitarian imperative
to treat those in need equally, regardless of their ethnic, religious,
political or other affiliations, humanitarian aid is all too quickly
instrumentalised by conflicting parties in times of war and that the
principle of neutrality is losing touch with reality.2
NGOs bring much-sought-after and extensive resources into
crisis regions in the form of aid goods. The distribution of these
goods can benefit warring parties, influence the course of war and
strengthen or weaken the position of social players and groups in
postwar times. Humanitarian aid therefore frequently contains –
intentionally or unintentionally – a political or military dimension.
This is demonstrated, in relation to the war in Iraq, by the vehemence
with which NGOs refused to be ‘embedded’ by the allied forces in
the same way as journalists and be used for image-enhancement
purposes (Byman 2001; Bierdel and Kap Anamur 2003).
However, the literature hardly deals explicitly with how the positive
and negative aspects of humanitarian aid in war situations relate to
nation-building. Nonetheless, there are a number of aspects that can
also play a role for nation-building:

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• Food aid distributed by NGOs can be used to win over the loyalty
of the population; to make opposing sections of the population
dependent and, therefore, submissive; to manipulate migratory
movements and selectively steer people into desired regions
(Prendergast 1996:19–20). Such settlement-policy measures can
serve to weaken or strengthen the predominant position of
political opponents with competing nation-building concepts
or secessionist ambitions.
• Food aid, just like other aid goods, is diverted to provide for
one’s own military. NGOs report from their operations in
Sudan, Liberia, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and
other conflict regions of aid goods being purloined or extorted
as road tolls, to provide for soldiers or to be sold in order to
procure weapons (Anderson 1999:38). In Somalia and Sudan,
NGOs estimate that up to 80 per cent of aid was lost through
theft and misappropriation (Byman 2001:99). International aid
payments can also be legally taken into account to reserve more
funds from the state budget for military expenditure (Barnes
2000).
• Refugee camps, also often run by NGOs, can be used as a cover
for military mobilisation and thus gain strategic advantage. The
security requirements for protecting refugee camps and aid goods
against theft and robbery can make NGOs victims of extortion
for protection money, thus enriching and strengthening parties
in the conflict.
• With their information-gathering work for the media and
decision-makers, NGOs influence the perception of conflicts
and the reactions of the public and governments abroad, which
can, for their part, exert influence on the course of war and
negotiations (e.g. by sending or withdrawing forces or aid
payments) (Clapham 2000:230).

These and other measures are suitable, within the context of nation-
building, for promoting integration or disintegration, consolidating
one’s own military strength or destabilising one’s opponents. The
extent of the impact of this strategic aid dimension in individual
cases depends on other external and internal factors, such as the
political leaning of the donors, interaction with other types of aid
(e.g. military aid) and the internal political balance of power.

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 128 The Politics of Nation-building

NGOs, RECONSTRUCTION AND NATION-BUILDING

The reconstruction phase is linked, in particular, with the practical,

organisational aspects of nation-building. Nationwide physical
infrastructure and communication networks are needed to boost
the national economy, as well as interaction and integration of
social groups. Certain basic supplies and services are necessary to
ensure social stability and facilitate productive employment. What
is required above all is state-building, that is the establishment of
an administrative apparatus to successfully manage functions and
investments in the areas of security, the economy, transport, health,
education, etc.
The state capacities in many post-conflict countries are, however,
still too weak to perform these functions. International aid attempts
to compensate for this deficiency at several levels – aid for the
military, the police, infrastructure, humanitarian issues, etc. NGOs
provide basic supplies and services as a matter of priority for as long
as state structures or market mechanisms are not yet in a position
to do so, though this provisional arrangement does frequently
become a permanent substitute for state or public action (e.g. in
Afghanistan and Palestine). This trend is encouraged by the change
in paradigm concerning the policy pursued by donors in awarding
funds, with NGOs frequently preferred over governments in the target
countries. What initially has (or could have) the effect of easing the
burden on weak state structures leads, in many case, to NGOs and
local governments competing with each other, which can impact
negatively on state-building. However, NGOs do not only have a
double-edged effect on the latter in frequent cases, they also impact
on the development of local markets.

NGOs AS PART OF THE MARKETS

The resources available to the NGO sector not only make it a

potentially efficient service provider, it also becomes an attractive
economic factor and labour market segment. NGOs need local skilled
personnel, translators, packers, drivers, cleaning staff, etc. In the
economically desolate region of Palestine, the NGO sector provided
around 25,000 jobs in 2001 (MIFTAH 2001). In Afghanistan, the
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan ran 168 clinics in 18 provinces in
2002, had around 6,000 Afghan personnel and was one of the largest
private employers in the country (Schenkenberg van Mierop 2002:3).

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 NGOs in Nation-building Processes 129

NGOs also create indirect employment through their demand for

property, office equipment and accommodation for their external
personnel, as well as maintenance requirements for vehicles, etc. The
prerequisite is that the goods required are (can be) purchased from
local producers rather than being imported. Economic stimulus of
this type is initially something positive.
The substantial demand created by NGOs can, however, distort
prices or even drive them excessively high. This concerns, in particular,
real estate, rents and qualified labour. What can be particularly
negative for nation-building are the high salaries that international
NGOs and UN organisations (can) pay in comparison to the local
country. This leads to a brain drain from the state sector to the non-
profit and development sector, which robs the state apparatus (and
frequently local NGOs) of capacities. Ignatieff (2003:100) speaks of
‘capacity-confiscation’. Highly qualified local personnel often work
merely as drivers or translators for Western development agencies,
with the result that qualifications valuable for nation-building are
left untapped (Guest 2000).
Given that the economy is a particularly important area of social
interaction, NGOs can, as employers and major customers, also
contribute to the integration, or even disintegration, of social structures.
If lucrative jobs and contracts are awarded along established conflict
lines, this can help exacerbate social tensions and discrepancies. In
Mozambique, for example, most of the qualified personnel were also
supporters of the governing party, Frelimo, while the workers from
the areas controlled by the resistance movement, Renamo, were more
poorly trained. Only NGOs that also took on Renamo personnel, thus
introducing social tensions into the organisation by way of mixed
teams, contributed – where successful – towards integration and
reducing or avoiding social tensions between the former adversaries
(Halvorsen 1995).
One extremely ambivalent item of the aid and development
economy for a nation-building process is security. NGOs need
security for their aid goods, facilities and personnel. If this cannot
be adequately ensured because of a lack of state monopoly of force
or international peace-keeping troops, NGOs frequently have to
depend on private security services or pay protection money to locally
dominant warlords in order to simply not be attacked by them. Since
this strengthens the warlords both economically and politically and
makes it more difficult to assert a state monopoly of force, it helps to
preserve the structures of the war economy that still exist.

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 130 The Politics of Nation-building

NGOs, GOVERNMENTS AND STATE-BUILDING

Ideally, NGOs become involved where the state’s social service

provision structures are not yet functioning. Newly emerging (and
also established) governments and state machineries can, however,
find themselves competing with individual NGOs or the NGO sector
as a whole at several levels: they compete for international aid funds,
for the personnel and technical resources for their organisation,
in the structuring of the system for providing social services, and
therefore also for the recognition and loyalty of the population. The
relationship between governments and NGOs is thus often strained
in view of the transfer of competencies and resources brought about
by the donors. This is particularly evident in Afghanistan.

[In Afghanistan] within the government (ministries and ACA [Afghan

Assistance Coordination Authority]), the question has emerged as to how
to ‘control’ the NGOs. There are repeated rumours of hostility, or at
least resentment, from government representatives towards NGOs. These
feelings may have been fed by the fact that for more than a decade, NGOs
have been able to operate in Afghanistan in a vacuum, bypassing the central
government, and sometimes even working against them. Presently, NGOs
outstrip the operational capacity of any government body by far and this
will probably remain so at least for the next two years. It should come as
no surprise that this situation may further trigger hostility and tensions.
(Schenkenberg van Mierop 2002:12)

The preference shown by the international donors for NGOs does, in

fact, signify the taking of a decision of general principle concerning
the system for the supply of social services. This no longer comes
under the area of responsibility of the government; rather it is being
privatised via NGOs. In Palestine, for example, local NGOs with
foreign support provided 60 per cent of basic medical care services
and ran 42 per cent of the hospitals, 90 per cent of the centres for
the disabled and 95 per cent of the preschool education facilities
before the outbreak of the second intifada (MIFTAH 2001). Some 70
per cent of the healthcare services in Afghanistan are provided by
NGOs (Ridde 2002:22). However, services in the health, social and
education domains are important sources of social recognition for the
state apparatus, especially in poor countries. Legitimation resources
and social policy control instruments are therefore being taken away
from the state by NGOs. For ideological reasons, NGOs do not always

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 NGOs in Nation-building Processes 131

share the political preferences of the donors, although they benefit

from them. Such NGOs characterised by social welfare state ideas
do, however, frequently get caught up in conflicts of objectives in
rigidly governed developing countries. In Palestine, for instance,
a large number of NGOs favour a Palestinian state that performs
important social and development policy functions nationwide while
at the same time being sceptical towards the policy pursued by the
autonomous authority:

... in the absence of democratic rules of the game, NGOs may view it is
being in their own interest to retain their own separate institutional sphere
and maintain a strong role in service provision, even at the expense of their
own ideological views. (Hanafi and Tabar forthcoming)

The present policy for awarding funds is resulting, in the final

analysis, in a conflict surrounding the distribution of resources
and control of their use. According to the Afghan transitional
government, for example, only US$296 million (16 per cent) of the
US$1.84 billion awarded between January 2002 and March 2003 went
directly to the government. Most of the money was distributed to
the UN (US$562 million) and international NGOs (US$446 million)
(Transitional Government of Afghanistan 2003:3). Cooperation
and coordination between the government and NGOs would be an
appropriate way to strengthen state sovereignty in the area of social
policy despite the lack of capacities and turn NGO work rather into
relief of the strain than into competition. Although mechanisms
for this already existed in part, according to Nazir Shahidi (2002),
Deputy Minister of Reconstruction in Afghanistan, the NGOs did
not make allowances for the government priorities elaborated in the
National Development Framework. They were seen to be unwilling
to cooperate and coordinate. Conversely, NGOs complain of a lack
of readiness to cooperate and an inability to coordinate on the part
of the government (Schenkenberg van Mierop 2002:11–12) and
see themselves as being occasionally excluded by the international
community through the introduction of new funding mechanisms
(Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) (Ridde 2002:22), or they
question the national ownership of the National Development
Framework (ActionAid 2003).
Although the awarding of resources via NGOs safeguards their use
for social rather than, for example, military purposes to a great extent,
it is not a guarantee against corruption and mismanagement or for

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 132 The Politics of Nation-building

the most effective allocation. According to Mark Sedra (2003:4), the

preference for NGOs has led in Afghanistan to a ‘“projectization”
of the reconstruction process, a fragmentation of the process along
institutional and project lines’. The Afghan government is also said
to prefer infrastructure projects that create employment to social
measures, as the former would, at the same time, provide alternative
income to those engaged in armed service for the warlords (Ignatieff
2003:11). This could help to break the cycle of the war economy and
weaken the warlords’ local monopoly of force.
Where NGO projects enable warlords to make a mark politically,
this also weakens young governments and weak state machineries.
The northern Afghan warlord, Rashid Dostum, for instance, enjoys
carrying out the official opening of schools and other facilities in
the region he controls and has made political capital out of the
return of hundreds of prisoners of war who, without the care of the
Red Cross, would otherwise have died beforehand in his prisons
(Ignatieff 2003:81–2). In contrast to the government in Kabul,
warlords repeatedly manage, by virtue of their regional monopoly
of force, to take the political credit for NGO projects. In this way,
NGOs help the warlords – intentionally or unintentionally – to obtain
social legitimacy, support their promoted regional and/or ethnic self-
conception instead of a national one and thus confirm the image of
the interim President Karzai as merely ‘the mayor of Kabul’.

NGOs AND NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

There are also counterexamples to the relationship potentially leading

to conflict and competition between NGOs and the government
in failed states, as outlined above. In Myanmar (Burma), the
government makes use of the NGO sector to consolidate its nation-
building project. In 1993, the military dictatorship’s State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC; previously the State Law and
Order Restoration Council/SLORC) established the Union Solidarity
and Development Association (USDA), a (quasi-)NGO loyal to the
government, with the mandate to realise ‘our three main national
causes – non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of
national solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty’ and an ideology
legitimising the dominant role of the national armed forces in this
nation-building process (Coakley 1998:2).
USDA is extremely active at local level in the areas of community
development and adult education. It draws large numbers of members

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 NGOs in Nation-building Processes 133

(estimated at 5 million in 1996) and offers a range of advantages, e.g.

regarding access to jobs and university places. At the same time, the
government uses the organisation to mobilise people against political
opponents, who could allegedly present a danger to the unity and
stability of the country (though in fact to the regime’s power). In
1999, according to Purcell, many donors and external NGOs looking
for local NGO partners were still cooperating with the USDA and
its extensive network, thus helping to strengthen its structures – at
the expense of small local NGOs and the Christian Church and
Buddhist networks (Purcell 1999:86, 97). USDA is therefore not only
an effective instrument for integration and control of the population,
safeguarding power and asserting a nation-building concept from
above; it also proves a useful body for channelling the resources and
activities of foreign NGOs and donor organisations.
USDA is an effective element of the nation-building strategy
in Myanmar principally because, in contrast to most NGOs, it is
nationally oriented in terms of objective and ideology. This is not
necessarily a characteristic of quasi-state organisations, nor is it
exclusive to them. The Afghan peace initiative, Afghanistan Peace
Association (APA), expressly supports national unity and overcoming
conflicts between the different groups of the multiethnic state:
‘Internal fighting and shooting at compatriots, in the view of the
APA, is considered anti-Afghan, anti-national and anti-unity’ (see
<www.afghanistanpeace.com>). A private initiative will, however,
only rarely be able to compete with a state-sponsored organisation
in the establishment of national structures.

ARE NGOs ESSENTIAL FOR NATION-BUILDING?

The role of NGOs in nation-building is a contradictory one and

therefore difficult to assess. In times of war, it depends on the skill of
the parties involved in the conflict as to how they make use of NGOs
for their strategies. NGOs rarely play an active role in this phase – if
they want to adhere to the principle of neutrality. If NGOs actually do
(or want to) become actively and effectively involved in the nation-
building process during a war, those with the greatest resources and
influence, at least, would have to decide to support one of the parties
in the conflict. It is precisely this, however, which is inconsistent
with the principle of neutrality, the humanitarian imperative and the
endeavour of many NGOs not to be instrumentalised – though the
latter can often not be avoided in armed conflicts, especially where

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 134 The Politics of Nation-building

there is a causal link between need and force. NGOs do, however,
have the possibility to avoid being consumed by the conflicting
parties through not offering any more aid, a measure that some
NGOs also actually threaten and practice.
In the reconstruction phase, there are likewise two sides to the role
of the NGOs. In the case of state machineries that are still unable
to act or are weak, they are indispensable for the rapid provision of
social services while, on the other hand, they can be an obstacle to
the development of functional state structures because of the brain,
loyalty and capacity drain. After all, they do not guarantee any
systematic, comprehensive provision of services to the population
as a whole. For these reasons, there are increasing demands for
international resources to be allocated directly to governments again
or to at least restrain the role and autonomy of NGOs.

Although their [NGOs’] role will remain important – particularly with

respect to the continuing need for humanitarian aid – they will also need to
accept that being ‘sidelined’ is a positive development if this means that the
reconstruction agenda is being led by a legitimate Afghan government. ...
Will they be prepared to relinquish some of their sovereignty and profile?
(Goodhand and Ludin 2002:32)

The direct responsibility of NGOs for the course of nation-building

should not be overrated. Other external factors and players perform
more important roles. It is the donors and not they themselves
who decide on the amount of resources that are made available to
them and which can cause them to potentially compete with the
government. Nor do their possible negative effects for state-building,
for example the brain drain, apply specifically to NGOs; this is
also true for development cooperation institutions as a whole. UN
organisations and foreign embassies pay even better salaries than
NGOs. Military aid, arms trading and foreign interests also carry
more weight where the arming of parties involved in the conflict is
concerned. The failure to establish the state’s monopoly of force in
Afghanistan is not the fault of the NGOs.
The cooperation difficulties between governments and NGOs
cannot be blamed exclusively on the NGOs; these can also be
attributed to sensitivities of the ruling elite that go beyond
meaningful considerations concerning the nation-building process.
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the image many NGOs
have of themselves, characterised by remoteness from the state, and

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 NGOs in Nation-building Processes 135

their exaggerated concern about abuse by the state can hinder the
development of constructive cooperation.
However, there are also structural reasons for the work of NGOs
in the area of nation-building being of only moderate relevance.
Disregarding quasi-state institutions like the USDA for a moment,
only very few NGOs have national structures and strategies and only
rarely do they take account of or propagate, like APA for instance,
ideas that have explicitly national terms of reference. On the contrary,
their central ideas are universal, reaching beyond the national level
to the humanitarian imperative or the concept of human rights. This
doesn’t necessarily harm nation-building. But does it help it?

NOTES

1. Meant by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) here are private,

national as well as international non-profit organisations involved in the
areas of humanitarian aid and development cooperation.
2. With regard to the humanitarian imperative, cf. the Code of Conduct for
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC et al. 1994).
The biggest but not all NGOs involved in emergency aid are bound by this
voluntary code.

REFERENCES

ActionAid (2003) The National Development Framework (Research Project)

<www.actionaid.org/resources/emergencies/emergencies.shtml>.
Anderson, Mary (1999) Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace – or War
(London).
Barnes, Sam (2000) ‘Feeding the War Machine in Ethiopia’, Boston Sunday
Globe, 28 May <www.escribe.com/culture/dehai-news/m9486.html>.
Bierdel, Elias and Kap Anamur (2003) Wie erleben die Menschen im Irak den
Krieg? (Interview on WDR 5 morgenecho, 28.03.2003).
Byman, Daniel (2001) ‘Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military’, Survival,
Vol. 43, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 27–114.
Clapham, Christopher (2000) Africa and the International System. The Politics
of State Survival, 5th edn (Cambridge).
Coakley, V. (1998) ‘Politics of Stability: Co-opting Burma’s Civil Society
through the USDA’, Burma Issues, Vol. 8, No. 10 (October), pp. 2–4.
Goodhand, Jonathan and Jawed Ludin (2002) ‘The Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund: a “Lack-of-Trust” Fund for Afghanistan?’, in Humanitarian
Exchange, publ. by Overseas Development Institute, London (November),
pp. 31–2.
Guest, Iain (2000): Misplaced Charity Undermines Kosovo’s Self-Reliance (Overseas
Development Council) <www. globalsolidarity.org/articles/mischar.
html>.

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 136 The Politics of Nation-building

Halvorsen, Kate (1995) Reintegration Efforts in a Post-War Context: The Activities

of the Danish Refugee Council and Norwegian Refugee Council in Mozambique
<www.cdainc.com/dnh/publications/casestudies/lcppCase11Mozambique.
pdf>.
Hanafi, Sari and Linda Tabar (forthcoming) Donors, International Organizations,
Local NGOs. The Emergence of the Palestinian Globalized Elite (Ramallah
[Arabic]/London [English]).
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) et al. (1994) Code of Conduct
for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster
Relief (Geneva).
Ignatieff, Michael (2003) Empire Lite. Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Afghanistan (London).
MIFTAH (Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and
Democracy) (2001) The Changing Role of NGOs in Palestine <www.miftah.
org/Display.cfm?DocId=84&CategoryId=4>.
Prendergast, John (1996) Frontline Diplomacy. Humanitarian Aid and Conflict
in Africa (London).
Purcell, Marc (1999) ‘“Axe-handles or Willing Minions?”: International NGOs
in Burma’, Burma Centre Netherlands (BCN)/ Transnational Institute (TNI)
(ed.), Strengthening Civil Society in Burma (Chiang Mai/Thailand).
Ridde, Valéry (2002) ‘Why a Trust Fund Won’t Work in Afghanistan’,
Humanitarian Exchange, publ. by Overseas Development Institute (London)
July, pp. 22–3.
Schenkenberg van Mierop, Ed (2002) NGO Coordination and Some Other Relevant
Issues in the Context of Afghanistan from an NGO Perspective <www.db.
idpproject.org/Sites/idpSur vey.nsf/wViewCountries/2E3B5DE
B1BE7387FC1256B9E00338A1F/$file/NGO_Coordination_9April02.pdf>.
Sedra, Mark (2003) ‘The “Day After” in Iraq. Lessons from Afghanistan’, Foreign
Policy in Focus (March) <www.fpif.org/papers/iraqrebuild2003.html>.
Shahidi, Nazir (2002) Erfolg oder Enttäuschung? Probleme beim Wiederaufbau in
Afghanistan (Interview on WDR 5 morgenecho, 26.11.2002).
Transitional Government of Afghanistan (2003) Analysis of Aid Flows to
Afghanistan (as per: 2 April 2003) <www.af/resources/mof/adf-ahsf-artf/
Aid_Analysis-with_graphs.pdf>.

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 11
External Nation-building vs Endogenous
Nation-forming – A Development
Policy Perspective
Ulrike Hopp and Adolf Kloke-Lesch

The development policy debate over the past few years has no doubt
been influenced primarily by the phenomena of globalisation,
breakdown of the state and internal national conflicts. Although
these processes are part of the challenges that many developing
countries have to face, they also represent conditions under which
development policy has to work. The background and consequences
of September 11, 2001 plus the conflict in Iraq have underscored the
complexity of these phenomena.
With the ever-growing cross-border interlinking of trade and
financial flows in particular, as well as increased pressure concerning
liberalisation and privatisation, plus the constantly and ever more
visibly widening gulf in economic and social conditions both
between and within regions and countries, the call for effective
statism and social equalisation is becoming louder. Protecting one’s
citizens internally and representing their interests externally requires
a functioning state. At the same time, states do not only enjoy
rights in a multilateral system, they also have responsibilities and
obligations, for example in relation to internal state implementation
of internationally agreed norms and standards (Maull 2002).
In a large number of developing countries, however, the relevance
of efficient, democratic statism is set against state dysfunctionality,
increasing state failure or even the breakdown of the state. Depending
on the method used to count them, there are anything up to 40 weak
states, with a good dozen countries heading toward state failure or
already deemed to have failed. Seen against this background, the
principle developed in the 1990s according to which development
cooperation was to take place with good-performing countries is being
increasingly watered down. Concepts for development cooperation
with poor-performing countries have been drawn up by the World
Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

137

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 138 The Politics of Nation-building

(OECD) and bilateral donors in order to find ways out of the spiral
of failure. Ultimately, international peace-keeping missions have
been required precisely in those places where states have no longer
fulfilled their responsibility with regard to human rights and the
security of their citizens.
On top of this, we have become increasingly aware of violent
conflicts and wars both within states and in the context of regional
conflict systems since the end of the Cold War. These frequently
have supraregional or even global repercussions, obstructing and
even preventing sustainable development.
Besides the numerous development policy contributions towards
dealing with conflicts in a civil manner, the concept of nation-building
is also addressed in the search for answers to these challenges, with
this specifically mentioned as one of the tasks in so-called complex
emergencies, for example in Cambodia, the Balkans or the present
East Timor. In the case of Afghanistan, it is seen at the same time as
an effective means of combating terrorism (Rotberg 2002:139–40).
However, contributions towards nation-building are also the subject
of discussion in less dramatic surroundings. It is possible that the term
is enjoying growing popularity because it promises a less technocratic
objective, in contrast to approaches like that of the OECD on
‘structural stability’. Furthermore, nation-building evidently serves
to kill two birds with one stone by combining state-forming as an
answer to dysfunctional statism with a cohesion strategy designed
to help counter external and alienating influences as well as division
and fragmentation within society.
However, there is a wide divergence in the understanding of
the process of nation-building and of the possibilities regarding
external support. This discourse is burdened by a widespread – and
not unfounded – ambivalent attitude towards the term, which
is often associated with the reconstruction after World War II,
the decolonialisation phase, the demise of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia or an especially pronounced leaning towards external
interests. Corresponding restraint can be found not only in the
European discussion; it is also evident in the debate in the US, which
otherwise proceeds in a rather more pragmatic manner when gearing
the objectives of its external support towards the National Security
Strategy, for example (Rice 2002).
A range of views are emerging in the debate, which can essentially
be divided between two poles:

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 A Development Policy Perspective 139

• On the one side, nation-building is seen in the context of or

even equated with state-building. It is felt that nation-building
should be organised from outside by the community of states
in order to boost international security, in particular (Ottaway
2002:17). Questions concerning the democratic ability of the
structures created and the role of the population concerned
are somewhat overlooked in this process in favour of a rather
mechanistic reconstruction of the state concerned or are simply
not viewed as a central theme. Understood in this way, we are
concerned here with an actual ‘building’ process, that is the
construction of a state or nation.
• At the other pole, nation-building is regarded as an autonomous
process of the development of a nation, that is nation-forming,
which can only be achieved by the societies themselves and
which goes beyond securing a monopoly of force, the ability
of the state apparatus to function and the setting-up of
infrastructure. The development of a national identity helps
the population to grow together into a collective community
of will. External actors do not play any role in this regard;
exerting their influence would be a disruptive interference in
the country’s national sovereignty. At best, they could offer
support in relation to post-conflict reconstruction, for example
(Hamre and Sullivan 2002:89ff).

A further striking feature is that the term ‘nation-building’ is

predominantly used in the debate on foreign and security policy. It
has so far hardly been applied at all in the domain of development
policy, which is also being increasingly defined via contributions
towards strengthening the functionality of the state. The narrowing
of these discourses in the sense of a broader understanding of security
also makes it necessary to establish a position from the development
policy viewpoint. We understand development policy as the area
of international politics aimed at helping to shape conditions in
other countries on a partnership basis using civil, structural policy
instruments and which presupposes that this coshaping process is, in
political terms, desired, necessary and possible. Nation-building that
goes beyond intervention purely in accordance with international
law and/or military intervention would therefore come under the
area of responsibility of development policy.

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 140 The Politics of Nation-building

NATION-BUILDING FROM THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY VIEWPOINT

With regard to establishing a development policy position, it would

appear meaningful to first determine the object and objective, subject
and time frame in functional terms.
Following Hippler in this volume, we understand the object and,
at the same time, the objective of nation-building as being a triad of
closely associated constituents.
The first of these concerns the development of a functional statism
accepted by civil society. Central to this are the functions of securing
a monopoly of force, guaranteeing security for the population and
neighbouring countries, the provision of public assets as well as
the rule of law and legal certainty, the very functions that define
a state.
Second, the building of a nation requires a physical, social and
media infrastructure that is shared by the entire civil society. These
assets must be accessible to all groups of the population and be used
by them for transactions and communication.
These components can be seen as state-forming. Third, nation-
building further presupposes a sociocultural structuring and
integration process leading to shared characteristics of identity, values
and goals. It is not the homogeneity of these characteristics that is
relevant, rather the recognition of heterogeneity and facilitating
inclusion.
The subject of nation-building is the population that together wants
to form a nation and assumes the responsibility for this process. Who
belongs to this community of will can be determined in the context
of a nation of citizens or of origin, though it should be structured as
holistically as possible. With regard to the role of the government
and civil society, this cannot be formulated any more clearly than in
the words of Woodrow Wilson: ‘When I look back on the process of
history, I see this written over every page: that nations are renewed
from the bottom, not from the top’ (Wilson 1913). This relates, in
particular, to the identity and development of a common political
will, which is frequently negotiated in an atmosphere of conflict
and characterises the institutional shaping of the nation, i.e. state-
building.
Besides this, there are also external players involved in the nation-
building process. The emerging nation can directly avail itself of
differing degrees of external assistance and it is likewise subject
to indirect influence – with this coming from the surrounding

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states, the international media, plus an increasingly Westernised

everyday culture. The emergence of a nation requires, not least of
all, recognition and at the very least toleration on the part of the
surrounding world – and finds expression in a particularly symbolic
manner through a country’s admission to the United Nations. This
mutual recognition also implies that each nation must make ‘sense’
to the world around it.
The time frame over which nation-building is talked about does not
commence with the end of violent conflicts or processes of decline,
nor can it be narrowed down to just a few years or decades. On the
contrary, there is first an ongoing process of confirmation and further
development regarding the way in which the nation sees itself – a
large number of examples show that the failure of such confirmation
to materialise can also lead to the demise of a nation.
It is this continuous development of an integrated society based
on shared values and goals with recourse to a functioning statism
and infrastructure that it can also shape according to its own will
which we describe as nation-forming in the following. In this way,
we make a distinction between nation-forming and constructional
nation-building influenced from outside.

HOW DOES DEVELOPMENT POLICY CONTRIBUTE TO NATION-FORMING?

As indicated, external support is also possible and, on occasions,

even necessary in a nation-forming process controlled by society.
Such support must, however, respect the sovereignty of the emerging
nation. It could be argued in this respect that this no longer exists
where the society is in an advanced state of fragmentation or the
state has broken down and external players must therefore take
over the ‘helm’. Irrespective of the fact that these players require
legitimation through the United Nations, a military operation or
the deployment of a force of blue-bereted UN peacekeepers may
be able to help stabilise the situation and establish security zones.
However, a negative peace – as defined by Johan Galtung – can only
constitute the starting point or initial measures for reconstruction
and not be interpreted as nation-forming.1 Although it has proved
possible to ensure relative stability in Kosovo, for example, the
reconciliation needed between the groups of the population has so
far not materialised and protection of the rights of minorities still
has to be monitored.

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 142 The Politics of Nation-building

The same is true for creating basic conditions in compliance with

international law, i.e. where peace treaties are entered into and
UN transitional administrations are set up, it must be ensured that
adequate attention is paid to essential conditions like the protection
of minorities and sufficient scope is left for the subsequent shaping
of the nation. Actual nation-forming can only commence once
these requirements are met. This is where long-term development
cooperation based on partnership begins. The Brahimi Report2
illustrates these necessities very clearly.
However, given that development policy is intended to have a
preventive effect on a state apparatus becoming dysfunctional or on
the waging of violent conflicts, cooperation must be maintained or
possibly (re)initiated sooner – even in situations that are becoming
increasingly difficult – so as to provide support for reform-minded
players in the society and state.

SUPPORT FOR NATION-FORMING:

EXAMPLES FROM GERMAN DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

The following examples of development policy support for nation-

forming are not intended as blueprints since each situation requires
specifically adapted assistance. Furthermore, the nation-forming
process is not automatically helped by every measure that could be
classified under this heading. Only the totality and interaction of the
three components can constitute such a contribution.
The examples from bilateral German development policy are, as
a rule, a part of more extensive strategies to enable bilateral and
multilateral players to provide support for partner countries. In the
case of demobilisation and reconstruction, so-called ‘multidonor
trust funds’ and programmes involving several donors are employed.
Multilateral action can be particularly helpful in politically sensitive
regions in terms of ‘balancing out’ the influence of individual donor
policies. In addition to the networking of bilateral and multilateral
contributions, the combined effect of state and non-state players is
gaining in importance, especially in development cooperation work
carried out under difficult conditions.

Statism
The ‘democracy, civil society, public administration’ domain
has become substantially more significant in German bilateral
development cooperation activities over the past number of years,

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 A Development Policy Perspective 143

with this agreed as a priority with more than 30 partner governments.

Added to these, there are a growing number of countries that have
selected the area of ‘peace development and crisis prevention’ as their
priority. This means that the political dimension of development is the
express focus of attention in around half of the 70 or so cooperating
countries. In 2003 alone, an approximate sum of €170 million was
earmarked for good governance/participatory development projects.
Although most of the programmes are not set up explicitly within the
context of nation-forming, their contribution in this regard should
not be underestimated.
For the majority of the population, democratic statism is often first
experienced as something positive through measures initiated in the
areas of decentralisation and municipal development. In Senegal, for
example, fostering good governance is associated with the building
up of the administration. Strengthening the inclusive element
of nation-forming by taking account of separatist endeavours in
southern Senegal is also important in this instance. A separate conflict
transformation priority to this end has been agreed upon within the
context of the cooperation between Germany and Senegal.
In post-conflict situations like those in Afghanistan and East Timor,
new structures adapted to the individual situation are being sought
in relation to development policy support on matters of statism and
good governance for which there may possibly be no example in the
nations of the West.
A crucial prerequisite for dealing with these issues is the
establishment and safeguarding of a state monopoly of force. Besides
support by way of military operations or UN peace-keeping missions,
the security sector needs to be reformed as quickly as possible in
such a way as to enable the security forces to carry out their task
effectively while also protecting human rights, as well as ensuring
effective civil and democratic control of the security bodies (Kloke-
Lesch and Steinke 2002).
Promoting efficient parliaments that are able to effectively monitor
budgetary issues, including the defence budget, is one method of
approach. The effectiveness of parliaments also depends, however,
on developing an effectual civil society. In many countries, civil
society players first have to be made aware of this in order for
capacity-building to be able to take hold through non-state assistance
and networking measures. The civil society cooperation that has
developed in relation to the controversial Chad–Cameroon pipeline
shows how such awareness can be enhanced.

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 144 The Politics of Nation-building

Statism must not, however, remain confined to the typical areas

of administration and internal security. It is especially the creation
and guarantee of basic political and legal conditions in the economic
domain that are frequently of decisive importance for nation-forming
to succeed.

Physical, social and media infrastructure

Facilitating the economic and social transactions that constitute a
nation requires an effective infrastructure. Economic development is
central to the cohesion of an emerging society. The (re)establishment
of water and energy supplies, the health system, residential
accommodation and waste disposal often make up a substantial
part of external assistance. The primary task in this regard is to
strengthen the government’s and society’s capacity to act. Where
development cooperation supports the provision of public assets, it
must be ensured that these are made equally accessible to all parts
of the population and that the projects serve to strengthen common
interests rather than widen the gulf between different groups of the
population. We know from southern Europe, for example, that the
readiness of population groups in multiethnic regions to share health
facilities with other groups, for instance, can only be built up again
at a relatively slow pace.
In Bolivia, the reform of the education system through the
introduction of intercultural, bilingual education is also encouraging
integration of the country’s indigenous population. This provides
sufficient scope for the imparting of native values and history. The
situation of the indigenous population in Latin America also clearly
shows that central issues of nation-forming still remain unresolved
even after almost two centuries of independence.
The media infrastructure is of particular relevance for the nation-
forming process. In the face of a fragile democratic culture, the
media have a large measure of influence with regard to divisive
ethnicistic, nationalistic or religious ideologies being reinforced
or overcome. The negative examples of the dissemination of hate
speeches in the Balkans or Rwanda are widely known. Journalistic
ethics and political responsibility on the part of the media can be
conveyed through awareness-enhancement measures and a boost
given to the media’s positive influences. Projects initiated by
political foundations, for example, are helping to develop a new
media policy which is crucial for reconciling the ethnic groups in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The UNTAC radio service also made

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 A Development Policy Perspective 145

a valuable contribution to democratisation in Cambodia through a

balanced information policy.

Identity, values and goals

As the examples referred to show, it is more often the way in which
support is implemented that determines the contribution to the nation-
forming process rather than the object of the support. Promoting a
shared identity and values is a theme that runs throughout numerous
projects. In many cases, the contributions cannot even be precisely
classified under one of the three constituent parts.
The support of truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa
or Guatemala, for example, has to be seen both as a contribution
against immunity from criminal proceedings and to improving legal
certainty as well as providing the basis for a common peaceful future
for the different groups of the population, something that is only
possible after first coming to terms with injustice, recognition of
victims’ suffering and reintegration of the perpetrators. Just how
relevant this ‘coming to terms’ process is can be clearly illustrated
in the example of Cambodia, where it is assumed that stability and
peace will not be possible until the Khmer Rouge have been brought
to justice or there has been a public confession of guilt.
The example of settling disputes in an alternative manner shows
that shared values and traditions can also be the starting point for
creating legal certainty. In Rwanda, for instance, the Gacaca lay courts
ease the burden on the classic criminal justice system and prevent
exemption from punishment, while also contributing towards
reconciliation and reintegration by way of traditionally acknowledged
public proceedings. In Guatemala, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
provides support in the technical discussion on the compatibility of
the Maya law of custom with the state’s legal system (KAS 2003:28)
while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation has
supported a series of seminars and radio transmissions aimed, among
other things, at recruiting a multiethnic police force (FES 2002: 52).
Support for the promotion of confidence building and reconciliation
is also provided in numerous fragile and post-conflict societies in the
service of civil peace.
This and many other examples show that support for nation-
forming in the domain of identity, values and goals primarily begins
with improving the possibilities for all groups to participate rather
than being initially concerned with culture or civilisation-related
subject matter. Although development cooperation can, for example,

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 146 The Politics of Nation-building

also help a nation to express identity through cultural assets and

historical references, as well as preserving and reflecting on these,
the acceptance of a nation by all its members ultimately depends on
its being accepted by them in the given context as the best of the
social orders possible with regard to intranational and international
interaction. Participation is therefore the key concept for identity,
goals and values.

DEVELOPMENT POLICY SUPPORT FOR NATION-FORMING –

RISKS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

With regard to its sequence and course, development policy support

should start with the priority given to those aspects that can be
identified as triggering and boosting integration processes and the
support of which can be expected to arouse the strongest response
among the population at large (Hamre and Sullivan 2002:93). It has
to be taken into account in this regard that the players involved can
rarely agree unanimously on the priorities – with this being true
both for the donors and the internal players. The conflicting coor-
dination processes can have a destabilising effect at an early stage,
with the administrative responsibilities overstretching the existing
support structures. However, the frequently resulting establishment
of parallel structures by the donors undermines autonomy and
individual responsibility.
We know from post-conflict situations that a perceptible ‘peace
dividend’ has to materialise quickly in the form of economic and
social improvement for the general population to enable the political
process to continue. This experience can presumably also be applied
to nation-forming. However, this must not lead to the improvement
at the commencement of the support phase being induced by an
excessively high inflow of financial aid which the countries cannot
absorb at that point in time3 and which, on the other hand, cannot
be maintained over the long term, thus resulting in the possibility
of people’s expectations being disappointed.
In the involvement of internal groups of players, consideration
has to be given to how to facilitate social negotiation concerning the
nation to be formed without neglecting the relevant social forces.
In peace processes or negotiations like the Bonn conferences on
Afghanistan, the centre of attention is focused on elitist groups and
powerful representatives of the diaspora, who have often formed a
government in exile. This frequently leads to inadequately represented

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 A Development Policy Perspective 147

groups of the population being overlooked in civil society, with their

resulting exclusion impeding or even preventing the nation-forming
process. While the involvement of women has gained in relevance
(though still low in de facto terms), this situation particularly applies
to young, poorly educated men without any fixed income.
In view of these young men, who are easily mobilised and often
prepared to use force, and also with regard to former combatants,
the tightrope between nation-forming and nationalism also has to
be borne in mind. Every contribution to nation-forming must bear
close examination of the extent to which it can contribute towards
a common identity shared by all groups of the population rather
than encouraging the isolation of or even discrimination against
individual groups.
In conclusion, we would like to once gain point out the danger of
instrumentalisation. To a not inconsiderable extent, nation-forming
is supported and therefore also influenced by the international
community on the basis of political, economic and security interests.
Development policy should, in a more distinct manner than
humanitarian or peace-keeping interventions, only be practised where
internal players show a genuine interest in such support and the will
to assume responsibility on their own account or where limitations
in this regard are compensated for by way of clear mandates from
the United Nations.

WHAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOLLOW?

We will now examine – though by no means exhaustively – a

number of principles of action, some of which originate from the
development policy tradition, while others result from experiences
in dealing with civil conflicts.4 These principles do not apply solely
to nation-forming; they are also generally valid for commitment in
the context of state failure and the waging of violent conflicts. In all
cases, external support should only proceed with the greatest possible
sensitivity and only on the basis of partnership.

• In the sense of all-party involvement, all relevant groups of

players must be allowed to take part and may on no account
be selected on the basis of traditional customs or diplomatic
considerations. Only action that also includes discourse with
Islamic groups, for example, will prove worthwhile over the
long term because groups that are excluded will normally

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 148 The Politics of Nation-building

look for other – often violent – ways of gaining influence for

themselves.
• All sides must be prepared to communicate with each other
openly in relation to difficult conditions and problems.
Cooperation which does not take up the issues of security,
structural obstacles to reform, political reservations or suspected
abuse of power cannot be effective over the long term. Previous
experience has shown that there are not as many taboos as
many people believe and all that is often required is to use new
forms of communication.
• External support is not free of the interests of those who provide
it. These interests should be disclosed openly. Measures, the
intention of which cannot be made public, should not be
applied so as not to undermine the credibility of the external
support among the population of the country concerned – or
among one’s own citizens, come to that.
• Furthermore, the values and norms, such as participation, respect
of human rights and gender equality, promoted in the context
of the support must also be applied in one’s own sphere of
influence. Non-observance of such standards, for example in
cases of corruption in or surrounding development cooperation
activities, undemocratic decision-making or availing oneself
of sexual services from individuals forced into prostitution, in
the course of peace-keeping operations, sends implicit moral
messages, the effects of which cannot be underestimated.
• In overall terms, the analysis of the interactions between
development policy measures and dysfunctional statism, social
fragmentation, plus the waging of violent conflict needs to be
improved. In the area of crisis prevention and dealing with
civil conflict, initial experience is now available in relation to
peace and conflict impact assessment, though this needs to be
further consolidated, applied to peace-keeping missions and UN
operations, as well as extended to include governance, plus state
and nation-forming. For example, transitional administrations
should be examined to determine to what extent over-hasty
political course-setting decisions in elections or constitutional
matters make the nation-forming process more difficult.
• With regard to the sharing of responsibilities with other policy
areas, though also with the sponsor community, greater use
must be made of the existing comparative advantages than has
been the case up to now. The closer linking of foreign, defence

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 A Development Policy Perspective 149

and development policy in the sense of a comprehensive

security policy is to be welcomed, but has so far led more to a
situation where everyone is doing everything. This results in
too little account being taken of experience already gained in
the other policy domains. At the same time, work is impeded
by the occasional lack of or inefficient coordination instead of
exploiting synergies between the respective areas of activity.

INSTEAD OF TAKING STOCK – WHAT SUPPORT

DOES NATION-FORMING ACTUALLY NEED?

We have concentrated on the direct contribution of development

policy to the processes of nation-forming where this contribution
begins with local structures. However, development policy can also
exert an indirect influence. Globalisation, breakdown of the state and
violent conflicts are influenced by external as well as internal players.
These external players can, through trade and economic policies or
inappropriate stipulations from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), help create the conditions that make international support
for nation-building necessary in the first place. Although breakdown
of the state and violent conflicts certainly do not occur because of
basic external conditions alone, the deterioration of prices for exports
or external shocks caused by rises in energy prices can, for example,
bring a country closer to the brink of disaster or contribute to the
failure of peace processes.
Support for nation-forming should not first be applied as a cure
when new nations are emerging or have to emerge. Development
policy can, in part, serve as a preventive measure to counteract the
fragmentation, marginalisation and impoverishment of societies, the
undermining of state functionality as well as the abuse of power by
corrupt elites. Development processes lie in the hands of the respective
societies, however. For this reason, development cooperation can only
be effective if the corresponding political will exists. Nevertheless,
the international community must not turn their attention to the
good-performing countries alone and leave the others at the mercy
of despotic governments, warlords or attacks and incursions by their
neighbours. It must look for non-violent civil means as an alternative
to military intervention or simply ignoring ‘the blank patches on the
map’. The overriding interest of the community of states in inclusive
nations with a functional statism as central building blocks for the
juridification of international relations and a multilateral order must

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 150 The Politics of Nation-building

not be torpedoed by the particular political interests of internationally

influential governments and concerns.

NOTES

1. Authors of US origin, in particular, often present pragmatic arguments with

regard to dealing with armed, undemocratic forces: ‘Whether we like it or
not, military power is a necessary component of state-building’ (Ottaway
2002:18).
2. The Brahimi Report is the report by the group of experts on United
Nations peace missions, drafted in 2000 under the supervision of Lakdar
Brahimi.
3. With regard to absorbability in post-conflict situations, see Collier and
Hoeffler (2002).
4. We refer here, in particular, to the recommendations of the ‘Do No Harm’
approach (Anderson 1999).

REFERENCES

Anderson, Mary B. (1999) Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace – or War
(London).
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2002) Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict
Societies (World Bank Working Paper 2902, October, Washington, DC).
FES (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) (2002) Krisen vorbeugen – Konflikte lösen –
Frieden sichern (Contribution by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation to dealing
with civil conflicts. Berlin).
Hamre, John and Gordon Sullivan (2002) ‘Toward Post-conflict Reconstruction’,
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 85–96.
KAS (Konrad Adenauer Foundation) (2003) Konfliktprävention durch
Demokratieförderung (St Augustin).
Kloke-Lesch, Adolf (2000) ‘Mitgestalten in anderen Ländern. Die Funktion
von Entwicklungspolitik im Rahmen von Global Governance’, edp-
Entwicklungspolitik, No. 14/15, pp. 32–7.
Kloke-Lesch, Adolf/Marita Steinke (2002) ‘Den Sicherheitskräften auf die
Finger schauen. Der Entwicklungspolitik muss es um eine bessere Kontrolle
von Polizei und Militär gehen’, Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, Vol. 43,
No. 2, pp. 44–7.
Maull, Hanns W. (2002) ‘Die “Zivilmacht Europa” bleibt Projekt. Zur Debatte
um Kagan, Asmus/Pollack und das Strategiedokument NSS 2002’, Blätter für
deutsche und internationale Politik, Vol. 47, No. 12, pp. 1468–78.
Ottaway, Marina (2002) ‘Nation Building’, Foreign Policy, No. 132, pp. 16–24.
Rice, Susan E. (2002) The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States
(The Brookings Institution Policy Brief No. 116, February, Washington,
DC).
Rotberg, Robert I. (2002) ‘Failed States in a World of Terror’, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 127–40.
Wilson, Woodrow (1913) The New Freedom (New York).

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 12
Nation-building: A Strategy for Regional
Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention
Helmut van Edig

This chapter focuses on the question of whether and under what

conditions nation-building can have a positive impact on conflict
prevention and regional stabilisation. It will become clear that the
nation-building process holds both risks and opportunities for
regional stabilisation. To understand the interaction between nation-
building and regional stabilisation, it is necessary, on the one hand, to
take a detailed look at the objectives, contents and players involved
in regional stabilisation. On the other hand, the consequences of
different variants of nation-building for regional stabilisation also
have to be examined. Finally, the question is posed to which extent
external players have scope to influence the process of nation-
building, what objectives are pursued in this regard and whether
any substantial influence can be exerted on regional stabilisation
in this way.

OBJECTIVES, CONTENTS AND PLAYERS

INVOLVED IN REGIONAL STABILISATION

‘Regional stabilisation’ appears in just about every catalogue of

foreign policy objectives. Industrialised and developing countries,
the European Union as well as international global and regional
organisations have all taken up the cause of regional stabilisation.
In relation to German policy on Africa, Germany’s Foreign Minister,
Joschka Fischer, declared (2000:3): ‘... our second priority area is
promoting security and stability in Africa. Here we place our faith
above all in regional cooperation, which has huge potential for the
creation of stability, prosperity and peace.’ In April 2000, the EU
Africa Summit in Cairo resolved in its action programme: ‘... we agree
to reinforce the continental and regional mechanisms for conflict
prevention, management and resolution ...’.1 The G8 countries drew
up an action plan together with the African side that aims, among

151

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other things, at promoting regional African capabilities for conflict

management and crisis intervention.
Regional stabilisation can be defined as a continuous process in
which countries that have a special relationship with each other,
through common characteristics, strive in a sustained and peaceful
manner to reconcile their interests in order to thus create the
conditions for a secure basis of existence for their citizens.
Regional stabilisation is therefore not an end in itself. It first serves
its purpose as an instrument with which to establish human security
beyond the security of states.2 The term ‘human security’ places
both the state and the individual at the centre of endeavours to
achieve security and stability (Benedek 2002). Regional stabilisation
cannot therefore be neutral; rather it must be oriented towards the
model of an extended security concept, as well as to the acquis of
international law.
The exclusion of force from regional relations is a minimum content
requirement for regional stabilisation. Ensuring the sustainability of
stabilisation does, however, require shaping of relations through
confidence-building measures, cooperation mechanisms and
structures in the security and other domains, as well as through
integration where applicable. Where there is a network of constructive,
forward-looking relations, the risk of disputes and (violent) conflicts
is reduced. A striking example of this is the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), whose original aim was to
resolve the peaceful coexistence of societies with different political
systems. Its central idea today is to promote stability and cooperation
on the basis of common norms. It is precisely these changed terms of
reference of the OSCE that elucidate the importance of the step from
stabilisation through coexistence to stabilisation through the positive
structuring of regional relations. A similar development could be
possible for Africa with the founding of the African Union (AU) and
the revival of sub-regional organisations.
There are different players involved in regional stabilisation. Where
these are states, it would be rash to equate these with the countries of
a particular region, even though the expression ‘regional stabilisation’
appears to indicate this. The term ‘region’ is enigmatic and ambiguous.
The large number of possible geographic, political and historical/
cultural criteria that can characterise a region can be used at will to
make more or less accurate delimitations. Political practice therefore
also proceeds according to political and economic considerations of
expediency. The influence of nation-building on regional stabilisation

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 A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention 153

depends, in particular, on the interdependence of the states involved.

This can be compared to a system of communicating tubes in which
any change has a direct effect on the relations in the overall system.
The greater its conductivity, the more the system is affected. The
conducting elements via which positive or negative changes are
transported are diverse. Geographical vicinity plays an important
but by no means exclusive role. The common elements of the political
systems, history and cultural traditions or ethnic affiliation have to
be included as well as the sharing of common natural resources, such
as water used by those residing around the same river basin or oil
deposits in border regions.
In addition to states, regional organisations can also be considered as
stabilisation players. They have the potential to take on responsibility
for stabilisation and frequently develop to form important pillars
of a region’s security structure (Volmer 2000). They do, however,
sometimes display inherent weaknesses. It is predominantly political
– also security policy – and economic reasons and less a common
regional identity that lead to the forming of regional organisations.
Under these conditions, many regional organisations have to tackle
the difficulties resulting from their heterogeneity and which interfere
with their role as regional stabilisers. Regional organisations that
include states outside an authentic regional identity risk burdening
the endeavours for regional stability with additional conflict
potential.3 The example of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) shows, nonetheless, that such obstacles are not
insurmountable.

NATION-BUILDING: RISK AND OPPORTUNITY FOR REGIONAL STABILITY

Regional stability is based on a multitude of factors. It is, therefore,

not nation-building alone that is crucial for stabilisation, even though
it plays an especially important role. Disputes concerning borders,
natural resources or economic interests and environmental problems
can prevent stabilisation or have a destabilising effect. An essential
requirement is, therefore, that the states are willing and able to
negotiate and enforce peaceful settlements.

Strong states – cornerstones of regional stability

Even though the nation-state is increasingly subject to influences that
restrict its sovereignty of action both inwardly and outwardly, it will

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 154 The Politics of Nation-building

remain the essential building block of the international community

for the foreseeable future (Tay 2001).
Regional stabilisation will therefore also have to be based in
the future on the efficiency and strength of the states concerned.
Strength is not founded on the state’s monopoly of force alone.
In general terms, a state can be described as strong when it has
successfully progressed through the process of state and nation-
building, the essential criteria of which are penetration, identity,
legitimacy, participation, distribution and external sovereignty
(Asseburg 2002:68, 75). Penetration, in this context, means the
demarcation of a national territory, as well as the establishment of
the authority of the state, the centralisation of power and assertion
of the state’s monopoly of force. Identity is based on the integration
of all groups of the population on the national territory into the
national community and their identification with the state system.
State institutions have legitimacy when they are committed to the
public interest and there is fundamental consensus among the
population on the type of government rule and its priority objectives,
with such consensus expressed in a constitution. Legitimacy can be
jeopardised by unsatisfactory results relating to the other dimensions
of state-building. Participation signifies political integration of all
groups of the population through the institutionalisation of political
participation, as is the case in a pluralist and democratic system
of a state under the rule of law. Distribution is an element of the
integration of the entire population into the state system through
economic integration. Finally, external sovereignty is the ability of
states to participate equally in international transactions (Asseburg
2002:75ff).
The criteria referred to are important in this context insofar as they
also form starting points for external support of the nation-building
process in the interests of regional stabilisation.

States without nation – nations without state

States that are unstable can set dynamics in motion that can manifest
themselves as a peaceful and participative but also as a violent and
repressive process, with corresponding consequences for regional
stabilisation. The maximum degree of instability is reached when
a state collapses. Failed states are now rightly regarded as a threat
to both regional and global security and stability (Kühne and
Hildebrandt 2001). This is expressed very clearly in the US National

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 A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention 155

Security Strategy of September 2002: ‘America is now threatened less

by conquering states than we are by failing ones.’4
History teaches us that wars, revolutions, repression or disputes
caused by the arbitrary drawing of borders were more often the forces
behind state- and nation-building than negotiations and peaceful
reconciliation of interests. Attaining the criteria against which the
strength of a nation is measured (see above) is consequently very
strongly associated with risks of violence.

Peaceful or violent nation-building processes

It is generally regarded as being the case that the fewer characteristics
of a strong state there are, the more potential for conflict nation-
building has. Participative and peaceful nation-building processes are
impeded by the fact that the partial processes referred to reinforce
each other to some extent while also standing in contradiction to
each other in part. Where it is possible to broaden participation
and establish distribution mechanisms, this furthers the legitimation
of the state and regime as well as the development of a collective
identity. However, inconsistencies exist, among other things, between
the stabilisation of state structures and establishment of the state’s
monopoly of force and unification processes on the one hand and the
extension of participation, allowing of pluralism and establishment
of opposition structures on the other hand (Asseburg 2002:80). An
important basis for the stability of a state order is the voluntary
acceptance of a national identity and political organisation of the
community, as voluntary cooperation does represent a fundamental
condition for lasting unity (Meyns 2002).
The young states of the postcolonial era in Africa and Asia were
confronted from the outset of their existence with the problems
caused by the nation-building process. The extent of the problems
was determined by the initial conditions, which were not identical
for all countries. Some states, for example, took over efficient
administrations and a well-developed infrastructure, while others
had only rudimentary state institutions at their disposal. Following
independence, countries of globally strategic interest, in particular,
received substantial support, whereas others had to depend more on
their own means and resources. A number of countries had become
multiethnic states by virtue of the arbitrary borders drawn during
the colonial period. Only a small number became independent with
a collective identity. All the young states, however, had to deal with
the contradictory dimension of nation-building. In most cases,

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 156 The Politics of Nation-building

preference was given to penetration and the creation of an identity,

at the expense of legitimacy and participation. This resulted in
tensions or violent conflicts between groups that were ethnically,
religiously, socially or linguistically different. Promises of economic
and social prosperity were given which did not, however, materialise
in most cases.
The large number of internal conflicts in young African and Asian
states clearly shows that no lasting solutions have been found.

Internal and external effects of participative-peaceful or repressive-

violent nation-building
Destabilisation as the result of repressive-violent nation-building
processes produces a power vacuum which internal and external
players are pushing to fill. Internally, the state’s monopoly of force is
replaced by warlords, ethnic militias and roving gangs of youths who
wrest sovereignty over parts of the territory away from the state and
implant themselves with their own machinery of power and force
(Traub-Merz 2003). The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo clearly illustrates, better than any other example, the effects
of a state crisis on regional stability and the significance of access
to natural resources as a compelling motive. Besides the ‘economic
intervention’ of the neighbouring states, which compete with each
other in this respect, the flows of refugees arising in the region of
the Great Lakes and other regions of Africa (southern Sudan/Uganda;
Somalia/Kenya) also have a destabilising effect (Kühne and Hildebrandt
2001). Gun-running, drug-trafficking and organised crime place an
additional burden on regional stability. Furthermore, ethnic groups
that are divided by borders and repressed in a country tend to spread
unrest to neighbouring states. A good many of the factors that put a
strain on regional stability also have a global impact. The events of
September 11, 2001 have shown that extremist movements use failed
or weak states as a sanctuary to expand their lawless activities at the
global level. The same applies to organised crime, money-laundering
and other illegal financial transactions.

OPTIONS FOR ACTION

Regional stabilisation as an essential element of German and

international peace policy
The community of states cannot, in its own security interests,
adopt a passive attitude towards regional destabilisation. This

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 A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention 157

applies, in particular, to states or communities of states affected by

the consequences of destabilisation, such as the European Union
in relation to the states in the Balkans or – following eastward
enlargement – the countries of the south Caucasus (Ehrhart 1999).
Beyond the security interests, the objectives of a value-oriented
policy determine actions and reactions in relation to problems of
regional stability. This is true, in particular, for Germany’s policy, the
central elements of which are to promote peace, stability and welfare
(German Foreign Office 2002:2).

Basic conditions for promoting regional stabilisation

It is primarily the states and the political and social forces at work
in them that are responsible for nation-building and internal and
external stabilisation. Assistance from outside cannot replace the
states’ own responsibility for achieving these objectives (Niedziella
2000). These can only be carried out in a subsidiary manner where
the state and political system has failed. Every outside intervention is
confronted with a range of problems. External initiatives and policies
related to nation-building have to be in accord with independence
and self-determination. Nation-building imposed or executed from
outside frequently leads to a new potential for violence.
National identity, as an important element of nation-building,
can certainly not be established from outside. Its emergence can,
however, be supported by better basic conditions (communication,
transport links, schools, economic integration, etc.), which make
growing together easier. Subsidiary action by external players is
also required where regional organisations are not willing or able to
prevent serious and regionally destabilising breakdown of the state or
flagrant violations of human rights. One example in this context was
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) prior to the founding of the
African Union (AU), whose hands were tied by the OAU charter’s rule
of non-intervention and which could therefore only look on during
the actions of dictators like Idi Amin and Bokassa or the genocide
in Rwanda (Meyns 2002).

Multidimensional approach
Despite the restrictions referred to, possibilities do exist to promote
regional stability via a range of measures that serve the nation-building
process. The prerequisite in this respect is a comprehensive and
sustainable approach that takes account of the different dimensions
of nation-building. The EU and Germany give preference in this

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 158 The Politics of Nation-building

context to civil crisis prevention, settlement of conflicts and the

consolidation of peace. The German government’s general concept
of crisis prevention and the settlement of conflicts (as at 2002)
postulated an overall strategy which interlinked instruments from
different relevant policy domains. The concept proceeded from the
position that crisis prevention in the broadest sense is successful
where external and internal players from the state and society
concentrate and coordinate their potential for preventing crises.
The EU’s Göteborg Programme from July 2001 for the prevention
of violent conflicts, which is aimed at improving the mobilisation
of instruments at the EU’s disposal for the cross-sectional task of
‘conflict prevention’, pointed in the same direction. Even though
crisis prevention should primarily be of a civil nature, experience in
Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Macedonia shows that military
means can be necessary as an instrument of crisis prevention and
crisis management in order to prevent or end the violent waging
of conflicts or so as to first create the conditions under which the
causes of conflict can be tackled by civil means. Military means
must, however, be embedded in an overall strategy and cannot be
a substitute for civil measures of conflict management. The peace-
keeping operations conducted by the United Nations also have to
be viewed from this perspective.

Promoting peaceful conflict management mechanisms that facilitate the

nation-building process
Conflicts that arise during the course of social development and
nation-building are a natural phenomenon. They only present a risk if
there is a lack of mechanisms for peaceful conflict management. The
primary requirement here is for effective state institutions, though
contributions towards crisis prevention on the part of society are also
essential. Supporting and promoting structures established under the
rule of law, democracy and responsible governance are important
contributions towards the nation-building process in this context.
In authoritarian states, as well as in transforming countries and
weak or failed states, state institutions can in many instances not be
considered as cooperation partners, or only to a limited extent. The
task in this case is to identify new partners as well as find new target
groups and modified forms of cooperation. Even though cooperation
with official bodies can often not be avoided, greater focus is
concentrated on cooperation with peaceable forces of civil society,
to which non-state cooperation players such as non-governmental

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 A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention 159

organisations (NGOs), political foundations or the churches can

add comparative advantages. Unhindered development of the civil
society is required to safeguard the durability of the constitutional
state and democracy, while at the same time ensuring the assertion
of responsible governance and the prevention of corruption. The role
of civil society is not uncontroversial, however. It is the mouthpiece
of the population vis-à-vis the state and can exert pressure on the
latter to take account of the needs of the country’s citizens. On the
other hand, there is a risk – as in a number of African countries – of
state structures being undermined (Kühne and Hildebrandt 2001; cf.
Schade, Chapter 10 in this volume). In the final analysis, civil society
can only act complementarily to the state; it cannot replace it.
Special attention will have to be given to the establishment of
‘peace economies’ to supersede the economic base of violent conflicts.
The conflict-relevant dimension of private economic dealings is also
being included in the deliberations to an increasing extent. The UN
Secretary-General’s Global Compact initiative is a particularly striking
example in this regard.

Safeguarding bases of existence

Integrating the entire population into the state system through
economic integration (state’s distribution function) is an essential
element of the nation-building process. Stability is endangered by
extreme poverty, unequal distribution of prosperity and lack of access
to resources – coupled with inadequate structures to manage the
reconciliation of economic and social interests. The UN Millennium
Summit held in autumn 2002 declared its support for the goal of
halving the numbers of people suffering extreme poverty by the year
2015, thus tackling a central structural cause of conflict. The German
government has adopted the Action Programme 2015 to implement
this objective. This programme also strives for structural changes
at international level with the aim of establishing a more just and
ecologically more sustainable economic and financial order so as to
create better conditions for controlling the effects of globalisation.
Globalisation also means that state sovereignty has lost some of
its significance in important areas. This restricts a state’s capacity to
act and a gap emerges between citizens’ expectations and the state’s
ability to react, which can lead to a legitimation crisis that weakens
the state (Reinicke and Witte 1999). The loss of a nation’s capacity to
act therefore needs to be compensated for by improved possibilities for
states to be involved in international decision-making processes.

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 160 The Politics of Nation-building

Strengthening the regional relations network

The benefits of regional cooperation are many and diverse – in addition
to removing possible hostile images and creating an atmosphere
of self-responsibility for the region’s political stability, it can also
help to raise living standards by establishing bigger markets; this,
in turn, strengthens the states concerned. Regional cooperation can
stabilise border regions, thus preventing conflicts from spilling over
into neighbouring states.
A multilateral approach of this kind is in line with the central
objectives of German foreign policy. Increasing the capacity to
act and the efficiency of international players in the domain of
crisis prevention, such as the UN, the OSCE, the AU and regional
organisations in Africa, is therefore a priority objective, the
achievement of which depends, however, on global and regional
conditions. Seen in global terms, the forming of regional blocks can
give rise to rivalries and new tensions. Nor can it be ruled out that
the formation of regional organisations will hinder integration at
higher levels.
Regionally, e.g. in the Asian context, the scope for external players is
less because greater emphasis is placed on the concept of sovereignty,
as the following two quotations clearly demonstrate:

We should ... explore security models that conform to the regional

circumstances. The experience of other regions may be drawn upon, but
cannot be copied and still less imposed upon this region,

commented Sha Zukang, the Chinese ambassador to the UN in

Geneva (Zukang 2000). And the former Indonesian ambassador to
Germany, Martodiredjo Hartono (1995), emphasises:

The Southeast Asian region is the responsibility of the respective regional

power. The security system of the region therefore must be ‘home grown’.
... Indonesia opposes the dominating roles assumed by foreign powers in
Southeast Asian regional affairs, especially in the political and military realms.
Southeast Asia should be given a chance to solve its own problems.

There is also an underlying concern here that regional organisations

could intervene in internal matters.
In contrast, regional cooperation in Africa has in the meantime
taken on a qualitatively different nature with the founding of the
AU and the strengthening of the regional organisations. A sense

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 A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention 161

of responsibility for security policy is beginning to develop within

the regions and regional organisations, the fostering of which the
German government hopes will produce long-term security effects
in the sense of the joint containment and prevention of conflicts
(Wieczorek-Zeul 2001). It has considerably increased the amount
of support for regional organisations and supraregional projects in
sub-Saharan Africa within the framework of development policy
cooperation (German Government 2001).
Of particular importance for regional stability is the G8 Africa
Action Plan, under which partners from industrialised countries and
developing countries in Africa have come together to, among other
things, expand the instruments of security-policy cooperation in
Africa at regional and continental level. The aim over the long term
is for the AU and African regional organisations to have efficient
institutions for conflict prevention and management at their disposal
(German Government 2001). Gravitation centres of stabilisation,
like the East African Community (EAC) in East Africa or ECOWAS
in West Africa, for instance, are suitable starting points. Individual
sectors such as water management in international river basins are of
particular significance in this regard. The G8 emphasise, for example,
the importance of sensible management of water resources since
water could become a cause for conflict in disputes between states
whereas cross-border inshore waters can also prove to be a catalyst
for regional cooperation once the countries recognise the advantages
of this (Eid 2003:58).
The Stability Pact for South-East Europe initiated in 1999 with
the priority of reestablishing a network of regional relations is also a
model for regional stabilisation. The Stability Pact was a turning point.
It has been instrumental in realising the concept of crisis prevention
and, therefore, regional stabilisation in a comprehensive approach
for the first time in south-east Europe despite the heterogeneity of
the players concerned (cf. Reljiç, Chapter 8 in this volume).
In conclusion, it can be said that regional stabilisation is a process
defined by values, the course of which is determined by the capacity
to act of the states involved. The possibilities of external players
to exert influence on the nation-building process and regional
stabilisation are, however, limited. The essential instruments for
action are the promotion of mechanisms for peaceful conflict
management and safeguarding the individual’s basis of existence as
well as strengthening the network of regional relations.

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 162 The Politics of Nation-building

NOTES

1. The Action Programme is available at <europa.eu.int/comm/development/

body/eu_africa/docs/cairo_en.pdf#zoom=100>.
2. Re human security, see UNDP (1994) and German Government (2002).
3. An example of this is the accession of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
4. The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002 <www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/c7889.htm>.

REFERENCES

Asseburg, Muriel (2002) Blockierte Selbstbestimmung: Palästinensische Staats-

und Nationenbildung während der Interimsperiode (Aktuelle Materialien zur
Internationalen Politik 65, Baden-Baden).
Benedek, Wolfgang (2002) Human Security and Prevention of Terrorism
(Occasional Paper Series, European Training and Research Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), 2, October, Graz) <http://www.
etc-graz.at/publikationen/Seiten%20aus%20Human%20Security%20-
%20Vienna%20Lecture%2010-2002-3.pdf>.
Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (1999) ‘Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa’, Blätter für
deutsche und internationale Politik, August, pp. 916–19.
Eid, Uschi (2003) Die Umsetzung des G8-Afrika-Aktionsplans. Report on the G8
summit held in Evian on 1–3 June 2003 <www.bmz.de/themen/imfokus/
g8Gipfel/index.html>.
Fischer, Joschka (2000) Afrika und Europa: Partnerschaft zwischen Solidarität
und Selbstverantwortung (Berlin) <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/
infoservice/presse/presse_ARCHIV?archiv_id=699>.
German Foreign Office (2002) Foreign-policy Strategy for the Region of East Africa
(Berlin) <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/regional
konzepte/afrika>.
German Government (2001) Afrika-Politik der Bundesregierung. Antwort auf die
Große Anfrage der FDP (BT Drucksache 14/5582).
German Government (2002) Gesamtkonzept: ‘Zivile Krisenprävention,
Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung’ (Berlin) <www.auswaertiges-amt.
de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv_km/konfliktpraev_html>.
Hartono, Martodiredjo (1995) Indonesia in the Asia-Pacific Region: Its Role in
ASEAN and APEC (Occasional Paper 2, Trier) <www.zops.uni-trier.de/op/
OccasionalPapersNr02.pdf>.
Kühne, Winrich/Ernst Hildebrandt (2001) Evolving Global Governance Structures.
Division of Labour and Co-operation between Regional and Global Security
Arrangements (SWP study 18/01, Berlin).
Meyns, Peter (2002) ‘Die “Afrikanische Union” – Afrikas neuer Anlauf zu
kontinentaler Einheit und globaler Anerkennung’, in Afrika Jahrbuch 2001,
ed. by Rolf Hofmeier and Andreas Mehler (Institute for African Studies,
Hamburg), pp. 51–67.

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 A Strategy for Regional Stabilisation and Conflict Prevention 163

Niedziella, Dietmar (2000) ‘Umfassender Ansatz. Der Stabilitätspakt für

Südosteuropa’, IFDT Zeitschrift für Innere Führung, No. 1/2 <www.ifdt.
de/0001/Artikel/Niedziella.htm>.
Reinicke, Wolfgang Z. and Jan Martin Witte (1999) ‘Globalization and
Democratic Governance: Global Public Policy and Trisectoral Networks’,
in Carl Lankowski (ed.), Governing Beyond the Nation-State. Global Public
Policy, Regionalism or Going Local? (AICGS Research Report 11, Washington,
DC), pp. 1–39.
Tay, Simon S.C. (2001) Comments on Dani Rodrik´s FOUR SIMPLE PRINCIPLES.
(Singapore) <www.demglob.de/comments1/tay1.html>.
Traub-Merz, Rudolf (2003) Afrika zwischen Staatszerfall, Stabilisierung und
regionalen Sicherheitsstrukturen: Beispiel Westafrika (Beitrag zu den Afrika-
Tagen der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ‘Afrika auf neuen Wegen?’, Bonn).
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1994) Report on Human
Development 1994 (New York).
Volmer, Ludger (2000) Rede zum Afrika-Tag (Bonn, 25 May) <www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/de/infoservice/presse/presse_archiv?archiv_id=>.
Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidemarie (2001) ‘Die afrikanische Herausforderung
– Eckpunkte einer strategischen Afrika-Politik’, Entwicklung und
Zusammenarbeit, Vol. 42, No. 5 (May), pp. 158–64.
Zukang, Sha (2000) Some Thoughts on Establishing a New Regional Security
Order. Statement to the East-West Center’s Senior Policy Seminar (Honolulu)
<http://genevamissiontoun.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5180.html>.

Hippler 02 chap09 163 4/5/05 9:23:22 am

 13
Nation-building: Possibilities
and Limitations of External
Military Contributions
Heinz-Uwe Schäfer

Operations by multinational armed forces to stabilise countries in

crisis regions have considerably increased in number and intensity
over the past few years. Of the total of 55 United Nations peace-
keeping missions since 1945, as many as 41 of these have taken place
in the last 14 years. The deployment figures for the German armed
forces reflect this situation graphically: in 1994, only twelve German
soldiers – under the United Nations observer mission in Georgia
– were stationed abroad as part of a peace-keeping mission. Just nine
years later, there were over 8,000 soldiers of the German armed forces
taking part in eight foreign operations on three continents – most of
which can be classified as military contributions to nation-building
– predominantly in the Balkans but also in the remote mountain
region of the Hindu Kush.
While political decision-makers worldwide are sending their forces
to distant regions to an ever-increasing extent to help consolidate peace
processes and promote nation-building, the discussion concerning
the possibilities and limitations of external troops in performing
this mandate is in its infancy. This also applies to the important
question regarding the justification, embedding and objective of
such military actions. Recourse to ‘international obligations’ or the
need for ‘humanitarian intervention’ alone are not sufficient to
provide convincing justification for the objective, appropriateness
and duration of military peace-keeping operations.
Even though the German armed forces are not involved in what is
so far the biggest and most costly attempt by a US-led ‘coalition of the
willing’ to restore security and order, with around 200,000 soldiers
in postwar Iraq (an operation that also continues to dominate public
awareness in Germany), the current developments in the Middle East
should provide additional stimulus to this overdue debate.

164

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 Possibilities and Limitations of External Military Contributions 165

The exponential increase in military operations within the context

of the multinational commitment to nation-building can be ascribed
to two main factors: first, the number of countries whose populations
have to cope with the consequences of preceding (civil) wars has risen
substantially; second, the interest of the international community
in supporting such states in this endeavour – also and in particular
through the provision of military forces – has grown significantly.
In order to assess the role of external military contributions in
relation to nation-building processes, I will first look at the most
important causes for this growing need. This is followed by an
examination of the motives of external players for deciding on ever-
greater military involvement in the nation-building process.

WORLD ORDER, TERRORISM AND NATION-BUILDING

The spectacular increase in failed nation-building processes or those

degenerating into violence that have been observed over the past
number of years can, in the main, be traced back to the end of
the Cold War. The conflict between East and West had polarised
international relations in the preceding decades and, in a certain way,
also stabilised them. It was in actual fact the danger of a global nuclear
apocalypse that formed the regulative and disciplinary momentum
for this global order.
This competition for power and the nuclear stalemate situation
subdued critical developments in most cases, even in those regions
that could not be directly assigned to either of the two centres of
power. To that extent, although this artificially produced pseudo-
order was not characterised by peaceableness in the real meaning of
the word, it was typified by an enforced stability.
A posteriori, violent eruptions of conflicts predominantly
motivated by power politics and ethnic factors, also in Europe,
revealed the subduing effect that the Cold War had on the potential
for escalating regional flash points – especially in relation to intrastate
conflicts. The consequences of nationalist and religious fanaticism,
interethnic aggression and violence increasingly threatened to also
involve other countries and regions that were not directly affected
by conflicts within the state. Unbearable images of human cruelty,
growing influxes of refugees and the latent danger of the uncontrolled
spreading of instability and lawlessness have, since the early 1990s,
intensified the pressure on the international community as a whole
to take action.

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 166 The Politics of Nation-building

At the same time, the end of the East–West conflict and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union have also released large parts of the
military capacities previously tied up in the antagonism arising from
the perception of being threatened and in acting as a deterrent. The
possibilities for political decision-makers to take action responsive to
these new developments by sending troops have therefore broadened
considerably.
Furthermore, the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 have led to
the realisation that ‘disintegrated states’ serve, in particular, religiously
and anti-West-motivated extremists as a refuge and control centre
for the preparation and execution of terrorist attacks, which have
reached global proportions. For this reason, weak or failed states
have attracted increasing security-policy interest besides the terror
networks operating worldwide.
Seen against this background, countries like Afghanistan have also
become the focus of security-policy involvement in addition to the
centres of conflict in the Balkans, the geographical coordinates of
which were in themselves sufficient to provoke action by Europe.
The much quoted phrase of the ‘defence at the Hindu Kush’ coined
by the German Minister of Defence was intended to illustrate that
the involvement of the German armed forces in the multinational
security presence in Afghanistan also directly serves the security
interests of Germany and the international community.

SECURITY INTERESTS AND NATION-BUILDING

Military contributions by external players to the consolidation of

peace reflect a normative understanding of nation-building in those
countries sending such personnel. Their governments are concerned
with quickly creating a minimum degree of security in a state marked
by chaos and anarchy following the end of military conflict, a degree
of security which is an absolute prerequisite for achieving any
improvement in the economic, political and social situation. Only
when a more peaceful environment has been created can the civil
instruments for reconstruction display their full effect.
The conventional, positive expressions of ‘peace-keeping mission’
or ‘humanitarian intervention’ relating to military contributions to
the nation-building process do make it easier, in their pithy, morally
accentuated concepts, to raise broad support from the parliaments
and societies in the countries sending troops while, at the same time,
evidently facilitating the forming of consensus at the international

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 Possibilities and Limitations of External Military Contributions 167

level. They do not, however, do justice to the generally complex

interests of the nations providing the soldiers.
Justifications reduced to ethical arguments fall short as an attempt
to brush aside critical questions concerning the main decision-
making criteria. The question, for example, of why the international
community comes to an agreement on intervening in case X but not
in case Y, although the prevailing situation is comparable in both
countries, can thus not be answered convincingly in this way, nor by
referring to limited military resources. It is necessary in this respect
to explain the political motives for intervention more transparently
than previously in cases of military operations abroad which go
beyond humanitarian aid. It is also quite legitimate and not morally
reprehensible to bring specific national security interests to bear in
this regard.
Furthermore, the sending of multinational troops should be
embedded in an overall political concept for the future of the state
affected. Only if there is clarity concerning the final political and
military outcome sought can the military leadership establish the
role of its forces to the required extent and perform the assignments
allocated to it with purposeful prioritisation and adequate rules of
conduct.
If this is not done, there will be a risk of the dispatch of soldiers
for reconstruction endeavours degenerating into an end in itself and
being understood as an expression of the lack of a political concept,
while the troops themselves grow sceptical about the meaningfulness
of an operation that is, in most cases, highly risky and full of privation
for them.

ON THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL FORCES IN NATION-BUILDING

A national reconstruction process supported by external players

should, in particular:

• prevent warlike actions from flaring up again (thus creating

conditions for supplying emergency aid to the population);
• establish sustainable stability and order, which is a precondition
for the return of refugees and economic development;
• protect minorities and returning refugees;
• disarm and demilitarise the parties involved in the conflict;
• eliminate dangerous residues left from the conflict (mines,
etc.);

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 168 The Politics of Nation-building

• support the national security forces in the reconstruction

process;
• restore essential bases of existence and minimum social
standards;
• initiate a new political beginning (democratisation, protection
and integration of minorities, establishing basic human
rights).

Armed external forces are generally allocated a major role in the first
six assignments listed, in particular. Furthermore, their help is also
enlisted in the early stage of the nation-building process – in view of
the often still fragile security situation – for reconstruction work that
is not essentially military in nature in order to bring about visible
successes as quickly as possible both for the population locally as
well as for the government and the public at large back home. The
support of civil projects in the further course of nation-building
also helps to increase the acceptance of the troops in the country
of operation, thus improving the security of the deployed forces in
unstable surroundings. Since 1997, the German armed forces have
so far entrusted assignments in the area of civil-military coopera-
tion (CIMIC) to around 1,300 soldiers in the operational regions of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Even if the active involvement of the German army and other forces
in the reconstruction of devastated infrastructure such as schools
and police stations meets with a positive response both among the
population in the country in which they are deployed and among the
German public, the real motive for sending armed forces for nation-
building should not be lost sight of: the aim is to establish a secure
environment for civil reconstruction by international organisations
and the population itself.
To enable the soldiers to perform the tasks intended for them, they
should arrive in the country of operation as quickly as possible and
be given a strong mandate. Furthermore, the presence of external
forces should be organised in such a way that the process of civil
construction can also move forward in the case of a step-by-step
reduction of the multinational military commitment, that is ensuring
the gradual creation of an environment of self-supporting sustainable
stability. Extensive assistance in the rebuilding of national security
forces by foreign military experts and police and provision of the
necessary equipment should, in addition, help to enable the presence
of foreign soldiers to be reduced over time. In practice, though, the

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picture presented is quite different: in the German army’s operations

in the Balkans and Afghanistan, there is still no prospect of withdrawal
of the troops and soldiers even after a period of eight years in some
instances – for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
How is it that the deployment of external forces there – and
apparently also in Iraq – will probably drag on for yet another few
years while the objective of self-supporting stability and, with it, the
higher objective of successful nation-building do not appear to be
getting any closer in real terms in these countries?

LIMITATIONS OF EXTERNAL MILITARY

CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATION-BUILDING

Decisions by the international community, a ‘coalition of the willing’

or national governments to support a nation-building process are
accompanied by particular ideas of the shaping of political, social
and economic structures in the country in which the operation is
to be carried out. The terms of reference used in this regard relate
principally to the situation in the countries sending the troops in
order to also ensure extensive compatibility of the country affected
with an international system of values and the international economic
order in the future. This normative standard, which implies universal
validity of a political and social framework based on the principles
of democracy and freedom, signifies – especially in countries where
the majority of the population has previously had little contact with
this system of norms by virtue of its tradition, culture, religious
persuasion and living habits – de facto a huge external interference
in the nation-building process, especially as it is being accompanied
by the weight of military presence. Added to this is the fact that the
aim of every operation of this type is to produce success as quickly
as possible. This subjects the nation-building process in countries
whose populations have just lived through years of violence and
expulsion to considerable time pressures.
Besides these normative factors, there is a conservative element,
normally expressed at the time of authorising such operations, which
also plays a significant role: in general, nation-building is intended to
be performed within the old state borders, that is protecting territorial
integrity. The important question of whether this fundamental
orientation of reconstruction endeavours is the one that most
promises success in each individual case is put aside, at least initially,

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 170 The Politics of Nation-building

in order to preclude the risk of the state territory being ethnically

fragmented and thus becoming a model for other regions.
In an age of civil wars, this political stipulation means in practice
that something is to be held together a priori which possibly no
longer wishes or is able to belong together. The hatred bottled up
inside the population after years of warlike conflicts between the
different ethnic groups cannot be controlled by external players.
Foreign forces can only help to check its symptomatic actions, such
as humiliation and violence. In this way, however, only a superficial
and non-sustainable stability is imposed from outside. The state of
affairs prevailing in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is, in actual
fact, a protectorate-type situation, which has little in common with
a nation-building process sui generis and serves more to block it to
a certain extent.
Even if the deployment of external forces to safeguard a nation-
building process follows a well-meaning rationale and – insofar as it has
been authorised by the United Nations Security Council – advocates
neutrality and even selflessness, the presence of foreign soldiers is
often perceived quite differently by the respective populations. The
thoughts of atrocities committed by uniformed fighters, still fresh in
people’s memories, mean that many of them can hardly bear the sight
of foreign troops armed to the teeth. On top of this, communication
problems and misunderstandings, which can be attributed not least
of all to serious cultural differences between the protecting forces
and the population, are apt to cause increasing alienation, even if
the foreign soldiers were initially welcomed as liberators.
In the nation-building cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, other
– extensively identical – political conditions which make peaceful
reconstruction and, in particular, the tasks of the external forces
additionally difficult also play a role. In both cases:

• the ruling regime was removed from power by external players

using superior armed troops;
• opening the state and society up to more democracy and a
market economy was defined as the political objective;
• the reconstruction of the countries is intended to ensure that
Islamist terrorist groups can no longer operate or be supported
from there;
• a national transitional government – or, in Iraq, a national
governing council – has been appointed under foreign control
to enable the normative objectives to be enforced extensively

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in compliance with the relevant interests and, where necessary,

against resistance within the population.

The acceptance of external forces decreases in the country of

deployment – especially among the political and religious leadership
elites – if they are seen as agents of a puppet government installed
by foreign powers. If economic reconstruction and the appointment
of a legitimised, sovereign government fail to make progress, the
growing displeasure of the population is directed principally against
the transitional government and the international institutions or
national governments behind it.
Added to this in the age of Islamic-motivated terror is the fact
that radical groups inside or outside the country take advantage of
the fragile and tense situation to further their own interests. They
aim targeted terror attacks against the foreign soldiers, who are
easily recognisable because of their uniforms, while, at the same
time, invoking – also with the help of Arab-Islamic media – the
different nature (‘lack of faith’) of the foreign troops and their
negative influences on the cohesion and morals of the indigenous
population. Their aim is to mobilise the masses against the ‘intruders’
and ‘occupiers’.
Current events in Iraq suggest that this strategy pursued by a
minority of Islamists prepared to use violence is working. The US forces
appear, despite their superior equipment, to be unable to establish
even the minimum degree of security in their role – confirmed by the
United Nations – as the occupying power. There is a danger of their
tending increasingly, under the impact of acts of terror and sabotage
that can hardly be prevented, towards nervous overreactions, thus
causing them to further lose acceptance among the population.
The ‘open-visor policy’ pursued successfully by the German armed
forces in Afghanistan has also been called into question following
the dreadful suicide attack of 7 June 2003.

SUMMARY

Multinational, military operations within the framework of nation-

building are booming. The international community of states should
critically examine whether this is the principal instrument that should
be employed to create a more peaceful world. Especially in view of
what is presently the greatest threat to international security, that
is international terrorism, the approach of a cumulative expansion

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 172 The Politics of Nation-building

of military involvements falls short of the mark because it trains its

sights only on the symptoms and not the causes of the increasing
tensions between the Islamic and the non-Islamic world. The example
of the conflict in the Middle East, which is, incidentally, contributing
towards this development to a considerable extent, shows that
even a state with vast military superiority is not able to create a
sufficient degree of ‘perceived’ security solely with the deployment
of armed forces.
If a number of governments, particularly in ‘old Europe’, focus
more on the question of adequate legitimation under international
law with regard to sending soldiers to other countries and call for
the United Nations to shoulder the dominant responsibility for
such reconstruction processes in order to enhance the acceptance
of these operations locally, this is to be fundamentally welcomed. The
status of broad support on the part of the international community
should not, however, be overestimated. In the perception of radical
opponents of nation-building according to ‘Western’ normative
ideas, this does not play a decisive role. These persons are primarily
concerned with freeing Islamic soil from alien, un-Islamic influences
– at any price.
The (mostly) ‘Western’ forces deployed in national reconstruction
operations – mainly in Islamic states – should only perform a stabilising
function in the early phase of the nation-building process and only
then where this is absolutely necessary. They cannot replace political
concepts designed to counteract disintegration of the state and
radicalisation of the Islamic world. It is time to recognise, in a rational
stock-taking of the situation, the limitations and counterproductive
potential of military contributions to nation-building as well as the
need for general political action.

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 14
Nation-states for Export?
Nation-building between Military
Intervention, Crisis Prevention
and Development Policy
Jochen Hippler

Nation-building in violent conflicts or post-conflict situations is

often viewed in most EU countries as a means of countering chaos
and fragmentation, as an instrument for conflict management and
prevention. Former Minister of State at the German Foreign Office,
Ludger Volmer (2002), gave a perfect example of this in June 2002:

More is needed than the deployment of police and the military to meet
the new challenges. What is needed is a long-term political and economic
strategy that deals precisely with the forgotten conflicts, failed states, failing
states and the black holes on our planet where there is no order whatsoever.
Establishing a new state, i.e. nation-building, will become a strategic task for
us. Europe has and Germany, too, has an important contribution to make
to this end.

The stabilising and ordering function of nation-building is intended

to have the effect of preventing crises and reducing violence. This
may quite possibly be true, but we should not overlook the fact that
some violent conflicts result precisely from aggressive nation-building
projects: ethnic expulsions and massacres are frequently intended
for the purpose of asserting a particular, ethnically ‘pure’ version of
a ‘nation’ or breaking resistance against a nation-state government.
Other violent conflicts stem from the contradictory nature of two
(or more) competing nation-building projects: for example from a
policy to maintain the ‘nation-state’ in a multiethnic context, also
by compulsion, or from an attempt to create or homogenise a nation
by force, with such an attempt called into question by one or more
ethnic groups by way of endeavours to gain independence. While,
for example, a Greater Serbia nation-building project would include
not only Serbia (including the Hungarian minority), but also the parts

173

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 174 The Politics of Nation-building

of Bosnia settled by Serbs and Kosovo, and relinquishment or loss of

any of these regions would mean the failure of the nation-building
project, a Kosovo-Albanian nation-building undertaking implies, of
course, the independence of Serbia and – depending on one’s political
taste – state independence or union with Albania.
In political reality, the alternative to nation-building in many cases
is not necessarily its absence but, rather, a competing model. Similarly,
external attempts at nation-building often conflict with internal
variants rather than with a situation of fragmentation, disintegration
or lack of rule or government. In Afghanistan, for example, the
Taliban and the extremist leader Hekmatyar also wanted to assert
their own special forms of nation-building, albeit in a particularly
brutal manner. And in many situations, the constructive aspect of
nation-building – that is the creation of a nation and nation-state
– first requires the dissolution or destruction of previous political
entities: the Turkish nation-state was founded on the dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire, the Croatian state on the destruction of
Yugoslavia, while the Baltic and Central Asian states presupposed
the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The development and peace policy discussion on nation-building
must therefore proceed from the understanding of the process as the
antithesis of the dissolution and disintegration of societies and states,
though it should not be forgotten that, in many violent situations,
it is precisely the conflict between several nation-building processes
that constitutes the core of the problem and that nation-building
often first presupposes the fragmentation of larger societies and states.
It is thus not always a case of asking whether nation-building is taking
place or should take place but, rather, which of the competing projects
is desirable and how such a process is to be structured. The significant
factors in the context of peace and development policy concern the
concrete form of social construction and deconstruction processes,
the specific dynamics of the production of ideology related to nation-
building (for example joint nationality/citizenship concepts versus
ethnic ideologies of confrontation) as well as the policy of the state
apparatus vis-à-vis society and the different social and ethnic groups.
Anyone wanting to conduct or support nation-building from outside
cannot avoid carrying out a serious and precise analysis of the initial
situation in order to limit errors and the possibility of failure.
All in all, nation-building does not promote peace a priori. On the
contrary, nation-building can, in the initial phase, even have the

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effect of markedly intensifying conflicts since it is often preceded by

a phase of disintegration. The latter may occur because any attempts
at integration are rejected by some sections of society, because the
methods of nation-building give rise to resistance, or because the
losers are able to fight against the unavoidable shifts in power. Even if
the threshold of violence is not necessarily exceeded in this context,
political and social conflicts will increase for some time and have
to be kept under control using sticks and carrots as well as patience.
Only when the specific nation-building project is evidently successful
and has been consolidated to some degree can a conflict-reducing
and peace-promoting effect be expected – this by virtue of the fact
that the monopoly of force of a state can be accepted by society and
the lessening or better management of lines of demarcation within
society can lower the level of internal violence. This positive effect
of the second stage of nation-building does not have to depend on
whether it has been conducted in a cooperative or repressive manner
– even though non-repressive methods are, of course, preferable.
Even violent nation-building can bring about a reduction of force
over the long term if it is lastingly successful. In this context, it must,
however, be ensured that the internal potentials for violence are not
simply diverted outwards.

NATION-BUILDING FROM OUTSIDE?

External players now perform a decisive role in the state and

administration of a range of countries experiencing post-conflict
situations: for example in Kosovo, which is governed by a UN
administration; in Bosnia, where a representative of the international
community has authority over a complex internal government
system decreed from outside; in Kabul, where the president, Karzai,
who was installed after the US military intervention, is now supported
by a NATO military contingent; and in Iraq, where a US military
administration (with nominal British involvement) actually ruled
the country and still controls it. External players have also played a
decisive role in the shaping of the political situation in other countries,
e.g. the US after its intervention in Haiti (1994/95), the UN in the
organisation of elections in Cambodia (1993) and the preparation
of the independence of East Timor (1999–2002), to name just three
examples. The term ‘nation-building’ was and continues to be used
for these and other operations. In most cases, it can be said that it
was not the external players that began the nation-building process,

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 176 The Politics of Nation-building

rather they only enforced or organised a different kind of nation-

building. The reasons for intervention by external players differ
greatly: for example as a response to a humanitarian crisis, which
leads to the assumption of particular administrative and security
functions; interest in regional stability; internal political interests,
such as the need not to appear ‘helpless’ or idle in the face of a crisis
arousing attention in the media; strategic and power interests.
In the most far-reaching cases – Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq – the
external players first crushed an existing power or government system
(and their specific nation-building concepts) by force in order to
then begin a process of material and political reconstruction, though
nation-building was never the actual objective of the respective
involvements, rather a means. For example, NATO did not wage war
against Serbia in order to carry out nation-building in Kosovo; it did
so out of a complex set of foreign policy, humanitarian and internal
political interests. After the war, however, there was no other option
but to take over the administration itself or transfer it to the UN. The
Clinton administration took the way out by reluctantly accepting
nation-building but letting the United Nations and the EU countries
go ahead with implementing it. In Afghanistan, the political and war
objectives of the US and its allies did not involve creating an Afghan
nation-state but, rather, smashing the al Qaeda terrorist network,
bringing down the Taliban, strengthening their own position in
Central Asia and demonstrating their own determination and ability
to act after the events of September 11, 2001. After the quick victory,
ways then had to be found of safeguarding influence and regional
stability and displaying an internationally presentable power model.
The poor postwar planning and incompetent implementation of the
plans following the conquest of Iraq by the US and British troops
were evidence of Washington having prepared extensively for the
military action but only very superficially for postwar arrangements
(Washington Post 2003a).
In Iraq, it was primarily a case of gaining a strategic position on the
Persian-Arabian Gulf, bringing down a regional rival and politically
reorganising the entire Middle East under US leadership, while
looking after important economic interests at the same time. After the
end of the rule of Saddam Hussein and the dissolution or smashing
of the central areas of his state apparatus, the reconstruction of Iraq
as a society and state became a necessity in order to avoid a political
vacuum, safeguard stability and, at the same time, promote one’s own
interests. The first US administrator of Iraq, Jay Garner, had spoken

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of his mandate being fulfilled within three months and of US troops

then being able to be withdrawn shortly afterwards (Washington Post
2003b) – a clear sign that nation-building was not the objective of the
war. Even after this, Washington still assumed for some time that the
number of US occupying troops could be reduced to around 70,000
by the summer of 2003. Only then was it realised that even 160,000
soldiers would not be enough to control Iraq, rebuild it and establish
a new political system.
External nation-building is thus often a consequence or instrument
of other intervention purposes and rarely the goal in itself – which
explains the improvisations, inconsistencies and lack of preparation
in many cases. There is not only serious interference in the local
balance of power, it also entails a clash of power politics between
internal and external players. Anyone who causes inside nation-
building projects to fail and replaces them with his own external one
has, at the same time, asserted his own power against that of others.
In this sense, nation-building also has imperial traits, as Ignatieff
(2003) emphasises pointedly in the title of his book: Empire Lite
– Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
Such imperial undertakings are closely linked to a shift in
international discourses – for example to the discussions surrounding
the admissibility of humanitarian interventions despite the restriction
contained in the UN Charter (prohibition of force, rules of non-
intervention, respecting the sovereignty of other states), to redefining
(restriction or conditioning in practical terms) the state sovereignty
of particular countries or to relativising international law and the
role of the UN in general (Hippler 2003a, 2003b).
Imperial variants of external nation-building should not be
confused with positive efforts to support internal nation-building
processes from outside in the political, economic or security-policy
domains. Nation-building can present the temptation for external
players to create one’s counterpart in one’s own image. The Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan (1979–89) is an example of this. External
players can, however, make extremely positive contributions to
nation-building in third countries with different political embedding
and greater emphasis on development and peace policy, thus also
helping social and political stabilisation over the long term.
However, external support of nation-building also finds itself in an
area of conflict between promoting – often contradictory – internal
processes and one’s own political objectives and interests, which only
rarely concur entirely. Internal nation-building, too, is aimed only

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 178 The Politics of Nation-building

Table 14.1 Selected dimensions of external nation-building

Starting points • Fragmented states and/or societies

• Failing states
• Post-conflict situations
Objectives • Gaining, expanding or securing a position of power or
dominance
• Stabilising a society or state, a government or a region
• Averting, reducing or overcoming a humanitarian disaster
• Creating conditions for economic and political
development
Functions • Humanitarian aid
• Restoration/provision of technical infrastructure
• Restoration/provision of social infrastructure
• Economic development
• Ensuring security
• Asserting or safeguarding the state’s monopoly of force
Necessary or expedient • Capacity-building: strengthening capacities and processes
mechanisms and structures of effective problem-solving in a society
and introduction or • State-building: applying capacity-building to state
strengthening of the same structures, administrations and governments
• Good governance: the obligation of government
institutions to principles such as transparency, freedom
from corruption and the rule of law
• Social integration of different socioeconomic,
ethnoreligious and other groups through efficient
communication and cooperation mechanisms
• Strengthening civil society, where not in conflict with the
nation-building project
• Connecting with and integrating partial interests with
overall interests
• Democratisation and elections, establishment of trans-
or interethnic participation mechanisms
• Peace-keeping
• Military occupation and administration

in exceptional cases primarily at promoting human rights, social

equalisation, good governance and participative democracy. As a rule
– and this is neither surprising nor reprehensible in itself – its goal
is to safeguard or extend the power of particular social and political
groups, the positive political objectives of which can, depending
on the circumstances, be perceived as helpful or a hindrance. Non-
imperial nation-building by external players will also only be able to
support the internal project as an overall package in exceptional cases;
the components must, rather, be carefully examined to verify whether
they are compatible with one’s own political objectives insofar as one’s
own development policy goals should not be compromised. External

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 Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and Development Policy 179

nation-building for the purpose of promoting strategic interests –

including the interest in stability – may disregard this dilemma and,
for example, attach greater value to stability than to democracy. This
does not make any sense from the development policy point of view.
Supporting the nation-building policy of a repressive government
may appear attractive to some in foreign or security policy terms (for
example the German support of Somalia under Siad Barre as a result
of the plane-hijacking by a German terrorist group to Mogadishu; the
decades of US support for Saudi Arabia), but in development policy
terms it is dubious. This strained relationship between imperial (or
expressed more politely: security policy-dominated) nation-building
and its development policy variant can also be observed within
individual nation-building projects. In Afghanistan, for instance,
there is an irresolvable contradiction between the attempts to install
and consolidate a functioning nation-state government in Kabul and
the US military’s close cooperation with and support of local warlords
in the provinces so as to be able to use them as auxiliary troops to
fight against the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda. This undermines
the building of a nation-state (cf. Chapter 6 by Spanta in this volume).
Such a contradiction also exists in Iraq in that, on the one hand, the
intention is to establish a new political and social system, a new state
apparatus and even democracy under Iraqi responsibility while, at
the same time, the US authorities want to keep central Iraqi players
(for example the Shiite parties and organisations) under control so
as not to jeopardise their own interests.
A central and fundamental question in external nation-building
endeavours is who guides and controls the overall process. Are the
key players the internal government in question or sectors of the
internal society (two very different possibilities), is it international
organisations (e.g. the UN) or individual external governments (e.g.
the US administration)?
Imperial and development policy nation-building differ both in
degree and structure. They are contrasting projects which require
different basic approaches, different instruments and different use of
personnel and resources. Imperial nation-building must, in principle,
recreate a nation-state and, in frequent cases, also the corresponding
society, even where components may exist for both. The desire to
bring this about via external players (regardless of whether it is
organised unilaterally or by way of UN policy) is not a sign of political
modesty but, rather, an act of creation of enormous dimensions
which – depending on the size and complexity of the country and

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its initial situation – can require substantial financial resources (easily

tens or hundreds of billions of euros) and one or two generations of
patience. It is particularly personnel-intensive and holds a substantial
risk: the undertaking is not impossible but can often be politically or
legally uncertain and so complex, so demanding in terms of resources,
political will and staying power that failure represents a realistic
possibility in the long term (not necessarily in the first few years).

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL NATION-BUILDING

Although imperial nation-building is not impossible in principle, it

will succeed only in rare exceptional cases in the twenty-first century.
The following reasons for this can be identified.

• The security problem: in conflict situations in fragmented

societies, the violence itself is often fragmented. External
occupying troops therefore have great difficulty distinguishing
between civilians and fighters and, because possible resistance
does not occur in larger military formations (which could then
be fought relatively easily) and is rarely controlled centrally,
establishing security is problematic and something for which
the military is often not suited. The targets against which the
occupiers could act frequently remain in the dark or they are
so closely linked to civilians or civilian targets that they can
only be fought against if large numbers of civilian casualties are
acceptable. This is not only problematic in terms of ethics and
international law, but also politically because civilian casualties
set the population against the occupying troops and legitimise
the resistance. And in cases where some groups in a multiethnic
society suffer more civilian casualties than others, the ethnic
boundaries are intensified and ethnic identities strengthened
and radicalised.
• The political problem of local rulers and warlords: since the priority
in imperial nation-building has to be placed on military security
(including that of one’s own troops) and one is dependent upon
functioning partners in the country, there is a great incentive to
use local power structures, militias, warlords and even criminal
gangs as auxiliary troops. In Kosovo, for example, the UN
administration worked together with the UÇK militia for some
time even though the latter was involved in numerous criminal
activities, the expulsion of Serbian and Roma minorities, plus

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other activities, including intimidation of the population

– partly because of fears of UÇK military resistance, such as
attacks on KFOR units. In Afghanistan, deals made with local
warlords (through the supply of weapons and money) have
resulted in strengthening these elements against the central
government and thus undermining the nation-building
process. This makes the key objective of a state’s monopoly
of force even more remote. Alternatives to entering into pacts
with local power structures are limited. Attempts to disarm or
disband them are often highly risky and require a great deal
of time and resources, which is generally unrealistic. In the
final analysis, the dilemma of needing dependable, effective
and politically acceptable partners with influence in the target
country lies in the fact that such partners often do not exist.
External nation-building is then left in a state of limbo or it
requires even greater commitment and involvement, which can,
in turn, easily provoke disapproval and resistance, especially if
the internal power factors are circumvented.
• The question of resources: in view of tight budgetary conditions
and restricted military capacities, military operations have to
be limited in time and carried out with the least possible outlay
in terms of finance and personnel. This is not always easy: the
costs of the US occupation in Iraq at around US$4 billion per
month have proved to be twice as high as the amount initially
calculated (Washington Post 2003c). However, it is precisely this
requirement of the deployment of minimum resources in the
shortest time frame possible that block the chances of success
for imperial nation-building. It may be possible to achieve
specific military objectives and realise projects within the space
of a few years, but it will hardly suffice for a state apparatus and
functioning society to be reconstituted by ‘outsiders’ in alien
surroundings.
• The internal political factor: societies in Europe and North
America are limited in their patience and readiness for
commitment in relation to faraway regional conflicts. Although
it is possible to bring about a willingness for intervention in
northern industrialised countries by using ‘moral’ (for example
humanitarian or human rights) arguments or fear of weapons of
mass destruction and maintain this for a time, keeping it going
at internal political level for a greater commitment over 10, 20
or more years with substantial outlay in terms of finance and

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personnel could be regarded as just about impossible in most

cases. Furthermore, there is the obvious problem of internal
political reaction to excessive demands at the foreign policy
level. The German armed forces, for example, is almost at
the limit of its capacity with its presence in the Balkans and
Afghanistan, while the US occupation of Iraq is so personnel-
intensive that even the US military has been experiencing
bottlenecks since summer 2003. It is questionable whether
parliaments and the public at large could or would approve a
permanent extensive presence or even the expansion of such
a presence to other countries.
• Conflicts of objective and conflicts of objective and means: in
imperial nation-building, there is frequently a conflict
between the interest in actual nation-building and interest
in control. However, the two require different approaches
and instruments: control has to focus on the security aspect
because it can otherwise easily erode, especially in the case of
external players who are themselves in a precarious situation
anyway in the target country. In this context, nation-building
becomes principally a means for social and political control of
the country and is therefore not an objective but – as already
referred to – an instrument for other purposes. This variant of
nation-building is shaped according to these purposes, which
usually comes down to: (i) an emphasis on military, police and
intelligence resources, e.g. relevant support or training of the
local state apparatus; (ii) appropriate infrastructure measures,
e.g. linking inaccessible areas to make it more difficult to use
them as possibilities for retreat or withdrawal and (iii) strictly
regulated democratisation and participation possibilities in
order to include local political forces in the administration
of the country and be better accepted among the public at
large without, however, letting go of the reins. An example
of this is the sudden cancellation of local elections in Iraq
even after the ballot papers had been printed in some cities
– a political sign for the Iraqi population of how seriously the
promises of democracy were meant by the military authorities
(Washington Post 2003d). There is also the temptation to use
the tactic of ‘divide and rule’, which impedes social integration.
Conflicts of objective and means frequently entail the primary
instrument of imperial nation-building – the military – not
being particularly suitable for civil tasks of national integration

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 Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and Development Policy 183

and state-building, while other instruments (for example from

the development policy domain) offer less scope for action and
have lesser means at their disposal.

All in all, imperial nation-building is a politically and ethically

questionable concern which suffers most from the congenital defect of
not being able to reconcile the tasks concerning the external control of
society with its function of nation-building. The US government, for
instance, spoke at length and with joy about its goal to ‘liberate’ and
democratise Iraq, while the US civil administrator in Baghdad, Paul
Bremer, stated plainly: ‘As long as we are here, we are the occupying
power. It’s an ugly word, but it’s the truth’ (Washington Post 2003e).
The evident tendency of wanting to achieve nation-building in the
imperial context a bit at a time, inconsistently, with improvisation,
and with the minimum of cost and personnel can easily push such
a project to the brink of failure.

DIFFICULTIES AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS IN NATION-BUILDING

Non-imperial nation-building is nevertheless possible and there are

many examples of this. Furthermore, successful nation-building can
also – after a possible phase of increased instability – make very
positive contributions towards stabilising and reducing the potential
for violence in previously fragile and fragmented societies. It is
not, however, a panacea in hopeless situations; rather it requires
appropriate conditions and preconditions, political will, patience,
concepts and resources.
The involvement of external players in development policy nation-
building in the sense of Hopp and Kloke-Lesch (referred to by them
as ‘nation-forming’ in contrast to ‘nation-building’; Chapter 11 in
this volume) represents what is still a complex, though more modest
and realistic policy variant than the imperial approach. Through its
fundamental method of support rather than the external creation of
nation-building, it limits the risk and one’s own commitment, raises
fewer political problems or difficulties under international law and
avoids the danger of placing excessive demands on oneself as well as
hubris. Where imperial nation-building is, in principle, a dramatic act
of the creation of nations by foreigners, development policy nation-
building resembles, so to speak, the selective drilling of thick timber
boards. You can drill the wrong holes or the drill bit may break while

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 184 The Politics of Nation-building

you’re working, but there’s little danger to the workman that the
entire house will collapse around him.
Nation-building is not likely to have good prospects of success
if – regardless of whether from outside or inside – it is laid over a
society like a blueprint. In particular, if an attempt is made to carry
out nation-building in the form of merely reapplying Western models
to fragmented societies of the Third World – for example a market
economy, a democratic constitution and then elections – it will
easily run into difficulties, as the example of Afghanistan illustrates.
Conversely, attempts to accomplish successful nation-building
by pragmatically feeling one’s way forward without a sound and
workable concept are also problematic in most cases – for example
first external security and control, then transferring power to locals
little by little. The experience in Iraq points this way.
Like democracy, nation-building also has the best prospects when
it fulfils certain functions for the society affected, something which
has to be assessed on the basis of the needs of the population and
its socioeconomic and political groups. Successful nation-building
in situations of acute crises, such as economic and social despair or
after a situation of genocide founded on ethnic factors, has much
poorer prospects of success than in cases where there is growing
scope for distribution and before the complete disintegration of
interethnic relations caused by excesses of violence. This applies,
unfortunately, regardless of the fact that the need for social and
political integration is particularly pronounced in grave conflict
or post-conflict situations. The more fragmented a society is and
the greater its current experience of violence, the more important
control and military and police security will be in order to reintegrate
that society over the long term. In addition, the more desolate the
socioeconomic situation is and the more this is perceived by the
population as being something lasting, the more difficult the internal
conditions will be for nation-building.
The question frequently arises in this regard of whether the
reintegration of a heterogeneous society is possible at all or meaningful
or whether corresponding attempts will only serve to painfully drag
out the process of disintegration. Some cases can therefore raise
alarming questions in political and ethical terms, such as whether
‘ethnic cleansing’ can be reversed at all without causing further
serious suffering or whether the disintegration of a multiethnic
society should be accepted from a certain point and made the starting
point of separate nation-building processes, rather than trying to

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 Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and Development Policy 185

force the different sides into a new entity against their will, like two
scorpions in a bottle. This ethical dilemma will often be irresolvable:
not wanting to accept brutal excesses of violence and expulsions by
taking their results as the starting point for political development,
and yet not being able to undo them without perpetuating the violent
conflict in a latent or acute manner.
For understandable reasons, the international community has
often dodged this question, for example in the Dayton Accord for
Bosnia and through the in-between state in Kosovo, where a return of
the Serbian and Roma populations that fled or were expelled would
set off a new round of violence. A Kosovo-Albanian nation-building
process is inconsistent with international law (by virtue of Kosovo
continuing to belong to Serbia under international law and on the
basis of the Rambouillet agreement), while not taking such action
or attempting to assert the affiliation to Serbia would escalate the
conflict again beyond the threshold of violence.

STARTING POINTS FOR NATION-BUILDING

Nation-building is a painful, contradictory and complex process

which tends to promise success more when the population affected
perceives practical improvements in its actual living circumstances
and implicitly or explicitly associates these with the nation-building
process. If living conditions deteriorate further or stagnate at a low
level, the legitimacy of every political project which the population
regards as being responsible for this will suffer. A lack of legitimacy
could, theoretically, be compensated for by compulsion for a time,
though this is not desirable and cannot be sustained over the long
term. Nation-building is accepted or at least tolerated when it
arouses hope for a better future and there are at least some credible
indications of this – otherwise it can easily be perceived as something
alien, enforced, artificial or threatening. There is then a danger of the
resulting dissatisfaction providing strength for alternative political
models (of a secessionist, ethnic or religious nature) at the expense
of the integration process.
The new ‘nation’ must therefore – first – have the feeling that ‘its’
new nation-state can solve the social problems in the interests of
the population, otherwise it will be extremely difficult to convey. A
needs-oriented approach of this kind will normally contain economic
and sociopolitical components (safeguarding food supplies, living
accommodation, jobs, healthcare, etc.) but should not be narrowed

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 186 The Politics of Nation-building

down to this. In many societies, matters of personal security

(especially in post-conflict situations or after overcoming a repressive
dictatorship), corruption, infrastructure (energy and water supplies)
as well as cultural symbols and forms of expression are of almost
equally great importance.
Secondly, in conjunction with the improvement in the living
situation, the necessary politicostructural changes should be
implemented, whereby the internal political and cultural conditions
must be made the starting point. It is not a case here of a schematic
introduction of democracy but, rather, of creating the prerequisites
for it, for example a functioning, expeditious and economical legal
system, a fair and effective fiscal system that does not favour (especially
ethnic) elites, a responsible police force and military that stand
above political and social groups, as well as the opening of society
to pluralism. Equal access possibilities to an education system that
opens up economic and living opportunities is an important aspect in
many societies. The rule of law, personal security and equal treatment
of all sectors and groups of society are the main focus of attention
in this context. All this is, however, easier to postulate than it is to
implement since some previously privileged groups will perceive such
equal treatment as a loss of power and as discrimination.
The third level of successful nation-building relates to the
nationwide networking of the political sector. The reforms of the
individual domains must be brought together through integration
of the state apparatus (and society) – functioning political sectors are
an important prerequisite, though not the core of nation-building.
Only when the state apparatus grows into a totality, integrates its
components both politically and ideologically and, at the same
time, produces political mechanisms for the integration of the
different sectors of society or cooperates with them – parliaments,
governments, allegiances and their requirements, e.g. functioning
political parties, an active civil society or political discourses relating
to society as a whole – only then can we actually speak of nation-
building. This aspect also includes the legal and actual enforcement
of the state’s monopoly of force.
The three levels shown in Table 14.2 should not be misunderstood
as a phase model in this context; they are, rather, dialectically related.
If there is no state apparatus functioning to a reasonable degree, it
will hardly be possible to manage the first two levels successfully; and
without a certain amount of success at those levels, it will be difficult
to make a fragile and ineffective state into an effective one. This is

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 Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and Development Policy 187

precisely where the core strategic difficulty lies. The complex nation-
building process cannot just be executed systematically and in clear
stages; rather it can, under some circumstances, quite simply signify
the placing of excessive demands on the political and economic
structures in weak and divided societies. There is rarely a central point
from which all other problems could be easily resolved.

Table 14.2 Three starting points for nation-building

• Perceptible improvement of actual living conditions

e.g. in the economic, social and personal security domains
• Structural reforms in individual sectors
e.g. police, legal system, health and education systems, infrastructure, fiscal system
• Integration of the overall political system
e.g. through national political parties, strengthening civil society, discourses relating
to society as a whole, elections and parliaments, balance between centralised and
federal political elements

It is precisely at this juncture that external assistance can play an

important supporting role, as long as it does not succumb to the
imperial temptation, by intervening at one or more of the three
levels with problem-solving capacities and resources – not in order
to replace internal nation-building with the external variety but,
rather, to provide the internal players with greater scope so that they
do not have to tackle three complex sets of problems at the same
time in a situation of weakness. Although the process itself can still
only be mastered by the internal players, their chances of success
can be increased or diminished from outside. This point can hardly
be overemphasised: successful nation-building can only take place
when the necessary prerequisites for it exist in the country itself and
suitable internal players are available. Pei and Kasper (2003:5) stress,
among other things, the importance of a fundamentally effective
state apparatus: ‘... strong performance capability within the state is
almost always a prerequisite for success’. Even though this sounds
virtually tautological – the building of a functioning nation-state
presupposes a strong state – it is not wrong: without basic political
and administrative functionality at the very least, nation-building
processes lack the important prerequisites. Pei and Kasper (2003:5)
are sceptical about creating a state from outside:

It is worth noting that whereas a strong, indigenous state capacity is almost

always a requirement for success, building this capacity may be a challenge

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 188 The Politics of Nation-building

beyond the capacity of even the most well-intentioned and determined

outsiders. Effective state institutions historically evolve organically out of
a nation’s social structure, cultural norms, and distributions of political
power. Therefore, political engineering by outsiders seldom succeeds
in radically altering the underlying conditions responsible for the state’s
ineffectiveness.

If nation-building lacks important prerequisites or these are

questionable – and these also include economic, social and cultural
preconditions – attempts at external nation-building will frequently
and more likely have the effect of adding to the destruction and
fragmentation. If both exist, however, a well-founded analysis of the
internal conditions and players, a realistic concept that integrates
the economic, social, political, cultural, security policy and other
aspects, as well as money, personnel and a great deal of patience
will still be required in order to be able to take advantage of such
an opportunity.
The three starting points proposed here coincide with the three
central areas of nation-building presented at the beginning of this
book (cf. Hippler in Chapter 1): integration of society (‘nation’),
state-building and ideological integration; they are, however,
evidently not identical. This becomes clear in relation to the role
of ideology, for example. While it is in fact the case that successful
nation-state-building will remain fragile over the long term without
ideological legitimation, the forming of ideology would only be a
suitable starting point in exceptional cases since, in the absence
of tackling the more strongly material tasks, it would quickly be
discredited. Such forming of ideology can rarely be promoted from
outside and, if so, only to a minor extent. If the forming of ideology
were to be at the beginning of the process, there would even be the
danger that it might easily develop an ethnic or other exclusiveness
in order to achieve mobilisation for an unsound nation-building
project through the exclusion of others. This is, in most cases, not
a good idea politically if the objective of conflict prevention is not
to be abandoned.

SUMMARY

‘Nation-building’ historically was and still is a complex political

concept. The discussion surrounding it moves back and forth
between a rather arbitrary use of the term to describe eclecticist

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 Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and Development Policy 189

political elements (in the domains of peace-keeping, state-building,

reconstruction, occupation politics and the political structuring of
outside societies), an imperial variant of interest politics for controlling
outside societies and a development and peace policy approach for
the purpose of stabilisation and conflict prevention in current and
potential crisis countries. The latter offers opportunities to deal with
difficult and conflict-intensifying situations constructively insofar
as the objective and subjective conditions permit in the individual
case concerned. Nation-building in this context is not a miracle cure
or any basically new or original development, foreign, security or
peace policy approach; rather it represents a possibility of integrating
different political instruments and methods in a conceptional
manner. Old and new instruments and policies are reevaluated from
the standpoint of strengthening political and social integration and
combined in order to thus enhance internal development possibilities
and the potential for reducing violence.
Such a policy of providing external support for internal, authentic
nation-building processes can, in this way, have the effect of
promoting development and peace. It does not attempt to reinvent
the wheel or simply transfer its own models to fragmented Third
World countries – a fault of the corresponding discussions conducted
in the 1950s and 1960s; the purpose is, rather, to precisely adapt the
set of existing policies and instruments to a politically central domain
and integrate them. Bringing these together at a time of numerous
and, in themselves, logical ‘sectoral policies’ and developing criteria
and conceptions to define their relation, weighting and final overall
objective is a task that needs to be carried out urgently. The integration
of fragmented societies and the functionality of a state apparatus
corresponding to and serving the society are, indeed, two key strategic
starting points that can systematise and facilitate the pursuance of a
large number of general and often somewhat more obscure political
objectives (development, peace, good governance, etc.).
There are so far only initial signs of an active, supportive policy of
nation-building, though hardly perceptible beneath a mountain of
rhetoric and incomplete work. It is, however, worthwhile to continue
working on this starting point and formulate manageable, unified
political concepts – as long as it proves possible beforehand to reject
the instrumentalisation of nation-building to make it a technique
for imperial power.

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 190 The Politics of Nation-building

REFERENCES

Hippler, Jochen (2003a) ‘USA und Europa: unterschiedliche Sicherheitspolitiken’,

in Development and Peace Foundation, Globale Trends 2004/2005. Fakten,
Analysen, Prognosen ed. by Ingomar Hauchler, Dirk Messner and Franz
Nuscheler (Frankfurt/M.).
Hippler, Jochen (2003b) ‘US-Dominanz und Unilateralismus im internationalen
System – Strategische Probleme und Grenzen von Global Governance’, in
Jochen Hippler and Jeanette Schade, US-Unilateralismus als Problem von
internationaler Politik und Global Governance INEF Report 70 (Duisburg)
<http://inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/documents/Report70.pdf>.
Ignatieff, Michael (2003) Empire Lite – Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Afghanistan (London).
Pei, Minxin and Sara Kasper (2003) Lessons from the Past: The American Record
on Nation Building, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy
Brief 24 (Washington, DC)
Volmer, Ludger (2002) New International Security Situation – Plenary address
by Minister of State Volmer at the 4th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 7
June (Madrid) <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_
id=3254>.
Washington Post (2003a) ‘Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors’, Washington Post,
24 July, p. A01.
Washington Post (2003b) ‘Reconstruction Planners Worry, Wait and Evaluate’,
Washington Post, 2 April, p. A01.
Washington Post (2003c) ‘Military Operations in Iraq Cost Nearly $4 Billion
a Month’, Washington Post, 10 July, p. A24.
Washington Post (2003d) ‘Occupation Forces Halt Elections throughout Iraq’,
Washington Post, 28 June, p. A20.
Washington Post (2003e) ‘The Final Word on Iraq’s Future – Bremer Consults
and Cajoles, but in the End, He’s the Boss’, Washington Post, 18 June,
p. A01.

Hippler 02 chap09 190 4/5/05 9:23:26 am

 Notes on the Contributors

Claudia Derichs is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political

Sciences, University of Duisburg-Essen, focusing on democratisation
and political Islam in South-East Asia, nation-building in multiethnic
states and the politics of Japan. Her publications include: Japans Neue
Linke (Hamburg, 1995); (ed.), Soziale Bewegungen in Japan (Hamburg,
1998); (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Ostasiens (Opladen, 2003); plus
numerous contributions on the region of South-East Asia in German
and international book publications and journals.

Helmut van Edig is a former Ambassador; he has been working as

editor, publicist and translator since 2000; head of the team set up by
the Federal Foreign Office to draw up the German government’s action
plan on the ‘Prevention of Civil Crises, Settlement of Conflicts and
Consolidation of Peace’. Publications include: (coordinator/editor),
Crisis Prevention – Conflict Resolution – Peacekeeping (Contributions
by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on Civil Conflict Transformation,
Berlin, 2003); former editor of Entwicklungspolitische Informationen
(discontinued in 2001).

Wolfgang Heinrich studied Cultural Anthropology, Culture and

Personality Research and Linguistics at the Georg-August University
in Göttingen and the University of California at Berkeley; worked in
Somalia 1995/96 for the Swedish Life and Peace Institute (LPI); from
1998 to 2000 and since 2002: Head of the ‘Desk for Peace and Conflict
Management Issues’ (AsFK) of the Churches’ Development Service
(EED); in 2001, coordinator of the ‘Local Capacities For Peace-Project’
initiated by the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), USA.
Publications include: Building the Peace. Experiences of Collaborative
Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993–1996 (Life and Peace Institute-LPI,
Uppsala, 1997); ‘Building Structures for Self-Determination And Inter-
Community Co-operation in Times of Violent Conflict’, in Hartmut
Quehl (ed.), Living in Wartimes – Living in Post-Wartimes (Felsberg,
2002), pp. 265–78; ‘There Is No Blueprint For Peace’, D+C, Vol. 44,
No. 1 (2003).

191

Hippler 02 chap09 191 4/5/05 9:23:26 am

 192 Notes on the Contributors

Jochen Hippler is a political scientist at the University of Duisburg-

Essen (Germany) and its Institute for Development and Peace
(INEF). Publications include: (ed. with Thomas Fues), Globale Politik
– Entwicklung und Frieden in der Weltgesellschaft. Festschrift für Franz
Nuscheler (Bonn, 2003); (ed. with Andrea Lueg), Feindbild Islam
– oder Dialog der Kulturen (Hamburg, 2002); ‘US-Dominanz und
Unilateralismus im internationalen System – Strategische Probleme
und Grenzen von Global Governance’, in Jochen Hippler and Jeanette
Schade, US-Unilateralismus als Problem von internationaler Politik und
Global Governance (INEF Report 70, Duisburg, 2003). www.Jochen-
Hippler.de

Ulrike Hopp studied Economic Sciences at the Free University of Berlin;

since 1997 with the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ); since 2002 with Unit 210, ‘Peace-Building and
Crisis Prevention’; member of the Interinstitutional Working Group
on Peace Development (FriEnt).

Adolf Kloke-Lesch studied Urban and Regional Planning at the

Technical University of Berlin; since 1978 with the German Ministry
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Deputy Director
General for ‘Peace and Democracy, Human Rights, United Nations’.
Publications include: (with Marita Steinke), ‘Den Sicherheitskräften
auf die Finger schauen. Der Entwicklungspolitik muss es um eine
bessere Kontrolle von Polizei und Militär gehen’, E+Z, Vol. 43, No.
2 (2002), pp. 44–7; (with Hans-Peter Baur), ‘Friedensentwicklung
und Krisenprävention als Strategieelemente der Entwicklungspolitik’,
in Tilman Evers (ed.), Ziviler Friedensdienst (Leverkusen, 2000),
pp. 189–98; ‘Mitgestalten in anderen Ländern. Die Funktion von
Entwicklungspolitik im Rahmen von Global Governance’, edp-
Entwicklungspolitik, No. 14/15 (2000), pp. 32–7.

Manfred Kulessa studied Law and History in Marburg, Frankfurt

and Athens, OH; has worked in the fields of academic exchange,
development service and international cooperation, and also as
Director in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and UN Coordinator in China. Publications include: (with Khalid
Malik), Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations – The Role of
UNDP in Reintegration Programmes (UNDP, New York, 2000); (ed.
with Rafeeuddin Ahmed and Khalid Malik), Lessons Learned in Crises

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 Notes on the Contributors 193

and Post-Conflict Situations – The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and

Reconstruction Programmes (UNDP, New York, 2002).
Cyril I. Obi is Senior Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs in Lagos; from 1999 to 2000 Guest Fellow at St.
Antony’s College, Oxford; editor of the Nigerian Journal of International
Affairs. Publications include: The Changing Forms of Identity Politics in
Nigeria under Economic Adjustment: The Case of the Oil Minorities of the
Niger Delta (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Research Report 119, Uppsala,
2001); ‘Ethnic Minority Agitation and the Spectre of National
Disintegration’, in Toyin Falola (ed.), Nigeria in the Twentieth Century
(Durham, NC, 2002); ‘Oil and the Politics of Transition in Nigeria’,
in Browne Onuoha and M.M. Fadakinte (eds), Transition Politics in
Nigeria 1970–1999 (Lagos, 2002).

Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka is a Professor of Social Anthropology at

the University of Bielefeld; from 1996 to 1998 President of the Swiss
Society of Social Anthropology; presently spokesperson for the Section
‘Developmental Sociology and Social Anthropology’ at the German
Sociological Association. Publications include: (ed. with D. Gellner
und J. Whelpton), Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The
Cultural Politics in Contemporary Nepal (Amsterdam, 1997); (ed. with
A. Nandy, D. Rajasingham and T. Gomez), Ethnic Futures, State and
Identity in Four Asian Countries (New Delhi, 1999).

Dušan Reljić studied Journalism and Communication, Theory of

Politics and Philosophy in Vienna; from 1996 to 2000 Fellow and
subsequently Head of Department of Media and Democracy at
the European Media Institute in Düsseldorf; since 2001 Fellow at
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP),
Berlin. Publications include: Serbien in Zeitnot. Neuanfang nach 42
Tagen Ausnahmezustand? (SWP Study 18, May 2003); ‘Das politische
System der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien’, in Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.),
Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (Opladen, 2002); ‘Der Vormarsch
der Megamedien und die Kommerzialisierung der Weltöffentlichkeit’,
in Tanja Brühl et al. (ed), Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik (Series ONE
World 11, Bonn, 2001); ‘The News Media and the Transformation
of Ethnopolitical Conflicts’, in The Berghof Handbook for Conflict
Transformation (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict
Management, Berlin, 2000).

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 194 Notes on the Contributors

Jeanette Schade is presently Fellow at the Institute for Development

and Peace (INEF) in Duisburg. Publications include: ‘Zivilgesellschaft’
– Überblick über eine vielschichtige Debatte (INEF Report 59, Duisburg,
2002); ‘Unilaterales US-Handeln im mulitlateralen Kontext – Eine
tabellarische Übersicht’, in Jochen Hippler and Jeanette Schade,
US-Unilateralismus als Problem von internationaler Politik und Global
Governance (INEF Report 70, Duisburg, 2003).

Heinz-Uwe Schäfer is a naval Commander; Business School

Graduate; Course Director of the 2003 admiral staff officer course at
the German Armed Forces‘ Command and Staff College. Publication:
(with Ernst-Christoph Meier and Richard Rossmanith), Wörterbuch
zur Sicherheitspolitik – Deutschland in einem veränderten internationalen
Umfeld (Hamburg, 2002).

Rangin Dadfar Spanta studied Jurisprudence and Political Science at

the Universities of Kabul and Ankara; took a doctorate at the RWTH
in Aachen; Head of the Third World Forum Aachen; Lecturer in the
Department of Political Science at the RWTH in Aachen; spokesman
for the ‘Alliance for Democracy in Afghanistan’. Publications include:
Afghanistan, Entstehung der Unterentwicklung, Krieg und Widerstand
(Frankfurt/M., 1993); plus numerous articles and interviews on
development, peace, fundamentalism and Afghanistan in German,
Turkish and Farsi.

Rainer Tetzlaff is Professor in the Department of Political Science at

the University of Hamburg, Member of the Board of Trustees of the
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg (IFSH).
Publications include: ‘Afrika als Teil der Vierten Welt – der Welt der
erodierenden Staatlichkeit – abgeschaltet von der Globalisierung?’,
in Hans Küng and Dieter Senghaas (eds), Ein neues Paradigma
internationaler Beziehungen? Ethische Herausforderungen für die Gestaltung
der Weltpolitik (Munich, 2003); ‘Politisierte Ethnizität als Kehrseite
politischer Partizipation in unsicheren Zeiten. Erfahrungen aus
Afrika’, WeltTrends, No. 38 (spring 2003), pp. 11–30; ‘Zur Renaissance
der politischen Parteien und Parteienforschung in Afrika’, Afrika
Spektrum, No. 37 (2002), pp. 239–57.

Hippler 02 chap09 194 4/5/05 9:23:27 am

 Index
Compiled by Sue Carlton

11 September 2001 105, 137, 166, Angola 121, 127

176 antiterror alliance 72, 73
see also terrorism apartheid system 30, 51
Abiola, Moshood 111, 112 Arab nationalism 17, 21
Addis Ababa Agreement 1993 64 Arab States, and national language
Aden, Abdurahman 67 46–7
Afenifere 112 Arewa Consultative Forum 112
Afghanistan 3, 43, 70–80, 143, 166, Arewa People’s Congress 111
169, 174, 176 Arta, Somali peace conference 2000
Assistance Coordination 63
Authority (ACA) 130 Ash, Timothy Garton 104
and conflict management 78–80, Ashdown, Paddy 100
158 Asia
and democratic participation ethnic conflicts 17
78–9 regional stabilisation 155–6
economic activities 73–4 Atwood, Brian 5
international intervention 74–5,
77–8, 182 Baath party 82, 83, 84
peace negotiations 146–7 Babangida, Ibrahim 111
and reconstruction 74, 131, 168, Baghdad 90
170–1 Baker, James 108–9
reforms 75–6 Balkans 3, 138, 144, 157
role of NGOs 128, 130, 131–2 and military intervention 164,
Soviet intervention 21, 75, 177 166, 169, 182
and state-building process 74–5, problems of nation-building
76, 77–8, 79 173–4, 185
and traditional structures 75–6 see also Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Transitional Government 70–3, former Yugoslavia; Kosovo
74–5, 76, 78 al Barakaat 66
warlords 72–4, 77, 78, 132, 179 Batatu, Hanna 82
Afghanistan Peace Association Biafra 111, 112, 118
(APA) 133, 135 Biden, Joseph 108
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust bin Mohamad, Mahathir 24
Fund 131 Bloomberg, Michael 108
Africa 5, 22, 58–9, 117–18, 120–1 Bokassa, Jean-Bédel 157
regional conflicts 3, 17 Bolivia 144
regional stabilisation 151–2, 155–6 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3, 98–101, 107,
Africa Action Plan 161 108, 174, 175
African Union (AU) 152, 157, 160 conflict prevention 144, 145, 158
Agbu, Osita 119 Dayton agreement 102, 104, 105,
Ake, Claude 114, 115 185
Albania 106, 107, 174, 185 democratisation 35
Algeria 48, 51, 120–1 and food aid 127
Amin, Idi 157 and military intervention 168, 170

195

Hippler 03 index 195 4/5/05 9:23:27 am

 196 Index

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 3 Democratic People’s Party of

Brahimi, Lakhdar 93 Afghanistan 75, 76
Brahimi Report 142 Democratic Republic of Congo
Bremer, Paul 88, 91 (DRC) 156
Bretton Woods institutions 23, 24 democratisation 11–12, 28–41,
see also IMF; World Bank 45–6, 75–6, 78–9
bridging 51 concordance model 33–4
Bulgaria 38 cultural autonomy model 33,
Burma 48 37–8
and ethnic minorities 28–9,
Cambodia 138, 145, 175 32–40
Canada 37 federal model 33, 36–7
capacity-building 143 local representation model 33,
CARDS programme 107 34–5
Caucasus 157 dependence 22–4
Chad–Cameroon pipeline 143 development aid annuities 25
Chalabi, Ahmed 89 development policy 137–50, 179,
Cheney, Dick 89 183, 189
China 15, 34, 37, 48 principles of action 147–9
and Afghanistan 80 risks 146–7
and developmental nationalism divided societies
20–1, 25 democratisation models 32–40
citizenship 11, 19, 116 see also ethnic conflicts
civil society Djibouti 61, 63
and conflict prevention 158–9 Dorraj, Manocheher 114
and democratisation 28 Dostum, Rashid 132
role in nation-building 79, 140, Ðukanoviç, Milo 106
143, 186
role in state deconstruction East African Community (EAC) 161
processes 59–60, 67 East Timor 46, 138, 143, 158, 175
see also NGOs Economic Community of West
Cold War African States (ECOWAS) 153,
end of 3, 165–6 161
and nation-building 5 education policy 46–7
Communist Party, Iraq 85 Egwu, Samuel 117
constitutional patriotism 8 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland 3
Crefeld, Martin van 22 Ethiopia 61
crisis prevention 143, 158, 160 ethnic conflicts 17, 18–19, 28
see also nation-building, and democratisation 29, 32–3,
and conflict prevention/ 36, 38, 40
management; regional ethnicity 18, 28–9
stabilisation and models of national unity
Croatia 98, 101, 103, 105, 144 29–32
cultural autonomy 37–8 EU-Africa Summit, Cairo 2000 151
Cyprus 34, 35 European Agency for
Reconstruction 107
Davidson, Basil 118 European Union
Dayton Accord 102, 104, 105, 185 and Afghanistan 74

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 Index 197

and Balkans 99, 100, 106–7, Germany 30, 37–8, 77

108–9, 157, 176 Action Programme 2015 159
Common Foreign and Security and crisis prevention 157–8, 160,
Policy 106, 108 161
and crisis prevention 157–8, 173 development policy 142–6, 179
Göteborg Programme 158 and former Yugoslavia 98, 103
military interventions 164, 166,
failed/failing states 3, 13, 57–8, 74 168, 169, 171, 182
deconstruction processes 59–60 policy on Africa 151
and development policy 137–8 and regional stabilisation 156–8
and opportunities for new Ghundha-i Jehadi (Holy War
structures 57–67 Squads) 72
and terrorism 166 Gil-Robles, Alvaro 100
Faisal I 81–2 globalisation 15–27, 159
Falluja 92 and development policy 137, 149
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 106 and global domestic policy 17–18
federalism 36–7 and national liberation
Feith, Douglas 88 movements 22–4
Fiji 34 and nationalism 15–18, 24–6
Fischer, Joschka 151 and politicisation of cultural
foreign debt 22, 23 differences 18–19
former Yugoslavia 3, 34 reactions to 20–2
and ethnic cleansing 103 good governance 143, 178
and ethnic conflicts 102, 106 Goodhand, Jonathan 134
and external nation-building Gorbachev, Mikhail 103
105–9 governments
fragmentation 98, 99, 101, 102–4 cooperation with NGOs 131,
interim appraisal of 99–101 132–3, 134
and right to self-determination role in state deconstruction
102–4 processes 59
see also Balkans; Bosnia- selling concept of nation 42–52
Herzegovina; Kosovo Great Lakes 156
framing 43 Guatemala 145
frame extension 51 Gulf War (1991) 3, 82
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3 Guurti 64
Frelimo 129
Friedrich Ebert Foundation 145 Habermas, Jürgen 22
functional state apparatus, Haig, Alexander 3
development of 7, 9, 10–11, Haiti 175
140, 141, 186–7, 189 Hanafi, Sari 131
Hartono, Martodiredjo 160
G8 countries 114, 151–2, 161 Hausa-Fulani 111–12, 118
Gabon 121 Hazara 72
Gacaca lay courts 145 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 174
Galtung, Johan 141 Heldman, Gerald B. 57
Gana, Aaron 117, 118 Hillebrand, Ernst 59
Gandhi, Mahatma 20 Hindu Kush 164, 166
Garner, Jay 88, 91, 176–7 Hindu nationalism 16, 21
genocide 18 Horowitz, Donald L. 38

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 198 Index

humanitarian aid 126–7, 128 transfer of power from US 93–5

Hussein, Saddam 82, 84, 85, 92, 176 and US occupation 88–94, 169,
Hyde, Henry 108 175
US postwar planning 87–8, 176–7
Ibrahim, Jibrin 117 Iraq War (2003) 3, 82, 137
identity 145–6, 154 Islamic Dawa Party 93
cultural 18–19 Islamic Transitional Government of
national 8, 42, 43, 49–50, 52, 67, Afghanistan 70–3
155–6, 157 Islamisation 51–2
Igbo 111, 112, 118 Islamism 21–2, 79, 171, 172
Ignatieff, Michael 129 Israel 8, 17
Imam Ali mosque 92
IMF (International Monetary Fund) Japan 25
23, 24, 107, 149 Jemat i Islami Afghanistan 71
India 16, 20, 21, 34, 35
infrastructure 9, 90–1, 94, 140, 141, Karzai, Hamid 70, 73, 76, 132, 175
144–5, 155 Kasper, Sara 187–8
integration Kenya 61, 63, 66
economic 159 Kepel, Gilles 21–2
ideological 7–8, 188 Khmer Rouge 145
political 10, 125, 186 Khost region 72–3
social 7, 8–9, 10, 12, 125, 129, Khuzistan 82
140–1, 146, 154, 188, 189 Kiplagat, Bethuel 66
Intergovernmental Authority on Kirkuk 86
Development (IGAD) 63, 66 Kohl, Helmut 103
international donors, and NGOs Konrad Adenauer Foundation 145
130–1 Kosovo 3, 98–101, 107, 108, 175,
international law 4, 142, 172 176, 180–1, 185
International Security Assistance ethnic homogenisation 105
Force Afghanistan (ISAF) 70, 78 and ethnic minorities 100, 141
Intifada, second 130 interim solution 102
Iran 51–2, 80, 83, 92 and military intervention 168,
Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) 82 170
Iraq 3, 43, 49, 81–97, 179 secession 100
elections 91, 105 UN administration (UNMIK) 99
ethnic groups 81 Kosovo Albanians 102, 104, 105–6,
infrastructure 90–1, 94 107, 108
invasion of Kuwait 82 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
nation-building after Iraq War 83, 86
(2003) 84–7, 88, 89, 91, 93–6, Kurdistan 86
170–1, 176 Kurds 81, 86–7, 95, 96
and oil 82–3, 92 autonomous zone 87, 89
postwar security 89–91, 92–3, 95, autonomy 83–4, 86, 92, 104
164 rebellions 82
Provisional Governing Council Kuwait, Iraqi invasion 82
91–2, 94, 95
Saddam’s nation-building project languages
82–3 minority 31, 34
sanctions 82 official 37, 46–7

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 Index 199

Lantos, Tomas 108 nation-building 3–7, 13–14, 188–9

Lebanon 34 assigning central status to 44–6
Lenhart, Lioba 3 association with other policy
Lewis, I.M. 61 issues 46–8
Liberia 23, 127 conditions for success 183–5
Libya 121 and conflict prevention/
Life and Peace Institute (LPI) 64 management 4, 13, 151, 152,
Lijphart, Arend 33–4, 38 158–9, 161, 173–5, 189
loya jirga 75 conflicts of interest 182–3
Ludin, Jawed 134 connecting with target groups
48–9
Macedonia 101, 106, 107, 158 cooperation with local rulers 77,
Mahdi Army 93 179, 180–1
Malaysia 24, 34, 47, 51 and development policy 5,
Masoud, Ahmad Shah 71 138–9, 140–1, 179, 183, 189
Maya law 145 in divided societies 28–41
media, role in nation-forming elements of 7–9, 140
144–5 and force 155–6
Mennonites 37 and globalisation 15–27
military interventions 164–72,
and ideology 7–8, 42–53
176–7
imperial 179–83, 187, 189
as humanitarian intervention
narrative familiarity 49–51
164, 166, 177
objectives 6–7, 178–9, 189
internal political factor 181–2
and openness to change 51–2
and international law 4, 172
and participation 11–12, 145–6,
justification for 164, 166–7
154, 155–6, 178
limitations of 169–71
see also democratisation
reasons for 176
performance criteria 43–4
resources for 181
and rational choice 49–50
role of external forces 167–9
and security interests 166–7, 179 role of external players 4, 140–1,
security problems 180 175–80, 187, 189
Mineral Act 1914 117 role of government 42–3, 140
modernisation 5, 12, 31 and social mobilisation 10–13
Mogadishu 63, 66 starting points for 185–8
Montenegro 101, 106, 107 triggering conflicts 12–13, 165,
Mosul 86, 90 173–5
Movement for the Actualisation of see also state-building
the Sovereign State of Biafra nation-forming 139, 141–50
112 nation-saving 57–8
Mozambique 24, 129 nation-states 4–5, 10–11
Mujaheddin 71, 72, 73, 78 deconstruction 59–60, 61–3, 67,
multi-donor trust funds 142 174
multinational companies 21, 114, and globalisation 15–17
117 legitimacy 26, 58–9, 154, 155,
Mustapha, Abdul 118 156, 185
Myanmar 48, 132–3 and political community 58, 67
reconstruction 60–1, 63–5, 67,
Najaf 92 167, 168, 170–1, 172, 176

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 200 Index

national liberation movements Ohanese Ndigbo 112

22–3 oil, and nation-building 114–17,
National Socialism 30 118–21
national unity 29–32 Olukoshi, Adebayo 119
culturally homogeneous model O’Odua People’s Congress 111
30–2 opium production 73
hierarchically organised Organisation of African Unity
(imperium) model 30 (OAU) 157
pluralistic-egalitarian model 32 Organisation for Economic
nationalism 7–8, 15–18, 20–2, 147 Co-operation and
defensive 20–1 Development (OECD) 137–8
developmental 20–1, 25 Organization for Security and
protesting 24 Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
NATO 175 152, 160
new wars 17
Newsweek 3 Pakistan 8, 79
NGOs (non-governmental Palestine 81, 130, 131
organisations) Paris Institute for Security Studies
and Afghanistan 70, 74, 132 108
capacity confiscation 129 Patriotic Union Kurdistan (PUK)
in conflict and post-conflict 83, 86
situations 126–7, 134 Pax Nigeriana 119
and conflict prevention/ Pei, Minxin 187–8
management 158–9 Pérez, Juan Pablo 114
cooperation with governments Petersberg Afghanistan Conference
131, 132–3, 134 (2001) 70, 71, 74
and international donors 130–1, petro-states 113, 114–15
133, 134 prospects for 120–1
and local markets 128–9 see also Nigeria; oil
and reconstruction 60, 64, 65, petrodollars 111, 114
77–8, 128, 134 political parties 22, 186
role in nation-building processes poverty eradication 159
125–36 power, redistribution of 12–13
and state-building 77–8, 128, Puntland 63
130–2 Purcell, Marc 133
see also civil society
Niger Delta 111, 116, 119–20 al Qaeda 77, 79, 176
Nigeria 111–22 quota systems 47
decolonisation process 118
and national unity 115–16, Rambouillet agreement 185
118–20 Ratner, Steven R. 57
and oil power 111, 113, 114–17 reconstruction 60–1, 63–5, 67, 167,
as oil state 116–17, 118–20 168, 170–1, 172, 176
prospects for 120–1 NGOs and 60, 64, 65, 77–8, 128,
Norris, Pippa 35 134
North Korea 51 ‘projectization’ of 132
Northern Alliance 71 refugee camps 127
regional stabilisation 151–63
Office of Special Plans 88 conditions for 157

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 Index 201

and external military Sierra Leone 23

intervention 164–72 Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph 43
and failed states 154–5, 156 Singapore 20, 25, 50
international policy options Skopje 101
156–61 Slovenia 101, 103, 105
multidimensional approach Soerensen, Georg 58
157–8 Solana, Xavier 106
need for strong states 153–4, 155 Somalia 3, 23, 57, 65–7, 127, 179
objectives 151–2 and clan loyalties 61, 62, 64–5
players 152–3 deconstruction 61–3
and regional cooperation 160–1 international intervention 63, 64,
see also nation-building, 66–7
and conflict prevention/ peace conferences 63, 64, 66, 67
management reconstruction of state 63–5
Renamo 129 transitional national government
Republika Srpska 104 (TNG) 63, 66
Reynolds, Andrew 33 Somalia Rehabilitation Programme
Rice, Condoleezza 88 (SRP) 65
Rivkin, Arnold 5 Somaliland 63, 64, 65–6, 67
Rumsfeld, Donald 88, 89 South Africa 30, 34, 50–1, 145
Russia South Korea 15, 20, 25
and Afghanistan 80 sovereignty 16, 25–6, 159, 177
and former Yugoslavia 98 internal and external 59, 62, 154
Rwanda 18–19, 25, 127, 144, 145, sovereignty annuities 23–4, 25
157 Stabilisation and Association
Process (SAP) 107–8
Sadr, Muqtada 93 Stability Pact for South-East Europe
Samoa 35 161
Schenkenberg van Mierop, Ed 130 State Peace and Development
Schubert, Gunter 20 Council (SPDC) (Burma) 132
Schwarz, Dr Axel 100 state-building 9, 67, 74, 139, 140,
SCIRI (Supreme Council for the 188
Islamic Revolution in Iraq) 93 statism 142–4
security interests 166–7, 179 see also functional state apparatus
Sedra, Mark 132 structural adjustment programmes
self-determination 20, 102–4 22, 111
Senegal 143 sub-Saharan Africa 21, 161
Serbia 101, 107, 173–4, 176, 185 Sudan 127
Serbia and Montenegro 100, 101, Sun Yat-sen 20
106–7 Sunnis 81, 85, 86, 87, 92, 93, 96
Shahidi, Nazir 131 Suu Kyi, Aung San 48
Sharia 16, 116 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
Shell 117 128
Shiites 49, 81, 85, 86–7, 92, 93, 95, Switzerland 34, 37–8
96, 179 Syria 81
Shu Zukang 160
Shura-i Nezar (Supervisory Council, Tabar, Linda 131
Afghanistan) 71–2 Taiwan 20, 25
Siad Barre, Mohamed 61, 62, 179 Tajikistan 79, 127

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 202 Index

Taliban 70, 71, 72, 77, 79, 174, 176 United Nations Development
Tanzania 22 Programme (UNDP) 59
terrorism 166, 171, 179 Somalia Rehabilitation
war against 73, 77, 79, 99, 105 Programme (SRP) 65
see also 11 September 2001 United States
Tetzlaff, Rainer 59 and Afghanistan 74, 77, 80
Thailand 48 and failing states 154–5
Tibet 48 and former Yugoslavia 98–9, 102,
Tito, Josip Broz 102 104, 105, 108–9
Transjordan 81 military intervention 175
truth and reconciliation racial segregation 30
commissions 145 regime change in Iraq 84
Turkey 83, 92 United States Institute of Peace 106
Turkmen 81 UNOSOM (United Nations
Turkmenistan 79 Operation in Somalia) 63, 64
Tutsis 19 UNTAC radio service 144–5
Uzbekistan 79
UÇK militia 180–1 Uzbeks 72
Uganda 19, 25
Union Solidarity and Development Vietnam War 5
Association (USDA) 132–3, 135 violent conflicts 4, 149, 165
United Nations 57, 141–2, 158, 160, and sustainable development 138
164 Volmer, Ludger 173
and Afghanistan 74
cooperation with local rulers war on terror 73, 77, 79, 99, 105
180–1 Washington Post 87, 88, 91
Global Compact 159 ‘we-groups’ 29, 39
and Iraq 93–4 Wilson, Woodrow 20, 140
and Kosovo 102 Wimmer, Andreas 31–2
and military interventions 170, Wolfowitz, Paul D. 105
175, 177 World Bank 23, 24, 107, 137
Millennium Summit 2002 159
and NGOs 125 Yoruba 111, 112, 118
and reconstruction processes 172,
176 Zaire (Congo) 25

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