G.R. No.
235315, July 13, 2020
HENRY T. PARAGELE, ROLAND ELLY C. JASO, JULIE B. APARENTE, RODERICO S.
ABAD, MILANDRO B. ZAFE JR., RICHARD P. BERNARDO, JOSEPH C. AGUS,
ROMERALD S. TARUC, ZERNAN BAUTISTA, ARNOLD MOTITA, JEFFREY CANARIA,
ROMMEL F. BULIC, HENRY N. CHING, NOMER C. OROZCO, JAMESON M. FAJILAN, JAY
ALBERT E. TORRES, RODEL P. GALERO, CARL LAWRENCE JASA NARIO, ROMEO
SANCHEZ MANGALI III, FRANCISCO ROSALES JR., BONICARL PENAFLORIDA
USARAGA, JOVEN P. LICON, NORIEL BARCITA SY, GONZALO MANABAT BAWAR,
DAVID ADONIS S. VENTURA, SOLOMON PICO SARTE, JONY F. LIBOON, JONATHAN
PERALTA ANITO, JEROME TORRALBA, AND JAYZON MARSAN, Petitioners. vs. GMA
NETWORK, INC., Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS
In their consolidated complaint for regularization turned into a complaint for "illegal dismissal, non-
payment of salary/wages, and regularization" against GMA Network, Inc., petitioners averred that
they were rank-and-file employees of the said network, and they were dismissed in May 2013.
GMA Network, Inc. denied the allegations, alleging that there was no employer-employee
relationship, and the petitioners were only “pinch-hitters or relievers” hired when the need arises.
On December 16, 2014, then Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated complaint of the
petitioners on the ground that they failed to prove that there is an employer-employee relationship
subsequently finding that GMA Network, Inc. could not commit an illegal dismissal in the said
situation.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on March 28,
2014. In its decision, NLRC recognized that said petitioners were employees of the network but
only one of the co-complainants was a rank-and-file employee. NLRC cited Article 295 (formerly
Article 280), stating that petitioners must have rendered "at least one year of service, whether
such service is continuous or broken" before one could become a regular employee. NLRC ruled
that an existing employer-employee relationship between petitioners and the GMA Network, Inc.
did not automatically mean that they were already regular employees of the network.
Petitioners filed a motion with NLRC to partially reconsider its March 28, 2014 decision but said
motion was denied by NLRC in its resolution dated May 21, 2014. Petitioners then filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the March 28, 2014 decision and May 21, 2014
resolution of the NLRC. However, on March 3, 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but said motion
was denied in a resolution dated October 26, 2017.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the March 3, 2017 decision and October
26, 2017 resolution of the Court of Appeals, and praying that they be recognized as illegally
dismissed regular employees of GMA Network, Inc. and be reinstated with full backwages.
ISSUE
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship guarantees regular employment status and
thus, consequently, GMA Network, Inc. illegally dismissed petitioners.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In the decision of the Supreme Court penned by
Justice Leonen (2020), it expressly stated the following:
“Only casual employees performing work that is neither necessary nor desirable to the
usual business and trade of the employer are required to render at least one (1) year of service
to attain regular status. Employees who perform functions which are necessary and desirable to
the usual business and trade of the employer attain regular status from the time of engagement.”
In addition, GMA Network, Inc.’s argument that herein petitioners were only “pinch-hitters or
relievers” lacks merit following the four-fold test with emphasis on the important element of control
wherein it has been found that the respondent network “exercised control over the means and
methods of petitioners' work.” In fact, the Supreme Court also said that the network’s “denial of
an employer-employee relationship, coupled with the claim that it merely exercised control over
the output required of petitioners, is an implicit assertion that it engaged petitioners as
independent contractors.”
Moreover, the Supreme Court also stated that a “reasonable connection exists between
petitioners' work as camera operators and GMA's business as both a television and broadcasting
company.” Additionally, “the repeated engagement of petitioners over the years only reinforces
the indispensability of their services to GMA's business.” These further affirmed that petitioners
were indeed regular employees of GMA Network, Inc.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the reinstatement of petitioners with
“backwages, allowances, and other benefits from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time
of their actual reinstatement.”
G.R. No. 171664, March 6, 2013
BANKARD, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION-FIRST
DIVISION, PAULO BUENCONSEJO, BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-
AWATU, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS
The respondent Bankard Employees Union-AWATU filed its first Notice of Strike (NOS), on 26th
of June 2000, before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the grounds that
Bankard, Inc. committed unfair labor practices, namely, job contractualization,
outsourcing/contracting-out jobs, manpower rationalizing program, and discrimination.
Following this, the Bankard Employees Union-AWATU held an initial conference to clear up the
issues raised in their NOS which was subsequently followed by a strike vote balloting wherein the
members voted to hold the strike. Bankard then requested the Office of the Secretary of Labor to
either assume jurisdiction over the case or certify the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for mandatory arbitration. The then Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) certified the case to the NLRC.
On the 25th of July 2000, Bankard Employees Union-AWATU declared that their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with Bankard, Inc. was in a stalemate which was followed by a
second NOS on the ground that Bankard, Inc. was bargaining in bad faith.
The Office of the Secretary of Labor then assumed jurisdiction upon Bankard, Inc.’s request. The
former certified the case to the NLRC. The Secretary of Labor issued two certification orders
preventing the union from doing actions that might aggravate the situation. However, the union
held a strike on August 11, 2000.
Despite negotiations, the parties failed to achieve an amicable settlement. On one hand, Bankard,
Inc. alleged that job contractualization or outsourcing or contracting out of jobs is not an unfair
labor practice but a valid exercise of management prerogative and that there was no bad faith on
its part during the bargaining because the union’s demands were beyond what Bankard, Inc. could
give. On the other hand, the union alleged that Bankard, Inc. has committed contractualization
since 1995 upon hiring contractual workers who do the work of regular employees and that
Bankard, Inc.’s offer was not up to par with the union’s demands.
The NLRC ruled that Bankard, Inc. did commit unfair labor practices under Article 248(c) of the
Labor Code, but “the issue of bargaining in bad faith was rendered moot and academic by virtue
of the finalization and signing of the CBA between the management and the union.”
Both parties then filed their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration. NLRC denied both
motions for lack of merit. Bankard, Inc. then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the resolution and order issued by the NLRC, alleging that NLRC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition, stating that NLRC’s decisions were based on substantial
evidence. In response, Bankard, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals
which was denied for repeating the grounds that were already raised in the former motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and denying the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Bankard, Inc. subsequently finding petitioner tohave
engaged in unfair labor practice.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is merit to the petition of Bankard, Inc.
As a general rule, "factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise
in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the
courts when supported by substantial evidence." However, the Supreme Court may review factual
issues if petitioner “persuasively alleges that there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on
record to support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo.”
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that the issue that needs to be determined is whether
or not Bankard, Inc. committed unfair labor practices referencing Article 247 and Article 248 of
the Labor Code. The Court found that there is no substantial evidence other than the allegations
of the union, stating that “contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or
management prerogative.”
The Supreme Court hereby granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 202091, June 7, 2017
SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORP. (surviving entity of a merger with Fresh Banana
Agricultural Corporation and other corporations), Petitioner. vs. NAGKAHIUSANG
MAMUMUO SA SUYAPA FARM (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU), Respondent.
CAGUIOA, J.:
FACTS
Private respondent and labor organization Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm
(NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) filed a Petition for Certification of Election before the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. XI in Davao City to officially represent the
rank-and-file employees of then packing plant 90 of the Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation
(FBAC) which was later merged with SUMIFRU with the latter being the surviving entity of the
merger.
In response, FBAC opposed the aforementioned petition on the grounds that no employer-
employee relationship exists between the members of NAMASUFA and FBAC, alleging that the
said members are under the independent contractor A2Y Contracting Services.
In its comment to the opposition of FBAC, NAMASUFA alleged that its members were previously
workers of Stanfilco even before FBAC came and that they were required to join the Compostela
Banana Packing Plant Workers' Cooperative (CBPPWC).
On July 28, 2008, after the merger of FBAC and SUMIFRU on June 20 of the same year, DOLE
granted the petition of NAMASUFA and subsequently declaring SUMIFRU as their legitimate
employer following the four-fold test.
SUMIFRU filed an appeal to DOLE, but DOLE dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed
the decision of the DOLE Regional Office No. XI Circuit Mediator-Arbiter. SUMIFRU then filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the DOLE Secretary
and alleging that the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition, stating that the DOLE Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion
because the ruling was based on substantial evidence. Following this, SUMIFRU filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the February 8, 2012 decision and May 18,
2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the DOLE Secretary.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the ruling of the DOLE Secretary.
The Supreme Court denied the petition of SUMIFRU subsequently affirming the February 8, 2012
decision and May 18, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the ruling of the DOLE
Secretary given that the said ruling is based on substantial evidence further defining what
substantial evidence is by citing the definition provided in T & H Shopfitters Corp./Gin Queen
Corp. v. T & H Shopfitters Corp./Gin Queen Workers Union (728 Phil. 168, 180-181 (2014)) that
substantial evidence is the “amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise."
In the case at bar, the DOLE Secretary found that the element of control was existing based on
the documents submitted by the parties, particularly the monitoring sheets required by SUMIFRU
and the imposition of disciplinary actions in case of failure to adhere to the "No Helmet - No Entry"
"No ID - No Entry" policies.
REFERENCES
Bankard, Inc. v. NLRC-First Division, et. al., G.R. No. 171664 (March 6, 2013) (Phil.),
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/mar2013/gr_171664_2013.html
Paragele v. GMA Network, Inc., G.R. No. 235315 (July 13, 2020) (Phil.),
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66401
SUMIFRU v. NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU, G.R. No. 202091 (June 7, 2017) (Phil.),
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63175
T & H Shopfitters Corp./Gin Queen Corp. v. T & H Shopfitters Corp./Gin Queen Workers Union,
G.R. No. 191714, 728 S.C.R.A. 168, 180 – 181 (February 26, 2014) (Phil.),
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/56581
