GLOBAL

C O UNTERSPAC E
C A PA BILI TIE S
An Open Source Assessment

> 04 2023
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
ABOUT
SEC URE WORLD
FO U N DATI O N

> Secure World Foundation (SWF) is a private operating foundation that promotes
cooperative solutions for space sustainability and the peaceful uses of outer
space. The mission of the Secure World Foundation is to work with governments,
industry, international organizations, and civil society to develop and promote
ideas and actions to achieve the secure, sustainable, and peaceful uses of outer
space benefiting Earth and all its peoples.

Global Counterspace Capabilities © 2023 by Secure World Foundation is

licensed under Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International. To view a copy
of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0

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ABOUT THE
EDITORS
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Dr. Brian Weeden Dr. Brian Weeden is the Director of Program Planning for Secure World
Director of Program Planning Foundation and has more than two decades of professional experience in
⸺ space operations and policy.

Dr. Weeden directs strategic planning for future-year projects to meet the
Foundation's goals and objectives, and conducts research on space debris,
global space situational awareness, space traffic management, protection
of space assets, and space governance. Dr. Weeden also organizes national
and international workshops to increase awareness of and facilitate dialogue
on space security, stability, and sustainability topics. He is a member and
former Chair of the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council on Space
Technologies, a former member of the Advisory Committee on Commercial
Remote Sensing (ACCRES) to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the Executive Director of the Consortium for
Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS).

Prior to joining SWF, Dr. Weeden served nine years on active duty as an officer
in the United States Air Force working in space and intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) operations. As part of U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space
Operations Center ( JSpOC), Dr. Weeden directed the orbital analyst training
program and developed tactics, techniques and procedures for improving
space situational awareness.

Respected and recognized as an international expert, Dr. Weeden's research

and analysis have been featured in The New York Times, The Washington Post,
National Public Radio, USA Today, The BBC, Fox News, China Radio International,
The Economist, The World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting in Davos,
academic journals, presentations to the United Nations, and testimony before
the U.S. Congress.
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Ms. Victoria Samson Ms. Victoria Samson is the Washington Office Director for Secure World Foundation
Washington Office Director and has 25 years of experience in military space and security issues.
⸺
Before joining SWF, Ms. Samson served as a Senior Analyst for the Center
for Defense Information (CDI), where she leveraged her expertise in missile
defense, nuclear reductions, and space security issues to conduct in-depth
analysis and media commentary. Prior to her time at CDI, Ms. Samson was
the Senior Policy Associate at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a
consortium of arms control groups in the Washington, D.C. area, where she
worked with Congressional staffers, members of the media, embassy officials,
citizens, and think-tanks on issues surrounding dealing with national missile
defense and nuclear weapons reductions. Before that, she was a researcher
at Riverside Research Institute, where she worked on war-gaming scenarios
for the Missile Defense Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.

Known throughout the space and security arena as a thought leader on policy
and budgetary issues, Ms. Samson is often interviewed by multinational media
outlets, including The New York Times, Space News, The BBC, and NPR. She is
also a prolific author of numerous op-eds, analytical pieces, journal articles, and
updates on space security matters. She is also a member of the International
Astronautical Federation’s committee on space security and the Space Security
Working Group of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s
Committee on International Security and Arms Control.

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TABLE OF
CONTENTS
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SECTION 1 — COUNTRIES THAT HAVE CONDUCTED DESTRUCTIVE ASAT TESTS

01. The United States ................................................................................ 01-01

02. Russia ............................................................................................ 02-01

03. China .............................................................................................. 03-01

04. India .............................................................................................. 04-01

05. Orbital Debris Created by Destructive ASAT Testing ................................. 05-01

SECTION 2 — COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTERSPACE TECHNOLOGIES

06. Australia ........................................................................................ 06-01

07. France ............................................................................................. 07-01

08. Iran ............................................................................................... 08-01

09. Japan .............................................................................................. 09-01

10. North Korea ...................................................................................... 10-01

11. South Korea ...................................................................................... 11-01

12. The United Kingdom ............................................................................... 12-01

SECTION 3 — CYBER COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

13. Global Cyber Counterspace Capabilities .................................................. 13-01

APPENDIX I — HISTORICAL ANTI-SATELLITE TESTS IN SPACE ................................... 14-01

APPENDIX II — IMAGERY OF COUNTERSPACE RELATED FACILITIES ............................ 15-01

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LIST
OF FIG URES

FIGURE 1-1 — MINOTAUR UPPER STAGE ............................................................... 01-03

FIGURE 1-2 — ORBITAL EXPRESS MISSION PLAN .................................................... 01-04

FIGURE 1-3 — GSSAP SATELLITES .................................................................... 01-07

FIGURE 1-4 — SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM GROUND TEST .................................. 01-11

FIGURE 1-5 — ASM-135 FLIGHT PROFILE ............................................................. 01-13

FIGURE 1-6 — UPLINK VS. DOWNLINK JAMMING ...................................................... 01-18

FIGURE 1-7 — SPACE FORCE GUARDIAN IN FRONT OF A PAIR OF COUNTER

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ANTENNAS .................................................. 02-12

FIGURE 2-1 — MiG-31BM CARRYING A BUREVESTNIK LAUNCHER ................................... 02-12

FIGURE 2-2 — LUCH ORBITAL HISTORY ............................................................... 02-12

FIGURE 2-3 — TEL-MOUNTED NUDOL ................................................................... 02-16

FIGURE 2-4 — RUSSIAN COUNTERSPACE EW SYSTEMS .................................................. 02-23

FIGURE 2-5 — KRASUKHA-4 ............................................................................. 02-26

FIGURE 2-6 — THE PERESVET LASER SYSTEM .......................................................... 02-29

FIGURE 2-7 — RUSSIAN MISSILE WARNING AND SSA RADARS .......................................... 02-32

FIGURE 3-1 — RPO/ROBOTIC ARM DEMONSTRATOR SY-7 .............................................. 03-03

FIGURE 3-2 — LONGITUDINAL HISTORY OF THE SJ-17 .............................................. 03-05

FIGURE 3-3 — LONGITUDINAL HISTORY OF THE TJS-3 .............................................. 03-07

FIGURE 3-4 — DF-21 MRBM ............................................................................. 03-12

FIGURE 3-5 — XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX ON APRIL 3, 2013 ............................... 03-13

FIGURE 4-1 — MISSION SHAKTI ASAT ................................................................. 04-02

FIGURE 8-1 — IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILES ........................................................ 08-03

FIGURE 9-1 — KWANGMYONGSONG-4 .................................................................... 10-03

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FIGURE 15-1 — FORT GREELY GBI FIELD ............................................................... 01-03

FIGURE 15-2 — VANDENBERG SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX 6 ............................................... 01-04

FIGURE 15-3 — CAPE CANAVERAL X-37B HANGAR ...................................................... 01-07

FIGURE 15-4 — KAPUSTIN YAR MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE ........................................ 01-11

FIGURE 15-5 — PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCH COMPLEX ............... 01-13

FIGURE 15-6 — PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SITE 133 ........................................... 01-18

FIGURE 15-7 — PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SITE 43 ............................................ 02-12

FIGURE 15-8 — PLESETSK AREA 141 BUREVESTNIK FACILITIES ....................................... 02-12

FIGURE 15-9 — SARY SHAGAN ABM SILOS ............................................................... 02-12

FIGURE 15-10 — BAIKONUR COSMODROME SITE 90 ..................................................... 02-16

FIGURE 15-11 — JIUQUAN SUBORBITAL LAUNCH COMPLEX ............................................ 02-23

FIGURE 15-12 — KORLA WEST TEST COMPLEX .......................................................... 02-26

FIGURE 15-13 — KORLA WEST LAUNCH PAD ............................................................. 02-29

FIGURE 15-14 — TAIYUAN SPACE LAUNCH CENTER MOBILE PAD ....................................... 02-32

FIGURE 15-15 — XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER NORTH ASAT PAD .................................. 03-03

FIGURE 15-16 — XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SOUTH ASAT PAD .................................. 03-05

FIGURE 15-17 — SATISH DHAWAN SPACE CENTRE ...................................................... 03-07

FIGURE 15-18 — ABDUL KALAM ISLAND LAUNCH COMPLEX ............................................. 03-12

FIGURE 15-19 — SEMNAN SPACE CENTER ................................................................ 03-13

FIGURE 15-20 — SHAHRUD LAUNCH SITE ................................................................ 04-02

FIGURE 15-21 — TANEGASHIMA SPACE CENTER .......................................................... 08-03

FIGURE 15-22 — TONGHAE SATELLITE LAUNCHING GROUND ............................................ 10-03

FIGURE 15-23 — SOHAE SATELLITE LAUNCHING STATION .............................................. 01-03

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FIGURE 15-24 — MIRACL LASER ......................................................................... 02-16

FIGURE 15-25 — PERESVET DEPLOYMENT SITE NEAR BARNAUL ........................................ 02-23

FIGURE 15-26 — KALINA LASER COMPLEX NEAR ZELENCHUKSKAYA .................................... 02-26

FIGURE 15-27 — TOBOL ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMPLEX NEAR ULAN-UDE ............................ 02-29

FIGURE 15-28 — LASER TEST SITE NEAR MIANYANG ................................................... 02-32

FIGURE 15-29 — LASER TEST SITE NEAR BOHU ........................................................ 03-03

FIGURE 15-30 — CAPE COD MISSILE WARNING RADAR .................................................. 03-05

FIGURE 15-31 — FYLINGDALES MISSILE WARNING RADAR ............................................. 03-07

FIGURE 15-32 — EGLIN SPACE SURVEILLANCE RADAR ................................................. 03-12

FIGURE 15-33 — KWAJALEIN S-BAND SPACE FENCE .................................................... 03-13

FIGURE 15-34 — LINCOLN SPACE SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX ............................................ 04-02

FIGURE 15-35 — GLOBUS II RADAR .................................................................... 08-03

FIGURE 15-36 — REAGAN TEST SITE ................................................................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-37 — GEODSS DIEGO GARCIA ............................................................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-38 — HOLT C-BAND RADAR IN EXMOUTH .................................................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-39 — SPACE SURVEILLANCE TELESCOPE IN EXMOUTH ..................................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-40 — AIR FORCE MAUI OPTICAL AND SUPERCOMPUTING OBSERVATORY .................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-41 — VORONEZH RADAR AT ORSK ........................................................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-42 — DARYAL RADAR AT PECHORA .......................................................... 10-03

FIGURE 15-43 — DNEPR SITE RADAR AT SARY SHAGAN ................................................ 10-03

FIGURE 15-44 — DON-2N SITE AT SOFRINO ............................................................ 10-03

FIGURE 15-45 — DUNAI-3M RADAR AT CHEKHOV ........................................................ 01-03

FIGURE 15-46 — KRONA COMPLEX NEAR STOROZHEVAYA ................................................ 01-04

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FIGURE 15-47 — 30J6 COMPLEX NEAR STOROZHEVAYA ................................................. 01-07

FIGURE 15-48 — OKNO COMPLEX NEAR NUREKE ......................................................... 01-11

FIGURE 15-49 — LPAR SITE NEAR KORLA .............................................................. 01-13

FIGURE 15-50 — PURPLE MOUNTAIN OBSERVATORY ..................................................... 01-18

FIGURE 15-51 — GRAVES RADAR TRANSMITTER ........................................................ 02-12

FIGURE 15-52 — GRAVES RADAR RECEIVER ............................................................ 02-12

FIGURE 15-53 — TAROT-CALERN TELESCOPE ........................................................... 02-12

FIGURE 15-54 — SWORDFISH RADAR NEAR GARHBANGOR ............................................... 02-16

FIGURE 15-55 — DELIJAN SPACE TRACKING CENTER .................................................. 02-23

FIGURE 15-56 — BISEI SPACEGUARD CENTER .......................................................... 02-26

FIGURE 15-57 — KAMISAIBARA SPACEGUARD CENTER ................................................. 02-29

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LIST
O F TA BLES

TABLE 1-1 — SATELLITES APPROACHED BY GSSAP .................................................. 01-08

TABLE 1-2 — RECENT U.S. RPOs ...................................................................... 01-09

TABLE 1-3 — HISTORY OF U.S. DA-ASAT TESTS ..................................................... 01-14

TABLE 1-4 — MAXMIMUM ALTITUDE REACHABLE BY SM-3 VARIANTS ............................... 01-16

TABLE 2-1 — IS TESTS CONDUCTED BY THE SOVIET UNION ....................................... 02-03

TABLE 2-2 — SUSPECTED NARYAD FLIGHT TESTS ................................................... 02-05

TABLE 2-3 — RECENT RUSSIAN RPOs ................................................................. 02-13

TABLE 2-4 — NUDOL FLIGHT TESTS TO DATE ........................................................ 02-17

TABLE 3-1 — RECENT CHINESE RPOs ................................................................. 03-09

TABLE 3-2 — HISTORY OF CHINESE DA-ASAT TESTS ................................................. 03-15

TABLE 4-1 — INDIAN DA-ASAT TESTS IN SPACE .................................................... 04-03

TABLE 5-1 — ORBITAL DEBRIS CREATED BY ASAT TESTS IN SPACE ............................... 05-01

TABLE 14-1 — HISTORICAL U.S. ASAT TESTS IN SPACE .......................................... 14-01

TABLE 14-2 — HISTORICAL RUSSIAN ASAT TESTS IN SPACE ...................................... 14-02

TABLE 14-3 — HISTORICAL CHINESE ASAT TESTS IN SPACE ...................................... 14-03

TABLE 14-4 — HISTORICAL INDIAN ASAT TESTS IN SPACE ........................................ 14-03

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LIST OF
ACRONYMS
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AAD AMS ASPOS OKP CASIC

Advanced Area Defense Academy of Military Automated Warning China Aerospace
Sciences System on Hazardous Industrial Corporation
ABL Situations in Outer
Airborne Laser ANGELS Space CCAFS
Automated Navigation Cape Canaveral Air
ABM and Guidance ATBM Force Station
Anti-Ballistic Missile Experiment for Anti-Tactical Ballistic
Local Space Missile CCD
ACCRES Charge-coupled Device
Advisory Committee APOSOS AWACS
on Commercial Asia-Pacific Ground- Airborne Early Warning CCS
Remote Sensing Based Space Object and Control Systems Counter
Observation System Communications
ADF BMD System
Australian Defence APSCO Ballistic Missile
Force Asia-Pacific Space Co- Defense CDI
operation Organization Center for Defense
ADRV BMEWS Information
Advanced Debris APSSO Ballistic Missile Early
Removal Vehicle Asia-Pacific Space Warning System CFSCC
Science Observatories Combined Force Space
AEOS C2 Component Command
Advanced Electro- APT Command-and-Control
Optical System Advanced Persistent CIC
Threat C4ISR Commercial
AIS Command, Control, Integration Cell
Automated ASAT Communications,
Identification System Antisatellite Computers, CMOS
Intelligence, Complementary
AKM ASDF Surveillance and Metal-oxide
Apogee Kick Motor Aerospace Self-Defence Reconnaissance Semiconductor
Force
ALCOR CASC CNE
ARPA Lincoln C-band China Aerospace Computer Network
Observables Radar Science and Exploitation
Technology
Corporation
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CNES DAAS EAGLE EW
Centre national Data as a Service ESPA Augmented Electronic Warfare
d'études spatiales Geostationary
DDOS Laboratory Experiment FBI
COIL Distributed Denial Federal Bureau of
Chemical Oxygen of Service ECS Investigation
Iodine Laser Environmental Control
DEW Systems FSB
COMSAT Directed Energy Federal Security
Communications Weapons EELV Service
Satellite Evolved Expendable
DHS Launch Vehicle FY
CSpOC Department of Fiscal Year
Combined Space Homeland Security EO
Operations Center Earth Observation GBI
DIA Ground-based
CSRS Defense Intelligence EOSAT Interceptor
Counter Surveillance Agency Electronic Ocean
and Reconnaissance Surveillance Satellite GEO
System DNS Geostationary Earth
Domain Name System EKV Orbit
DA-ASAT Exoatmospheric Kill
Direct-Ascent ASAT DRDO Vehicle GEODSS
Defence Research Ground-based
DARC and Development ELINT Electro-Optical Deep
Deep Space Advanced Organisation Electronic Intelligence Space Surveillance
Radar Capability
DSA EMP GLONASS
DARPA Defence Space Agency Electromagnetic Pulse Global Navigation
Defense Advanced Satellite Systems
Research Projects DSC ESPA
Agency Defensive Space Control EELV Secondary GMD
Payload Adapter Ground-based Missile
DART DSS Defense
Demonstration Defence Space Strategy ESPC
for Autonomous Earth System GNSS
Rendezvous Technology Prediction Capability Global Navigation
Satellite Systems
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GPS ICS JASDF KIAM

Global Positioning Industrial Control Japanese Air Keldysh Institute of
System Systems Self-Defense Force Applied Mathematics

GRAVES ILRS JAXA KKV

Grand Réseau Adapté International Laser Japan Aerospace Kinetic Kill Vehicle
à la Veille Spatiale Ranging Service Exploration Agency
KRIT
GSO IRBM JFSCC Korea Research
Geosynchronous Orbit Intermediate Range Joint Force Space Institute for Defense
Ballistic Missile Component Command Technology Planning
GSSAP and Advancement
Geosynchronous Space IRGC JICSpOC
Situational Awareness Islamic Revolutionary Joint Interagency KW
Program Guard Corps Combined Space Kilowatt
Operations Center
GTO ISES LAC
Geosynchronous International Space JNWC Line of Actual Control
Transfer Orbit Environmental Service Joint Navigation
Warfare Center LACE
HEO ISON Low-Power
Highly Elliptical Orbit International Scientific JSpOC Atmospheric
Optical Network Joint Space Compensation
HPM Operations Center Experiment
High-Power Microwave ISR
Intelligence, JTF-SD LEO
HTK Surveillance, Joint Task Force Space Low-Earth Orbit
Hit-to-kill and Reconnaissance Defense
LPAR
IADC ISRO KARI Large Phased-Array
Inter-Agency Space Indian Space Research Korea Aerospace Radar
Debris Coordination Organisation Research Institute
Committee MDA
ITU KCNA Missile Defense Agency
ICBM International Korean Central News
Intercontinental Telecommunication Agency MEO
Ballistic Missile Union Medium Earth Orbit
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MIRACL NavIC NSDC PLA
Mid-Infrared Advanced Navigation with Indian National Space People’s Liberation Army
Chemical Laser Constellation Defense Center
PMO
Mi-TEx NAVWAR NSS Purple Mountain
Micro-satellite Navigation Warfare National Space Observatory
Technology Experiment Strategy
NESDIS PNT
MITM National Environmental OCS Positioning, Navigation,
Man-in-the-middle Satellite, Data, and Offensive and Timing
Information Service Counterspace
MMW PRAM
Millimeter Wave NETRA OSC Photovoltaic
Network for Space Offensive Space Radio-frequency
MOSSAIC Object Tracking and Control Antenna Module
Maintenance of space Analysis
situational awareness OTV QZSS
integrated capabilities NOAA Orbital Test Vehicle Quasi Zenith Satellite
National Oceanic System
MOTIF and Atmospheric PAD
Maui Optical Tracking Administration Prithvi Air Defence RAF
and Identification Royal Air Force
Facility NOTAM PARCS
Notice to Airmen Perimeter Acquisition RAT
MUBLCOM Radar Attack System Remote Access Tool
Multiple Path NPT
Beyond Line of Site Nuclear PAVE PAWS RDT&E
Communication Non-Proliferation Precision Acquisition Research, Development,
Treaty Vehicle Entry Phased Testing, and Evaluation
NASA Array Warning System
National Aeronautics NRL RF
and Space Naval Research PDV Radiofrequency
Administration Laboratory Prithvi Defence Vehicle
RKA
NASIC NSA PGM Relativistic Klystron
National Air and Space National Security Precision-Guided Amplifier
Intelligence Center Agency Munitions
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RORSAT SDIO SLBM SWF

Radar Ocean Strategic Defense Submarine-launched Secure World
Reconnaissance Initiative Office Ballistic Missile Foundation
Satellite
SDMU SLR TEL
RPO Space Domain Satellite Laser Ranging Transporter-erector-
Rendezvous and Mission Unit launcher
Proximity Operations SLV
SDOAC Space Launch Vehicle THAAD
SAM Space Debris Terminal High Altitude
Surface-to-air Missile Observation and SPR Area Defense
Data Application Space Strategic
SAR Center Portfolio Review TRADEX
Synthetic Aperture Target Resolution
Radar SFIA SSA and Discrimination
Space Force Space Situational Experiment
SAST Intelligence Activity Awareness
Shanghai Academy of TsNIIKhM
Spaceflight Technology SHF SSC Central Scientific
Super-High Frequency Space Systems Research Institute
SATCOM Command for Chemistry and
Satellite SIGINT Mechanics
Communications Signals Intelligence SSN
Space Surveillance TT&C
SBSS SIP Network Tracking, Telemetry,
Space-Based Satellite Interceptor and Control
Surveillance System Program SSS
Space Surveillance TT&M
SCADA SKKP System Targeting, Tracking,
Supervisory Control Центр контроля and Measurement
and Data Acquisition космического SST
пространства, tr. Space Surveillance UAS
SDF Tsentr kontrolya Telescope Unmanned Aerial
Self-Defense Forces kosmicheskogo Systems
prostranstva SWAC
SDI Space Warfighting UAV
Strategic Defense Analysis Center Unmanned Aerial
Initiative Vehicle
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UHF YODA
Ultra-High Frequency Yeux en Orbite pour un
Démonstrateur Agile
UKSA
United Kingdom
Space Agency

UKSpOC
UK Space Operations
Centre

USAF
United States Air Force

USSF
United States Space Force

USINDOPACOM
United States
Indo-Pacific
Command

USSPACECOM
United States Space
Command

USSR
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

VSAT
Very Small Aperture
Terminal
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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> The space domain is undergoing a significant set of changes. A growing number
of countries and commercial actors are getting involved in space, resulting
in more innovation and benefits on Earth, but also more congestion and
competition in space. From a security perspective, an increasing number of
countries are looking to use space to enhance their military capabilities and
national security. The growing use of, and reliance on, space for national security
has also led more countries to look at developing their own counterspace
capabilities that can be used to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
space systems.

The existence of counterspace capabilities is not new, but the circumstances

surrounding them are. Today there are increased incentives for development,
and potential use, of offensive counterspace capabilities. There are also greater
potential consequences from their widespread use that could have global
repercussions well beyond the military, as huge parts of the global economy
and society are increasingly reliant on space applications.

This report compiles and assesses publicly available information on the

counterspace capabilities being developed by multiple countries across five
categories: direct-ascent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, directed energy,
and cyber. It assesses the current and near-term future capabilities for each
country, along with their potential military utility. The evidence shows
significant research and development of a broad range of destructive and
non-destructive counterspace capabilities in multiple countries. However,
only non-destructive capabilities are actively being used in current
military operations. The following provides a more detailed summary of
each country’s capabilities.
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1 — THE UNITED STATES
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

The United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close
approach and rendezvous in both LEO and GEO, along with tracking, targeting,
and hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept technologies that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT
capability. These tests and demonstrations were conducted for other non-
offensive missions, such as missile defense, on-orbit inspections, and satellite
servicing, and the United States does not have an acknowledged program to
develop co-orbital capabilities. However, the United States possesses the
technological capability to develop a co-orbital capability in a short period
of time if it chooses to.

While the United States does not have an operational, acknowledged DA-ASAT
capability, it does have operational midcourse missile defense interceptors
that have been demonstrated in an ASAT role against a low LEO satellite. The
United States has developed dedicated DA-ASATs in the past, both conventional
and nuclear-tipped, and likely possesses the ability to do so in the near future
should it choose so.

The United States has an operational electronic warfare (EW) offensive

counterspace system, the Counter Communications System (CCS), which is
deployed globally to provide uplink jamming capability against geostationary
communications satellites. The United States has also initiated a program
called Meadowlands to upgrade the CCS capabilities. Through its Navigation
Warfare program, the United States has the capability to jam and interfere
with the civil signals of global navigation satellite services (GNSS) within a
local area of operation to prevent their effective use by adversaries and has
demonstrated doing so in several military exercises. The United States likely
could jam military GNSS signals as well, although the effectiveness is difficult
to assess based on publicly available information. The effectiveness of U.S.
measures to counter adversarial jamming and spoofing operations against
military GPS signals is not known.

Over the past several decades, the United States has conducted significant
research and development on the use of ground-based high-energy lasers
for counterspace and other purposes. We assess that there are no technological
roadblocks to the United States operationalizing them for counterspace
applications. With its Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) sites and defense research
facilities, the United States possesses low-power laser systems with the capability
to dazzle, and possibly blind, Earth observation (EO) imaging satellites. However,
there is no indication that these potential high or low power capabilities have
been operationalized.
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 There is no public evidence that the United States has a space-based directed
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

energy weapons (DEW) capability. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is

planning to conduct research into the feasibility of DEW for defending against
ballistic missiles and the Space Force has expressed an interest in a directed
energy architecture in general (not necessarily space-based). If developed,
these systems may have a capability against other orbiting satellites and,
depending on their target acquisition and tracking capabilities may be considered
de facto anti-satellite systems.

The United States currently possesses the most advanced SSA capabilities in
the world, particularly for military applications. U.S. SSA capabilities date to
the beginning of the Cold War and leverage significant infrastructure developed
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for missile warning and missile defense. The core of its SSA capabilities is
a robust, geographically dispersed network of ground-based radars and
telescopes and space-based telescopes. The United States is investing heavily
in upgrading its SSA capabilities by deploying new radars and telescopes
in the Southern Hemisphere, upgrading existing sensors, and signing SSA
data sharing agreements with other countries and satellite operators. The
United States still faces challenges in modernizing the software and computer
systems used to conduct SSA analysis and is increasingly looking to leverage
commercial capabilities.

The United States has had established doctrine and policy on counterspace
capabilities for several decades, although not always publicly expressed. Most
U.S. presidential administrations since the 1960s have directed or authorized
research and development of counterspace capabilities, and in some cases
greenlit testing or operational deployment of counterspace systems. These
capabilities have typically been limited in scope and designed to counter a
specific military threat, rather than be used as a broad coercive or deterrent
threat. The U.S. military doctrine for space control includes defensive space
control (DSC) and offensive space control (OSC), and is supported by SSA.
The United States recently underwent a major reorganization of its military
space activities as part of a renewed focus on space as a warfighting domain.
Since 2014, U.S. policymakers have placed increased focus on space security,
and have increasingly talked publicly about preparing for a potential “war in
space.” This rhetoric has been accompanied by a renewed focus on reorganizing
national security space structures and increasing the resilience of space
systems. This has culminated in the reestablishment of U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM) and the creation of the U.S. Space Force (USSF), which assumed
the responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command for space warfighting and
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) for operating, training, and equipping of
space forces, respectively. To date, the missions of these new organizations
are largely a continuation of previous military space missions, although some
have advocated for expanding their focus to include cislunar activities and
more offensive weapons. It is possible that the United States has also begun
developing new offensive counterspace capabilities, although the United
States has publicly stated it will not test destructive DA-ASAT weapons. The
United States also continues to hold annual space wargames and exercises
that increasingly involve close allies and commercial partners.
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2 — RUSSIA
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

There is strong evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs since
2010 to regain many of its Cold War-era counterspace capabilities. Since 2010,
Russia has been testing technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO that could
lead to or support a co-orbital ASAT capability, and some of those efforts have
links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program. Additional evidence
suggests Russia may have started a new co-orbital ASAT program called
Burevestnik, potentially supported by a surveillance and tracking program
called Nivelir. The technologies developed by these programs could also be
used for non-aggressive applications, including surveilling and inspecting
foreign satellites, and most of the on-orbit RPO activities done to date match
these missions. However, Russia has deployed two “sub-satellites” at high
velocity, which suggests at least some of their LEO RPO activities are of a
weapons nature.

Russia has long had the potential for a DA-ASAT capability through its historical
ballistic missile defense capabilities and had DA-ASAT development programs
in the past that never fully became operational. In 2021, after more than a
decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT
capability against a LEO satellite. It is unclear whether this system, the Nudol,
will become operational soon, and it does not appear to have the capability to
threaten targets beyond LEO.

Russia places a high priority on integrating electronic warfare (EW) into military
operations and has been investing heavily in modernizing this capability.
Most of the upgrades have focused on multifunction tactical systems whose
counterspace capability is limited to jamming of user terminals within tactical
ranges. Russia has a multitude of systems that can jam GPS receivers within
a local area, potentially interfering with the guidance systems of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), guided missiles, and precision-guided munitions
(PGMs), but has no publicly known capability to interfere with the GPS satellites
themselves using radio frequency interference. The Russian Army fields
several types of mobile EW systems, some of which can jam specific satellite
communications user terminals within tactical ranges. Russia can likely jam
communications satellites uplinks over a wide area from fixed ground stations
facilities. Russia has operational experience in the use of counterspace EW
capabilities from current military campaigns, as well as using it within Russia
xix
 for protecting strategic locations and VIPs. New evidence suggests Russia
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

may be developing high-powered space-based EW platforms to augment its

existing ground-based platforms.

Russia has a strong technological knowledge base in directed energy physics

and is developing a number of military applications for laser systems in a
variety of environments. Russia has a mobile ground-based laser dazzler system,
Peresvet, that is linked to protection of their road mobile intercontinental ballistic
missile force. Russia may have revived a legacy program whose goal is to develop
an aircraft-borne laser system for targeting the optical sensors of imagery
reconnaissance satellites, although there is no indication that an operational
capability has been achieved. Although not their intended purpose, Russian
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ground-based satellite laser ranging (SLR) facilities could be used to dazzle

the sensors of optical imagery satellites. There is no indication that Russia is
developing, or intending to develop, high-power space-based laser weapons.

Russia has sophisticated SSA capabilities that are likely second only to the
United States. Russian SSA capabilities date to the Cold War and leverage
significant infrastructure originally developed for missile warning and missile
defense. Although some of these capabilities atrophied after the fall of the
Soviet Union, Russia has engaged in several modernization efforts since the
early 2000s to reinvigorate them. While the government owned and operated
SSA capabilities are limited to the geographic boundaries of the former Soviet
Union, Russia is engaging in international civil and scientific cooperative
efforts that likely give it access to data from SSA sensors around the globe.
Today, Russia maintains a catalog of Earth-orbiting space objects in LEO that
is somewhat smaller than that of the United States but a slightly more robust
catalog of HEO and GEO objects.

Russian military thinkers see modern warfare as a struggle over information

dominance and net-centric operations that can often take place in domains
without clear boundaries and contiguous operating areas. To meet the challenge
posed by the space aspect of modern warfare, Russia is pursuing lofty goals
of incorporating EW capabilities throughout its military to both protect its
own space-enabled capabilities and degrade or deny those capabilities to its
adversary. In space, Russia is seeking to mitigate the superiority of U.S. space
assets by fielding a number of ground-, air-, and space-based offensive
capabilities. Russia has recently reorganized its military space forces into a new
organization that combines space, air defense, and missile defense capabilities.
Although technical challenges remain, the Russian leadership has indicated
that Russia will continue to seek parity with the United States in space.
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3 — CHINA
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and
rendezvous in both low-earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary earth orbit (GEO)
that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. However, the public evidence
indicates they have not conducted an actual destructive intercept of a target,
and there is no proof that these technologies are definitively being developed
for counterspace use as opposed to intelligence gathering or other purposes.
China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway
to develop DA-ASAT capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems
or as midcourse missile defense systems that could provide counterspace
capabilities. China has engaged in multiple, progressive tests of these capabilities
since 2005, indicating a serious and sustained organizational effort. Chinese
DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and may be operationally
fielded on mobile launchers. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space
targets (medium Earth orbit, or MEO, and GEO) is likely still in the experimental
or development phase, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether
it will become an operational capability in the near future.

China is likely to have significant EW counterspace capabilities against GNSS

and satellite communications, although the exact nature is difficult to determine
through open sources. Chinese military doctrine places a heavy emphasis on
electronic warfare as part of the broader information warfare, and in recent
years, China has taken steps to integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare
capabilities under a single military command. While there is significant evidence
of Chinese scientific research and development of EW capabilities for counterspace
applications and some open-source evidence of Chinese EW counterspace
capabilities being deployed, there is no public evidence of their active use in
military operations.

China is likely to be developing directed energy weapons (DEW) for counterspace

use, although public details are scarce. There is strong evidence of dedicated
research and development and reports of testing at four different locations, but
limited details on the operational status and maturity of any fielded capabilities.

China is developing a sophisticated network of ground-based optical telescopes

and radars for detecting, tracking, and characterizing space objects. Like the
United States and Russia, several of the Chinese SSA radars also serve missile
warning functions. While China lacks an extensive network of SSA tracking
assets outside its borders, it does have a fleet of tracking ships and is developing
relationships with countries that may host future sensors. Since 2010, China has
deployed several satellites capable of conducting RPO on orbit, which likely aids
in its ability to characterize and collect intelligence on foreign satellites.
xxi
 Although official Chinese statements on space warfare and weapons have
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

remained consistently aligned to the peaceful purposes of outer space, unofficially

they have become more nuanced. China has recently designated space as a
military domain, and military writings state that the goal of space warfare and
operations is to achieve space superiority using offensive and defensive means
in connection with their broader strategic focus on asymmetric cost imposition,
access denial, and information dominance. In 2015, China reorganized its
space and counterspace forces, as part of a larger military reorganization,
and placed them in a new major force structure that also has control over
electronic warfare and cyber. China’s considerable investment in developing
and testing counterspace capabilities, as detailed in this chapter, suggest
they see space as a domain for future conflicts, whether or not that is officially
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stated. That said, it is uncertain whether China would fully utilize its offensive
counterspace capabilities in a future conflict or whether the goal is to use
them as a deterrent against U.S. aggression. There is no public evidence of
China actively using destructive counterspace capabilities in current military
operations, although it is likely they are using SSA and electronic warfare in at
least some support roles.

4 — INDIA
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

India has over five decades of experience with space capabilities, but most of
that has been civil in focus. It is only relatively recently that India has started
organizationally making way for its military to become active users of space
and creating explicit military space capabilities. India’s military has developed
indigenous missile defense and long-range ballistic missile programs that
could lead to DA-ASAT capabilities, should the need arise. India demonstrated
its ASAT capability in March 2019 when it destroyed one of its satellites. While
India continues to insist that it is against the weaponization of space, India
may be moving toward an offensive counterspace posture. India is reportedly
in the early stages of working on directed energy weapons.
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6 — AUSTRALIA
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

Australia is a relative newcomer in space, although it has long played a support

role by hosting ground infrastructure for satellite communications and command
and control. Recently, however, Australia has been laying the groundwork for
more indigenous space capabilities, including military. It has recently started
a military space organization, is building out a policy framework for its military
space priorities, is putting concerted efforts and resources into building its own
SSA capabilities, is examining an EW capability for its Department of Defence, and
is looking into non-destructive ways in which to interfere with enemy satellites.

7 — FRANCE
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

While France has long had a space program, as well as military satellites, it was
not until recently that France had an explicit focus on offensive and defensive
counterspace activities. The major change occurred in July 2019 with the release
of the first French Space Defense Strategy, which elevated French military
space efforts and control of French military satellites. The French Space Defense
Strategy focuses on two main areas: to improve space situational awareness
around French space assets and provide them with some form of active defense
against threats. While some French officials suggested machine guns and
laser cannons on satellites, the actual plan calls for ground-based lasers for
dazzling and space-based inspection satellites. In 2021 and 2022, France carried
out military exercises, codenamed “ASTERX,” in outer space, testing the
capabilities of its Space Command, as part of France’s evolving goal to be
the world’s third-largest spatial power.
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8 — IRAN
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare
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Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

Iran has a nascent space program, building and launching small satellites that
have limited capability. Technologically, it is unlikely Iran has the capacity to build
on-orbit or direct-ascent anti-satellite capabilities, and little military motivation
for doing so at this point. Iran’s military appears to have an independent ability
to launch satellites, separate from Iran’s civil space program. Iran has not
demonstrated any ability to build homing kinetic kill vehicles, and its ability to
build nuclear devices is still constrained. Iran has demonstrated an EW capability
to persistently interfere with the broadcast of commercial satellite signals,
although its capacity to interfere with military signals is difficult to ascertain.

9 — JAPAN
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

Japan has long been a well-established space actor and its space activities have
historically been non-military in nature. In 2008, Japan released a Basic Space
Law that allowed for national security-related activities in space and since
then, government officials have begun to publicly speak about developing
various counterspace capabilities or developing military SSA capacity. Japan
is currently undergoing a major reorganization of its military space activities
and the development of enhanced SSA capabilities to support military and
civil applications. While Japan does not have any acknowledged offensive
counterspace capabilities, it is exploring whether to develop them. Japan does
have a latent ASAT capability via its missile defense system but has never
tested it in that capacity.
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 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
10 — NORTH KOREA
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

North Korea has no demonstrated capability to mount kinetic attacks on U.S.

space assets: neither a DA-ASAT nor a co-orbital system. In its official statements,
North Korea has never mentioned ASAT operations or intent, suggesting that
there is no clear doctrine in Pyongyang’s thinking at this point. North Korea
does not appear highly motivated to develop dedicated counterspace assets,
though certain capabilities in its ballistic missile program might be eventually
evolved for such a purpose. North Korea has exhibited the capability to jam
civilian GPS signals within a limited geographical area. Their capability against
U.S. military GPS signals is not known. There has been no demonstrated ability
of North Korea to interfere with satellite communications, although their
technical capability remains unknown.

11 — SOUTH KOREA
R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare

Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

Over the last several years, South Korea has had a growing focus on military
space capabilities. It is working to enhance the space capabilities of its Air
Force through the establishment of a Space Operations Center, cooperating
with the United States on sharing SSA capabilities, and developing its own
longer-range ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles; it also has expressed
interest in developing its own reversible counterspace capabilities.
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S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

12 — THE UNITED KINGDOM

R&D TESTING OPERATIONAL USE IN CONFLICT

LEO Direct Ascent

MEO/GEO Direct Ascent

LEO Co-Orbital

MEO/GEO Co-Orbital

Directed Energy

Electronic Warfare
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Space Situational Awareness

LEGEND: NONE SOME SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAIN NO DATA

The United Kingdom has long played a supporting role in military space
activities through its participation in NATO and its bilateral relationship with
the United States. Over the past few years, the United Kingdom has begun to
add additional elements to increase its indigenous military space capabilities,
primarily in SSA and policy, organization, and doctrine. To date, the United
Kingdom has not publicly announced any specific plans to develop offensive
counterspace capabilities.

13 — CYBER CAPABILITIES

Multiple countries possess cyber capabilities that could be used against space
systems; however, actual evidence of cyber attacks in the public domain
is limited. The United States, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have all
demonstrated the ability and willingness to engage in offensive cyber attacks
against non-space targets. Additionally, a growing number of non-state actors
are actively probing commercial satellite systems and discovering cyber
vulnerabilities that are similar to those found in non-space systems. This indicates
that manufacturers and developers of space systems may not yet have reached
the same level of cyber hardness as other sectors. But to date, there have only
been a few publicly-disclosed cyber attacks directly targeting space systems.
The largest was a cyber attack by Russia against the user segment of Viasat’s
commercial satellite broadband service in Europe, which coincided with the
first day Russian forces entered Ukraine in February 2022.

There is a clear trend toward lower barriers to access, and widespread

vulnerabilities, coupled with reliance on relatively unsecured commercial
space systems, create the potential for non-state actors to carry out some
counterspace cyber operations without state assistance. However, while
this threat deserves attention and will likely grow in severity over the next
decade, there remains a stark difference at present between the cyber attack
capabilities of leading nation-states and other actors.
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 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
2023
A DDITIO NS

> The following are brief summaries of the major additions for the 2023 edition
of this report, broken down by country, along with a page reference to their
location in the text. Individual minor changes or the impact of changes on
summaries and assessments have been integrated into the text.

1. The United States / • Added details about the launch of X-37B OTV-6, which carried a new service
module and deployed additional payloads (01-04)

• Added RPO between the U.S. GSSAP satellite, USA 270, and the Chinese SY-12
(01) and SY-12 (02) satellites in GEO in January 2022 (01-06)

• Corrected and clarified details of the NOTSNIK, HiHo, and SIP Cold War
DA-ASAT programs (01-10)

• Updated status of Aegis Ashore site in Poland (01-16)

• Revised the declared mission of the Counter Communications System (01-18)

• Added U.S. State Department comments on use of EW in armed conflicts (01-20)

• Added U.S. Space Force Black Skies, Red Skies, and Blue Skies EW training
exercises (01-20)

• Updated future DEW plans based on the 2022 Missile Defense Review (01-27)

• Updated SST reaching operational status in September 2022 (01-30)

• Added rescheduling of the launch of SILENT BARKER (01-30)

• Added renaming of the 18th Space Control Squadron to 18th Space Defense
Squadron and creation of the 19th Space Defense Squadron for xGEO SDA
(01-31)

• Added details from the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, updated
version of DoD Directive 3100.10, updated DoD Directive 3100.10, DOD
Tents of Responsible Behavior in Space, and the 2022 Strategic Space Review
(01-35)

• Clarified the organizational structure of USSF and USSPACECOM (1-39)

• Added additional details about recent U.S. space exercises, including Space
Flag (01-40)
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S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

2. Russia / • Added additional details on the air-launched component of the Burevestnik

co-orbital ASAT program (02-01)

• Added launch of the Cosmos 2558 satellite and its shadowing of USA 326
(02-11)

• Added launch of Cosmos 2561 and Cosmos 2562, which may be part of the
Numizmat RPO program (02-13)

• Clarified distinction between the Aerostat long-range interceptor for the

A-235 missile defense program and the Nudol DA-ASAT program (02-15)

• Updated debris totals from the 2021 Nudol DA-ASAT test (02-17)
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• Clarified the uncertainty around the potential revival of the air-launched

Kontakt DA-ASAT program and its relationship with the Burevestnik air-
launched co-orbital ASAT (02-20)

• Updated the status of the S-500 ABM system (02-21)

• Added additional reports of Russian EW being used against space systems

as part of the conflict in Ukraine (02-23)

• Added reports of GPS interference along Finland’s eastern border with

Russia (02-25)

• Added report of Russian EW attacks against Starlink commercial satellite

broadband service (02-26)

• Added report of interference with the European Sentinel-1 SAR satellites

over Ukraine (02-26)

• Added report of the cancellation of the A-60 airborne laser dazzler program
(02-29)

• Added discussion of rumored Peresvet laser dazzler deployment to Ukraine

(02-30)

• Added additional details on new construction contracts for the Kalina

ground-based laser system (02-30)

• Clarified that the Skif-DM launch was of an unarmed mockup (02-31)

• Clarified details on the Krona SSA complex (02-33)

• Added the Pristel radio-electronic sensor complexes for SSA (02-34)

• Added the Zorkiy mobile optical sensor complex for SSA (02-34)

• Added Russian statements regarding the legality of attacks on commercial

satellites that participate in armed conflicts (02-38)

• Added budget reductions and shortfalls for the Russian space program in
2021 and 2022 (02-38)
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3. China / • Added details about the subsatellite released by the first Shenlong space
plane in 2020 and the lack of registration with the UN for either object (03-05)

• Added details about the launch of the second Shenlong spaceplane in 2022,
its release of a subsatellite, and current operations (03-05)

• Added launch of the NEO-01 active debris removal technology demonstration

payload (03-05)

• Added movements of the TJS-3 satellite, which has approached and stayed
within a few hundred km of several U.S. military satellites in GEO, although
not technically conducted RPOs (03-07)

• Added further activities of SJ-21 after its remediation of Compass G2 and

lack of registration with the UN (03-08)

• Added launch of the SJ-12 (01) and SJ-12 (02) RPO satellites into GEO, their
encounter with the U.S. GSSAP satellite (USA 270), and ongoing operations
(03-08)

• Clarified naming conventions for Chinese DA-ASAT systems (03-12)

• Added likely DA-ASAT tests in February 2021 and and June 2022 (03-15)

• Clarified the location, organizational connection, and likely mission of the

DEW site near Korla/Bohu (03-18)

• Added new research into high-powered relativistic klystron amplifiers and

potential EW counterspace applications (03-19)

• Clarified assessment of China’s official vs unofficial stance on space warfare

(03-22)

• Added more details about SSF units participating in Chinese military exercises
(03-25)

4. India / • Added the AD-1 endo- and exo-atmospheric missile defense system (04-02)

• Added signing of a SSA sharing agreement with the United States (04-04)

6. Australia / • Added announcement that they would be exploring non-destructive EW

counterspace capabilities (06-01)

• Added SST telescope reaching operational status in September 2022 (06-01)

• Updated status of the Australian space domain review (06-02)

• Updated announcement of progress on a new Australian national space

strategy, the Space Strategic Update, release of the Defence Space Strategy,
and release of the Space Power eManual (06-03)
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S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

7. France / • Added details about the YODA program to develop initial versions of inspection
or protection satellites for GEO (07-01)

• Added increase in budget for the EU SST Programme and announcement

of public services in the near future (07-03)

• Added Naucrates program to develop a SSA imaging satellite for GEO (07-03)

• Added changes to France’s Space Operations Law to allow civilian assets to

be transferred to the military or commandeered by the military (07-04)

• Added details about the 2022 version of the ASTERX space exercise (07-04)
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8. Iran / • Added details of the apparent failure of the Zuljanah rocket launch attempt
(08-02)

• Added details on the successful launch of Noor-2, the second Iranian military
satellite 08-02)

• Added details on Russia’s launch of the Khayyam remote sensing satellite and
plans for a future Ekvator geostationary communications satellites (08-03)

• Added reports of resumed Iranian jamming of Eutelsat commercial broadcasts

(08-04)

9. Japan / • Added successful test of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptors (09-01)

• Added announcement of a new military space operations unit within the Self
Defence Forces that will focus on SSA (09-02)

• Added announcement of a contract to LeoLabs to provide SSA data and

training for the Self Defence Forces (09-02)

• Added integration of hosted payloads for SSA to two future QZSS navigation
satellites (09-02)

• Added renamed of the Air Self-Defence Force to the Aerospace Self-Defence

Force (09-03)

• Added exchange officer agreement between the ASDF and USSPACECOM (09-03)

• Added release of the new National Security Strategy and plans for a future
space security strategy (09-03)

• Added announcement from the U.S. and Japan that attacks in space could
lead to invocation of Article V of their mutual defense treaty (09-03)

10. North Korea / • Added flight tests of the Hwasong-17 ICBM-class vehicle and display of another
solid fuel ICBM during a military parade (10-01)

• Added likely preparations for a launch of a reconnaissance satellite from

Sohae Satellite Launch Center (10-04)

• Added report of jamming of a South Korean satellite in 2012 (10-04)

• Added Kim Jong Un calls to modernize Sohae Satellite Launch Center (10-05)
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11. South Korea / • Added more details about the South Korean ballistic missile development
programs, which could lead to future DA-ASAT capabilities (11-01)

• Added KRIT report calling for South to invest in space weapons to keep up
with other space powers (11-01)

• Added statements from the ROK Air Force on the importance of improving
SSA (11-02)

• Added details on 2022 budget for space activities (11-02)

12. The United Kingdom / • Added details on the contributions of the UK SSA capabilities to the ESA SSA
programs (12-01)

• Added announcement of UKSA’s “Monitor Your Satellites” conjunction

assessment service (12-01)

• Added details of for future UK space spending (12-02)

• Added release of the Space Power military space doctrine publication (12-02)

13. Cyber / • Added reports of Anonymous cyber attacks on the website of the Russian
Space Research Institute (13-05)

• Added Case Study of the Russian wiper malware attack against the Viasat’s
KA-SAT commercial satellite broadband service (13-06)

• Added new research on weaknesses in authentication and controls on older

GEO communications satellites and hardware attacks against Starlink end
user terminals (13-07)

15. Appendices / • Added imagery of the construction at Plesetsk airport to support the
Burevestnik program (15-08)

• Added imagery of the Kalina laser complex near Zelenchukskaya (15-26)

• Corrected description of the Tobol electronic warfare complexes (15-27)

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A C K N O W LE D G E-
MENTS
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⁕ Catherine Dill This publication would not have been possible without the contributions
from the following individuals who contributed their time and expertise
Gilles Doucet
in a personal capacity in developing the original and subsequent editions.
Kylee Dickinson We are deeply grateful for their expertise and commitment.

Jeffrey Edmonds
This work is a synthesis of all these individual contributions with those from
Laura Grego SWF staff, and as such, Secure World Foundation bears all responsibility for
any errors or omissions.
Marissa Martin

Louison Mazeaud We also would like to thank Planet for kindly providing access to their imagery
database through their Planet Explorer program, and Analytical Graphics,
Brandon Kelley
Inc., for assisting with some of the imagery and graphics.
Jonathan McDowell

Sean O’Connor

Pavel Podvig

Kevin Pollpeter

Robert Ronci

Tamara Tanso

Seth Walton

Josh Wolny
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 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
FOREWORD

> Space security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. Over the last
decade, there has been growing concern from multiple governments about
the reliance on vulnerable space capabilities for national security and the
corresponding proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities that could
be used to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems. This in turn has
led to increased rhetoric from some countries about the need to prepare for
future conflicts on Earth to extend into space and calls from some corners to
increase the development of offensive counterspace capabilities and put in
place more aggressive policies and postures.

Unfortunately, much of this debate has taken place out of sight of the public,
largely due to the reluctance of most countries to talk openly about the subject.
Part of this can be traced to the classified nature of the intelligence on offensive
counterspace capabilities and to the unwillingness to reveal details that
could compromise sources and methods. But part of it is also the political
sensitivity of the topic and the discrepancies between what countries say
in public and what they may be doing behind the scenes. At the same time,
some media outlets and pundits have used what little information is known
to make hyperbolic claims that do not add constructively to the debate.

We feel strongly that a more open and public debate on these issues is urgently
needed. Space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services,
nor is space security and stability something that only matters to geopolitical
rivals. Our global society and economy are increasingly dependent on space
capabilities, and a future conflict in space could have massive, long-term
negative repercussions that are felt here on Earth, as everyone on this planet
is a user of space data in some form. The public should be as aware of the
developing threats and risks of different policy options as would be the case
for other national security issues in the air, land, and sea domains.

The purpose of the project is to provide a public assessment of counterspace

capabilities being developed by countries based on unclassified information.
We hope doing so will increase public knowledge of these issues, the willingness
of policymakers to discuss these issues openly, and the involvement of other
stakeholders in the debate.
xxxiii
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N
0 4/202 3

Finally, we must note that this publication is not meant to be the conclusive
answer on these issues. We have done our best to base our findings and
•
assessments on publicly available data, and we would like to thank our expert
contributors for their hard work on this issue. However, some of the topics
discussed here are difficult to assess using open sources, and we acknowledge
that significant gaps are likely to remain. Our limited resources also prevented
us from covering all the topics we hoped to. We intend to continue to publish
updated editions of this publication that address these shortcomings, and
work with the broader space community to improve this assessment.

Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson

xxxiv
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
INTRO DUCTIO N

> The space domain is undergoing a significant set of changes. A growing

number of countries and commercial actors are getting involved in space,
resulting in more innovation and benefits on Earth but also more congestion
and competition in space. From a security perspective, an increasing number
of countries are looking to use space to enhance their military capabilities
and national security. Most of the space applications being worked on are
not new and have been developed by the United States or the Soviet Union
since the beginning of the Space Age. Space-based, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR), positioning navigation and timing (PNT), and satellite
communications (SATCOM) are staples of military space applications. What
has changed is the proliferation of these capabilities beyond just superpowers.

The growing use of, and reliance on, space for national security has also
led more countries to look at developing their counterspace capabilities.
Counterspace, also known as space control, is the set of capabilities or
techniques that are used to gain space superiority. Space superiority is the
ability to use space for one’s own purposes while denying it to an adversary
for a limited time and location. Accordingly, counterspace capabilities have
both offensive and defensive elements, which are both supported by space
situational awareness (information about the space environment). Defensive
counterspace helps protect one’s own space assets from attack, while offensive
counterspace tries to prevent the adversary from using their space assets.
Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons are a subset of offensive counterspace capabilities,
although the satellite itself is only one part of the system that can be attacked.
Offensive capabilities can be used to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or
destroy any of the three elements of a space system: the satellite, the ground
system, or the communication links between them.

A key driver in the proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities is the

increased use of space capabilities to support conventional warfare. For
much of the Cold War, space was limited to mainly a strategic role in collecting
strategic intelligence, enforcing arms control treaties, and warning of potential
nuclear attacks. Although the Cold War saw significant development and testing
of counterspace capabilities, the close link between space capabilities and
nuclear war provided a level of deterrence against actual attacks on space
systems. However, over the last three decades, many of these strategic space
capabilities have found new roles by directly supporting conventional wars by
xxxv
 providing operational and tactical benefits to militaries. This has increased the
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

incentives for countries to develop offensive counterspace capabilities, while

also decreasing the deterrent value of the nuclear link.

While there are undeniable military benefits to these new uses of space, there
are risks as well. First, the growing reliance on space for national security and
the proliferation of counterspace capabilities creates an increased risk that
incidents in space can spark or escalate conflict on Earth. The sudden loss or
interruption of space capabilities during a period of heightened geopolitical
tensions could create the assumption that it is the opening salvo of an armed
attack, even if it was a natural event or an onboard failure. Second, the actual
use of offensive counterspace capabilities could have long-lasting consequences
0 4/202 3

for humanity, whether through the loss of critical space capabilities that underpin
the global economy and societies or through the creation of long-lived space
debris that hinders future space activities.

To help address this issue, Secure World Foundation began a project in the
summer of 2017 to develop an open-source assessment of global counterspace
capabilities. We convened a group of international experts to work with
our staff to compile publicly available information on the development of
counterspace capabilities by several countries. We decided to examine five
distinct categories of offensive counterspace capabilities:

Direct Ascent: weapons that use ground, air-, or sea-launched missiles with
interceptors that are used to kinetically destroy satellites through force of
impact, but are not placed into orbit themselves;

Co-orbital: weapons that are placed into orbit and then maneuver to
approach the target to attack it by various means, including destructive and
non-destructive;

Directed Energy: weapons that use focused energy, such as laser, particle,
or microwave beams to interfere or destroy space systems;

Electronic Warfare: weapons that use radio frequency energy to interfere

with or jam the communications to or from satellites;

Cyber: weapons that use software and network techniques to compromise,

control, interfere, or destroy computer systems.

In the 2020 edition, we added space situational awareness (SSA) as a separate

category for each of the countries included in the report. SSA is defined as
knowledge about the space environment and human space activities and
generally includes detection, tracking and characterization of space objects,
and space weather monitoring and prediction. While SSA is not uniquely
used for counterspace, it is a critical enabler for both offensive and defensive
counterspace operations. In some countries, the national security version of
SSA is known as Space Domain Awareness (SDA), with an added emphasis on
detecting and characterizing threats.

For each of these categories, we assessed what the current and near-term
capabilities might be for the countries examined in this report, based on the
publicly available information. We also assessed the potential military utility for
each capability, which includes both the advantages and disadvantages of the
capabilities. Finally, when possible, we examined each country’s policy, doctrine,
and budget to support the offensive counterspace capabilities being developed.
Taken together, this analysis is intended to provide a more holistic picture of
xxxvi
what each country is working on and how these capabilities may be used.

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
This edition has been updated to include events through February 2023.

All cataloged space objects mentioned in this report are described by three
separate identifiers. The first identifier is the public name of the space object
as determined by official reports or documents. The second identifier is
the international designator, a unique code established by the Committee
on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council for Science, and
consisting of the year of launch, a three-digit incrementing launch number of
that year, and up to a three-letter code representing the sequential identifier
of a piece in a launch. The third identifier is the unique number assigned to
the object by the U.S. military in its public satellite catalog, often referred to
as the satellite number or satno, which increments by one for each new object
cataloged. In this text, the first mention of a space object will include all three
identifiers in the format <name> (international designator, satno). Further
mentions will include only the public name if it is known or the catalog number
if the public name is not known.

The countries we chose to examine in this report are the ones most active in
developing their own indigenous offensive counterspace capabilities. However,
they should not be taken as an exhaustive list of countries doing so. Some of the
capabilities, such as cyber or DEW, are difficult to observe while in development
and could be much more widely proliferated than indicated herein this report.
It is likely, however, that the types of counterspace capabilities being developed
by other countries are similar to those discussed in this report.

Many of the details contained in this report will not be new to the government
experts who have been analyzing these same trends. In fact, we hope that
much of our work replicates theirs. However, since much of the government
work on these issues is classified or otherwise not divulged to the public, the
assessment presented in this report is likely to be new to those who do not
have active security clearances. We hope that it provides useful context to the
soundbites and headlines being generated over military and political leaders’
concerns about counterspace and space superiority.

Finally, while we have strived to make this report as unbiased and accurate
as possible, like all analytical products, it should be read with a degree of
skepticism. A significant degree of judgment was used in determining which
sources of information to include in this report, and how to weigh their impact
on the overall assessment. Many of the sources themselves are flawed in that
they originate from media reports that similarly are the product of individual
judgment about what to report, or not to report. Wherever possible, we tried
to include the lowest level of reference for the information presented here
so that the reader can bring their own judgment to bear.

In 2022, we did a major restructuring to better highlight the scope of different

countries’ counterspace activities. The report is now divided into three main
sections. Section 1 includes countries that have conducted destructive ASAT
tests in space, in chronological order by year of their first test, and ends with
an assessment of the space debris created by these tests. Section 2 includes
countries that have significant counterspace R&D programs but have not yet
done a destructive test. Section 3 focuses on cyber capabilities, given that they
are exceedingly difficult to assess on a per-country level based on open-source
data. Finally, the report includes two Appendices: one with satellite imagery of
major launch, testing, and other facilities discussed in the report, and a second
with tables of historical ASAT testing in space.
xxxvii
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Conducted Destructive
Countries That Have

ASAT Tests
⁕
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
77.0369°W
01

UNITED
THE

STATES
38.9072°N
The United States currently has the most advanced military space capabilities

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
in the world. During the Cold War, the United States pioneered many of the
national security space applications that are in use today and remains the
technology leader in nearly all categories. The U.S. military also has the most
operational experience of any military in the world in integrating space
capabilities into military operations, having done so in every conflict since
the 1991 Persian Gulf War against Iraq.

During the Cold War, the United States, like the Soviet Union, had multiple
counterspace programs, ranging from nuclear-tipped missiles to conventional
DA-ASATs launched from fighter jets. Most of these programs were to counter
specific Soviet military space capabilities, such as the ability to use satellites
to target U.S. Navy ships with anti-ship missiles. After the fall of the Soviet
Union, the United States briefly considered pushing ahead and developing
new counterspace systems to solidify its space superiority. However, these
efforts never fully materialized due to a range of factors, including domestic
budgetary and political pressure, deliberate self-restraint, and the focus
on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns following the 9/11
terrorist attacks. 01

Today, the United States fields one acknowledged counterspace system that 02
uses electronic warfare capabilities to interfere with satellite signals, but it
also has multiple other operational systems that could be used in counterspace 03
roles. There is evidence to suggest a robust debate is underway, largely
behind closed doors, on whether the United States should develop new 04
offensive counterspace capabilities, either deter an adversary from attacking
U.S. assets in space or to deny an adversary their own space capabilities in 05
the event of a future conflict. The impetus for this debate is renewed Russian
and Chinese counterspace developments and the recent conclusion that the 06
United States is engaged in great power competition with Russia and China.
The United States has also undertaken a major reorganization of its military 07
space capabilities by creating a separate military service, the U.S. Space Force,
and combatant command, U.S. Space Command, dedicated to space. 08

The following sections summarize U.S. counterspace development across 09

co-orbital, direct ascent, directed energy, electronic warfare, and space
situational awareness categories, along with a summary of U.S. policy and 10
doctrine on counterspace.
11

1.1 — U.S. CO-ORBITAL ASAT 12

Assessment / 13
The United States has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close
approach and rendezvous in both LEO and GEO, along with tracking, targeting, 14
and hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept technologies that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT
capability. These tests and demonstrations were conducted for other non- 15
offensive missions, such as missile defense, on-orbit inspections, and satellite
servicing, and the United States does not have an acknowledged program
to develop co-orbital capabilities. However, the United States possesses the
technological capability to develop a co-orbital capability in a short period of
time if it chooses to.
01-01
 1 Paul Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Specifics /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Policy, 1945-1984, Cornell University Press,

August 1, 1985, pp. 112.
Although the United States never had an operational co-orbital ASAT program,
it has had proposals for such a program and did test and develop many of
2 Ibid, p. 112-113.
the underlying technologies during the Cold War. Most notably, several of the
3 Ibid, p. 115. technologies for space-based ballistic missile intercept developed as part of
4 John Dassoulas and Michael D. Griffin, “The
the SDI during the 1980s could have been used to intercept satellites as well.
Creation of the Delta 180 Program and Its
Follow-ons,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest,
vol. 11, Numbers 1 and 2 (1990): p.86,
Project SAINT
https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/ Project SAINT (also known as the Satellite Inspector Program) was a USAF
pdf/V11-N1-2/11-01-Dassoulas.pdf.
effort to develop a system that could be used initially as a satellite inspector but
5 “VSE (Delta-180, DM-43),” Gunter’s Space Page, could be turned into a co-orbital ASAT weapon. The concept began because
accessed March 22, 2018, http://space.skyrock-
of a set of studies done from 1956 through 1959 on ways to defend against
0 4/202 3

et.de/doc_sdat/vse.htm.
hostile satellites.1 Following those studies, the USAF developed initial ideas for
three different concepts: one that was uncrewed and ground-launched, one
that was uncrewed and air-launched, and a third that was crewed. In 1960, the
USAF pressed forward with a “satellite inspector” version of the program in
response to concerns about an unidentified space object that was detected
in December 1959 (that later turned out to be a piece of debris from the U.S.
01
Discoverer V satellite).2

02
The inspector concept called for the SAINT vehicle to be launched into orbit
on an Atlas booster, after which it would match orbits with the target and use
03
onboard television cameras and radars to inspect the target from as close
as 50 feet. However, the USAF also hoped that a later version of the SAINT
04
vehicle would include a kill mechanism, such as high-explosive rockets. The
USAF planned for an initial set of four intercept tests beginning in 1963 and
05
for SAINT to be fully operational by the summer of 1967.3 However, lack of
budget support and political concerns led to the program’s cancellation in
06
1962, before any on-orbit tests were conducted.

07
Delta 180
Although not explicitly designed as a co-orbital ASAT weapon, the United
08
States did conduct a successful co-orbital intercept during the Delta 180
experiment as part of the SDI. The goal of the Delta 180 experiment was to
09
better understand tracking, guidance, and control for a space intercept of an
accelerating target.4 The experiment involved modifying the second stage of
10
a Delta 2 rocket (D2) to carry a sophisticated tracking system that included
ladar, ultraviolet, visible, and infrared sensors. The payload consisted of a
11
McDonnell Douglas PAS (Payload Assist System) platform combined with
the warhead and seeker from a Phoenix air-to-air missile and Delta 2 rocket
12
motors. The Delta 180 rocket was launched from the Cape Canaveral Air
Force Station (CCAFS) on September 5, 1986, and two objects (Delta 1 R/B,
13
1986-069B, 16938; USA 19, 1986-069A, 16937), presumably the D2 and PAS,
respectively, were placed into a 220 km circular orbit. The PAS maneuvered
14
to a separation distance of 200 km, and 90 minutes after launch, the D2
observed the launch of an Aries rocket from White Sands Missile Range. At
15
205 minutes after launch, the D2 and PAS both ignited their engines on an
intercept course, colliding at a combined speed of nearly 3 km/s.5 Sixteen
pieces of orbital debris from the collision were cataloged with apogees as
high as 2,300 km. Due to the low altitude of the intercept, most of the pieces
reentered the atmosphere within two months. The final piece of debris
reentered on April 4, 1987, more than seven months after the test.
01-02
Recent LEO RPO Activities 6 Thomas M. Davis and David Melanson, “XSS-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
10 Micro-Satellite Flight Demonstration,”
Since the end of the Cold War, the USAF, National Aeronautics and Space Paper No. GT-SSEC.D.3: p.7. https://smartech.
Administration (NASA), and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/8036/
SSEC_SD3_doc.pdf;jsessionid=906BB-
(DARPA) have all conducted tests and demonstrations of close approach and 52FE69F848048883B704DB20F07.smart2?se-
rendezvous technologies in LEO. On January 29, 2003, the USAF launched quence=2.

the XSS-10 (2003-005B, 27664) as a secondary payload on a Delta-2 rocket 7 “XSS-11 Micro Satellite,” Fact Sheet: Air Force
carrying a U.S. military GPS satellite. After the GPS satellite was deployed and Research Laboratory, Space Vehicles Director-
ate, current as of September 2011, accessed
the Delta upper stage (203-005C, 27665) conducted its passivation burns, the March 22, 2018, p.1, http://www.kirtland.
XSS-10 was released. It then conducted a pre-planned series of RPO maneuvers af.mil/Portals/52/documents/AFD-111103-035.
pdf?ver=2016-06-28-110256-797.
near the Delta upper stage, eventually closing to within 50 m (165 ft).6 XSS-11
(2005-011A, 28636) was launched on April 11, 2005, and according to the 8 Ibid, p.2.

official fact sheet, proceeded to “successfully demonstrate rendezvous and 9 “Overview of the DART Mishap Investigation
proximity operations with the expended rocket body [that placed it in orbit].” 7 Results,” NASA, accessed March 22, 2018,
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/148072main_DART_
The fact sheet also stated that over the following 12 to 18 months, the mishap_overview.pdf.
spacecraft “conduct[ed] rendezvous and proximity maneuvers with several
US owned, dead or inactive resident space objects near its orbit.” However, it
is impossible to verify whether these activities occurred and whether XSS-11
visited any non-U.S. space objects because the U.S. military did not publish
any positional information for the XSS-11 while in orbit. 01

02
FIGURE 1-1 — MINOTAUR UPPER STAGE
03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11
The image was taken by XSS-11 from a distance of approximately 500 m. Image credit: AFRL.8

12

On April 15, 2005, NASA launched the DART satellite (2005-014A, 28642)
13
to conduct an autonomous rendezvous experiment with a U.S. Navy
communications satellite, the MUBLCOM satellite (1999-026B, 25736). DART
14
ended up “bumping” into MUBLCOM during the test, and although both
satellites were apparently unharmed, the public version of NASA’s mishap
15
report lacks details as to why the collision happened.9

DARPA also conducted a demonstration of close approach and rendezvous

technology in the context of satellite servicing with its Orbital Express
mission. Orbital Express consisted of two spacecraft, the ASTRO servicing
vehicle (2007-006A, 30772) and the NEXTSat client vehicle (2006-006C, 30774).
On March 8, 2007, the two spacecraft were launched from CCAFS on an Atlas
V rocket and placed into a roughly 500 km circular orbit. After checkout, the
ASTRO demonstrated the ability to autonomously transfer fluid to NEXTSat
and use a robotic arm to swap out components. The two spacecraft then
01-03
 10 “Orbital Express – Mission Updates,” Boeing, separated and spent the next few months demonstrating multiple rendezvous
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Defense, Space & Security PhantomWorks,

accessed March 22, 2018,
and capture scenarios, including the first-ever use of a robotic arm to
https://web.archive.org/web/20121017163534/ autonomously capture another space object.10 The two spacecraft were
http://www.boeing.com/bds/phantom_works/
orbital/updates.html.
deactivated in July 2007.11

11 Stephen Clark, “In-space Satellite Servicing

Tests Come to an End,” SpaceFlight Now,
July 4, 2007, http://spaceflightnow.com/news/ FIGURE 1-2 — ORBITAL EXPRESS MISSION PLAN
n0707/04orbitalexpress/.

12 “Orbital Express: Testing On-Orbit Servicing,”

Defense Industry Daily, April 19, 2007,
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/orbital-
express-is-that-a-new-battery-or-are-you-just-
glad-to-see-me-03220/.
0 4/202 3

13 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “X-37B

Breaks Record, Lands After 780 Days In Orbit,”
United States Air Force, October 27, 2019,
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Arti-
cle/1999734/x-37b-breaks-record-lands-after-
780-days-in-orbit/.

14 Marco Langbroek, “Launching Cubesats From

the X-37B OTV 5: Lifetime Modelling With
GMAT,” SatTrackCam Leiden (b)log,
01
February 21, 2020, https://sattrackcam.blog-
spot.com/2020/02/launching-cubesats-from-x-
37b-otv-5.html.
02
15 Stephen Clark, “Upgraded X-37B spaceplane
rockets into orbit aboard Atlas 5 launcher,”
03
Spaceflightnow.com, May 17, 2020,
Image credit: Boeing.12
https://spaceflightnow.com/2020/05/17/up-
graded-x-37b-spaceplane-rockets-into-orbit-
04
aboard-atlas-5-launcher/.
Secret Deployment of Satellites
16 Jonathan McDowell, Tweet, May 30, 2020,
05 On October 27, 2019, the Orbital Test Vehicle 5 (OTV-5) flight of the X-37B
https://twitter.com/planet4589/sta-
tus/1266781929078231041. completed an at that time record-breaking 780-day stay in orbit with a landing
06 at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility. In a press release,
17 Joseph Trevithick, “X-37B’s Power Beaming Pay-
load A Reminder Of Potential Orbital Microwave the director of the Rapid Capabilities Office stated that as part of its mission
Anti-Satellite Weapons,” TheDrive.com,
07 it had provided a ride for small satellites.13 Although a similar reference was
May 19, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/
the-war-zone/33531/x-37bs-power-beaming- made during the launch of OTV-5 in September 2017, it was perceived at that
payload-a-reminder-of-potential-orbital-micro-
08 time to be small satellite ride shares that would be attached to the upper
wave-anti-satellite-weapons.
stage of the Falcon 9 booster that placed it into orbit, as has been done on
09 previous launches. However, no such deployment was announced nor cataloged
by the U.S. military after the launch of OTV-5, leading to the conclusion that
10 the deployment must have occurred from the X-37B itself later in the mission.
On February 11, 2020, the U.S. military quietly cataloged three new satellites—
11 USA 295 (45169, 2017-052C), USA 296 (45170, 2017-052D), and USA 297
(45171, 2017-052E)—associated with OTV-5. However, no orbital information
12 was provided for those three satellites. On February 12, the catalog was
updated to reflect that they were no longer in orbit. An analysis done by Dr.
13 Marco Langbroek suggests the three cubesats had to be deployed before
August 2018 if they were of 3U size.14
14
The latest launch of the X-37B was OTV-6 (2020-029A, 45606) in May 2020,
15 carrying for the first time a new service module at its end that would give it
more room for payloads and experiments; one of them is a satellite, FalconSAT 8,
built by students at the USAF Academy, and was deployed in October 2021.15
OTV-6 released a subsatellite at the end of May 2020, which was cataloged
by the U.S. military as USA 300 (2020-029B, 45610) indicating it was another
separate payload.16 OTV-6 also tested an on-orbit power beaming system,
the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)’s Photovoltaic Radio-frequency
Antenna Module (PRAM), that collected solar power and transformed it into
a microwave beam. This was the first test of such capabilities in space and
could eventually lead to large-scale space-based solar power, but could also
provide offensive DEW counterspace capabilities.17 OTV-6 also carried NASA
01-0 4
payloads that did not separate, including Materials Exposure and Technology 18 Thomas Newdick, “Details About X-37B Payload

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Adapter Revealed After Record-Setting Mission,”
Innovation in Space (METIS-2), which tested candidate radiation shielding The War Zone, November 14, 2022,
materials, printed electronic materials, and thermal control coatings; METIS-1 https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/
details-about-x-37b-payload-adapter-revealed-
had been on OTV-5.18 Russian reports claimed that the X-37B released a small after-record-setting-mission.
object in October 2021, which spent a day keeping about 200 meters away
19 Dmitry Stefanovich, Twitter, December 8, 2021,
from the object, and then moved away from it.19 The U.S. military’s public satellite https://twitter.com/KomissarWhipla/sta-
catalog lists an additional object associated with the launch as USA 299 DEB tus/1468593293235793924?s=20;
Vladimir Kozin, “Cold Star War: The US has
(54246, 2020-029D) but has not provided orbital data for any objects associated Questions for Moscow about Space, Russia has
with OTV-6 before it returned to Earth. even more Questions for the US,” VKP-News,
November 29, 2021, https://vpk-news.ru/
articles/64859.
OTV-6 landed in November 2022 after spending 908 days in orbit, which is
20 Stefano D’Urso and David Cenciotti, “Reflecting
a new record for the X-37B.20 The service module separated from the plane On The X-37B’s Latest Record-Breaking Mission,”
prior to landing and is thought to have burned up in the Earth’s atmosphere The Aviationist, December 24, 2022, https://
theaviationist.com/2022/12/24/reflecting-on-
during reentry; Secretary of Air Force Frank Kendall pointedly stated, “The the-x-37bs-latest-record-breaking-mission/.
deliberate manner in which we conduct on-orbit operations to include the
21 Newdick, ibid.
service module disposal speaks to the United States’ commitment to safe and
responsible space practices, particularly as the issue of growing orbital debris 22 “X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle,” United States Air
Force, September 1, 2018,
threatens to impact global space operations.” 21 https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Dis-
play/Article/104539/x-37b-orbital-test-vehicle/.
01
The mission of the X-37B has long been a source of mystery and speculation. 23 Joseph Trevithick, “Space Force Has A Unit Ded-
While the USAF has acknowledged the existence of the X-37B program and icated To Orbital Warfare That Now Operates
02
The X-37B Spaceplane,” TheDrive.com, Oct.
announced launches and landings, it has been secretive about the mission of 30, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
the X-37B and its location and activities while on orbit. Officially, the USAF has zone/37361/space-force-has-a-unit-dedicated-
03
to-orbital-warfare-that-now-operates-the-x-
stated that the X-37B is a platform for testing new technologies and operational 37b-spaceplane.
concepts.22 However, the secrecy has led to a huge amount of speculation, 04
24 Tyler Rogoway, “This Is Our First Look At The
particularly by Russia and China, that the X-37B is some sort of orbital bomber Secretive X-37B Spaceplane With Its Cargo Bay
or secret weapons testing platform. Complicating things further is that the Doors Open,” TheDrive.com,
05
Sept. 15, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/
USSF’s Space Delta 9 is now responsible for overseeing the X-37B’s operations the-war-zone/36440/this-is-our-first-look-at-
once it is in orbit. Space Delta 9 “conducts protect and defend operations the-secretive-x-37b-spaceplane-with-its-cargo-
06
bay-doors-open.
from space and provides response options to deter and defeat adversary
threats in space.” 23 25 Brian Weeden, “X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle Fact
07
Sheet,” Secure World Foundation, June 1, 2017,
https://swfound.org/media/206982/swf_x-
Analyzing the known facts about the size, shape, and orbit of the X-37B can 37b_otv_fact_sheet.pdf.
08
provide a more useful answer. The spaceplane resembles the now-retired
space shuttle orbiter in overall shape but is much smaller, completely robotic, 09
and as initially designed, has a payload bay that is roughly the size of a pickup
truck bed.24 The ring-shaped service module added for OTV-6 does increase 10
what it can carry. However, it still has a limited ability to host weapons, and its
limited gliding capability and maneuverability makes it not militarily useful as 11
an orbital bomber.25 Based on tracking data from hobbyists, the X-37B normally
orbits between 300 and 400 km and at inclinations between 38 and 54 degrees 12
with a ground track that repeats every few days. This strongly indicates a
likely remote sensing mission, perhaps by flight testing new payloads. While 13
it likely has substantive maneuvering capability, to date, the X-37B has not
approached nor rendezvoused with any other space objects. 14

The secret deployment of multiple small satellites raises additional questions 15

about the mission of the X-37B. It suggests that the X-37B may have a mission
to serve as a covert satellite deployment platform. The secrecy surrounding both
the X-37B and the deployment may indicate they are part of a covert intelligence
program, but it may also indicate the testing of offensive technologies or
capabilities. The failure to even catalog the deployed satellites—something that is
done even for classified U.S. military and intelligence satellites—calls into question
the trustworthiness of the public SSA data provided by the U.S. military.
01-05
 26 Ted Molczan, “Unknown GEO Object Recent GEO RPO Activities
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

2000-653A/90007 Identified as Prowler,”

January 21, 2011, p. 12, http://satobs.org/
The United States has also conducted multiple close approach and proximity
seesat_ref/STS_38/Unknown_GEO_Ob- operations in GEO. The earliest known example is a satellite reportedly called
ject_2000-653A_-_90007_Identified_as_
Prowler.pdf.
Prowler. Based on publicly available data, satellite observer Ted Molczan
concluded that Prowler was secretly launched from a Space Shuttle mission
27 Robert Windrem, “What is America’s Top-Secret
Spy Program? Experts Think Democrats Object-
in 1990, 26 and matched the description given in a 2004 NBC news article
ed to Satellite Weapon,” NBC News, about a classified U.S. government satellite program that had run afoul of
December 9, 2004, http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/6687654/ns/us_news-security/t/what-ameri-
Congress.27 The satellite had reportedly maneuvered close to multiple Russian
cas-top-secret-spy-program/. geosynchronous orbit (GSO) satellites to collect intelligence on their
28 Justin Ray, “Experimental Military Microsatel-
characteristics and capabilities, and utilized stealth technologies to remain
lites Reach Orbit,” Spaceflight Now, undetected by Russian optical space surveillance systems. To this day, the United
June 22, 2006, https://www.space.com/2529-
States has never officially acknowledged the existence of Prowler and lists it
0 4/202 3

experimental-military-microsatellites-reach-
orbit.html. as an extra rocket body from the Shuttle launch in its public satellite catalog.
29 Ryan Caron, “Mysterious Microsatellites in GEO:
is MiTEx a Possible Anti-Satellite Capability While Prowler is thought to have been decommissioned in around 1998,
Demonstration?” TheSpaceReview.com,
July 31, 2006, http://www.thespacereview.com/
it was followed by programs designed for similar missions. In 2006, the USAF
article/670/1. launched two small satellites into GSO, officially designated as Micro-satellite
30 Brian Weeden, “The Ongoing Saga of DSP Flight
Technology Experiment (USA 187, 2006-024A, 29240; USA 188, 2004-024B,
01
23,” TheSpaceReview.com, January 19, 2009, p.1, 29241), with the official mission to identify, integrate, test, and evaluate small
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1290/1.
satellite technologies to support and enhance future U.S. space missions.28
02
31 Marco Langbroek, “A NEMESIS in the Sky: Observers speculated that the MiTEx satellites would be conducting RPO in
PAN, MENTOR 4, and Close Encounters of
the SIGINT Kind,” TheSpaceReview.com,
GSO. 29 In 2009, news reports revealed that they had been used to conduct
03
October 31, 2016, https://www.thespacereview. “flybys” of the U.S. early-warning satellite DSP 23, which had mysteriously
com/article/3095/1.
failed on orbit shortly after launch.30 Observations from hobbyists noted that
04
32 Marco Langbroek, “PAN (NEMESIS 1) is on the the two MiTEx satellites maneuvered from their parking slots in GSO to drift
Move Again,” SatTrackCam Leiden Blog,
September 14, 2021, https://sattrackcam.
towards the location of DSP 23, passing it around December 23, 2009, and
05
blogspot.com/2021/09/pan-nemesis-1-is-on- January 1, 2010.
move-again.html.

06
33 Amy Butler, “USAF Reveals Sats to Offer Un- A classified satellite publicly known only as PAN (USA 207, 2009-047A), was
precedented Space Intel,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, March 3, 2004, http://aviationweek.
launched on September 8, 2009, into GEO orbit, where it was observed
07
com/awin/usaf-reveals-sats-offer-unprecedent- relocating every six months or so, until late 2013; its nine moves over four years
ed-space-intel.
placed it near several other satellites. 31 Then it stayed in a stable position
08
34 “Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness until roughly February 2021, when it appears to have started moving again.32
Program,” USAF Fact Sheet, March 22, 2017,
http://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/
Very little is known about the mission of PAN, although most public observers
09
Article/730802/geosynchronous-space-situa- believe it has a signals intelligence mission and could be conducting similar
tional-awareness-program-gssap/.
activities to the Russian Luch/Olymp-K satellite (See Russian Co-Orbital ASAT,
10
35 “GSSAP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,” Gunter’s Space Page, ac- Chapter 2-1).
cessed March 22, 2018, http://space.skyrocket.
de/doc_sdat/gssap-1.htm; Theresa Hitchens,

11
“Space Force to loft 2 new ‘neighborhood In recent years, the USAF appears to have applied the lessons it learned with
watch’ sats, as leader frets launch funds,”
BreakingDefense, January 21, 2022,
Prowler and MiTEx to an operational program known as the Geosynchronous
12
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/space- Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), which may have the internal
force-to-loft-2-new-neighborhood-watch-sats-
as-leader-frets-launch-funds/.
codename of Hornet. GSSAP uses two pairs of small satellites deployed in
13
near-GEO orbits, with altitudes slightly above and below the GSO belt, which
36 Mariia Kiseleva, “USSF-8 / Atlas V 511,”
EverydayAstronaut, January 13, 2022,
allow them to drift east and west and provide close inspections of objects in
14
https://everydayastronaut.com/ussf-8-at- the GEO region.33 The official USAF fact sheet states that the GSSAP satellites
las-v-511/.
can conduct RPO of “resident space objects of interest.” 34 The first pair of GSSAP
15
37 Colin Clark, “US, China, Russia Test New Space satellites (USA 253, 2014-043A; USA 254, 2014-043B) was launched on July
War Tactics: Sats Buzzing, Spoofing, Spying,”
BreakingDefense, October 28, 2021,
28, 2014, and the second pair (USA 270, 2016-052A; USA 271, 2016-052B) on
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/us- August 19, 2016, both times on a Delta 4 rocket from CCAFS. A third pair, GSSAP-5
china-russia-test-new-space-war-tactics-sats-
buzzing-spoofing-spying/.
and -6, was launched in January 2022.35 Very limited public information is
known about the on-orbit activities of the six GSSAP satellites, as the USAF
does not disclose information on their orbits; they are thought to operate in
pairs, with one satellite staying below the GEO belt, and one operating above
it.36 In a video released by the commercial SSA company COMSPOC, it can be
seen that USA 271 approached China’s SJ-20 satellite in August 2020, getting
within 20 km of it.37 USA 270 did another close approach of Shiyan-12 (01) and
(02), two Chinese satellites in GEO, in January 2022; at their closest approach,
01-0 6
the satellites were 73 km apart.38 The GSSAP satellites are now operated by 38 Andrew Jones, “China’s Shijian-21 towed dead

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
satellite to a high graveyard orbit,”
the 1st Space Operations Squadron of the USSF’s Space Delta 9, which has a SpaceNews.com, January 27, 2022,
mission to conduct orbital warfare.39 https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-
spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-
satellite/.
On September 18, 2015, General John E. Hyten, then Commander of AFSPC,
39 Joseph Trevithick, “Space Force Has A Unit
remarked at a public forum that the two GSSAP satellites had been “pressed Dedicated To Orbital Warfare That Now
into early service” to provide information to an un-named customer.40 According Operates The X-37B Spaceplane,” The War Zone,
Oct. 30, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/
to General Hyten, the two satellites provided what he deemed “eye-watering” the-war-zone/37361/space-force-has-a-unit-
pictures of one or more objects in GSO. dedicated-to-orbital-warfare-that-now-oper-
ates-the-x-37b-spaceplane.

40 Mike Gruss, “Space Surveillance Sats Pressed

FIGURE 1-3 — GSSAP SATELLITES Into Early Service,” Space News, September
18, 2015, http://spacenews.com/space-surveil-
lance-sats-pressed-into-early-service/.

41 “Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness

Program,” USAF Fact Sheets, March 22, 2017,
https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/730802/geosynchro-
nous-space-situational-awareness-program/.

01

02

03

04

05

06
Artist’s depiction. Image credit: U.S. Air Force. 41

07
Although the U.S. military did not initially provide any public data on the
locations or maneuvers of the GSSAP satellites, other sources of tracking data 08
show they are very active in the GEO region. Data collected by the ISON space
surveillance network, managed by the Russian Academy of Sciences, indicates 09
that the GSSAP satellites have conducted hundreds of maneuvers since 2014
and have conducted close approaches or proximity operations of more than 10
a dozen operational satellites in GEO, as summarized in Table 1-1. GSSAP has
done close approaches of several U.S. military satellites, several Russian and 11
Chinese military satellites, and commercial satellites built by China and operated
by other countries. According to Russian sources, some of these close approaches 12
involved the GSSAP satellite making many small phasing maneuvers during
a short period of time or conducting its close approach while both satellites 13
passed through the Earth’s shadow and could not be tracked by ground-based
optical telescopes. These incidents made it very difficult to estimate the current 14
and future position of the GSSAP satellite and the other object, creating
difficulty in determining safe approaches and ascertaining the intent of the 15
approach, which could lead to misperceptions and mistakes. Russian sources
also claim GSSAP made more than 14 one- and two-impulse maneuvers
during their proximity operations of WGS 4 (2012-003A, 38070), a U.S. military
communications satellite, which raised concerns about whether it was testing
co-orbital technologies. The U.S. military began releasing public positional
information for the four GSSAP satellites active at the end of 2019, although
some of the data are weeks or months old.
01-07
 42 Based on data provided by Vladimir Agapov,
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

derived from tracking data collected by the TABLE 1-1 — SATELLITES APPROACHED BY GSSAP 42
ISON Space Surveillance Network.
DATE SATELLITE COUNTRY OF APPROACH
43 Debra Werner, “An In-Orbit Game of Cat and APPROACHED OWNERSHIP DISTANCE

Mouse: Close approaches prompt calls for

Sept. 13, 2016 TJS-1 China 15 km
communications and norms,” Space News, June
16, 2022, https://spacenews.com/an-in-orbit-
Jul. 13, 2017 Express AM-8 Russia 10 km
game-of-cat-and-mouse-close-approaches-
prompt-calls-for-communications-and-norms/.
Sept. 14, 2017 Luch Russia 10 km
44 SpaceNewsInc,“USA 270/Shiyan12 encounter,”
Sept. 21, 2017 Paksat 1R Pakistan 12 km
Youtube, Accessed February 22, 2023, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0ZlgmdjXjw.
Sept. 29, 2017 Nigcomsat 1R Nigeria 11 km
45 Stephen Clark, “Air Force General Reveals New
Oct. 5, 2017 Blagovest (Cosmos 2520) Russia 14 km
Space Surveillance Program,” SpaceFlight Now,
0 4/202 3

February 25, 2014, http://spaceflightnow.com/

Nov. 17, 2017 Raduga-1M 3 Russia 12 km
news/n1402/25gssap/.

May 14, 2018 Raduga-1M 2 Russia 13 km

46 “Fact Sheet: Automated Navigation and
Guidance Experiment for Local Space,” Air
Aug. 23, 2020 SJ-20/Chinasat 6A China 24 km
Force Research Laboratory, current as of
July 2014, accessed March 22, 2018, p.1,
Jan. 2022 SY-12 01, SY-12 02 China 73 km
http://www.kirtland.af.mil/Portals/52/
documents/AFD-131204-039.pd-
f?ver=2016-06-28-105617-297.

01 In late January 2022, one of the four GSSAP satellites, USA 270, maneuvered
47 Arielle Vasquez, “3rd SES Bids Farewell to AN-
GELS Satellite,” 50th Space Wing Public Affairs, to approach a pair of Chinese satellites, SY-12 (01) (2021-129A, 50321) and
November 21, 2017,
02 SY-12 (02) (2021-129B, 50322), that had recently been launched into GEO (see
http://www.patrick.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
Article/1378964/3rd-ses-bids-farewell-to-an- Chinese Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 3.1). According to tracking data collected by
gels-satellite/.
03 ExoAnalytic Solutions, SY-12 01 and SY-12 02 made significant maneuvers to
48 Stephen Clark, “Multi-satellite payload hoisted split up and begin rotating around the GEO belt in opposite directions, with
into high altitude orbit by Atlas 5 rocket,” Space-
04 SY-12 02 apparently also getting an imaging opportunity on USA 270.43 A video
flightnow.com, April 15, 2018,
https://spaceflightnow.com/2018/04/15/multi- animation released by COMSPOC Corporation also shows the encounter.44
satellite-stack-hoisted-into-high-altitude-orbit-
05
by-atlas-5-rocket/.
The USAF also announced that the launch of the first two GSSAP satellites
49 Air Force Research Laboratory, “ESPA Augment-
06 included a satellite from another RPO program, the Automated Navigation
ed Geosynchronous Laboratory Experiment
(EAGLE)”, ABW Public Affairs fact sheet, and Guidance Experiment for Local Space (ANGELS) Program.45 The goal of
April 2018, https://www.kirtland.af.mil/Por-
07 ANGELS was to provide a clearer picture of the local area around important
tals/52/documents/EAGLE-factsheet.pdf.
U.S. national security satellites in GSO. The first ANGELS satellite (USA 255,
08 2014-043C, 40101) stayed attached to the Delta 4 upper stage (2014-043D,
40102) while it placed the first GSSAP pair into GSO and conducted a disposal
09 maneuver to place it a few hundred km above GSO. At that point, ANGELS
detached from the upper stage and conducted a series of RPO maneuvers to
10 close within a few kilometers.46 Russian tracking sources indicate that during
one close approach conducted on June 9, 2016, the Delta upper stage altered
11 its orbit, suggesting it might not have been entirely inert. The USAF originally
did not disclose orbital information for either ANGELS or the Delta 4 upper
12 stage but began to do so in February 2020. ANGELS was decommissioned in
November 2017.47
13
On April 14, 2018, the United States conducted another military launch that
14 placed multiple small satellites in GEO, including at least one that has conducted
rendezvous and proximity operations.48 The primary payload on the launch
15 was the USAF’s Continuous Broadcast Augmenting SATCOM (CBAS) military
communications relay satellite, cataloged at USA 283 (2018-036A, 43339). The
launch also included the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary
Payload Adapter (ESPA) Augmented Geosynchronous Laboratory Experiment
satellite, known by the triple-nested acronym EAGLE but officially cataloged as
USA 284 (2018-036B, 43340). The ESPA ring is commonly used for deploying
small satellites as secondary payloads, and the EAGLE concept converts the
ESPA ring from part of the launch vehicle into an independent maneuverable
satellite, allowing for more flexible deployment of multiple small satellites.49

On this first launch, the EAGLE separated from the upper stage in the GEO
01-0 8
region and subsequently deployed at least three small satellites. One of these 50 88 th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, “Successful

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
launch for AFRL Eagle spacecraft experiment
small satellites, Mycroft (USA 287, 2018-036G, 43465), separated from EAGLE on AFSPC-11 mission,” Schriever Air Force Base,
in early May 2018 and conducted a series of close approaches to EAGLE. The April 18, 2018, https://www.schriever.af.mil/
News/Article-Display/Article/1496633/success-
name Mycroft refers to the older and smarter brother of the fictional detective ful-launch-for-afrl-eagle-spacecraft-experi-
Sherlock Holmes, and the USAF describes it as demonstrating “improved space ment-on-afspc-11-mission/.

situational awareness for space vehicles.” 50 The U.S. military has not provided 51 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog
any information on the other two payloads. In January 2020, the U.S. military maintained by the U.S. military at https://space-
track.org.
began providing public orbital information for CBAS, the Centaur upper stage,
and the other two unnamed payloads, but not EAGLE or Mycroft.51 52 Rachel Cohen, “AFRL Dispatching Satellite to
Examine Unresponsive Smallsat,” Air Force
Magazine, October 18, 2019, https://www.
In October 2019, the USAF announced that Mycroft was being sent to inspect airforcemag.com/AFRL-Dispatching-Satel-
lite-to-Examine-Unresponsive-Smallsat/.
another U.S. satellite in the GEO region, S5 (2019-009D, 44065).52 S5 was an
experimental satellite launched into GEO on February 22, 2019, to test out 53 Ibid.

new space situational awareness concepts, but stopped communicating 54 Scott Tilley, Tweet, December 21, 2019,
with ground controllers in March 2019.53 The USAF stated that Mycroft would https://twitter.com/coastal8049/sta-
tus/1208475681790627841?s=20.
conduct a series of RPO maneuvers with S5 over a period of weeks to try
and determine the status of the latter’s solar arrays and antennas. Amateur
observers noted that Mycroft was communicating using a largely “suppressed”
carrier signal, making it more difficult to detect.54 01

02
TABLE 1-2 — RECENT U.S. RPOs
DATE(S) SYSTEM(S) ORBITAL NOTES 03
PARAMETERS

Jan. 2003  XSS-10, 800 x 800 km; XSS-10 did a series of maneuvers to bring it within 50
04
Delta R/B 39.6° meters of the Delta upper stage that placed it in orbit.

Apr. 2005 – XSS-11, LEO XSS-11 did a series of maneuvers to bring it close to
05
Oct. 2006 multiple objects the Minotaur upper stage that placed it in orbit. It
then performed additional close approaches to other
U.S. space objects in nearby LEO orbits over the next
06
12-18 months.

Apr. 2005 DART, LEO DART did a series of autonomous maneuvers to bring
07
MUBLCOM it close to the MUBLCOM satellite and ended up
bumping into it.

08
Mar. – Jul. ASTRO, LEO ASTRO and NEXTSat were launched together and
2007 NEXTSat  performed a series of separations, close approaches,
and dockings with each other.
09
Dec. 23, DSP-23, MiTEx GEO Inspection and close rendezvous with a failed U.S.
2008 and (USA 187, USA satellite. Possibly other demonstrations and tests in
10
Jan. 1, 2009 188) geosynchronous orbit.

2009 – Yahsat 1B, GEO Part of NROs Nemesis satellites (geostationary

11
2013 others COMINT).Presumed to have completed SIGNIT (signals
unknown, PAN intelligence) with other satellites. Unique for roaming
(USA-207) various times to different orbits and satellites.
12
Jul. 2014 – GSSAP, GEO Two pairs of GSSAP satellites have been performing
present multiple objects RPO with various other objects in the GEO region.
13
Jul. 2014 – ANGELS, GSO ANGELS separated from the Delta 4 upper stage that
Nov. 2017 Delta 4 R/B placed the first GSSAP pair into orbit and then performed
14
a series of RPO in the GSO disposal region.

May 2018 Mycroft, GEO EAGLE separated from the Delta V upper stage, and
15
EAGLE Mycroft subsequently separated from EAGLE. Mycroft
conducted RPO of EAGLE in the GEO region.

Oct. 2019 Mycroft, S5 GEO Mycroft maneuvered to rendezvous with S5 after

the latter ceased communications.

Aug. 2020 SJ-20, USA 271 GEO In August 2020, USA 271 approached China’s SJ-20,
shadowing the spacecraft. The Chinese spacecraft
detected the U.S. satellite and rapidly moved away.

Jan. 2022 Shiyan-12(01) GEO In January 2022, USA 270 approached China’s
and Shiyan-12(01) and (02) satellites in GEO. As USA 270
Shiyan-12(02), approached, the Shiyan-12 satellites maneuvered away
USA 270 to drift orbits. The closest approach was around 73
kilometers.
01-0 9
 55 Andreas Parsch, “WS-199,” Directory of U.S. Potential Military Utility /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Military Rockets and Missiles, Updated

November 1, 2005, http://www.designa-
The most likely military utility of the capabilities demonstrated by the DART,
tion-systems.net/dusrm/app4/ws-199.html. XSS-10, XSS-11, Orbital Express, Prowler, MiTEx, GSSAP, ANGELS, and Mycroft
satellites is for on-orbit SSA and close-up inspections. What little is known
of their operational pattern is consistent with relatively slow and methodical
approaches to rendezvous with other space objects in similar orbits. The
satellites they are known to have approached were in similar orbits and, based
on the publicly available data, they did not make huge changes to rendezvous
with satellites in significantly different orbits. This behavior is similar to several
international RPO missions to test and demonstrate satellite inspection and
servicing capabilities, in particular the Chinese SJ-12, SJ-15, SJ-17, and TJS-3
satellites (see Chinese Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1.1) and the Russian Cosmos
0 4/202 3

2499, Luch, and Cosmos 2521 satellites (see Russian Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 2.1).

The Delta 180 mission did include explicit testing of offensive capabilities,
particularly the ability to physically collide with another satellite to damage
or destroy it. However, the deliberate maneuvering to create a conjunction
with the target satellite would be detectable with existing processes already
01
in place to detect accidental close approaches. Warning time of such a close
approach would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO), unless
02
the attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit.

03
1.2 — U.S. DIRECT-ASCENT ASAT
04
Assessment /
05
While the United States does not have an operational, acknowledged DA-ASAT
capability, it does have operational midcourse missile defense interceptors that
06
have been demonstrated in an ASAT role against a low LEO satellite. The United
States has developed dedicated DA-ASATs in the past, both conventional and
07
nuclear-tipped, and likely possesses the ability to do so in the near future
should it choose so.
08
Specifics /
09
During the Cold War, the U.S. military had multiple efforts to develop DA-ASAT
capabilities. Some of those efforts remained on the drawing board and several
10
were tested in space, but none reached operational status.

11
Bold Orion and High Virgo
U.S. DA-ASAT capabilities began as final tests of already existing anti-ballistic
12
missile (ABM) weapons. Because midcourse missile defense systems are
intended to destroy nuclear warheads that travel through outer space at
13
speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such midcourse ABM
systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In the late 1950s and early 60s,
14
the United States tested many air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM) as part of
efforts to defend against Soviet ICBMs. At the end of the testing period, the
15
final ALBM tests of the Bold Orion and High Virgo were used to validate the
feasibility of destroying a satellite with ballistic missile technology.55 These
tests led to the development of the first DA-ASAT program built from the Nike
Zeus anti-ballistic missile.

NOTSNIK, HiHo, and Satellite Interceptor Program (SIP)

During the 1960s, the U.S. Navy was also researching possible ASAT capabilities.
Early efforts focused on matching a Navy Sparrow anti-aircraft missile with a
Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) but these efforts did not
proceed beyond ground experiments. In 1958, the Navy started working on
a program (known as Project Pilot or, more commonly, NOTSNIK) that would
0 1-10
give the United States an air-launched SLV capability; after 10 launch failures, 56 Gunter D. Krebs, “Pilot (NOTS-EV-1, NOTSNIK),”

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Gunter’s Space Page; accessed February 21,
NOTSNIK was halted, with efforts focusing on an improved launch vehicle, the 2022, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/
Caleb rocket, also known as NOTS-EV-2.56 In 1962, the Navy began work on nots1.htm.

Project HiHo, which involved a Caleb rocket fired from a Phantom 4D fighter 57 John Pike, “HiHo / Hi-Hoe / NOTS-EV-2 Caleb,”
bomber aircraft.57 Although the primary focus was on developing an air- GlobalSecurity.org, accessed February 24, 2021,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/sys-
launched SLV, a secondary objective was to develop ASAT capabilities. Three tems/hiho.htm.
test launches in space were conducted from 1961 to 1962; the first two failed
58 Gunter D. Krebs, “Caleb (NOTS-EV- 2),” Gunter’s
but the third reached an apogee of 1,600 km. In the end, the Navy decided Space Page, accessed February 20, 2022,
not to pursue an operational version.58 Subsequently, the Navy investigated https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/caleb.htm.

using the NOTS-EV-2 launch vehicle but adapted for ground-launch as part of 59 Jeff Scott, “NOTSNIK, Project Pilot & Project
a program known as the Satellite Interceptor Program (SIP). There were two Caleb,” April 23, 2006, http://www.aerospace-
web.org/question/spacecraft/q0271.shtml.
launches (held in October 1961 and May 1962) that apparently were successful Accessed February 20, 2022.
tests, but little else is known about them.59

FIGURE 1-4 — SATELLITE INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM GROUND TEST

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

Image credit: Aerospaceweb.org

0 1-11
 60 Paul Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Nike Zeus
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Policy, 1945-1984, Cornell University Press,

August 1, 1985, p. 117.
The Nike Zeus ASAT Program was developed out of anti-ballistic missile testing
of the U.S. Army’s Nike Zeus system and later came to be known as Program
61 Brian Weeden, “Through a Glass, Darkly
Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-satellite
505. Beginning in 1957, the U.S. Army argued that its Nike Zeus ABM system
Testing in Space,” TheSpaceReview, March 17, could have an ASAT capability added to it to help defend against ICBMs and
2014, https://swfound.org/media/167224/
through_a_glass_darkly_march2014.pdf.
space threats.60 In 1962, the proposal was approved and Project Mudflap, later
named Nike Zeus, began development. Nike Zeus consisted of a modified three-
62 Curtis Peebles, “High Frontier: The U.S.
Air Force and the Military Space Program,”
stage solid fuel Nike rocket tipped with a one-megaton nuclear warhead. It was
Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997, believed that detonating the warhead in close proximity to a target satellite
https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/cMg-
dYypcPc8C?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PP1.
would disable it, either through the resultant fireball or an EMP. In May 1963,
a modified Zeus B missile successfully intercepted an Agena D rocket stage in
63 Paul Stares, “The Militarization of Space:
orbit, marking a key success of the program’s new capability and extension to
0 4/202 3

U.S. Policy, 1945-1984,” Cornell University

Press, August 1, 1985, https://www.google. Kwajalein Atoll.61 Testing continued throughout the early 1960s but eventually
com/books/edition/The_Militarization_of_
Space/2asgAAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0.
gave way to Program 437, which demonstrated greater performance and would
extend through the remainder of the decade.
64 Mark Wade, “Program 437,” Astronautix.com,
http://www.astronautix.com/p/program437.
html, accessed Feburary 19, 2021. Program 437
65 McGeorge Bundy, “Assignment of the Highest
Similar to Nike Zeus/Program 505, Program 437 was developed from ABM
01
National Priority to Program 437,” The White technology but replaced the Nike Zeus with a Thor missile allowing for longer
House, National Security Action Memorandum
No. 258, August 6, 1963, https://fas.org/irp/
range capabilities.62 Program 437 could target satellites orbiting as high
02
offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam258.jpg. as 1,300 kilometers and used a 1.4 megaton W49 nuclear warhead with a
66 Parsch, “Vought ASM-135 ASAT,” Directory
likely kill radius of 8 kilometers.63 The missiles and warheads were stored at
03
of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, updated Vandenberg AFB in California, while the Thors were operated out of Johnston
December 29, 2004, http://www.designa-
tion-systems.net/dusrm/m-135.html.
Atoll, so they required a two-week notification to get the missiles and warheads
04
to their launch vehicle.64 On August 6, 1963, President Kennedy directed that
67 Andreas Parsch, “Vought ASM-135 ASAT,”
Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles,
Program 437 be given the highest national priority category for further research
05
updated December 29, 2004, http://www.desig- and development.65 It was tested multiple times against rocket bodies and
nation-systems.net/dusrm/m-135.html.
other space debris to assure the missile could pass within the kill radius
06
68 Ibid. without destroying the object and creating unnecessary debris. It remained
69 The four other tests include: a successful mis-
operational on Johnston Atoll until the early 1970s and was formally terminated
07
sile test without the MHV on January 21, 1984; in 1975.66
a failed missile test directing MHV at a star on
November 13, 1984; and two successful flight

08
tests directing MHV at a star on August 22, ASM-135 Air-Launched DA-ASAT
1986 and September 29, 1986. Gregory Karam-
belas and Sven Grahn, “The F-15 ASAT Story,”
ASM-135 was an air-launched missile developed in response to the Soviet
09
http://www.svengrahn.pp.se/histind/ASAT/ Union’s successful demonstration of a co-orbital ASAT capability and intended
F15ASAT.html; Raymond Puffer, “The Death of
a Satellite,” Air Force Flight Test Center History
to fulfill the DA-ASAT role without requiring the use of nuclear weapons.67
10
Office, archived from web in 2003, https://web. The missile, produced in 1984, was designed to be launched from a modified
archive.org/web/20031218130538/http://www.
edwards.af.mil/moments/docs_html/85-09-13.
F-15A in a supersonic zoom climb and intercept targets in LEO.68 Five flight tests
11
html. occurred,69 the most famous of which was an intercept test on September 13,
70 “Vought ASM-135A Anti-Satellite Missile,”
1985, in which the Solwind P78-1 satellite (1979-017A, 11278) was destroyed
12
National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, at an altitude of 555 km, marking the only time that a U.S. missile destroyed
March 14, 2016, http://www.nationalmuseum.
af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Dis-
a satellite prior to 2008.70
play/Article/198034/asm-135-asat/.
13

14

15
0 1-1 2
 71 Soviet Satellite Defense Against the US Miniature

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
FIGURE 1-5 — ASM-135 FLIGHT PROFILE 71 Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon (U): An Intelligence
Assessment, Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research, Central Intelligence Agency, SW83-
10062, September 1983, https://www.archives.
gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-151-
doc01-03.pdf.

72 Parsch, “Vought ASM-135 ASAT.”

73 “ASAT Overview,” Vought Heritage Website,

archived from web in 2007, https://web.archive.
org/web/20070131173354/http://www.vought.
com/heritage/products/html/asat.html;
“Altair 3,” Encyclopedia Astronautica, archived
from web in 2008, https://web.archive.org/
web/20080202163409/http://www.astronautix.
com/stages/altair3.htm.

74 Soviet Satellite Defense Against the US Miniature

Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon (U): An Intelligence
Assessment, Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research, Central Intelligence Agency, SW83-
10062, September 1983,
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/
iscap/pdf/2012-151-doc01-03.pdf.

75 Parsch, “Vought ASM-135 ASAT.”

01

Credit: U.S. Department of Defense.

02

The ASM-135 had an estimated operational range of 648 km, flight ceiling 03
of 563 km, and speed of over 24,000 km/h.72 The missile incorporated an
infrared homing seeker guidance system, and three rocket stages: a modified 04
Boeing AGM-69 SRAM with a Lockheed LPC-415 solid-propellant two-pulse rocket
engine, an LTV Aerospace Altair 3 using a Thiokol FW-4S solid-propellant rocket 05
engine and equipped with hydrazine-fueled thrusters for finer maneuvering to
target, and an LTV-produced interceptor named the Miniature Homing Vehicle 06
(MHV) equipped with 63 small rocket motors for fine trajectory adjustments
and attitude control.73 A CIA document from 1983 about the system (calling it 07
then the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle program, or ALMV) noted how various
Soviet satellite systems would fare against the system; included in thegroup 08
was the crewed Salyut Soviet space station.74 This was likely due to some of the
Salyuts actually being secret Soviet Almaz military space stations (see Russian 09
Co-orbital ASAT, Section 2.2).
10
The USAF had planned to deploy an operational force of 112 ASM-135 missiles,
to be deployed aboard 20 modified F-15s.75 Fifteen ASM-135 missiles were 11
ultimately produced, five of which were used in flight tests, and a number of
airframes were modified to support its use. In 1988, due to a mix of budgetary, 12
technical, and political concerns, the Reagan administration mothballed the
program, though the expertise and technical capability likely remain intact. 13

14

15
0 1-1 3
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

TABLE 1-3 — HISTORY OF U.S. DA-ASAT TESTING

DATE ASAT SYSTEM SITE TARGET APOGEE NOTES

Sept. 22, 1959 High Virgo Unknown None 12 km Unknown results due
(TX-20) to loss of telemetry

Oct. 13, 1959 Bold Orion Unknown Explorer VI 200 km Success (passed within
kill radius)

Oct. 1, 1961 SIP (NOTS-EV-2) San Nicolas None Unknown Successful rocket test
Island

Oct. 5, 1961 HiHo (NOTS-EV-1) F4D-I None Unknown Rocket failure

Mar. 26, 1962 HiHo (NOTS-EV-1) F4D-I None Unknown Rocket failure
0 4/202 3

May 5, 1962 SIP (NOTS-EV-2) F4-C None Unknown Successful rocket test

Aug. 26, 1962 HiHo (NOTS-EV-1) F4-C None 1,600 km Successful rocket test

Dec. 17, 1962 Program 505 WSMR None 160 km Success (reached
(Nike Zeus) designated point in
space)

Feb. 15, 1963 Program 505 Kwajalein None 241 km Successful intercept of
(Nike Zeus) designated point in
01 space

Mar. 21, 1963 Program 505 Kwajalein None – Unsuccessful attempt

02 (Nike Zeus) to intercept simulated
satellite target

03 Apr. 19, 1963 Program 505 Kwajalein None – Unsuccessful attempt

(Nike Zeus) to intercept simulated
satellite target
04
May 24, 1963 Program 505 Kwajalein Agena D Unknown Successful close
(Nike Zeus) intercept
05
Jan. 4, 1964 Program 505 Kwajalein None 146 km Successful intercept
(Nike Zeus) of a simulated satellite
06 target

Feb. 14, 1964 Program 437 Johnston Transit 2A 1000 km Success (passed within
07 (Thor) Atoll Rocket Body kill radius)

Mar. 1, 1964 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 674 km Success (primary missile
08 (Thor) Atoll scrubbed, backup
missile passed within
kill radius)
09
Apr. 21, 1964 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 778 km Success (passed within
(Thor) Atoll kill radius)
10
May 28, 1964 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 932 km Failed (missed intercept
(Thor) Atoll point)
11
Nov. 16, 1964 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 1,148 km Successful Combat
(Thor) Atoll Test Launch (passed
12 within kill radius)

Mar. 1965 Program 505 Kwajalein None – –

13 (Nike Zeus)

Apr. 5, 1965 Program 437 Johnston Transit 2A 826 km Successful Combat

14 (Thor) Atoll Rocket Body Test Launch (passed
within kill radius)

15
June-July Program 505 Kwajalein None Unknown Four test intercepts,
1965 (Nike Zeus) of which three were
successful

Jan. 13, 1966 Program 505 Kwajalein None Unknown Successful intercept
(Nike Zeus) with simulated target

Mar. 30, 1967 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 484 km Successful Combat
(Thor) Atoll piece of Evaluation Launch
space debris (passed within kill
radius)

May 15, 1968 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 823 km Successful Combat
(Thor) Atoll Evaluation Launch
(passed within kill
radius)
0 1-14
 76 “Navy Missile Hits Dying Spy Satellite,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
TABLE 1-3 — HISTORY OF U.S. DA-ASAT TESTING (CONT.) Says Pentagon,” CNN, February 21, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/space/02/
DATE ASAT SYSTEM SITE TARGET APOGEE NOTES 20/satellite.shootdown/.

Nov. 21, 1968 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 1,158 km Successful Combat 77 “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense,” Missile
(Thor) Atoll Evaluation Launch Defense Advocacy Alliance, December 1, 2017,
(passed within kill http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/mis-
radius) sile-defense-systems-2/missile-defense-sys-
tems/u-s-deployed-intercept-systems/ground-
Mar. 28, 1970 Program 437 Johnston Unknown 1,074 km Success (passed within based-midcourse-defense/.
(Thor) Atoll satellite kill radius)
78 Jen Judson, “Where are the laser-armed drones?
Jan. 21, 1984 ASM-135 Aircraft None 1,000 km ASM-135 missile fired Missile Defense Review wish list missing from
from F-15 fighter, MDA’s budget,” Defense News, March 12, 2019,
successful missile test https://www.defensenews.com/smr/feder-
al-budget/2019/03/13/missile-defense-review-
Nov. 13, 1984 ASM-135 Aircraft Star 1,000 km Failed test ambitions-not-reflected-in-mdas-94b-fy20-
budget/.
Sept. 13, 1985 ASM-135 Aircraft Solwind 555 km Successful test, debris
created 79 Laura Grego, George N. Lewis, David Wright,
“Shielded from Oversight: The Disastrous
Aug. 22, 1986 ASM-135 Aircraft Star 1,000 km Successful test US Approach to Strategic Missile Defense;
in tracking Appendix 6: The Ground-Based Interceptor and
Kill Vehicle,” Union of Concerned Scientists, July
Sept. 5, 1986 Delta 180 AFETR Delta 2/B 326 km? Sucessful intercept 2016: p. 1, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/de-
Payload Adapter of thrusting object in fault/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Over-
System 220-km circular orbit, sight-appendix-6.pdf.
debris created. 01

Sept. 29, ASM-135 Aircraft Star 1,000 km Successful test

1986 in tracking 02

Feb. 20, 2008 SM-3 USS Lake USA 193 2,700 km Successful test
Erie 03

04
Midcourse Missile Defense Systems as Anti-Satellite Weapons
Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range 05
ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to
those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. 06
In many ways, attacking satellites is an easier task than defending against
ballistic missiles. Satellites travel in repeated, predictable orbits, and observations 07
of the satellite can be used to predict its future position. While the launch of
a ballistic missile may occur with little or no advanced notice, an anti-satellite 08
attack could be planned in advance to be under the most convenient conditions,
and the attacker may be able to try multiple times if the first try fails. 09

The United States currently has two operational midcourse missile defense 10
systems that have latent DA-ASAT capabilities: the ground-based interceptors
(GBIs), part of the Ground-based Midcourse System (GMD), and the ship- 11
based Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors, part of the Aegis system. Of the
two, only the SM-3 has been demonstrated in a DA-ASAT role. In 2008, the 12
U.S. Operation Burnt Frost used an SM-3 Block IA interceptor fired from an
Aegis Cruiser to destroy an ailing U.S. reconnaissance satellite at an altitude 13
of 240 km.76 Three SM-3 missiles had a “one-time software modification” to
enable them to intercept the satellites, but it is impossible for an adversary 14
to verify whether any additional SM-3 interceptors have been modified for
ASAT capability. 15

The GBIs have the most potential capability in a DA-ASAT role. Forty-four GBIs
are currently deployed at bases in Fort Greely, Alaska (see Imagery Appendix,
pg. 15-01), and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,77 with plans underway to
deploy an additional 20 interceptors.78 The planned burnout speed of the GBIs
is reported to be 7 to 8 km/s.79 A missile with this burnout speed could lift the
exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to a height of roughly 6,000 km. This puts it
in reach of all satellites in LEO, and possibly some satellites in highly elliptical
orbits with perigees that dip down into these altitudes. The GBI could not
reach satellites in much higher MEO or GEO.
0 1-1 5
 80 Laura Grego, “The Anti-Satellite Capability of The EKV will be guided toward the predicted position of the satellite by ground-
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense

System,” Federation of American Scientists,
based radar data. From there, the sensors on the EKV use light in two infrared
Winter 2011, p. 3, https://fas.org/pubs/ bands, designed to detect light emitted by room-temperature ICBM-launched
pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf.
warheads or sunlight reflected off them in their journey through the vacuum
81 Ibid. of space. Their ability to home in on any given satellite depends on the satellite’s
82 Sam LaGrone, “Aegis Ashore Site in Romania
particular properties, including its operating temperature, its surface properties,
Declared Operational,” USNI News, and whether it is in sunlight. Note that while low-Earth orbiting satellites may
May 12, 2016, https://news.usniorg/2016/05/
12/aegis-ashore-site-in-romania-declared-
enter and exit the Earth’s shadow repeatedly during a day, an attacker has the
operational. advantage of being able to choose the most advantageous time to attack.
83 Andrew Eversden, “Missile defense chief
‘confident’ Poland’s Aegis Ashore ready in The current SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors are less capable as DA-ASATs
2023,” BreakingDefense, Aug. 12, 2022, https://
than the current GBIs - they can only reach the relatively few satellites in orbits
0 4/202 3

breakingdefense.com/2022/08/missile-de-
fense-chief-confident-polands-aegis-ashore- with perigees at or below 600 km altitude.80 However, the SM-3 Block IIA
ready-in-2023/.
interceptors, currently under joint development with Japan, are intended to
84 Michael Unbehauen & Christian Decker, “Japan defend larger areas against more capable threats; even using a conservative
Cancels Aegis Ashore: Reasons, Consequences,
and International Implications,” Journal of
estimate of the burnout speed for such a missile (4.5 km/s), it would be able
Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press, to reach the vast majority of LEO satellites as shown in Table 1-4. Interceptors
September 25, 2020, https://www.airuniversity.
af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2361398/japan-can-
with burnout speeds at the high range of estimates for the SM-3 IIA (5.5 km/s)
01
cels-aegis-ashore-reasons-consequenc- would be able to reach any satellite in LEO.
es-and-international-implications/.

85 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile

02
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, Congressional Research Service
TABLE 1-4 — MAXMIMUM ALTITUDE REACHABLE BY SM-3 VARIANTS 81
report RL33745, updated December 23, 2020,
03 SM-3 VARIANT BURNOUT VELOCITY (KM/S) MAXIMUM REACHABLE ALTITUDE (KM)
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.
pdf, p.5. Block IA 3.0 600
04
86 S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, “China’s Block IIA (lower range) 4.5 1,450
Constellation of Yaogan Satellites and the
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: October 2015 Up-
05 Block IIB (upper range) 5.5 2,350
date,” National Institute of Advanced Studies,
October 2015, p. 10, http://isssp.in/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/Chinese-Yaogan-Satellite-
06
Constellation-and-ASBM-Oct-2015-Update.pdf.
The SM-3 interceptors are meant to be flexible and address emerging ballistic
07
87 Robert L. Smith, “Final Report of the Ad Hoc missile threats from the Middle East and East Asia over the coming decade.
NSC Space Panel—Part II: U.S. Anti-Satellite
Capabilities,” National Security Council,
They exist not only on U.S. Navy ships that can be redeployed around the
08
November 3, 1976: p. 1. world but also are intended to be deployed at land-based “Aegis Ashore” sites.
The initial land-based Aegis Ashore site in Romania is in operation.82 A second
09
site in Poland is close to finishing construction and is planned to become
operational later in 2023.83 At one point, Japan was planning on joining the Aegis
10
Ashore program, but canceled construction in June 2020.84 The number of
ballistic missile defense (BMD)-capable Aegis ships is expected to go from 48
11
(end of FY2021) to 65 (end of FY2025) 85 and any of their hundreds of interceptors
could be ASAT-capable.
12
Potential Military Utility /
13
The SM-3 and GBI interceptors represent a potentially large and flexible
DA-ASAT capability that could be used against adversary military satellites in
14
LEO in a future conflict. Of particular interest is China’s rapid development of
space-based reconnaissance capabilities to target anti-ship ballistic missiles
15
against U.S. ships.86 These Chinese satellites pose a similar threat to one
posed by Soviet satellites during the Cold War, against which the United States
decided to develop a DA-ASAT capability.87

As the United States continues to build out its Aegis, GMD, and Aegis Ashore
missile defense architecture, it could theoretically hold at risk a significant
portion of either China’s or Russia’s low earth orbiting satellites, particularly if
the number of Block II interceptors is increased or it is considered in concert
with GMD. The Aegis ships could be positioned optimally to stage a “sweep”
0 1-16
attack on a set of satellites nearly at once, rather than a sequential set of 88 United States Department of Defense, “DOD

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,”
attacks as satellites moved into the range of fixed interceptor sites. This Defense Technical Information Center, Febru-
positioning flexibility also means that the SM-3 missiles would not have to ary 2018, p. 78, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
expend much of their thrust going cross-range and could retain the ability
to reach the highest LEO satellites. The more powerful GMD interceptors 89 Ibid, p. 76.

also could use some of their fuel to reach out laterally over thousands of
kilometers, allowing them to hit satellites in orbits that do not pass directly
over the GMD missile fields in Alaska, and California.

1.3 — U.S. ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Assessment /
The United States has an operational EW counterspace system, the Counter
Communications System (CCS), which can be deployed globally to provide
uplink jamming capability against geostationary communications satellites.
It is working on Meadowlands, an updated version of the CCS system.

Through its Navigation Warfare program, the United States has the capability 01
to jam and interfere with the civil signals of global navigation satellite services
(GNSS) within a local area of operation to prevent their effective use by 02
adversaries and has demonstrated doing so in several military exercises.
The United States likely could jam military GNSS signals as well, although the 03
effectiveness is difficult to assess based on publicly available information. The
effectiveness of U.S. measures to counter adversarial jamming and spoofing 04
operations against military GPS signals is not known.
05
Specifics /
The following paragraphs provide a general overview of different types of EW 06
capabilities as related to counterspace applications that are relevant to all the
country-specific EW sections in this report. 07

Electronic warfare is defined as “military action involving the use of 08

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum
or to attack the enemy.” 88 In the context of this report, the scope of EW is 09
narrowed to refer specifically to intentional interference with an adversary’s
radiofrequency (RF) transmissions to or from a satellite. This intentional 10
interference is often referred to as “jamming.” 89
11
In the case of satellite signals, jamming is often characterized as being either
uplink or downlink, as shown in Figure 1-6. Uplink, or orbital, jamming occurs 12
when an interference signal targets the satellite directly. Most communication
satellites serve as a relay node that rebroadcast signals directed at it, or 13
uplinked, from the ground. The uplink interference signal can originate anywhere
within the satellite receive antenna beam and overwhelms the intended 14
signal such that the signal retransmitted by the satellite and received by the
users on the ground consists of indecipherable noise. The impact may be 15
widespread since all users within the satellite’s service area (known as the
footprint) are affected. Downlink, or terrestrial, jamming targets the ground
user of satellite services, by broadcasting an RF signal that overwhelms the
intended satellite signal for users in a specific area. In downlink jamming, the
satellite itself suffers no interference, nor would users outside the range of
the jammer.
0 1-17
 90 Pierluigi Paganini,”Hacking Satellites: Look Up
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

To the Sky,” Infosec Institute, September 18, FIGURE 1-6 — UPLINK VS. DOWNLINK JAMMING 90
2013, https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/
hacking-satellite-look-up-to-the-sky/#gref.

91 “RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet (R-2

Exhibit), PE Number: 0604421F, PE Title:
Counterspace Systems,” Air Force, Febru-
ary 2003, p. 883, https://www.saffm.hq.af.
mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/RDTE_/
FY21%20Space%20Force%20Research%20
Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation.
pdf?ver=2020-02-11-083608-887.
0 4/202 3

Image credit: Infosec Institute.

A second type of EW attack is known as spoofing, which is altering the content

of a signal or broadcasting a false signal in order to confuse or manipulate the
end user. For example, an attacker might broadcast the same signal as a real
01 one but at higher power in an attempt to get end users to use the spoofed
signal instead of the real one, thereby allowing the attacker to use that spoofed
02 signal to send their own information. In some cases, it is possible for an attacker
to intercept and manipulate the real signal, enabling them to inject or alter the
03 information that it carries.

04 Modern militaries regard EW capabilities and vulnerabilities as highly sensitive

information and hence little public information is generally available. Development
05 and testing of equipment and techniques can be conducted within secure
defense facilities, leaving little or no external evidence of the activities.
06
The three principal areas of concern for counterspace are the jamming or
07 spoofing of:

08 1. GNSS signals,
2. Satellite communications, and
09 3. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging.

10 The following sections indicate U.S.-specific developments of these capabilities.

11 Counter Communications System (CCS)

The Counter Communications System (CCS) program was initiated in 2003
12 as part of a broader counterspace capability development program. Very little
information is publicly available on the CCS system or its capabilities, apart
13 from budget documents and occasional press items. A February 2003 budget
planning document describes the CCS mission.91
14
This effort supports concept exploration and follow-on system development of
15 a mobile/transportable counter satellite communications system and associated
command and control. It includes system hardware design and development,
software design and integration, and testing and procurement of a capability to
provide jamming of satellite communications signals in response to USSTRATCOM
requirements.

The lack of public information is not surprising since the CCS is an electronic
warfare (EW) system for jamming communication satellites. All EW capabilities
are considered to be very sensitive and are conducted exclusively in the
classified domain.
0 1-1 8
Successive annual budget planning documents have continued to provide a 92 Air Force, Justification Book Volume 1,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Procurement, Space ForceRDT&E Budget Item
generic description of the CCS. In the most recently available document (April Justification: FY 2023, “CTRSPC / Counterspace
2021), the description has evolved somewhat, offering more insight into the Systems,” 1 Space Force, Program Element:
PE 1206421F / Counterspace Systems, project
role of the CCS. It states that the “program provides expeditionary, deployable, 65A001 / Counter Satellite Communications
reversible offensive space control (OSC) effects applicable across the full System, April 2021, p. 1 of 7, https://www.
saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/
spectrum of conflict. It prevents adversary satellite communications (SATCOM) FY23/PROCUREMENT_/FY23%20Space%20
in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) including Command and Control (C2), Early Force%20Procurement.pdf?ver=vMyfar1x-
W31ifPHFc-mz6A%3d%3d. February 2020, p.
Warning, and Propaganda; and hosts Rapid Reaction Capabilities in response 111, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/
to Urgent Needs.” 92 documents/FY04/AFD-070223-060.pd-
f?ver=2016-08-22-101828-843.

There is no public information on any technical characteristics of the CCS, such 93 “Counter Communications System,” L3Harris,
https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/
as frequency ranges, power levels, and waveforms. However, it is reasonable counter-communications-system.
to conclude that CCS can likely jam most of the major commercial frequencies
94 “76th Space Control Squadron Fact Sheet,”
(particularly C and Ku) and the most common military frequencies (X-band), Peterson AFB web site, August 16, 2012,
with a possible capability in the increasingly popular Ka band. Also, the CCS is https://www.peterson.spaceforce.
mil/About/Fact-Sheets/Display/Arti-
likely targeted mainly at geostationary communications satellites (COMSATs), cle/326218/76th-space-control-squadron/.
given that they are currently the primary source of satellite communications.
95 Jeffrey Lewis, “Counter Satellite Communica-
tions System Deployed,” ArmsControlWonk.com,
October 2, 2004, https://www.armscontrol-
01
FIGURE 1-7 — SPACE FORCE GUARDIAN IN FRONT OF A PAIR OF wonk.com/archive/200025/counter-satel-
lite-communications-system-deployed/.
COUNTER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ANTENNAS 93 02
96 George I. Seffers, “Harris to Upgrade Counter
Communication Systems,” Signal,
November 13, 2002, https://www.afcea.org/
03
content/harris-upgrade-counter-communica-
tion-systems.

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12
Image credit: L3Harris.

13
The CCS is operated and maintained by the 4th Electromagnetic Warfare
Squadron (formerly the 4th Space Control Squadron), attached to Space Delta
14
3 of the U.S. Space Force located at Peterson SFB, Colorado. Operationally, it
is under the command of USSPACECOM’s Combined Force Space Component
15
Command (CFSCC). The CCS units can be deployed globally to conduct mobile
and transportable space superiority operations in support of global and
theater campaigns.94

The first two CCS units were reportedly delivered in 2004.95 The initial systems
are known as Block 10 systems. In 2012, Harris Corp, Space and Intelligence
Systems, was contracted to upgrade the five existing CCS Block 10 systems to
the Block 10.1 configuration.96 In 2014, Harris again was awarded a contract to
upgrade the Block 10.1 systems to the Block 10.2 configuration and deliver a
total of 16 Block 10.2 systems to the 4th Space Control Squadron as well as Air
0 1-1 9
 97 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Gets Up- National Guard units.97 In March 2020, CCS Block 10.2 was announced to have
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

graded Satellite Communications Jammers

for ‘Offensive’ Operations,” SpaceNews,
reached initial operating capability and was deemed to be the USSF’s first
February 4, 2020, https://spacenews. offensive weapon.98
com/u-s-space-force-gets-upgraded-sat-
ellite-communications-jammers-for-offen-
sive-operations/. The total number of current U.S. CCS units is not publicly known, but there
98 “Counter Communications System Block
are at least 13 units. In March 2017, Harris was awarded a contract to provide
10.2 achieves IOC, ready for the warfighter,” Block 10.2 upgrades for 13 existing antennas across the CCS.99 In October
Space and Missile Systems Public Affairs,
March 13, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/
2021, L3Harris was awarded a $120.7 million-contract to provide upgraded
News/Article/2113447/counter-communica- units to Space Force bases in the United States and classified overseas locations,
tions-system-block-102-achieves-ioc-ready-for-
the-warfighter/.
with L3Harris required to produce 16 units by 2025.100

99 “U.S. Air Force Modifies Counter Commu-

In April 2020, the USAF announced Meadowlands as a further block upgrade
0 4/202 3

nication System Contract,” Signal, March

13, 2017, https://www.afcea.org/content/ to CCS 10.2. It is intended to be lighter than the CCS system, jam a broader
Blog-us-air-force-modifies-counter-communi-
cation-system-contract.
spectrum of frequencies, and use open architecture software to allow for easier
updates.101 It is being built by L3Harris to deliver four systems by April 2023;
100 Sandra Erwin, “L3 Harris wins $120 million
contract to upgrade Space Force electronic
the USSF intends to launch a competition for 28 more units.102
jammers,” SpaceNews, October 22, 2021,
https://spacenews.com/l3-harris-wins-120-
million-contract-to-upgrade-space-force-elec-
The CCS continues to be well funded with activities including upgrades to existing
01
tronic-jammers/. systems as well as procurement of new units. The approximate funding of
101 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Builds Ground-Based
the program can be deduced from a series of unclassified budget planning
02
Arsenal to Jam Russia, China Satellites,” documents available on the Defense Technical Information Center’s website.
Bloomberg Quint, April 17, 2020,
https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/u-s-
From 2004 to 2017, approximately $222 million was spent on the CCS program.
03
space-force-is-arming-to-jam-russian-and-chi- The projected spending for FY21-FY25 totals an additional $174 million.103
nese-satellites.

04
102 Frank Wolfe, “Space Force Developing Non-Ki- There is no public information on theater deployments, if any, by the CCS.
netic Counterspace Systems,” Defense Daily,
Nov. 9, 2020, https://www.defensedaily.com/
In March 2022, when discussing Russia’s attack on Ukraine, Eric Desautels,
05
space-force-developing-non-kinetic-counter- the acting deputy assistant secretary for emerging security challenges and
space-systems/space/.
defense policy in the Department of State’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification,
06
103 RDT&E Budget Item Justification: FY 2021 and Compliance stated that “the United States has our own communications
Space Force, Program Element: PE 1206421F
/ Counterspace Systems, project 65A001 /
jammer known as the CCS system,” and that, “We think that jamming is probably
07
Counter Satellite Communications System, a normal part of conflict;” however, he did not say if the CCS has been sent to
February 2020, p. 111, https://www.saffm.
hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/RDTE_/
the region.104 A USSF press release in March 2020 noted that CCS was used
08
FY21%20Space%20Force%20Research%20 by USAF active-duty units and Air National Guard units in California, Colorado,
Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation.
pdf?ver=2020-02-11-083608-887.
and Florida.105 However, it is clear from the funding allocations that the CCS
09
is a high-priority program and likely offers the U.S. military a very effective
104 Theresa Hitchens, “Satellite jamming ‘normal’
by militaries during conflict, not peacetime:
SATCOM jamming capability. The CCS system continues to be evolved,
10
State Dept. official,” BreakingDefense, presumably with increasing sophistication and capability.
March 21, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
com/2022/03/satellite-jamming-nor-

11
mal-by-militaries-during-conflict-not-peace- Black Skies
time-state-dept-official/.
The Space Force undertook an EW training event called “Black Skies” in
12
105 Space and Missile Systems Center Public September 2022.106 This event was intended to allow Space Force personnel
Affairs, “Counter Communications System Block
10.2 achieves IOC,” United States Space Force,
to practice jamming satellites, focusing on a commercial satellite target leased
13
March 13, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/ by the Space Force for this purpose. This is part of a larger testing series
News/Article/2113447/counter-communica-
tions-system-block-102-achieves-ioc-ready-for-
planned for the Space Force, with “Red Skies” in summer 2023 that will focus
14
the-warfighter/. on orbital warfare (with the goal of making training scenarios more realistic
106 Courtney Albon, “Space Force refining range
through incorporating space weapons simulations and allowing the partici-
15
needs through ‘Black Skies’ training,” Defense pation of more operators) and a “Blue Skies” event in 2024 that will focus on
News, September 22, 2022, https://www.
defensenews.com/space/2022/09/22/space-
cyber operators. Major General Shawn Bratton, the head of Space Training
force-refining-range-needs-through-black- and Readiness Command, has said that they are considering a fleet of “live”
skies-training/.
on-orbit satellites that the Space Force could practice on.107 The USSF has a live
107 Albon, September 22, 2022, ibid. ground-based EW range—the Space Test and Training Range—at Schriever
108 Albon, June 15, 2022, ibid.
Space Force Base in Colorado.108
01-2 0
NAVWAR 109 Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
February 8, 2012, prepared under the direction
The United States DoD relies heavily on PNT capabilities, which are primarily of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
provided by GPS satellites. Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has put (CJCS), https://info.publicintelligence.net/
JCS-EW.pdf.
significant effort into incorporating GPS capabilities into a wide array of weapons
systems and operational practices. Along with the enormous potential of 110 “Joint Navigation Warfare Center ( JNWC)
Fact Sheet,” U.S. Strategic Command,
enhancing military operations, satellite navigation systems also introduce a October 17, 2016, http://www.stratcom.mil/Me-
potential vulnerability since their precise navigation signals are also prone to dia/Factsheets/Factsheet-View/Article/976408/
joint-navigation-warfare-center-jnwc/.
interference by an adversary. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. military launched a
formal effort called Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) as part of the compromise 111 Doug Messier, “Final Steps Underway To
Operationalize Ultra-Secure, Jam-Resistant GPS
to turn off Selective Availability for GPS. Over time, NAVWAR became a broader M-Code Signal,” Parabolic Arc, March 30, 2020,
effort to develop a strategy for how the U.S. military could conduct both http://www.parabolicarc.com/2020/03/30/fi-
nal-steps-underway-to-operationalize-ultra-se-
defensive and offensive operations to protect U.S. use of PNT capabilities cure-jam-resistant-gps-m-code-signal/.
while also interdicting or preventing adversary use of PNT capabilities.109
112 “Global Positioning System: Updated Schedule
Assessment Could Help Decision Makers
The Joint Navigation Warfare Center ( JNWC) was established by the Deputy Address Likely Delays Related to New Ground
Control System,” Government Accountability
Secretary of Defense Memorandum on November 17, 2004, and assigned Office, GAO-19-250, May 21, 2019,
to USSTRATCOM/JFCC SPACE in 2007. JNWC is a staff element that directly https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699234.pdf.

supports warfighters as the Joint Subject Matter Expert to integrate/coordinate 113 Sally Cole, “Securing military GPS from spoofing
NAVWAR across the full range of military operations for all domains, every and jamming vulnerabilities,” Military Embedded
01
Systems, November 30, 2015, http://mil-embed-
phase of war, and the six joint warfighting functions. The JNWC’s mission is ded.com/articles/securing-military-gps-spoof-
“[t]o enable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Superiority by providing ing-jamming-vulnerabilities/.
02
operational NAVWAR support and by creating and maintaining NAVWAR 114 Michael Jones, “New Military Code About
knowledge for the Department of Defense, Interagency Partners, and the to Board 700+ Platforms,” GPS World,
03
April 9, 2019, https://www.gpsworld.com/new-
Coalition.” 110 military-code-about-to-board-700-platforms/.

04
Being an electronic warfare domain, most of the U.S. NAVWAR capabilities and
activities are classified, and hence there is little publicly available information. 05
However, the U.S. DoD likely devotes significant resources to this domain,
since space-based PNT (specifically GPS) is crucial to most military operations. 06

The NAVWAR defensive measures seek to prevent adversarial electronic 07

countermeasures from interfering with the operational use of GPS in two
fundamental ways. The U.S. military developed a new military signal, called 08
M-code, which is much more secure than the older P(Y) military GPS signal.
M-code operates at a higher power and a waveform that increases its 09
resistance to jamming, and improved encryption protocols to protect
against spoofing. 10

New generations of GPS satellites, starting with the first GPS Block IIR-M 11
satellite (NAVSTAR 57, 2005-038A, 28874) launched on September 26, 2005,
are able to broadcast M-code. There are currently 24 M-code capable GPS 12
satellites, including the first of the new GPS Block IIIA satellites launched on
December 23, 2018.111 Deployment of the ground control system (known as 13
OCX) and new end user receivers to fully implement and utilize M-code have
run into significant delays and challenges.112 Six USSF sites are receiving new 14
software-defined receivers that will allow for M-code to be enabled to meet
the goal of protecting from spoofing and jamming. The effectiveness of these 15
measures against a sophisticated adversary is not known,113 and it will take a
significant period of time to roll out upgrades or new receivers to the 700+
deployed weapon systems that utilize GPS.114

There is no confirmed public information on the U.S. military’s technical

capabilities for offensively jamming or spoofing adversary PNT capabilities.
Nevertheless, the United States likely has very effective capabilities for
jamming and spoofing of GNSS receivers, including GPS, GLONASS, and Beidou.
This assessment is based on the consistent high priority placed on the
NAVWAR effort, the success of U.S. EW systems in other domains of warfare,
01-21
 115 Daniel Cebul, “DoD jams GPS in western states and the technical sophistication of the U.S. industry in this field. The most likely
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

for joint exercise”, C4ISR Net, January 26, 2018,

https://www.c4isrnet.com/special-reports/
way this would be accomplished is by using downlink jamming to interfere with
pnt/2018/01/26/dod-jams-gps-in-western- or spoof GNSS signals in a specific geographic area.115 It is rumored that the
states-for-joint-exercise/.
United States interfered with GPS in the East China Sea region in order to disrupt
116 Minnie Chan, “‘Unforgettable humiliation’ led to a Chinese missile drill held during a time of heightened relations in 1996.116
development of GPS equivalent,” South China
Morning Post, November 13, 2009, https://www.
scmp.com/article/698161/unforgettable-humili- The U.S. military is also known to exercise the ability to jam GNSS or operate
ation-led-development-gps-equivalent.
while adversary jamming is taking place. In January 2018, the USAF announced
117 Tyler Rogoway, “USAF is jamming GPS in the it would be jamming the civil GPS signals across the Nevada Test and Training
Western U.S. for largest ever Red Flag air war
exercise,” The Drive, January 25, 2018,
Range as part of its annual Red Flag exercise.117 In August 2018 and February
http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17987/usaf- 2019, a U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group also exercised wide-scale jamming of
is-jamming-gps-in-the-western-u-s-for-largest-
GPS across the southeastern coast of the United States.118 Additional wide-scale
0 4/202 3

ever-red-flag-air-war-exercise.
jamming was exercised along the southeastern coast of the United States on
118 David Cenciotti, “Basically, Carrier Strike Group
4 is jamming GPS across the U.S. Southeast
August 30, 2019, September 5, 2019,119 and January 16–24, 2020.120
coast,” The Aviationist, February 8, 2019,
https://theaviationist.com/2019/02/08/basi-
cally-carrier-strike-group-4-is-jamming-gps-
Potential Military Utility /
across-u-s-southeast-coast/. The Counter Communications System is likely very effective in denying potential
119 Tracy Cozzens, “U.S. Navy to Conduct GPS Inter-
adversaries of geostationary satellite communications capabilities, and the new
01
ference Tests Off Savannah,” GPS World, August upgrades even more so. With COMSATs being used for an increasingly large
30, 2019, https://www.gpsworld.com/u-s-navy-
to-conduct-gps-interference-tests-off-savan-
and diverse set of critical military communications purposes (e.g., command
02
nah/. & control, relay of intelligence and operational data, control of UAVs) the
120 Tom Demmerly, “U.S. Navy Now Jamming
employment of CCS in theater would likely be very effective at hampering an
03
GPS Over Six States and 125,000 Square Miles,” opponent’s operations. The specific impact would depend on the circumstances
The Aviationist, January 23, 2020,
https://theaviationist.com/2020/01/23/u-s-
of the situation.
navy-now-jamming-gps-over-six-states-and-
04
125000-square-miles/.
NAVWAR, both defensive and offensive components, is essential to military
05
121 Brandon Davenport and Rich Ganske, “Recal- operations due to the dependency on navigation services. The ability to employ
culating Route: A Realistic Risk Assessment for
GPS,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2019,
precision navigation services while simultaneously denying the same to an
06
https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/recalculat- adversary would confer a tremendous advantage in a time of conflict.
ing-route-a-realistic-risk-assessment-for-gps/.

07
However, conducting operationally-useful, dependable, and reliable jamming
or spoofing of highly-used military space capabilities, such as GNSS, is more
08
difficult than most commentators suggest. Military GNSS signals are much
more resilient to jamming than civil GNSS signals, and a wide variety of tactics,
09
techniques, and procedures exist to mitigate attacks.121 It is much more likely
that an EW counterspace weapon would degrade military space capabilities
10
rather than completely deny them.

11
1.4 — U.S. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
12
Assessment /
13
Over the past several decades, the United States has conducted significant
research and development on the use of ground-based high-energy lasers for
14
counterspace and other purposes. We assess that there are no technological
roadblocks to the U.S. operationalizing them for counterspace applications.
15
With its SLR sites and defense research facilities, the United States possesses
low-power laser systems with the capability to dazzle, and possibly blind, EO
imaging satellites. However, there is no indication that these potential high- or
low-power capabilities have been operationalized.

There is no public evidence that the United States has a space-based DEW
capability. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is planning to conduct research
into the feasibility of DEW for defending against ballistic missiles and the Space
Force has expressed an interest in a directed energy architecture in general
(not necessarily space-based). If developed, these systems may have a capability
against other orbiting satellites and, depending on their target acquisition
01-2 2
and tracking capabilities may be considered de facto anti-satellite systems. 122 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gron-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
lund, The Physics of Space Security, American
Academy of Arts and Science, 2005, Appendix A
Specifics / to Section 11, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/2019-09/physics-space-security.pdf.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) refers to a class of potential weapons
technologies that harness concentrated beams of electromagnetic waves or
subatomic particles. The three main types of DEWs are lasers, particle beams,
and radio frequency energy. Of these, laser systems are the most developed
and most prominent of the DEW counterspace threats.

The following paragraphs provide a general overview of different types of

DEW capabilities as related to counterspace applications that apply to all the
country-specific DEW sections in this report.

Laser Systems
Laser systems for counterspace applications could be either ground-based
or space-based. Ground-based systems require much higher power and have
few restrictions on size, type, and consumption of chemicals or electrical
power. Space-based systems, on the other hand, could be effective at lower
power but are severely restricted in size and power availability. For example, 01
ground-based chemical lasers can generate high power but would be difficult
to implement in space due to their size and the disturbance torques that may 02
be generated by exhaust. Solid-state and fiber lasers would be more appropriate
for space basing but require large inputs of electrical energy. 03

Although admittedly a great oversimplification, several essential technological 04

building blocks must be developed in order to field a high-power laser that will
have an effective counterspace capability: 05

1. High fidelity space situational awareness, 06
2. High power laser device,
3. Precise beam tracking and control, and 07
4. Adaptive optics to counteract atmospheric turbulence (ground-based).
08
The use of lasers in satellite countermeasure or weapon applications can be
classed into three categories based on their effects: 09

1. Dazzling of a satellite’s imaging sensor, 10
2. Damage to a satellite’s imaging sensor, and
3. Damage to the satellite bus or its subsystems. 11

Laser dazzling is more appropriately considered a countermeasure than a 12

weapon since the effect is not permanent. The dazzling phenomenon consists
of directing a relatively low-power laser beam into the optics of an imaging 13
satellite. The laser light will impinge on the sensor’s detector array—usually a
charge-coupled device (CCD) or a complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor 14
(CMOS)—and overwhelm the natural collection of photons. As a result, a number
of the pixels of an image will be saturated, thus obscuring a portion of the 15
image scene. The effects may persist in the sensor and associated electronics
would be temporary in nature. For example, in a CCD array, it might take several
successive readouts of the array to completely clear the electric charge that
was induced by the laser. Therefore, the effect may impact a plethora of images,
following the laser incident. However, this effect is considered temporary
since it will eventually clear on its own with no operator intervention. Laser
dazzling could be used as a countermeasure to protect specific ground facilities
from being imaged by optical means. The laser source would need to be located
near the target it is intended to protect.122
01-2 3
 123 Ibid. Since imaging sensors are very sensitive to light, relatively low power levels
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

124 Yousaf Butt, “Effects of Chinese Laser Ranging

are required to dazzle. For example, Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) is a mechanism
on Imaging Satellites,” Science and Global to accurately track satellites that have been equipped with laser retroreflectors.
Security, 17:20-35, 2009, http://scienceandglo-
balsecurity.org/archive/sgs17butt.pdf.
SLR is used for satellites in which the precise knowledge of position and orbits
is essential for their mission (e.g., geodetic or navigation satellites). Low-power
125 Butt, 2009, ibid.
lasers used for SLR would be of sufficient power to dazzle imaging sensors.
The amount of power required to dazzle but not damage is not clear and
depends on several factors specific to the particular situation. Factors relating
to wavelength, atmospheric conditions, and, in particular, the design of the
satellite optics and sensor all contribute. However, rough estimates suggest
that even a 10 Watt laser could be sufficient to create a dazzling effect and
obscure an area on the ground.123 Other research confirms this finding, but
0 4/202 3

also notes that the pulse rate of the laser needs to be taken into account, as
the laser could only impact a satellite’s optics if it was pointed at the laser
during a pulse.124 Ultimately, the most difficult aspect of laser dazzling is not
the power of the laser, but the accurate tracking of the satellite.

Damage to a satellite’s image sensor, or associated electronics, could be

01
caused when the laser power is of sufficient intensity. Damage to optics would
involve a higher power than dazzling. However, the threshold between dazzling
02
and damage is almost impossible to predict; thus, whenever a dazzling attempt
is made there may be a risk of damage. This is because the ground area
03
obscured (corresponding to the portion of the sensor dazzled) increases with
increasing laser power. At the high end, where a large portion of the array
04
becomes saturated, some of the sensor elements may become subject to
sufficient intensity to cause permanent damage. Under some conditions,
05
damage to a portion of the sensor array could be incurred using a continuous
wave with a power level as low as 40 Watts. This power level would likely only
06
affect a few pixels in the array, but it would be permanently damaged,
nonetheless. A more likely power level to use for a weapons application where
07
significant damage to the sensor was intended would be in the kilowatt range.125

08
In the case of damage to optical sensors, the satellite will not otherwise be
damaged. It can continue to be controlled and operated and the other non-
09
imaging payloads will continue to function.

10
Damage to the satellite bus could be inflicted with the use of a very high-
power laser. The damage would be due to the thermal effects of the absorbed
11
energy causing failure of some essential components of the bus (ex. thermal
regulation system, the batteries, or attitude control system). In this scenario,
12
there is a complete failure of the satellite. All satellites would be potentially
susceptible to this type of attack, but it would require a large very high-power
13
laser system.

14
Neutral Particle Beams
High-energy particle beams are generated by accelerating and focusing
15
subatomic particles through the use of powerful electromagnetic fields.
Neutral particle beams are a type of particle beam that consists of neutral
particles. Neutral beams are required for counterspace applications since,
unlike charged beams, they are unaffected by the Earth’s magnetic field.

Radio Frequency Weapons

Radio frequency weapons—not to be confused with RF jammers—emit a very
intense focused beam of microwave energy. The high-power microwave (HPM)
energy can cause damage to electronic circuitry as well as discomfort to humans.
01-24
U.S. Specific Directed Energy Weapons Program for Counterspace 126 White Sands Missile Range, “High Energy Laser

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Systems Test Facility,” updated October 26,
Over the past several decades, the United States has sufficiently developed the 2018, https://www.wsmr.army.mil/testcenter/
technologies required to construct and deploy a ground-based counterspace testing/landf/Pages/HighEnergyLaserSystem-
sTestFacility.aspx.
laser weapon that would be capable of damaging most types of LEO satellites.
However, there is no public indication that the United States has transitioned 127 “Army to fire laser at satellite in space,” Tampa
Bay Times, Oct. 3, 1997, https://www.tampabay.
from a research phase to an operational capability. com/archive/1997/10/03/army-to-fire-laser-at-
satellite-in-space/.

Most of the historical activities and research is connected to the Strategic 128 William Broad, “U.S. to Fire Laser Weapon at
Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s and focused on high-power lasers that a Satellite,” New York Times, October 3, 1997,
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/03/us/us-
could be used to intercept ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads but could to-fire-laser-weapon-at-a-satellite.html.
also be used against satellites. The most publicized U.S. counterspace
129 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
laser research project involves the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (DARPA), “MIRACL,” accessed February 23,
(MIRACL) Program. MIRACL is a chemical laser (deuterium fluoride) capable 2019, https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/time-
line/miracl.
of emitting a multi-megawatt beam in the infrared spectrum (see Imagery
Appendix, pg. 15-24). The project was initially funded by the Strategic Defense 130 White Sands Missile Range, “High Energy Laser
Systems Test Facility,” updated October 26,
Initiative Office (SDIO) beginning in 1985, with the goal of conducting research 2018, https://www.wsmr.army.mil/testcenter/
on ballistic missile defense.126 MIRACL was fired against an orbiting satellite testing/landf/Pages/HighEnergyLaserSystem-
sTestFacility.aspx.
in October 1997, with then Secretary of Defense William Cohen putting out a
statement that the test was “fully consistent” with U.S. policy and did not violate 01
international law.127 The target was the MSTI-3 satellite, a USAF experimental
satellite that had been launched in May 1996 and had completed its mission. 02
MSTI-3 carried IR sensors and was an ideal target for an IR laser. Detailed
results of the test were not made public. Official statements by the Pentagon 03
indicated that the test was defensive in nature with the purpose of gathering
data to “improve computer models used for planning the protection of U.S. 04
satellites” and the Pentagon further stated that ‘’there’s absolutely no intention
to use the laser for offensive purposes.” 128 05

Regardless of assurances as to the intent of the test, the capability of MIRACL 06

to damage satellites in orbit appeared to have been demonstrated. MIRACL
continued to be used for research on other high-power laser applications, 07
such as defense against rockets and missiles, until at least the mid-2000s.129
The MIRACL laser appears to still be actively used in research projects and 08
remains a key component of the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at
the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile range.130 09

Another notable example was the Low-Power Atmospheric Compensation 10

Experiment (LACE) satellite, launched in 1990, which was a Naval Research
Laboratory project sponsored by the SDIO. The satellite carried three separate 11
sensor arrays capable of characterizing ground-based laser beams of various
types and wavelengths. The sensors determined the power received from 12
ground-based lasers and were used to determine the effectiveness of various
methods of compensating for atmospheric distortion, an important 13
consideration for ground-based laser ASAT systems.
14
A third example was the Airborne Laser (ABL), a USAF/Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) project, begun in 1996, to test the feasibility of intercepting ballistic 15
missiles in their boost phase using a high-power laser installed in a Boeing
747 aircraft. The aircraft carried a megawatt class chemical oxygen iodine
laser (COIL) along with two lower power lasers for target identification and
tracking. During its lifetime, the project demonstrated capabilities by conducting
several intercept tests of aerodynamic and ballistic targets. The project came
under budget pressure and was canceled in 2011. This project did not have
a counterspace objective and did not directly develop capabilities to target
satellites, although some technologies may have been able to contribute to
counterspace applications.
01-2 5
 131 P. G. O’Shea, T. A. Butler, M. T. Lynch, K. F. There is no indication that the United States has developed the technology
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

McKenna, M. B. Pongratz, T. J. Zaugg, “A Linear

Accelerator In Space: The Beam Experiment
required for the building blocks of a space-based laser ASAT capability, nor
Aboard Rocket,” Proceedings of the Linear has it been a goal since the early days of SDI in the 1980s. There is no publicly
Accelerator Conference 1990, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, USA, https://accelconf.web.cern.
available evidence to suggest that the United States currently has space-based
ch/accelconf/l90/papers/th454.pdf. laser counterspace capabilities and there are likely significant technological
132 Active Denial Technology Fact Sheet, U.S.
obstacles to fielding such capabilities. However, there was an effort under SDI
Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons to develop space-based neutral particle beams. In 1989, the BEAM Experiment
Program, May 11, 2016, https://jnlwp.defense.
gov/Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/
Aboard Rocket used a linear accelerator mounted inside an upper stage to
Fact_Sheets/ADT_Fact_Sheet_May_2016.pdf. test the propagation of a neutral particle beam in the outer space environment
133 Frank Tiboni, “Air Force seeks satellite blinder
on a suborbital vehicle.131 The experiment was deemed successful because it
plans,” FCW, October 24, 2003, https://fcw.com/ successfully generated a neutron particle beam, albeit at extremely low power
workforce/2003/10/air-force-seeks-satellite-
and for only a short period of time. To date, there appears to have been little
0 4/202 3

blinder-plans/224950/.
further development of the technology.
134 John A. Tirpak, “Securing the Space Arena,”
Air Force Magazine, July 1, 2004,
https://www.airforcemag.com/artcle/ The United States has also conducted significant historical research and
0704space/.

development on HPM for broad military applications and terrestrial use. One
135 Adolfo J. Fernandez, “Military Role in Space such application is the Active Denial System; a prototype non-lethal system to
Control: A Primer,” Congressional Research
Service Report RL32602, September 23, 2004,
be used at short ranges for stopping, deterring, and turning back suspicious
01
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL32602.pdf. individuals with minimal risk of injury.132 Although, in theory, an HPM weapon
136 U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed Energy (DE)
in space could damage a satellite if it was sufficiently close, there is no indication
02
Programs: Background and Potential Issues for of any space-based capability or intent to pursue such by the United States.
Congress, Congressional Research Service,
Updated February 12, 2018, https://crsreports.

03
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45098. In October 2003, the U.S. Air Force awarded an additional $32.2 million contract
to Northrop Grumman to develop the Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance
04
System (CSRS, pronounced “scissors”), a mobile system that was intended to
develop reversible means to temporarily dazzle space-based surveillance and
05
reconnaissance satellites.133 This was on top of an earlier award of $15 million.
At the time the add-on contract was awarded, the goal was to get the work
06
finished by October 2004; by July 2004, that had been pushed back to striving
to reach initial operational capability by FY2009.134 But the FY2005 Defense
07
appropriations bill, finalized in August 2004, cut the entire funding for the
program, with the Senate report noting that the Air Force had decided to stop
08
the program.135

09
Current U.S. DEW Developments and Capabilities
The U.S. military is investing significant research and development funds in
10
various DEW weapons applications. High-power laser prototypes are being
developed for tactical use, such as defense against missiles, rockets, artillery,
11
and UAVs.136 While none of these prototypes can be used for a counterspace
role, they are furthering the development of component technologies that
12
may apply to counterspace applications.

13
The United States currently operates several SLR sites, most of which are
operated by either NASA or universities. The lone DoD site, the NRL Optical
14
Test Facility at Stafford, VA, would be the likeliest of the ILRS sites to conduct
laser dazzling tests or operations. However, there is no indication that this has
15
occurred. Although it is theoretically possible to use SLR facilities to conduct
laser dazzling, it is assessed that these sites are not a counterspace threat
due to most of them being civilian. Furthermore, laser dazzling would only
be useful if the SLR site was geographically located near a sensitive facility so
that it could dazzle adversary imaging satellites as they came overhead from
imaging that sensitive facility.

More recently, there has been a renewed discussion in the United States
of some of the space-based missile defense initiatives that could also have
counterspace applications. The SDIO transitioned into the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO) in 1994, and then renamed MDA in 2002. The
01-2 6
2019 Missile Defense Review conducted by the Pentagon under the Trump 137 2019 Missile Defense Review, Office of the

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Secretary of Defense, January 17, 2019,
administration proposed revisiting the original SDI concept of placing https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interac-
interceptor systems in orbit. Citing major improvements in technologies tive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/
The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20
applicable to space-basing and directed energy, the review directed the DoD Summary.pdf.
to study space-based defenses, which may include on-orbit demonstrations
138 Patrick Tucker, “Pentagon Wants to Test A
of concepts and technology.137 Although the funding that may be devoted Space-Based Weapon in 2023,” Defense One,
specifically to the space-based intercept options has not yet been revealed, at March 14, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/
technology/2019/03/pentagon-wants-test-
least $15 million is reported to be allocated to the exploration of space-based space-based-weapon-2023/155581/.
lasers for boost phase intercept.138 The MDA’s budget request for 2020 included
139 Transcript of Department of Defense Press
$34 million for neutral particle beam and laser technologies, with plans for Briefing on the President’s Fiscal Year 2020
testing a neutral particle beam weapon in orbit by 2023; however, the House Defense Budget for the Missile Defense Agency,
U.S. Department of Defense, March 12, 2019,
version of the defense authorization act for that year asked for an in-depth https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/
study first and in September 2019, the Pentagon announced that it was Transcript-View/Article/1784150/department-
of-defense-press-briefing-on-the-presidents-
“deferring work on neutral particle beams indefinitely.” 139 fiscal-year-2020-defense/; Oriana Pawlyk,
“Pentagon Halts Work on Directed-Energy
Beam to Stop Enemy Missiles,” Military.com,
It is not clear if the proposed studies into space-based defenses would include September 4, 2019, https://www.miitary.com/
both boost and midcourse phases of ballistic missile flight. Although there daily-news/2019/09/04/pentagon-halts-
work-directed-energy-beam-stop-enemy-
have been statements suggesting that the studies into laser space-based missiles.html.
defense concepts would address boost phase intercept,140 that limitation is not 01
140 Patrick Tucker, “Pentagon Wants to Test A
specified in the 2022 Missile Defense Review, which does not mention lasers Space-Based Weapon in 2023,” Defense One,
at all,141 nor in the budget request information that has been made public. March 14, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/
02
technology/2019/03/pentagon-wants-test-
space-based-weapon-2023/155581/.
The difference between boost phase and midcourse phase concepts is 03
141 2022 Missile Defense Review, U.S. Department
significant for ASAT capability. The tracking and pointing requirements for a of Defense, October 27. 2022, https://media.
boost phase intercept are different from that which would be required of an defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-
04
1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-
ASAT. However, the requirements for a midcourse phase intercept would be MDR.PDF.
very similar, leading to the assessment that a midcourse intercept capability 05
142 Nathan Strout, “The Space Force wants to use
equates to an ASAT capability. Regardless of the technical details of the directed-energy systems for space superiority,”
concepts being studied, potential adversaries are likely to interpret this initiative C4ISRNet.com, June 16, 2021, https://www.c4is-
06
rnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2021/06/16/
as research and development into both ballistic missile defense and ASAT the-space-force-wants-to-use-directed-ener-
capabilities. gy-weapons-for-space-superiority/.
07

This MDA initiative to study concepts marks only an initial step towards a 08
possible future space-based BMD and ASAT capability. Numerous technological
and budgetary obstacles remain, and it will likely be several years before 09
substantial progress towards an actual capability could possibly be achieved,
with no certainty of eventual success. The MDA is also planning to conduct 10
research into the feasibility of placing a high-power laser on airborne platforms
to intercept ballistic missiles in the boost phase. Even if successful, this 11
approach will likely not result in a counterspace capability since the target
acquisition and tracking requirements are substantially different. 12

In June 2021, then Space Force Chief of Space Operations General John “Jay” 13
Raymond was asked during a Congressional hearing whether the United
States was working on a DEW portfolio “to be an effective capability for space 14
dominance;” his response was, “Yes sir, we are…. We have to be able to protect
these capabilities that we rely so heavily on.” 142 A Space Force spokesperson 15
explained later in a statement that Raymond’s response “was confirming that
our architecture developments in the face of these threats are appropriate.”
 
Military Utility /
DEWs, primarily lasers, offer significant potential for military counterspace
applications. They offer the possibility of interfering with or disabling a
satellite without generating significant debris. The technologies required for
ground-based lasers systems are well developed. Ground-based systems
can dazzle or blind EO satellites, or even inflict thermal damage on most
LEO satellites.
01-27
 In contrast, the technical and financial challenges to space-based DEW for
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

counterspace remain substantial. These include the mass of the weapon,

consumables and disturbance torques (chemical lasers), electrical power
generation (solid-state and fiber lasers, particle beams), target acquisition
and tracking, and the potential required large size of a constellation. The
acquisition and tracking challenges are greatly simplified in a co-orbital
GEO or LEO scenario.

However, both ground- and space-based DEW counterspace capabilities do

have significant drawbacks in assessing their effectiveness. It can be very
difficult to determine the threshold between temporary dazzling or blinding
and causing long-term damage, particularly since it may depend on the
0 4/202 3

internal design and protective mechanisms of the target satellite that are not
externally visible. Moreover, it can be difficult for an attacker to determine
whether a non-destructive DEW attack actually worked.

1.5 — U.S. SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

01
Assessment /
02
The United States currently possesses the most advanced SSA capabilities in
the world, particularly for military applications. U.S. SSA capabilities date to
03
the beginning of the Cold War and leverage significant infrastructure developed
for missile warning and missile defense. The core of its SSA capabilities is
04
a robust, geographically dispersed network of ground-based radars and
telescopes and space-based telescopes. The United States is investing heavily
05
in upgrading its SSA capabilities by deploying new radars and telescopes in
the Southern Hemisphere, upgrading existing sensors, and signing SSA data
06
sharing agreements with other countries and satellite operators. The United
States still faces challenges in modernizing the software and computer systems
07
used to conduct SSA analysis and is increasingly looking to leverage commercial
capabilities.
08
Specifics /
09
SSA is the ability to accurately characterize the space environment and activities
in space. Civil SSA combines positional information on the trajectory of objects
10
in orbit (mainly using optical telescopes and radars) with information on space
weather. Military and national security SSA applications also include characterizing
11
objects in space, their capabilities and limitations, and potential threats.

12
Ground-based radars have historically been the backbone of SSA. Radar
consists of at least one transmitter and receiver. The transmitter emits radio
13
waves at a specific frequency, some of which reflect off the target and are
measured by the receiver, which can then calculate the location of the target
14
in relation to the radar. The primary advantages of radars are that they can
actively measure the distance to a target and some types of radars can accurately
15
track many objects at once. Some radars can also detect the motion of an
object and construct a representation of its shape. The main disadvantages
of radars are their cost, size, and complexity.

Optical telescopes are also widely used for SSA. Telescopes collect light or
other electromagnetic (EM) radiation emitted or reflected by an object and
focused into an image using lenses, mirrors, or a combination of the two.
The main advantages of using optical telescopes for SSA are their ability to
cover large areas quickly and track objects above 5,000 km in altitude. Some
telescopes can create high resolution images of space objects. The main
disadvantage of optical telescopes is that they require specific lighting
01-2 8
conditions and clear skies to see an object, although space-based optical 143 Sandra Erwin, “L3Harris Wins $1.2 billion Con-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
tract to Maintain, Upgrade Space Surveillance
telescopes eliminate some of these limitations. Systems,” SpaceNews, February 29, 2020,
https://spacenews.com/l3harris-wins-1-2-bil-
lion-contract-to-maintain-upgrade-space-sur-
Other types of sensors can be used for SSA, including sensors that detect veillance-sensors.
radio frequency (RF) or other types of signals from satellites, lasers that measure
144 Steve Kotecki, “C-band Radar Reaches Full
the distance or range to a satellite very accurately, and infrared sensors that Operational Capability in Australia,” Peterson
detect heat. Combining data from many different types of sensors, both Air Force Base, March 15, 2017, https://www.pe-
terson.af.mil/News/Article/1114478/c-band-ra-
ground- and space-based, that are also distributed around the globe provides dar-reaches-full-operational-capability-in-aus-
a more complete picture of the space environment and activities in space. tralia/.

145 Nathan Strout, “New Space Radar Likely to

The United States, like Russia, developed its original SSA capabilities as part of go Online Later This Month,” C4ISRNET,
February 3, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/
the Cold War space and nuclear rivalry. The U.S. Space Surveillance Network battlefield-tech/space/2020/02/03/new-space-
(SSN) consists of multiple phased array radars that are primarily used for missile radar-likely-to-go-online-this-month/.

warning along with a few dedicated phased array and mechanical tracking
radars, dedicated ground-based electro-optical telescopes, and dedicated space-
based optical telescopes. Several of the SSN sensors are located outside of
the continental United States and some of those are operated by NATO allies.

For tracking objects in LEO, the SSN originally contained elements of the Ballistic 01
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars at Clear Air Force Station in
Alaska, Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, and Royal Air Force Fylingdales in 02
the United Kingdom (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-31). Those radars have
been replaced by modern phased array systems. The SSN also contains radars 03
that are part of the Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning
System (PAVEPAWS) system developed in the 1980s and currently located at 04
Cape Cod Air Force Station in Massachusetts (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-32)
and Beale Air Force Base in California. The network also contains radars 05
developed for missile defense, such as the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System (PARCS) radar, which was created for the Safeguard 06
ABM system at Cavalier Air Force Station in North Dakota and the Cobra Dane
radar at Eareckson Air Station in the Aleutian Islands. A dedicated phased 07
array radar for space surveillance is in operation at Eglin Air Force Base in
Florida (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-32). 08

The SSN also contains multiple radar and optical sensors that can be used 09
to track objects out to GEO. Major sites include radars at the Lincoln Space
Surveillance Complex near Boston, Massachusetts (see Imagery Appendix, 10
pg. 15-34), and the Reagan Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the South Pacific (see
Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-36), along with optical telescopes at the USAF Maui 11
Optical and Supercomputing observatory in Hawaii (see Imagery Appendix,
pg. 15-40). 12

In 2020, L3Harris won a 10-year, $1.2 billion contract for the creation of MOSSAIC 13
(maintenance of space situational awareness integrated capabilities).143 This
new contract expands the previous scope of work, which previously had focused 14
on the USAF’s Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System
(three radars that track objects in geostationary orbits), to support SSA centers 15
in California, Colorado, and Virginia.

Several efforts are underway to develop new capabilities for the SSN. A C-band
mechanical tracking radar originally located in Antigua was moved to Naval
Communication Station Harold E. Holt near Exmouth, Western Australia (see
Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-38) in March 2017.144 A large S-Band phased array
fence was also constructed on Kwajalein Atoll (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-33),
which is anticipated to be able to track small space objects down to a few
centimeters.145 The USAF envisioned a second Space Fence site in the future,
but no funding has yet been made. Another new radar program, the Deep
01-2 9
 146 Sandra Erwin, “Northrop Grumman win Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC), was awarded in February 2022 to
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

$341 million Space Force contract to develop

a deep-space tracking radar,” SpaceNews,
build the first of an anticipated three new radars capable of tracking objects
February 23, 2022, https://spacenews.com/ in deep space.146 The Space Force also invested in technology that allowed a
northrop-grumman-wins-341-million-space-
force-contract-to-develop-a-deep-space-track-
company called Numerica to develop sensors that can track satellites during
ing-radar/. daylight; the network of six sensors is being installed in Colorado, Australia,
147 Sandra Erwin, “With Air Force funding, Nu-
and Spain, and will allow the Space Force to access its data.147 Finally, the
merica deploys telescopes to monitor space Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), a 3.5-meter telescope originally developed
in broad daylight,” SpaceNews, April 5, 2021,
https://spacenews.com/with-air-force-fund-
by DARPA, was moved to Naval Communication Station Holt in Western
ing-numerica-deploys-telescopes-to-monitor- Australia (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-38) to be jointly operated by the USAF’s
space-in-broad-daylight/.
Space Delta 2 unit and the Royal Australian Air Force.148 It imaged its first
148 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Deploying objects in March 2020 and was declared operational in September 2022.149
Surveillance Telescope In Australia,” SpaceNews,
0 4/202 3

April 23, 2020, https://spacenews.com/u-s-

space-force-deploying-surveillance-telescope- In addition to the ground-based sensors, the U.S. SSN also includes multiple
in-australia/.
space-based optical sensors. The Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS)
149 “Joint US-Australian Space Surveillance satellite is in LEO and has a large, gimbaled telescope that can track space
Telescope To Be Improved,” Australian Defence
Magazine, July 16, 2020, https://www.australian-
objects in higher orbits.150 The Canadian Sapphire satellite is a smaller satellite
defence.com.au/defence/cyber-space/joint-us- in a similar orbit that also contributes to the SSN.151 The USSF also operates
australian-space-surveillance-telescope-to-be-
improved.
the four GSSAP satellites in GEO, which can provide up-close imaging,
01
characterization, and intelligence (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT; Section 1-2).
150 “Space-Based Space Surveillance,” Air Force
Space Command, March 22, 2017,
ORS-5 (or SensorSat) was launched in 2017 and became operational in 2019.152
02
https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact- It keeps an eye on GEO from an altitude of 372 miles.153 TDO-2 was launched
Sheets/Article/249017/space-based-space-sur-
veillance-sbss/.
in March 2020 and is intended to provide space domain awareness for the
03
USSF by using lasers to get range data on space objects, as well as allow
151 Mike Gruss, “Canada’s Sapphire Satellite Begins
Operations,” SpaceNews, January 31, 2014,
for optical calibration options.154 A classified space-based SSA system called
04
https://spacenews.com/39343canadas-sap- “SILENT BARKER” is being jointly developed by the USSF and the NRO; it
phire-satellite-begins-operations/.
was to have been launched in 2022, but a problem was discovered during
05
152 “SMC Sets New Standard Of Success For launch preparation, so the satellite was returned to its manufacturer and
Acquisition And Operations Of Sensorsat,” SMC
Public Affairs News Release, October 9, 2019,
the launch rescheduled for November 2023.155
https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
06
Article/1985934/smc-sets-new-standard-of-
success-for-acquisition-and-operations-of-sen-
sorsat/.
07
153 Joseph Trevithick, “Space Force Has A Unit
Dedicated To Orbital Warfare That Now
08
Operates The X-37B Spaceplane,” TheDrive.com,
October 30, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/
the-war-zone/37361/space-force-has-a-unit-
09
dedicated-to-orbital-warfare-that-now-oper-
ates-the-x-37b-spaceplane.

10
154 Nathan Strout, “The Space Force is adding
another satellite to its first launch,” C4ISRNET,
March 10, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/
11
battlefield-tech/space/2020/03/11/the-space-
force-is-adding-another-satellite-to-its-first-
launch/.
12
155 Theresa Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: NRO,
SPACECOM Craft CONOPS For War In Space,”
13
BreakingDefense, May 4, 2020, https://breaking-
defense.com/2020/05/exclusive-nro-space-
com-craft-conops-for-war-in-space/.
14

15
01-3 0
In April 2019, the head of the Space Development Agency announced they 156 Theresa Hitchens, “SDA’s Kennedy: Cislunar

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Space the Next Military Frontier,” Breaking
were exploring architectures for extending SSA out to cislunar space.156 Defense, April 17, 2019, https://breakingde-
AFRL’s Space Vehicles Directorate is also considering what it calls “xGEO” fense.com/2019/04/sdas-kennedy-cislu-
nar-space-the-next-military-frontier/.
orbits, those beyond GEO out to cislunar space, with the goal of extending
SDA from GEO out past the Moon.157 AFRL announced a project in September 157 Theresa Hitchens, “AFRL Targets Space Ops In
New Orbits,” Breaking Defense, June 5, 2020,
2020 called “Cislunar Highway Patrol System,” or CHPS, which is planned to https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/afrl-to-
help detect and track objects from GEO to the Moon by improving sensor demo-ops-in-nontraditional-orbits-for-space-
force/.
technologies and algorithms needed for tracking objects.158 In December 2021,
AFRL announced its support of a research project called “Space Object 158 Sandra Erwin, “Air Force Research Labora-
tory Announces New Space Experiments,”
Understanding and Reconnaissance of Complex Events (SOURCE),” which is SpaceNews, Sept. 2, 2020, https://spacenews.
intended to help improve SSA modeling of the xGEO domain.159 com/air-force-research-laboratory-announc-
es-new-space-experiments/.

The data from the SSN sensors is collated and processed by the 18th Space 159 Theresa Hitchens, “AFRL jumpstarts early
research on cislunar monitoring, satellite
Defense Squadron (18 SDS), located at Vandenberg Space Force Base in servicing,” BreakingDefense, December 17,
California.160 The mission was originally done by the 1st Space Control Squadron 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/
afrl-jumpstarts-early-research-on-cislu-
in Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station in Colorado but was moved to nar-monitoring-satellite-servicing/.
Vandenberg in 2007 as part of the creation of the Joint Space Operations
160 “18 th Space Control Squadron,” Peterson
Center ( JSpOC), although much of the communications and data is still routed Air Force Base, August 6, 2018,
through Cheyenne Mountain. JSpOC became the Combined Space Operations https://www.peterson.af.mil/About/Fact-S
01
heets/Display/Article/1060346/18th-space-
Center (CSpOC) in July 2018 to improve interoperability with allies and commercial control-squadron/.
partners.161 An alternate command center is located in Dahlgren, Virginia, at 02
161 “Combined Space Operations Center Estab-
what used to be the control facility for the Naval Space Surveillance Fence. In lished At Vandenberg AFB,” Joint Force Space
April 2022, the unit at Dhalgren was renamed the 19th Space Defense Squadron Component Command Public Affairs, Joint
03
Force Space Component Command Public Af-
with a new focus on xGEO SDA.162 Both report to Space Delta 2, garrisoned at fairs, Air Force Space Command, July 18, 2018,
Peterson SFB, Colorado.163 https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
04
Article/1579285/combined-space-opera-
tions-center-established-at-vandenberg-afb/.
A significant portion of the satellite catalog maintained by the 18th SDS and SSA 05
162 Theresa Hitchens, “The USSF stood up the 19th
analysis products such as conjunction assessments and re-entry predictions Space Defense Squadron in April 2022 so it
are made publicly available on the Space Track website.164 Efforts to improve can track objects in xGEO space,” BreakingDe-
06
fense, April 21, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
the software and computer systems used by the 18th SPCS have run into long- com/2022/04/to-infinity-and-beyond-new-
standing problems and delays.165 In January 2022, the USSF shut down the space-force-unit-to-monitor-xgeo-beyond-
07
earths-orbit/.
last part of the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS), a software
platform intended to improve SSA but was instead beleaguered by delays 163 Stephen Brady, “Space Delta 2 monitors deep
08
space,” Peterson Space Force Base Press
and cost overruns.166 Release, accessed February 20, 2022, https://
www.peterson.spaceforce.mil/News/Arti-
09
cle/2564700/space-delta-2-monitors-deep-
A new facility, originally called the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations space/.
Center ( JICSpOC) and later renamed to the National Space Defense Center 10
164 Anyone can sign up for an account at
(NSDC), was created to improve collaboration between military and intelligence https://space-track.org as long as they sign
communities to respond to attacks in space and became operational in a user agreement.
11
January 2018.167 A main function of the NSDC is to leverage military and 165 Cristina Chaplain, “Space Command and Con-
commercial SSA capabilities to detect and characterize attacks on U.S. national trol: Comprehensive Planning and Oversight
12
Could Help DOD Acquire Critical Capabilities
security satellites.168 and Address Challenges,” U.S. Government
Accountability Office, October 2019,
13
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/702424.pdf.

166 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force’s troubled

14
space-tracking system is officially shut down,”
Space News, January 27, 2022, https://space-
news.com/space-forces-troubled-space-track-
15
ing-system-is-officially-shut-down/.

167 Shellie-Anne Espinosa, “National Space De-

fense Center Transitions to 24/7 Operations,”
Air Force Space Command Public Affairs,
January 26, 2018, http://www.afspc.af.mil/
News/Article-Display/Article/1423932/nation-
al-space-defense-center-transitions-to-247-op-
erations/.

168 Sandra Erwin, “Air Force Eyes Commercial

Options to Gain Intelligence on Space Threats,”
SpaceNews, September 18, 2018, https://space-
news.com/air-force-eyes-commercial-options-
to-gain-intelligence-on-space-threats/.
01-31
 “One year into Initial Operational Capability, Since 2010, the United States military has signed more than 150 SSA data sharing
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

169
U.S. Space Command is protecting, defending
the space domain,” US Space Command Staff
agreements with other countries, commercial satellite operators, and
Report, August 29, 2022, https://www.space- international nongovernmental organizations.169 The primary purpose of
com.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/
Article/3143254/one-year-into-initial-opera-
these agreements is to enable the U.S. military to share more data and
tional-capability-us-space-command-is-pro- analysis with other entities than what is publicly available on the Space Track
tecting-def/.
website. In some cases, the agreements allow for a two-way exchange of SSA
170 “One year into Initial Operational Capability, data between the parties. To date, the U.S. military has signed SSA agreements
U.S. Space Command is protecting, defending
the space domain,” US Space Command Staff
with 30 countries.170
Report, August 29, 2022, https://www.space-
com.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/
Article/3143254/one-year-into-initial-opera-
The United States has significant space weather capabilities that are provided
tional-capability-us-space-command-is-pro- by the USAF, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
tecting-def/.
(NOAA), and NASA. NOAA operates the National Space Weather Prediction Center
0 4/202 3

171 “National Space Weather Action Plan,” National (SWPC) that collates data from a wide variety of satellites operated by NASA,
Science and Technology Council, October 2015,
https://www.sworm.gov/publications/2015/
the USSF, and international partners. In 2015, the Obama administration issued
swap_final__20151028.pdf. the Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan, which outlined the implementation
172 “National Space Weather Strategy and Action
approach for improving space weather capabilities.171 An updated version
Plan,” Office of Science and Technology Policy, was issued by the Trump administration in 2019.172
March 2019, https://aerospace.org/sites/de-
fault/files/2019-03/Natl%20Space%20Weath-

01
er%20Strategy%20Mar19.pdf. Military Utility /
The United States possesses sophisticated SSA capabilities that allow it to track,
02
identify, and characterize nearly all objects bigger than 10 centimeters in
Earth orbit. While the U.S. SSN possesses shortcomings in geographic coverage
03
of LEO due to its northern location, the United States is actively working to
close those gaps by deploying additional sensors to the Southern Hemisphere.
04
Although the United States has never publicly acknowledged an explicit link
between its SSA capabilities and offensive counterspace programs, it likely
05
maintains the ability to effectively detect, track, characterize, and target any
adversary national security satellites.
06

07
1.6 — U.S. COUNTERSPACE POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION

08
Assessment /
The United States has had established doctrine and policy on counterspace
09
capabilities for several decades, although not always publicly expressed. Most
U.S. presidential administrations since the 1960s have directed or authorized
10
research and development of counterspace capabilities, and in some cases
greenlit testing or operational deployment of counterspace systems. These
11
capabilities have typically been limited in scope and designed to counter a
specific military threat, rather than be used as a broad coercive or deterrent
12
threat. The U.S. military doctrine for space control includes defensive space
control (DSC), offensive space control (OSC), and is supported by space
13
situational awareness (SSA).

14
The United States recently underwent a major reorganization of its military
space activities as part of a renewed focus on space as a warfighting domain.
15
Since 2014, U.S. policymakers have placed increased focus on space security,
and have increasingly talked publicly about preparing for a potential “war in
space.” This rhetoric has been accompanied by a renewed focus on reorganizing
national security space structures and increasing the resilience of space
systems. This has culminated in the reestablishment of U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM) and the creation of the U.S. Space Force (USSF), which assumed
the responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command for space warfighting and
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) for operating, training, and equipping of
space forces, respectively. To date, the missions of these new organizations
are largely a continuation of previous military space missions, although some
have advocated for expanding their focus to include cislunar activities and
01-3 2
more offensive weapons. It is possible that the United States has also begun 173 Brent Scowcroft, “Follow-up on Satellite Vulner-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
ability,” memo to President Gerald Ford, March
developing new offensive counterspace capabilities, although the U.S. has 15, 1976; Brent Scowcroft, “Soviet Anti-Satellite
publicly stated it will not test destructive DA-ASAT weapons. The United States Capability,” memo to President Gerald Ford,
April 26, 1976.
also continues to hold annual space wargames and exercises that increasingly
involve close allies and commercial partners. 174 National Security Decision Memorandum-345,
January 18, 1977; Presidential Directive/NSC-37,
May 11, 1978.
Specifics /
175 “National Space Policy of the United
States of America,” The White House,
U.S. National Space Policy on Counterspace December 9, 2020, p. 4, https://web.archive.
org/web/20201209213138/https://www.white-
The United States has had established doctrine and policy on counterspace house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
capabilities for several decades, although not always publicly expressed. Most 12/National-Space-Policy.pdf.

recent U.S. presidential administrations have directed or authorized research 176 “United States Space Priorities Framework,”
and development of counterspace capabilities, and in some cases greenlit The White House, December 2021, p. 6,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
testing or operational deployment of counterspace systems. These capabilities uploads/2021/12/United-States-Space-Priori-
have typically been limited in scope and designed to counter a specific military ties-Framework-_-December-1-2021.pdf.

threat, rather than be used as a broad coercive or deterrent threat.

For example, a series of policy memos in the mid-1970s recommended the

development of a limited offensive counterspace capability to destroy a limited 01
number of militarily-important Soviet space systems in a crisis or war.173
The goal was not to deter the Soviets from attacking U.S. space capabilities, 02
but rather create the capability to reduce the Soviet ability to use space
against the United States in a conflict while limiting escalation against U.S. 03
satellites to those in LEO. The memos specifically highlighted the use of
Soviet space systems for targeting long-range anti-ship missiles against U.S. 04
naval forces as the most critical capability to counter. The memos culminated
in presidential decision directives by the Ford and Carter administrations to 05
develop a limited ASAT capability, along with complementary space arms
control initiatives.174 The ASAT capability eventually became the ASM-135 06
missile launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft.
07
More recent U.S. presidential decision directives are still classified, but there
is evidence to suggest there is at least still some policy support for limited 08
offensive counterspace capabilities. For example, the most recent national
space policy, issued by the Trump administration in December 2020, states, 09
“Purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure,
will be considered an infringement of a nation’s rights. Consistent with the 10
defense of those rights, the United States will seek to deter, counter, and
defeat threats in the space domain that are hostile to the national interests of 11
the United States and its allies. Any purposeful interference with or an attack
upon the space systems of the United States or its allies that directly affects 12
national rights will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner,
and domain of our choosing.” 175 13

In December 2021, the Biden administration unveiled its Space Priorities 14

Framework, which states, “The United States will defend its national security
interests from the growing scope and scale of space and counterspace 15
threats…. To deter aggression against U.S., allied, and partner interests in a
manner that contributes to strategic stability, the United States will accelerate
its transition to a more resilient national security space posture and strengthen
its ability to detect and attribute hostile acts in space. The United States also
will take steps to protect its military forces from space-enabled threats.” 176
01-3 3
 177 “Counterspace Operations,” Annex 3-14 U.S. Military Doctrine on Counterspace
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Counterspace Operations, August 27, 2018,

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doctrine-Publica-
The link between these policy statements and offensive counterspace capabilities
tions/AFDP-3-14-Counterspace-Ops/. can be found in the official U.S. military doctrines on space operations. Two
178 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations,
different historical doctrines existed on space operations: an Air Force doctrine
October 26, 2020, https://www.jcs.mil/Por- developed by AFSPC; 177 and a joint doctrine developed by United States
tals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_
14ch1.pdf.
Strategic Command.178 The most recent publicly available versions of these
doctrines are August 2018 and October 2020, respectively. The October 2020
179 Space Doctrine Note, Operations, January
2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/
update to the joint doctrine reintroduced the role of USSPACECOM, realigned
Feb/02/2002931717/-1/-1/0/SDN%20OPERA- space capabilities with existing joint warfighting functions, added details on
TIONS%2025%20JANUARY%202022.PDF.
space threats and threat mitigation. In January 2022, a “Space Doctrine Note,
180 Ibid. p. I-4. Operations” was published to provide additional guidance on space operations
doctrine for the USSF.179
0 4/202 3

181 Space Capstone Publication Spacepower:

Doctrine for Space Forces, USSF, June 2020,
https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/
Space%20Capstone%20Publication_10%20
Under current doctrine, the U.S. military considers USSPACECOM to be a
Aug%202020.pdf. geographic combatant command with an area of responsibility of everywhere
182 Space Doctrine Note (SDN) Operations, USSF,
higher than 100 kilometers above the Earth. Counterspace operations fall
January 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/ under Space Control, which includes offensive space control and defensive
Feb/02/2002931717/-1/-1/0/SDN%20OPERA-
TIONS%2025%20JANUARY%202022.PDF.
space control operations to ensure freedom of action in space and achieve space
01
superiority.180 Threats to space systems are mitigated through space mission
183 Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: NRO, SPACECOM
Craft CONOPS for War in Space,” BreakingDe-
assurance, which includes defensive operations, reconstitution, resilience,
02
fense, May 4, 2020, https://breakingdefense. disaggregation, distribution, diversification, protection, proliferation, and
com/2020/05/exclusive-nro-spacecom-craft-
conops-for-war-in-space/.
deception. Deterrence, by denying an adversary of benefits and displaying
03
the resources and resolve to respond, is critical for deterring attacks on
184 Hitchens, May 4, 2020, ibid.
space systems.
04
Offensive space control (OSC) operations consist of offensive operations
05
conducted for space negation, where negation involves measures to deceive,
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space systems or services. U.S.
06
OSC operations could employ reversible and/or nonreversible means. Defensive
space control (DSC) operations consist of all active and passive measures taken
07
to protect friendly space capabilities from attack, interference, or hazards.
Active space defense consists of actions taken to neutralize imminent space
08
control threats to friendly space forces and space capabilities. Passive space
defense consists of all other measures taken to minimize the effectiveness
09
of on-orbit and terrestrial threats to friendly space forces and friendly space
capabilities, including camouflage, evasion, dispersal, and hardening.
10
The USSF released its first space doctrine in June 2020 with its Space Capstone
11
Publication which articulated how it views spacepower. Included in its guiding
principles are that “[t]The U.S. must adapt its national security space
12
organizations, doctrine, and capabilities to deter and defeat aggression
and protect national interests in space,” that spacepower is inherently global
13
and multidomain, and that military space forces employ spacepower “in, from,
and through the space domain” which necessitates “close collaboration and
14
cooperation with the U.S. Government, Allies, and partners.” 181 It was
supplemented by the January 2022 release of the USSF’s space doctrine
15
note on operations which detailed how operations help the USSF deliver
its cornerstone responsibilities to “preserve freedom of action, enable joint
lethality and effectiveness, and provide independent options.” 182

The NRO and USSPACECOM announced in May 2020 that they were working
on a shared “playbook” for how to protect military and intelligence satellites
during a conflict as part of a joint concept of operations (CONOPS).183 According
to the NRO’s deputy director, this is intended to “strengthen and synchronize
our defensive operations” and to clarify who defends what.184
01-3 4
The latest version of the Unified Command Plan (UCP 2020), which outlines 185 Hitchens, Jan. 28, 2021, ibid.

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
the relationships between the combatant commands, was signed by Trump 186 Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: Milley to OK New
in January 2021.185 This document elucidated USSPACECOM’s roles and Unified Command Plan; Defines SPACECOM’s
Roles,” BreakingDefense, August 26, 2020,
responsibilities compared to the other combat commands and charged https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/exclu-
USSPACECOM with decision-making authority to determine which targets sive-milley-to-sign-new-unified-command-
plan-defines-spacecoms-roles/.
will be tracked via space assets and who has priority for using communications
satellites during a conflict.186 It also gave USSPACECOM some new responsibilities: 187 Hitchens, Aug. 26, 2020, ibid.

“global sensor manager” and “global satcom bandwidth manager.” 187 188 Dyke Weatherington, testimony before the
House Committee on Armed Forced, Strategic
Forces Subcommittee, March 25, 2015, p.3,
Recent Policy Shifts https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
Since 2014, U.S. policymakers have placed increased focus on space security, AS29/20150325/103106/HHRG-114-AS29-
Wstate-WeatheringtonD-20150325.pdf.
and have increasingly talked publicly about preparing for a potential “war in
space” and about space being a “warfighting domain.” Between May and August 189 Mike Gruss, “U.S. spending on space protection
could hit $8 billion through 2020,” SpaceNews,
2014, the Department of Defense convened a Space Strategic Portfolio Review July 2, 2015, http://spacenews.com/u-s-spend-
(SPR),188 which concluded there was a need to identify threats in space, be ing-on-space-protection-could-hit-8-billion-
through-2020.
able to withstand aggressive counterspace programs, and counter adversary
space capabilities.189 Following the SPR, senior military leadership began to 190 John E. Hyten, “Overcoming Our Space
Vulnerabilities,” Speech at the Space and
talk publicly about the inevitability of conflict on earth extending to space and Missile Defense Symposium, August 12, 2014,
the need for the military to prepare to defend itself in space.190 There was also http://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Lead-
01
ership-Speeches/Speeches/Display/Arti-
increased focus on preparing to “fight a war in space,” even though senior cle/731712/overcoming-our-space-vulner-
U.S. military leaders expressed no desire to start one.191 In November 2021, abilities/; Bob Work, “Remarks at the Space
02
Symposium,” April 12, 2016, https://www.
General David Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the Space Force, defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/
encapsulated much of the besieged language U.S. government officials have Article/723498/remarks-at-the-space-sympo-
03
sium/.
been using to describe the current state of space when he told a reporter that
U.S. satellites were being targeted by reversible attacks “every single day.” 192 191 Steve Liewer, “’The World is Still a Very Dangerous
04
Place’: Gen. Hyten Takes Helm of StratCom at
A shift in tone was also seen in academic writings from U.S. military journals a Time of Increasing Global Tensions,” Omaha
calling for renewed focus on fighting wars in space and offensive space control.193 World-Herald, November 4, 2016, http://
05
www.omaha.com/news/military/the-world-is-
The U.S. Congress also weighed in, calling in 2014 for a study on how to deter still-a-very-dangerous-place-gen-hyten/arti-
and defeat adversary attacks on U.S. space systems, and specifically the role cle_6d2e4828-a1ec-11e6-a1d2-5f806ae563fa.
06
html; “AFSPC Commander Announces Space
of offensive space operations.194 This concern was echoed in the 2023 National Enterprise Vision,” Air Force Space Command
Defense Authorization Act, released in December 2022, which acknowledged Public Affairs, April 11, 2016, http://www.afspc.
07
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/730817/
“the need to shift to a more resilient and defendable national security space afspc-commander-announces-space-enter-
architecture” and required DoD to create a “strategy and requirements for the prise-vision/.
08
protection of DoD satellites.” 195 192 Josh Rogin, “Opinion: A shadow war in space is
heating up fast,” Washington Post, November
09
30, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2021/11/30/space-race-china-david-
thompson/.
10
193 B.T. Cesul, “A Global Space Control Strategy,” Air
and Space Power Journal, November-December
11
2014: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185638/
ASPJ-Nov-Dec-2014Full.pdf; Adam P. Jodice,
Mark R. Guerber, “Space Combat Capability…
12
Do We Have It?” Air and Space Power Journal,
November-December 2014, https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/185638/ASPJ-Nov-Dec-2014Full.pdf.
13
194 House Resolution 3979 – Carl Levin and
Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
14
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 113th
United States Congress, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3979/text.
15
195 Sandra Erwin, “NDAA compromise bill wants
more focus on satellite protection, responsive
launch,” Space News, December 7, 2022,
https://spacenews.com/ndaa-compromise-bill-
wants-more-focus-on-satellite-protection-re-
sponsive-launch/.
01-3 5
 196 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump On March 23, 2018, the Trump administration issued a new National Space
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

is unveiling an America first National Space

Strategy,” Whitehouse.gov, March 23, 2018,
Strategy (NSS) that echoed similar themes as expressed at the end of the
https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/up- Obama administration but with more aggressive rhetoric.196 The aggressive
loads/2018/09/Trump-National-Space-Strategy.
pdf.
rhetoric from the Trump administration increased in the latter half of 2018
and throughout 2019. In various speeches and rallies promoting the USSF,
197 The White House, “Remarks by President
Trump at Signing Ceremony for Space Policy
then President Trump called for the United States to “dominate” space. In his
Directive-4 (Space Policy Comments Excerpt)”, remarks during the signing ceremony for establishing the USSF, then President
SpaceRef.com, February 19, 2019, http://space-
ref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=52251.
Trump said the United States was developing “a lot of new defensive weapons
and offensive weapons” that they were now “going to take advantage of” with
198 For example, the formal strategy proposal
for the Space Force does not include the
the USSF.197 Yet official U.S. policy statements on space security issues issued
word “dominate”. See https://media.defense. by the Trump Administration, or at least the public ones, continue to reflect
gov/2019/Mar/01/2002095012/-1/-1/1/UNITED-
a more moderate tone and did not explicitly outline the development of new
0 4/202 3

STATES-SPACE-FORCE-STRATEGIC-OVERVIEW.
PDF. offensive space weapons.198
199 Michael Sheetz, “Pentagon calls for stop to
anti-satellite weapons testing after Russian In December 2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks stated, “We
demo debris threatened ISS,” CNBC, December
1, 2021, Pentagon calls for stop to anti-satellite
would like to see all nations agree to refrain from anti-satellite weapons testing
weapons testing (cnbc.com). that creates debris,” 199 leading to some speculation that the United States
200 “Fact Sheet: Vice President Harris Advances
might be soon supporting an ASAT test moratorium. The United States did
01
National Security Norms in Space,,” indeed announce in April 2022 that it was making the commitment not to
White House, April 18, 2022, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
conduct destructive anti-satellite missile tests. 200 Over the next six months,
02
statements-releases/2022/04/18/ it was followed by Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom,
fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-na-
tional-security-norms-in-space/.
Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Australia, and France making similar commitments.
03
201 Lloyd Austin, “Tenets of REsponsible Behavior
in Space,” U.S. Department of Defense, July
The Department of Defense is also increasing its focus on resiliency and
04
7, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/ norms of behavior as a way in which to also ensure its continued access to and
Jul/23/2002809598/-1/-1/0/TENETS-OF-RE-
SPONSIBLE-BEHAVIOR-IN-SPACE.PDF.
use of space. In July 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin released the first
05
“Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,” a set of norms that USSPACECOM
202 DoD Directive 3100.10: Space Policy, August
30, 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/
would use to guide their military space operations.201 In August 2023, an update
06
Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/310010p.PDF. to DoD Directive 3100.10, “Space Policy,” was released that directed compliance
203 DoD Directive 3100.10: Space Policy, ibid.
with the tenets.202 Directive 3100.10 also directed the DOD to develop and
07
field capabilities that counter hostile uses of space; develop capabilities, resilient
204 Theresa Hitchens, “EXCLUSIVE: US Strategic
Space Review signed out, but no unclassified
architectures, and options for capability reconstitution to reduce vulnerabilities
08
version is coming,” BreakingDefense, and deny benefits from attacking U.S. space systems; and promote long-term
November 1, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
com/2022/11/exclusive-us-strategic-space-re-
sustainability of the space environment; cooperate with like-minded international
09
view-signed-out-but-no-unclassified-version- partners to establish, demonstrate, and uphold norms of safe and responsible
is-coming/.
behavior; and cooperate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies
10
205 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. national security space to act as a good steward of the domain.” 203
strategy emphasizes resilient systems,
responsible behavior,” Space News, December

11
14, 2022, https://spacenews.com/u-s-nation- In November 2022, it was reported that the United States had finished its
al-security-space-strategy-emphasizes-resil-
ient-systems-responsible-behavior/.
most recent Strategic Space Review, conducted jointly by the Director of
12
National Intelligence and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but that
206 Lloyd Austin, “Tenet Derived Responsible
Behaviors in Space,” U.S. Department of
an unclassified version would not be released.204 DoD officials were able to
13
Defense, February 9, 2023, https://www.space- broadly discuss what it included: listed as priorities were for the DoD to, in the
com.mil/Newsroom/Publications/Pub-Display/
Article/3318615/tenet-derived-responsible-be-
words of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb, “build
14
haviors-in-space/. a resilient national security space architecture” and “lead in the responsible
Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force chief outlines
207
and peaceful use of space,” as part of its guidance “to protect and defend our
15
3-part ‘competitive endurance’ theory aimed at national security interests” against counterspace attacks.205
‘space superiority’,” Breaking Defense, March 7,
2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/
space-force-chief-outlines-3-part-competitive-en- In February 2023, USSPACECOM released an updated version of the tenets
durance-theory-aimed-at-space-superiority/.
that added eight specific proposed behaviors for the Department of Defense’s
operations in the space area of responsibility.206

In March 2023, General Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations unveiled

the broad strokes of a new “theory of success” for the USSF through a
“Commander’s Note” issued to the service.207 General Saltzman stated that
the formative purpose of the USSF was to “contest, and when directed, control
the space domain on behalf of the joint force.” In doing so, the USSF needed
01-3 6
to focus on three core tenets: space domain awareness, using resilience to deter 208 Larry James, “The Challenge of Integration:

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Lessons from Schriever Wargame 2010”, High
attack, and ‘responsible’ counterspace activities that avoided destruction of Frontier, Vol 7 No 1, November 2010, https://
satellites that would create orbital debris. www.afspc.af.mil/Portals/3/documents/HF/
AFD-101116-028.pdf.

U.S. Space and Counterspace Organization 209 Cheryl Pellerin, “Stratcom, DoD Sign Space
Operations Agreement with Allies,” Defense.
Since the early 2000s, there had been an on-going debate about the gov, September 23, 2014, https://www.defense.
organization of U.S. military space activities. The recruit, train, and equip gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/603303/strat-
com-dod-sign-space-operations-agreement-
functions normally done by a service were assigned to the Department of the with-allies/.
Air Force, and the operational warfighting functions were assigned to U.S.
210 USSPACECOM Public Affairs, “Combined Space
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In the 2010s, the debate was revitalized Operations Initiative Welcomes France and
by the increased concern expressed above over adversary counterspace Germany,” United States Space Command,
February 12, 2020, https://www.spacecom.
capabilities, and also a desire to increase coordination with allies and mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2083368/
commercial partners. Since 2010, there have been numerous efforts to bridge combined-space-operations-initiative-wel-
comes-france-and-germany/.
this gap. The 2010 edition of the then-biennial Schriever wargame exercised
the concept of a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) that integrated 211 “Combined Space Operations Center / 614th Air
Operations Center,” U.S. Strategic Command,
allies and commercial partners into the decision-making during the scenarios.208 July 2018, https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/
Following the wargame, USSTRATCOM began working on plans to make the Documents/CSpOC_Factsheet_2018.pdf.

CSpOC a reality. Initially, it was brought to life in the form of the Combined 212 Sandra Erwin, “Congressman Rogers: A Space
Space Operations (CSpO) concept, which involved each partner creating their Corps is ‘Inevitable,’” SpaceNews, December 2,
01
2017, http://spacenews.com/congressman-rog-
own national space operations center and establishing lines of communication ers-a-space-corps-is-inevitable/.
and coordination between them. The founding partners were the United 02
213 Katie Rogers, “Trump orders establishment
States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.209 New Zealand was added of Space Force as sixth military branch,” The
in 2015, and France and Germany joined in 2019.210 In addition to maintaining New York Times, June 18, 2018, https://www.
03
nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/trump-
their own national centers, U.S. Strategic Command’s JSpOC was renamed the space-force-sixth-military-branch.html.
CSpOC and included CSpO exchange officers and a Commercial Integration 04
214 The White House, “Text of Space Policy
Cell (CIC).211 Directive-4: Establishment of the United States
Space Force”, Whitehouse.gov, February
05
19, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/
The organizational debate came to a head in the mid-2010s when the U.S. Mar/01/2002095015/-1/-1/1/SPACE-POLICY-DI-
Congress criticized the USAF for its handling of space programs and forced RECTIVE-4-FINAL.PDF.
06
a debate over reorganizing national security space, potentially by creating a 215 The White House, “Text of a memorandum from
separate entity such as a Space Corps.212 Then President Donald Trump added the President to the Secretary of Defense
07
regarding the establishment of the United
further impetus to this debate by making a surprise call in June 2018 for the States Space Command”, Whitehouse.gov,
creation of a separate Department of the Space Force.213 But Space Policy December 18, 2018, https://aerospace.org/
08
sites/default/files/2019-01/US%20Space%20
Directive (SPD)-4, released by the Trump administration in February 2019, Command%20memo%2018Dec18.pdf.
settled on a more moderate approach that would create the Space Force 09
216 Jim Garamone, “Pentagon Rolls Out Space
as a new military service within the Department of the Air Force.214 Separately, Command,” U.S. Department of Defense,
there were also calls to resurrect U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) August 29, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/
10
Explore/News/Article/Article/1948420/penta-
as the combatant command to take over space warfighting duties from gon-rolls-out-space-command/.
USSTRATCOM.215 11
217 Theresa Hitchens, “SPACECOM to Write New
Ops War Plan: 100km and Up,” Breaking
USSPACECOM was officially re-established as the 11th combatant command Defense, September 16, 2019, https://breaking-
12
defense.com/2019/09/spacecom-to-write-new-
on August 29, 2019, in a ceremony at the White House Rose Garden.216 ops-war-plan-100km-and-up/.
General Raymond was named as Commander of USSPACECOM, which was 13
218 Commander’s Strategic Vision, January 2021, p. 6.
established as a geographic combatant command with authority for all U.S.
military operations above 100 km altitude.217 The mission of USSPACECOM is 219 Ibid.
14
to deter aggression and conflict, defend U.S. and allied interests, deliver space
combat power, and develop ready and lethal joint warfighters.218 Initially, 15
USSPACECOM was intended to consist of two subordinate commands, each of
which was composed of several already existing commands and operations
centers. Combined Force Space Component Command (CFSCC) plans, tasks,
directs, monitors, and assesses the execution of combined and joint space
operations for theater effects. The Joint Task Force Space Defense ( JTF-SD),
in unified action with mission partners, deters aggression, defends capabilities,
and defeats adversaries throughout the continuum of conflict. Schriever
Space Force Base in Colorado.219 In November 2021, General James Dickinson,
commander of USSPACECOM, signed off on the creation of a new operational
component command, the Combined Joint Task Force-Space Operations
01-37
 220 Staff Report, “USSPACECOM establishes a (CJTF-SO), which will eventually combine JTF-SD and CFSCC to streamline
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Combined Joint Task Force,” U.S. Space

Command, November 15, 2022, https://www.
reporting chains under USSPACECOM and USSF.220
spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Dis-
play/Article/3218630/usspacecom-establishes-
a-combined-joint-task-force/.
In May 2020, General Raymond signed the first operations order as
Commander of USSPACECOM for Operation Olympic Defender (OOD),
221 Theresa Hitchens, “‘Major Milestone’ as Allies
Join SPACECOM’s War Plan,” BreakingDefense.
USSPACECOM’s plan to protect U.S. and allied satellites during a conflict. 221
com, May 21, 2020, https://breakingdefense. OOD was created by USSTRATCOM in 2013 and opened for ally participation
com/2020/05/major-milestone-as-allies-join-
spacecoms-war-plan/.
in 2018.222 The United Kingdom became the first ally to join OOD in July 2019.223

222 Hitchens, May 21, 2020, ibid.

The USSF was formally created on December 20, 2019, with then President
223 “USSPACECOM releases first formal order Trump’s signing of the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act.224
to execute multinational space operations,”
The signing followed an intense debate between the House, Senate, and
0 4/202 3

USSPACECOM, May 21, 2020, https://www.

spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Arti- White House throughout much of 2019. The compromise signed into law more
cle/2194150/usspacecom-releases-first-for-
mal-order-to-execute-multinational-space-op-
closely resembles the Space Corps idea pushed by the House in 2017 than the
erations/. separate department then President Trump wanted in June 2018.225 The USSF
224 Leonard David, “Trump Officially Establishes US
is a separate military service with independent powers to train, equip, and
Space Force with 2020 Defense Bill Signing,” operate, but exists within the Department of the Air Force to reduce overhead.
Space.com, December 21, 2019, https://www.
space.com/trump-creates-space-force-2020-
Initially, the USSF consisted only of members of the USAF and was stood up
01
defense-bill.html. over 18 months, beginning by re-designating AFSPC as the USSF. The USSF
225 Kaitlyn Johnson, “Congress Approved the
has about 8,100 personnel as of February 2023,226 but is planned to eventually
02
Space Force. Now What?,” Center for Strategic grow to 16,000.
and International Studies, December 19, 2020,
http://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/up-

03
loads/2019/12/NDAA-Space-Force.2.pdf. The USSF is organized into multiple commands: training is handled by the
226 Rachel Cohen, “New in 2023: Saltzman leads
Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM); operations by Space
04
Space Force into its 4th year,” Air Force Times, Operations Command (SpOC); and acquisitions by Space Systems Command
January 3, 2023, https://www.airforcetimes.
com/news/your-air-force/2023/01/03/new-in-
(SSC).227 Within each command are a number of Space Deltas, many of which
05
2023-saltzman-leads-space-force-into-its-4th- are rebranded space operations squadrons that formerly existed under
year/.
AFSC. The Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC) is a direct reporting unit
06
227 Brian W. Everstine, “Space Force Announces intended to develop “force design” for USSF mission areas, like ISR or missile
Significant Reorganization,” Air Force Magazine,
July 24, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/
warning and tracking, and is headquartered in Washington, DC.228
space-force-organizations-take-shape-as-se-
07
lection-boards-meet/.
STARCOM was activated in August 2021 and is charged with training the
08
228 Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: Space acquisition Guardians (what members of the USSF are called), building out space doctrine
shop set for another re-org, following Congress-
backed SWAC model,” BreakingDefense,
and tactics, and establishing testing and evaluation of the USSF.229 As part of
09
December 20, 2021, https://breakingdefense. this training, STARCOM is looking at what level of baseline capability is needed
com/2021/12/exclusive-space-acquisition-
shop-set-for-another-re-org-following-con-
for the USSF’s National Space Test and Training Complex (NSTTC), which would
10
gress-backed-swac-model/. help provide realistic training for Guardians.230
229 “Space Force activates Space Training and

11
Readiness Command,” AFNS, August 24, 2021, SSC is based on Air Force Space Command’s Space and Missile Systems Center
https://www.spacewar.com/reports/Space_
Force_activates_Space_Training_and_Readi-
and is headquartered at Los Angeles Air Force Base in California. SSC announced
12
ness_Command_999.html. a reorganization in March 2022 that is intended to help acquisitions become
230 Courtney Albon, “Space Force envisions digital
better integrated and to pivot significantly to a resilient architecture.” 231 The
13
future for testing and training,” C4ISRNet. USSF created the Space Force Acquisition Council as part of its efforts to carry
com, June 15, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/
battlefield-tech/space/2022/06/15/space-
out the responsibilities of being designated the lead integrator for joint space
14
force-envisions-digital-future-for-testing-and- requirements; representatives from the SSC, MDA, and NRO, among others,
training/.
discuss their programs with the goal of making their work complementary.232
231 Sandra Erwin, “Raymond: Space Force in 2022
15
to focus on the design of a resilient architecture,”
Space News, January 18, 2022, https://space-
news.com/raymond-space-force-in-2022-to-fo-
cus-on-the-design-of-a-resilient-architecture/.

232 Nathan Strout, “Space enterprise more

unified than ever, says Space Force chief,”
Defense News, September 21, 2021, https://
www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/
space/2021/09/21/space-enterprise-more-uni-
fied-than-ever-says-space-force-chief/.
01-3 8
USSF is also actively developing dedicated space intelligence capabilities. In 233 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force intelligence

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
organization established at Wright Patterson
October 2021 the Space Force Intelligence Activity (SFIA) was created as an Air Force Base,” Space News, October 4, 2021,
interim step until the National Space Intelligence Center is eventually stood https://spacenews.com/space-force-es-
tablishes-intelligence-analysis-organiza-
up by the USSF.233 Space Force Delta 18 was created in June 2022 to be able to tion-at-wright-patterson-air-force-base/.
provide intelligence on threats and foreign space capabilities to U.S. policy-
234 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force establishes
makers; it will run the National Space Intelligence Center at Wright-Patterson intelligence unit to put sharper focus on orbital
Air Force Base in Ohio.234 threats,” Space News, June 24, 2022, https://
spacenews.com/space-force-establishes-intel-
ligence-unit-to-put-sharper-focus-on-orbital-
Both the USSF and USSPACECOM have also taken specific organizational threats/.

steps to address the cyber security of space capabilities. In April 2021, 235 Jackson Barnett, “Space Command to launch
USSPACECOM announced it was standing up a Joint Cyber Center to focus Joint Cyber Center,” FedScoop, April 20, 2021,
https://www.fedscoop.com/space-command-
on cybersecurity of satellites and space-based communications and to joint-cyber-center/.
help it integrate with other DoD cyber organizations. 235 In May 2021, the
236 Shaun Waterman, “Space Force Looks to Boost
Space Systems Command of the USSF stated it was developing a digital Cyber Defenses of Satellites with Acquisition
twinning technology to improve the cyber security of future military space Reorganization,” Air Force Magazine, May
10, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/
architectures.236 The USSF’s Space Delta 6 (the “Cyber” Delta) was planning space-force-looks-to-boost-cyber-defens-
to expand the number of squadrons it had in summer 2022 so it could provide es-of-satellites-with-acquisition-reorganization/.

nearly all the other Space Deltas with cyber squadrons to protect their 237 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force adding
mission systems.237 In general, cybersecurity is a serious concern for the USSF: new cyber squads, improving satellite
01
control,” BreakingDefense, May 27, 2022,
Space Operations Command (SpOC) head Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/
called cybersecurity “the soft underbelly of these global space networks.” 238 space-force-adding-new-cyber-squads-improv-
02
ing-satellite-control/.

The USSF also has created four new Space Force service components to 238 Chris Gordon, “Cybersecurity Is the ‘Soft
03
Underbelly’ of Space Operations, SpOC
support regional combatant commands in South Korea, the Middle East, Europe, Commander Says,” Air & Space Forces
and the Pacific.239 Magazine, October 14, 2022, https://www.
04
airandspaceforces.com/cybersecuri-
ty-is-the-soft-underbelly-of-space-opera-
Members of Congress have been discussing creating a Space National Guard tions-spoc-commander-says/.
05
as a reserve component for the USSF to tap into the expertise at the state 239 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force takes first
level: eight states and Guam have about 2,000 personnel specializing in space step to establish components in commands
06
from Europe to Asia,” BreakingDefense,
operations, mostly from their state National Guards.240 November 29, 2021, https://breakingdefense.
com/2021/11/space-force-takes-first-step-to-
07
establish-components-in-commands-from-eu-
U.S. Counterspace Budget and Exercises rope-to-asia/.
Despite this increased rhetoric, the unclassified U.S. national security space 08
240 Sandra Erwin, “Lamborn and Crow propose
budget contains a relatively small amount of funding for dedicated counterspace establishment of Space Force National Guard,”
programs (excluding SSA) but has seen recent increases. Between FY2016 and Space News, August 30, 2021, https://space-
09
news.com/lamborn-and-crow-propose-estab-
FY2017, the total unclassified research, development, testing, and evaluation lishment-of-space-force-national-guard/.
(RDT&E) budget for counterspace programs increased from $24.1 million to 10
241 Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification:
$41.9 million,241 and it increased again in FY2018 to $68.38 million.242 Nearly FY 2018 Air Force, Vol. 2, Program Element: PE
all of the increase was to support the development of the 10.3 version of the 1206421F / Counterspace Systems, May 2017:
11
p. 403, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: FY
CCS electronic warfare system. The FY2018 budget also included $28.8 million 2018 Air Force, May 2017: p. 403, https://www.
to purchase two new 10.2 versions of CCS for active-duty USAF and Air National saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/Air%20
12
Force%20Research,%20Development,%20
Guard units.243 The FY2019 budget for these same programs decreased to Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Vol-II%20FY18.
$26.7 million.244 It is possible that additional dedicated counterspace programs, pdf?ver=2017-05-23-160041-060.
13
and possibly programs with potential counterspace utility, are funded through 242 Ibid, p. 697.
the classified budget. The United States also spends nearly $8 billion a year 14
243 Ibid, p. 697.
on missile defense capabilities, several of which could have counterspace
applications.245 244 Ibid, p. 751.
15
245 Missile Defense Agency Fiscal Year (FY) 2018
In March 2019, the Pentagon released its FY2020 budget request, which listed Budget Estimates Overview, Missile Defense
Agency, 17-MDA-9186, May 15, 2017, https://
“investing in the emerging space and cyber warfighting domains” as a major www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budget-
priority. While there was an overall increase of 22 percent in requested funding fy18.pdf.

for military space programs, space control and counterspace programs saw 246 Velos, PB20 budget summary document, March
a 46 percent decrease in requested funding.246 The majority of this change 20, 2019, https://files.constantcontact.com/
bd3dd1d9401/1fd41231-1164-4c82-8d0e-
5c30be4680dc.pdf.
01-3 9
 247 Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Line Item Justification: was a shift of an AF TENCAP program to another budget line. Other programs
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

PB2020 Air Force, Vol. 2, Program Element

1206421F / Counterspace Systems, March 2019,
such as CCS, BOUNTY HUNTER, and Offensive Counterspace C2 continued
p. 997, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/ at modest funding levels.247 In February 2020, the Pentagon released its
documents/FY20/RDTE/FY20_PB_RDTE_Vol-II.
PDF?ver=2019-03-18-153506-683#[page=997.
FY2021 budget request, which included an increase of 36 percent in funding
for counterspace programs, mainly due to accelerating the development of
248 Valerie Insinna, “Space Force Asks for $15B in
First Budget Request,” DefenseNews, February
additional CCS systems. The Pentagon also asked for $77 million in overseas
10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/ contingency operations funding to support counterspace operations.248 The
federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-space-forces-
15-billion-budget-for-fy21-shows-a-service-in-
DoD budget request released in April 2022 asked for $63 million for counterspace
transition/. systems in FY2023 as part of its procurement budget line, increasing to $67
249 LI CTRSPC - Counterspace Systems, Budget
million in FY2024, and then dropping considerably to $4 million in FY2025 and
Justifications FY2023 Air Force, Procurement: eventually $2 million in FY2027.249 $60 million was eventually appropriated
Space Force, April 2022, vol. 1-11, https://www.
for it in FY 2023.250 RDT&E for the Space Force included $58 million for space
0 4/202 3

saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/
PROCUREMENT_/FY23%20Space%20Force%20 control programs and anticipated increases every year through FY2027, when
Procurement.pdf?ver=vMyfar1xW31ifPH-
Fc-mz6A%3d%3d.
the annual request is planned to be for $63 million. 251 The final amount
appropriated in FY2023 for space control technology was $50 million.252
250 “FY2023 Final Appropriations Mission Profiles,”
Velos, December 22, 2022, https://files.
constantcontact.com/bd3dd1d9401/c741b650- The United States has also held multiple wargames and exercises over the
75a0-4e84-9518-88578318935b.pdf?rdr=true.
last 25 years to practice and refine its counterspace doctrine. The most well-
01
251 PE 1206438SF / Space Control Technology, known is the Schriever Wargame, which began in the mid-1990s as a biennial
Budget Justifications FY 2023 Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation, Space Force,
tabletop exercise to look at how advanced space technologies influenced
02
April 2022, vol. 1-155, https://www.saffm. future conflicts in space. In recent years, the Schriever Wargame has become
hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY23/RDTE_/
FY23%20Space%20Force%20Research%20
an annual event that also explored policy and strategy issues, diplomatic,
03
Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation. economic, military, and information activities, and included participation
pdf?ver=I2npdFjyjdbiZU_fpVnOAw%3d%3d.
from a growing number of allied military and commercial partners. The 2018
04
252 “FY2023 Final Appropriations Mission Profiles,” Schriever Wargame looked at a scenario involving a notional peer space and
Velos, December 22, 2022, https://files.
constantcontact.com/bd3dd1d9401/c741b650-
cyberspace competitor in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)
05
75a0-4e84-9518-88578318935b.pdf?rdr=true. AOR and included participation from Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
253 Tracy Cozzens, “Schriever Wargame 2018
Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.253 In 2017, the USAF also held
06
concludes,” GPS World, October 19, 2018, the first Space Flag exercise. Modeled after the USAF’s Red Flag air combat
https://www.gpsworld.com/schriever-war-
game-2018-concludes/.
exercise at Nellis Air Force Base, the Space Flag exercise focused on practicing
07
and training for space warfare.254 The 13th Space Flag (Space Flag 22-1) was
254 Phillip Swarts, “Air Force Launches ‘Space Flag’
Exercise Inspired by IMAX-Worthy Red Flag
held in December 2021 and was the third Space Flag that included partners
08
War Games,” Space News, May 3, 2017, http:// like Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.255 Space Flag 22-3 was held in
spacenews.com/air-force-launches-space-flag-
exercise-inspired-by-imax-worthy-red-flag-
August 2022 and included for the first time the 5th Electronic Warfare Squadron;
09
war-games/. it was followed in December 2022 by Space Flag 23-1, which included U.S.
255 Mike Stone, “U.S. Space Force holds war game
Army space operations officers and members from the Australian, Canadian, and
10
to test satellite network under attack,” Reuters, U.K. militaries.256 The USAF’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS)
December 13, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/
business/aerospace-defense/us-space-force-
held an exercise in April 2020 that was intended to support USSPACECOM as
11
holds-war-game-test-satellite-network-under- its space assets came under simulated attack.257
attack-2021-12-14/.

256 “STARCOM executes first JNTC-accredited,

12
largest SPACE FLAG exercise ever,” Space
Training and Readiness Command Public
Affairs / August 22, 2022, https://www.
13
spaceforce.mil/News/Article/3135368/
starcom-executes-first-jntc-accredited-larg-
est-space-flag-exercise-ever/; Jason Cutshaw,
14
“Army space professionals participate in
exercise Space Flag,” U.S. Army public affairs,
December 28, 2022, https://www.army.mil/
15
article/263011/army_space_professionals_par-
ticipate_in_exercise_space_flag.

257 Theresa Hitchens, “Attack On US Satellites Focus

Of Next ABMS Test: Goldfein,” BreakingDefense,
March 3, 2020, https://breakingdefense.
com/2020/03/attack-on-us-satellites-focus-of-
next-abms-test-goldfein/.
01-4 0
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
37.6173°E
02

R U SSIA
55.7558°N
Over the last two decades, Russia has refocused its effort on regaining many

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
of the space capabilities it lost following the end of the Cold War. For the first
several decades of the Space Age, the Soviet Union developed a robust set of
governmental space programs that matched, or exceeded, the United States
in many areas. While often not quite as technologically advanced as their U.S.
counterparts, the Soviets nonetheless managed to field significant national
security space capabilities.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed a range of counterspace
capabilities as part of its strategic competition with the United States. Many
of these capabilities were developed for specific military utility, like destroying
critical U.S. military satellites or countering perceived threats, such as the
Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Some of them underwent
significant on-orbit testing and were considered operationally deployed.
However, the Soviet Union also signed bilateral arms control agreements
with the United States that put limits on the use of counterspace capabilities
against certain satellites. Many of these programs were scrapped or mothballed
in the early 1990s as the Cold War ended and funding dried up.
01
There is strong evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs over
the last decade to regain some of its Cold War-era counterspace capabilities. 02
In some cases, the evidence suggests legacy capabilities are being brought
out of mothballs, and in other cases, the evidence points to new, modern 03
versions being developed such as the Nudol DA-ASAT. In all cases, Russia has
a strong technical legacy to draw upon. Under President Putin, Russia also 04
has renewed political will to obtain counterspace capabilities for much the
same reason as China: to bolster its regional power and limit the ability of the 05
United States to impede on Russia’s freedom of action.
06
Unlike China, there is also significant evidence that Russia is actively employing
non-destructive counterspace capabilities in current military conflicts. There 07
are multiple, credible reports of Russia using jamming and other electronic
warfare measures in Ukraine, as well as cyber counterspace weapons, and 08
there are indications that these capabilities are tightly integrated into Russian
military operations in other regions as well. 09

The following sections summarize Russian counterspace development across 10

co-orbital, direct ascent, directed energy, electronic warfare, and space
situational awareness categories, along with a summary of Russia’s policy, 11
doctrine, and military organizational framework on counterspace.
12

2.1 — RUSSIAN CO-ORBITAL ASAT 13

Assessment / 14
There is strong evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs since
2010 to regain many of its Cold War-era counterspace capabilities. Since 2010, 15
Russia has been testing technologies for RPO in both LEO and GEO that could
lead to or support a co-orbital ASAT capability, and some of those efforts have
links to a Cold War-era LEO co-orbital ASAT program. Additional evidence suggests
Russia may have started a new co-orbital ASAT program called Burevestnik,
potentially supported by a surveillance and tracking program called Nivelir.
The technologies developed by these programs could also be used for non-
aggressive applications, including surveilling and inspecting foreign satellites,
and most of the on-orbit RPO activities done to date match these missions.
However, Russia has deployed two “sub-satellites” at high velocity, which
suggests at least some of their LEO RPO activities are of a weapons nature.
02-01
 1 Anatoly Zak, “IS Anti-satellite System,” Specifics /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Russian Space Web, last modified July 13, 2017,

http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had multiple efforts to develop, test,
and deploy co-orbital ASAT capabilities. Many different concepts for the
2 J.-C. Liou, “History of On-Orbit satellite
Fragmentations,” NASA Orbital Debris Program
deployment of co-orbital weapons were considered, including lasers, missile
Office, 15th Edition, July 4, 2018, https://ntrs. platforms, manned and unmanned gunnery platforms, robotic manipulators,
nasa.gov/api/citations/20180008451/down-
loads/20180008451.pdf.
particle beams, shotgun-style pellet cannons, and nuclear space mines, but
most died on the drawing board. HTK co-orbital ASATs are one of the few
3 Bart Hendrickx, “Naryad-V and the
Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet,”
known to have achieved operational status.
Space Chronicle, Vol 69, 2016, available at
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nary-
ad-V-and-the-Soviet-Anti-Satellite-Fleet-Hen-
IS and IS-M
drickx/414e786666492c48af754bdf5f383e- The first known serious effort was the Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS) or “satellite
34cea77c6f.
fighter” system, which was conceived in the late 1950s and began development
0 4/202 3

in the 1960s.1 The system featured a launch vehicle based on the R-36 (U.S.
designation SS-9) missile based from dedicated launch pads at Baikonur
Cosmodrome in southern Kazakhstan (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-10). After
being launched into orbit, the interceptor would separate from the booster, make
multiple changes to its orbit so that it passed close to the target object, and
then explode to release shrapnel that had an approximate effective range of 50
01
m. A shortcoming of the system is that it needed at least two orbits to do this,
and the target object had several hours to detect the attack and alter its own
02
trajectory.

03
The IS system was tested in orbit multiple times over three decades, with
several actual intercepts against targets between 230 and 1,000 km and the
04
creation of nearly 900 pieces of orbital space debris larger than 10 cm. Many
of the events are described in detail in the NASA History of On-orbit Satellite
05
Fragmentations.2

06
Table 2-1 shows the known tests of the IS system and its follow-ons. The first
round of testing began in 1963 and concluded in 1971, with the system being
07
declared operational in February 1973.3

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
02-02
 4 Data compiled from multiple sources and

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
TABLE 2-1 — IS TESTS CONDUCTED BY THE SOVIET UNION 4 available here: https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheets/u/1/d/1e5GtZEzdo6xk41i2_
DATE TARGET OBJECT INTERCEPTOR NOTES ei3c8jRZDjvP4Xwz3BVsUHwi48/edit?us-
p=drive_web.
Nov. 1, 1963 None Polyot 1 Engine and maneuvering test

Apr. 12, 1964 None Polyot 2 Engine and maneuvering test

Oct. 27, 1967 None Cosmos 185 (IS) First test launch of IS interceptor

Oct. 20, 1968 Cosmos 248 Cosmos 249, Cosmos Attacked twice: by Cosmos 249 on Oct.
252 (IS) 20 and by Cosmos 252 on Nov. 1

Oct. 23, 1970 Cosmos 373 Cosmos 374, Cosmos Attacked twice: by Cosmos 374 on Oct.
375(IS) 23 and by Cosmos 375 on Oct. 30

Feb. 25, 1971 Cosmos 394 Cosmos 397 (IS) Successful intercept, debris created

Mar. 18, 1971 Cosmos 400 Cosmos 404 (IS) Longer test flight with new approach
from above to intercept target

Dec. 3, 1971 Cosmos 459 Cosmos 462 (IS) Successful intercept, debris created

Feb. 16, 1976 Cosmos 803 Cosmos 804, Cosmos Attacked twice: by Cosmos 803 on Feb.
814 (IS) 12 and by Cosmos 804 on Feb. 16

July 9, 1976 Cosmos 839 Cosmos 843 (IS) Intercepted satellite, but possible failure
01
Dec. 17, 1976 Cosmos 880 Cosmos 886 (IS) Successful intercept, debris created

May 23, 1977 Cosmos 909 Cosmos 910, Attacked twice: by Cosmos 910 on May 02
Cosmos 918 (IS) 23 and by Cosmos 918 on Jun. 17 (both
failures)
03
Oct. 26, 1977 Cosmos 959 Cosmos 961 (IS) Successful intercept, no debris created

Dec. 21, 1977 Cosmos 967 Cosmos 970 (IS) Missed target, used as target itself 04
in following test

May 19, 1978 Cosmos 970 Cosmos 1009 (IS-M) Successful intercept, debris created 05

Apr. 18, 1980 Cosmos 1171 Cosmos 1174 (IS-M) Unsuccessful intercept, debris created
06
Feb. 2, 1981 Cosmos 1241 Cosmos 1243, Attacked twice: Cosmos 1243 on Feb. 2
Cosmos 1258 (IS-M) and Cosmos 1258 on Mar. 14 (both
failures) 07

June 18, 1982 Cosmos 1375 Cosmos 1379 (IS-PM) Successful intercept, debris created
08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
02-03
 5 Ibid. From 1976–77, eight additional tests of the system were conducted, publicly
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

6 Pavel Podvig, “Is China Repeating the Old

demonstrating an ability to operate effectively in a broader swathe of orbits
Soviet and U.S. Mistakes?”, Russian Strategic from 150 to 1,600 km, culminating in the deployment of an upgraded version
Nuclear Forces, January 19, 2007,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2007/01/is_
of the system, dubbed IS-M.5 IS-M was allegedly capable of targeting satellites
china_repeating_the_old_sov.shtml. at altitudes of up to 2,200 km, and inclinations of 50 to 130 degrees, with an
7 Laura Grego, “Á History of Anti-Satellite
estimated kill probability of 70–80 percent.6 IS-M also reduced attack time by
Programs,” Union of Concerned Scientists, increasing speed and maneuverability to allow rendezvous with the target in
January 2012, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/
a single orbit.7 The final test of the IS-M system occurred in 1982; in 1983, a
a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf. moratorium was declared on all ASAT tests, 8 though modernization efforts
8 Grego, ibid, p. 5.
apparently continued.

9 Anatoly Zak, “Origin of the Almaz project,”

Soviet documents from the late 1980s indicate there were two more planned
0 4/202 3

Russian Spoce Web, http://www.russianspace-

web.com/almaz_origin.html, accessed upgrades to the IS system, the IS-MU (14F10) and the IS-MD (75P6), also
February 17, 2022.
known as Naryad. IS-MU was designed to be an even more capable LEO
10 Anatoly Zak, “Here Is the Soviet Union’s co-orbital interceptor, and the IS-MD would be able to intercept satellites in
Secret Space Cannon,” Popular Mechanics,
November 16, 2015, https://www.popularme-
GEO. There are no records of either system moving past the drawing board
chanics.com/military/weapons/a18187/here- or confirmation of being tested in space, and both were ended in 1993. However,
is-the-soviet-unions-secret-space-cannon/.
some components, including the network’s SSA, targeting, and control systems,
01
11 Anatoly Zak, “Soviet space rocket-propelled are known to have been maintained in working condition and also to have
grenade revealed.” Russian Space Web,
http://russianspaceweb.com/almaz-shield2.
undergone comprehensive upgrades and modernization over the last decade.
html, accessed February 17, 2022.
02
Almaz Space Station
03
During the 1970s, the Soviet Union developed a series of classified military
space stations known as the Almaz program (“diamond” in Russian). The
04
program began in the 1960s, before the civil and publicly-known Salyut
space station program, and was a response to the American Manned Orbiting
05
Laboratory (MOL) program.9 The concept was to use crewed space stations
to conduct military missions such as imagery and reconnaissance that was
06
not possible by robotic satellites at that time. Three Almaz space stations flew
between 1973 and 1975 under the official/cover names of OPS-1/Salyut 2,
07
OPS-2/Salyut 3, and OPS-3/Salyut 5.

08
The three Almaz space stations carried weapon systems that were purportedly
for “defensive” purposes but could be used offensively in certain situations.
09
The main weapon system was the R-23 Kartech, a modified 23 mm tailgun
from a Tu-22 bomber that was mounted on the forward belly of the station.10
10
The cannon was reportedly only test-fired once at the end of OPS-1/Salyut-3
and had significant limitations. As the cannon was fixed to the station, the entire
11
station needed to be re-orientated to aim it, and due to orbital mechanics likely
only had a relatively short range.
12
The cannon was slated to be replaced by a more advanced missile system
13
starting with the OPS-4 space station but never did, as the program was
canceled. The missile system was known as “Shield-2” and would have been a
14
radar-guided missile capable of hitting another space object up to 100 km (60
miles) away.11 The Shield-2 system reportedly used a series of small solid rocket
15
charges to propel itself, which could also be detonated in close proximity to
the target to create shrapnel.
02-0 4
Naryad 12 Pavel Podvig, “Is China Repeating the Old Sovi-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
et and U.S. Mistakes?”, Russian Strategic Nuclear
Towards the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union began developing a new Forces, January 19, 2007, http://russianforces.
and more capable co-orbital system known as Naryad-V (14F11). The key org/blog/2007/01/is_china_repeating_the_old_
sov.shtml.
technologies of the Naryad-V were a silo-based solid fuel rocket launch vehicle
derived from the UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) paired with a new and very capable 13 Bart Hendrickx, “Naryad-V and the
Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet,” Space Chronicle,
liquid fuel upper stage. The combination was designed to allow the system to Vol 69, 2016, available at
target an extremely wide range of orbits between 0 to 130 degrees inclination https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nary-
ad-V-and-the-Soviet-Anti-Satellite-Fleet-Hen-
and altitudes of 150 to 40,000 km,12 and rapid launches of large numbers at drickx/414e786666492c48af754bdf5f383e-
once. At one meeting regarding the program in 1990, the prospect was discussed 34cea77c6f and Pavel Podvig, “Did Star Wars
Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the
of launching as many as one hundred in a single volley.13 SDI Program,” Russian Forces, March 17, 2013,
http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_
star_wars_help_end_the_col.shtml, p.18.
As with the later versions of the IS, the Naryad development was cut short by
the fall of the Soviet Union. 14 Anatoly Zak, “UR-100”, Russian Space Web,
updated June 27, 2013, http://www.russians-
paceweb.com/baikonur_ur100.html; “Rockot
Table 2-2 shows the known testing history of the Naryad program. The Naryad Launch Vehicles,” updated December 24, 2017,
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/rockot.html.
launch vehicle had two sub-orbital flight tests in November 1990 and December
1991, both from Baikonur Cosmodrome.14 A third orbital flight test from Baikonur 15 Mark Wade, “Radio,” Astronautix, Accessed
March 22, 2018, http://www.astronautix.com/r/
was conducted in December, with a Rockot booster delivering the Radio ROSTO radio.html.
amateur radio satellite (1994-085A, 23439) into a 1,900 by 2,145 km orbit.15 It 01
16 For an updated list of Rokot launches,
is rumored that the launch had a second payload, which may have been the see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Naryad interceptor, that fragmented shortly after launch. Twenty-seven pieces Rokot#Launch_table.
02
of orbital space debris were cataloged, of which 24 are still on orbit along with 17 Anatoly Zak, “Briz-K/KM,” Russian Space Web,
the ROSTO satellite. updated March 11, 2016, http://www.russians-
03
paceweb.com/briz.html.

18 Anatoly Zak, “Russian Anti-Satellite Systems,”

04
Russian Space Web, updated
TABLE 2-2 — SUSPECTED NARYAD FLIGHT TESTS November 30, 2017, http://www.russianspace-
web.com/naryad.html; Anatoly Zak, “The Hid-
DATE BOOSTER PAYLOAD LAUNCH SITE LAUNCH PAD ORBIT 05
den History of Soviet Satellite-Killer,” Popular
Nov. 20, Rockot/Briz-K Naryad-V Baikonur Site 131 Sub-orbital Mechanics, November 1, 2013,
https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/
1990 anti-satellite 06
satellites/a9620/the-hidden-history-of-the-so-
Dec. 20, Rockot/Briz-K Experimental, Baikonur Site 175/1 Sub-orbital viet-satellite-killer-16108970/.
1991 Naryad test? 07
Dec. 26, Rockot/Briz-K Radio-ROSTO, Baikonur Site 175/1 1,900 km; 65°
1994 Naryad test? 08

09
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the components of the Naryad program found
new commercial uses, leading to speculation that the program could be revived.
10
The rocket has become the Rockot commercial launch vehicle operating from
Plesetsk Cosmodrome (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-05), which has had 28
11
successful launches and placed more than 70 satellites into orbit.16 The Naryad
upper stage was developed into the Briz-KM and Briz-M, which are mainstays
12
of Russian space launches to GEO.17 Russian military officials have claimed that
some “basic [ASAT] assets [were] retained” in connection to the “Naryad-VN”
13
and “Naryad-VR” systems, to be employed if the United States or China were
to put weapons in space.18 It remains unclear precisely what those designations
14
refer to, or what the difference between the two subsystems might be.

15
Recent Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in LEO
More recently, a resurgence of Russian RPO has driven substantial anxiety
in the United States and elsewhere over concerns that they are aimed at
developing new co-orbital ASAT capabilities. Since 2013, Russia has launched
several satellites into LEO and GEO that have demonstrated the ability to
rendezvous with other space objects, and in some cases do so after periods
of dormancy.
02-05
 19 Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the Dark Redux: The first known event was on December 25, 2013, when a Russian Rockot
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Recent Russian Rendezvous and Proximity

Operations in Space,” The Space Review,
launch vehicle from Plesetsk Cosmodrome placed three small satellites into
October 5, 2015, http://www.thespacereview. LEO in what appeared to be another routine launch to replenish the Rodnik
com/article/2839/1.
constellation.19 The Rodnik satellites are the current generation of store-
20 Jonathan McDowell, “Jonathan’s and-dump communications satellites, which store messages uploaded from
Space Report No. 697,” May 17, 2014,
https://planet4589.org/space/jsr/back/
end users and then downlink them when the satellite passes over a receiving
news.697.txt. station. The launch was publicly announced, and shortly afterward the Russian
21 Jonathan McDowell, Tweet,
Defense Ministry announced that the three spacecraft (Cosmos 2488, 2013-
January 12, 2020, https://twitter.com/plan- 076A, 39483; Cosmos 2489, 2013-076B, 39484; Cosmos 2490, 2013-076C,
et4589/status/1216265783644389376?s=20.
Total amount of orbital debris derived from
39485) had successfully separated from the upper stage (Breeze-KM R/B,
from the public U.S. military satellite catalog 20113-076D, 39486). However, the U.S. military cataloged a fourth payload
at https://space-track.org.
from the launch (Cosmos 2491, 2013-076E, 39497), and over the following
0 4/202 3

22 Thread at the Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums, months, evidence emerged from official and open sources to confirm it.20
dated May 16, 2014, http://novosti-kosmonavti-
ki.ru/forum/forum12/topic14232/?PAGEN_1=5.
From launch through the end of 2019, Cosmos 2491 did not make any significant
23 Posting on the Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums,
dated November 28, 2014, http://novosti-kos-
changes to its orbit and remained at a relatively high LEO altitude of 1,500 km. On
monavtiki.ru/forum/messages/forum12/top- December 23, 2019, Cosmos 2491 did make a small maneuver of approximately
ic14778/message1315049/#message1315049.
1.5 m/s, which was accompanied by the release of 18 pieces of orbital debris that
01
24 Пашков, Дмитрий, “Cosmos-2491/RS-46 were eventually cataloged by the U.S. military.21 Given the relatively low energy of
(R4UAB),” Youtube, December 2, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHKoSdhM-
the event, it is likely that the propulsion system of Cosmos 2491 failed immediately
02
VDk#t=14. The Russian government publicly after launch and the orbital change and fragmentation event was caused by the
disclosed the existence of the amateur radio
payloads, which were activated at the end of
explosive release of the residual fuel.
the main mission.
03
On May 23, 2014, another Rockot launch took place from Plesetsk with what
04
appeared to be another Rodnik replenishment mission. Once again, the
Russian government publicly declared that the launch carried three military
05
satellites (Cosmos 2496, 2014-028A, 39761; Cosmos 2497, 2014-028B, 39762;
Cosmos 2498, 2014-028C, 39763). Two days later, hobbyist satellite observers
06
indicated that a fourth payload (Cosmos 2499, 2014-028E, 39765) was on the
launch. By mid-June, hobbyists reported that Cosmos 2499, had begun a series
07
of maneuvers to match orbits with the Briz-KM upper stage (2014-028D,
39764) that placed it in orbit.22 The process took several months, and it was
08
not until the end of November when Cosmos 2499 passed within a kilometer
of the Briz-KM.23 Amateur radio operators also reported that Cosmos 2499
09
appeared to be using the same radio frequencies as Cosmos 2491, suggesting
they used the same Yubileiny-2 microsatellite bus.24 After drifting apart,
10
Cosmos 2499 did another series of maneuvers in January 2015 to put itself
in an orbit that kept it a few kilometers above and several hundred kilometers
11
away from the Briz-KM. On March 26, 2016, Cosmos 2499 made another orbit
adjustment that slowly brought it closer to the Briz-KM by about tens of
12
kilometers per day.

13
Since 2016, Cosmos 2499 appears to have reached end-of-mission, but has
experienced two additional events. On October 23, 2021, Cosmos 2499
14
experienced a fragmentation event that released 21 additional fragments,
and on January 4, 2023, it experienced another breakup that released 85
15
additional fragments. The most likely cause of these incidents is rupture of an
onboard fuel tank or some other anomaly, and given that Cosmos 2491 also
experienced a fragmentation event in 2019, this suggests a potential design
flaw in the 14F153 satellite series.

On March 31, 2015, a third Rockot launch took place from Plesetsk with what
was publicly declared as carrying three Gonets-M satellites (Gonets M11,
2015-020A, 40552; Gonets M12, 2015-020B, 40553; Gonets M13, 2015-020C,
40554) and a classified military payload (Cosmos 2504, 2015-020D, 40555).
The Gonets serve as a civilian version of the Strela/Rodnik store-and-dump
02-06
LEO communications constellation. Cosmos 2504 began a small series of 25 Anatoly Zak, “Russia Goes Ahead with Anti-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Satellite System,” Russian Space Web, updated
maneuvers in early April to bring it close to the Briz-KM upper stage (2015-020E, December 15, 2017, http://www.russianspace-
40556) that placed it in orbit. At some point during that pass, the Briz-KM’s web.com/Cosmos-2504.html.

orbit was disturbed by an unknown perturbation, which could have been 26 Gwiz posting to the NASASpaceflight.com
the result of a minor collision between the two space objects. If it was, the forums, December 11, 2019, https://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=32816.
impact was very slight and did not result in additional debris being generated. msg2024319#msg2024319.
It is also unknown if the impact was planned or an accident. On July 3, 2015,
27 Anatoly Zak, “Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret
Cosmos 2504 made another significant maneuver, lowering both its apogee Satellite,” Russian Space Web, August 30, 2017,
and perigee significantly by around 50 km each, further separating itself from http://www.russianspaceweb.com/napryazhe-
nie.html.
the Briz-M. In late July 2016, the USAF cataloged five small pieces of debris
attributed to the Briz-KM upper stage but did not release a cause. On March 28 “Спутник ‘Космос-2519’ Минобороны РФ
будет фотографировать космические
27, 2017, after more than a year of dormancy, Cosmos 2504 made a series of объекты [Sputnik ‘Cosmos-2519’ of the
maneuvers that lowered its orbit, and on April 20, it passed within two km Russian Defense Ministry Will Photograph
Space Objects],” MilitaryRussia.ru,
of a piece of Chinese space debris from its 2007 ASAT test.25 This suggests June 24, 2017, http://www.militarynews.ru/
that Cosmos 2504 has a satellite inspection or observation mission and may story.asp?rid=1&nid=454841.

have been looking for intelligence on the Chinese direct ascent interceptor 29 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASAspace-
program. Cosmos 2504 maneuvered again on December 10, 2019, to lower flight.com Forums, February 27, 2018,
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/
its perigee by 40 km, although the reason is not yet known.26 As of February index.php?PHPSESSID=35dsgsej5k8t-
2023, Cosmos 2504 was still in orbit but inactive. t51h7fo7re8e04&topic=43064.ms-
01
g1793720#msg1793720.

On June 23, 2017, a Russian Soyuz 2-1v rocket was launched from Plesetsk (see 30 “С запущенного в интересах Минобороны
02
космического аппарата выведен в космос
Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-05) with two military payloads. One payload was спутник-инспектор,” Interfax.ru,
rumored to be the first of the new series of military geodetic satellites, used August 23, 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/
03
russia/576068.
to create extremely precise maps of the Earth’s shape and gravitational field.27
Russian officials declared that the launch also included a “space platform 31 Jonathan McDowell, “Jonathan’s Space Report
04
No. 742,” November 25, 2017,
which can carry different variants of payloads” which was designated Cosmos https://planet4589.org/space/jsr/back/
2519 (2017-037A, 42798).28 In late July and early August, Cosmos 2519 made news.742.txt.
05
a series of small maneuvers. Publicly available information strongly suggests 32 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NA-
that Cosmos 2519 has a remote sensing mission.29 Shortly thereafter on August SAspaceflight.com forums, March 3, 2018,
06
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
23, Russian officials announced that a small satellite, designated Cosmos 2521 php?topic=43064.msg1795369#msg1795369.
(2017-037D, 42919) had separated from the platform and was “intended for 07
33 Jonathan McDowell, “Nivelir (Kosmos-2519
the inspection of the condition of a Russian satellite.” 30 Subsequently, Russia et al): A new series of Russian military satel-
reported that the satellite-inspector completed a series of proximity operations lites,” Jonathan’s Space Page, accessed
08
February 2, 2020, https://planet4589.org/
experiments and returned to the Cosmos 2519 host satellite on October 26.31 space/plots//niv/index.html.
On October 30, Russia announced that another small satellite, Cosmos 2523 09
34 W.J. Hennigan, “Exclusive: Strange Russian
(2017-037E, 42986), separated from Cosmos 2521 and would have a satellite Spacecraft Shadowing U.S. Space Satellite,
inspection function but to date, it has not been proven to approach other General Says,” Time.com, February 10, 2020,
10
https://time.com/5779315/russian-spacecraft-
satellites.32 Jonathan McDowell calculated that Cosmos 2523 was released at spy-satellite-space-force/.
a relative velocity of 27 meters per second (60 miles per hour).33 Comments 11
35 Jonathan McDowell, “Jonathan’s Space Report
from senior U.S. military leadership suggest they consider the deployment of No. 752,” August 17, 2018 https://planet4589.
Cosmos 2523 to have been an ASAT test, given its relatively large deployment org/space/jsr/back/news.752.txt.
12
velocity.34 Throughout March, April, and June 2018, Cosmos 2519 and 2521 36 “U.S. Spots Maneuvers of Russian Military
conducted several RPOs of each other.35 As of March 2018, Cosmos 2519 and Satellite,” TASS, August 31, 2019, https://tass.
13
com/science/1075876.
Cosmos 2521 have not maneuvered to approach any other space objects but
have made small adjustments to their orbits, likely to forestall natural orbital 37 “The United States Reported that Russia
14
Lost a Military Satellite Inspector,” TASS,
decay.36 Cosmos 2521 eventually re-entered the atmosphere on September 12, September 13, 2019, https://tass.ru/kos-
2019 37 and Cosmos 2519 re-entered on December 23, 2021.38 As of February mos/6882787.
15
2023, Cosmos 2523 remains in orbit. 38 “Russian military satellite that worked with
inspector spacecraft burns in atmosphere,”
TASS, December 23, 2021, https://tass.com/
Links to Project Nvelir and Burevestnik science/1380133.
Further open source research done by analyst Bart Hendrickx suggests that
39 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-
the Cosmos 2491, 2499, 2504, and 2521 satellites are part of a project started flight.com forums, February 1, 2019,
in 2011 to develop space-based space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities and https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
php?topic=43064.msg1906972#msg1906972.
may play a supporting role for other counterspace weapons.39 Publicly-available
02-07
 40 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace- documents and patents suggest a link between those Cosmos satellites and
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

flight.com forums, October 22, 2019,

https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
procurement for a project designated Nivelir (“Dumpy level”) and under the
php?topic=48521.msg2007320#msg2007320. control of the Central Scientific Research Institute for Chemistry and Mechanics
41 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia develops co-orbital
(TsNIIKhM), which was involved in the original IS co-orbital ASAT program.
anti-satellite capability,” Jane’s Intelligence Nivelir appears to have two series of satellites under it, 14F150 (Cosmos 2519
Review, September 27, 2018, https://www.janes.
com/images/assets/463/83463/Russia_devel-
and 14F153 (Cosmos 2491, 2499, 2504, and 2521).40 Hendrickx also uncovered
ops_co-orbital_anti-satellite_capability.pdf. evidence suggesting there is an active Russian co-orbital ASAT program
42 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-
codenamed Burevestnik (“Petrel”) or project 14K168, also managed by
flight.com forums, April 8, 2020, https://forum. TsNIIKhM and also started in 2011.41 Burevestnik appears to involve ground-
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=45734.
msg2066800#msg2066800.
based infrastructure at Plesetsk Cosmodrome near Noginsk-9 (see Imagery
Appendix, pg. 15-05), which was the location of the ground control center for
43 Bart Hendrickx, “Burevestnik: a Russian
the Soviet-era IS co-orbital ASAT and is near the headquarters for the Russian
0 4/202 3

air-launched anti-satellite system,” The Space

Review, April 27, 2020, https://www.thespacere- military space surveillance network. TsNIIKhM also supplied the explosive
view.com/article/3931/1.
warhead for the IS, which targeted LEO satellites. Additional reports suggest
44 Bart Hendricks, posting on the NASASpace- Burevestnik includes a three-stage solid fuel rocket built by NPO Iskra.42 It
flight.com forums, October 22, 2019,
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
appears this rocket is intended to be launched from a modified MiG-31 fighter
php?topic=48521.msg2007320#msg2007320. aircraft (labeled MiG-31BM) to serve as a quick-response system to place
45 Ibid.
the Burevestnik ASATs into orbit. The concept is a new version of the Ishim
01
proposal from the early 2000s and using a fighter as a launch platform would
46 Ibid.
enable significant flexibility for launch times and orbits to target.43
47 Bart Hendrickx, “Burevestnik: a Russian
02
air-launched anti-satellite system,” The Space
Review, April 27, 2020, https://www.thespacere-

03
view.com/article/3931/1. FIGURE 2-1 — MiG-31BM CARRYING A BUREVESTNIK LAUNCHER

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11 Credit: ShipSash

12 The Nivelir inspection and Buresvestik co-orbital ASAT programs share a lot
of technologies. They appear to use the same bus, thermal catalytic thrusters,
13 and fuel tanks as the Burevestnik co-orbital ASATs and may also support the
Burevestnik program either by testing RPO technology or providing tracking
14 and targeting support. Additional research suggests Burevestnik might utilize
low-temperature solid-fuel generators that produce nitrogen gas to defend
15 spacecraft from attacks.44 The aerosol created by such gas generators would
have both a masking and damaging effect, most likely meaning that they
could be used not only to conceal the satellite under attack from the interceptor,
but also to disable some of the interceptor’s systems (such as optical devices).45
Other research discusses the use of electrostatically charged finely dispersed
particles to remove oppositely charged orbital debris in GEO, which could also
have offensive applications.46 Another possibility is that the interceptors might
use explosive charges to generate fragments, as indicated by a contract given
to the Krasnoarmeysk Scientific Research Institute of Mechanization (KNIIM)
and a company called OOO Expotekhvzryv as part of Burevestnik.47
02-08
Another Rodnik replenishment mission was launched from Plesetsk on 48 Иван Синергиев,“С космодрома Плесецк

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
запущена ракета-носитель «Рокот» с
November 30, 2018, and again there was a fourth object (Object E, 2018-097E, военными спутниками.” Коммерса́ нтъ,
43755) placed into orbit in addition to the three Rodnik communications November 30, 2018, https://www.kommersant.
ru/doc/3814723.
satellites (Cosmos 2530, 2018-097A, 43751; Cosmos 2531, 2018-097B, 43752;
Cosmos 2532, 2019-097C, 43753). While the separation profile of Object E 49 Russian Federation, “Information Furnished in
Conformity with the Convention on Registra-
matched the deployment of Cosmos 2504 and other inspector satellites, Russian tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space,” ST/
media reports stated that the fourth object was a dummy payload that replaced SG/SER.E/906, August 15, 2019, http://unoosa.
org/oosa/en/osoindex/data/documents/ru/st/
a laser reflector satellite at the last minute.48 Since reaching orbit, no signals stsgser.e906.html.
or maneuvers have been detected by the fourth object, suggesting it is indeed
50 Cees Bassa, Twitter, July 12, 2019,
a piece of debris or inert payload. https://twitter.com/cgbassa/sta-
tus/1149662117819060224.

On July 10, 2019, Russia launched another set of four military payloads on 51 “Российский военный спутник-инспектор
a Soyuz-2-1v from Plesetsk, designated by the U.S. military as Cosmos 2535 проверил другой космический аппарат
России на орбите,” TASS, August 1, 2019,
(2019-039A, 44421), Cosmos 2536 (2019-039B, 44422), Cosmos 2537 (2019- https://tass.ru/kosmos/6724059.
039C, 44423), and Cosmos 2538 (2019-039D, 44424). All four objects were
52 Jonathan McDowell, ”Space Activities in 2019,”
registered with the United Nations in August 2019.49 The satellites were placed January 12, 2020, pp. 25-28, https://planet4589.
into a 97.88° inclination and 612 by 623 km orbit and one of the four satellites org/space/papers/space19.pdf.

was detected broadcasting on the same frequency as Cosmos 2521, indicating 53 Data compiled from the public catalog main-
it may be part of the Nivelir program.50 On August 1, 2019, Russia announced tained by the U.S. military at https://Space-
01
Track.org.
that two of the satellites, Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536, would be engaged
in satellite inspection and satellite servicing activities.51 According to data 54 “Успешный пуск ракеты-носителя «Союз-
02
2.1в»”, TASS, November 26, 2019,
compiled by Jonathan McDowell, the two satellites conducted a series of RPO https://www.roscosmos.ru/27793/.
experiments between August 7 and 19, 2019, with approach distances as 03
55 Bart Hendrickx, posting to the NASASpace-
close as 30 km before backing off to 180 to 400 km.52 Shortly before the RPO, flight.com forums, November 25, 2019,
nine debris objects were released in the vicinity of the two satellites, with https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
04
php?topic=49501.msg2019200#msg2019200.
apogees as high as 1,400 km, suggesting a significant energetic event. The
other two satellites, Cosmos 2537 and Cosmos 2538, have not maneuvered 56 “Минобороны провело в космосе
05
эксперимент по отделению малого спутника
and may be radar calibration targets. In early October 2019, several additional от другого аппарата” TASS, December 6, 2019,
debris objects were detected, although it is uncertain which parent object https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/7285111.
06

they came from. This, along with differences between this launch and previous 57 Jonathan McDowell, “Space Activities in 2019,”
Nivelir missions, has led some to suspect that they may be part of the Burevestnik January 12, 2020, p. 29, https://planet4589.org/
07
space/papers/space19.pdf.
co-orbital ASAT program and could be involved in the testing of aerosols
or charged particles. Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536 continued their RPO 58 Initial observations and analysis were devel-
08
oped by multiple observers on the See-Sat
activities in December 2019, which resulted in the release of six more debris mailing list as documented here
objects. In total, 30 cataloged debris objects have been associated with this http://www.satobs.org/seesat/Dec-2019/0108.
09
html. Additional analysis provided by Michael
launch as of February 2021.53 Thompson in a tweet thread posted January
30, 2020, https://twitter.com/M_R_Thomp/sta-
10
tus/1222990126650994698. Further analysis
On November 25, 2019, Russia conducted another launch of a Soyuz-2-1v and by Jonathan McDowell in a tweet
from Plesetsk with an announced military payload on board. The satellite was thread posted February 1, 2020,
11
https://twitter.com/planet4589/sta-
cataloged by the U.S. military as Cosmos 2542 (2019-079A, 44797) in a 97.9° tus/1223420130576818176?s=20.
inclination and 370 by 860 km orbit. The mission of the satellite as announced 12
by Russia was to conduct space surveillance as well as Earth remote sensing.54
Outside experts have indicated it is likely the second satellite in the Nivelir 13
14F150 series.55 On December 6, Cosmos 2542 released a small subsatellite
that was cataloged by the U.S. military as Cosmos 2543 (2019-079D, 44835) 14
and publicly announced by Russia.56 Cosmos 2543 remained within 2 km of
Cosmos 2542 for three days before it conducted a series of maneuvers to 15
raise its apogee to 590 km by December 16.57 Subsequent analysis by amateur
observers strongly suggests that the purpose of these maneuvers was to
place Cosmos 2543 in an orbit where it can observe a classified U.S. intelligence
satellite, USA 245 (2013-043A, 39232), which was launched in 2013 and is
believed to be the latest generation of electro-optical imagery satellite operated
by the National Reconnaissance Office. The orbits of Cosmos 2543 and USA
245 are synchronized such that Cosmos 2543 came within 20 km of USA 245
several times in January 2020 and since then periodically comes within 150 to
300 km of USA 245 while the latter is illuminated by the Sun and can observe
both sides of USA 245 continuously for up to a week at a time.58
02-09
 59 W.J. Hennigan, “Exclusive: Strange Russian The close proximity of Cosmos 2543 to USA 245 sparked concerns from the
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Spacecraft Shadowing U.S. Spy Satellite, Gener-

al Says,” Time, February 10, 2020, https://time.
U.S. military. General Raymond, then Chief of Space Operations for the USSF
com/5779315/russian-spacecraft-spy-satellite- and Commander of USSPACECOM, stated, “We view this behavior as unusual
space-force/.
and disturbing,” and compared it to the 2017 separation of Cosmos 2523 that
60 “В МИД ответили на обвинения США в the U.S. military considers to be a weapons test.59 In a response published by
преследовании американского спутника”,
РИА Новости, February 17, 2020, https://ria.
RIA Novosti, the Russian Foreign Ministry denied those accusations, claimed
ru/20200217/1564880619.html. that they were part of a propaganda campaign against Moscow, and stated
61 Michael Thompson (@M_R_Thomp),
that Cosmos 2543 did not pose a threat to USA 245 and did not violate any
“Cosmos 2542, the Russian inspection norms or principles of international law.60
satellite of recent interest, was set to make
another set of close passes to USA 245 some-
time in the next week,” Twitter thread, A few weeks later, it appears both countries made changes in their satellites’
March 11, 2020, https://twitter.com/M_R_
orbits to increase the separation of the two objects. On March 11, 2020,
0 4/202 3

Thomp/status/1237763403231440896?s=20.
hobbyist tracking showed USA 245 conducted a small maneuver to increase
62 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-
flight.com forums, May 15, 2020, https://forum.
its distance from Cosmos 2542.61 And in late April, Cosmos 2542 lowered its
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=49501. perigee to increase the separation and create a gradual separation in planes
msg2082452#msg2082452.
between the two satellites.62
63 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-
flight.com forums, June 15, 2020, https://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=49501.
In June 2020, Cosmos 2543 made a series of maneuvers to place it into RPO
01
msg2096595#msg2096595. with Cosmos 2535, including close approaches within 60 kilometers.63 A month
64 “Успешно испытан новый военный
later, the Russian Ministry of Defense issued a press report stating that the
02
спутник-инспектор – Минобороны two satellites had conducted a close-up study of a domestic satellite with the
России,” ИНТЕРФАКС-АВН, July 15, 2020,
https://www.militarynews.ru/story.as-
help of specialized equipment on a small satellite.64 On July 15, a small piece of
03
p?rid=0&nid=534933&lang=RU. orbital debris was spotted in the vicinity of the two satellites that appeared to
65 Jonathan McDowell (@planet4589), “I have
have separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity of between 140 to 186
04
recalculated the ejection velocity of the meters per second (313 to 415 miles per hour).65 The U.S. military cataloged
Kosmos-2543 projectile. The delta-V between
Kosmos-2543 and object 45915 is somewhere
the released object (Object E, 2019-079E, 45915) on July 16 in a 783 x 504
05
between 140 m/s and 186 m/s,” Twitter thread, km orbit, with Cosmos 2543 still in a 617 x 603 km orbit. Neither object has
July 24, 2020, https://twitter.com/planet4589/
status/1286831091857403904?s=20.
altered its orbit significantly since and their orbits are slowly decaying.
06
66 Jonathan McDowell (@planet4589), “More on
Kosmos-2543 and object 45915. The object
Jonathan McDowell noted that the release occurred while the objects passed
07
was ejected during a pass in view of Plesetsk, over Plesetsk.66 The event was similar in nature to the release of Cosmos 2523
as seen here”, Twitter posting, July 25, 2020,
https://twitter.com/planet4589/sta-
in October 2017, and eventually, two more pieces of small debris were cataloged
08
tus/1287052396749881344. in proximity to the satellites.

67 USSPACECOM Public Affairs Office, “Russia

09
conducts space-based anti-satellite weapons In a press release, USSPACECOM characterized the event as a space-based
test,” United States Space Command, July 23,
2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/
satellite weapons test and stated that the Russian satellites “displayed
10
News/Article-Display/Article/2285098/russia- characteristics of a space-based weapon.” 67 The head of the United Kingdom’s
conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-
test/.
Space Directorate, Air Vice Marshal Harvey Smyth, also released a public
11
statement on Twitter expressing concerns and calling on Russia to avoid further
68 Ministry of Defence (@DefenceHQ), “Air
Vice-Marshal @HarvSmyth, director of the UK’s
testing.68 The following day, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs again denied
12
Space Directorate, has responded to a recent those claims, stating that this was part of a campaign to discredit Russia’s
Russian satellite test in space”, Twitter.com,
July 23, 2020, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/
activities in space and that Russia was committed to the peaceful exploration
13
status/1286312151469166592?s=20. and use of outer space by all states.69
69 “Comment by the Information and Press
Department regarding statements by US and
14
British officials about the testing of a Russian
satellite,” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, July 24, 2020, https://www.
15
mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub-
lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4253360.
0 2-10
Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2543 remained in close proximity through August 70 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
flight.com forums, August 13, 2020,
2020, and by August 13, they were joined by Cosmos 2536.70 In late September https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
2020, Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536 were close enough that they are presumed php?topic=49501.msg2119753#msg2119753.

to have docked.71 In mid-October, Cosmos 2536 separated away from Cosmos 71 Jonathan McDowell (@planet4589),
2535 to a distance of 20 kilometers.72 “Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536 have now been
within 1 km of each other for a month (and are
likely docked). Latest TLEs might suggest they
On August 1, 2022, a Russian Soyuz 2.1v launch vehicle placed a mysterious are now separated again, but too early to really
be sure - might just be noise in the data,”
satellite, dubbed Cosmos 2558 (2022-089A, 53323) into LEO. The launch timing Twitter.com, September 24, 2020,
and initial orbit appeared to coincide with the orbital plane of USA 326, a https://twitter.com/planet4589/sta-
tus/1309225961070751745?s=20.
classified NRO imagery satellite that was launched in February 2022. Analysis
suggested that the orbits of Cosmos 2558 and USA 326 were very similar in 72 Jonathan McDowell (@planet4589), “After
1.5 months in the close vicinity of Kos-
inclination and would periodically come within 60 to 70 km in altitude.73 On mos-2535 (and maybe docked to it) Kos-
August 18, 2022, USSPACECOM released a statement condemning Russia for mos-2536 separated from it on Oct 12 and has
now retreated to 20 km from it,” Twitter.com,
this behavior, calling the activities of Cosmos 2558 “dangerous and irresponsible October 16, 2020, https://twitter.com/plan-
behavior.” 74 Further analysis confirmed that as of September 2022 Cosmos et4589/status/1317161112392126464?s=20.

2558 had altered its orbit to continue to match the orbital plane of USA 326, 73 Marco Langbroek, “Kosmos 2558, a Russian
although it is not in an actual proximity orbit.75 It is unclear whether Cosmos inspector satellite targeting the US IMINT
satellite USA 326?,” SatTrackCam Leiden (b)log,
2558 is related to Cosmos 2535 or Cosmos 2542. August 2, 2022, https://sattrackcam.blogspot.
com/2022/08/kosmos-2558-russian-inspec-
01
tor-satellite.html.
Recent Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in GEO
Russian RPO activities have also occurred in GEO. On September 28, 2014, 74 Brett Tingley, “Pentagon space chief con-
02
demns “irresponsible’ launch of Russian in-
a Proton-M SLV was launched from Baikonur Cosmodrome. Onboard was a spector satellite,” Space.com, August 18, 2022,
satellite built for the Russian Ministry of Defence and Federal Security Service https://www.space.com/russia-inspector-satel-
03
lite-kosmos-2558-irresponsible-behavior.
(FSB), which was destined for the GEO region. The name of the satellite is not
precisely known, with manufacturer documents referring to it as “Olymp” or 75 Marco Langbroek, “Kosmos 2558 keeping its
04
orbit close to USA 326,” SatTrackCam Leiden
“Olymp-K.” 76 Russian filings with the United Nations reference the satellite as (b)log, September 9, 2022, https://sattrackcam.
“Luch,” 77 which is a series of Russian “bent pipe” data relay satellites, while the blogspot.com/2022/09/kosmos-2558-keeping-
05
its-orbit-close-to.html.
USAF called it Luch/Olymp (2014-058A, 40258).
76 Anatoly Zak, “Proton Successfully Returns to
06
Flight Delivering a Secret Olymp Satellite,”
The launch proceeded the same as many other Russian GEO launches. The initial Russian Space Web, October 19, 2015,
set of burns placed the Briz-M upper stage and Luch payload into an initial http://www.russianspaceweb.com/olymp.html.
07
highly elliptical GTO. Roughly nine hours after launch, the Briz-M upper stage 77 United Nations Secretariat, “Note verbale”
executed a burn to (mostly) circularize the orbit at near GEO altitude and also dated 10 December 2015 from the Permanent
08
Mission of the Russian Federation to the United
zero out the inclination. After separating from Luch, the Briz-M then conducted Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secre-
another burn to boost it out of the active GEO belt and into a disposal orbit tary-General, February 1, 2016, https://cms.
09
unov.org/dcpms2/api/finaldocuments?Lan-
above GEO in accordance with the IADC debris mitigation guidelines. guage=en&Symbol=ST/SG/SER.E/761.

10
Over the next several months, Luch conducted a series of maneuvers that
brought it close to other operational satellites around the GEO belt. The 11
launch process left Luch at approximately 57 degrees east longitude, roughly
due south of Yemen and the tip of the Arabian Peninsula. It originally began 12
to drift eastward, towards the Indian Ocean, but around October 7, changed
its orbit to begin drifting westward back towards Africa at a relatively high 13
rate. Towards the end of October, it began to slow its drift rate, and around
October 28, appeared to settle into position at around 52–53 degrees east. 14
The only known Russian orbital slot nearby was that of the Express AM-6, a
Russian commercial communications satellite that was launched on October 15
21, 2014. Luch stayed in this general area for nearly three months.

In late January 2015, Luch began to move again. By January 31, it had begun to
drift eastwards again, at what began as a fairly relatively high rate and slowed
over time. It eventually arrived near 95–96 degrees east longitude, almost due
south from Myanmar, around February 21. Observers once again wondered
why Luch was in this area and hypothesized that it might be due to the presence
of the Russian Luch 5V satellite (2014-023A, 39727), which was launched on
April 28, 2014.
0 2-11
 John Leicester, Sylvie Corbert, Aaron Mehta, Around April 4, 2015, Luch began to move again. This time it began to drift
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

78
“’Espionage:’ French defense head charges
Russia of dangerous games in space,”
westward at a lower rate, eventually coming to a stop around 18.1 degrees
DefenseNews, September 7, 2018, west, due south of the very western tip of Africa, on June 25, 2015. Observers
https://www.defensenews.com/space/
2018/09/07/espionage-french-defense-
began to wonder why it stopped at this location, noticing that there were no
head-charges-russia-of-dangerous-games- Russian satellites in the area. However, this location did place Luch in between
in-space/.
two operational Intelsat satellites, Intelsat 7 (1998-052A, 25473) at 18.2 degrees
79 Jonathan McDowell (@planet4589), “OK, let’s west and Intelsat 901 (2001-024A, 26824) at 18 degrees west, where it remained
talk about this story about Luch-Olimp passing
“too closely” to the French-Italian military com-
until mid-September.
munications satellite ATHENA-FIDUS,” Twitter
thread, September 7, 2018, https://twitter.com/
planet4589/status/1038147610073341953.
On September 25, 2015, Luch left its parking spot between the Intelsat
satellites and began to drift again, heading westward. Over the next several
80 Marco Langbroek, “LUCH (Olymp-K), an
months, it made several more stops around the GEO belt. In September 2018,
0 4/202 3

eavesdropping SIGINT snooping around

commercial comsats,” SatTrackCam Leiden (b) the French Defense Minister stated that Luch made a “too close approach”
log, April 6, 2021, https://sattrackcam.blogspot.
com/2021/04/luch-olymp-k.html/.
of a French-Italian military communications satellite in late 2017.78 Jonathan
McDowell noted that the satellite was likely Athena-Fidus (2014-006B, 39509)
81 Bob Hall, “Luch Space Activities,” AGI web
series, Ep. 14, June 26, 2019, https://youtu.be/
and the close approach likely happened around October 20, 2017, as part
D67dg9P3eDY. of a move to place Luch close to Paksat-1R (2011-042A, 37779), a Pakistani
communications satellite.79 During its nine years on orbit, Luch has parked
01
near more than two dozen commercial communications satellites for periods
ranging from a few weeks to nine months, 80 and typically close enough to
02
be within the typical ground terminal uplink window.81 The orbital history of
Luch is documented in Figure 2-2.
03

04
FIGURE 2-2 — LUCH ORBITAL HISTORY

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12 A compilation of Luch’s orbital history and satellites visited. Credit: COMSPOC Corporation.

13 All the recent Russian RPO activities in LEO and GEO are summarized in Table 2-3.

14

15
02-1 2
 82 Bart Hendrickx,” Project Numizmat,”

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
TABLE 2-3 — RECENT RUSSIAN RENDEZVOUS AND PROXIMITY NASASpaceflightForums.com, April 9, 2020,

OPERATIONS https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
php?topic=47851.new#new.

DATE(S) SYSTEM(S) ORBITAL PARAMETERS NOTES

83 T. Thayaparan and C. Wernik, “Noise Radar
Jun. 2014 – Cosmos 2499, 1501 x 1480 km; Cosmos 2499 did a series of maneuvers to Technology Basics,” Defence Research and
Mar. 2016 Briz-KM R/B 82.4° bring it close to, and then away from, the Development Canada, December 2006,
Briz-KM upper stage. https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc55/
p526766.pdf.
Apr. 2015 – Cosmos 2504, 1507 x 1172 km; Cosmos 2504 maneuvers to approach the
Apr. 2017 Briz-KM R/B, 82.5° Briz-KM upper stage and may have had a 84 Bart Hendrickx, “Re: Soyuz-2.1v/Volga -
slight impact before separating again. Kosmos 2561/2562 - Plesetsk 43/4 - 21 Oct
2022 19:20 UTC,” NASASpaceflightForums.
Mar. – Cosmos 2504, 1507 x 848 km; After a year of dormancy, Cosmos 2504 did com, January 9, 2023, https://forum.na-
Apr. 2017 FY-1C Debris 82.6° a close approach with a piece of Chinese saspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=57374.
space debris from the 2007 ASAT test. msg2447737#msg2447737.

Oct. 2014 – Luch, 35,600 km, Luch parked near several satellites over
Feb. 20202 Multiple 0° nearly five years, including the Russian
Express AM-6, multiple U.S. Intelsat 7,
Intelsat 401, Intelsat 17, Intelsat 20, Intelsat
36 satellites, Pakistani Paksat iR, Turkish
Turksat 4B, Emirati Yahsat 1B, and French-
Italian Athena-Fidus satellites, and the
French Eutelsat 8 West B.

Aug. – Cosmos 2521, 670 x 650 km; Cosmos 2521 separated from Cosmos 2519 01
Oct. 2017 Cosmos 2519, 97.9° and performed a series of small maneuvers
Cosmos 2523 to do inspections before redocking with
Cosmos 2519. Cosmos 2523 separated 02
from Cosmos 2521 but did not maneuver
on its own.
03
Mar. – Cosmos 2521, Cosmos 2521 conducted close approaches
Apr. 2018 Cosmos 2519 of Cosmos 2519.
04
Aug. – Cosmos 2535, 623 x 621 km; Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536 conducted
Dec. 2019 Cosmos 2536 97.88° at least 25 individual RPO operations to
within 2 km and as far apart as 380 km. 05
Dec. 2019 – Cosmos 2542, 859 x 590 km; Cosmos 2542 released Cosmos 2543.
Mar. 2020 Cosmos 2543, 97.9° Cosmos 2542 did station keeping with 06
USA 245 Cosmos 2542, then raised its orbit to come
within 30 km of USA 245 and establish
repeated close approaches within 150 km, 07
likely for the purpose of surveillance.
Cosmos 2542 also made close approaches
to USD 245. 08
Jun. – Cosmos 2543, Cosmos 2543 rendezvoused with Cosmos
Oct. 2020 Cosmos 2535 2535 and released a small object at high 09
relative velocity. In Sept., Cosmos 2536
joined in the RPO with the other two and
may have docked with Cosmos 2535. 10

11
Russia also appears to have started a new initiative to develop more advanced
sensor technologies for RPO. Project Numizmat was started in 2014 and appears
12
to involve the development of a space-based ultra-wideband (UWB) radar
payload.82 UWB radar broadcasts relatively low power signals over a very wide
13
swath of spectrum, often more than 500 megahertz. A specific type called
UWB noise radar has inherent immunity from jamming, detection, and external
14
interference.83 Such a payload could have significant benefits for RPO and
co-orbital ASAT weapons. On October 21, 2022, Russia launched two satellites,
15
Cosmos 2561 (2022-137A, 54109) and Cosmos 2562 (2022-137B, 54110), into
LEO on a Soyuz-2.1v rocket. Initial analysis suggests they are two new types
of satellites (designated 14F164 and 14F172) and may be part of the
Numizmat program.84

Potential Military Utility /

The most likely military utility for the Cosmos 2499, Cosmos 2504, Cosmos
2519, Cosmos 2535, Cosmos 2542, and Luch satellites is for on-orbit inspection
and surveillance. Although the program appears to share some heritage with
the Naryad program, their actual behavior on orbit has been different than
02-1 3
 that of the IS kinetic co-orbital interceptor. The operational pattern of the
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Cosmos 2499 and Cosmos 2504 satellites is consistent with slow, methodical,
and careful approaches to rendezvous with other space objects in similar
orbits. The other space objects they approached were in largely similar
orbits to their own, and only involved changes in altitude or phasing and not
significant changes in inclination. This behavior is similar to several U.S. RPO
missions to test and demonstrate satellite inspection and servicing capabilities,
in particular, XSS-11 and Orbital Express (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1.1).
Such inspection or surveillance could be used to support target identification
and tracking for attacks by other counterspace capabilities.

Luch’s approach to the other satellites in GEO was consistent with the way
0 4/202 3

other active satellites in the GEO belt relocate to different orbital slots. It is
also not unusual for satellites to be co-located within several tens of kilometers
to share a GEO slot, although it is rare for them to approach within the 10 km
that Luch eventually did. The evidence strongly suggests Luch is intended
for a surveillance or intelligence mission. Documents from Russian industry
indicate links to a military satellite communications program and possible
01
heritage to the Luch series of relay satellites. The on-orbit behavior of Luch
indicates a potential mission to intercept broadcasts aimed at other GEO
02
satellites, and possibly also to inspect other GEO satellites. Likely examples
of the former are the activities of the U.S. PAN satellite (35815, 2009-047A)
03
between 2009 and 2014 (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1.1) and the Chinese
SJ-17 satellite (40258, 2014-058A) in 2017 (see Chinese Co-Orbital ASAT,
04
Section 1.1).

05
While the known on-orbit activities of Cosmos 2499, Luch, Cosmos 2504,
Cosmos 2519, or Cosmos 2542 did not include explicit testing of offensive
06
capabilities or aggressive maneuvers, it is possible that the technologies they
tested could be used offensively in the future. One potential offensive use
07
would be to get a radio frequency jammer close to a satellite, thereby greatly
amplifying its ability to interfere with the satellite’s communications. The RPO
08
activities of Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536 are more troubling, given the
research papers linking them to the deployment of aerosols or particulate
09
clouds and the unexplained orbital debris generated by their RPO activities.
Furthermore, the high-speed deployment of Cosmos 2523 from Cosmos 2521
10
and another object from Cosmos 2543 suggests they may be part of an ASAT
interceptor deployment test, potentially linked to the Burevestnik program.
11
The onboard tracking and guidance systems used for rendezvous could be
12
used to try and physically collide with another satellite to damage or destroy
it. However, the approach would have to involve much higher relative velocities
13
than Russian RPO satellites have demonstrated to date, and potentially
involve higher velocities and distances than what these satellites are capable
14
of. Furthermore, the deliberate maneuvering to create a conjunction with the
target satellite would be detectable with existing processes already in place
15
to detect accidental close approaches. Warning time of such a close approach
would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO), unless the attacking
satellite was already in a very similar orbit.

2.2 — RUSSIAN DIRECT-ASCENT ASAT

Assessment /
Russia has long had the potential for a DA-ASAT capability through its historical
ballistic missile defense capabilities and had DA-ASAT development programs
in the past that never fully became operational. In 2021, after more than a
0 2-14
decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a 85 “Комплекс 14Ц033 Нудоль, ракета 14А042

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
[Complex 14TS033 Nudol rocket 14A042]”,
DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite. It is unclear whether this system, MilitaryRussia.ru, February 2, 2017,
the Nudol, will become operational soon, and it does not appear to have the http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-806.html.

capability to threaten targets beyond LEO. 86 For an in-depth discussion of the A-135
program as well as its limitations, see: Pavel
Podvig, “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War?
Specifics / Soviet Response to the SDI Program,” Russian
The Russian DA-ASAT capabilities currently consist of three primary programs Forces, March 17, 2013, http://russianforces.
org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_
which have direct or indirect counterspace capabilities: end_the_col.shtml. For a discussion of the
current state of Russian BMD, including the
implications of retiring Gorgon, see Aleksandr
1. Nudol: a rapidly maturing ground-launched ballistic missile designed to Stukalin, “‘Samolet M’ and the Future of Mos-
be capable of intercepting targets in LEO; cow Missile Defense,” Moscow Defense Brief,
p. 26 (2011).
2. B urevestnik: an air-launched rocket that could either be a new version
of the Kontakt DA-ASAT that is an SLV to place co-orbital ASATs into LEO 87 Keir Giles, “Russian Ballistic Missile Defense:
Rhetoric and Reality,” U.S. Army War College,
orbit, on a several-year development timeline; and June 2015, https://www.jstor.org/stable/res-
3. S-500: a next-generation exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense system, rep11662.

still several years from deployment, that may have capabilities against 88 Bart Hendrickx, “Re: Russia Tests Nudol ASAT
targets in low LEO orbits. System,” posting on the NASASpaceflight.
com forum, January 18, 2020, https://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=38943.
All three have their roots in Soviet-era programs but have been revived or msg2036403#msg2036403.
01
reconstituted in recent years. 89 See “Комплекс 14Ц033 Нудоль, ракета
14А042 [Complex 14TS033 Nudol rocket
02
14A042]”, MilitaryRussia.ru, February 2, 2017,
14A042 Nudol http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-806.html.
The Soviet missile defense system A-135, first released in June 1978, was 03
90 “Годовой отчет Концерна ПВО ‘Алмаз-Антей’
developed by the Vympel division of the Tactical Missile Corporation, which за 2012 год [Annual Report of the Almaz-Antei
oversees Russia’s multilayered missile defense architecture.85 The A-135 system Air Defense Concern for 2012],” LiveJournal,
04
July 18, 2013, https://saidpvo.livejournal.
included two missile interceptors, the exoatmospheric 51T6 (NATO designation com/190982.html?page=1.
“SH-11 Gorgon”) and the endoatmospheric 53T6 (NATO designation “Gazelle”). 05
91 GSKB Annual Report 2013.
While the system at the time possessed some dual-use potential for use
as an ASAT, it was sharply limited and has likely since been eliminated by the 92 Bart Hendrickx, “Re: Russia Tests Nudol ASAT
06
System,” posting on the NASASpaceflight.
retirement of the 51T6.86 com forum, January 18, 2020, https://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=38943.
07
msg2036403#msg2036403.
Designs for the would-be replacement, the A-235 missile defense system (under
the Russian codename Samolyot-M), first surfaced in 1985–1986, though little 93 Bart Hendrickx, “Aerostat: a Russian long-
08
range anti-ballistic missile system with possible
came of it at the time.87 The system includes the 53T6M, an upgraded version counterspace capabilities,” The Space Review,
of the Gazelle, as its short-range interceptor but does not appear to have a October 11, 2021, https://www.thespacereview.
09
com/article/4262/1.
DA-ASAT capability at this time.
10
In August 2009, the PVO (Russian space defense company) Almaz-Antey
signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense, followed by subcontracts 11
with OKB Novator and KB Tochmash (also known as the Nudelman Design
Bureau) to work on a separate program called Nudol (U.S. designation PL-19).88 12
KB Tochmash had previously developed a cannon for the Almaz military space
station and worked on several other Soviet-era counterspace programs and 13
OKB Novator has a long history developing long-range anti-aircraft missiles.
In 2010, Almaz-Antey began technical design work based on those initial 14
blueprints and entered prototyping and initial production of various software
and hardware components over the next several years.89 Individual components 15
were tested in 2012 90 and initial non-flight testing of the system as a whole
was successfully conducted in 2013.91 In 2013, a second contract was signed
between the Ministry of Defense and Almaz-Antey that also includes the Moscow
Institute of Thermal Technology, which specializes in long-range solid fuel
ballistic missiles, as a subcontractor instead of OKB Novator.92 The second
contract was for a system called Aerostat, which appears to be the longer-
range interceptor for the A-235 system, which is a separate program from
the Nudol but still may have some DA-ASAT capability.93
02-1 5
 94 “Противоракеты [Anti-Missile Systems],”
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LiveJournal.com, January 17, 2015, FIGURE 2-3 — TEL-MOUNTED NUDOL

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1137442.html.

95 “Система ПРО А-235 (ОКР «Нудоль») [PRO-235

System A (OCD “Nudol”)],” Boehhoe Military
Review, May 14,2015, https://topwar.ru/74866-
sistema-pro-a-235-okr-nudol.html; Bill Gertz,
“Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile,”
Washington Free Beacon, December 2, 2015,
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/rus-
sia-conducts-successful-flight-test-of-anti-sat-
ellite-missile/.

96 Bill Gertz, “Russia Just Successfully Tested

an Anti-satellite Missile,” December 2, 2015,
Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.
0 4/202 3

com/russia-just-successfully-tested-an-an-
ti-satellite-missile-2015-12?amp;IR=T&r=UK
&IR=T.

97 Pavel Podvig, “Russia Tests Nudol Anti-

Satellite System,” Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces, April 1, 2016, http://russianforces.org/
blog/2016/04/russia_tests_nudol_anti-satell.
shtml; Pavel Podvig, “Construction at the
Chekhov Radar Site,” Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces, June 24, 2016, http://russianforces.
01
org/blog/2016/06/construction_at_the_chek-
hov_radar_site.shtml.

02
98 Pavel Podvig, “Russia Tests Nudol Anti-Satellite
System,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,
April 1, 2016, http://russianforces.org/
03
blog/2016/04/russia_tests_nudol_anti-satell.
shtml.
Artist’s depiction from company calendar. Image credit: Almaz-Antey.94
04
99 Ankit Panda, “Russia Conducts New
Test of ‘Nudol’ Anti-Satellite System,”
The Diplomat, April 2, 2018, https://thediplomat. The evidence suggests Nudol is being developed for the direct purpose of
05
com/2018/04/russia-conducts-new-test-of- DA-ASAT operations. Throughout the development process, Almaz-Antey
nudol-anti-satellite-system/.
(whose role within the Russian defense complex is the development of
06
100 George Leopold, “Russian Test Reported, technologies for “active space defense”) has pitched the system as valuable
But Was it ASAT?,” Defense Systems,
December 22, 2016, https://defensesystems. for holding U.S. LEO assets at risk.95 What little is known publicly about the
07
com/articles/2016/12/22/russian.aspx; L. Todd Nudol flight tests are more suggestive of an orbital ballistic trajectory intercept
Wood, “Russia Tests Anti-satellite Weapon,”
Washington Times, December 21, 2016, than a midcourse missile intercept. Most significantly, the system itself is
08
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/ described by Russian state-run press reports as a mobile, TEL-based “new
dec/21/russia-tests-anti-satellite-weapon-pl-
19-nudol/. Russian long-range missile defense and space defense intercept complex…
09
within the scope of the Nudol OKR [experimental development project].” 96
101 Pavel Podvig, “Nudol ASAT system tested from
Plesetsk,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, The system appears to be designated the 14Ts033 (14Ц033), comprised
10
December 16, 2020, http://russianforces.org/ of the 14А042 Nudol rocket, 14P078 command and control system, and
blog/2020/12/nudol_asat_system_tested_from.
shtml. 14TS031 radar.97
11
102 USSPACECOM Public Affairs, “Russia tests di-
rect-ascent anti-satellite missile,” United States There have been twelve potential flight tests of Nudol, two of which were
12
Space Command, April 15, 2020, unsuccessful, eight likely successful, and two additional unconfirmed tests.
https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/
Article-Display/Article/2151611/russia-tests-di- Sources suggest that at least the November 2015 test was of just a rocket
13
rect-ascent-anti-satellite-missile/. and did not include a kill vehicle.98 A report in April 2018, citing unnamed U.S.
103 USSPACECOM Public Affairs, “Russia tests di- intelligence officials, stated that the Nudol test in March 2018 was the first
14
rect-ascent anti-satellite missile,” United States time it was fired from the transporter-erector-launcher it will be deployed
Space Command, December 16, 2020,
https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/ with.99 Evidence is inconclusive as to whether any of the remaining tests included
15
Article-Display/Article/2448334/russia-tests-di- a kill vehicle.100 Russia issued safety notices for airspace closures in June and
rect-ascent-anti-satellite-missile/.
November 2019 that are consistent with additional Nudol tests, but it appears
the June test did not happen.101 Two additional successful tests occurred on
April 15, 2020, and December 16, 2020, with the USSPACECOM issuing statements
confirming both test and calling them “further proof of Russia’s hypocritical
advocacy of outer space arms control proposals designed to restrict the
capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting
their counterspace weapons programs.” 102, 103 Table 2-4 lists the known and
suspected tests of the Nudol.
0 2-16
 104 Telegram posting from Warbolts, “Еще

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
TABLE 2-4 — NUDOL FLIGHT TESTS TO DATE один пуск из этой серии. Что за изделие
испытывается достоверно не известно
DATE SYSTEM LAUNCH SITE PAYLOAD APOGEE NOTES до сих пор, но эксперты связывают его с
“Нудоль”. Закрытия в целом повторяют
Aug. 12, 2014 Nudol ? ? X Failed shortly after launch. ранее объявляемые, период действия
15/11/2021 02:00 (UTC) - 17/11/2021 05:00
Apr. 22, 2015 Nudol ? ? X Failed at launch. (UTC). Из интересного, в данных NOTAM
на Плесецк и Чёшскую губу указан номер
Nov. 18, 2015 Nudol Plesetsk KKV 200 km? First successful test of missile. телефона некоего Чирикова.” November 13,
2021, https://t.me/warbolts/707.
May 25, 2016 Nudol Plesetsk ?? 100 km? Appears to be likely rocket
test (successful) 105 Tweet from Jonathan McDowell, “Here is the
pass of Kosmos-1408 (red line) northbound
Dec. 16, 2016 Nudol “Central Russia” Likely KKV 100 km? Appears to be likely rocket over Plesetsk at about 0245 UTC Nov 15. Well
(Plesetsk? test (successful) aligned with the NOTAM areas (indicated) for
Kapustin Yar?) the suspected Nudol antisatellite test,” November
15, 2021, https://twitter.com/planet4589/statu
Mar. 26, 2018 Nudol Plesetsk Likely KKV ? First test from a mobile s/1460305735317868545?s=20&t=Sl7upa788x-
launcher. Mw7JECDsi3og.

Dec. 23, 2018 Nudol Plesetsk Likely KKV ? Successful PL-19 Nudol test, 106 “Kosmos 1408,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.
mobile launcher org/wiki/Kosmos_1408, accessed February 16,
2022.
Nov. 15, 2019 Nudol Plesetsk Likely KKV ? –
107 Data compiled from the public satellite catalog
Apr. 15, 2020 Nudol Plesetsk Likely KKV ? Successful, nothing hit maintained by the U.S. military at https://space-
track.org.
Dec. 16, 2020 Nudol Plesetsk Likely KKV ? Successful, nothing hit 01
108 “New Russian system being tested hit old
Apr. 2021 Nudol Plesetsk Likely KKV ? Unconfirmed test satellite with “goldsmith’s’ precision – Shoigu,”
02
TASS, November 16, 2021, https://tass.com/
Nov. 15, 2021 Nudol Plesetsk KKV 470 km Intercepted and destroyed science/1362219.
Cosmos 1408
03
109 W.J. Hennigan, “Astronauts Take Shelter
Aboard ISS After Russian Anti-satellite Test,
U.S. Says,” Time, November 15, 2021,
On November 15, 2021, Russia conducted the first known intercept test 04
https://time.com/6117840/astronauts-shel-
of the Nudol, which intercepted and destroyed Cosmos 1408 (1982-092A, ter-iss-russia-test/.

13552), a defunct Russian military satellite, at an altitude of approximately 05

110 U.S. Space Command Public Affairs Office,
470 km. The test was preceded by a NOTAM issued on November 13 for “Russian direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test
creates significant, long-lasting space debris,”
November 15–17 that corresponded to the usual reentry zones for a Nudol 06
U.S. Space Command, November 15, 2021,
launch.104 Cosmos 1408 passed over the launch side headed NE and the NOTAM https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/
Article-Display/Article/2842957/russian-di-
suggests that the Nudol was launched in the same direction, meaning 07
rect-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-test-cre-
that it was generally traveling in the same direction as the satellite and the ates-significant-long-last/.

intercept velocity was likely lower than other DA-ASAT tests.105 The intercept 08
destroyed Cosmos 1408, a 1,750 kg (3,860 lb) defunct Soviet Tselina-D signals
intelligence satellite,106 and created a large amount of orbital debris. As of 09
February 2023, more than 1,700 pieces of orbital debris larger than 10 cm
(4 inches) have been cataloged from this test with 300 still in orbit.107 10

Immediately following the intercept, the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly 11

claimed that the debris from the test “posed no threat to space activity,” 108
However, due to the proximity of the test to the orbit of the International 12
Space Station (ISS), NASA flight directors ordered the crew onboard the ISS to
take emergency shelter in the Dragon and Soyuz lifeboats.109 The U.S. military 13
condemned the test, stating that it demonstrated a “deliberate disregard
for the security, safety, stability, and long-term sustainability of the space 14
domain for all nations.” 110
15
0 2-17
 111 “#PutinAtWar: New Russian Anti-Ballistic Little is known for sure about the operational capabilities of the Nudol, and
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Missile,” Digital Forensic Research Lab,

December 1, 2017, https://medium.com/dfrlab/
available estimates for maximum altitude vary widely from approximately
putinatwar-new-russian-anti-ballistic-mis- 50 km 111 to nearly 1,000 km.112 Something in the middle but closer to the former
sile-4a4194870e0d.
is most likely, based on observations from flight tests as well as third-party
112 “There is an on-going discussion about the analysis of suspected components.113 Russian media reports of the April
veracity of various public sources that indicate
a range of potential interceptors and altitudes
2015 failure suggested a rocket mass of 9.6 metric tons, which if true would
for the Nudol”. indicate only a very limited ASAT capability.114 The designation 14A is usually
113 See Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Vehicles,”
reserved for “space rockets” and intended for intercepting space objects,
Accessed March 21, 2018, http://planet4589. either satellites or nuclear warheads.115
org/space/lvdb/sdb/LV. The suspected apogees
were 350km and 500-1000km. These estimates
are notably highly consistent with estimates The imagery of the Nudol appears to show a mobile launch capability but
derived by Russian military open source
stationary radar, in keeping with the missile defense application for which it
0 4/202 3

blogger Dimmi from analysis of suspected

components and launch observations, which was initially conceived and reports that it relies on the 14TS031 radar system.116
are summarized in a table: “Complex 14TS033,”
MilitaryRussia.ru.
This has led some experts to note that while the system is movable, without
mobile radar, it could be limited to hitting satellites passing over Russian
114 Bart Hendrickx, “Re: Russia Tests Nudol ASAT
System,” posting on the NASASpaceflight.
territory.117 However, several factors reduce the salience of this fact. First, in
com forum, January 18, 2020, https://forum. the event of a conflict in Russia’s near abroad, many of the most relevant U.S.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=38943.
msg2036403#msg2036403.
assets would indeed be passing overhead. More importantly, Russia is
01
rapidly maturing multiple technologies for advanced targeting, tracking,
115 Ibid.
and measurement. These include, among others: ground-based lasers which,
02
116 “Противоракеты [Anti-Missile Systems],” while stationary, are a more flexible means of target-acquisition than radar;
LiveJournal.com, January 17, 2015, http://bmpd.
livejournal.com/1137442.html.
mobile radar; space-based targeting, tracking, and measurement (TT&M)
03
and SSA capabilities; expansion and modernization of ground-based space
117 Bill Gertz, “Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite
Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon,
monitoring sites throughout Russia; and on-board guidance systems akin
04
May 27, 2016, http://freebeacon.com/nation- to those employed for late-stage course-correction of conventional and
al-security/russia-flight-tests-anti-satellite-
missile.
nuclear cruise and ballistic missiles.118
05
118 A number of on-board and ground complex
systems being developed and upgraded for
use with the Nudol in particular, including
06
a new final-stage interceptor guidance and
control system, a dedicated next-generation
radar beginning with the 14TS031 radar with
07
digital adaptive phased array, new hardware
and software specially developed by A/A for
ground command of the Nudol, planned inte-
08
gration with a more comprehensive space- and
ground-based early warning system, and a spe-
cially-upgraded version of the “Don-2N”/5N20
09
and “Don-2NP”/5N20P radar systems in the
interim. See: “Complex 14TS033,”
MilitaryRussia.ru.
10

11

12

13

14

15
02-1 8
It is possible that the nuclear armament of the Nudol under at least some 119 Note that this, while a decent indicator, is not

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
definitive: an alternative possibility is that
circumstances is being considered, but the evidence is not conclusive. Available the ECS components are present to protect
depictions of the Nudol TEL have features that appear to be environmental the seeker/kill vehicle, or that the image was
manipulated by the employees at Almaz-Antey
control systems (ECS) on the missile tubes—a feature typically associated responsible for producing it prior to publication.
with nuclear-armed missiles.119 And there is precedent for such a decision: the
120 Sean O’Connor, “Russian/Soviet Anti-Ballistic
51T6 Gorgon was nuclear-tipped due to persistent skepticism regarding the Missile Systems,” Air Power Australia,
efficacy and reliability of non-nuclear missile defense.120 Some Soviet and Russian January 27, 2014, http://www.ausairpower.net/
APA-Rus-ABM-Systems.html#mozTocId371125;
military strategists have discussed the desirability of nuclear ASATs for reliable, Pavel Podvig, (ed.), 2001, Russian strategic
rapid, and wide-area kinetic and EMP effect, but there is no conclusive public nuclear forces, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.
416; Laura Grego, “A History of Anti-Satellite
evidence that the Soviet Union or Russia planned on nuclear-tipped ASAT Programs,” Union of Concerned Scientists,
weapons, even as part of their response to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative January 2012, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/
default/files/2019-09/a-history-of-ASAT-pro-
(SDI).121 There are also some who argue that Russia has shifted its nuclear grams_lo-res.pdf.
doctrine towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons for warfighting, but
121 Pavel Podvig, “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold
most Russian experts conclude that this has not yet happened.122 Moreover, War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program,”
Russian-language media reported in early 2018 that the system would not Russian Forces, March 17, 2013, http://russian-
forces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_
be equipped with nuclear warheads.123 help_end_the_col.shtml.

122 Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, “The Nuclear

78M6 Kontakt Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Descalaton:’ A
The second category of direct-ascent ASAT system explored by the Soviet Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,”
01
War on the Rocks, February 20, 2018,
Union, and seemingly resurrected in recent years, is an air-launched missile https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nucle-
system known as Kontakt. The launch platform was originally intended to ar-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-
02
dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem.
be a variant of the MiG-31 “Foxhound,” designated the MiG-31D.124 At least
six such aircraft were completed in the 1980s, with intent to be fitted with a 123 Nikolay Surkov and Alexey Ramm, “Москва
03
получит новую противоракетную защиту
Vympel-developed ASAT missile dubbed the 79M6 “Kontakt.” 125 Two waves [Moscow will receive a new anti-missile de-
of interceptor development were planned in the 1980s: the first was to be a fense],” Izvestia, February 21, 2018, https://iz.
04
ru/710845/nikolai-surkov-aleksei-ramm/mosk-
three-stage interceptor capable of hitting targets at orbits of 120–600 km; va-poluchit-novuiu-protivoraketnuiu-zashchitu.
the second was to reach altitudes of up to 1,500 km.126 The system was also 05
124 “MiG-31 Foxhound Interceptor Aircraft,”
intended to be capable of deploying with little or no warning, in contrast to AirForce-Technology.com, accessed March 15,
the USSR’s co-orbital interceptors,127 and of attacking large numbers of 2018, http://www.airforce-technology.com/
06
projects/mig-31/; “Russians Alter MiG-31 for
satellites quickly: Soviet documents speak of an operational target of at least ASAT Carrier Roles,” Aviation Week and Space
24 satellites within 36 hours, or as many as 20–40 satellites within 24 hours.128 Technology, 17 August 1992, p.63. For a fully
07
comprehensive treatment of the aircraft and
its variants, see: Yefim Gordon, MiG-25 Foxbat,
MiG-31 Foxhound: Russia’s Defensive Front
08
Line, Midland Publishing Ltd. (England), 1997.
For a concise but detailed description of the
MiG-31D, including its design specifications,
09
differences from the standard MiG-31, and
method of ASAT operation, refer to John Pike,
“USSR/CIS Miniature ASAT,” GlobalSecurity.org,
10
updated October 4, 2016, http://www.globalse-
curity.org/space/world/russia/mini.htm.

11
125 Ibid.

126 Pavel Podvig, “Another Old Anti-satellite System

12
Resurfaces,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,
January 25, 2013, http://russianforces.org/
blog/2013/01/another_old_anti-satellite_sys.
13
shtml.

127 John Pike, “USSR/CIS Miniature ASAT,”

14
GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 4, 2016,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/
russia/mini.htm.
15
128 Pavel Podvig, “Another Old Anti-satellite System
Resurfaces,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,
January 25, 2013, http://russianforces.org/
blog/2013/01/another_old_anti-satellite_sys.
shtml.
02-19
 129 Anatoly Zak, “Anti-Satellite Weapons: History The program was based out of Sary Shagan (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-09)
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

and Definitions,” presentation given at a

United Nations Institute for Disarmament
with support to be provided by the Krona optical space surveillance complex,
Research conference, March 2014, and allegedly became ready for flight-testing around 1991.129 Whether such
http://www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/
anti-satellite-weapons-asats-history-and-defi-
testing ever actually occurred is an open question, with the program remaining
nitions-en-1-968.pdf. shrouded in secrecy, but recent reports from a former MiG test pilot describe
130 Audio of the interview with MiG test pilot
several tests in which the missile was successfully launched from a MiG-31D in
Valery Menitsky is available here (accessed flight, homed in on a Soviet target, and then did a deliberate near-miss before
12 July 2017): http://www.buran.ru/sound/
men_31d.mp3.
self-detonating to prevent the United States from discovering the program.130
If true, this would demonstrate the maturity of the rocket (likely retained to the
131 John Pike, “USSR/CIS Miniature ASAT,
” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 4, 2016,
present day as other such assets were), but also of the aircraft’s special upward-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/ facing radar array, ground-based targeting and command-and-control
russia/mini.htm.
complexes, and ability to stably and accurately launch at-speed.
0 4/202 3

132 “СМИ: Минобороны готовится испытать

противоспутниковый комплекс [Media:
the Ministry of Defense is preparing to test
Put on hold due to budget cuts in the 1990s, there are reports that the
the anti-complex],” Vzyglad, 24 January 2013, program may have been resumed by the Russian Air Force in 2009.131 Little
https://vz.ru/news/2013/1/24/617307.html;
Dmitriy Balburov, and Aleksei Mikhailov, “Tests
public evidence exists that would confirm the existence, much less operational
of Antisatellite Complex Will Begin at the End nature, of a viable air-launched ASAT at present, but both the launch
of the Year: Revived Soviet Krona Will Down
Satellites With Ground-Based or Air-Launched
platform and ground-based support systems are undergoing intensive
01
Missiles,” Izvestia, January 24, 2013. modernization efforts.
133 “СМИ: Минобороны готовится испытать

02
противоспутниковый комплекс [Media: the Meanwhile, the integrated detection, targeting, tracking, and communications
Ministry of Defense is preparing to test the
anti-complex],” Vzyglad, 24 January 2013,
networks on which an airborne DA-ASAT system would depend are expanding
03
https://vz.ru/news/2013/1/24/617307.html. and new facilities constructed: a new Krona ground radar-optical complex
134 Tyler Rogoway and Ivan Voukadinov,
was recently constructed at Nakhodka (see Imagery Appendix; page 15-46),
04
“Exclusive: Russian MiG-31 Foxhound carrying a total of three others have been built over time (one each at Stavropolye,
huge mystery missile emerges near Moscow,”
TheDrive.com, September 29, 2018,
Сары-Шаган, and near Moscow), and all have undergone significant and
05
http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/23936/ ongoing technological upgrades in recent years.132 These upgrades have been
exclusive-russian-mig-31-foxhound-carrying-
huge-mystery-missile-emerges-near-moscow.
followed by testing which, according to Russian military officials, has featured
06
a particular emphasis on “interaction of various components, especially the
135 Amanda Macias, “A never-before-seen
Russian missile is identified as an anti-satellite
impact means, with a ground-radar optical complex search and identification
07
weapon and will be ready for warfare by 2022,” of artificial satellites” in order to “deal with the satellites.” 133
CNBC.com, October 25, 2018,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/25/rus-

08
sian-missile-identified-as-anti-satellite-weap- Images of a MiG-31 carrying what was reportedly a mock-up of a new ASAT
on-ready-by-2022.html.
missile to replace the Kontakt appeared online in mid-September 2018.134
09
136 Bart Hendrickx, “Burevestnik: a Russian Three anonymous U.S. government sources stated in 2018 that the system
air-launched anti-satellite system,” The Space
Review, April 27, 2020, https://www.thespacere-
was being actively tested with the goal of reaching operational readiness
10
view.com/article/3931/1. in 2022; as of March 2023, it most likely is not operational.135 Information
137 Bart Hendrickx, posting on NASA
uncovered in spring 2020 suggests that the recent MiG-31B activity is linked
11
Spaceflightforum.com, July 28, 2020, to the Burevestnik co-orbital ASAT system, as opposed to a renewed version
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
php?topic=45734.msg2112384#msg2112384.
of the Kontakt DA-ASAT. Researcher Bart Hendrickx uncovered significant
12
documentation for a three-stage solid rocket carried by a MiG-31BM that
would likely be used as a quick-response launch system to place one or more
13
co-orbital ASATs into orbit (see “ Russian Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 2-1).136
Construction work is ongoing at Plesetsk airport to build infrastructure for
14
future Burevestnik launches from an aircraft-carried booster and it is unclear
what further role Sary Shagan will have in this program.137
15
02-2 0
S-500 ABM Sebastien Roblin, “Russia’s S-500: The Ultimate

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
138
Weapon Against American Missiles or a Paper
Moscow is also developing next-generation missile defense capabilities, the Tiger?,” The National Interest, November 4,
most advanced of which is the S-500 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.138 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/russias-s-500-the-ultimate-weapons-
Relatively little information about the S-500 exists in the public domain, but against-american-missiles-18294.
it appears to include an exoatmospheric interceptor, capable of destroying
139 Christopher F. Foss, “S-500,” Jane’s Land
not only ballistic missiles before re-entry but also objects in orbit.139 Russian Warfare Platforms: Artillery and Air Defense
officials, in the years following the Chinese and U.S. ASAT and missile defense (London: IHS Global, 2016), 580-1; Bill Gertz,
“Pentagon: China, Russia Soon Capable of
tests of the late 2000s, began to explicitly discuss the S-500 as serving a dual Destroying U.S. Satellites,” Washington Free
missile defense-ASAT purpose.140 The development of dedicated ASATs since Beacon, January 30, 2018, http://freebeacon.
com/national-security/pentagon-china-rus-
then, however, makes this less likely. The system was originally intended to begin sia-soon-capable-destroying-u-s-satellites/.
production and deployment in 2016 or 2017,141 but had not yet completed
140 Anatoly Zak, “Russian Anti-Satellite Systems,”
testing.142 Russian media reported that the S-500 entered production in March Russian Space Web, updated November 30,
2018, with the system being manufactured at the Almaz-Antey plant in Nizhny 2017, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/nary-
ad.html.
Novgorod and missiles in Kirov.143 Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu
announced that he expected deliveries to begin as soon as 2020, and funding 141 Brendan McGarry, “Graphic Details Russian
Surface to Air Missile Coverage in Europe,”
has been guaranteed as part of the State Armament Program 2018–2027; 144 Military.com, August 30, 2016, https://www.
Russia reportedly planned to field 10 battalions of the new system.145 military.com/defensetech/2016/08/30/de-
tailing-russian-surface-to-air-missile-cover-
age-in-europe.; “S-500 Prometheus,” Missile
In June 2020, General Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Russian Aerospace Threat, updated May 4, 2017, https://missileth-
01
reat.csis.org/defsys/s-500-prometheus/.
Forces, gave a lengthy interview in which he called the S-500 a “first generation
space defense system” and noted that it will be capable of defeating low-orbit 142 Ibid.
02
satellites and space strike systems in the future.146 In July 2021, Russia showed 143 Vladimir Karnozov, “Russia’s Next-generation
the first video footage of a containerized missile of the S-500 system being S-500 SAM Enters Production,” AINonline,
03
March 14, 2018, https://www.ainonline.com/
test fired from a TEL.147 While it was reported that the first S-500 unit had aviation-news/defense/2018-03-14/rus-
been delivered to Russian forces in September 2021, Russian Deputy Prime sias-next-generation-s-500-sam-enters-pro-
04
duction.
Minister Yuri Borisov stated that it was not a mature system and still needed
“configurations.” 148 Even so, the S-500’s manufacturer announced in April 2022 144 Ibid.
05
that mass production had begun and that serial delivery was intended to 145 Andrius Genys, “S-500,” Military Today,
begin in 2025. April 5, 2017, http://www.military-today.com/
06
missiles/s500.htm.

In December 2021, TASS reported that the S-550 system had entered service 146 “Чтобы господство в воздухе оставалось
07
за нами,” Redstar.ru, July 2, 2020,
and that it was capable of “hitting spacecraft, ballistic missile reentry vehicles http://redstar.ru/chtoby-gospodst-
and hypersonic targets at altitudes of tens of thousands of kilometers.” 149 vo-v-vozduhe-ostavalos-za-nami/.
08
However, this report was immediately called into question as other reports 147 Thomas Newdick, “This is Our First View of Rus-
indicated that development of the system had not yet started or that it had sia’s New S-500 Air Defense System in Action,”
09
The Drive, July 20, 2021, https://www.thedrive.
been confused with the S-500.150 com/the-war-zone/41627/this-is-our-first-view-
of-russias-new-s-500-air-defense-system-in-
10
action.

148 Inder Singh Bisht, “Russia Begins Mass

11
Production of S-500 Air Defense System,”
TheDefencePost, April 28, 2022, https://
www.thedefensepost.com/2022/04/28/rus-
12
sia-mass-producing-s-500/.

149 “First S-550 air defence systems enter service

13
in Russias – source,” TASS, December 28, 2021,
https://tass.com/defense/1382133.

14
150 Joseph Trevithick, “No, Russia’s S-550
Missile Defense System Hasn’t Been Fielded,”
The Drive, December 29, 2021, https://www.
15
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43675/no-russias-
s-550-missile-defense-system-hasnt-been-
fielded.
02-21
 151 Laurie Moe Buckhout, “Modern Russian Potential Military Utility /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Electronic Warfare,” SITREP Quarterly Review

of C4ISR Technology Advancements, Q1 2016,
Given the known testing, it is likely that Russia has some existing capability
http://www.leonardodrs.com/sitrep/q1-2016- to field an operational DA-ASAT capability against most LEO satellites within
the-invisible-fight/modern-russian-electron-
ic-warfare/.
the next few years. This would include satellites performing military weather
and ISR functions. Russia would have to wait for such satellites to overfly an
area where one of the systems is deployed, but most LEO satellites would do
so daily to every few days. However, once launched, the target would only have
an estimated 8–15 minutes of warning time before impact. Moreover, the
potential for an air-launched DA-ASAT capability could dramatically expand
the potential launch opportunities.

To date, there is no public evidence suggesting Russia is experimenting with

0 4/202 3

or developing DA-ASAT capabilities against satellites in higher orbits such as

MEO or GEO, although it is possible given their advanced rocket and guidance
technology.

At the same time, there are also constraints on the military utility of such
systems, particularly as Russia replenishes its own space capabilities. The
01
use of a kinetic-kill DA-ASAT against an orbital target will invariably create
large amounts of orbital space debris, as was seen in the 2021 Nudol test.
02
The aggressive use of such a capability would invariably lead to widespread
condemnation, as happened after the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. The debris will
03
pose just as much a threat to Russia’s space capabilities, including its human
spaceflight program, as it does to other countries. Thus, the military utility of
04
DA-ASATs would have to be weighed against the potential costs, particularly
relative to less destructive capabilities such as jamming or blinding. The use
05
of a DA-ASAT would also be relatively easy to attribute to Russia.

06
2.3 — RUSSIAN ELECTRONIC WARFARE
07
Assessment /
08
Russia places a high priority on integrating electronic warfare (EW) into military
operations and has been investing heavily in modernizing this capability.
09
Most of the upgrades have focused on multifunction tactical systems whose
counterspace capability is limited to jamming of user terminals within tactical
10
ranges. Russia has a multitude of systems that can jam GPS receivers within
a local area, potentially interfering with the guidance systems of unmanned
11
aerial vehicles (UAVs), guided missiles, and precision-guided munitions
(PGMs), but has no publicly known capability to interfere with the GPS satellites
12
themselves using radio frequency interference. The Russian Army fields
several types of mobile EW systems, some of which can jam specific satellite
13
communications user terminals within tactical ranges. Russia can likely jam
communications satellites uplinks over a wide area from fixed ground stations
14
facilities. Russia has operational experience in the use of counterspace EW
capabilities from current military campaigns, as well as using it within Russia
15
for protecting strategic locations and VIPs. New evidence suggests Russia
may be developing high-powered space-based EW platforms to augment its
existing ground-based platforms.

Specifics /
Given the paucity of public information on EW in general and Russian
counterspace EW in particular, this assessment relies, in part, on indirect
evidence, principally Russian technological capability, EW doctrine, and
known EW capabilities in other environments.151
02-2 2
Some additional information on Russian EW doctrine, organization, and 152 Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Electronic

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” International
capabilities can be found in the report, “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities Centre for Defence and Security,
to 2025,” published by the International Centre for Defence and Security September 2017, https://icds.ee/wp-content/
uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electron-
in Estonia.152 ic_Warfare_to_2025.pdf.

153 Brian Wang, “Russia Will Place GPS Jammers on

GNSS Jamming 250,000 Cellphone Towers to Reduce Enemy
GNSS jamming, particularly of the U.S. GPS network, is a well-known technology, Cruise Missile and Drone Accuracy in the Event
of Large Scale Conventional War,” The Next Big
and jammers are widely proliferated throughout the globe. Russia is assessed Future, October 18, 2016,
to be proficient in GPS jamming capabilities, having developed both fixed and https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/10/rus-
sia-will-place-gps-jammers-on-250000.html.
mobile systems. The known systems are downlink jammers, which affect GPS
receivers within a local area. There is no known system that targets uplink 154 “Silent Protector: Russia Develops Hi-Tech
Jammer to Block Enemy Electronics,” Sputnik
jamming of the GPS satellites themselves. International, August 25, 2016, https://sputni-
knews.com/russia/201608251044633778-rus-
sia-jammer-electronics/.
The first category of Russian GPS jammers is used to protect fixed facilities.
For example, Russian state media announced that Russia is deploying 250,000 155 “Electronic Warfare Chief Interviewed,” Russian
Defense Policy, May 30 2017, https://russian-
GPS jammers on cell phone towers throughout the country.153 The objective of defpolicy.blog/tag/electronic-warfare/.
these Pole-21 jammers, developed by the JSC Scientific and Technical Center
156 “R330ZH,” Rosobornexport, accessed
of Electronic Warfare, is to reduce the accuracy of foreign UAVs and cruise March 15, 2018, http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/
missiles over much of the Russian landmass, thereby protecting fixed installations. air-defence-systems/elint-and-ew-equip-
01
ment/r-33ozh/. “Sky’s the Limit: Russia’s Unique
The Pole-21 systems are reported to be effective to a range of 80 km.154 Jamming System Getting Upgrade,” Sputnik
News, May 12, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/
02
russia/201612051048187517-russia-electron-
The second category of Russian GPS jammers are mobile systems that are ic-warfare-system/.
integrated within military EW units and form a critical component of Russian 03
157 David Stupples, “How Syria is Becoming a
military capabilities.155 These units are equipped with multifunction EW equipment, Test Bed for High-tech Weapons of Electronic
a number of which have GPS jamming capability. Two of these are the R-330Zh Warfare,” The Conversation, October 8, 2015,
04
https://theconversation.com/how-syria-is-be-
“Zhitel” and the “Borisoglebsk-2.”156 The role of these systems is to protect coming-a-test-bed-for-high-tech-weapons-of-
Russian units by jamming an adversary’s tactical signals. The local jamming electronic-warfare-48779; “It is Official, Russian
05
Army Deployed R-330Zh Jammer in the Battle of
of GPS seeks to negate the effectiveness of UAVs, cruise missiles, and PGMs. Debaltseve,” Inform Napalm, April 23, 2016,
Recently, there have been multiple reports of Russia deploying some of these https://informnapalm.org/en/r-330zh-jammer-
06
battle-debaltseve/; Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian
EW systems in support of Russian deployments in Syria and Ukraine.157 In Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real
May 2019, the Ukrainian military released maps showing the deployment of and Imaginable,” Real Clear Defense May 26,
07
2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/
Russian EW systems throughout the Donbas region of Ukraine.158 Reports of articles/2017/05/26/russian_electronic_war-
GPS interference along the Ukrainian border intensified in March and April fare_in_ukraine_111460.html.
08
2021.159 In August 2021, the Jamestown Foundation released a detailed report 158 Russian Army Deployed R-330Zh Jammer in the
on Russian EW activities in the Donbas region of Ukraine.160 Battle of Debaltseve,” Inform Napalm, April 23,
09
2016, https://informnapalm.org/en/r-330zh-
jammer-battle-debaltseve/.
In February 2022, reports of GPS interference in Ukraine spiked alongside 10
159 Dana Goward, “Russia ramps up GPS
Russia’s forces entering Ukraine. Hawkeye360, a U.S.-based commercial jamming along with troops at Ukraine border,”
geospatial analytics company, said they noted increased GPS interference in GPS World, April 21, 2021,
11
https://www.gpsworld.com/russia-ramps-up-
and around Ukraine in the months leading up to the February attack as well as gps-jamming-along-with-troops-at-ukraine-
since. However, the first few months of the conflict did not include the degree border/.
12
of GPS interference and other kinds of electronic warfare that some analysts 160 Sergey Sukhankin, “Blind, Confuse, and
expected, with several different potential explanations as to why. However, as Demoralize: Russian Electronic Warfare
13
Operations in Donbas,” Jamestown Foundation,
of July 2022, at least three of Russia’s five EW brigades were reported to be August 27, 2021, https://jamestown.org/
involved in the fighting in Ukraine and reports of electronic warfare began to program/blind-confuse-and-demoralize-rus-
14
sian-electronic-warfare-operations-in-donbas/.
increase. GPS jamming around Russian Engles-2 and Marinikova air bases also
increased following Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on those facilities. 15
02-2 3
 161 Ukrainian Mission to OSCE & UN in Vi-
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

enna (@UKRinOSCE), “Російські новітні FIGURE 2-4 — RUSSIAN COUNTERSPACE EW SYSTEMS

системи озброєння - автоматизована
станція перешкод Р-330Ж “Житель” та
комплекс радіоелектронної боротьби
“Тірада-2”, зафіксовані Спеціальною
моніторинговою місією ОБСЄ неподалік
від н.п. Южна Ломуватка, на окупованій
Росією частині Донбасу,” Twitter.com, April
3, 2019, https://twitter.com/UKRinOSCE/
status/1113385017185640448?s=20. Further
analysis suggests that the system identified in
the photo as a Tirada-2 was another EW sys-
tem, the R-934BMV counter-UAV system. See
Michael Sheldon, “Tirada-2 Likely Not Spotted
in Ukraine,” Digital Forensic Research Lab,
July 17, 2019, https://medium.com/dfrlab/
0 4/202 3

tirada-2-likely-not-spotted-in-ukraine-a4b-
b86956adc.

162 Matt Burgess, “When a Tanker Vanishes,

All the Evidence Points to Russia,” Wired,
September 21, 2017, https://www.wired.co.uk/
article/black-sea-ship-hacking-russia.

163 “Norway, Finland suspect Russia of jamming

GPS,” GPS World, November 12, 2018,
https://www.gpsworld.com/norway-finland-
01
suspect-russia-of-jamming-gps/.

164 Nerijus Adomaitis, “Norway says it proved Rus-

02
sian GPS interference during NATO exercises,”
Reuters, March 18, 2019,
Russian mobile counterspace EW systems deployed in Eastern Ukraine. Image credit: OSCE 161
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nor-
03
way-defence-russia/norway-says-it-proved-rus-
sian-gps-interference-during-nato-exercis-
es-idUSKCN1QZ1WN.
There have also been reports of GPS interference occurring outside of conflict
04
zones. In June 2017, the captain of a tanker approaching the Russian Black
165 “Above Us, Only Stars,” C4ADS,
March 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/
Sea port of Novorossiysk noticed a sudden anomaly in the ship’s GPS system,
05
static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5c- placing its location approximately 30 miles away on land near the local airport.
99488beb39314c45e782da/1553549492554/
Above+Us+Only+Stars.pdf.
Additionally, the Automated Identification System (AIS), a navigation safety
06
communication system carried by all large commercial ships, reported that
166 “Head of the Russian General Staff’s Office for
UAV Development Major General Alexander
several other ships were also located near the airport. The AIS system relies
07
Novikov holds briefing for domestic and foreign on GPS to identify a ship’s location. This anomaly could have been caused by
reporters,” Ministry of Defence of the Russian
Federation, January 11, 2018, https://twitter.
GPS spoofing exercises or tests conducted by the Russian military, likely
08
com/mod_russia/status/951469288220774401. within the parameters of a test program or exercise in the local area and the
ships were unintentionally affected.162 In November 2018, there were media
09
reports of widespread jamming of civil GPS signals in Norway and Finland at
the same time as a major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise.163
10
The jamming reportedly affected military systems as well as civilian airliners,
cars, trucks, ships, and smartphones. In March 2019, the Norwegian
11
government claimed they had proof that the disruption was caused by
Russian interference and demanded an explanation.164
12

In March 2019, the nonprofit C4ADS published an in-depth report on Russian

13
GNSS jamming and spoofing in Russia, Crimea, and Syria.165 The report details
nearly 10,000 suspected incidents across the entire Russian Federation, its
14
occupied territories (including Crimea), and overseas military facilities (primarily
in Syria). In particular, the report tracks the use of GNSS spoofing as part of
15
very important person (VIP) protection, protection of important strategic
facilities, and airspace denial in active combat zones. The report was based
on data from maritime AIS, ridesharing services such as Uber, and GPS-enabled
fitness tracker applications. The spoofing often manifested in devices reporting
they were located at one or more nearby airports, which may be an attempt
to use the mandatory geofencing in commercial drones to deny their use. At
Russian air bases in Syria, where weaponized drone attacks have occurred,
military EW systems have reportedly been used to spoof GNSS and force
attacking drones to land in designated spots.166 The spoofing began in 2016,
peaked in 2017, and appears to have lessened since being publicly reported.
02-24
In June 2019, Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv, Israel, experienced 167 “Loss of GPS Signal at Ben Gurion Airport, Tel

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Aviv, Israel, (LLBG),” The International Feder-
GPS disruptions that Israel attributed to Russian military activities. The ation of Airline Pilots’ Associations, 19SAB05,
International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Associations noted that it had June 25, 2019, https://www.ifalpa.org/me-
dia/3388/19sab05-loss-of-gps-signal-at-ben-
received multiple reports from pilots about the loss of GPS signals near the gurion.pdf.
airport.167 The disruptions affected only airborne systems and not terrestrial
168 “Ben Gurion Airport GPS Disruption Blamed on
navigation systems and only occurred during the daytime. Israeli security Russian Electronic Warfare,” DefenseWorld,net,
officials stated that the disruptions were caused by defensive electronic June 28, 2019, https://www.defenseworld.net/
news/25041/Ben_Gurion_Airport_GPS_Disrup-
warfare measures being taken at the Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, 390 km tion_Blamed_on_Russian_Electronic_Warfare.
north, where Russian aircraft were based.168
169 Thomas Newdick, “Russia is Jamming Royal Air
Force Transport Aircraft Flying Out of Cyprus:
In March 2021, the U.K. Royal Air Force reported GPS jamming affecting its Reports,” The Drive, March 19, 2021,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
military flight operations out of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, with zone/39872/russia-is-jamming-royal-air-force-
suspicion falling on Russian military operations in Syria.169 In June 2021, the transport-aircraft-flying-out-of-cyprus-reports.

AIS position of a U.S. Navy warship was spoofed to make it appear that it 170 Thomas Newdick, “U.S. Destroyer Shows Up
was sailing with a Ukrainian patrol within the territorial waters of Russian- Right Off Crimea On Vessel Tracking Sites But It
Ever Left Port (Updated),” The Drive,
occupied Crimea, when in fact the ship was tied up in port in Odessa.170 June 29, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/
the-war-zone/41349/u-s-destroyer-shows-up-
right-off-crimea-on-vessel-tracking-sites-but-
In March 2022, several aircraft flying near Kaliningrad and also along Finland’s it-never-left-port.
eastern border reported interference with their GPS signals. Although the 01
171 “Finland reports GPS disturbances in aircraft
Finnish government did not make any public attributions to the interference, flying over Russia’s Kaliningrad,” The Guardian,
some of it was significant enough to halt flights from Helsinki to Savonlinna in Mar 9, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/
02
world/2022/mar/09/finland-gps-disturbanc-
eastern Finland.171 Additional reports of GPS interference in eastern Finland es-aircrafts-russia.
spike later in 2022 to more than 81 days, four times as many as in early years, 03
172 Tor Kjetil Kristoffersen, “Russerne jammer
and likely a result of the renewed conflict in Ukraine.172 Widerøes GPS-er: – Skaper store problemer for
oss,” Nettavisen, December 22, 2022, https://
04
www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/russerne-jammer-
No Russian system is known to be capable of targeting the GPS satellites wideroes-gps-er-skaper-store-problemer-for-
themselves (uplink jamming). oss/s/5-95-819901.
05
173 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia gears up for electronic
In 2021, new research emerged about a Russian program called Tobol that warfare in space (part 2),” The Space Review,
06
November 2, 2020, https://www.thespacere-
appears to be aimed at protecting Russian satellites from uplink jamming.173 view.com/article/4060/1.
The head of the project is linked to several academic papers and patents 07
174 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-
related to monitoring authentic satellite signals, detecting any focused flight.com forums,Bart Hendrickx, “Re:
interference, and transmitting additional signals to counter the interference. Russian space-related electronic warfare
08
projects,” posting to NASA Spaceflight
Additional sources suggest that there are at least seven Tobol complexes Forums, February 11, 2022, https://forum.
spread across Russian territory, all of which are co-located with satellite nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=52194.
09
msg2340475#msg2340475.
tracking facilities.174 Four are stationary, two are mobile, and the seventh is
undetermined as of yet (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-27). There is also some 175 Ibid.
10
evidence to suggest that Russia may be planning a new version or modification 176 Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Electronic
to the Tobol system that can attack foreign satellite transmissions, including Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” International
11
Centre for Defence and Security, September 2017,
potentially acting as an uplink jammer for GPS, in addition to (or instead of) https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/
protecting Russian satellite transmission.175 ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_
12
to_2025.pdf.

Jamming of Communications Satellites 177 Anatoly Zak, “Russian Anti-Satellite Systems,”

13
Russian Space Web, November 30, 2017,
Russia has dedicated capabilities for both downlink and uplink jamming of http://www.russianspaceweb.com/naryad.html.
signals from communications satellites. The R-330Zh “Zhitel” mobile jammer 14
is reportedly able to jam commercial INMARSAT and Iridium receivers within a
tactical local area and has been deployed throughout recent Russian military 15
campaigns.176

Russia has also committed to developing more advanced EW and communications

jamming capabilities over the next decade. In November 2017, Oleg Ochasov, the
Deputy Head of 46th TsNII research institute of the Ministry of Defense, disclosed
to the Russian parliament in connection with the 2018–2027 defense procurement
program that the “Tirada-2S electronic warfare complex…specialized in jamming
communications satellites” was under development, and “expected to be
available in ‘ground’ and ‘mobile’ architectures.”177 The Tirada-2 reportedly
02-2 5
 178 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia gears up for electronic can be used to conduct uplink jamming of communications satellites, potentially
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

warfare in space (part 1),” The Space Review,

October 26, 2020, https://www.thespacereview.
even capable of causing permanent damage.178 The Russian Ministry of
com/article/4056/1. Defense has publicly stated that the Tirada-2 would enter service in 2019 and
179 Ibid.
three additional versions were in development.179 Another system reportedly
in development is the Bylina-MM, which is designed to “suppress the on-board
180 Ibid.
transponders of the millimeter band communications satellites Milstar, GBS,
181 “Warfare Plane,” Sputnik News, Skynet, Sicral, Italsat and Sakura” and may be linked to a much larger EW
September 7, 2019, https://sputniknews.com/
military/201807091066176858-russia-electron-
program also under the name Bylina.180
ic-warfare-plane-satellites/.

182 Jon Brodkin, “Eon Musk: “High” probability

In September 2018, the Sputnik News service published a report claiming that
of Russian attacks on Starlink in Ukraine,” Russia was developing a new EW aircraft that could be used to target satellite
Arstechnica, March 4, 2022, https://arstechni-
services.181 The project is aimed at replacing the IL-22PP Porubshchik EW
0 4/202 3

ca.com/tech-policy/2022/03/elon-musk-high-
probability-of-russian-attacks-on-starlink-in- aircraft, which has become difficult to support due to its underlying airframe.
ukraine/.
The new project is reported to add the ability to interfere with space systems
183 Valeria Insinna, “SpaceX beating Russian as well as air, ground, and maritime systems, but this has not yet been confirmed,
jamming attack was ‘eyewatering’: DoD official,”
Breaking Defense, April 20, 2022, https://
nor has the specific capability of the system.
breakingdefense.com/2022/04/spacex-beat-
ing-russian-jamming-attack-was-eyewater-
ing-dod-official/.
In March 2022, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk also warned Ukrainian users of his
01
company’s Starlink satellite broadband communication system about potential
184 E. Dilipraj, “Electronic Warfare: Russia’s
Capabilities,” Centre for Air Power Studies,
attacks against end user terminals by Russian forces.182 Mr. Musk further
02
January 2016, pp.30-32, https://www.research- claimed that Russia had jammed a Starlink terminal in Ukraine for “hours at a
gate.net/publication/333420461_Electron-
ic_Warfare_Russia’s_Enhanced_Capabilities.
time” before SpaceX was able to ship a software update to mitigate much of
03
the jamming.183 However, there has not been independent or public validation
185 “Jamming the Enemy: Russia Ramps Up Pro-
duction of Electronic Warfare Systems,” Sputnik
of the type and magnitude of the jamming and the specific mitigation
04
News, May 13, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/ measures taken.
military/201705131053579633-russia-electron-
ic-warfare-systems-production/.

05
Jamming of SAR Satellites
186 Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Electronic Warfare
Capability: Training and Procurement,” Eurasia
The Krashukha-4 mobile electronic warfare system, manufactured by Russia’s
06
Daily Monitor, May 17, 2018, https://jamestown. Radio-Electronic Technologies Group (KRET), is designed to counter airborne
org/program/russias-electronic-warfare-capa-
bility-training-and-procurement/.
early warning and control systems (AWACS) and other airborne radar and
07
has a reported effective range of 300 km.184 Due to its range and power, it
187 Dylan Malyasaov, “Russia is jamming European
Space Agency’s Sentinel satellite,” Defence
is also reported to be effective against LEO synthetic aperture radar imaging
08
Blog, July 25, 2021, https://defence-blog.com/ satellites.185 Recent news reports have discussed delivery of a new EW system
russia-is-jamming-european-space-agen-
cys-sentinel-satellite/.
called Divnomorye that is meant to replace the Krashukha and serve as an
09
integrated EW system against air, space, and ground systems.186
188 Joseph Trevithick, “Ukraine Just Captured Part
of One of Russia’s Most Capable Electronic

10
Warfare Systems,” The War Zone, March 22, In July 2021, several public reports emerged claiming the European Space
2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
zone/44879/ukraine-just-captured-part-of-
Agency’s Sentinel-1 radar imaging satellite was jammed while imaging locations
11
one-of-russias-most-capable-electronic-war- near the Russian-Ukrainian border.187 The exact source of the jamming, and
fare-systems.
whether it was deliberate or not, is uncertain as the Sentinel-1 radar operates
12
189 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASAS in C-Band (around 5 Ghz), which is also used by various ground-based radar
paceflight.com forums,Bart Hendrickx,
“Re: Russian space-related electronic warfare
systems. Sentinel-1 is used for civil applications, with a relatively low resolution
13
projects,” posting to NASA Spaceflight and all of its data publicly accessible, making it unlikely that it was being used
Forums, February 15, 2022, https://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=52194.
for national security purposes.In March 2022, Ukrainian forces captured a
14
msg2342023#msg2342023. containerized command post for the Krashukha-4 system intact near Kyiv.188

15
There is some evidence that Russia is planning a follow-on to its Tobol EW
system that might be aimed at preventing optical and radar reconnaissance
satellites from imaging Russian territory by blocking the signals they send to
data relay satellites.189
02-2 6
 190 “Invisible Shield, Invisible Sword: Russia’s

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
FIGURE 2-5 — KRASUKHA-4 Electronic Warfare ‘Second to None’,” Sputnik
News, August 31, 2017, https://sputniknews.
com/20170831/russia-electronic-warfare-sys-
tem-krasukha-1056962045.html.

191 Bart Hendrickx, “Ekipazh: Russia’s Top-Secret

Nuclear-Powered Satellite,” The Space Review,
October 7, 2019, https://www.thespacereview.
com/article/3809/1.

192 Ibid.

193 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-

flight.com forums, Bart Hendrickx, “Re: KB
Arsenal’s project Ekipazh,” posting to the
NASA Spaceflight Forum message boards,
November 10, 2021, https://forum.na-
saspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=48342.
msg2309060#msg2309060.

A Russian mobile electronic warfare system used to jam radar. Image credit: Sputnik News.190

Space-based Jamming 01

In October 2019, new research emerged that suggests Russia might be

developing a new generation of nuclear reactors to power on-orbit jammers. 02

Research done by Bart Hendrickx uncovered evidence of a project called

Ekipazh that involves a Russian company, KB Arsenal, with a long history of 03
developing nuclear reactors for satellites.191 The Ekipazh project began on August
13, 2014, under the project code 14F350 and uses language that implies a 04
connection to a “transport and energy module” (TEM) that had been previously
proposed as part of the Plazma-2010 nuclear-powered space tug (a project 05
that was apparently never funded).
06
While the exact payload for the Ekipazh program is unknown, KB Arsenal had
previously suggested that the Plazma-2010 could be used to power space- 07
based EW payloads.192 KB Arsenal has argued that the nuclear reactor would be
powerful enough to support jammers operating on a wide range of frequencies 08
and interfering with electronic systems over a wide area from highly elliptical
or geostationary orbits. Additional documentation emerged in 2021 that suggests 09
the purpose of Ekipazh is indeed to develop a nuclear-powered satellite for
electronic warfare.193 Developing and deploying such a system would be 10
consistent with Russia’s stated military doctrine for space, but there is currently
no public evidence of plans for operational deployment. 11

Potential Military Utility / 12

RF jamming is an effective means of negating certain space capabilities. The
most significant and prevalent, thus far, is using EW to degrade the accuracy 13
of GPS-guided systems in tactical scenarios. Given this high reliance of modern
militaries on GNSS, and GPS in particular, Russia is likely to yield significant 14
military utility from being able to actively prevent, or even undermine confidence
in, the ability of adversaries to use GNSS in a future conflict. 15

EW can be used to suppress or degrade space capabilities by the uplink jamming

of communications satellites. It is an attractive option for counterspace
because of its flexibility: it can be temporarily applied, its effects on a satellite
are completely reversible, it generates no on-orbit debris, and it may be
narrowly targeted, which could affect only one of a satellite’s many capabilities
(e.g., specific frequencies or transponders). EW is an extremely useful military
counterspace capability and is expected to gain even more prominence in the
future, in step with increasing autonomy of military systems and increasing
reliance on satellite systems.
02-27
 194 Brandon Davenport and Rich Ganske, However, conducting operationally useful, dependable, and reliable jamming
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

“Recalculating Route: A Realistic Risk

Assessment for GPS,” War on the Rocks,
of highly-used military space capabilities, such as GNSS, is more difficult than
March 11, 2019, https://warontherocks. most commentators suggest. Military GNSS signals are much more resilient
com/2019/03/recalculating-route-a-realis-
tic-risk-assessment-for-gps/.
to jamming than civil GNSS signals, and a wide variety of tactics, techniques,
and procedures exist to mitigate attacks.194 It is much more likely that an EW
195 John Pike, “Lasers,” GlobalSecurity.Org,
updated October 4, 2016, https://www.glo-
counterspace weapon would degrade military space capabilities rather than
balsecurity.org/space/world/russia/lasers.htm. completely deny them.
196 “Soviets could have laser able to blind
U.S. satellites,” Gadsden Times,
April 10, 1984, https://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840410&id=
2.4 — RUSSIAN DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
fqkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBA-
J&pg=2785,2451827.
Assessment /
0 4/202 3

197 Boris Kononenko,“Silent Space is Being Russia has a strong technological knowledge base in directed energy physics
Monitored,” Armeyskiy Sbornik, June 1996,
https://web.archive.org/web/20131224105115/
and is developing a number of military applications for laser systems in a
http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1996/dru- variety of environments. Russia has revived, and continues to evolve, a legacy
ma189_s96005.htm.
program whose goal is to develop an aircraft-borne laser system for targeting
198 Bill Keller, “American Team Gets Closer Look the optical sensors of imagery reconnaissance satellites, although there is no
at Soviet Laser,” New York Times, July 9, 1989,
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/09/
indication that an operational capability has been yet achieved. Although not
01
world/american-team-gets-close-look-at- their intended purpose, Russian ground-based satellite laser ranging (SLR)
soviet-laser.html.
facilities could be used to dazzle the sensors of optical imagery satellites. There
02
199 “Russian Scientists Invent Technology is no indication that Russia is developing, or intending to develop, high-power
to Wirelessly Recharge and ‘Kill’ Drones,”
Russian Aviation, June 21, 2017,
space-based laser weapons.
https://www.ruaviation.com/
03
news/2017/6/21/9042/?h.
Specifics /
04
Russia has a long history of research in high-energy laser physics science
and is considered to have advanced technical knowledge and capability in
05
this field. During the 1980s, the USSR reportedly researched several potential
anti-satellite laser weapon systems, although there is no evidence that any
06
reached the stage of realistic testing or deployment.195 The most well-known
of these was the suspected laser weapons research facility Terra-3 located
07
on the Sary Shagan testing range (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-09 ), where
the Reagan administration claimed the Soviets were developing advanced
08
anti-satellite laser weapons.196 There was even a rumor that Terra-3 had been
used to lase the Space Shuttle Challenger on October 10, 1984.197 However,
09
an official U.S. Congressional visit in 1989 found it was more of a “Potemkin
village” than an operational weapons site, with lasers that were much less
10
powerful than what the U.S. military already had deployed (see Imagery
Appendix, pg. 15-09).198 With the economic turmoil created by the dissolution
11
of the USSR, these programs appear to have been abandoned. However,
the scientific knowledge base remained.
12
The resurgence of Russia in the past decade enabled increased funding for
13
military research, which in turn allowed continued Russian research into
advanced laser technologies and applications. For example, it was recently
14
reported that the Institute of Atmospheric Optics at Tomsk has developed
a laser system with the capability to shoot down drones, using fiber laser
15
technology.199 This system would, however, have no capability against
spacecraft in orbit.

Airborne Laser (ABL) ASAT System

During the 1980s, the USSR began a development program to mount a high-
power laser on a modified IL-76 transport aircraft (known as the Beriev A-60).
The laser was installed in the cargo bay, with a turret opening on the top of
the aircraft. The aircraft was used to test the laser system that was later used
in the Skif-DM spacecraft, lost in a failed launch in 1987. The test aircraft was
reportedly lost in a fire during the late 1980s. A second aircraft was modified for
continued testing. In 2009, the aircraft laser reportedly conducted a successful
02-2 8
test of illuminating a Japanese satellite in orbit. Work on the project was halted 200 John Pike, “A-60 1A Airborne Laser,”

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
GlobalSecurity.org, August 3, 2018,
in 2011, due to lack of funding.200 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/russia/a-60.htm.

In 2012, the Ministry of Defense announced the revival of the program.201 In 201 Pavel Podvig, “Russia to Resume Work on
April 2017, Almaz-Antey general designer Pavel Sozinov announced that the Airborne Laser ASAT,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces, November 13, 2012,
company had been ordered by Russian leadership to “develop weapons that http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/11/rus-
could interfere electronically with or achieve ‘direct functional destruction of sia_to_resume_work_on_airbo.shtml.

those elements deployed in orbit.’” 202 The new system, called Sokol-Echelon 202 Patrick Tucker, “Russia Claims It Now Has
(“Falcon Echelon”), will be equipped with the 1LK222 laser system, apparently a Lasers to Shoot Satellites,” Defense One,
February 26, 2018, http://www.defenseone.
different system than the original Carbon Dioxide laser type from the 1980s. com/technology/2018/02/russia-claims-it-
The new laser reportedly was to be fitted aboard a “brand-new, as-yet-unnamed” now-has-lasers-shoot-satellites/146243/; “В
РФ разрабатывается противоспутниковая
aircraft, according to Russian media reports,203 which turns out to be a modified система РЭБ,” Ria Novosti, April 25, 2017,
IL-76MD-90A transport.204 https://topwar.ru/114285-v-rf-razrabatyvaet-
sya-protivosputnikovaya-sistema-reb.html.

There is no public technical information available on the 1LK222 laser system. 203 Patrick Tucker, “Russia Claims It Now Has
Lasers to Shoot Satellites,” Defense One,
It is therefore not possible to determine if its mission is to dazzle or damage February 26, 2018, http://www.defenseone.
satellite sensors. The program’s chief designer, Aleksandr Ignatyev, stated com/technology/2018/02/russia-claims-it-
now-has-lasers-shoot-satellites/146243/.
in interviews in 2010 and 2014 that the program was initiated in response
to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and was 204 Bart Hendrickx, posting on the NASASpace-
01
flight.com forums, February 6, 2020,
designed to “counter air-based and space-based reconnaissance assets in the https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
infrared part of the spectrum.” 205 If the 1KL222 is a solid-state laser, it could php?topic=50072.msg2042842#msg2042842.
02
be operated at different power levels, thereby making it possible to operate 205 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile
in both laser dazzling and optical sensor damage roles. Due to the technical laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,”
03
The Space Review, June 15, 2020,
challenges of operation on an aircraft, it is unlikely that the laser is sufficiently https://www.thespacereview.com/
high powered to cause damage to a satellite’s structure. Therefore, it is likely article/3967/1.
04
intended to target only optical imaging satellites. An airborne system provides 206 Bart Hendrickx, “Re: Sokol-Eshelon: an
a few advantages for laser ASAT systems. The high flight altitude reduces the airborne laser ASAT system,” NASASpaceflight-
05
Forums.com, July 25, 2022, https://forum.
amount of atmosphere that the laser beam has to traverse, thereby reducing nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=50072.
attenuation and beam spreading. However, this advantage comes at the cost msg2389751#msg2389751.
06
of more difficult pointing due to the instability of the aircraft in flight. 207 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: a Russian mobile
laser system to dazzle enemy satellites,”
07
The Space Review, June 15, 2020,
The Beriev A-60 flew several flight tests during the 2010s with the goal of https://www.thespacereview.com/
detecting and tracking satellites and aiming laser beams at them. Reportedly, article/3967/1.
08
one of the tests was directed at a Japanese satellite called Ajisai. The program 208 Ibid.
was reportedly near cancellation after that but survived and a new IL-76MD-90A 09
aircraft is in the process of being outfitted with a laser. However, recent reports
once again suggest that the Russian Ministry of Defense has decided to cancel 10
the program.206
11
Peresvet Mobile Laser Dazzler
Russia is also developing an advanced mobile laser dazzling system known 12
as Peresvet that appears to be designed to protect mobile ICBMs from being
imaged.207 The system was formally named in part of a speech by Russian 13
President Vladimir Putin on March 1, 2018, where he boasted about Russia’s
progress in arming its troops with laser weapons. President Putin called for 14
a public contest to name the system, resulting in “Peresvet,” which translates
to “overexposure.” 208 In July 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a 15
second video showing the shelters for the Peresvet vehicles and the training
facility for the operators. The shelters are located alongside garrisons near
Teykovo, Yoshkar-Ola, and Novosbirsk for the new Topol-MR ICBM currently
being deployed (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-25).
02-2 9
 209 Ibid.
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

FIGURE 2-6 — THE PERESVET LASER SYSTEM

210 Ibid.

211 Чтобы господство в воздухе оставалось

за нами,”, Redstar.ru, July 2, 2020,
http://redstar.ru/chtoby-gospodst-
vo-v-vozduhe-ostavalos-za-nami/.

212 Amy Chang, “Russian touts new laser weapons,

but Ukraine and the U.S. are skeptical,” The
Washington Post, May 19, 2022, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/19/rus-
sia-laser-weapon-zadira-peresvet-ukraine/.

213 Ed Browne, “Fact Check: Did Russia Use Lasers

to Target Satellites Over Ukraine Border?”
0 4/202 3

Newsweek, October 5, 2022, https://www.

newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-laser-weapon-
peresvet-light-1749202.

214 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia develops co-orbital

anti-satellite capability,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, September 27, 2018, https://www.janes.
com/images/assets/463/83463/Russia_devel-
ops_co-orbital_anti-satellite_capability.pdf. A Russian mobile laser system used to dazzle aerial and space reconnaissance assets.
Image credit: Russian Ministry of Defense 209
215 Bart Hendrickx, “Kalina: A Russian ground-
01
based laser to dazzle imaging satellites,” The
Space Review, July 5, 2022, https://www.thespa-
cereview.com/article/4416/1.
The Peresvet system consists of a laser connected to a gimbaled mirror, all
02
of which is mounted inside a truck-towed trailer. A statement by the Russian
Ministry of Defense in December 2018 said that the system had entered
03
“experimental combat duty” and could “efficiently counter any aerial attack
and even fight satellites in orbit.” 210 While the system is unlikely powerful
04
enough to destroy space objects, it is likely capable of temporarily dazzling
visible optics used by satellites. Additionally, the system is linked to two patents
05
for a “mobile optical telescope” designed to monitor and clean up space debris.
The Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces Valeriy Gerasimov
06
confirmed that Peresvet’s task is to “conceal the movements” of mobile missile
systems, suggesting that its job is to dazzle aerial and space reconnaissance
07
systems tying to detect, image, or track Topol-MR deployments.

08
In June 2020, General Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Russian Aerospace
Forces, gave a lengthy interview in which he stated the Peresvet system was
09
operational.211 In May 2022, Russian officials claimed that Peresvet, or potentially
an even more advanced version referred to as “Zadira,” was being deployed to
10
the conflict in Ukraine.212 However, there is no evidence to support that claim,
and some social media reports of lasers being fired in the sky are likely due to
11
meteorological phenomena rather than laser weapons.213

12
Kalina Upgrade to Krona Ground-based Electro-Optical System
There are indications that Russia may be upgrading its Krona optical space
13
surveillance system in the North Caucasus with laser dazzling or blinding
capabilities (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-26). The Krona complex has
14
historically included ground-based radars and optical telescopes for tracking,
identifying, and characterizing space objects. Lasers have long been used
15
to support optical tracking of space objects by providing range-finding for
precision tracking and creating artificial guide stars used in adaptive optics.
Research by Bart Hendrickx discovered bank guarantees and reports
suggesting a project code-named Kalina to upgrade the facilities at Krona
to include “functional suppression of electro-optical systems of satellites,”
which is likely a euphemism for dazzling or partially blinding optical sensors
of satellite systems.214 The project appears to be led by the Scientific and
Industrial Corporation “Precision Instrument Systems” (NPK SPP). Public
documents suggest the contracts were awarded in 2015 and 2018 and satellite
imagery suggests that construction work on the project began in August 2019.215
02-3 0
In May 2018, NPK SPP presented a proposal to the Russian Academy of Sciences 216 Bart Hendrickx, “Kalina: A ground-based

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
laser ASAT system?”, NASAspaceflight.com,
to install a laser at the Titov Optical Laser Centre (AOLTs) in the Altai mountain October 2, 2018, https://forum.nasaspaceflight.
range that would be able to deorbit small pieces of space debris through laser com/index.php?topic=46485.

ablation.216 The idea is similar to historical U.S. proposals such as Project Orion 217 J.W. Campbell, “Project ORION: Orbital debris
in the 1990s.217 More recently, NASA Ames proposed a “LightForce” concept for a removal using ground-based sensors and
lasers,” National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
less powerful laser to deorbit small space debris through radiation pressure.218 ministration, Technical Memorandum 108522,
Although NASA ultimately passed on the proposal, it has been picked up by a October 1996, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/
nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19960054373.pdf.
private company, Electro Optic Systems, and is being developed with support
from the Australian government.219 It is unclear if the NPK SPP proposal for AOLTs 218 Jahn Stupl et al, “LightForce Photon-pressure
collision avoidance: Updated efficiency analysis
will go forward, or if it is linked to the Kalina proposal. utilizing a highly parallel simulation approach
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.
nasa.gov/20150000244.pdf.
Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR): Potential for Laser Dazzling
Russia has nine stations that are part of the International Laser Ranging 219 Nick Grimm, “Scientists plan to use high pow-
ered lasers to track and shoot away space junk,”
Service Satellite (ILRS) network.220 The ILRS network supports laser ranging Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
measurements to cooperative satellites with retro-reflector arrays for scientific March 21, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2018-03-21/scientists-plan-to-shoot-
purposes. Although it is not their purpose, the stations could be used to down-space-junk-with-a-laser/9573066.
dazzle optical imaging satellites (but is harmless to other types of satellites).221
220 International Laser Ranging Service web page,
Additionally, Russia could establish a network of laser dazzling stations near List of Stations; online https://ilrs.cddis.eosdis.
sensitive sites using SLR technology. However, there is no public indication of nasa.gov/network/stations/index.html.
01
this occurring, and SLR technology capable of this is not unique to Russia. 221 Yousaf Butt, “Effects of Chinese Laser Ranging
on Imaging Satellites,” Science and Global
02
Security, 17:20-35, 2009, http://scienceandglo-
Space-Based Laser ASAT balsecurity.org/archive/sgs17butt.pdf.
During the 1970s, the USSR researched the development of a space-based 03
222 Dwayne A. Day, and Robert G. Kennedy III,
high-power laser for anti-satellite missions.222 The program resulted in the “Soviet Star Wars,” Air and Space Magazine,
production of a concept known as Skif-DM (or Polyus). The Skif-DM vehicle January 2010, https://www.airspacemag.com/
04
space/soviet-star-wars-8758185/?all.
was to be a very large spacecraft (approximately 80,000 kg) that was placed in
orbit by the very large Energia space launch vehicle used to launch the Buran 223 Ibid.
05
space shuttle.223 On May 11, 1987, an attempted launch of an unarmed Skif- 224 “Polyus/Skif-DM,” Buran-Energia.com, accessed
DM mock-up was a failure, attributed to an attitude control problem on the March 16, 2018, http://www.buran-energia.
06
com/polious/polious-desc.php.
payload itself, which re-entered into the Pacific Ocean.224 The mock-up was
reportedly a test vehicle for a one-megawatt carbon dioxide laser.225 No other 225 Pavel Podvig, “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold
07
War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program,”
launches of similar test spacecraft were attempted, and the program was Science and Global Security, 2017, Vol 25 No 1,
likely abandoned in the turmoil of the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. This 3—27, p. 11, https://scienceandglobalsecurity.
08
org/archive/sgs25podvig.pdf.
was also the first flight of the Energia SLV, which was eventually abandoned
together with the Buran space shuttle program.226 226 Dwayne A. Day, and Robert G. Kennedy III,
09
“Soviet Star Wars,” Air and Space Magazine,
January 2010, https://www.airspacemag.com/
Operating a high-power space-based laser would be a very demanding space/soviet-star-wars-8758185/?all.
10
technological challenge. Achieving high enough power to damage or destroy
satellites would require either a large chemical laser or a large solid-state 11
laser. The chemical laser would require a large store of feed chemicals in
order to operate for more than a few seconds. Also, venting of the exhaust 12
gasses during operation would pose stability challenges for the spacecraft.
A solid-state laser would require a large electrical generation capacity. If 13
achieved with solar panels, a very large array would be required. It would not
be possible to surreptitiously deploy either of these concepts in orbit. 14

There is no evidence that Russia has either the technological capacity or the 15
intent to pursue a space-based laser ASAT capability at this time.

Potential Military Utility /

DEWs, primarily lasers, offer significant potential for military counterspace
applications. They offer the possibility of interfering with or disabling a
satellite without generating significant debris. The technologies required
for ground-based lasers systems are well developed. Ground-based systems
can dazzle or blind EO satellites, or even inflict thermal damage on most
LEO satellites.
02-31
 227 Sean O’Connor, “Soviet and Russian Space In contrast, the technical and financial challenges to space-based DEW for
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Surveillance Facilities,” IMINT and Analysis,

June 23, 2008, https://geimint.blogspot.
counterspace remain substantial. These include the mass of the weapon,
com/2008/06/soviet-russian-space-surveil- consumables and disturbance torques (chemical lasers), electrical power
lance.html.
generation (solid-state and fiber lasers, particle beams), target acquisition
228 Ibid. and tracking, and the potentially large constellation of satellites required.
The acquisition and tracking challenges are greatly simplified in a co-orbital
GEO or LEO scenario.

However, both ground- and space-based DEW counterspace capabilities do

have significant drawbacks in assessing their effectiveness. It can be very
difficult to determine the threshold between temporary dazzling or blinding
and causing long-term damage, particularly since it may depend on the
0 4/202 3

internal design and protective mechanisms of the target satellite that are not
externally visible. Moreover, it can be difficult for an attacker to determine
whether a non-destructive DEW attack actually worked.

2.5 — RUSSIAN SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

01
Assessment /
02
Russia has sophisticated SSA capabilities that are likely second only to the
United States. Russian SSA capabilities date to the Cold War and leverage
03
significant infrastructure originally developed for missile warning and missile
defense. Although some of these capabilities atrophied after the fall of the
04
Soviet Union, Russia has engaged in several modernization efforts since the
early 2000s to reinvigorate them. While the government owned and operated
05
SSA capabilities are limited to the geographic boundaries of the former Soviet
Union, Russia is engaging in international civil and scientific cooperative
06
efforts that likely give it access to data from SSA sensors around the globe.
Today, Russia maintains a catalog of Earth-orbiting space objects in LEO that
07
is somewhat smaller than that of the United States but a slightly more robust
catalog of HEO and GEO objects.
08
Specifics /
09
Like the United States, Russia developed its original SSA capabilities as part
of the Cold War space and nuclear rivalry. The Russian Space Surveillance
10
System (SKKP) consists of multiple phased array radars that are primarily
used for missile warning along with dedicated ground-based electro-optical
11
telescopes. Several of the SKKP sensors are located in former Soviet republics
and are operated by Russia under a series of bilateral agreements with the
12
host countries.

13
Russian ground-based radar tracking of space objects began as part of their
ABM and ASAT efforts. The original Russian SSA radars were the 5N15 Dnestr
14
(NATO codename HEN HOUSE) installations built in the 1960s near Irkutsk and
Sary Shagan.227 Each site had four complexes, with each complex containing
15
a pair of Dnestr radars that could track LEO objects linked to a command and
control building, and was intended to be the targeting system for the Soviet
IV ASAT system (see Russian Co-Orbital ASAT; Section 2.1).228 Beginning in the
1970s, the radars were incrementally upgraded to Dnestr-M and integrated
into the national ballistic missile early warning network, and most were later
upgraded to the Dnepr variant (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-43). The Dnepr
upgrades included new installations at Balkhash (modern-day Kazakhstan);
Mishelevka, Siberia; Skrunda (modern-day Latvia), Olenegorsk, Kola Peninsula;
Sevastapol, and Mukachevo (both in modern-day Ukraine). The dissolution
of the Soviet Union eventually led to the radars in Skrunda, Sevastapol, and
Mukachevo being shut down by the early 2000s.
02-32
In 2009, Russia began construction of the Voronezh phased array radar to 229 Pavel Podvig, “Radar in Lekhtusi Begins

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Combat Duty,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,
replace the Dnestr-M and Dnepr radars for both ballistic missile early warning February 11, 2012, http://russianforces.org/
and SSA missions (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-41). The Voronezh-M uses very- blog/2012/02/radar_in_lekhtusi_begins_com-
ba.shtml.
high frequency (VHF) radio waves, Voronezh-DM uses UFH, and Voronezh-VP
works in L-Band. The DM version is claimed to be able to detect objects the size 230 “Three Advanced Early Warning Radars Enter
Service in Russia,” TASS, December 19, 2017,
of a soccer ball at 8,000 kilometers and track up to 500 objects simultaneously. https://tass.com/defense/981965.
The first Voronezh was built at a new location in Lekhtusi near St. Petersburg
231 Pavel Podvig, “Early Warning,” Russian Strategic
and was operational in 2012.229 The remaining Dnepr radar sites were planned Nuclear Forces, January 3, 2020, http://russian-
to be converted over to Voronezh by 2022, with several new sites also being forces.org/sprn/.

developed.230 As of 2019, 12 early warning radars were operational across 11 232 Allen Thompson, “Sourcebook on the Okno,
sites, with four more radars under construction or planned. It is unclear if all Okno-S, Krona, and Krona-N Space Surveillance
Sites,” Federation of American Scientists, Version
of these sites are actively involved in providing SSA data. 2014-11-19, pg 6 and pg 15, https://fas.org/spp/
military/program/track/okno.pdf.

233 William Broad, “Private Satellite Photos Offer

FIGURE 2-7 — RUSSIAN MISSILE WARNING AND SSA RADARS 231 Clues About Soviet Laser Site,” New York Times,
October 23, 1987, https://www.nytimes.
RADAR STATION RADARS STATUS com/1987/10/23/us/private-satellite-photos-of-
fer-clues-about-soviet-laser-site.html.
Olenegorsk (RO-1) Dnepr Operational
Voronezh-VP? Under Construction (2022) 234 Allen Thompson, “Sourcebook on the Okno,
Pechora (RO-30) Daryal Operational Okno-S, Krona, and Krona-N Space Surveillance
Vorkuta Voronezh-VP, -SM Under Construction (2021) Sites,” Federation of American Scientists, Version 01
2014-11-19, https://fas.org/spp/military/pro-
Mishelevka (OS-1) Dnepr Operational gram/track/okno.pdf/.
2xVoronezh-VP Operational 02

Lekhtusi Voronezh-M Operational

Lekhtusi/Ragozinka-2 Voronezh-SM Planned 03
Armavir 2xVoronezh-DM Operational

Kaliningrad Voronezh-DM Operational 04

Barnaul Voronezh-DM Operational
Yeniseysk Voronezh-DM Operational
Orsk Voronezh-M Operational 05
Sevastopol Voronezh-SM Planned (2024)

Balkhash, Kazakhstan (OS-2) Dnepr Operational 06

Baranovichi, Belarus Volga Operational

07

Russia’s primary optical SSA facility is the Okno (“Window”) complex located
08
near the city of Nurek in northern Tajikistan (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-48).
The Okno facility consists of a cluster of 10 electro-optical telescopes, laid out
09
in 2 clusters of 4 and 6 telescopes each, that are designed to detect space
objects at altitudes from 2,000 to 40,000 kilometers, although some reports
10
suggest an additional capability to track space objects down to 120 km and up
to 50,000 kilometers, as well as conduct TT&C with Russian civilian satellites.232
11
Each telescope is covered by a 25-meter metal dome to protect it during the
daytime. Although construction began in the 1980s, it was not commissioned
12
until 2004 and underwent significant modernization that was completed in
2018. Originally, Western analysts suspected Okno was being built as a laser
13
weapons site, but those speculations were proven wrong.233 Originally, a total
of four Okno sites were planned throughout the Soviet Union, but ultimately
14
work was only started on one, Okno-S, in Primorsky Krai in the Russian Far
East. However, open source analysts have yet to identify the site nor determine
15
its status.

Russia also operates the Krona radio-optical complex near Storozhevaya

in southwestern Russia (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-46). Krona uses a
combination of radar and optical sensors to track, image, and characterize
space objects. The radar, located at 43.826155°N, 41.343355°E, includes both
ultra-high frequency (UHF) and super-high frequency (SHF) transmitters and
the optical sensor, located 30 km away at 43.7169171°N, 41.2316883°E,
includes a laser locator and electro-optical imager.234 The dual radar bands allow
for both broad area search and detection and precise tracking. The precise
02-3 3
 235 Ibid. tracking data is used to aim the laser, which then generates a precise lidar
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

236 Allen Thomspon, “The Altay Optical-Laser

image of the object. Another complex, Krona-N, is located at 42°56′8.52″N
Center Sourcebook,” Federation of American 132°34′36.37″E, near Nakodka in the Russian Far East.235
Scientists, updated March 29, 2011,
https://fas.org/spp/military/program/track/
altay.pdf. The Altay Optical Laser Center, located near the small Siberian town of
237 Ibid, p. 3.
Sav vushka, is a specialized facility for providing high resolution images of
space objects.236 The facility uses a laser rangefinder and a 60 centimeter
238 Steven Aftergood, “Russia Images the
LACROSSE Spysat,” Secrecy News,
telescope equipped with adaptive optics to enable high resolution images
April 23, 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/secre- of satellites in LEO. A second 3.12 meter telescope is under construction that
cy/2015/04/lacrosse-altay/.
would allow an imaging resolution of 25 centimeters or better out to 1,000
239 “Russia to Deploy New Space Surveillance kilometers.237 In 2015, the site was reportedly used to image a U.S. LACROSSE
System Element to Four Regions,” Sputnik,
radar reconnaissance satellite.238 Russia is currently engaged in programs to
0 4/202 3

November 30, 2016, https://www.defencetalk.

com/russia.-to-deploy-new-space-surveillance- upgrade many of its SKKP sensors, although its current status is difficult to
system-elements-in-four-regions-68624/.
judge from open sources.
240 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia’s space surveillance
network,” NASASpaceflight.com forums,
March 29, 2022, https://forum.nasaspace-
In 2016, Russian state media reported that upgrades were planned for four
flight.com/index.php?topic=55993.ms- radio-electronic sensor complexes in the Altai Republic, the Far East, Crimea,
g2355021#msg2355021
and the Republic of Buryatia,239 which appears to be a new program called
01
241 Russia to Set Up SSA Observatories Along Pritsel (“Target”) under the code 14Sh33.240 The project officially started in
Arctic Ocean Coast,” SpaceWatchGlobal,
November 2018, https://spacewatch.glob-
2007 and includes optical telescopes in multiple locations co-located with
02
al/2018/11/russia-to-set-up-ssa-observatories- other types of sensors.
along-arctic-ocean-coast/.

03
242 I. Molotov, V. Voropaev, G. Borovin, and A. Russia has also announced plans to set up new ground-based observatories
Romanov, “International Scientific Optical
Network (ISON) for the Near-Earth Space
in the Nenets Autonomous Region to monitor space objects in polar orbits.241
04
Monitoring: the Latest Achievements and In addition to the government owned and operated facilities, Russia also has a
Prospects,” ISON, presentation to the fif-
ty-fourth session of the Scientific and Technical
program to develop a network of scientific instruments for SSA purposes. The
05
Subcommittee of the United Nations Com- International Scientific Optical Network (ISON) is a collection of more than 38
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
January 30 – February 10, 2017,
observation facilities of various affiliation with 90 telescopes in 16 countries that
06
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/ are coordinated by the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics (KIAM) of the
copuos/stsc/2017/tech-05E.pdf.
Russian Academy of Sciences.242 The telescopes are used to track space objects
07
243 Ibid. and orbital debris in Earth orbit as well as Near-Earth Objects (asteroids and
244 The public catalog can be accessed at
comets) in orbit around the Sun. The ISON network includes four different types
08
http://spacedata.vimpel.ru/. of partners: 26 telescopes used by KIAM for scientific research, 24 telescopes
245 United Nations Office for Outer Space
used by KIAM Ballistics Service for commercial purposes, 22 telescopes used
09
Affairs,“UNOOSA and the Keldysh Institute by Roscosmos/TsNIIMash for conjunction analysis, and 18 telescopes used by
of Applied Mathematics are Working on an
Announcement of Opportunity to Provide
the Vympel Corporation for SSA.243 The network collects more than 2 million
10
Telescopes to Institutions in Developing observations annually and maintains a catalog of more than 6,000 space objects
Countries,” SpaceRef, December 24, 2019,
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.htm-
in HEO or GEO orbits. In 2014, Vympel launched a public portal to access the
11
l?pid=55062. catalog maintained by ISON.244 In December 2019, KIAM announced a partnership
246 Bart Hendricks, “Russia’s Space Surveil-
with the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs to launch a project to
12
lance Network,” NASA Spaceflight forums, provide small telescopes and training to select developing countries free of
March 9, 2022, https://forum.nasaspace-
flight.com/index.php?topic=55993.ms-
charge beginning in 2020.245
g2348815#msg2348815.
13
247 “Главный центр разведки космической
Russia has also been working on a mobile optical sensor complex known as
14
обстановки отметил свое 25-летие,” Zorkiy (“sharp-sighted,” “vigilant”).246 The project appears to have been proposed
Topwar.ru, July 11, 2013, https://topwar.
ru/30674-glavnyy-centr-razvedki-kosmich-
as early as 2009 but more recent contracts suggest an actual starting date of
15
eskoy-obstanovki-otmetil-svoe-25-letie.html. 2015. Zorkiy appears to consist of a vehicle-mounted 1.5 m optical telescope
along with a second control vehicle and was intended to be used for observing
small objects in HEO or GEO orbits from prepared observation sites.

SSA data is processed by two different centers, one military and one civil.
The military center is the 821st Main Centre for Reconnaissance of Situation
in Space (Главный центр разведки космической обстановки, tr. GTsRKO),
located in the village of Dubrovo about 35 kilometers outside of Moscow.247
The Centre controls the SKKP and uses its data products for both offensive
and defensive counterspace applications. In 2016, a new civil SSA monitoring
center called Automated Warning System on Hazardous Situations in Outer
02-3 4
Space (ASPOS OKP) began operations under contract to Roscosmos.248 ASPOS 248 V. Agapov, “The use of ASPOS OKP System in

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
the Interests of Ensuring the Safety of Space
OKP utilizes data from ISON and other Russian SSA assets to detect and track Operations and Increasing Awareness About
objects in Earth orbit above 2000 kilometers and provide a range of SSA the Situation in High Orbits,” presentation to
the sixty-first session of the United Nations
services, including conjunctions, fragmentations, reentries, and post-mission Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
disposal. June 25, 2018, http://unoosa.org/documents/
pdf/copuos/2018/copuos2018tech05E.pdf.

In May 2020, Roscosmos outlined plans for several upgrades to its SSA 249 “Russia to develop space surveillance satellite
to monitor space debris as part of Milky Way
capabilities under a program called Milky Way.249 In remarks to the TASS news SSA network,” SpaceWatch Global, June 2020,
agency, Alexander Bloshenko, Roscosmos Executive Director for Long-Term https://spacewatch.global/2020/06/russia-to-
develop-space-surveillance-satellite-to-moni-
Programmes and Science, said that Russia would develop at least one space tor-space-debris-as-part-of-milky-way-ssa-net-
surveillance satellite and space surveillance hosted payloads on future Sfera-class work/.

Earth observation satellites, and a hosted payload on the ISS, to complement 250 “Russia to launch first satellite to monitor
its existing ground-based telescope network.250 Bloshenko stated that these space junk in 2027,” TASS, May 28, 2020,
https://tass.com/science/1161437.
upgrades, along with machine learning, would allow Russia to better identify
orbital debris and reduce uncertainty in calculating collision hazards in LEO. 251 S. Avdyushin et al, “Russian Space Weather
Initiatives,” ResearchGate, January 1999,
https://www.researchgate.net/publica-
Russia also has several institutions involved in space weather research. Russia tion/237384438_RUSSIAN_SPACE_WEATH-
ER_INITIATIVES.
operates a network of ground stations that cover 170 degrees of longitude
and 60 degrees of latitude to measure various geomagnetic and space weather 252 “Space Weather Today and Possible Effects,”
01
Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
effects.251 Russia also operates multiple satellites with on-orbit space weather Environmental Monitoring, accessed
sensors, including the Meteor series of polar-orbiting meteorological satellites. February 21, 2020, http://space-weather.ru/
02
index.php?page=home-en.
Space weather predictions and warnings are provided by the Federal Service
for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring.252 The Institute for 03
Applied Geophysics contributes to the ISES.
04
Potential Military Utility /
Russia possesses sophisticated SSA capabilities that allow it to track, identify, 05
and characterize nearly all objects bigger than 10 centimeters in Earth orbit.
While the Russian SKKP possesses many of the same shortcomings of the U.S. 06
SSN in geographic coverage of LEO due to its northern location, the addition
of the ISON network eliminates those shortcomings for GEOs. Russian SSA 07
capabilities were originally developed as part of their ASAT capabilities and
likely maintain the ability to effectively detect, track, characterize, and target 08
many adversaries’ national security satellites. The ongoing modernization of
Russia’s SSA capabilities, combined with the modernization of their offensive 09
counterspace capabilities, suggests a focus on developing an integrated
operational system for future conflicts that extend into space. 10

11
2.6 — RUSSIAN COUNTERSPACE POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION
12
Assessment /
Russian military thinkers see modern warfare as a struggle over information 13
dominance and net-centric operations that can often take place in domains
without clear boundaries and contiguous operating areas. To meet the challenge 14
posed by the space aspect of modern warfare, Russia is pursuing lofty goals
of incorporating EW capabilities throughout its military to both protect its 15
own space-enabled capabilities and degrade or deny those capabilities to its
adversary. In space, Russia is seeking to mitigate the superiority of U.S. space
assets by fielding a number of ground-, air-, and space-based offensive
capabilities. Russia has recently re-organized its military space forces into a new
organization that combines space, air defense, and missile defense capabilities.
Although technical challenges remain, the Russian leadership has indicated
that Russia will continue to seek parity with the United States in space.
02-3 5
 S.G. Chekinov, and S.A. Bogdanov, “Evolution Specifics /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

253
of the Essence and Content of the Concept of
War in the 21st Century,” Voennaia mysl, no. 1
(2017), https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/ Russian Military Thought and Initiatives on Space and Conflict
doc/48113925; Daniel Coats, “Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Communi-
Having observed the U.S. way of war during the past several decades, the
ty: Statement for the Record,” March 6, 2018, Russian political and military leadership have come to see the military aspect
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/
congressional-testimonies/item/1851-state-
of space as essential to modern warfare and winning current and future conflicts.
ment-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-as- While it is true that the Russian military sees the U.S. reliance on space-based
sessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community.
assets as a vulnerability to be exploited, Russian thinking about conflict in
254 Anton Petrov, “Future Warfare,” Moscow space and space in conflict is much more a reflection of the evolution of
Defense Brief, no. 3 (2016), http://www.mdb.
cast.ru/mdb/3-2016/item1/article1/.
modern warfare and the struggle to achieve information dominance during
military operations.253 To that end, the Russian military is aggressively pursuing
255 S.G. Chekinov, and S.A. Bogdanov, “Evolution
capabilities to degrade or destroy adversary space-based assets as well as
0 4/202 3

of the Essence and Content of the Concept

of War in the 21st Century,” Voennaia mysl, negate the advantage of space-based capabilities in theaters of conflict. At
no. 1 (2017), https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
doc/48113925.
the same time, the Russian military is expanding its presence in space and its
ability to use space-based capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces
256 Yu Donskov, A.L. Moraresku, and V.V. Panasyuk,
“On the Issue of Disorganization of Command
in conflict. Given Russian views of the nature of warfare and its perceptions
and Control,” Voennaia mysl, no. 8 (2017). of the threat environment facing the Russian Federation, Russian investment
257 Anton Lavrov, “Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Con-
in the space domain is certain to continue.
stellation,” Moscow Defense Brief, no. 4 (2017),
01
http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/4-2017/item2/
article3/.
Russian Views of Space and Modern Warfare
02
Russian leadership and military assessments of the security aspect of space
must be understood within the larger context of Russian views of modern
03
warfare. Russian strategists see the trajectory of modern warfare being
dominated by the struggle to achieve information dominance as a prerequisite
04
to military victory.254

05
Information-driven modern technologies ranging from long-range precision
strike platforms to offensive cyber capabilities are driving a Russian view of
06
modern conflict as evolving toward non-contact warfare (beskontaktnaia voenna).
According to this view, technological advancements enable adversaries to
07
target and conduct offensive operations against each other’s assets and critical
infrastructure without entering the physical geographic theater of conflict.255
08
This concept also appears in the Russian military at times under different
rubrics such as 6th generation warfare in the 1990s and early 2000s, and
09
perhaps more recently as “new type warfare.”

10
Space-based, information-driven military capabilities make non-contact
warfare possible, through such enabling actions as queuing and guidance
11
of long-range strike assets. This is but one application of space-enabled
information. Russian security strategists believe the struggle for information
12
dominance begins before the conflict and, once the conflict has ensued,
is used to dominate an opponent’s decision-making by either denying the
13
adversary’s ability to utilize space-enabled information or by corrupting that
information to mislead an adversary into making decisions contrary to their
14
military objectives.256

15
Space in Conflict
The role of space in conflict is to provide the information necessary to employ
one’s forces and weapons and to deny that ability to one’s adversary. The
Russian military has invested heavily in electronic warfare, in part, to mitigate
U.S. space-based capabilities.

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia’s GLONASS satellite system had
atrophied to a mere seven satellites, not enough for effective military application.
For example, in the first Chechnyan war from 1994–1996, Russian pilots and
ground forces came to partially rely on western-based GPS navigation systems.257
02-3 6
Since 2011, Russia has maintained the minimum 24 GLONASS satellites 258 Ibid.

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
necessary for its military applications.258 The return of Russian space-based 259 Constantine Bogdanov, “Russian Operations in
capabilities is increasing the capability and effectiveness of Russian forces and Syria,” Natsional’naia oborona, no. 12 (2017).

weapons platforms—a capability that some Russian writers suggest signals 260 Ibid.
Russia’s ability to conduct non-contact warfare.259 A fully functioning GLONASS
261 Dmitry Kornev, “Russian High-Precision
architecture benefits Russian forces in navigation, PGM employment, and Weapons in Syria,” Moscow Defense Brief,
command and control. For example, satellite-based course correction for no. 3 (2016), http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-
2016/item4/article1/.
some Russian PGMs decreased the impact deviation from 30 to less than
10 meters.260 In Syria, Russian forces have used satellite-enabled weapons 262 Anton Lavrov, “Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Con-
stellation,” Moscow Defense Brief, no. 4 (2017),
ranging from more accurate air-launched and dropped munitions to sea-based http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/4-2017/item2/
PGM employment.261 Satellite navigation has also improved Russian situational article3/.

awareness on the ground.262 263 Roman Skomorokhov, “Станция постановки

помех Р-330Ж «Житель»,” accessed
March 15, 2018, https://​topwarru​/ ​9 8467-stanci-
Russian capabilities to deny an adversary’s use of space-based information ya-postanovki-pomeh-r-330zh-zhitel.html.
span the military spectrum from the tactical through the operational and into
264 Dimitry Yurov, “Мат в два хода: как «Мурманск-
the strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, GPS jamming platforms such БН» нейтрализует силы НАТО за минуты [Mate
as the Zhitel would be employed in conflict to deny western forces the use of in two moves: how ‘Murmansk-BN’ neutralizes
NATO forces in minutes],” Tvzezda,ru,
GPS.263 At the operational-strategic level, other systems would challenge western October 18, 2016, https://​t vzvezda.ru​/​news/​
military forces’ use of satellite-based communications over large sections forces/​content/​201610180741-uzd8.htm.
01
of the battlefield.264 The Russian military is integrating these capabilities into 265 “Рогозин предупредил о необратимых
all of its combat units down to the lowest level with an understanding that последствиях размещения оружия США в
02
космосе [Rogozin warned about the irrevers-
information warfare, to include space-based capabilities, is essential to winning ible consequences of placing U.S. weapons in
in modern warfare. space],” VPK, March 14, 2018, https://​v pk-news.
03
ru​/​news/​41695; Vladimir Kozin, “Pentagon
Rushes Into Space,” Red Star, 2017, No. 2
Conflict in Space 37,” https://​dlib.eastview.com​/​s earch/​p ub/​
04
doc?art=64&id=48594676; B.L. Zaretsky, “Aero-
There is an obvious overlap between space in conflict and conflict in space. space Security of Russia - VM,” Voennaia mysl,
Considerations of the military aspects of the space domain drive several no. 9 (2015), https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/
05
doc/45346075.
concerns and initiatives from the Russian political and military leadership.
First, as noted earlier, the Russian military sees the U.S. reliance on space- 266 Daniel Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment
06
of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Statement
based capabilities as a potential vulnerability to be exploited during conflict. for the Record,” March 6, 2018,
The Russian forces also see their space-based capabilities as enabling https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/
07
congressional-testimonies/item/1851-state-
more effective early warning and combat operations, especially when one ment-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-as-
considers the contrast between operations against Georgia and recent sessment-of-the-us-intelligence-community.
08
operations in Syria and Ukraine. However, based on an understanding of the 267 Victor Mokhov, “Russian Satellites: Failure After
U.S. vulnerability, the Russian military understands that its own space-based Failure,” Moscow Defense Brief, no. 6 (2015),
09
http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/6-2015/item3/
capabilities are a vulnerability that must be mitigated through both offensive article1/.
means and retaining key capabilities and knowledge that is not reliant on 10
268 Ivan Cheberko, “Launch of the Satellite System
space-based information. Finally, the Russian leadership is concerned about Arktika is Postponed Until 2018,” Defense &
the possibility of space-based weapons that can target ground-based assets Security, 2016, No. 967,” https://​dlib.eastview.
11
com​/​s earch/​p ub/​doc?art= 11&id= 47537968.
and critical infrastructure.
269 “Путин анонсировал полет российской
12
миссии на Марс в 2019 году,” accessed March
One could argue, based on public Russian statements and initiatives, such 15, 2018, http://​w ww.interfax.ru​/​r ussia/​6 03683;
as promoting treaties against the weaponization of space, that the Russian “Путин рассказал о новых космических
13
проектах России,” accessed March 15, 2018,
concern over the militarization of space is in response to U.S. initiatives. 265 https://​w ww.vesti.ru​/​doc.html?id=2876961.
It is more likely, however, that Russian strategists see space as a natural 14
domain within which competition and conflict will grow. Motivations aside,
Russian military leaders and the defense industry are aggressively pursuing 15
destructive and nondestructive ground-, air-, and space-based anti-satellite
capabilities. 266

Russian objectives in space, however, face significant challenges over the

near term primarily from industry shortcomings. 267 The Ukraine conflict and
the subsequent sanctions placed on Russia brought to light several Russian
industrial and technological deficiencies in its space program such as the
hardening and miniaturization of electronics. 268 Despite these challenges,
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a series of initiatives suggesting
that Russia intends to aggressively address its shortfalls in space. 269
02-37
 270 “Russian space agency head says satellite hack- Russia has also made recent statements on its interpretation of attacks
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

ing would justify war - report,” Reuters, March

2, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/rus-
against satellites. In March 2022, the head of Roscosmos stated publicly
sia-space-agency-head-says-satellite-hacking- that any cyber attacks on Russian satellites would be taken as a justification
would-justify-war-report-2022-03-02/.
for war. 270 In October 2022, a senior Russian official in the Foreign Ministry
271 “Russia warns West: We can target your stated that commercial satellites from the United States and its allies could
commercial satellites,” Reuters, October 27,
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-
become legitimate targets if they were involved in the war in Ukraine. 271
says-wests-commercial-satellites-could-be-tar-
gets-2022-10-27/.
Space and Counterspace Organization
272 Avaneesh Pandey, “Russia’s Federal Space Russian space activities are run by Roscosmos. Created in 1992 as the Federal
Agency Dissolved, Responsibilities To Be
Transferred To State Corporation,” International
Space Agency, it was dissolved in 2015 and its responsibilities transferred to
Business Times, December 28, 2015, the Roscosmos state corporation, which was also merged with the United
https://www.ibtimes.com/russias-feder-
Rocket and Space Corporation.272 In its current form, Roscosmos is responsible
0 4/202 3

al-space-agency-dissolved-responsibili-
ties-be-transferred-state-2240831. for Russian civil space activities as well as supervising companies manufacturing
273 Forian Vidal, “Russia’s Space Policy: The Path
civil and military space, missile, and rocket hardware. Russia’s space strategy
of Decline?”, Études de l’Ifri, Ifri, p.15, is defined by the Ministry of Defense, although some suggest Roscosmos
January 2021, https://www.ifri.org/sites/de-
fault/files/atoms/files/vidal_russia_space_poli-
may have a role.273 In 2015, Russia also reorganized its military space forces.
cy_2021_.pdf. From 2001 until 2011, Russian military space forces were a separate branch
274 Matthew Bodner, “Russian military merges Air
of the military. In 2011, they became part of the Aerospace Defense Troops
01
Force and Space Command,” The Moscow Times, and in 2015 the Aerospace Defense Troops were merged with the Air Force
August 3, 2015, https://www.themoscowtimes.
com/2015/08/03/russian-military-merges-air-
to become the Aerospace Forces. The new Aerospace Forces have authority
02
force-and-space-command-a48710. for conducting space launches, maintaining ballistic missile early warning,
275 Ibid.
the satellite control network, and the space surveillance network along with
03
anti-air and anti-missile defense.274 According to Russia Defense Minister Sergei
276 Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Electronic War-
fare Capabilities to 2025,” International Centre
Shoigu, the move was motivated by a recognition of a “shift in the combat
04
for Defence and Security, September 2017, pp. ‘center of gravity’ toward the aerospace theater” and also a desire to counter
5-6, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/
ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_
U.S. capabilities such as the Prompt Global Strike Program.275
to_2025.pdf.
05
277 Ibid, pp. 7.
A report issued in 2017 noted that company-level EW units, including a
06
platoon dedicated to operating the R-330Zh “Zhitel” counter-GPS and satellite
278 Павел Лузин, “Цена и перспективы
военной космической программы,” Riddle,
communications jammer, are now included organically within each Russian
07
May 22, 2020, https://www.ridl.io/ru/ce- Motorised Rifle Brigade.276 Additionally, Russia maintains five dedicated EW
na-i-perspektivy-voennoj-kosmicheskoj-
programmy/.
brigades that can provide operational or strategic effects out to several hundred
08
kilometers.277
279 Eric Berger, “Putin slashes Russia’s space
budget and says he expects better results,”

09
Arstechnica, October 8, 2021, https://arstechni- The budget for Russian military space activities was estimated at $1.7 billion in
ca.com/science/2021/10/putin-slashes-russias-
space-budget-and-says-he-expects-better-re-
2020.278 In 2021, President Putin announced that he planned to cut the budget
10
sults/. for Russian space activities across the board by 16 percent annually from 2022
280 Pavel Luzin, “Russian Space Spending for 2023,”
to 2024, citing unhappiness with its performance.279
The Jamestown Foundation, February 10, 2023,
11
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-
space-spending-for-2023/.
In 2022, more evidence emerged signaling significant budget challenges for
12
the Russian space program. Roscosmos reportedly suffered a huge increase
in net losses to $421 million (31 billion rubles) in 2021–2022, and the ongoing
13
war in Ukraine and associated economic sanctions may make that even worse.280
The budget shortfalls are likely to be exacerbated by Russia’s complete severing
14
of its foreign commercial space launch sales as a result of the war in Ukraine.

15
02-3 8
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
116.4074°E
03

CHINA
39.9042°N
Over the last few decades, China has embarked on a sustained national effort 1 A previous incident in October 2008 involving

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
the Chinese BX-1 microsatellite and the Inter-
to develop a broad spectrum of space capabilities across the civil, national national Space Station was most likely an inci-
security, and commercial sectors. Space capabilities under development by dental conjunction, as the BX-1 was not under
any active control at the time. For more details,
China include a robust human spaceflight and robotic space exploration see Brian Weeden, “China’s BX-1 Microsatellite:
program; remote sensing for weather and resource management; and military A Litmus Test for Space Weaponization,”
The Space Review, October 20, 2008,
applications such as positioning, navigation and timing and intelligence, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1.
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
2 Mark Wade, “SJ-6,” Astronautix, accessed
March 22, 2018, http://www.astronautix.com/
China appears to be highly motivated to develop counterspace capabilities to s/sj-6.html.

bolster its national security. China is beginning to assert its regional political,
economic, and military interests more strongly, and sees counterspace
capabilities as a key enabler. Much has been written about how reliant the United
States is on space capabilities to project global military power, and thus being
able to counter U.S. space capabilities is a key element of China’s ability to
assure its freedom of action and deter potential U.S. military operations in
its sphere of influence.

There is strong evidence suggesting that China has a sustained effort to develop
a broad range of counterspace capabilities. Over the last decade, China has 01
engaged in multiple tests of technologies and capabilities that either are
offensive counterspace weapons or could be used as such. China has also 02
begun developing the policy, doctrine, and organizational frameworks to support
the integration of counterspace capabilities into its military planning and 03
operations. That said, it is unclear whether China intends to fully utilize
counterspace capabilities in a future conflict, or whether the goal is to use 04
them as a deterrent against aggression. There is no confirmed public evidence
of China actively using counterspace capabilities in current military operations. 05

The following sections provide details on China’s development of co-orbital, 06

direct ascent, electronic warfare, directed energy, and space situational
awareness capabilities for counterspace applications and the policy, doctrine, 07
and military organizational framework to support those capabilities.
08

3.1 — CHINESE CO-ORBITAL ASAT 09

Assessment / 10
China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and
rendezvous in both low-earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary earth orbit (GEO) 11
that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. However, the public evidence
indicates they have not conducted an actual destructive intercept of a target, 12
and there is no proof that these technologies are definitively being developed
for counterspace use as opposed to intelligence gathering or other purposes. 13

Specifics / 14
China has conducted a series of on-orbit demonstrations of rendezvous
between different pairs of unmanned satellites.1 The first known incident 15
occurred in LEO in the summer of 2010 and involved the Chinese satellites
Shi Jian-12 (SJ-12, 2010-027A, 36596), and the SJ-06F (2008-053B, 33409). The
SJ-06F was launched on October 25, 2008,2 and the SJ-12 was launched on
June 15, 2010. Both satellites were reportedly built by the Shanghai Academy
of Spaceflight Technology (SAST) under contract with the China Aerospace
Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). The official mission for the SJ-06
series satellites is to measure the space environment and perform space
experiments. Some observers believe that their true mission is collection of
electronic intelligence (ELINT) or signals for the Chinese military, in part because
no scientific research is known to have been published based on the work of
03-01
 3 Ibid. these satellites.3 The mission of SJ-12, as stated by the State media service Xinhua,
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

4 Leiying Xu, “China Sends Research Satellite

is to carry out “scientific and technological experiments, including space
into Space,” Xinhua, updatedJ une 15, 2010. environment probe [sic], measurement, and communications.” 4 Both the SJ-12
http://english.cri.cn/6909/2010/06/
15/1821s576844.htm.
and SJ-06F were in orbits between 600 kilometers (km) and 570 km sun-
synchronous orbits with an inclination of 97.6 degrees.
5 A more detailed technical analysis of this event
can be found in Brian Weeden, “Dancing in
the Dark; The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 In the summer of 2010, the SJ-12 initiated a series of deliberate changes in its
and SJ06F,” The Space Review, August 30, 2010,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1.
orbital trajectory to approach and rendezvous with the SJ-06F satellite.5 The
maneuvers occurred over several weeks between June 12, 2010, and August
6 “Overview of the DART Mishap Investigation
Results,” NASA, accessed March 22, 2018.
16, 2010, and indicated a very slow and methodical approach. On August 19,
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/148072main_DART_ the two satellites had their closest approach, which was estimated to be less
mishap_overview.pdf.
than 300 meters (m). A change in the orbital trajectory for the SJ-06F around
0 4/202 3

7 Jonathan McDowell, posting on the NASAspace- that same time indicates that the two satellites may have bumped into each
flight.com forums, July 20, 2013, http://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=30486.
other, although at a very slow relative speed of a few meters per second.
msg1076481#msg1076481. There were no external indications of damage to either satellite or any debris
8 Posting on the 9ifly.cn Forums, August 8, 2013,
created by the incident. The incident appears to have been similar to the
http://bbs.9ifly.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread bumping that occurred during the autonomous rendezvous attempt between
&tid=9551&page=1#pid261125.
NASA’s Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART)
01
9 Posting on the 9ifly.cn Forums, July 26, 2013, satellite and the U.S. Navy’s Multiple Path Beyond Line of Site Communication
http://bbs.9ifly.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread
&tid=10910&page=16#pid259544.
(MUBLCOM) satellite in April 2005 (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1.1).6
02
10 Gunter Krebs, “CX 1,” Gunter’s Space Page,
Another rendezvous between two Chinese satellites in LEO occurred in 2013.
03
updated November 12, 2017, http://space. On July 19, 2013, China placed three payloads into roughly similar orbits
skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/cx-1.htm.
around 670 km altitude and 98 degrees inclination from the same launch:
04
11 Due to the uncertainty regarding which pay- Shiyan 7 (SY-7, 2013-037A, 39208), Chuangxin 3 (CX-3, 2013-037B, 39209),
load was which, the public Space Track catalog
has not identified which satellite was which.
and Shijian 15 (SJ-15, 2013-037C, 39210). The mission was publicly described
05
They are still labeled Payload A, Payload B, by the Chinese government as “conducting scientific experiments on space
and Payload C.
maintenance technologies.” 7 Public information at the time indicated the SY-7
06
was built by the DFH Satellite Corporation on behalf of the Chinese Academy
of Space Technology (CAST), and likely carried a robotic arm being developed
07
to support China’s space station program, perhaps similar to the Canadian
robotic arm used on the International Space Station.8 SJ-15 was built by the
08
SAST after eight years of development, and was reportedly an optical space
tracking satellite similar to the U.S. Air Force (USAF)’s Space-Based Surveillance
09
System (SBSS) satellite.9 CX-3 was built by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and
was likely a small store-and-forward communications satellite that was the
10
most recent in a series of such satellites.10 Once on orbit, the three satellites
were cataloged as Payload A, Payload B, and Payload C by the U.S. military.11
11
More than a year later, in October 2014, an internet code repository was
12
discovered that supported earlier claims that the three satellites were engaged
in capture and surveillance activities. Payload A was known internally to the
13
Chinese program as Tansuo-4, corresponding to the public designation SY-7,
and was designed with a teleoperated robotic arm that interacted with the
14
separating subsatellite, as shown at the lower left of Figure 3-1 below. Payload
B was known internally as Tansuo-3, corresponding to the public designation
15
CX-3, and was designed to provide optical surveillance of space objects
in geostationary and low Earth orbits. Payload C was known internally as
Tansuo-5, corresponding to the SJ-15, and was designed to maneuver and
conduct proximity operations with other space objects.
03-02
 12 Posting on Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
FIGURE 3-1 — RPO/ROBOTIC ARM DEMONSTRATOR SY-7 January 1, 2016, https://forum.novosti-kosmo-
navtiki.ru/index.php?msg=1462007.

13 Marcia Smith, “Surprise Chinese satellite ma-

neuvers mystify western experts,” Space Policy
Online, updated August 19, 2013, http://space-
policyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satell-
lite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/.

14 Bill Gertz, “China Testing New Space Weapons,”

The Washington Free Beacon, October 2, 2013,
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-
testing-new-space-weapons/.

15 Marcia Smith, “Did China Succeed in Capturing

One of its own Satellites? – Update,” Space
Policy Online, updated October 26, 2013,
http://spacepolicyonline.com/news/did-china-
succeed-in-capturing-one-of-its-own-satel-
lites/.

16 Posting on Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums,

May 5, 2014, http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/
forum/messages/forum12/topic13702/mes-
sage1254275/#message1254275.

17 Posting on Novosti Kosmonavtiki forums,

01
May 29, 2014, http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/
forum/messages/forum12/topic13702/mes-
sage1262548/#message1262548.
02
Image of the SY-7 (lower left, with robotic arm) and its small companion satellite. Image credit: Liss 12

03
In August 2013, the SJ-15 initiated a series of maneuvers to alter its orbit and
bring it close to two other satellites. On August 9, the SJ-15 altered its altitude by 04
a few tens of kilometers, which meant it passed above the CX-3 at a distance
of a few kilometers before returning largely to its original orbit. On August 05
16, the SJ-15 altered its altitude by more than 100 km and its inclination by 0.3
degrees, which eventually led to a close approach of Shi Jian 7 (SJ-7), a Chinese 06
satellite launched in 2005 (2005-024A, 28737), to within a few kilometers.13
Anonymous U.S. officials claimed that the rendezvous was part of a “covert 07
anti-satellite weapons development program,” and that one of the satellites
“grabbed” another,14 although there is no way to confirm a physical docking 08
from the publicly available tracking data and the satellite with the arm, SY-7,
was not involved in this particular RPO. 09

On October 18, 2013, the SY-7 initiated a small maneuver to raise its orbit 10
by several hundred meters, and shortly thereafter released another object,
which the U.S. military labeled Payload A Debris (2013-037J, 39357). The SY-7 11
and Payload A debris orbited in relatively close proximity to each other for
several days, ranging between a few kilometers and several hundred meters, 12
with some reports claiming the two objects may have physically joined with
each other.15 However, the publicly available tracking is not accurate enough 13
to confirm those claims. Both objects occasionally conducted small maneuvers
throughout 2014 and 2015, although the separation distance between them 14
never exceeded more than a few kilometers.
15
In April 2014, the SJ-15 began another series of small maneuvers to conduct
proximity operations around the CX-3. Between April 12-14, the SJ-15 raised its
orbit by several tens of kilometers, and then between May 12 and 14, Payload
C lowered its orbit by several tens of kilometers. The effect of these maneuvers
was to match orbital planes once again with the SJ-7, and on a trajectory that
brought it above and then behind the SJ-7 at a range of around 150 km, with a
vertical separation of a few kilometers.16 Throughout the rest of May, the SJ-15
slowly decreased the distance to the SJ-7 to within a kilometer.17
03-03
 Posting on NASAspaceflight.com forums, The SJ-15 continued to occasionally make changes to its orbit in 2015 and 2016,
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

18
June 7, 2016, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.
com/index.php?PHPSESSID=iamdpaq7i-
but the reasons for doing so were unclear. On December 3, 2015, the SJ-15
g407ooqdmi8gm06k6&topic=30486.ms- increased its inclination by 0.3 back to 98 degrees. On May 6, 2016, the SJ-15
g1545873#msg1545873.
changed its altitude by several tens of kilometers, bringing it close to the
19 “China lands Prototype Crew Spacecraft after CX-3 again.18
inaugural Long March 7 Launch,” Space-
flight101, June 27, 2016, http://spaceflight101.
com/long-march-7-maiden-launch/china- In 2016, another Chinese satellite was launched that again created concerns
lands-prototype-crew-spacecraft-after-inaugu-
ral-long-march-7-launch/.
about on-orbit grappling. The Aolong-1 (AL-1, 2016-042F, 41629), also known
as the Advanced Debris Removal Vehicle (ADRV) or “Roaming Dragon,” was a
20 “Is China militarising space? Experts say new
junk collector could be used as anti-sat-
small satellite developed by Harbin Institute of Technology under contract to the
ellite weapon,” South China Morning Post, China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) to reportedly demonstrate
updated June 12, 2017, http://www.scmp.
using a robotic arm to capture a small piece of space debris for removal from
0 4/202 3

com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti-
cle/1982526/china-militarising-space-ex- orbit. Aolong-1 was placed into orbit on the first launch of China’s new Long
perts-say-new-junk-collector.
March 7 (LM-7) rocket on June 25, 2016, along with a scaled-down test version
21 During a 2011 workshop organized by the of China’s next human spacecraft, a ballast mass, and a few small rideshare
National Research Council as part of a study
of NASA’s space debris program, participants
cubesats. The purpose of the launch was to demonstrate the ability of the LM-7
stated that a Department of Defense plan to and its restartable upper stage to place the new crewed spacecraft into orbit,
remove space debris did not go forward in part
due to concerns that “most of the proposals
to deploy multiple payloads into different orbits, test the new Tianyuan-1
01
had a weapons-like character about them”. refueling system developed by the National University of Defense Technology,
See National Research Council, Limiting Future
Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of
and test the atmospheric re-entry of the crewed spacecraft test vehicle.19
NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs,
02
Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2011, https://doi.org/10.17226/13244, pg. 143.
Although they were only small parts of the mission, the debris removal and
03
refueling experiments generated significant press outside of China due to
22 Jon Fingas, “China successfully refuels a
satellite in orbit,” Engadget, July 2, 2016,
concerns over dual-use technology and China leaping ahead in technology.
04
https://www.engadget.com/2016/07/02/chi- Stories included an inflammatory report that quoted a researcher from the
na-refuels-satellite-in-orbit/.
National Astronomical Observatories in Beijing talking about the potential for
05
23 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “China’s largest Aolong-1 to be used as a weapon system.20 However, it is unclear whether the
space launch vehicle, the Long March 7 flies,
with a Technological Triple Whammy,” Popular
researcher was truly convinced that was indeed the motive for Aolong-1, or
06
Science, July 8, 2016, http://www.popsci.com/ whether he was hypothesizing about military applications for debris removal
chinas-largest-space-launch-vehicle-long-
march-7-flies-with-technological-triple-
technology in general, much as U.S. scientists and officials often do.21 More
07
whammy. media stories were generated that claimed the same test had included the
24 “Re-Entry: Aolong-1 Space Debris Removal
successful refueling of another satellite,22 and that the two events taken togeth-
08
Demonstrator,” Spaceflight101, August 28, 2016, er demonstrated China’s increasing technological prowess.23
http://spaceflight101.com/re-entry-aolong-1-
space-debris-removal-demonstrator/.

09
The reality of either the Aolong-1 or the refueling experiment was less than
25 Geoff Brumfiel, “New Chinese Space Plane
Landed At Mysterious Air Base, Evidence
the media hype. By all appearances, the Tianyuan-1 refueling system was
10
Suggests,” NPR, September 9, 2020, attached to the upper stage, as no separate satellite of that description was
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/09/911113352/
new-chinese-space-plane-landed-at-mysteri-
ever cataloged by the U.S. military, nor did any of the ten objects cataloged in
11
ous-air-base-evidence-suggests. space rendezvous with any other satellites. According to U.S. military tracking
26 Data compiled from the public U.S. military
data, the Aolong-1 did indeed separate into a 380 km by 200 km orbit but
12
satellite catalog at https://space-track.org. did not rendezvous with any other objects. The debris capture experiment
27 Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “China’s
appears to have been simulated, and the Aolong-1 does not appear to have
13
Secret Spacecraft Looks To Have Landed At altered its orbit during its short two months on orbit.24
This Remote Base With A Massive Runway,” The
Warzone, September 8, 2020,

14
https://www.thedrive.com/the-warzone/ In September 2020, China launched an experimental Shenlong spaceplane
36270/this-remote-base-with-a-massive-
runway-looks-to-be-where-chinas-secretive-
that may have deployed at least one small satellite on orbit. On September 4,
15
spacecraft-landed. 2020, China launched what it called a “reusable experimental spacecraft into
orbit on a CZ-2F rocket from Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (See Imagery
Appendix pg. 15-11) under unusually heavy secrecy.25 Few facts are known,
but the U.S. military cataloged the spaceplane (PRC Test Spacecraft, 2020-063A,
46389) and a CZ-2F upper stage (CZ-2F R/B, 2020-063B, 46390) in a 348 km
by 331 km and 50.2° inclination orbit. One day later, they cataloged three
pieces of debris in a similar orbit and the following day, on September 6, the
U.S. military cataloged an unknown payload in orbit (Object A, 2020-063G,
46395) while also indicating the spaceplane had re-entered the atmosphere.26
Outside experts suggested that the spaceplane could have landed on a long
runway constructed at China’s Lop Nor nuclear test site,27 which is supported
03-04
by commercial satellite imagery showing a long runway.28 The mission of the Geoff Brumfiel, “Satellite Photos Show China

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
28
Expanding Its Mysterious Desert Airfield,”
small satellite it deployed is unknown, although it broadcast transmissions National Public Radio, July 1, 2021,
that were similar to a small “companion” satellite released by the Shenzhou 7 https://www.npr.org/2021/07/01/1011806020/
satellite-photos-show-china-expand-
crewed spacecraft during a mission in September 2008.29 Neither the spaceplane ing-its-mysterious-desert-airfield?s=09.
nor the subsatellite it released have been registered with the United Nations.
29 Andrew Jones, “China’s mystery spaceplane
releases object into orbit,” SpaceNews,
In August 2022, China launched a second Shenlong spaceplane (PRC TEST November 2, 2022, https://spacenews.com/
chinas-mystery-spaceplane-releases-object-in-
SPACECRAFT2, 2022-093A, 53357) from Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (See to-orbit/.
Imagery Appendix pg. 15-11) into an orbit of 346 km by 593 km at 49.99°
30 Andrew Jones, “China’s spaceplane raises orbit
inclination. Six pieces of orbital debris from the launch were also cataloged and national funding,” SpaceNews, October 25,
shortly after launch, five of which re-entered the atmosphere by January 2022, https://spacenews.com/chinas-space-
plane-raises-orbit-and-national-funding/.
2023. On October 23, 2022, the spaceplane raised its perigee significantly to
a nearly circular orbit of 607 km by 597 km.30 Shortly thereafter, a new object 31 Stephen Clark, “Chinese Long March 6
rocket delivers nine small satellites to space,”
(OBJECT J, 2022-093J, 54218), was cataloged that was apparently released SpaceflightNow.com, April 30, 2021, https://
from the spaceplane after its orbit-raising maneuver. Neither the spaceplane spaceflightnow.com/2021/04/30/chinese-long-
march-6-rocket-delivers-nine-small-satellites-
nor Object J appear to have made any significant maneuvers. As of February to-space/.
2023, both objects are still in orbit and neither have been registered with the
32 Cao Siqi, “Robot prototype capable of clearing
United Nations. space debris shines at Airshow China,” Global
Times, November 21, 2022, https://www.global-
01
times.cn/page/202211/1279404.shtml.
On April 27, 2021, China launched nine small payloads into LEO from Taiyuan
Space Launch Center (See Imagery Appendix pg. 15-14) that reportedly carried 33 “China’s Shijian-17 Satellite settles in Geo-
02
stationary Orbit for Experimental Mission,”
an orbital debris removal experiment.31 The NEO-01 payload, developed by Spaceflight101, November 24, 2016,
Origin Space Technology Company, reportedly carried out an experiment of http://spaceflight101.com/shijian-17-set-
03
tles-in-geostationary-orbit/.
using a large net to capture orbital debris.32 However, it is difficult to accurately
verify if this claim is true as the U.S. military has not identified any of the 34 General James Dickinson, statement before
04
the Senate Armed Services Committee,
objects from the launch as a specific payload and it’s unclear if any of them April 21, 2021, https://www.armed-ser-
released any additional objects. None appeared to have approached any vices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickin-
05
son04.20.2021.pdf.
existing pieces of space debris.
35 The other major method of getting to GEO
06
utilizes constant thrust ion propulsion, which
Recent Chinese Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in GEO / can take weeks or months.
Another incident of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) between two 07
36 “China’s Shijian-17 Satellite settles in
Chinese satellites occurred in 2016, but this time in GEO. On November 3, Geostationary Orbit for Experimental Mission,”
2016, China lofted the SJ-17 satellite (2016-065A, 41838) to GEO on the maiden Spaceflight101, November 24, 2016,
08
http://spaceflight101.com/cz-5-maiden-flight/
launch of its new Long March 5 (LM-5) space launch vehicle. The SJ-17 was shijian-17-settles-in-geostationary-orbit/.
reportedly designed to test advanced technologies such as environmentally 09
37 Originally, this was reported as Chinasat 6A
friendly chemical propellant, ion propulsion, quad-junction gallium arsenide closing in with Chinasat 5A, due to the U.S.
solar panels, and an on-board optical surveillance sensor.33 General James military mislabeling the SJ-17 as Chinasat 6A.
10
Dickinson, then Commander of U.S. Space Command, stated in Congressional
testimony that the SJ-17 also carried a robotic arm that could be used for dual 11
use capabilities.34 The launch was typical of the historical process of getting
most satellites to GEO using chemical propulsion,35 taking about 6 hours and 12
14 minutes after launch.36 The only anomaly was with the Yuanzheng-2 (YZ-2,
2016-065C, 41840) upper stage that carried the SJ-17 to GEO. The YZ-2 failed 13
to do a disposal maneuver to remove itself from the protected GEO zone in
accordance with international debris mitigation guidelines. Instead, the YZ-2 14
remained in an orbit with a perigee near GEO altitude such that the YZ-2 will
occasionally dip down very close to, and rotate around, the active GEO belt for 15
decades to come.

Several days after reaching GEO and separating from the YZ-2, the SJ-17 began
maneuvering to place itself into the active GEO belt close to another Chinese
satellite. It began with a maneuver on November 10 to lower its orbit and
reduce its westward drift, and then a pair of maneuvers on November 11 to
fully stabilize within the active GEO belt at a longitude of 162.9 E. This placed
the SJ-17 relatively close to another Chinese satellite, Chinasat 5A (1998-033A,
25354).37 Chinasat 5A was originally built by Lockheed Martin under contract
to the Chinese Communications Ministry, and launched in 1998 under the
03-05
 Gunter Krebs, “Zhongwei 1 (ChinaStar 1) → ZX name Zongwei 1 to provide commercial satellite communications services for
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

38
5A (ChinaSat 5A) → APStar 9A,” Gunter’s Space
Page, updated November 12, 2017, http://
southeast Asia.38 The SJ-17 made several small maneuvers to circumnavigate
space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/zhongwei-1.htm. Chinasat 5A at a distance of between 100 and 50 km for several days, slowly
39 “In-Space Eavesdropping? – China’s Shiji-
closing in to within a few km on November 30, and then returning to a 100 to
an-17 completes High-Altitude Link-Up,” 50 km standoff distance.39 The two satellites remained close until December
Spaceflight101 December 9, 2016, http://
spaceflight101.com/cz-5-maiden-flight/shiji-
29, when Analytical Graphics, Inc, (AGI) reported that Chinasat 5A had begun
an-17-rendezvous-with-chinasat-5a/. drifting away.40 On April 26, 2017, the SJ-17 began drifting again, and stopped
40 Analytical Graphics (@AGItweets), “ComSpOC
around the end of June at 125 E. It drifted again between September 29 and
has detected that #Chinasat 5A has departed October 10, 2017, settling in at 118 E. On January 11, 2018, the SJ-17 began a
SJ-17 & is drifting 0.9 deg/day westward.
SJ-17 remains @ 163 deg,” Tweet, December
rapid eastward drift at two degrees per day, followed by a rapid drift westward
29, 2016, https://twitter.com/AGItweets/sta- at four degrees per day starting on February 9. On March 20, the SJ-17 lowered
tus/814513003798364161.
its orbit to reverse its drift and moved to RPO with Chinasat 20 (2003-052A,
0 4/202 3

41 Posting by Liss on NASA Spaceflight.com 26643), a Chinese military communications satellite that was still under
Forum, February 6, 2021, https://forum.
nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=39415.
longitudinal control but had slowly been increasing in inclination for years.41
msg2189039#msg2189039.

42 Jonathan McDowell, “Jonathan’s Space Report,”

Over the first half of 2018, the SJ-17 made additional unusual changes to its
No. 754, October 8, 2018, http://planet4589. orbit. Beginning on January 23, 2018, the SJ-17 raised its inclination from
org/space/jsr/back/news.754.txt; Verified by
data compiled from the public U.S. military
0.43 to roughly four degrees, before reverting to zero between July 20-22.42
01
satellite catalog at https://space-track.org. According to the commercial SSA company AGI, this reversal in inclination was
43 Bob Hall, “Ep16 – Chinasat 1C Space Activities,”
also accompanied by maneuvering to a drift orbit of four degrees per day.
02
Analytical Graphics, Inc, July 2, 2019, This appears to be linked to an unexplained anomaly in the orbital trajectory
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTmRj-
cac3VE.
of Chinasat 1C, a Chinese communications satellite launched in December
03
2015, which began drifting westward at 0.5 deg/day.43 The sudden, large
change in inclination suggests the SJ-17 has significant delta-vee capability as
04
plane change maneuvers are among the most energy intensive. SJ-17 slowed
to rendezvous with Chinasat 1C, coming to within 1.5 km on July 29. Ten days
05
later, Chinasat 1C halted its drift and began to slowly drift back to its operational
location. SJ-17 remained with Chinasat 1C through the first week of August
06
before departing, while Chinasat 1C arrived back at its original location on
September 7. This strongly suggests that SJ-17 was used to inspect Chinasat 1
07
to determine the source of the anomaly and then monitor the recovery attempt.

08
Following its rendezvous with Chinasat 1C, the SJ-17 made smaller changes
to conduct RPO with Chinasat 6B in January 2020 and, SJ-20, a new Chinese
09
high bandwidth communications satellite launched in December 2019, in
October 2020. Figure 3-2 summarizes the longitudinal history of the SJ-17 in
10
the geosynchronous region.

11

12

13

14

15
03-06
 Data compiled by the COMSPOC Corporation.

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
44
FIGURE 3-2 — LONGITUDINAL HISTORY OF THE SJ-17 44
45 “China opens 2017 with obscure communica-
tions satellite launch,” Spaceflight101,
January 5, 2017, http://spaceflight101.com/
long-march-3b-tjs-2-launch/.

46 See discussion of this in the following

thread on the NASASpaceflight.com forums:
https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.
php?topic=46903.0;all.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Colin Clark, “US, China, Russia Test New Space

War TacticsL Sats Buzzing, Spoofing, Spying,”
Breaking Defense, October 28, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/us-
china-russia-test-new-space-war-tactics-sats-
buzzing-spoofing-spying/.

50 Andrew Jones, “A Chinese spacecraft has been

checking out US satellites high above Earth,”
Space.com, March 3, 2023, https://www.
The longitudinal history of the SJ-17 satellite since launch in 2017, including major RPOs with other satellites.
space.com/chinese-spacecraft-tjs-3-inspect-
Image credit: COMSPOC Corporation. ing-us-satellites.
01
51 T.S. Kelso, Tweet, January 25, 2022, “The
On December 23, 2018, China launched another mission to GEO that has also object identified as TJS-3 AKM has completed
02
a circuit of the GEO belt, 2 months after it
exhibited unusual behavior. Like its predecessors, the Tongxin Jishu Shiyan maneuvered well above the threshold for
(TJS)-3 satellite was launched from Xichang Space Launch Center (see Imagery the GEO graveyard. It is presumed to have
03
been decommissioned and its ops status in
Appendix, pg. 15-15) into an elliptical geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). Few the CelesTrak SATCAT is being changed to
details are known publicly about the TJS series, the first of which was launched reflect that,” https://twitter.com/TSKelso/
04
status/1486138895196512256?s=20&t=CYW-
in early 2017. Chinese official media has described them as communications fr_ZABBtnxffeSn-y2Q.
technology test satellites but observers believe they may also be testing 05
missile warning sensors, deployable antennas, or other technology.45 TJS-3
appeared to be similar and the U.S. military ended up cataloging two objects 06
from the launch in GEO: the TJS-3 satellite (2018-110A, 43874) and a second
object (2018-110C, 43917) that was assumed to be an apogee kick motor 07
(AKM), a detachable rocket engine often used to circularize a satellite in GEO,
as it was slowly drifting westward. While the modern practice is to separate 08
and dispose of AKMs above GEO for space debris mitigation, it is not uncommon
for them to be in GEO. However, shortly after the separation, object 43917 did 09
a series of maneuvers to place it into a GEO slot at 59.07E, near TJS-3.46 Object
43917 slowly drifted toward TJS-3 and according to AGI, exhibited photometry 10
consistent with a stabilized object and not one that was tumbling.47 Thus object
43917 appears to be a subsatellite, not an AKM, and is maintaining a relatively 11
close distance (100 to 200 km) from TJS-3.48 In May 2019, TJS-3 departed the
TJS-AKM and moved to another location, suggesting that it was conducting 12
initial check-out for the first few months while near TJS-AKM. However, its
departure was accompanied by an unusual synchronization of maneuvers 13
between TJS-3 and TJS-3 AKM, which some have suggested was a deliberate
tactic to complicate tracking of TJS-3.49 Since May 2019, TJS-3 has circled 14
the GEO belt and parked relatively close to multiple satellites, including the
Russian Luch satellite that has conducted many of its own RPOs in GEO (see 15
Russian Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 2-1), and several U.S. national security satellites
(including USA 263, also known as WGS 7, in July 2019, and USA 233, also
known as WGS F4, in October 2022) as shown in Figure 3-3.50 However, TJS-3 has
maintained several hundred km distance from these U.S. satellites, suggesting
it is doing something other than close RPO or has adopted a different pattern
of behavior. In December 2021, TJS-3 AKM raised its orbit significantly above
geostationary, which caused it to drift around the entire GEO belt and is now
presumed decommissioned.51
03-07
 52 Data compiled by the COMSPOC Corporation.
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

FIGURE 3-3 — LONGITUDINAL HISTORY OF THE TJS-3 52

53 Stephen Clark, “China says its launched a
space debris mitigation tech demo satellite,”
Spaceflight Now, October 25, 2021, https://
spaceflightnow.com/2021/10/25/china-says-it-
has-launched-a-space-debris-mitigation-tech-
demo-satellite/.

54 Ibid.

55 Andrew Jones, “China launches classified

space debris mitigation technology satellite,”
Space News, October 24, 2021, https://space-
news.com/china-launches-classified-space-de-
bris-mitigation-technology-satellite/.
0 4/202 3

56 Andrew Jones, “An object is now alongside Chi-

na’s Shijian-21 debris mitigation satellite,” Space
News, November 5, 2021, https://spacenews.
com/an-object-is-now-orbiting-alongside-chi-
nas-shijian-21-debris-mitigation-satellite/.

57 “Orbital Debris Quarterly News,” NASA Orbital

Debris Program Office, Volume 20, Issue 4,
October 2016, https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.
The longitudinal history of the TJS-3 satellite since launch in 2018, including major RPOs with other satellites.
gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/odqnv20i4.pdf.
Image credit: COMSPOC Corporation.
01
58 Theresa Hitchens, “China’s SJ-21 ‘tugs’ dead
satellite out of GEO belt: Trackers,” Breaking-

02
Defense, January 26, 2022, https://breakingde- On October 24, 2021, China launched a classified satellite from the Xichang
fense.com/2022/01/chinas-sj-21-tugs-dead-sat-
ellite-out-of-geo-belt-trackers/.
satellite launch center that it claimed was for a space debris mitigation
03
mission.53 The satellite, publicly named SJ-21 (49330, 2021-094A) was placed
59 Andrew Jones, “Long March 7A launches
classified Shiyan-12 satellites,” SpaceNews,
into an initial GTO inclined at 28.5 degrees by a Long March 3B. A statement
04
December 23, 2021, https://spacenews.com/ from the China Aerospace and Technology Corporation, which conducted
long-march-7a-launches-classified-shiyan-12-
satellites/.
the launch, stated that it was built by the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight
05
Technology, and Xinhua reported that the satellite would be used “mainly to
test and verify space debris mitigation technologies.” 54 The Shanghai Academy
06
had previously unveiled a “supplemental service spacecraft” designed to refuel
satellites on orbit at an airshow two months earlier.55 By November 2, the SJ-21
07
used an apogee kick motor to circularize its orbit at about 156E and bring
the inclination down to 8°, releasing the AKM as a piece of debris afterward.
08
SJ-21 began drifting slowly westward at about 1 degree per day, although still
inclined to geostationary orbit. For a while, SJ-21 maintained close proximity
09
to the AKM, which suggested it was conducting an RPO.56

10
On December 25, 2021, the SJ-21 rendezvoused with a defunct Chinese
navigation satellite, Compass G2 (34779, 2009-018A). The Compass G2 was
11
a second-generation navigation satellite launched in 2009 as part of China’s
Beidou constellation and appeared to fail early in its orbital lifetime as it lost
12
station keeping and began to drift both east-west and increase in inclination.
Compass G2 also experienced a fragmentation event in 2016 that released
13
at least six trackable pieces of debris.57 While maintaining tight proximity to
Compass G2 for several weeks, the SJ-21 docked to it at some point and then
14
around January 21, 2022, used its onboard propulsion to pull both satellites
to a higher altitude above the geostationary belt. By January 27, 2022, both
15
objects were in an elliptical orbit ranging from 290 km to 3,100 km above the
protected GEO zone, as observed by commercial trackers.58 Shortly thereafter,
SJ-21 reduced its orbital altitude back down to close to GEO, although
maintained an inclination slightly higher than 8°. As of February 2023, the
SJ-21 has not been registered with the United Nations.

On December 23, 2021, China launched a pair of satellites into GEO orbit as
part of the Shiyan series officially labeled Shiyan-12 01 (2021-129A, 50321)
and Syhiyan-12 02 (2021-129B, 50322).59 The two satellites remained relatively
close to each other in GEO, indicating that they had maneuvering capability
and may have been conducting RPO. In late January 2023, USA 270, one of
the four American GSSAP intelligence collection satellites (see U.S. Co-Orbital
03-08
ASAT, Section 1-1) maneuvered to approach SY-12 (01) and SY-12 (02). According 60 Debra Werner, “An In-Orbit Game of Cat and

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Mouse: CLose approaches prompt calls for
to tracking data collected by ExoAnalytic Solutions, SY-12 01 and SY-12 02 communications and norms,” Space News, June
made significant maneuvers to split up and begin rotating around the GEO 16, 2022, https://spacenews.com/an-in-orbit-
game-of-cat-and-mouse-close-approaches-
belt in opposite directions, with SY-12 02 apparently also getting an imaging prompt-calls-for-communications-and-norms/.
opportunity on USA 270.60 A video animation released by COMSPOC Corporation
61 SpaceNewsInc,“USA 270/Shiyan12 encounter,”
also shows the encounter.61 Youtube, Accessed February 22, 2023, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0ZlgmdjXjw.

The activities of the SJ-12, SJ-15, SJ-17, TJS-3 AKM, SJ-21, and SY-12 01 and 02 are 62 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to
consistent with the demonstration of RPO technologies for satellite servicing, Security in Space,” February 2019, https://apps.
dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082341.pdf.
space situational awareness, and inspection. Notably, a counterspace assessment
released by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in February 2019 stated 63 Thomas M. Davis and David Melanson,
“Xss-10 Micro-Satellite Flight Demonstration,”
that China is developing capabilities for inspection, repair, and space debris Smartech.GATech.edu, accessed
removal that may also be used as a weapon but did not specifically state that March 23, 2018, https://smartech.gat-
ech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/8036/
any Chinese RPO activities were a weapons test.62 Specifically, they appear similar SSEC_SD3_doc.pdf;jsessionid=906BB-
in nature to the activities of the USAF’s XSS-11 satellite, which was used to do 52FE69F848048883B704DB20F07.smart2.

inspections of satellites in LEO in 2005 and 2006;63 DARPA’s OrbitalExpress 64 Lt Col Fred Kennedy, “Orbital Express Space
satellite, which launched as a joined pair and conducted a series of rendezvous, Operations Architecture,” DARPA Tactical
Technology Office, accessed March 23, 2018,
docking, and robotic arm experiments in 2007; 64 the Swedish Mango (2010-028B, http://archive.darpa.mil/orbitalexpress/
36599) and Tango (2010-028F, 36827) cubesats that were part of the Prototype index.html.
01
Research Instruments and Space Mission technology Advancement (PRISMA) 65 “Prisma,” OHB Sweden, accessed
mission, which demonstrated cooperative rendezvous and proximity operations March 23, 2018, http://www.ohb-sweden.se/
02
space-missions/prisma/.
and formation flying in 2010; 65 and the USAF’s Micro-satellite Technology
Experiment (MiTEx) satellites 66 and Geosynchronous Space Situational Aware- 66 Craig Covault, “Secret inspection satellites
03
boost space intelligence ops,” Spaceflight Now,
ness (GSSAP) satellites, 67 which conducted inspections in the GEO belt in 2009 January 14, 2009, http://www.spaceflightnow.
and 2016, respectively (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1-1). com/news/n0901/14dsp23/.
04
67 Mike Gruss, “Air Force sent GSSAP satellite
to check on stalled MUOS-5,” Space News,
05
TABLE 3-1 — RECENT CHINESE RPOs August 18, 2016, http://spacenews.com/air-
force-sent-gssap-satellite-to-check-on-stalled-
muos-5/.
ORBITAL PARAM- 06
DATE(S) SYSTEM(S) NOTES
ETERS

June – SJ-O6F, SJ-12 570-600 km; 97.6° SJ-12 maneuvered to rendezvous with 07
Aug. 2010 SJ-06F. Satellites may have bumped into
each other.
08
July 2013 – SY-7, CX-3, SJ-15 Approx. 670 km; SY-7 released an additional object that it
May 2016 98° performed maneuvers with and may have
had a telerobotic arm. CX-3 performed 09
optical surveillance of other in-space objects.
SJ-15 Demonstrated altitude and inclination
changes to approach other satellites. 10
Nov. 2016 – SJ-17, YZ-2 35,600 km; 0° YZ-2 upper stage failed to burn to the
Feb. 2018 upper stage graveyard orbit and stayed near GEO. SJ-17 11
demonstrated maneuverability around the
GEO belt and circumnavigated Chinasat 5A.
12
Jan. – TJS-3, TJS-3 AKM 35,600 km; 0° TJS-3 AKM separated from the TJS-3 in the
April 2019 GEO belt, and both performed small
maneuvers to maintain relatively close 13
orbital slots. Both satellites then
maneuvered away from each other.
14
May 2019 – TJS-3, Luch, 35,876 km; 8° TJS-3 drifted around the GEO belt, period-
Feb. 2023 USA 233, USA 263, ically stopping to conduct RPO with other
Chinasat 10, satellites. 15
Chinasat 16, SJ-20,
Chinasat 12

Jan.– Chinasat 6B, SJ-20, – SJ-17 made smaller changes to RPO with
Aug. 2020 SJ-17 Chinasat 6B in January 2020 and, SJ-20, a
new Chinese high bandwidth communica-
tions satellite launched in December 2019,
in October 2020.

Dec. 2021 – SJ-21, Compass G2 35,876 km; 8° SJ-21 maneuvered to dock with Compass
Jan. 2022 G2 and pull it into a much higher orbit.
03-09
 68 David Chen, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Potential Military Utility /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Economic and Security Review Commission,”

Hearing on ‘China’s Advanced Weapons’ Panel
The most likely military utility of the capabilities demonstrated by the SJ-12, SJ-15,
on China’s Directed Energy and Electromag- SJ-17, TJS-3 AKM, TJS-3, SJ-21, and SJ-12 (01) and (02) satellites is for on-orbit
netic Weapons Programs, February 23, 2017,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
space situational awareness (SSA) and satellite servicing. Their operational
Chen_Testimony.pdf. pattern was consistent with slow, methodical, and careful approaches to
69 Stephen Chen, “Chinese scientists build
rendezvous with other space objects in similar orbits. The satellites the SJ-12
anti-satellite weapons that can cause explosion and SJ-15 approached were in relatively similar orbits, differing in altitude by
inside exhaust,” South China Morning Post,
October 21, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/
a couple of hundred kilometers and slightly in inclination. They did not make
news/china/military/article/3153174/chi- huge changes to rendezvous with satellites in significantly different orbits.
nese-scientists-build-anti-satellite-weap-
on-can-cause.
This behavior is similar to several U.S. RPO missions to test and demonstrate
satellite inspection and servicing capabilities such as the XSS-11 (see U.S.
Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1.1).
0 4/202 3

The SJ-17’s approach to Chinasat 5A was not inconsistent with the way other
active satellites in the GEO belt relocate to different orbital slots. It is also
not unusual for satellites to be co-located within several tens of kilometers
to share a GEO slot, although it is rare for them to approach within 1 km as the
SJ-17 eventually did. Such a close approach in GEO could be used for very
01
detailed imaging or inspection of another satellite or to intercept radio frequency
signals directed at another satellite from Earth. Likely examples of the latter
02
are the activities of the U.S. PAN satellite (35815, 2009-047A) between 2009
and 2014 (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1.1), and the Russian Luch/Olymp
03
satellite (40258, 2014-058A) in 2015 (see Russian Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 2.1).

04
While the known on-orbit activities of the SJ-12, SJ-15, SJ-17, TJS-3 AKM, and
SJ-21 did not include explicit testing of offensive capabilities or aggressive
05
maneuvers, it is possible that the technologies they tested could be used
for offensive purposes in the future. One potential offensive use would be to
06
get a radio-frequency jammer close to a satellite, thereby greatly amplifying
its ability to interfere with the satellite’s communications. While possible, to
07
date there is no direct public evidence of such systems being tested on orbit,
although there have been multiple research articles published in Chinese
08
journals discussing and evaluating the concept.68 A more recent paper from
Chinese researchers suggests that they are studying the ability to use RPO
09
capabilities to plant small explosive charges in the nozzle of a spacecraft’s
engine, although only ground tests are reported so far.69
10
The onboard tracking and guidance systems used for rendezvous could be
11
used to try and physically collide with another satellite to damage or destroy it.
However, the approach would have to involve much higher relative velocities
12
than what the Chinese RPO satellites have demonstrated to date, and potentially
involve higher velocities and longer closing distances than what these satellites
13
are capable of. Furthermore, the deliberate maneuvering to create a conjunction
with the target satellite would be detectable with existing processes already in
14
place to detect accidental close approaches. The warning time of such a close
approach would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO) unless the
15
attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit.

3.2 — CHINESE DIRECT-ASCENT ASAT

Assessment /
China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway to
develop DA-ASAT capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems or as
midcourse missile defense systems that could provide counterspace capabilities.
China has engaged in multiple, progressive tests of these capabilities since
2005, indicating a serious and sustained organizational effort. Chinese DA-ASAT
03-10
capability against LEO targets is likely mature and may be operationally 70 Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Tech-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
nology in Chinese Open-Source Publications,”
fielded on mobile launchers. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space Union of Concerned Scientists, July 1, 2009,
targets (medium Earth orbit, or MEO, and GEO) is likely still in the experimental https://ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/
Kulacki-Chinese-ASAT-Literature-6-10-09.pdf.
or development phase, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether
it will become an operational capability in the near future. 71 Ibid.

72 Mark Stokes and Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving

Specifics / Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S.
Interests,” report prepared for The US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission,
Program Background April 26, 2012, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&-
did=708400.
The Chinese direct-ascent ASAT program has its roots in several programs
that emerged from the 1960s through the 1990s. Program 640, initially tasked 73 Mark Stokes and Dean Cheng, ibid; Mi-
chael Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s
with the development of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and surface-to-air missile Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs,
(SAM) sites, began a dedicated ASAT program in 1970 and oversaw most of Policies and Doctrines,” report prepared for
The US-China Economic and Security Review
China’s counterspace funding and development for the first two decades. During Commission, January 19, 2007, https://www.
this period, nearly all Chinese ASAT work appears to have taken place within uscc.gov/research/assessment-chinas-an-
ti-satellite-and-space-warfare-programs-poli-
the various subsidiaries of the Fifth Academy of the Chinese Ministry of Defense, cies-and-doctrines; John Pike, “HQ-19 Anti-Bal-
especially the No. 2 General Design Department of the Second Academy.70 listic Missile Interceptor,” GlobalSecurity.org,
last updated February 6, 2018, https://www.
globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/hq-19.
These various subsidiaries have, over time, been consolidated into large state- htm.
01
owned companies, yet have retained deep-seated direct ties to the military—
particularly regarding the development and use of ASAT technologies. Today, 02
the General Design Department is a subsidiary of the China Aerospace Industry
Corporation (CASIC), which is responsible, among other things, for a variety of 03
derivatives of China’s Dong-Feng ballistic missile series, including several with
ASAT relevance.71 04

The emergence of this structure is important for understanding the character 05

of China’s counterspace development. First, there is often little division between
the ‘private’ and ‘public’ sectors, or between civilian and military space. Second, 06
it is likely that bureaucratic imperatives for rent-seeking and sustainment,
coupled with institutional inertia and silos of information and decision-making 07
authority, are giving elements of Chinese counterspace development a life
of their own, much as they did in the United States and USSR during the Cold 08
War. The number and diversity of counterspace programs may be driven by
competition between organizations more than a deliberate strategy to have 09
multiple competing programs.
10
Program 640 was shuttered in 1980. A few years later, Program 863—a broad
umbrella program for cutting edge technological developments—took its 11
place. In 1995, a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) project began which was housed
within Program 863.72 Initial testing began in the late 1990s, followed by 12
further vector and velocity control testing in 2003, at which point the system
entered service as the interceptor for the HQ-19 missile defense system.73 13
The HQ-19 is a solid-propelled high altitude hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept system
roughly equivalent to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 14
missile defense system. Since then, China has demonstrated significant
advances in HTK capability, and engaged in large-scale modernization and 15
development efforts for advanced rocket technology; tracking, targeting, and
SSA capabilities; and launch infrastructure, both mobile and stationary.

Capabilities
China may be developing as many as three direct-ascent ASAT systems,
although it is unclear whether all three are intended to be operational or
whether their primary mission is counterspace or midcourse missile defense.
The first known system is known as the SC-19, sometimes referred to as DN-1,
and has been tested multiple times, as summarized in Table 3-2. The first
known tests were in 2005 and 2006, both from Xichang Satellite Launch Center
0 3-11
 Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. in Sichuan (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-15 ), and appear to have been tests
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

74
Knew of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent,”
New York Times, April 23, 2007,
of the missile itself.74 On January 11, 2007, the SC-19 was tested for the third
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/washing- time from Xichang and destroyed an aging Chinese FengYun 1C weather satellite
ton/23satellite.html.
(1999-025A, 25730) at an altitude of 865 km, which created several thousand
75 T.S. Kelso, “Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT pieces of orbital debris.75 The system was reportedly tested again in 2010
Test and the Impact of its Debris on the Space
Environment,” AMOS Conference Technical
and 2013 from the Korla Missile Test Complex (see Imagery Appendix, pg.
Papers, (2007), pp. 321-330. http://celestrak. 15-12) with successful intercepts of a ballistic target. The move from Xichang
com/publications/AMOS/2007/AMOS-2007.pdf.
to Korla may indicate the system entered a new phase of development, or
76 “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. possibly even operational testing. In April 2021, the U.S. Office of the Director
Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, April 9, 2021,
of National Intelligence assessed that China had “fielded ground-based ASAT
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/as- missiles intended to destroy satellites in LEO.” 76
sessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
0 4/202 3

77 Rick Fisher finds that the DF-21 forms the

basis for the SC-19. See: Fisher, China’s Military
Naming Convention for Chinese DA-ASATs
Modernization: Building for Regional and
Global Reach, pp. 2, 131; MissileThreat provides The naming conventions for Chinese DA-ASATs are complicated and uncertain. The U.S. intelligence
an operational range of 2500 km for the DF-21, community traditionally christens foreign missiles according to the launch site at which they were first
while think tank analyst Sean O’Connor pegs observed, followed by a number indicating how many other unique missile types already bear that
the range at 2150 km. See “DF-21 (Dong Feng-
moniker. For example, SC-19 corresponds to the nineteenth missile type observed from Shuang cheng
21 / CSS-5)”, MissileThreat, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, https://missilethreat. zi, the U.S. intelligence designation for Jiuquan Space Launch Center. The Chinese DA-ASATs have also
csis.org/missile/df-21; Sean O’Connor, “PLA Bal- been referred to as “DN,” indicating shorthand for Dong Neng (动能), a Chinese phrase translating to
01
listic Missiles,” (Report prepared under contract “Kinetic Energy.” Although this is somewhat in line with the taxonomy for China’s designations for its
APA-TR-2010-0802 for Air Power Australia in
ballistic and cruise missiles, the Dong-Feng-XX (東風, literally “East Wind”), the only public mentions of
2010, Last updated: 27 January 2014),
02 the DN label have been in U.S. news reports citing anonymous U.S. officials. Thus, the DN-X designation
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Ballis-
tic-Missiles.html#mozTocId8319. may be a leak of the Chinese internal name for the system as divined by U.S. intelligence. If so, that

03 suggests that DN-1 is the Chinese designation for the SC-19, DN-2 is the longer range GEO version, and
78 Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes,
DN-3 could be an upgraded LEO version or a midcourse missile defense interceptor.
“China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implica-
tions,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46, (2007):
04
pp. 39-45, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=get-
Record&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=A-

05
DA517485. While the specifications of the SC-19 are not publicly available, analysis of its
79 Dylan Malyasov, “China displays DF-21D Anti-Ship
technological foundations and demonstrated capabilities is revealing. The SC-19
06
Ballistic Missile,” Defence-Blog, September 3, appears to be based on the DF-21C ballistic missile, but also derives
2015, https://defence-blog.com/china-displays-
df-21d-anti-ship-ballistic-missile/.
some elements from the HQ-19 missile defense system, including the intercept
07
vehicle and certain rocket stages.77 The DF-21 has an operational range of
2150-2500 km, which typically would amount to a vertical reach of about half
08
that or approximately 1250 km. Subsequent analyses have concluded that
while the SC-19 incorporates many design aspects of the DF-21, it may feature
09
three solid stages and a liquid upper stage.78

10
FIGURE 3-4 — DF-21 MRBM
11

12

13

14

15

Missile version upon which the SC-19 is likely based, mounted atop a TEL. Image credit: Defence Blog.79

The organizational history of the SC-19 yields further clues. Chinese rocket
development is centralized in two state-owned corporations. According to
03-1 2
Chinese bloggers, CASIC sought to leverage the DF-21 and its expertise in 80 Brian Weeden, “Through a glass, darkly:

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Chinese, American, and Russian anti-satellite
solid rockets to develop a new line of solid rocket space launch vehicles (SLV).80 testing in space,” The Space Review,
The first attempt was the Kaituozhe 1 (KT-1), a four-stage rocket 13.6 m in March 17, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.
com/article/2473/1.
length and 1.4 m in diameter that was designed to place a 50 kg payload in a
400 km sun-synchronous orbit. Both known tests of the KT-1 failed, and the 81 “中国再次高空科学探测试验: 高度更高数据更多,”
China News, May 14, 2013, http://www.chinan-
project was apparently canceled. A larger 1.7 meter diameter version called ews.com/gn/2013/05-14/4817925.shtml.
the KT-2 was planned but never developed. However, in 2002, CASIC won a
82 Marc V. Schanz, “Chinese Anti-Satellite Test?,”
contract to build a 1.4 m diameter, four-stage rocket (three solid stages with a Air Force Magazine, May 16, 2013,
liquid upper stage) called the KT-409 that was launched from a WS2500 TEL. http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/
Pages/2013/May%202013/May%2016%202013/
This is likely the SC-19. Chinese-Anti-Satellite-Test.aspx.

83 Bill Gertz, “China Conducts Test of New

China has also conducted at least one test of what is likely a DA-ASAT that Anti-Satellite Missile,” The Washington Free
might be able to reach higher orbits. On May 13, 2013, China launched a Beacon, May 14, 2013, http://freebeacon.com/
national-security/china-conducts-test-of-new-
rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center, which the Chinese Academy anti-satellite-missile/.
of Sciences stated was a high-altitude scientific research mission.81 A U.S.
84 “Chinese Officials provide initial Information on
military official stated that “the launch appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory Monday’s Sub-Orbital Launch,” Spaceflight101,
nearly to [GEO]. We tracked several objects during the flight…and no objects May 15, 2013, http://www.spaceflight101.net/
chinese-rocket-launch-may-2013.html.
associated with this launch remain in space,” 82 but unofficial U.S. government
sources say it was a test of a new ballistic missile related to China’s ASAT 85 Brian Weeden, “Through a glass, darkly:
01
Chinese, American, and Russian anti-satellite
program.83 Subsequent launch analysis strongly supports this conclusion. testing in space,” The Space Review,
March 17, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.
02
com/article/2473/1.
The details of the launch were different from those of either a standard satellite
launch to GEO or the launch of a sounding rocket. The Notice to Airmen 86 Note that in the Chinese language, 10,000 is a
03
base amount of something, so this may have
(NOTAM) released by China to provide warning of the flight path in case of been used as an order of magnitude statement
complications covered a ground track lining up with a GEO launch trajectory,84 rather than meant as an absolute distance. Still,
04
it was less than forthcoming about the actual
but stretching further south than either GEO satellite launches or a typical apogee of the test.
sounding rocket. The resultant rocket launch went far higher than a typical 05
87 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. sees China launch as
sounding rocket, and the rocket plume was much larger and more intense than test of anti-satellite muscle: source,” Reuters,
would be expected with a sounding rocket. Moreover, there is no evidence May 15, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/
06
us-china-launch/u-s-sees-china-launch-as-
that it “released a barium cloud” as claimed by CAS, nor has there been any test-of-anti-satellite-muscle-source-idUS-
subsequent scientific research published because of the launch. BRE94E07D20130515.
07
88 Brian Weeden, “Through a glass, darkly:
Analysis of the launch site also points to something other than either an orbital Chinese, American, and Russian anti-satellite
08
testing in space,” The Space Review,
or sounding rocket.85 Both are typically larger and more complicated than March 17, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.
ballistic missiles. As a result, they are usually launched from fixed launch pads, com/article/2473/1.
09
with standing support structures. In Xichang, however, there are only two official
launch pads: one was unavailable at the time of the May 13 launch (as it was 10
being retrofitted after use for the LM-3A), while the other played host to a LM-3B/E
launch on May 1, leaving insufficient time to prep another SLV for launch. 11

Furthermore, the launch appeared to go much higher than the altitude claimed 12
by the Chinese government. In their statement, CAS claimed the rocket reached
10,000 km 86, whereas the U.S. military claimed it went “nearly to GEO” at 13
36,000 km. U.S. officials also stated that the upper stages re-entered the Earth’s
atmosphere “over the Indian Ocean”.87 A technical analysis concluded that 14
re-entry location is only possible if the apogee was at least 30,000 km; if the
apogee was only 10,000 km, the Earth would not have had enough time to rotate 15
for it to land in the Indian Ocean. 88 The flight trajectory is also far beyond
what the SC-19 is believed to be capable of.

The most plausible explanation for the May 2013 launch was that it was a test
of the rocket component of a new direct ascent ASAT weapons system derived
from a road-mobile ballistic missile. Commercial satellite imagery shows a
03-1 3
 89 Ibid. transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), commonly associated with mobile ballistic
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

90 “USCC 2015 Annual Report,” pp. 294-294,

missiles, located on a purpose-built launch pad towards the southeast corner
November 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/annu- of Xichang, as shown in Figure 3-5.89 The pad is similar to the one believed to
al-report/2015-annual-report-congress.
have been constructed for the SC-19 testing in the northwest of Xichang (see
91 Bill Gertz, “China Conducts Test of New Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-15 ). A report from the U.S.-China Economic and
Anti-Satellite Missile,” The Washington Free
Beacon, May 14, 2013, http://freebeacon.com/
Security Review Commission labeled this new rocket as DN-2 and claimed it may
national-security/china-conducts-test-of-new- reach operational status in 2020-2025.90 However, the only known sources of
anti-satellite-missile/.
this designation are news reports that cite anonymous U.S. defense officials.91
92 Mike Gruss, “U.S. State Department:
China Tested Anti-satellite Weapon,”
SpaceNews, July 28, 2014, http://spacenews.
com/41413us-state-department-china-test- FIGURE 3-5 — XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX ON APRIL 3, 2013
ed-anti-satellite-weapon/.
0 4/202 3

93 Mike Gruss, “Senior U.S. Official Insists

China Tested ASAT Weapon,” SpaceNews,
August 25, 2014, http://spacenewscom/
41676senior-us-official-insists-china-test-
ed-asat-weapon/.

94 “USCC 2015 Annual Report,” p. 293,

November 2015, accessed March 23, 2018,
https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2015-
annual-report-congress.
01
95 Jing Heng, “网友11月1日拍到新疆库尔勒神奇天
象 疑似航天或反导试验,” Guancha.cn, November
02
1, 2015, http://www.guancha.cn/military-af-
fairs/2015_11_01_339656.shtml.

03
96 Tom Demerly, “Commercial Pilot Catches
Remarkable Photos of Alleged Secret Chinese
Anti-Missile Test,” The Aviationist, July 29, 2017,
04
https://theaviationist.com/2017/07/29/com-
mercial-pilot-catches-remarkable-photos-of-al-
leged-secret-chinese-anti-missile-test/.
05
97 Ankit Panda, “Revealed: The Details of
China’s Latest Hit-To-Kill Interceptor Test,”
06
The Diplomat, February 21, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revealed-
the-details-of-chinas-latest-hit-to-kill-intercep-
07
tor-test/.
Imagery shows a TEL on the southeast pad. Image © 2013 DigitalGlobe. All rights reserved.
For media licensing options, please contact [email protected]
08

09
In 2014, China conducted another rocket test, this time claiming that it was
part of a missile defense interceptor program.92 Very little information is
10
available in the public record about this launch, other than that it occurred,
remained suborbital, and does not appear to have had an evident target,
11
ballistic or otherwise. However, the United States government openly declared
it an anti-satellite test—the only time since 2007 that any event has been
12
so-labeled publicly. When asked for comment, then-Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Frank Rose noted on
13
the record that “Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test, let me
assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment, that the
14
event was indeed an ASAT test.” 93 A report published by the US-China Economic
and Security Review Commission also stated that the 2014 test was of the
15
SC-19/DN-1, but did not provide independent evidence.94

Since 2014, evidence suggests China has conducted at least three more tests
that may be linked to their DA-ASAT program. A launch on October 30, 2015,
from Korla created unusual contrails that were seen on Chinese social media.95
Photos from another test on July 22, this time launched from Jiuquan Satellite
Launch Center (See Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-11) were captured by a pilot on
a Dutch commercial airliner flying over the Himalayas.96 On February 5, 2018,
Chinese state media announced it had carried out “land-based midcourse missile
interception test within its territory.” 97 In all three cases, anonymous U.S.
officials were cited by news sources claiming that the tests were of a system
0 3-14
known publicly as DN-3 and labeled by U.S. intelligence agencies as KO-09 98 Bill Gertz, “China Carries Out Flight Test of

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Anti-Satellite Missile,” Washington Free Beacon,
(as the ninth missile type seen out of Korla).98 DN-3 could refer to an upgraded August 2, 2017, http://freebeacon.com/nation-
version of the LEO-capable DN-1 or an adaptation of the same weapon al-security/china-carries-flight-test-anti-satel-
lite-missile/.
system for midcourse missile defense, akin to the U.S. sea-based Standard
Missile (SM)-3 interceptor or Ground-based Interceptor (GBI), with latent 99 Ankit Panda, “Revealed: The Details of
China’s Latest Hit-To-Kill Interceptor Test,”
ASAT capabilities (see U.S. DA-ASAT, Section 1-2).99 China publicly announced The Diplomat, February 21, 2018, https://the-
additional “land-based midcourse missile intercept technology test[s]” diplomat.com/2018/02/revealed-the-details-of-
chinas-latest-hit-to-kill-interceptor-test/.
on February 4, 2021 100 and June 21, 2022,101 with very similar descriptions
as previous tests of the DN-1 and its derivatives. 100 Wang Xinjuan, “China conducts land-based
mid-course missile interception test,”
Chinese Ministry of National Defense,
More recent reporting suggests that at least one of these systems, likely February 5, 2021, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/
view/2021-02/05/content_9980841.htm.
the SC-19, has achieved operational status. In December 2018, the National
Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) released a public counterspace 101 Emma Helfrich, “China Conducts Midcourse
Missile Defense Test One Year After Last,” The
assessment of foreign space and counterspace capabilities that stated, “China Warzone, June 21, 2022, https://www.thedrive.
has military units that have begun training with anti-satellite missiles.” 102 In com/the-war-zone/china-conducts-sixth-mis-
sile-defense-test-one-year-after-the-last-one.
his statement for the record before the United States Senate on January 29,
2019, Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats stated that China “has an 102 National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
“Competing in Space”, December 2018,
operational ground-based ASAT missile intended to target low-Earth-orbit https://media.defense.gov/2019/
satellites.” 103 Taken together, these statements suggest that China has Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-
01
NV711-0002.PDF.
operationally deployed DA-ASAT systems to at least some units and has
developed operational training for their use, although there has not been 103 Daniel Coats, “Worldwide threat assessment
02
of the United States intelligence community,”
independent confirmation of this through open sources. Senate Select Committee on National Intelli-
gence, January 29, 2019,
03
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/os-dcoats-012919.pdf.
TABLE 3-2 — HISTORY OF CHINESE DA-ASAT TESTS 104 04
104 Data compiled from multiple sources already
DATE SYSTEM LAUNCH SITE PAYLOAD APOGEE NOTES cited in the text of this document.

July 7, 2005 SC-19 Xichang None known ? Likely rocket test 05

Feb. 6, 2006 SC-19 Xichang Unknown ? Likely near-miss of

satellite orbital target 06

Jan. 11, 2007 SC-19 Xichang FY-1C satellite 865 km Destruction of orbital
target, debris created 07

Jan. 11, 2010 SC-19 Korla CSS-X-11 ballistic 250 km Destruction of

missile launched suborbital target 08
from Jiuquan

Jan. 27, 2013 Possible Korla Unknown ballistic Suborbital Destruction of 09

SC-19 missile launched suborbital target
from Jiuquan
10
May 13, 2013 Possible Xichang None known ~30,000 km Likely rocket test
DN-2
11
July 23, 2014 Possible Korla? Likely ballistic Suborbital Likely intercept test
DN-2 ( Jiuquan?) missile launched
from Jiuquan 12

Oct. 30, 2015 Possible Korla None known, Suborbital Likely rocket test
DN-3 possible ballistic 13
missile

July 23, 2017 Possible Jiuquan? Likely ballistic Suborbital, Likely intercept test 14
DN-3 missile malfunctioned

Feb. 5, 2018 Possible Korla Likely ballistic Suborbital Likely intercept test 15
DN-3 missile

Feb. 4, 2021 Possible Korla Likely ballistic Suborbital Likely intercept test
DN-3 missile

Jun. 19, 2022 Possible Korla Likely ballistic Suborbital Likely intercept test
DN-3 missile

There has been speculation by Western analysts that China may also have
sea- or air-based capabilities that could be used as DA-ASATs. Some have
suggested that the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) developed
03-1 5
 for basing on China’s JIN-class SSBNs may have an ASAT capability. Others
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

have suggested China may be developing an air-launched DA-ASAT, similar to

the U.S. ASM-135 (see U.S. Direct-Ascent ASAT, Section 1.2) or Russian Kontakt
(see Russian Direct-Ascent ASAT, Section 2.2) systems. However, there is very
little to no publicly available evidence to support these claims, other than the
theoretical possibility.

Potential Military Utility /

China’s 2007 ASAT test, and the subsequent ballistic intercepts, have
demonstrated the ability to hit and destroy space objects using a KKV. Their
heritage from road-mobile ballistic missiles indicates the systems may be mobile,
which would create additional challenges for locating the threat prior to launch.
0 4/202 3

However, the known tests to date have all occurred from prepared pads, leaving
the possibility that a minimum level of infrastructure may be required.

Given the known testing, it is likely that China either has fielded, or could field,
an operational DA-ASAT capability against most LEO satellites. This would
include satellites performing military weather and ISR functions. China would
01
have to wait for such satellites to overfly an area where one of the systems is
deployed, but most LEO satellites would do so daily to every few days. However,
02
once launched, the target would only have an estimated 5-15 minutes of warning
time before impact.
03
It is unlikely that China currently possesses an operational DA-ASAT capability
04
against high altitude satellites in MEO or GEO orbits. Only one test, in May
2013, is known to have targeted higher altitudes, and given the unique nature
05
of such a system, it would likely require multiple tests to become militarily
useful. In addition, the primary target in MEO for such a system, the U.S.
06
military’s Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation constellation, consists
of more than 30 satellites distributed across multiple orbital planes. Many of
07
the GPS satellites would need to be destroyed to have an appreciable impact
on the GPS system, and their higher altitude (20,000 km) would provide at
08
least an hour of warning time after launch. Other potential targets in the GEO
belt, such as U.S. missile early warning, data relay, or electronic intelligence
09
satellites, are much fewer in number and less distributed, making the capabilities
easier to eliminate. However, their even higher altitude (36,000 km) would
10
mean an even longer warning time of several hours after launch. The ability
of the DA-ASAT kill vehicle to adjust for any changes in the target’s trajectory
11
over that time is unknown, and unlikely at present.

12
At the same time, there are also constraints on the military utility of such
systems, particularly as China improves its space capabilities. The use of
13
a kinetic-kill DA-ASAT against an orbital target will invariably create large
amounts of orbital space debris, as was seen in the 2007 test. Aggressive use
14
of such a capability would invariably lead to widespread condemnation, as
happened after the 2007 test, and appears to have shaped Chinese testing
15
practices since. Moreover, as China invests in and deploys its military satellites
and space capabilities, the long-lasting debris from the use of DA-ASATs will
be increasingly likely to threaten their own capabilities. The use of a DA-ASAT
would also be relatively easy to attribute to China. Thus, the military utility of
DA-ASATs would have to be weighed against the potential costs, particularly
relative to less destructive capabilities such as jamming or blinding.
03-16
3.3 — CHINESE ELECTRONIC WARFARE 105 Michael Gordon and Jeremy Page, “China

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
installed military jamming equipment on S
pratly Islands, U.S. says,” The Wall Street Journal,
Assessment / April 9, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
china-installed-military-jamming-equipment-
China is likely to have significant EW counterspace capabilities against GNSS on-spratly-islands-u-s-says-1523266320.
and satellite communications, although the exact nature is difficult to determine
106 Mark Harris, “Ghost Ships, Crop Circles, and
through open sources. Chinese military doctrine places a heavy emphasis on Soft Gold: A GPS Mystery in Shanghai,” MIT
electronic warfare as part of the broader information warfare, and in recent Technology Review, November 15, 2019,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614689/
years, China has taken steps to integrate space, cyber, and electronic warfare ghost-ships-crop-circles-and-soft-gold-a-gps-
capabilities under a single military command. While there is significant evidence mystery-in-shanghai/.

of Chinese scientific research and development of EW capabilities for 107 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to
counterspace applications and some open-source evidence of Chinese EW Security in Space,” January 2019, p. 20,
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/
counterspace capabilities being deployed, there is no public evidence of their News/Military%20Power%20Publications/
active use in military operations. Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.

108 Ibid.
Specifics /

GNSS Jamming
GNSS jamming, particularly of the U.S. GPS, is a well-known technology, and
jammers are widely proliferated throughout the globe. China is assessed 01
to be proficient in GNSS jamming capabilities, having developed both fixed
and mobile systems. The known systems are downlink jammers, which affect 02
GNSS receivers within a local area. There is no publicly known system that
targets uplink jamming of GNSS satellites themselves. 03

In April 2018, news reports revealed satellite imagery indicating China had 04
placed military jamming equipment on the Mischief Reef, part of the disputed
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.105 The imagery shows what appears 05
to be mobile military jamming trucks that are designed to interfere with GPS
or other GNSS signals. 06

In November 2019, a new report detailed multiple incidents of GNSS jamming 07

and spoofing near the Chinese port of Shanghai.106 Analysts from the Center
for Advanced Defense Studies determined that jamming and spoofing of 08
the GNSS signals used by the automatic identification system (AIS) to track
commercial shipping began in the summer of 2018. The attacks culminated in 09
July 2019 with spoofed locations for over three hundred ships in Shanghai or
the Huangpu River on a single day. The effect of the spoofing was also unique: 10
the position of the ships was jumping every few minutes in a ring pattern
that showed as large circles over weeks. Additional analysis showed that the 11
spoofing was affecting fitness tracks as well, suggesting it was impacting all
GPS receivers in the area. 12

SATCOM Jamming 13
The January 2019 DIA space and counterspace report stated that China is
developing jammers to target SATCOM over a range of frequency bands, 14
including military protected extremely high frequency communications, citing
Chinese scientific papers describing the status of research and potential 15
operational techniques.107

SAR Jamming
The January 2019 U.S. DIA space and counterspace report stated that China is
developing jammers dedicated to targeting SAR aboard military reconnaissance
platforms, including LEO satellites, citing Chinese scientific papers describing
the status of research and potential operational techniques.108
0 3-17
 109 Shishir Gupta, “China builds new structures In October 2020, an Indian newspaper reported that China had deployed
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

near LAC, relocates troops. India reads a

message,” Hindustan Times, October 20, 2020,
“counterspace jammers” near Lakdah, Kashmir, close to the disputed Line of
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ Actual Control on the border between China and India.109 The report suggests
india-spots-movement-across-lac-china-is-
building-new-structures-relocating-troops/
that the purpose of these jammers is to prevent satellites from tracking the
story-DIe6zUzawUyTwEBrakZ45K.html. deployment of Indian troops, but this has not been verified.
110 Brandon Davenport and Rich Ganske,
“Recalculating Route: A Realistic Risk Military Utility /
Assessment for GPS,” War on the Rocks,
March 11, 2019, https://warontherocks.
RF jamming is an effective means of negating certain space capabilities. The
com/2019/03/recalculating-route-a-realis- most significant and prevalent, thus far, is using EW to degrade the accuracy
tic-risk-assessment-for-gps/.
of GPS-guided systems in tactical scenarios. Given this high reliance of modern
111 Richard Fisher, Jr. “China’s Progress with militaries on GNSS, and GPS in particular, China is likely to yield significant military
Directed Energy Weapons,” Testimony before
utility from being able to actively prevent, or even undermine confidence in,
0 4/202 3

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review

Commission on China’s Advanced Weapons, the ability of adversaries to use GNSS in a future conflict.
February 23, 2017 https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Fisher_Combined.pdf.
EW is an attractive option for counterspace because of its flexibility: it can be
112 Based on personal communication with
Sean O’Conner.
temporarily applied, its effects on a satellite are completely reversible, it generates
no on-orbit debris, and it may be narrowly targeted, which could affect only
113 Eli Lake, “The Bohu Laser Facility, Part 1: History
and Organization,” Arms Control Wonk blog,
one of a satellite’s many capabilities (e.g., specific frequencies or transponders).
01
December 20, 2022, https://www.armscontrol- EW is an extremely attractive option for China in a future conflict with the United
wonk.com/archive/1216848/the-bohu-laser-fa-
cility-part-1-history-and-organisation/.
States as it is likely to take place in the Asia-Pacific region and thus the United
02
States would be heavily reliant on satellite communications, space-based ISR,
and GNSS for successful military operations.
03
However, conducting operationally-useful, dependable, and reliable jamming
04
of highly-used military space capabilities, such as GNSS, is more difficult than
most commentators suggest. Military GNSS signals are much more resilient
05
to jamming than civil GNSS signals, and a wide variety of tactics, techniques,
and procedures exist to mitigate attacks.110 It is much more likely that an EW
06
counterspace weapon would degrade military space capabilities rather than
completely deny them.
07

08
3.4 — CHINESE DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

09
Assessment /
China is likely to be developing directed energy weapons (DEW) for counterspace
10
use, although public details are scarce. There is strong evidence of dedicated
research and development and reports of testing at four different locations, but
11
limited details on the operational status and maturity of any fielded capabilities.

12
Specifics /
China has been actively pursuing DEW for counterspace and other applications
13
since the 1960s, and there are significant scientific and technical discussions
of research and possible future military applications as part of the Project 640
14
Anti-Ballistic Missile program.111 However, information about how advanced
Chinese DEW counterspace weapons are remains unknown and there is very
15
little public evidence of their deployment or use.

Open-source research suggests at least five main sites are supporting China’s
DEW work.112 Two of these sites are the Center for Atmospheric Optics at the
Anhui Institute for Optics and Fine Mechanics in Hefei, Anhui Province, and
the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics campus in Mianyang, Sichuan
Province (See Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-28). Both facilities have strikingly similar
large, rectangular buildings with retractable roofs and suggest facilities where
DEW aimed at satellites could have been developed. A third site is located
near the Korla Missile Test facility in Xinjiang Province, known as “Korla”,
“Bosten Lake”, or “Bohu”,113 and features camouflaged buildings and security
03-18
fences that strongly suggest it is military-operated (See Imagery Appendix, 114 Vinayak Bhat, “These Futuristic Chinese Space

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Denial Weapons Can Disable or Destroy
pg. 15-12). In March 2019, a retired Indian Air Force officer published an article Opposing Satellites,” The Print, March 23, 2019,
showing commercial satellite imagery of the Xinjiang facility and four buildings https://theprint.in/defence/these-futuristic-chi-
nese-space-denial-weapons-can-disable-or-de-
suspected of housing laser weapons.114 Evidence suggests that Unit 63655 of stroy-opposing-satellites/210212/.
the Strategic Support Force operates the Korla/Bohu complex.115
115 Eli Lake, “The Bohu Laser Facility, Part 1: History
and Organization,” Arms Control Wonk blog,
In 2006, a report by Defense News cited anonymous U.S. defense officials December 20, 2022, https://www.armscontrol-
wonk.com/archive/1216848/the-bohu-laser-fa-
who claimed that China had used ground-based lasers to “dazzle” or blind U.S. cility-part-1-history-and-organisation/.
optical surveillance satellites on multiple occasions.116 Subsequent reporting
116 Glenn Kessler, “Bachman’s claim that China
suggested that the satellites may have been merely illuminated by the lasers ‘blinded’ U.S. satellites,” Washington Post,
and senior U.S. officials at the time stated that no U.S. satellites were materially October 4, 2011, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/
damaged. A Chinese scientific journal also documented a successful test in bachmanns-claim-that-china-blinded-us-
2005 of a vehicle mounted laser stationed in Xinjiang.117 satellites/2011/10/03/gIQAHvm7IL_blog.
html?utm_term=.1bdb2e34aa46.

In December 2013, an article in a Chinese scientific journal stated that a 117 Minghui Gao, Yuquan Zheng, and Zhihong
Wang, ‘Development of Space-Based Laser
successful laser blinding test had been carried out in 2005 against a LEO Weapons’, Chinese Optics 20:6 (2013): 810–17.
satellite at 600 km altitude.118
118 Gao Min-hui, Zhou Yu-quan and Wang
Zhi-hong, “Development of Space Based Laser
The December 2018 NASIC counterspace assessment stated that Chinese Weapons,” Chinese Optics, December 2013,
01
http://chineseoptics.net.cn/en/article/
defense research has proposed the development of several reversible and doi/10.3788/CO.20130606.810.
non-reversible counterspace directed-energy weapons, although did not 02
119 National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
provide more specifics.119 The January 2019 DIA space and counterspace report “Competing in Space”, December 2018,
stated that China is likely pursuing laser weapons for counterspace applications https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/
03
2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-
and assessed that China will likely field a ground-based laser weapon by 2020, 0002.PDF.
although this has not yet been confirmed.120 The DIA report cites several 04
120 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges
Chinese scientific papers on DEW research or proposals for military uses but to Security in Space,” January 2019, p. 20,
does not provide additional evidence of real-world systems. Additional open https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082341.pdf.
05
source research suggests that the Korla/Bohu complex is the main site for 121 Eli Lake, “The Bohu Laser Facility, Part 2: Op-
this R&D and it may be aimed at developing vehicle-mounted dazzling or erations,” Arms Control Wonk blog, December
06
21, 2022, https://www.armscontrolwonk.
destructive lasers.121 com/archive/1216867/the-bohu-laser-facili-
ty-part-2-operations/.
07
In December 2021, a Chinese research team from Zhejiang University published 122 Stephen Chen, “The powerful Chinese
a paper documenting their development of a “small but powerful” laser that megawatt laser ‘small enough for a satellite’,”
08
South China Morning Post, January 7, 2022,
could be used for several different applications in space.122 The research team https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/
created a laser that weighs 1.5 kilograms and can deliver 5 nanosecond pulses article/3162566/chinese-megawatt-laser-pow-
09
erful-small-enough-be-used-satellite.
of about 5 millijoules each at up to 100 times per second for 30 minutes
before overheating. While it is not powerful enough to do physical damage 123 Gabriel Honrada, “China in a microwave weapon
10
great leap forward,” Asia Times, March 17, 2022,
to another space object, the research suggests significant improvements in https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/china-in-a-micro-
power to weight ratio for space-capable laser systems. wave-weapon-great-leap-forward/.
11
124 Stephen Chen, “New device could protect
In March 2022, a team of Chinese scientists reported development of a high- satellites from microwave attacks, say Chinese
12
scientists,” South China Morning Post, Feb-
powered relativistic klystron amplifier (RKA) that could create short pulses ruary 23, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/
of up to 5 megawatts in the Ka frequency band.123 RKAs are a decades-old china/science/article/3167937/chinese-scien-
13
tists-say-new-device-could-protect-satellites.
technology for creating high-power microwave beams and have broad
applications in radars, particle accelerators, and communications systems. 14
While not a new technology, RKA development has posed challenges in both
increasing the power of the beams and moving to high frequencies. One 15
application of this new development by Chinese scientists could be satellite-
mounted RKAs that could be used to damage or interfere with the electronics
of other satellites from relatively close range. Around the same time, a different
group of Chinese scientists published their own research on new ways to
protect satellites against attacks by high-power microwave weapons.124
03-19
 125 “About Purple Mountain Observatory Potential Military Utility /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

(PMO),” Purple Mountain Observatory, accessed

February 28, 2022, http://english.pmo.cas.cn/
DEWs, primarily lasers, offer significant potential for military counterspace
au/. applications. They offer the possibility of interfering with or disabling a satellite
126 Charles Choi, “China Says Work Under Way
without generating significant debris. The technologies required for ground-
to Mitigate Space Junk,” Space.com, based lasers systems are well developed. Ground-based systems can dazzle
September 3, 2007, https://www.space.com/
4301-china-work-mitigate-space-junk.html.
or blind EO satellites, or even inflict thermal damage on most LEO satellites.

127 Andrew Tate, “China integrates long-range

surveillance capabilities,” IHS Jane’s, 2017,
In contrast, the technical and financial challenges to space-based DEW for
https://www.janes.com/images/as- counterspace remain substantial. These include the mass of the weapon,
sets/477/75477/China_integrates_long-range_
surveillance_capabilities.pdf.
consumables and disturbance torques (chemical lasers), electrical power
generation (solid state and fiber lasers, particle beams), target acquisition
128 Ibid.
and tracking, and the potential required large size of a constellation. The
0 4/202 3

acquisition and tracking challenges are greatly simplified in a co-orbital GEO

or LEO scenario.

However, both ground- and space-based DEW counterspace capabilities do

have significant drawbacks in assessing their effectiveness. It can be very
difficult to determine the threshold between temporary dazzling or blinding
01
and causing long-term damage, particularly since it may depend on the
internal design and protective mechanisms of the target satellite that are not
02
externally visible. Moreover, it can be difficult for an attacker to determine
whether a non-destructive DEW attack actually worked.
03

04
3.5 — CHINESE SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

05
Assessment /
China is developing a sophisticated network of ground-based optical telescopes
06
and radars for detecting, tracking, and characterizing space objects. Like the
United States and Russia, several of the Chinese SSA radars also serve missile
07
warning functions. While China lacks an extensive network of SSA tracking
assets outside its borders, it does have a fleet of tracking ships and is developing
08
relationships with countries that may host future sensors. Since 2010, China
has deployed several satellites capable of conducting RPO on orbit, which likely
09
aids in its ability to characterize and collect intelligence on foreign satellites.

10
Specifics /
China’s main optical SSA capabilities are operated by the Purple Mountain
11
Observatory (PMO) (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-50), which operates multiple
telescopes in seven separate locations that can track satellites throughout
12
all orbital regimes.125 PMO originated from civilian and scientific research on
astronomy and maintains a strong scientific focus. Since the early 2000s, PMO
13
has increasingly been involved in tracking human-generated space objects
and orbital debris and is China’s main contributor to the Inter-Agency Space
14
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) that researches orbital debris.126

15
Few details are known about China’s radar SSA capabilities as they are primarily
operated by the PLA. The PLA operates at least five large phased-array radars
(LPARs) (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-49) that likely have a primary mission
of ballistic missile warning but could also support an SSA mission. The existing
radars are located near Huanan (46.53N, 130.76E), Yiyuan (36.02N, 118.09E),
Hangzhou (30.29N, 119.13E), Korla (41.64N, 86.24E), and Kongtong (35.4829
N 106.571 E).127 The radars are approximately 30 meters in diameter and likely
have a coverage arc of 90 to 120 degrees, similar to a U.S. BMEWS radar (see
U.S. Space Situational Awareness Capabilities, Section 1.5).128 The Korla radar
can be rotated and is likely used to support the ballistic missile and ASAT
testing done at Korla.
03-20
In June 2021, China held a ceremony to break ground on a new tracking telescope 129 “New survey telescope in NW China’s

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Qinghai will help detect space debris in
in Xining, Qinghai Province. The announced plans include the construction of medium and high orbits,” Global Times,
a large array of telescopes called the Multi-Application Survey Telescope Array June 28, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202106/1227223.shtml.
(MASTA) that will mainly be used to detect space objects above LEO.129 The project
is being managed by the Purple Mountain Observatory and is expected to be 130 Na Chen, “Agency Set to Track, Deal with Space
Junk,” Chinese Academy of Sciences,
completed in 2023. June 10, 2015, http://english.cas.cn/news-
room/archive/news_archive/nu2015/201506/
t20150610_148380.shtml.
In June 2015, China launched the Space Debris Monitoring and Application
Center to collate SSA data from various sensors and help protect Chinese 131 Fan Wei, “Following ‘extremely dangerous
rendezvous’ between Russian space debris
satellites from on-orbit collisions. The Space Debris Monitoring and Application and Chinese satellite, Chinese expert says it’s
Center, part of the China National Space Administration, is responsible for possible the two get closer again,” Global Times,
January 20, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/
tracking waste, analyzing hazards, developing prevention and disposal plans, page/202201/1246440.shtml.
setting up a database, and communicating with other nations and international
132 Chen Guoling and Zou Weirong, “China
organizations.130 Officials stated that the Center would provide early warnings Advances Maritime Space Monitoring and
of close approaches and possible collisions to Chinese satellite operators. In Control Capability,” Ministry of Defense of
the People’s Republic of China, June 23, 2017,
January 2022, the Space Debris Monitoring and Applications Center sent a http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-06/23/con-
warning about a close approach between a piece of debris from the November tent_4783536.htm.

2021 Russian ASAT test and a Chinese science satellite. The analysis provided by 133 Elsa Kania, “China’s Strategic Situational
the Center suggested that a piece of Cosmos 1408 debris would pass within Awareness Capabilities,” Center for Strategic
01
and International Studies, Spring 2019,
14.5 meters of the Tsinghua Science satellite, a small satellite launched in 2020 https://ontheradar.csis.org/issue-briefs/chi-
to provide Earth observation.131 na-situational-awareness/.
02
134 Victor Robert Lee, “China Builds Space-
China also maintains a global network of satellite tracking stations, which may Monitoring Base in Argentina,” The Diplomat,
03
May 24, 2016, https://thediplomatcom/2016/
have some SSA capabilities. China maintains a fleet of Yuanwang ships that 05/china-builds-space-monitoring-base-in-
are primarily used to support Chinese space launches.132 The ships will deploy the-americas/.
04
to areas around the world where they can augment China’s ground-based 135 “About APSCO,” Asia-Pacific Space
satellite tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) located in its territory. In addition, Cooperation Organization,
05
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/
China has signed agreements to host ground-based tracking stations in WhatisAPSCO/2018-06-06/33-144-1.shtml,
Karachi, Pakistan; Swakopmund, Namibia, Malindi, Kenya; Dongara, Australia; accessed February 18, 2020.
06
Santiago, Chile; Alcantara, Brazil; Neuquén, Argentina; and Kiruna, Sweden.133 136 “Ground-Based Space Object Observation
All of these TT&C capabilities are coordinated through the Xi’an Satellite Network,” Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
07
Organization, accessed February 18, 2020,
Measurement and Control Center. Typically, TT&C facilities use antennas to detect http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/
signals from active satellites and broadcast commands to them or receive APOSOS/2019-03-01/59-261-1.shtml.
08
transmissions from them, which would not be able to track orbital debris or 137 NewsAPSCO,” Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation
satellites broadcasting on different frequencies. These facilities may include Organization, April 2019, http://www.apsco.int/
09
upload/file/20190508/2019050809583923213.
telescopes or other SSA sensors that could do such tracking, and their spread pdf.
has prompted concerns about the PLA using them for military operations 10
138 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges
or espionage.134 However, to date, there is no evidence that the international to Security in Space,” January 2019, p. 20,
TT&C sites operated by China are fundamentally different from those operated https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/
11
News/Military%20Power%20Publications/
by other countries. Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.

12
In addition to its national effort, China has also engaged in international
cooperation efforts on SSA through the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 13
Organization (APSCO). APSCO is a China-led intergovernmental organization
for space cooperation that includes Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, 14
Peru, Thailand, and Turkey as members and Mexico as an observer.135 In 2012,
APSCO started the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Space Object Observation 15
System (APOSOS) Phase 1 project to integrate data from three telescopes in
Pakistan, Peru, and Iran with a Date Centre in Beijing.136 In April 2019, APSCO
kicked off the Asia-Pacific Space Science Observatories (APSSO) Project that
expanded the scope of APOSOS and included plans for a future Space Debris
Observation and Data Application Center (SDOAC).137 While some publications
have described APOSOS as being fully capable of providing global GEO
coverage,138 the publications from ASPCO suggest the project is still nascent
and has only limited capabilities.
03-21
 139 “Space Weather Products,” National Center for China’s work on space weather is conducted through the National Space
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Space Weather, accessed February 18, 2020,

http://www.nsmc.org.cn/NSMC/spaceweather/
Weather Monitoring and Warning Center, which was established by the
en/sws/index.html. Central Planning Committee in 2002 and is part of the China Meteorological
140 “Members,” International Space Environment
Administration.139 The Center provides daily space weather forecasts and
Service, accessed February 18, 2020, warnings of severe space weather based mainly from sensors and payloads
http://www.spaceweather.org/ISES/rwc/
rwc.html.
carried by the Feng Yung series of meteorological satellites in LEO and GEO.
China is a member of the Asia-Oceania Space Weather Alliance and the
141 Statement by Ms. Pan Kun of the Chinese
Delegation at the 71st Session of the UN Gen-
International Space Environmental Service (ISES), where it shares space
eral Assembly on Agenda Item 48: International weather data with fourteen other countries.140
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, October 13, 2016, http://www.china-un.
org/eng/hyyfy/t1405942.htm. Potential Military Utility /
China’s existing SSA capabilities likely allow it to maintain accurate orbital
0 4/202 3

positions on and characterize most LEO, MEO, and GEO space objects. This
tracking information may be good enough for targeting of anti-satellite
weapons, as shown by the 2007 ASAT test, although that was against a
Chinese satellite that may have been providing additional information from
telemetry. China’s current SSA capabilities lack robust geographic coverage
outside of its borders that negatively impact the quality of its trajectory
01
propagations in LEO and the ability to track satellites in GEO over Western
Europe and the Americas. China’s efforts to develop a global network of TT&C
02
stations and SSA collaboration within APSCO may offset these limitations in
the near future, although the utility and reliability of these efforts for military
03
operations is unknown.

04
3.6 — CHINESE COUNTERSPACE POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION
05
Assessment /
06
Although official Chinese statements on space warfare and weapons have
remained consistently aligned to the peaceful purposes of outer space,
07
unofficially they have become more nuanced. China has recently designated
space as a military domain, and military writings state that the goal of space
08
warfare and operations is to achieve space superiority using offensive and
defensive means in connection with their broader strategic focus on asymmetric
09
cost imposition, access denial, and information dominance. In 2015, China
reorganized its space and counterspace forces, as part of a larger military
10
reorganization, and placed them in a new major force structure that also has
control over electronic warfare and cyber. China’s considerable investment in
11
developing and testing counterspace capabilities, as detailed in this chapter,
suggest they see space as a domain for future conflicts, whether or not that
12
is officially stated. That said, it is uncertain whether China would fully utilize
its offensive counterspace capabilities in a future conflict or whether the goal
13
is to use them as a deterrent against U.S. aggression. There is no public
evidence of China actively using destructive counterspace capabilities in
14
current military operations, although it is likely they are using SSA and electronic
warfare in at least some support roles.
15
Specifics /

Chinese Views on Space Warfare

Official Chinese public statements on space warfare and space weapons have
remained consistent: “China always adheres to the principle of the use of
outer space for peaceful purposes and opposes the weaponization of or an
arms race in outer space.” 141 However, since 2015, other official writings suggest
China’s position on space warfare and space weapons has become more
nuanced. China’s 2015 defense white paper, China’s Military Strategy, for the
first-time designated outer space as a military domain and linked developments
03-2 2
in the international security situation to defending China’s interests in space. 142 China’s Military Strategy, White Paper issued

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
by the State Council Information Office of the
The defense white paper states that “Outer space has become a commanding People’s Republic of China, May 2015,
height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/.

developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of 143 “Authorized Release: National Security
weaponization of outer space have appeared.” As a result, “China will keep Law of the People’s Republic of China,”
(授权发布：中华人民共和国国家安全法), Xinhua,
abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and July 1, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/poli-
challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national tics/2015-07/01/c_1115787801_3.htm.

economic and social development and maintain outer space security.” 142 144 The State Council Information Office of the
In particular, the white paper states that “threats from such new security People’s Republic of China, “China’s National
Defense in the New Era,” The State Council,
domains as outer space and cyberspace will be dealt with to maintain the July 24, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/
common security of the world community.” In 2015, defense of China’s interests archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_
WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.
in space was made legally binding in China’s National Security Law.143 China’s
2010 defence white paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, stated 145 See Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase, and
Eric Heginbotham, The Creation of the Strategic
“threats to outer space…loom large” and stated a goal to “safeguard China’s Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese
security interests in outer space.” 144 Military Space Operations, (Santa Monica:
RAND, 2017).

Chinese Counterspace Doctrine 146 Daniel Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of

the U.S. Intelligence Community,” unclassified
The Chinese military does not appear to have an official doctrine governing statement for the record before the Senate
the use of space in military operations and most of what can be assessed Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2018,
01
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News-
about Chinese thinking on the role of counterspace weapons must be based room/Testimonies/Final-2018-ATA---Unclassi-
on unofficial Chinese military writings. This may change in the coming years, fied---SASC.pdf.
02
however. On December 31, 2015, the Chinese military established the Strategic 147 Xu Nengwu and Huang Changyun, “Space
Support Force, an organization intended, in part, to help unify the command Deterrence: Changes in the U.S. Strategic
03
Deterrence System and Global Strategic
and control of China’s space forces and to make them more operationally Stability” (太空威慑: 美国战略威慑体系调整与全
responsive.145 More recently, U.S. intelligence officials state that the People’s 球战略稳定性), Foreign Affairs Review (外交评
04
论), No. 5, 2014, p. 62; Xiao Lei, Qing Mu, and
Liberation Army (PLA) has “formed military units and begun initial operational Wang Qu, “Who Stirs Up a Space War?” (谁在挑
training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as 起太空战争？), Decision & Information (决策与信
05
息), Vol. 2, No. 339, 2013, p. 18; Yang Caixia and
ground-launched ASAT missiles” toward the end of better integrating Ai Dun, “On the Legality of the Development of
counterspace capabilities with other domains.146 ASATs for China” (论中国发展反卫星武器的合法
06
性), Journal of Journal of Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (Social Sciences
Nevertheless, Chinese thinking on space has remained consistent for at least Edition) (北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）),
07
Vol. 23, No. 2, March 2010, pp. 46, 47, 50.
the past two decades. According to the 2015 defense white paper, the PLA will
“endeavor to seize the strategic initiative in military struggle” and “proactively 148 Jiang Yu, “Space Thunder: Development of
08
Hard-Kill Antimissile Weapon and China’s Anti-
plan for military struggle in all directions and domains.” missile Testing” (太空惊雷 反导硬杀伤武器的发展
及中国反导试验), Shipborne Weapons (舰载武器),
09
No. 2, 2010, p. 14.
Chinese analysts argue that China must develop counterspace weapons to
balance U.S. military superiority and protect Chinese interests.147 As one 149 AMS, Science of Military Strategy, p. 102.
10
researcher writes, China’s development of ASAT weapons is to protect its own 150 Jiang Lianju and Wang Liwen (Eds.), Textbook
national security and adds that “only by preparing for war can you avoid war.” 148 for the Study of Space Operations (空间作战学教
11
程), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House,
The authors of the 2013 Science of Military Strategy write that given the 2013, 127.
wide-range of rapid strike methods, “especially space and cyber attack and 12
151 Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics (军事航天
defense methods,” China must prepare for an enemy to attack from all 学), (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press,
domains, including space.149 2002), 257‒58.
13

Chinese analysts assess that the U.S. military relies upon space for 70‒90 14
percent of its intelligence 150 and 80 percent of its communications.151 Based on
this assessment, Chinese analysts surmise that the loss of critical sensor and 15
communication capabilities could imperil the U.S. military’s ability to achieve
victory. In this context, the Chinese military seeks to deny the U.S. military use
of information from its space-based assets. Chinese military analysts have noted
the dependence of the U.S. military on space and have concluded that the loss
of the use of space for the U.S. military may cause it to lose the conflict.

In addition to actual warfighting, space power can also be used to coerce.

Chinese analysts write that having the ability to destroy or disable an opponent’s
satellites may deter an adversary from conducting counterspace operations
against Chinese satellites. Space power can also improve the overall capabilities
03-2 3
 152 Jiang Lianju and Wang Liwen (Eds.), Textbook of a military and serve as a deterrent force not just against the use of specific
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

for the Study of Space Operations (空间作战学教

程), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House,
types of weapons, but also as a general capability that can deter a country
2013, 127. from becoming involved in a conflict.152
153 Jiang Lianju and Wang Liwen (Eds.), Textbook
for the Study of Space Operations (空间作战 Chinese military writings state that the goal of space warfare and space
学教程), Beijing: Military Science Publishing
House, 2013, p. 14.
operations is to achieve space superiority. Space superiority is defined a
“ensuring one’s ability to fully use space while at the same time limiting,
154 Ibid, p. 1.
weakening, and destroying an adversary’s space forces.” It not only includes
155 China Academy of Military Science (AMS) offensive and defensive operations in space against an adversary’s space
Military Strategy Studies Department, Science
of Military Strategy (战略学), Beijing: Military
forces, but also air, ground, and naval operations against space assets.
Science Press, December 2013; p. 96.

Chinese writers make the oft-repeated statement that “whoever controls

0 4/202 3

156 Jiang Lianju and Wang Liwen (Eds.), Textbook

for the Study of Space Operations (空间作战学教 space will control the Earth” and that outer space is the new high ground of
程), Beijing: Military Science Publishing House,
2013, p. 42.
military operations. They assert that the center of gravity in military operations
has transitioned from the sea to the air and is now transitioning to space.153
157 Ibid, p. 52.
According to a textbook published by the Chinese military’s top think tank, the
158 Ibid, pp. 142-143. Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), “Whoever is the strongman of military
159 Stephen Chen, “Chinese researchers say
space will be the ruler of the battlefield; whoever has the advantage of space
01
China’s military must be able to destroy Elon has the power of the initiative; having ‘space’ support enables victory, lacking
Musk’s Starlink satellites in a war,” South China
Morning Post, May 25, 2022, https://www.busi-
“space” ensures defeat.” 154 The authors of the influential Science of Military
02
nessinsider.com/china-need-ability-to-destroy- Strategy, also published by AMS, similarly conclude that space is the new high
elon-musk-starlink-researchers-say-2022-5.

ground and that without space superiority one is at a disadvantage in all
03
160 John Costello, “The Strategic Support other domains.155
Force: Update and Overview,” The Jamestown
Foundation, China Brief Volume 16 Issue 19,

04
December 21, 2018, https://jamestown.org/ Chinese military writings overall place a heavy emphasis on gaining the initiative
program/strategic-support-force-update-over-
view/.
at the outset of a conflict, including during the deployment stage. Looking at
05
the 1991 Gulf War, and the initial invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in
161 “Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2020,” U.S.
2003, Chinese military analysts assess that the PLA cannot allow the U.S. military
06
Department of Defense, pp. 63, https://media. to become fully prepared lest they cede victory. According to the authors of
defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-
1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-RE-
Study of Space Operations, China will “do all it can at the strategic level to
07
PORT-FINAL.PDF. avoid firing the first shot,” 156 but recommend that China should “strive to attack
first at the campaign and tactical levels in order to maintain the space battlefield
08
initiative.” 157 They also argue that fighting a quick war is one of the “special
characteristics of space operations” and that a military should “conceal the
09
concentration of its forces and make a decisive large-scale first strike.” 158 In
April 2022, a study sponsored by the PLA’s Strategic Support Force recommend-
10
ed that China develop counterspace capabilities to also target commercial capa-
bilities, such as SpaceX’s Starlink broadband communications constellation in
11
case of a future armed conflict with the United States.159

12
Chinese Space and Counterspace Organization
In recent years, China has undertaken a significant reorganization of its
13
military space and counterspace forces. In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping
initiated a sweeping reorganization of the PLA. Part of this reorganization
14
included the creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) as the fifth military
service by merging existing space, cyber, and electronic warfare units under a
15
new unified command that reports directly to the Central Military Commission.
The intent is to shift the PLA’s most strategic, informatized missions from a
discipline-centric to domain-centric force structure and enable full-spectrum
war-fighting.160 The SSF provides oversight of the Space Systems Department,
which is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space
launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; and space
telemetry, tracking, and control and space warfare.161 The 2021 U.S. Department
of Defense Report on Military and Security Developments in China assessed
03-24
that the SSF is responsible for the development of counterspace capabilities.162 162 “Military and Security Developments Involving

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
the People’s Republic of China 2021,” U.S.
At this point, it is unclear if the SSF also has authority for conducting ASAT Department of Defense, p. 64, https://media.
operations or whether that remains with the PLA Rocket Force.163 defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-
1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.

The SSF has two main function departments.164 One of them, the Space 163 Ibid.

Systems Department, handles military uses of space, including space 164 Jack Lau, “China’s Strategic Support Force: what
launches, remote sensing, and the BeiDou navigation Satellites. The second do we know about the hi-tech military branch?”
South China Morning Post, December 19, 2022,
department, the Network Systems Department, handles cyber operations, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/
electronic warfare, and signals intelligence. article/3203702/chinas-strategic-support-
force-what-do-we-know-about-hi-tech-mili-
tary-branch.
Chinese Counterspace Budget and Exercises
165 Feng Shuxing, Reflection on Development of
Little reliable information has been provided on the budget for China’s Space Power and Space Security (我国空间力量
entire space program, let alone its budget for counterspace technologies. 发展与空间安全的思考), Journal of Academy of
Equipment(装备学院学报), October 2012, p. 9.
It is likely that in relative terms, China spends much less on space than the
United States, yet still manages to fund an extensive and robust program. 166 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual
Report to Congress: Military and Security
According to one 2012 source, China invests less than 0.1 percent of its Developments Involving the People’s Republic
GDP on its space program. If correct, this would have placed China’s annual of China 2019,” United States Department of
Defense, May 2, 2019, p. 23, https://media.
spending on its entire space program below $8.227 billion.165 However, any defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-
estimate of China’s spending and budget should be seen with a great deal 1/-1/1/2019%20CHINA%20MILITARY%20
01
POWER%20REPORT%20(1).PDF.
of skepticism.
167 “PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in
02
China’s Military, Air, Space, and Missile Forces,”
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, in 2018, China’s SSF conducted China Aerospace Studies Institute, 3rd Edition
the LUOYANG series of force-on-force exercises to train in a complex (August 2022), https://www.airuniversity.
03
af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/
electronic warfare environment, although it is uncertain to what extent the Other-Topics/2022-08-15%20PLA%20Prim-
exercise involved space capabilities.166 There is no public evidence that the er%203rd%20edition.pdf.
04
LUOYANG exercise has been repeated. Elements of the SSF have reportedly
participated in more than eleven different exercises since May 2018, although 05
it is unclear if any of them involved space operations.167
06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
03-2 5
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
77.2090°E
04

I N DIA
28.6139°N
Assessment / Amrita Shah, “Flashback 1963: The beginnings

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
1
of India’s dazzling space programme; An
India has over five decades of experience with space capabilities, but most of excerpt from Amrita Shah’s ‘Vikram Sarabhai
that has been civil in focus. It is only relatively recently that India has started – A Life’, about the father of India’s space
initiatives,” Scroll.In, February 15, 2017,
organizationally making way for its military to become active users of space https://scroll.in/article/829466/flashback-
and creating explicit military space capabilities. India’s military has developed 1963-the-beginnings-of-indias-daz-
zling-space-programme.
indigenous missile defense and long-range ballistic missile programs that
could lead to DA-ASAT capabilities, should the need arise. India demonstrated 2 “List of Indian Satellites,” Wikipedia.org,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_
its ASAT capability in March 2019 when it destroyed one of its satellites. While satellites, last updated March 10, 2018.
India continues to insist that it is against the weaponization of space, India
3 Harsh Vasani, “India’s Anti-Satellite Weapons:
may be moving toward an offensive counterspace posture. India is reportedly Does India truly have the ability to target ene-
in the early stages of working on directed energy weapons. my satellites in war?” The Diplomat,
June 14, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/
2016/06/indias-anti-satellite-weapons/.
Specifics /
4 “Ex-ISRO chief calls China’s A-SAT a
cause for worry,” Press Trust of India,
DA-ASAT Technologies September 14, 2009.

India launched its first rocket – a US-supplied Nike-Apache – in November 5 Bharath Gopalaswamy and Harsh Pant, “Does
1963.1 In July 1980, with the Rohini RS-1 satellite, India became the 7th nation India need anti-satellite capability?” Rediff
News, February 9, 2010, http://news.rediff.com/
to have indigenous satellite launch capabilities.2 column/2010/feb/09/does-india-need-anti-sat-
ellite-capability.htm.
01
India’s space program was at first primarily focused on peaceful uses and 6 “India has anti-satellite capability: Saraswat,”
development. However, as more countries incorporated space into security Press Trust of India, February 10, 2010.
02
capabilities, this became more attractive to India as well. China had its first 7 Sandeep Unnithan, “India has all the building
successful ASAT missile test intercept in 2007, which generated space debris blocks for an anti-satellite capability,” India
03
Today, April 27, 2012, http://indiatoday.intoday.
and worries globally about its military space capacity. Indian officials operating in/story/agni-v-drdo-chief-dr-vijay-kumar-
in the context of historically fraught Indo-Chinese relations, including a war saraswat-interview/1/186248.html.
04
in 1962, ongoing border disputes, and concerns about China’s role in the 8 Ibid.
Asia-Pacific, began to consider whether India should have its own ASAT 05
9 Rajat Pandit, “After Agni-V launch, DRDO’s new
capability. Lt. General H S Lidder, then Integrated Defense Staff chief, was target is anti-satellite weapons,” Times of India,
quoted as saying, “[W]ith time, we will get sucked into the military race to April 21, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
06
com/india/After-Agni-V-launch-DRDOs-
protect space assets and inevitably there will be a military contest in space. new-target-is-anti-satellite-weapons/article-
In a life-and-death scenario, space will provide the advantage.” 3 show/12763074.cms.
07

Dr. K. Kasturirangan, former head of the Indian Space Research Organization 08

(ISRO), said in September 2009 that “India has spent a huge sum to develop
its capabilities and place assets in space. Hence, it becomes necessary to protect 09
them from adversaries. There is a need to look at means of securing these.” 4
Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik said in February 2010, “Our satellites are vulnerable 10
to ASAT weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one.” 5
11
In February 2010, V.K. Saraswat, who at that time was the head of India’s
Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), stated, “In Agni-III, 12
we have the building blocks and the capability to hit a satellite but we don’t
have to hit a satellite,” due to debris concerns; instead, India “will validate the 13
anti-satellite capability on the ground through simulation.” 6 In 2012, Saraswat
asserted, “Today, India has all the building blocks for an anti-satellite system 14
in place. We don’t want to weaponize space but the building blocks should
be in place. Because you may come to a time when you may need it... We will 15
not do a physical test (actual destruction of a satellite) because of the risk
of space debris affecting other satellites.” 7 He went on to say that the Long
Range Tracking Radar used for Indian missile defense had a range of 600
km, but that it could be extended to 1,400 km to track satellites in orbit, and
noted the work done on the BMD system’s communications and kill vehicles.8
In promoting the Agni-V ICBM, he pointed out that “An ASAT weapon would
require to reach [sic] about 800 km altitude... Agni V gives you the boosting
capability and the ‘kill vehicle’, with advanced seekers, will be able to home
into the target satellite,” but iterated, “India does not believe in weaponization
of space. We are only talking about having the capability. There are no plans
for offensive space capabilities.” 9
04-01
 10 “India successfully test-fires interceptor India’s missile defense system was intended to have two phases: one that
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

missile,” Times of India, February 11, 2017,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-
would intercept an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a capability that
dia-successfully-test-fires-interceptor-missile/ initially was planned to be in place around 2012/2013, and one that would
articleshow/57093816.cms.
intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a capability that initially was
11 “India Conducts Successful Interceptor planned to be in place around 2016. The first phase’s interceptors were the
Missile Test at Night,” PTI, September 23, 2018,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/de-
Prithvi Air Defense (PAD) system (later to be replaced by the Prithvi Defense
fence/india-conducts-successful-interceptor-mis- Vehicle, or PDV) and the Advanced Area Defense (AAD) system; the second
sile-test-at-night/articleshow/65925514.cms.
phase would use the AD-1 missile. The PDV was successfully test-fired in February
12 “Successful Test Firing of AAD Endo-Atmo- 2017 and is intended to provide exoatmospheric intercepts; it was reported to
spheric Interceptor Missile,” Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of De-
have destroyed its target at an altitude of 97 km.10 It was tested at night in
fence, March 1, 2018, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ September 2018 and was able to “successfully engage” its target.11 The AAD
PrintRelease.aspx?relid=158774.
was launched in March 2017 to make a successful intercept at an altitude of
0 4/202 3

13 Franz-Stefan Gady, “India’s Advanced Air 15-25 km.12 It was tested in August 2018 and successfully destroyed its target,
Defense Interceptor Shoots Down Ballistic
Missile Target in Test,” The Diplomat,
which was surrounded by decoys.13 In January 2020, government officials stated
August 3, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/ that the system was complete.14 The AD-1 missile was successfully flown for
08/indias-advanced-air-defense-interceptor-
shoots-down-ballistic-missile-target-in-test/.
the first time in a November 2022 test and is designed to be able to provide
both endo- and exoatmospheric intercepts.15 India has also negotiated a deal
14 Snehesh Alex Philip, “India’s Ballistic Missile
Shield Ready, IAF & DRDO To Seek Govt Nod
with Russia to buy four of its S-400 Triunf surface-to-air missile systems for
01
To Protect Delhi,” The Print, January 8, 2020, $5.5 billion.16 India’s missile defense network uses the Green Pine radar, which
https://theprint.in/defence/indias-ballistic-mis-
sile-shield-ready-iaf-drdo-to-seek-govt-nod-to-
was developed by Israel as part of its Arrow missile defense system.
protect-delhi/345853/.
02
15 Ahmad Adil, “India conducts maiden flight-

03
test of ballistic missile defense interceptor,” FIGURE 4-1 — MISSION SHAKTI ASAT 17
Andalou Agency, Nov. 2, 2022, https://www.
aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/india-conducts-maid-
en-flight-test-of-ballistic-missile-defense-inter-
04
ceptor/2727822.

16 Rahul Bedi, “Why Is the US Saying India Could

05
Face Sanctions for Buying Russian S-400
Missile Systems?,” TheWire, January 20, 2021,
https://thewire.in/security/us-india-sanctions-
06
caatsa-s400-russia.

17 Masao Dahlgren, Tweet, April 19, 2021,

07
https://twitter.com/masao_dahlgren/sta-
tus/1384192441020911616.

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

Image Credit: DRDO

On March 27, 2019, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced
that they had successfully conducted Mission Shakti, where an interceptor
launched from the Kalam Island launch complex (see Imagery Appendix, pg.
04-02
15-18) successfully intercepted one of India’s satellites at an altitude of about 18 Ankit Panda, Tweet, April 20, 2021,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/
300 km. The missile used was from India’s indigenously developed missile 1384531089901998081.
defense system, a PDV MK-II, and the satellite target was Microsat-R, which was
19 Dinakar Peri, “Two Years Since ASAT Test,
a medium-sized (740 kg) Indian military imaging satellite launched into a low DRDO Working on Several Key Space
Sun-synchronous orbit in January 2019. ISRO launched the satellite but did Technologies,” The Hindu, March 26, 2021,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/two-
not know that it was intended to be an ASAT target - just that it was intended years-since-asat-test-drdo-working-on-several-
to have a defense application.18 The kill vehicle’s terminal guidance used a ring key-space-technologies/article34171447.ece.

laser gyro-based inertial navigation system and a strap-down Imaging Infrared 20 Indranil Roy, “All You Need To Know About The
Seeker; the interception was done at a speed of 10 km/second, with the electro PDV MK-II: India’s Satellite Killer,” Delhi Defence
Review, April 3, 2019, https://delhidefencere-
optical tracking system tracking the entire engagement.19 Reportedly, the view.com/2019/04/03/all-you-need-to-know-
decision was made in 2017 to undertake the test, giving DRDO engineers about about-the-pdv-mk-ii-indias-satellite-killer/.
This article goes into deep detail about the
20 months to ensure that the kill vehicle was ready for it.20 In a fact sheet interceptor.
released about the ASAT test, the Indian government explained, “The test was
21 “Frequently Asked Questions on Mission Shakti,
done to verify that India has the capability to safeguard our space assets. It is India’s Anti-Satellite Missile test conducted
the Government of India’s responsibility to defend the country’s interests in on 27 March, 2019,” Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, March 27, 2019,
outer space,” but went on to say, “We are against the weaponization of Outer https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.
Space and support international efforts to reinforce the safety and security of htm?dtl/31179/Frequently_Asked_Questions_
on_Mission_Shakti_Indias_AntiSatellite_Mis-
space-based assets.” 21 After the test was held, DRDO Chair G. Sateesh Reddy sile_test_conducted_on_27_March_2019.
told reporters that “We don’t need any more tests in this orbit now,” but did 01
22 Snehesh Alex Philip, “DRDO Rules Out A-SAT
not rule out tests at higher orbits.22 Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh tweeted Tests In Lower Earth Orbits, But Keeps Options
on the one-year anniversary of Mission Shakti, “The success of ‘Mission Shakti’ Open In Higher Orbits,” ThePrint, April 6, 2019,
02
https://theprint.in/defence/drdo-rules-out-a-
proved our capability to defend the assets in outer space and made India the sat-tests-in-lower-earth-orbits-but-keeps-op-
4th Space Power in the world.” 23 tions-open-in-higher-orbits/217879/.
03
23 Pradip Sagar, “A year after Mission Shakti,
Shortly after the test, anonymous U.S. government sources stated that they DRDO says it has no plans to repeat it,”
04
The Week, March 27, 2020,
had detected an earlier failed ASAT test in February 2019 where the PDV failed https://www.theweek.in/news/in-
thirty seconds into flight.24 The Indian government had issued a NOTAM just dia/2020/03/27/a-year-after-mission-shakti-
05
drdo-says-it-has-no-plans-to-repeat-it.html.
before this flight and the time of the launch correlated with an overflight of
Microsat-R, another indication that it was launched into orbit to be a target 24 Ankit Panda, “Exclusive: India Conducted a
06
Failed Anti-Satellite Test in February 2019,”
for an ASAT test. The Diplomat, March 30, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/exclusive-in-
07
dia-conducted-a-failed-anti-satellite-test-in-fe-
bruary-2019/.
TABLE 4-1 — INDIAN DA-ASAT TESTS IN SPACE 08
25 Marco Langbroek, “Why India’s ASAT Test Was
DATE ASAT SYSTEM ASAT TYPE LAUNCH SITE TARGET NOTES Reckless: Publicly available data contradicts
official Indian assertions about its first an-
Feb. 12, 2019 PDV-MK II direct ascent Abdul Kalam Microsat-R Unsuccessful intercept 09
ti-satellite test,” The Diplomat, April 30, 2019,
island https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/why-indias-
asat-test-was-reckless/.
Mar. 27, 2019 PDV-MK II direct ascent Abdul Kalam Microsat-R Successful intercept, 10
island debris generated

11

Indian officials downplayed concerns about large amounts of debris being

12
created by this test, stating that the test was at a low enough altitude that
most of the debris would re-enter in a few days, with the entirety of it coming
13
back down within 45 days at most.25 Microsat-R was similar in mass to the FY-1C
satellite destroyed by China in January 2007, which resulted in more than
14
3,000 pieces of orbital debris larger than 10 cm (see Chinese Direct-Ascent
ASAT, Section 3.2). However, Microsat-R was at a much lower altitude when
15
destroyed, 300 km versus 800 km for the FY-1C, meaning orbital debris
generated would have a shorter lifespan. The U.S. military cataloged 130 pieces
of trackable orbital debris from this test; the final piece of trackable debris
re-entered the atmosphere in June 2022, 3.2 years after the ASAT test. At
least some pieces had been thrown to an altitude of 1000 km due to collision
dynamics, as happened with the February 2008 intercept of USA 193 by the
United States (see U.S. Direct-Ascent ASAT, Section 1.2).

A prime motivation for the test was likely to ensure India would be grandfathered
into any future ban on DA-ASAT testing. Indian officials are still upset that India
04-03
 26 “ISRO readying for a number of launches,” was left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Deccan Chronicle, January 27, 2018,

https://www.deccanchronicle.com/science/
weapon state and believe, probably rightfully so, that if they had tested a
science/270118/isro-readying-for-a-number-of- nuclear weapon before the treaty’s 1968 inception (as opposed to when they
launches.html; “ISRO acquiring land in TN for
its 2,300-acre second launch centre,”
did test it, in 1974), they would have been grandfathered in to be a nuclear
New Indian Express, January 2, 2020, weapon state. Successfully demonstrating its DA-ASAT capability might have
https://www.newindianexpress.com/na-
tion/2020/jan/02/isro-acquiring-land-in-
been a political prerequisite for India to support discussions on a future ban.
tn-for-its-2300-acre-second-launch-cen-
tre-2083911.html.
India’s space vehicle launchpad is at Satish Dhawan Space Center near
27 Surendra Singh, “Isro’s launch capacity will Sriharikota (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-17). Officials announced in August
get boost with new facility at Sriharikota by
year-end,” Times of India, August 3, 2017,
2017 that work began on a second vehicle assembly building at the center
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/isros- that was anticipated to be completed by mid-2018; it was dedicated in 2019.26
launch-capacity-will-get-boost-with-new-facili-
According to A S Kiran Kumar, ISRO chairperson, “With the new assembly
0 4/202 3

ty-at-sriharikota-by-year-end/
articleshow/59890384.cms. facility, we will be able to assemble the launch vehicle [in parallel] and bring
28 Ibid.
it to existing two launchpads. It will thus help boost the launch capability of
the Sriharikota center.” 27 Launches from the center were initially expected to
29 Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar, “India’s Space
Programme: Organisations and Warfighting
increase from seven a year to 12 a year, and in fact, 14 launches are planned
Potential,” Future Wars, August 2, 2021, https:// for 2023.28
futurewars.rspanwar.net/indias-space-pro-
gramme-organisations-and-warfighting-poten-

01
tial/. Electronic Warfare
30 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “What Are
India demonstrated its EW capability against Pakistani radars and
02
India’s Plans for Directed Energy Weapons?” communications. It has developed several indigenous offensive EW systems,
The Diplomat, Sept. 24, 2020,
https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-are-
including the Samyukta and Himshakti. 29 However, its ability to jam space-
03
indias-plans-for-directed-energy-weapons/. based communications is unclear.
31 Rajat Pandat, “DRDO plans Star Wars-style
weapons for battles of future,” Times of
04
India, Sept. 14, 2020, https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/drdo-plans-star-wars-
Directed Energy
05
style-weapons-for-battles-of-future/article- India is reportedly in the early stages of working on directed energy weapons.
show/78096712.cms.
In August 2019, Reddy acknowledged, “We have been working in this area for
06
32 “India building satellite tracking station in the past three to four years to develop 10 kW and 20 kW” weapons.30 However,
Vietnam to track China’s movements in South
China sea,” Catch News, February 14, 2017,
the targets for these weapons, which are in the very early stages of development,
07
http://www.catchnews.com/world-news/ are aerial or electronic 31: they do not appear to be working towards a
india-is-building-a-satellite-tracking-station-
in-vietnam-to-track-china-s-movements-in-
counterspace capability.
the-south-china-sea-1453791004.html.
08
33 Madhumathi D.S., “ISRO initiates ‘Project
Space Situational Awareness
09
NETRA’ to safeguard Indian space assets India has made many strides in its tracking and situational awareness capabilities.
from debris and other harm,” The Hindu,
September 24, 2019, https://www.thehindu.
It currently has ground stations in Brunei, Biak (Indonesia), Mauritius, and the
10
com/sci-tech/science/isro-initiates-project- Andaman and Nicobar Islands for tracking satellites, and is building a satellite
netra-to-safeguard-indian-space-assets-from-
debris-and-other-harm/article29497795.ece.
tracking and data reception center in Vietnam.32 In September 2019, ISRO
11
began Project NETRA (Network for space object Tracking and Analysis), which
34 Chethan Kumar, “Isro’s inaugurates space
object tracking centre,” Times of India,
is intended to give India its own SSA network by bringing together radars,
12
Dec. 16, 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes. telescopes, data processing, and a control center.33 It will start by focusing on
com/articleshow/79755718.cms.
identifying and tracking objects in LEO, but eventually is hoped to have the
13
35 “Lack of military-civil cooperation framework ability to detect objects in GEO. ISRO announced in December 2020 that its
impeding innovation in space tech: IAF Vice
Chief Vivek Ram Chaudhari,” Economic Times,
SSA Control Centre in Bengaluru is now operational, stating that “the Directorate
14
September 7, 2021, https://economictimes. of SSA and Management (DSSAM) has been established to engage in evolving
indiatimes.com/news/defence/lack-of-mil-
itary-civil-cooperation-framework-imped-
improved operational mechanisms to protect space assets through effective
15
ing-innovation-in-space-tech-iaf-vice-chief- coordination amongst ISRO centres, other space agencies and international
vivek-ram-chaudhari/articleshow/86008913.
cms?from=mdr.
bodies, and establishment of necessary supporting infrastructure.” 34 In
September 2021, Air Marshal Vivek Ram Chaudhari, Vice Chief of the Indian Air
36 “Readout of U.S. - India 2+2 Ministerial
Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Defense Press
Force (IAF), acknowledged that India lacks the ability to identify, observe, and
Release, April 11, 2022, https://www.defense. track non-cooperative objects in orbit.35 In April 2022, India and the United
gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2996350/
readout-of-us-india-22-ministerial-dialogue/.
States signed a space situational awareness agreement to expedite sharing of
SSA data.36 Air Force Air Chief Marshall VR Chaudhari noted in June 2022 that
37 Krishn Kaushik, “Space-based assets can
be applied for military force, says Air Force
Mission Shakti “brought to fore the need for Comprehensive Space Situational
chief,” Indian Express, June 15, 2022, https:// Awareness (SSA) through a robust Space Surveillance Network (SSN).” 37
indianexpress.com/article/india/space-based-
assets-can-be-applied-for-military-force-says-
air-force-chief-7970102/.
04-04
Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization 38 Anusuya Datta, “India’s Decision To

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
De-Regulate Geospatial Information Is
India does not currently have a national space policy, although one has been Significant In So Many Ways,” Geospatial
rumored to be in the works for years and being developed by ISRO. It is thought World, February 22, 2021, https://www.geospa-
tialworld.net/blogs/indias-decision-to-de-re-
by supporters that the strategic ambiguity by not having a policy is more gulate-geospatial-information-is-signifi-
effective than having something specific. Its Constitution from 1950, Satellite cant-in-so-many-ways/.

Communications Policy from 2000, and revised Remote Sensing Data Policy 39 Rajat Pandit, “Dedicated satellite for Navy by
from 2011 are the only national laws that specifically deal with space. There year-end,” The Times of India, May 10, 2010.

was a draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill in 2016, but it did not progress; 40 Ibid.
in February 2021, the Indian government announced that it was deregulating
41 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Need for an
geospatial information.38 Indian Military Space Policy,” in Space India
2.0: Commerce, Policy, Security and Governance
Perspectives, ed. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
In October 2007, the Defence Space Vision was released, and listed intelligence, and Narayan Prasad (Observer Research
surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, and navigation as primary thrust Foundation, 2017), https://www.orfonline.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ORF_Space-In-
areas.39 In 2010, the Ministry of Defense wrote a “Technology Perspective and dia-2.0_NEW-21Nov.pdf.
Roadmap” which discussed developing ASATs for “for electronic or physical
42 Sudha Ramachandran, “India goes to
destruction of satellites (2,000 km altitude above earth’s surface) and GEO- war in space,” Asia Times, June 18, 2008,
synchronous orbits.” 40 https://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/06/
india-goes-to-war-in-space.html?m=0.

In June 2010, India established an Integrated Space Cell, located in the 43 Rajagopalan, “Need for an Indian Military
01
Space Policy,” pp. 206-207.
Integrated Defense Headquarters, which is comprised of all three branches
of India’s armed forces.41 The Integrated Space Cell oversaw defense-specific 44 Saikat Datta, “The Indian military is once
02
again trying to bring the three forces closer –
space capability requirements and was composed of the armed forces, the but will it succeed?” Scroll.in, July 31, 2017,
Department of Space, and ISRO. When announcing the cell, Antony stated https://scroll.in/article/845332/the-indian-mi-
03
litary-is-once-again-trying-to-bring-the-three-
that part of why India needed it was “[o]ffensive counter-space systems like forces-closer-but-will-it-succeed.
anti-satellite weaponry, new classes of heavy-lift and small boosters and an 04
45 Ajey Lele, “Indian Space Force: A Strategic
improved array of military space systems have emerged in our neighborhood.” 42 Inevitability,” Space Policy, 2022, https://doi.
There has been discussion by the Ministry of Home Affairs of a “Border Space org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2022.101526.
05
Command,” that would use space capabilities to monitor India’s disputed 46 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to launch a de-
borders.43 In July 2017, at a unified commanders’ meeting conference, the defense fense-based space research agency,” Defense
06
News, June 12, 2019, https://www.defensenews.
secretary “apprised the audience that the Defence Cyber & Space Agencies com/space/2019/06/12/india-to-launch-a-de-
and Special Operations Division will soon become a reality.” 44 fense-based-space-research-agency/.
07
47 Ibid.
In September 2018 Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that India 08
48 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “A First: India to
would be creating a Defence Space Agency (DSA) that would coordinate the Launch First Simulated Space Warfare Exercise:
space assets of the three branches of the Indian armed forces and work on Reports of a tabletop wargame speak to India’s
09
ongoing efforts to develop its space policy,”
space protection policies for Indian space assets; it became operational late The Diplomat, June 12, 2019, https://thediplo-
in 2019.45 The DSA is intended to eventually have 200 personnel assigned to mat.com/2019/06/a-first-india-to-launch-first-
10
simulated-space-warfare-exercise/.
it and will incorporate the Defence Satellite Control Centre and the Defence
Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre.46 It was followed by the establishment 49 Rajat Pandit, “Satellite killer not one-off,
11
India working on star wars armoury,” Times
in June 2019 of the Defence Space Research Organisation, which would of India, April 7, 2019, https://timesofindia.
conduct research and provide technical support to the DSA.47 With these indiatimes.com/india/satellite-killer-not-a-
12
one-off-india-working-on-star-wars-armoury/
new organizations, India may be shifting to a more offensive approach to its articleshow/68758674.cms.
counterspace capabilities, but it is too soon to be certain. The fact that India 13
50 “India increases military capabilities in space
reportedly held a tabletop exercise (IndSpaceEx) to game out space warfare two years after Mission Shakti,” ZeeNews,
possibilities and identify gaps and weaknesses in its space security in July March 26, 2021, https://zeenews.india.com/
14
india/india-increases-military-capabili-
2019 indicates a willingness to theoretically consider using these capabilities.48 ties-in-space-two-years-after-mission-shak-
Statements by G Satheesh Reddy, head of DRDO, in April 2019 that “We are ti-2350777.html.
15
working on a number of technologies like DEWs, lasers, electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) and co-orbital weapons etc. I can’t divulge the details, but we are taking
them forward,” do lend credence to the idea that India is considering many
different options.49 Government officials asserted in March 2021 that “In the
last two years, a lot of work has been done to increase [India’s] capabilities in
space through the development of sensors and satellites by the Space group
formed within the DRDO.” 50

India’s usage of space has evolved to incorporate more investment in its

domestic satellite and launch capabilities, as well as an increased emphasis
04-05
 SATCAT Boxscore, Celestrak, Feb. 20, 2023, on a military space capability. According to Celestrak’s Satellite Boxscore, as
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

51
https://celestrak.org/satcat/boxscore.php.
of February 2023, India has 75 active payloads in orbit.51 India has earned a
52 “India launched 353 foreign satellites since significant amount of foreign exchange by launching non-Indian satellites; in
2014: Govt,” Economic Times, Feb. 8, 2023,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
February 2023, Union Minister Jitendra Singh stated that India had launched
india/india-launched-353-foreign-satellites- 353 foreign satellites since 2014 and from doing so, had received $39 million
since-2014-govt/articleshow/97744061.cms.
from the United States and 184 million Euros from European countries.52
53 Amit R. Saksena, “India and Space Defense,”
The Diplomat, March 22, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-
India is now using satellite technologies for strategic purposes: reconnaissance,
and-space-defense/. communications, and navigations. The first satellite created specifically for the
54 Ajey Lele, “India’s Strategic Space Programme:
military was the GSAT-7 communications satellite, launched in August 2013.53
From Apprehensive Beginner to Ardent It was designed and developed by ISRO, with the intent of being used by the Navy
Operator,” in Space India 2.0: Commerce,
for communications and ELINT purposes. It was followed by GSAT-6, launched
0 4/202 3

Policy, Security and Governance Perspectives,

ed. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Narayan in August 2015, and again developed by ISRO for military communications
Prasad (Observer Research Foundation, 2017),
pp.190-191, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-con-
purposes.54 With the June 2017 launch of the Cartsat 2E+ Earth observation
tent/uploads/2017/02/ORF_Space-India-2.0_ satellite, it was reported that India had 13 satellites that are being used for military
NEW-21Nov.pdf.
purposes.55 India’s answer to GPS – the Navigation with Indian Constellation
55 Surendra Singh, “Military using 13 satellites to (NAVIC) precision, navigation, and timing system - started off life as the Indian
keep eye on foes,” Times of India, June 26, 2017,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/mili-
Regional Navigation Satellite System. It is a seven-satellite constellation that is
01
tary-using-13-satellites-to-keep-eye-on-foes/ intended to provide accuracy of 20 meters within India and within 1,500-2,000
articleshow/59314610.cms.
km surrounding it.56
56 Lele, “India’s Strategic Space Programme,”
02
p. 191.
Potential Military Utility
03
India has invested heavily in its national security space infrastructure and
capabilities and incorporated those capabilities into its military operations;
04
furthermore, it is receiving an increasing amount of income from launching
satellites for other countries.
05
India has demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite. However,
06
it is likely of limited military utility: the capability is more likely to be useful as
a bargaining chip or a way to publicly demonstrate that India is keeping pace
07
with China than a militarily useful capability in a future conflict. Otherwise,
India risks damaging the same environment it has invested a significant amount
08
of resources to be able to use and benefit from. Finally, India has a nascent
but still very rudimentary SSA capability, so its ability to target non-Indian
09
satellites is unclear but probably limited.

10

11

12

13

14

15
04-06
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
05

O R BITAL
D EB RIS
Created by Destructive ASAT Testing
The countries listed in the prior section have carried out more than a dozen

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
destructive ASAT tests in space, all of which have created orbital debris that
persisted long after the test itself. While some of the orbital debris from
past ASAT tests has decayed from orbit, significant portions of it remain on
orbit today.

The amount of orbital debris created by a destructive ASAT test depends on

the nature of the event: primarily the speed of the intercept and the altitude at
which it occurred, as well as the mass and structure of the target. If either the
interceptor or target was in orbit when the test occurred, a significant portion
of the resulting debris is likely to remain in orbit as well. The lifespan of that
resulting debris is primarily a function of the altitude at which the destruction
happened.

Table 5-1 below lists the known destructive ASAT testing done to date, along
with the number of orbital debris tracked on orbit following the test and how
much remains on orbit as of the publication of this report. Note that tracked
debris generally only includes pieces larger than 10 cm (4 in) in size. These tests
also likely created tens of thousands of pieces of small debris (less than 10 cm) 01
that are not tracked or cataloged but pose additional threats to other spacecraft.
02

TABLE 5-1 — ORBITAL DEBRIS CREATED BY ASAT TESTS IN SPACE 03

DATE COUNTRY ASAT TARGET INTERCEPT TRACKED DEBRIS TOTAL
SYSTEM ALTITUDE DEBRIS STILL ON DEBRIS
ORBIT LIFESPAN 04
Oct. 20, 1968 Russia IS Cosmos 248 252 79 50+ years
05
Oct. 23, 1970 Russia IS Cosmos 373 147 35 50+ years

Feb. 25, 1971 Russia IS Cosmos 394 118 45 50+ years 06

Dec. 3, 1971 Russia IS Cosmos 459 29 0 3.3 years
07
Dec. 17, 1976 Russia IS Cosmos 880 127 57 45+ years

May 19, 1978 Russia IS-M Cosmos 970 73 64 40+ years 08

Apr. 18, 1980 Russia IS-M Cosmos 1171 48 6 40+ years
09
Jun. 18, 1982 Russia IS-M Cosmos 1375 64 60 35+ years

Sept. 13, 1985 U.S. ASM-135 Solwind 530 km 287 0 18+ years 10
Sept. 5, 1986 U.S. Delta 180 Delta 2 R/B 17 0 < 1 year
PAS 11
Dec. 26, 1994 Russia Naryad-V? Unknown 27 24 25+ years
12
Jan. 11, 2007 China SC-19 FengYun 1C 880 km 3536 2786 15+ years

Feb. 20, 2008 U.S. SM-3 USA 193 220 km 175 0 1+ year 13
Mar. 27, 2019 India PDV- Microsat-R 300 km 130 1 3+ years
MK II 14
Aug.-Dec. Russia Cosmos Cosmos 2536 30 16 3+ years
2019 2535 15
Nov. 15, 2021 Russia Nudol Cosmos 1408 470 km 1790 300 Unknown

Total 6850 3472

05-01
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Counterspace Technologies
Countries Developing
⁕
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
149.1310°E
06

A U STR A –
LIA
35.2802°S
Assessment / 1 “Defence explores options for Space Electronic

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Warfare,” Press release by the office of the Hon
Australia is a relative newcomer in space, although it has long played a Peter Dutton MP, Minister of Defence,
support role by hosting ground infrastructure for satellite communications July 29, 2021, https://www.minister.defence.
gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/media-releases/
and command and control. Recently, however, Australia has been laying defence-explores-options-space-electron-
the groundwork for more indigenous space capabilities, including military. ic-warfare.

It has recently started a military space organization, is building out a policy 2 Colin Clark, “Aussie Space Command looks to
framework for its military space priorities, is putting concerted efforts and electronic warfare, other tech to deter attacks
on satellites,” BreakingDefense, March 2, 2023,
resources into building its own SSA capabilities, is examining an EW capability https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/aussie-
for its Department of Defence, and is looking into non-destructive ways in space-command-looks-to-electronic-warfare-
other-tech-to-deter-attacks-on-satellites/.
which to interfere with enemy satellites.
3 Clark, ibid.

Specifics / 4 Nigel Pittaway, “JP9360 to provide a sharp

focus on space,” Australian Defence Magazine,
December 16, 2021, https://www.australiande-
Electronic Warfare fence.com.au/defence/cyber-space/jp9360-to-
Australia announced in July 2021 the creation of Defence Project 9358 which provide-a-sharp-focus-on-space.

is intended to explore the options for a ground-based EW counterspace 5 Gregor Ferguson, “Unified space strategy
capability and create recommendations on next steps.1 In March 2023, Air update to shape defence space R&D,” The Aus-
tralian, April 8, 2022, https://www.theaustralian.
Vice Marshall Cath Roberts, the head of Australia’s Defence Space Command, com.au/special-reports/unified-space-strategy-
said, “I think it’s a really important part of where we go to is just looking at update-to-shape-defence-space-rd/news-story/
01
ad45871956260afd722583d6001ddf54.
how we can have that sort of electronic warfare-type of capability to allow us
to deter attacks or certainly interfere.” 2 This was part of a larger conversation 6 Pittaway, December 16, 2021, ibid.
02
about the need to have non-kinetic ways to deter impacts on Australian satellites. 7 Nigel Pittaway, “Defence rethinks space surveil-
AVM Roberts did not give a timeline for when Australia would have those EW lance roadmap,” Australian Defence Magazine,
03
September 9, 2021, https://www.australiande-
capabilities, other than, “As soon as I can.” 3 fence.com.au/defence/cyber-space/defence-re-
thinks-space-surveillance-roadmap.
04
Space Situational Awareness 8 Steve Kotecki, “C-band Radar Reaches Full
Australia’s Department of Defence launched a program in July 2020 called Operational Capability in Australia,” Peterson
05
Air Force Base, March 15, 2017, https://www.pe-
JP9360 (Space Domain Awareness) with the goal of combining six earlier terson.af.mil/News/Article/1114478/c-band-ra-
SSA projects into one program.4 It was reported that AUD $2 billion will be dar-reaches-full-operational-capability-in-aus-
06
tralia/.
invested via this project.5 Air Commodore Philip Gordon, Director General
Air Defence and Space, noted, “SDA is absolutely critical to space control and 9 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Deploying Sur-
07
veillance Telescope In Australia,” SpaceNews,
everything we do in space. It seeks to give us an independent ability to assess April 23, 2020, https://spacenews.com/u-s-
and verify what’s going on in space, and at the same time contribute to a space-force-deploying-surveillance-telescope-
08
in-australia/; Sandra Erwin, “Space surveillance
broader SDA enterprise with the US and our allies.”6 It expects industry to first telescope developed by the U.S. begins oper-
provide data as a service (DAAS) but later iterations (“tranches”) hope to develop ations in Australia,” SpaceNews, September
09
30, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-sur-
its own data capability and mission systems.7 Australia is host to several of veillance-telescope-developed-by-the-u-s-be-
the new sensors that contribute to the United States’ SSA capacity and fill in gins-operations-in-australia/.
10
critical geographical gaps. A C-band mechanical tracking radar originally 10 “Joint US-Australian Space Surveillance Tele-
located in Antigua was moved to Naval Communication Station Harold E. scope To Be Improved,” Australian Defence
11
Magazine, July 16, 2020, https://www.austra-
Holt near Exmouth, Western Australia (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-38) in liandefence.com.au/defence/cyber-space/joint-
March 2017.8 The SST, a 3.5-meter telescope originally developed by DARPA, us-australian-space-surveillance-telescope-to-
12
be-improved; Erwin, September 30, 2022, ibid.
was moved to Naval Communication Station Holt in Western Australia (see
Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-38) to be jointly operated by the USAF’s Space Delta 13
2 unit and the Royal Australian Air Force.9 It imaged its first objects in March
2020 and was declared operational in September 2022.10 14

Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization 15

In the July 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the Australian government identified
several key issue areas it wanted to focus on in space. These include assured
access to space, a satellite network to allow for independent communications,
SSA capabilities (sensors and tracking), and “an enhanced space control
06-01
 11 Malcolm Davis, “ADF space command is the program.” On the same day, Australia’s Force Structure Plan 2020 included
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

right next step for Australian space power,”

ASPI The Strategist, May 5, 2021,
a chapter on the space domain, and noted that “Continued investment and
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/adf-space- development of space capabilities will be required to further improve Defence’s
command-is-the-right-next-step-for-australi-
an-space-power/.
resilience and enhance a large number of space-dependent capabilities
across the Joint Force.” In the section about space control, it calls for a focus
12 “Australian military to set up space division
with $7bn budget,” Australian Associated Press,
on space domain awareness but also notes that its plans include “the
May 19, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/ development of options to enhance ADF space control through capabilities to
australia-news/2021/may/19/australian-mili-
tary-to-set-up-space-division-with-7bn-budget.
counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain
and that assure our continued access to space-based intelligence, surveillance
13 Jack Norton, “Russia and China give Australia’s
space commander the need for speed,” ASPI
and reconnaissance.”
The Strategist, March 23, 2022, https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/russia-and-china-give-
Australia’s Department of Defence is undertaking a “space domain review” as
0 4/202 3

australias-space-commander-the-need-for-
speed/. part of its efforts to recognize space as a full operational warfighting domain.
14 Norton, March 23, 2022, ibid; Daniel Hurst,
It is intended to be completed in March 2023.
“Peter Dutton says space command needed
as some countries ‘see space as a territory
for their taking’,” The Guardian, March 21,
Australia announced in May 2021 that it would be establishing an Australian
2022, https://www.theguardian.com/austra- Defence Force (ADF) space command that will be housed within the Royal
lia-news/2022/mar/22/peter-dutton-says-
space-command-needed-as-some-countries-
Australian Air Force. It is intended to bring together the three branches of the
01
see-space-as-a-territory-for-their-taking. Australian military with representatives of the Australian government with the
15 “Australian military,” ibid.
goal of creating “an organisation to sustain, force-generate, operate space
02
capabilities and assign them to a joint operation command if needed.” 11 Mel
16 Rami Mandow, “Govt. Defence Strategy Invest
$7 Billion in Space,” SpaceAustralia, July 7, 2020,
Hupfeld, chief of the air force, clarified that while there were concerns about
03
https://spaceaustralia.com/news/govt-de- space being contested, “this does not mean that defence encourages the
fence-strategy-invest-7-billion-space.
militarisation of space,” and that “All space operations are conducted consistent
04
17 Colin Clark, “‘Dancing with the gorilla’: Aussies with international and domestic legal obligations.” 12 In March 2022, Air
launch space strategy,” BreakingDefense,
March 4, 2022, https://breakingdefense.
Vice-Marshal Catherine Roberts, the head of the Australian Defence Force’s
05
com/2022/03/dancing-with-the-gorilla-auss- new space command, stated, “I think the activities by China and Russia, which
ies-launch-space-strategy/.
have been fairly well documented in the public domain, scare me … We need
06
18 Malcom Davis, “Australia needs to aim high with to accelerate the capabilities so we can deal with the threats.” 13 The space
space strategic update,” ASPI The Strategist,
March 11, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.
command, officially established in March 2022 with about 100 personnel,
07
au/australia-needs-to-aim-high-with-space- is reported to be investigating irreversible and reversible ways in which to
strategic-update/.
disable enemy satellites (via lasers or jamming) but will not use counterspace
08
capabilities that create debris.14

09
Australia’s Ministry of Defence intends to invest AUD $7 billion in space over
the next decade.15 This was announced in July 2020 as part of its 2020 Defence
10
Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan and is planned to be used on
developing space services and emerging space technologies.16
11
In March 2022, Australia announced the head of its space agency had begun
12
working on a national space strategy - its Space Strategic Update, or SSU - which
was intended to guide the country’s space activities and priorities to the 2040s
13
and integrate its military, commercial, and civil space efforts.17 It is intended
to take 18 months to be completed.18
14
Also in March 2022, Australia released its Defence Space Strategy, which included
15
plans for over AUD $17 billion to be spent on space capabilities by 2036. The
strategy declared that the mission of the Australian military forces in space
was to shape the space domain, deter competitor actions, and despond as
necessary to assure access to space capabilities. The document lists five “lines
of effort” to meet that vision:

• Enhance space capability to assure Joint Force access in a congested,

contested and competitive space environment;
• Deliver military effects integrated across Whole of Government and
with allies and partners in support of Australia’s national security;
• Increase the national understanding of the criticality of space;
06-02
 19 Space Power eManual: Lightspeed Edition, Defence

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Space Command, Austrlalian Department of
• Advance Australian sovereign space capability to support the Defence, 2022, https://www.airforce.gov.au/
development of a sustainable national space enterprise; and our-work/strategy/defence-space-strategy.

• Evolve the Defence Space Enterprise to ensure a coherent,

efficient and effective use of the space domain.”

The strategy also discussed Defence’s role in continuing to “identify

Space Control gaps and opportunities to develop a credible Space
Control capability, and space capability developers will actively seek
to improve resilience of the space capabilities,” noting as well, “Defence
will explore options consistent with its commitment to be
a responsible actor in space.”

Finally, Australia’s Defence Space Command released a “Space Power

eManual” in March 2022.19 It describes itself as “the foundational Defence
reference on the employment of space power, complementing and
supporting all levels of Defence education and doctrine;” space power
is further defined as “the total strength of a nation’s ability to conduct
and influence activities to, in, through and from space to achieve its 01
objectives.” Space control is described as involving “offensive and
defensive operations to ensure freedom of action in space by defeating 02
efforts to interfere with or attack Australian or allied space systems
and, when directed, deny space services to a competitor,” and that 03
those activities may happen in any operating domain - that is to say,
not just in space - and is made up of “offensive space control, 04
defensive space control, space electronic warfare and the aspects
of navigation warfare that deal with space based PNT.” 05

Potential Military Utility / 06

Australia has made significant policy changes aimed at developing
more of a national security space capability and dealing with space 07
threats. Between creating a project to develop a ground-based EW
counterspace capability and statements from Australian military 08
officials about the importance of Australia developing that capability,
it is likely that Australia will have at least an initial EW counterspace 09
capability in the near future. Furthermore, given the amount of policy
documents being generated for defense space purposes, it would 10
appear that Australia is serious about having the option to use its
nascent EW counterspace capability, so it is most likely going to be 11
operational in some capacity. Additionally, given the investment in its
SSA capabilities and physical possession of some SSA radars already, 12
should Australia decide to target space assets for offensive measures,
it is likely to have at least some inherent capacity to do so. 13

14

15
06-03
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
2.3522°E
07

FR A N CE
48.8566°N
Assessment / 1 Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, “SAMP/T

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Air Defense System (France & Italy),”
While France has long had a space program, as well as military satellites, it was https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/de-
not until recently that France had an explicit focus on offensive and defensive fense-systems/sampt-air-defense-system/.

counterspace activities. The major change occurred in July 2019 with the release 2 Adam Plowright and Daphne Benoit, “France
of the first French Space Defense Strategy, which elevated French military to develop anti-satellite laser weapons: minis-
ter,” Phys.org, July 25, 2019, https://phys.org/
space efforts and control of French military satellites. The French Space Defense news/2019-07-france-unveil-space-defence-
Strategy focuses on two main areas: to improve space situational awareness strategy.html.

around French space assets and provide them with some form of active defense 3 Ibid.
against threats. While some French officials suggested machine guns and
4 “The War Satellite Cometh – New Technology
laser cannons on satellites, the actual plan calls for ground-based lasers for Definition Research Note,” Space & Defence,
dazzling and space-based inspection satellites. In 2021 and 2022, France carried December 7, 2021, https://spaceanddefense.io/
the-war-satellite-cometh-new-technology-defi-
out military exercises, codenamed “ASTERX,” in outer space, testing the nition-research-note/.
capabilities of its Space Command, as part of France’s evolving goal to be
5 “France’s Space Commander shares lessons
the world’s third-largest spatial power. learned from Ukraine and future plans,”
Satellite Observation, February 6, 2023, https://
satelliteobservation.net/2023/02/06/frances-
Specifics / space-commander-shares-lessons-learned-
from-ukraine-and-future-plans/.

DA-ASAT Technologies 6 Comité Rochefort, “The ‘Non-Identical’

There are no known plans for France to have a DA-ASAT capability currently. Twins of European Military Space (Part 1),”
01
Defense-Aerospace.com, April 20, 2022,
France does have a jointly fielded missile defense system with Italy called https://www.defense-aerospace.com/eu-
SAMP/T (Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/Terrain); however, its interception ropes-non-identical-military-space-twins-1/.
02
altitude is at best 120 km and is thus not of much military utility as an ASAT 7 Plowright and Benoit, ibid.
weapon.1 France does maintain significant expertise in space launch vehicle 03
and ballistic missile technology that could be the basis for a future DA-ASAT
program. 04

Co-Orbital Technologies 05
In July 2019, when announcing France’s interest in developing active counterspace
capabilities, French Minister of Defense Florence Parly did reportedly offer the 06
option of including machine guns on satellites that would theoretically target
enemy satellites’ solar panels.2 This was part of a larger discussion about how 07
“our allies and adversaries are militarising space...we need to act.” 3 However,
in private discussions with French officials, this was clarified as having been a 08
poorly-used metaphor. Orbital mechanics severely limits the utility of projectile
weapons in orbit. 09

France is reported to be working on what appear to be patrolling nanosatellites 10

that would be placed in GEO.4 “Yeux en Orbite pour un Démonstrateur Agile,”
or YODA, is intended to be launched in 2024 or 2025,5 which it believed to 11
be an RPO surveillance or inspection platform, similar to the United States’
GSSAP program (see U.S. Co-Orbital ASAT, Section 1-1). The YODA program is 12
also framed as an early technology demonstrator program of later and bigger
versions of inspector satellites that would be able to protect French military 13
satellites by 2030.6
14
Electronic Warfare
While France has terrestrial-based EW capabilities, there are scant details 15
available in the public domain and it is unclear how effective or operational
they are against space capabilities.

Directed Energy
In July 2019, French Minister of Defense Florence Parly indicated the potential
for placing lasers on satellites with the goal of protecting them from attack. “If
our satellites are threatened, we intend to blind those of our adversaries…We
reserve the right and the means to be able to respond: that could imply the
use of powerful lasers deployed from our satellites or from patrolling nano-
satellites.” 7 These lasers would “dazzle those who would be tempted to approach
07-01
 8 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Lasers for Satellite too close.” 8 Minister Parly said that by 2025, the first capabilities under her
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Defense Top New French Space Strategy,”

BreakingDefense, July 26, 2019,
strategy should be ready, with the completion being achieved by 2030.9
https://breakingdefense.com/2019/07/
france-envisions-on-orbit-lasers-for-satel-
lite-defense/.
It is unclear whether these are meant to be destructive laser weapons or
those used as countermeasures against the targeting systems of an attacker.
9 Taylor Mahlandt, “France is Getting Serious
About Its ‘Space Command,” SpaceWatchGlobal,
A nanosatellite is very unlikely to have sufficient on-board power to generate
August 1, 2019, https://spacewatch.glob- a destructive laser, although it may be possible to have lower power directed
al/2019/09/cnes-supports-french-armed-forc-
es-in-implementing-military-space-strategy/.
energy systems that could be used to blind, dazzle, or confuse electro-optical
targeting systems of approaching co-orbital ASATs or inspection satellites.
10 Ibid.
These systems could operate in a similar manner to the directional infrared
11 Andrea Console, “Command and Control of a countermeasures systems mounted on some modern aircraft to confuse or
Multinational Space Surveillance and Tracking
jam infrared seekers on anti-aircraft missiles. However, successfully aiming
0 4/202 3

Network,” NATO Joint Air Power Competence

Centre, June 2019, https://www.japcc.org/ such a laser at an approaching satellite or interceptor is a non-trivial challenge.
wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_C2SST_2019_
screen.pdf, p. 33.
There are indications that the YODA satellites mentioned above may have DEW
12 Ibid.
capabilities on board that may be capable of dazzling or otherwise interfering
13 Console, ibid, p. 34. with other space objects.10
14 Ibid.
01
Space Situational Awareness
15 Ibid.
France’s Space Command is charged with coordinating SSA for the country
02
16 Luke Kitterman, “18 SDS, France’s COSMOS as a whole. It operates the Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale (GRAVES)
integrate SDA knowledge during ‘Operator
Exchange’,” Combined Force Space Compo-
radar (see Imagery Appendix, pg 15-51 and pg. 15-52), which can see objects
03
nent Command Public Affairs, October 24, with radar cross sections down to 1 meter at an altitude of 400-1000 km.11
2022, https://www.spoc.spaceforce.mil/News/
Article-Display/Article/3197664/18-sds-fran-
France also has three SATAM C-band radars that are not primarily SSA sensors
04
ces-cosmos-integrate-sda-knowl- but do have a secondary mission to track space debris.12 Another asset which
edge-during-operator-exchange.
contributes to French SSA capabilities (but does so in the capacity of it being
05
17 Plowright and Benoit, ibid. its secondary mission) is the Bâtiment d’Essaiset de Mesures (BEM) Monge
18 Office of the President of the French Republic,
tracking ship.13 France also has the SPOC (Système Probatoire d’Observation
06
“Meeting of the French-German Defense and du Ciel) telescope, which can do initial orbit determinations, and the TAROT
Security Council: conclusions (excerpt),”
July 14, 2017, https://www.defense-aerospace.
system of two 25 centimeter telescopes (see Imagery Appendix, pg 15-53),
07
com/articles-view/verbatim/4/185306/conclu- which – along with the ROSACE telescope – can track objects at GEO.14 All of
sions-of-franco_german-defense-council.html.
these capabilities contribute to France’s Centre Opérationnel de Surveillance
08
19 Christina Mackenzie, “France plans to boost its Militaire des Objets Spatiaux (COSMOS), its Military Surveillance Operational
self-defense posture in space,” Defense News,
July 26, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/
Centre of Space Objects.15 COSMOS operators visited the U.S. 18th Space
09
global/europe/2019/07/26/france-plans-to- Defense Squadron (which is charged with running the USSF’s space domain
boost-its-self-defense-posture-in-space/.
awareness mission) in October 2022 as part of an exchange to improve SSA
10
20 Hitchens, July 26, 2019, ibid. data sharing and operational best practices.16
21 Arthur Laudrain,”France’s ‘strategic autonomy’

11
takes to space,” IISS Military Balance Blog, In her July 2019 announcement about France’s interest in counterspace
August 14, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/mil-
itary-balance/2019/08/france-space-strategy.
capabilities, French Minister of Defense Florence Parly noted that while France
12
has some existing SSA capabilities, it wished to work with other European
Union countries on shoring those up. Specifically, she said, “France has her
13
independence and is attached to it. But she does not want to be isolated in
this new zone of conflicts… I am counting particularly on Germany to become
14
the beating heart of surveillance in space.” 17 The Franco-German Space and
Defence Council in 2017 approved a joint SSA project, which is hoped to be
15
able to provide clarifying information about unfriendly or hostile actions in
space.18 The existing French GRAVES ground-based phased array radar is
intended to have a follow-up capability, which, according to Parly, “must be
able to detect satellites 1,500 km away that are no bigger than a shoe-box.” 19
Parly also said that they plan to use Ariane Group’s Geotracker network in
order to capture pictures of objects in GEO.20

Another capability being discussed is onboard cameras for the Syracuse military
communications satellites that could alert satellites to oncoming threats so
that the satellites can take defensive actions or maneuvers.21 Again, doing so
is difficult in practice given the orbital mechanics of RPO in GEO. A strategy of
07-02
maintaining competitiveness and autonomy internationally in the SSA domain 22 “3 rd EU SST Webinar: Building the future of SST,”

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Webinar, European Union Space Surveillance
is also being pursued by the European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking and Tracking (EU SST), October 5, 2021,
(EU SST), of which France is a key member. The EU SST has increased the https://www.eusst.eu/wp-content/up-
loads/2021/10/3rd_EU_SST_Webinar_presen-
budget contracted to European Industry in R&D and capabilities by 205% in tation.pdf.
2020-2022 compared to 2018-2019.22
23 “AAC Clyde Space To Be Part Of First European
Space Situational Awareness GEO Satellite,”
In January 2023, it was announced that the European Defence Fund had AAC Clyde Space press release, January 26,
2023, https://investor.aac-clyde.space/en/
awarded a contract to a consortium for the creation of a satellite, Naucrates, press-releases/aac-clyde-space-to-be-part-of-
that could be placed in GEO in order to do close approaches to other spacecraft first-european-space-situation-101796.

there and take centimeter-level resolution images.23 Delivery of Naucrates 24 AAC Clyde Space,” ibid.
is anticipated for 2026.24 Presumably France, as a member of the European
25 Christina Maza, “Russian Spy Satellite
Commission, could get access to the SSA data generated by this satellite. Tried to Steal Military Information from
France, Defense Minister Says,” Newsweek,
September 17, 2018, https://www.newsweek.
Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization com/russian-spy-satellite-tried-steal-mili-
In September 2018, French Minister of Defense Florence Parly surprised some tary-information-france-1112072.

by openly calling out the Russians for using their Luch Olymp satellite to allegedly 26 Sophie Louet, Myriam Rivet and Bate Felix,
attempt to spy on France’s Athena-Fidus satellite (see Russian Co-Orbital ASAT, “France to create space command within air
force: Macron,” Reuters, July 13, 2019,
section 2.1). She said, “It got so close that we might have imagined it was trying https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-
to intercept our communications,” and commented, “Trying to listen to your nationalday-defence/france-to-create-space-
01
command-within-air-force-macron-idUSKC-
neighbors is not only unfriendly. It’s an act of espionage.” 25 It should be noted N1U80LE.
that surveillance of this type does not violate any existing international laws. 02
27 Christina Mackenzie, “French Air Force Changes
Name As It Looks To The Stars,” Defense News,
In July 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that by September September 15, 2020, https://www.defense-
03
news.com/global/europe/2020/09/15/french-
1 of that year, France would be elevating the existing Joint Space Command air-force-changes-name-as-it-looks-to-the-
within the French Air Force to be a full Space Command and renaming the stars/#:~:text=In%20a%20statement%2C%20
04
the%20Air,command%20is%20led%20by%20Brig.
French Air Force to be the Air and Space Force, or the Armée de l’Air et de
l’Espace. He said that this was to “ensure the development and reinforcement 28 Ibid.
05
of our space capabilities.” 26 France’s Space Command (or Commandement de 29 “France’s Space Commander shares lessons
l’espace, CDE) is starting off with 220 people as its staff and will grow eventually learned from Ukraine and future plans,”
06
Satellite Observation, February 6, 2023, https://
to 500 when it reaches full operational capacity in 2025.27 According to Parly, satelliteobservation.net/2023/02/06/frances-
“Eventually, this command will be responsible for all our space operations, space-commander-shares-lessons-learned-from-
07
ukraine-and-future-plans/.
under the orders of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.” She noted the
importance of the Ministry of Armed Forces becoming a space operator, as “If 30 Norimitsu Onishi, “France Nudges Europe
08
Into Space Race, Where It Lags Behind,” New
we want to be able to carry out real military space operations, we must develop York Times, July 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
autonomy of action.” 28 CDE is moving its offices to Toulouse to be co-located com/2019/07/18/world/europe/france-eu-
09
rope-space-race-apollo-11-anniversary.html.
near CNES (Centre national d’études spatiales), France’s civil space agency;
NATO’s Centre of Excellence for Space is intended to be in Toulouse as well.29 31 «France to create space command within air
10
force: Macron,» Reuters, July 13, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-na-
The French military had originally put aside 3.6-billion Euros (roughly tionalday-defence/france-to-create-space-
11
command-within-air-force-macron-idUSKC-
USD$4 billion) to invest in its satellites from 2019-2025.30 Parly announced N1U80LE.
in July 2019 an additional 700 million Euros for this effort.31 These 4.3 billion 12
32 The French Ministry for the Armed Forces,
Euros include funds for refreshing France’s military space infrastructure Space Defence Strategy, Report of the Space
(reconnaissance, signals intelligence, and communications satellites, as well Working Group, 2019; downloaded from:
13
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/actua-
as the GRAVES radar used for space surveillance). Parly also noted that France lites/articles/florence-parly-devoile-la-strate-
will be testing a long-range radar as a result of increased missile threats. gie-spatiale-francaise-de-defense.
14
33 Laudrain, ibid.
In July 2019, France also announced its first Space Defense Strategy.32 It has 15
34 Hitchens, ibid.
two goals: to increase and strengthen SSA for there to be better decision-making
nd to protect French and selected European space assets. This strategy is
intended to be defensive in nature, with Parly noting in her July 2019 speech
that this was “not an arms race.” 33 According to Parly, “active defense is not
an offensive strategy, it’s all about self-defense…That is, when a hostile act
has been detected, characterized and attributed, to be able to respond in
an appropriate and proportionate way, in conformity with the principles of
international law.” 34
07-03
 35 Space Defence Strategy, pp. 12-13. The space defense strategy noted that the renewed doctrine for military space
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

36 Ibid.
operations will have the following four functions: “support for space capabilities,
situational awareness, support for operations and action in space.” 35 It also
37 Ibid, p. 26.
stated that a “consolidated assessment of threats affecting our capabilities”
38 Ibid, p. 27. will be needed.36 France’s Defense Innovation Agency is intended to take part
39 Ibid.
in space research and development guidelines.

40 Philippe Clerc, “Can national space law offer

solutions ? The French Space Operations Act’s
The strategy talks about the need to be able to respond to “unfriendly, illegal
contribution,” presentation to the Toulouse or aggressive acts, in accordance with international law.” 37 It gives the following
Space Show 2012, June 26, 2012, https://iislweb.
space/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2012_
guidelines for responses in these cases:
Clerc.pdf.

• “ In the face of an unfriendly act in space, France reserves the right to take
0 4/202 3

41 Stromgade on Twitter, March 9, 2022,

https://twitter.com/stromgade/sta- retaliatory measures;”
tus/1500407634192654337?s=21; Ordinance
No. 2022-232 of February 23, 2022 on the
• “in response to an unlawful act committed against it, it may take
protection of national defense interests in countermeasures with the sole purpose of putting an end to it,
the conduct of space operations and the
use of data of space origin, Government of
in accordance with its obligations under international law; these
France, taken from the official journal Lois et countermeasures will be strictly necessary and proportionate to
Décrets vol. 47, published February 25, 2022,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORF-
the objective;”
01
TEXT000045222114. • “ in the event of armed aggression in space, France can make use
42 Vivienne Machi, “France puts space at top of
of its right to self-defence.” 38
national — and European — security priori-
02
ties,” Defense News, March 14, 2022, https://
www.defensenews.com/space/2022/03/14/
The strategy does recommend France continue to participate in multilateral
03
france-puts-space-at-top-of-national-and-eu- fora, especially so it can “focus on behavioural standards to ensure strategic
ropean-security-priorities/.
stability and avoid opportunities for misunderstandings or escalations.” 39
43 “France conducts first military exer-
04
cises in space,” Deutsche Welle (DW),
March 10, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/
As part of this overhaul of France’s military space capabilities, the French Ministry
05
france-conducts-first-military-exercis- of Defense would now be allowed to conduct activities in space. To allow for
es-in-space/a-56821868.
this shift toward military space, France’s National Space Law will have to go
06
44 Murielle Delaporte, “ASTERX 2021: French through inter-ministerial discussions to be adapted to reflect this new set-up.
Space Forces Reach for Higher ‘Orbit,’”
BreakingDefense, April 9, 2021, https://breaking-
France’s June 2008 Space Operations Act (LOS) encourages space activity
07
defense.com/2021/04/asterx-2021-french- to be primarily commercial and/or civil in nature.40 It was created in order
space-forces-reach-for-higher-orbit/.
to meet France’s Article 6 obligations of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which
08
45 “ASTERX 22: France’s annual military space requires continuing supervision of national space activities. In February 2022,
exercise,” SatelliteObservation.net, March
6, 2022, https://satelliteobservation.
France’s Space Operations Law was modified to reflect its military space
09
net/2022/03/06/asterx-22-frances-annual-mili- strategy, allowing civilian assets to be transferred to the Ministry of Defence,
tary-space-exercise/.
designated the Ministry of Defence to be liable if those assets caused any
10
46 “ASTERX 22,” ibid. damage, and permitted the Ministry of Defence to commandeer civilian assets.41

11
During a December 2021 hearing, French military officials announced their
plans to spend EUR 646 million on space in 2022, and that they earmarked
12
EUR 5.3 billion for military space capabilities and services to be spent between
2019 and 2025.42
13
In 2021, the French Ministry of Defense legally conducted its first military
14
exercises in outer space.43 The exercise was codenamed “ASTERX,” and it tested
the capabilities of France’s Space Command in tackling 18 different space
15
events and threats to its satellites and defense equipment.44 ASTERX was held
in 2022 as well; this version simulated 16 events and an orbital population of
10,000 objects.45 It was broader in terms of scope from the previous year’s
exercise in that it included the European External Action Service (EEAS) plus
four other countries; it also incorporated commercial data via the Commercial
Integration Cell (CIC).46
07-0 4
Potential Military Utility /

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Between the SAMP/T missile defense system and its extensive space launch
and ballistic missile expertise, France has the technological building blocks
to develop a DA-ASAT capability if it chooses to do so. France is developing
the initial capability for RPO in GEO that may enable a future co-orbital ASAT
program, but for the moment it appears to be limited to SSA, intelligence
collection, and nondestructive counterspace applications. Additionally, France’s
indigenous SSA capabilities are fairly well-developed so they could potentially
be used for targeting non-French satellites and could be of limited military
utility as well. Finally, given the amount of policy documents and military space
organization being generated for defense space purposes, it would appear
that France is serious about using counterspace capabilities, once they are
more solidly developed.

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
07-05
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
51.3890°E
08

IR A N
35.6892°N
Assessment / 1 Paul Bedard, “Expert: Iran Ships a Dry Run for

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Later Nuclear/EMP Attack; Humiliate Obama,”
Iran has a nascent space program, building and launching small satellites that Washington Examiner, February 14, 2014,
have limited capability. Technologically, it is unlikely Iran has the capacity to build https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/expert-
iran-ships-a-dry-run-for-later-nuclearemp-at-
on-orbit or direct-ascent anti-satellite capabilities, and little military motivation tack-humiliate-obama/article/2544041.
for doing so at this point. Iran’s military appears to have an independent ability
2 Philip Bump, “Republican Warnings About
to launch satellites, separate from Iran’s civil space program. Iran has not an Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,
demonstrated any ability to build homing kinetic kill vehicles, and its ability Explained,” Washington Post, January 15, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
to build nuclear devices is still constrained. Iran has demonstrated an EW fix/wp/2016/01/15/no-you-dont-really-need-to-
capability to persistently interfere with the broadcast of commercial satellite worry-about-an-emp-attack.

signals, although its capacity to interfere with military signals is difficult 3 Patrick Disney, “The Campaign to Terrify
to ascertain. You About EMP,” The Atlantic, July 15, 2011,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2011/07/the-campaign-to-terrify-you-
Specifics / about-emp/241971/.

4 Center for Strategic and International

DA-ASAT Technologies Studies, “Simorgh,” Missile Threat, accessed
March 21, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/
There is no public evidence that Iran has developed, or is developing, a dedicated missile/simorgh.
DA-ASAT capability. However, Iran does have a robust ballistic missile program,
5 Bill Gertz, “Iran Conducts Space Launch,”
including a demonstrated satellite launch vehicle, which could theoretically Washington Free Beacon, April 20, 2018,
be used as a DA-ASAT rocket. It would still need to be combined with several http://freebeacon.com/national-security/
01
iran-conducts-space-launch/.
other technologies that Iran has not yet tested either.
6 “Iran Announces First Successful Simorgh Test
02
Launch,” SpaceFlight101.com, July 29, 2017,
Iran has several short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, either in operational http://spaceflight101.com/iran-announces-
status or in development, with estimated ranges from 150 km to more than first-successful-simorgh-test-launch/.
03
2,000 km. The longer-range missiles could theoretically be used as the basis 7 “U.S. Warns Iran Against ‘Provocative’ Space
for a DA-ASAT rocket, with a potential ceiling of half their ballistic range. There Vehicle Launches,” RFE-RL, January 4, 2019,
04
https://www.rferl.org/a/us-warns-iran-
is no evidence Iran has ever tested its ballistic missiles in this role, nor that it space-vehicle-launch-missile-ballistic-nucle-
has a program to develop this capability. ar/29690741.html.
05
8 Sarah Lewin, “Satellite Photos Show Evidence
There are some who claim Iran is developing the ability to create crude of Iranian Rocket Launch. But Did It Fail?”
06
Space.com, February 7. 2019,
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons by putting nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles https://www.space.com/43260-iran-sec-
on ships. Such weapons, they claim, could be used to conduct surprise attacks ond-satellite-launch-possible-failure.html.
07
on national power grids, or as an indiscriminate ASAT weapon.1 However, many 9 Jon Gambrell, “Images Suggest Iran Has
other experts discount the ability to use a primitive nuclear device in this way,2 Attempted a Second Satellite Launch,” Times of
08
Israel, February 7, 2019, https://www.timesofis-
and state that this is a scare tactic designed to promote missile defense.3 rael.com/images-suggest-iran-launched-satel-
lite-despite-us-criticism/; https://www.space.
09
com/43260-iran-second-satellite-launch-possi-
Iran is also developing space launch capabilities, both civil and military. It ble-failure.html.
already possesses a proven space launch vehicle, the Safir rocket, which has 10
10 Geoff Brumfiel, “Iranian Rocket Launch Ends In
been used to place four small satellites into orbit from the Semnan Space Failure, Imagery Shows,” NPR, August 29, 2019,
Launch Complex (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-19). Iran is developing a https://www.npr.org/2019/08/29/755406765/
11
iranian-rocket-launch-ends-in-failure-images-
theoretically more capable SLV known as the Simorgh, but it has experienced show.
significant delays. Simorgh shares some design similarities with the North 12
Korean Unha SLV and was initially meant to have been launched in 2010.4
Its delay could mean that its development has been harder than anticipated, 13
or that sanctions on ballistic missile and space technology have limited Iran’s
ability to get materials it needs, or that there have been test launches that 14
failed and have not been reported. In April 2016, the first known test of the
Simorgh was reported by U.S. intelligence agencies to have been a “partial 15
success” that did not reach orbit.5 A second test in July 2017 was reported by
Iranian press to have been a success, but U.S. intelligence officials stated it
was a catastrophic failure and no objects reached orbit.6 In January 2019, U.S.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned Iran about holding what he termed
“provocative” space vehicle launches.7 Iran held a Simorgh launch in January
2019 which failed to launch its satellite, Payem.8 Intelligence analysts believe
that Iran attempted and failed in the launch of another satellite in February
2019, the Doosti satellite, using a Safir rocket.9 In August 2019, commercial
satellite imagery from Planet documented a launchpad explosion of an Iranian
rocket at the Imam Khomeini Space Center (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-19).10
08-01
 11 Mike Wall, “Iran satellite launch fails to The type of launch pad where the explosion took place was the same kind
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

reach orbit,” Space.com, February 10, 2020,

https://www.space.com/iran-satel-
used to launch Safir rockets. In February 2020, Iran tried to launch the Zafar I,
lite-launch-failure-zafar-1.html. a communications satellite, via the Simorgh SLV; however, it experienced an
12 William Graham, “Iran’s Simorgh rocket falls
anomaly at some point between the second and third stages. Ahmad Hosseini,
short of orbit with three payloads aboard,” Defense Ministry space program spokesperson, stated, “Stage-1 and stage-2
NASASpaceflight.com, December 30, 2021,
https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/12/
motors of the carrier functioned properly and the satellite was successfully
iran-simorgh-three-payloads/. detached from its carrier, but at the end of its path it did not reach the required
13 Graham, December 30, 2021, ibid.
speed for being put in the orbit.” 11 An unsuccessful space launch was detected
by U.S. military analysts in June 2021; it is unclear what rocket was used, but it
14 Fabian Hinz, “Iran’s Solid-Propellant SLV Pro-
gram is Alive and Kicking,” ArmsControlWonk.
is possible that it was a Simorgh. A second launch may have been held at that
com, February 14, 2020, https://www.armscon- same launch pad later that month, possibly of a Simorgh again.12 In December
trolwonk.com/archive/1208906/irans-solid-
2021, Iran launched a Simorgh with three payloads on-board, none of which
0 4/202 3

propellant-slv-program-is-alive-and-kicking/.
appear to have made it to orbit.13
15 Hinz, ibid.

16 Hinz, ibid. Both the Safir and Simorgh are liquid-fueled rockets. They launch from a
17 Hinz, ibid.
single space launch facility after a significant set-up period, making them less
than ideal as counterspace launch vehicles.14 Satellite imagery has detected a
18 Nasser Karimi, “Iran state TV airs launch of new
satellite-carrying rocket,” The Associated Press,
limited number of what appear to be engine tests at the Islamic Revolutionary
01
February 1, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/ Guard Corps (IRGC)’s Jihad Self-Sufficiency Organization at the Shahrud facility
space-launches-middle-east-iran-46fef0c-
23da4a42e5aae42daf00fe887.
(see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-20), and in February 2020, Iranian officials
02
released imagery of a motor being tested there, which they stated was of the
19 Jon Gambrell, “Satellite photos show Iran had
another failed space launch,” The Associated
Salman engine (intended to be a smaller upper stage motor).15 Footage showed
03
Press, March 2, 2022, https://apnews.com/ that the developers appear to have been able to make at least two technologies
article/space-launches-technology-sci-
ence-business-iran-4ed71f17a612e8aef2c-
that would be helpful for an SLV program and also a long-range ballistic
04
9b58af4538183. missile capability: carbon fiber motor casings and thrust vector control (via
20 “Iran Reports Test Of Satellite Launcher As
flexible nozzles).16 The same day that the Salman motor footage was released,
05
Diplomats Announce Restart Of Nuclear Talks,” Iranian news reported that a solid fueled SLV, the Zuljanah, was finished and
RFE/RL, June 26, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/
iran-satellite-launcher-test-zuljanah/31915794.
would be able to launch the Nahid I satellite, potentially as early as June 2020.17
html.
06
21 “Iran’s Military Satellite Launch Full Of
Footage of the launch of the Zuljanah rocket was aired on Iranian television
07
Surprises,” SpaceWatchGlobal, April 2020, in February 2021; it did not attempt to put a satellite in orbit, but Iranian
https://spacewatch.global/2020/04/irans-mili-
tary-satellite-launch-full-of-surprises/.
defense ministry officials who oversaw the program stated that it could carry
08
one 220 kg-sized satellite or 10 smaller ones.18 Satellite imagery in February
22 “Iran Unveils Military Space Command, New
Details on Satellite Launch,” SpaceWatchGlobal,
2022 showed the aftereffects of an apparent explosion at the Imam Khomeini
09
April 2020, https://spacewatch.global/2020/04/ Spaceport; the damaged gantry resembled the one used for launching the
iran-unveils-military-space-command-new-de-
tails-on-satellite-launch/.
Zuljanah satellite launch vehicle in 2021.19 Reports emerged in June 2022 that
10
Iran had launched the Zuljanah SLV but it is unclear when the launch occurred;
23 Ibid.
again, the Zuljanah did not appear to be carrying any satellites.20
24 Khosro Kalbasi, June 8, 2020,
11
https://twitter.com/KhosroKalbasi/sta-
tus/1269971351475011584.
In April 2020, the IRGC launched from its Shahrud base a satellite (Noor-1) on
12
a previously unknown SLV, the Qassed.21 This SLV used a combination of liquid
25 “Report: Iran launched solid-fuel satellite
rocket into space,” Associated Press,
and solid fuel, based respectively on the Iranian Ghadr-110 medium-range
13
January 13, 2022, https://abcnews.go.com/ ballistic missile and Salman solid-fueled rocket engine; the Qassed has three
International/wireStory/report-iran-launched-
solid-fuel-satellite-rocket-space-82245006.
stages and can be launched via a TEL. Noor-1 was described as a military
14
reconnaissance satellite which appears to be a 6U cubesat; it was detected in
26 “Report: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard launches
second satellite,” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2022,
an SSO at an altitude of 425 km.22 The IRGC also announced in April 2020 the
15
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/re- existence of its Aerospace Force’s Space Command after the launch by the
port-irans-revolutionary-guard-launches-sec-
ond-satellite.
Qassed SLV.23 Ali Jafarabadi, head of IRGC’s space force, announced in June
2020 that Iran is working on an all solid-fuel Qassed-2 SLV, which he said is
27 Lamson and Lewis, ibid.
lighter and can carry payloads farther, and indicated an interest in launching
something to GEO.24 In January 2022, the IRGC reported that it launched a
solid-fueled rocket for the first time.25 The IRGC successfully launched Noor-2
on the Qassed SLV to an altitude of 500 km in March 2022; this marked the
second military satellite in orbit for Iran.26

Iran is anticipated to start work on a new launch base at Chabahar along its
southeastern coast which may become Iran’s primary launch site.27
08-02
 28 Center for Security and International Studies,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
FIGURE 8-1 — IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILES “Iran’s Ballistic Missiles,” Missile Threat,
accessed March 21, 2018, https://missilethreat.
csis.org/country/iran/.

29 Robert Tait, “Iran Launches First Domestically

Produced Satellite,” The Guardian,
February 3, 2009, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2009/feb/03/iran-satellite-launch-
omid.

30 David Wright, “Radad-1: Iran Launches Its Sec-

ond Satellite,” All Things Nuclear, June 16, 2011,
https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/rasad-1-
iran-launches-its-second-satellite.

31 David Wright, “Another Iranian Satellite Launch:

Navid,” All Things Nuclear, February 6, 2012,
https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/anoth-
er-iranian-satellite-launch-navid.

32 “Iran’s Safir Rocket Successfully Launches

Fajr Satellite Into Orbit,” SpaceFlight101.com,
February 2, 2015, https://spaceflightnow.
com/2015/02/02/iranian-satellite-successful-
ly-placed-in-orbit/.

33 Gunter D. Krebs, “Noor 1, 2,” Gunter’s Space

01
Page, retrieved February 23, 2023, from
https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/noor.htm.
Image Credit: CSIS 28
02
34 Ahmad Majidyar, “Iran Plans to Launch Several
Satellites Into Space, Including 1st Sensor-
Co-Orbital Technologies Operational Satellite,” Middle East Institute,
03
May 30, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/io/
Iran has no known co-orbital ASAT capabilities or development program, and iran-plans-launch-several-satellites-space-in-
its indigenous satellite manufacturing and operations capabilities are very basic. cluding-1st-sensor-operational-satellite.
04
Iran has put a small number of low-mass satellites on orbit primarily using 35 “Russia puts Iranian satellite into orbit,”
the Safir SLV. Its pace of launch attempts is slow, possibly due to sanctions on Reuters, August 9, 2022, https://www.reuters.
05
com/world/russia-launches-iranian-satel-
its ability to make progress, or perhaps because it is sensitive to international lite-into-space-under-shadow-western-con-
reaction to satellite launches because of their similarities to ballistic missile cerns-2022-08-09/.
06
launches. Iran has launched six satellites into orbit: Omid (2009),29 Rasad (2011),30 36 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia and Iran expand space
Navid (2012),31 Fajr (2015),32 Noor-1 (2020), and Noor-2 (2022)33. cooperation,” The Space Review, October
07
31, 2022, https://www.thespacereview.com/
article/4475/1.
These were all small satellites, 50 kilograms or lighter, lofted into such low- 08
37 “Iran Announces Launch of Nahid-2 Com-
altitude orbits that atmospheric drag brought them down fairly quickly. No munications Satellite for 2018,” SpaceWatch
data have been published from their satellites, so either they did not work as Middle East, May 2017, https://spacewatchme.
09
com/2017/05/iran-announces-launch-na-
anticipated or they worked but the results were not impressive and judged hid-2-communications-satellite-2018/; ”Iran
not to improve the reputation of the program. Iran does have plans to launch Completes Construction Of Nahid-2 Satellite,”
10
Mehr News Agency, January 21, 2021, https://
larger satellites,34 both developed domestically and through bilateral cooperation en.mehrnews.com/news/168843/Iran-com-
with other countries, but many of those plans have been significantly delayed. pletes-construction-of-Nahid-2-satellite;
11
“Iran Sends 3 Research Devices into Space
Russia launched a remote sensing satellite (“Khayyam”) for Iran in August Successfully,” Farsi News Agency, Decem-
2022; Iranian officials say that the satellite is intended to conduct environmental ber 30, 2021, https://www.farsnews.ir/en/
12
news/14001009000505/Iran-Sends-3-Re-
monitoring and scientific research.35 Russia is also thought to be working on a search-Devices-in-Space-Sccessflly; “Iran
geostationary communications satellite, “Ekvator;” while it is not clear that unveils Nahid-2, Tolou-3 homegrown satellites,”
13
Xinhua News Agency, February 7, 2023,
Iran is the customer, its slot is 34 degrees east longitude, which according to https://english.news.cn/20230207/d965a-
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a slot that is reserved for 36c7a384e27b708496bfc82e14d/c.html.
14
an Iranian communication satellite.36 Iran first announced that it would attempt
to launch its Nahid-2 communications satellite before the end of 2018, but 15
as of February 2023 it had not been launched. Iranian officials announced in
February 2023 that it and two other satellites (Toulou-3 and Zafar) would be
launched by May 2023.37

Iran has not demonstrated the ability to manufacture satellites with significant
on-orbit maneuverability or remote sensing capabilities, nor the ability to
successfully do the precision command-and-control (C2), which would be
necessary to develop an effective co-orbital ASAT capability.
08-03
 38 “Satellite Jamming in Iran: A War Over Electronic Warfare
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Airwaves,” Small Media Lab, November 2012,

https://smallmedia.org.uk/media/projects/
There is significant public evidence that Iran could conduct electronic warfare
files/satjam.pdf. attacks against commercial satellite broadcasters. Specifically, Iran has been
39 Peter B. de Selding, “ITU Implores Iran to Help
accused of repeatedly interfering with commercial communications satellites’
Stop Jamming,” SpaceNews, March 26, 2010, ability to broadcast Persian-language programming into Iran over the last
https://spacenews.com/itu-implores-iran-help-
stop-jamming/.
several years. In some cases, it appears Iran coordinated with other States
to perform the jamming. For example, the jamming of Telstar 12’s broadcast
40 Jason Rainbow, “Eutelsat says satellite jammers
within Iran are disrupting foreign chan-
of Persian-language content originating from California was jammed from
nels,” Space News, October 7, 2022, https:// Havana, Cuba, started in 2003, and eventually, similar jamming occurred from
spacenews.com/eutelsat-says-satellite-jam-
mers-within-iran-are-disrupting-foreign-chan-
Bulgaria and Libya in 2005/2006.38 Eventually, it appears, Iran became able to
nels/. jam these channels from within its own territory.
0 4/202 3

41 Greg Jaffe and Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Says

It Downed U.S. Stealth Drone; Pentagon In 2010, the ITU ordered Iran to assist in stopping the jamming originating
Acknowledges Aircraft Downing,” Washington
Post, December 4, 2011, https://www.wash-
from its territory, saying that it was acting on two complaints from Eutelsat
ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran- that its broadcasts of Persian language programs by the BBC and the Voice
says-it-downed-us-stealth-drone-pentagon-
acknowledges-aircraft-downing/2011/12/04/
of America have been interfered with.39 Eutelsat stated in October 2022 that
gIQAyxa8TO_story.html. two of its satellites were undergoing jamming from transmissions originating
42 Rick Gladstone, “Iran is Asked to Return U.S.
in Iran.40
Drone,” New York Times, December 12, 2011,
01
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/
middleeast/obama-says-us-has-asked-iran-to-
There is also speculation that Iran may have more advanced electronic warfare
02
return-drone.html. capabilities that could interfere with satellite-based command and control
43 Scott Peterson and Payam Faramarzi,
signals or GPS signals. In late 2011, a stealthy U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel UAV landed
03
“Exclusive: Iran Hijacked U.S. Drone, Says in Iran.41 The United States confirmed that a UAV had landed in Iran and asked
Iranian Engineer,” Christian Science Monitor,
December 15, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.
for its return.42 The UAV was reportedly part of an intelligence operation near
04
com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive- the Iran-Afghanistan border and there had been no intent for it to land in Iran.
Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-
engineer/.

05
The United States first suggested that the UAV crash-landed because of a
44 “Spoofing a Superyacht At Sea,” UT News,
July 30, 2013, https://news.utexas.edu/2013/
technical malfunction and then because of pilot error. Iran claims that it took
06
07/30/spoofing-a-superyacht-at-sea/. command of the UAV and brought it down with little damage. Because these
45 John Hudson, “Nobody Knows if Iran’s Drone
UAVs fly at high altitudes and are stealthy, and the UAV was displayed largely
07
Hack Was a Hoax,” The Atlantic, April 24, 2012, in one piece, it is unlikely that it was shot down. It is also unlikely that Iran took
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2012/04/nobody-knows-if-irans-drone-
control of the UAV: C2 of such a UAV would typically be done over encrypted
08
hack-was-hoax/328944/. military satellite channels that would require extremely sophisticated capabilities
46 Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Govern-
to hijack.
ment Warns of Iranian Threats to Commercial
09
Shipping, Including GPS Interference,” CNN,
August 7, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/
Some reporting suggests that instead of gaining direct control of the UAV,
10
08/07/politics/us-warns-of-iranian-threats- Iranian electronic warfare specialists used a combination of techniques to bring
to-shipping/.
it down. The attack would have started by interrupting C2 communications
11
47 Maritime Administration, “Persian Gulf, Strait with the UAV. Reportedly, under these circumstances, a drone would be
of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red
Sea-Threats to Commercial Vessels by Iran and
programmed to return to its home base. In an interview, an Iranian engineer
12
its Proxies.” U.S. Department of Transportation, claims that Iran then faked or spoofed GPS coordinates so that the drone
MSCI Advisory 2019-012, August 7, 2019,
https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2019-
would land in Iran, not at its home base in Afghanistan.43 While the ability to
13
012-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-gulf-oman-ara- conduct such a spoofing attack on the civil GPS signal has been demonstrated, 44
bian-sea-red-sea-threats-commercial-vessels.
conducting a similar attack on the military GPS signal would be much more
14
challenging because it is encrypted. It is possible that Iran may have found
a way to jam the military GPS signal, forcing the UAV to fall back on the civil
15
signal. After the capture of the sophisticated drone, Iran claims it had been
able to break into encrypted data on-board the drone, gaining access to
sensitive information about the program, but this is difficult to confirm from
public sources.45

In August 2019, the U.S. government issued public warnings to commercial

shipping about potential Iranian jamming and spoofing of space services.46
The warning cites several incidents of ships reporting GPS interference,
bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing, and/or other communications
jamming.47 Unnamed U.S. officials told CNN that Iran had placed GPS
jammers on Iran-controlled Abu Musa Island near the entrance to the
08-04
Strait of Hormuz, but so far they have only affected civilian GPS signals and 48 Dana Goward, “GPS Circle Spoofing

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Discovered In Iran,” GPS World, April 21, 2020,
not U.S. military ships and aircraft. https://www.gpsworld.com/gps-circle-spoof-
ing-discovered-in-iran/.

There were reports in March 2020 of “circle spoofing” of GPS devices around 49 Goward, April 21, 2020, ibid.
the staff college for Iran’s Army, the AJA University of Command and Staff.48
50 “Iran Opens New Space-Tracking Center,”
There was another incident of circle spoofing detected by the fitness app Strava RFE-RL, June 9, 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/
around an Iranian government facility in Tehran.49 iran-space-tracking-center/25011651.html.

51 “Iran Claims to Have SSA Radar Capable

Space Situational Awareness of Detecting Satellites in LEO,” SpaceWatch-
Global, December 2018, https://spacewatch.
Iran is developing some SSA capabilities that in theory could eventually be global/2018/12/iran-claims-to-have-ssa-radar-
used to track targets and be used in future counterspace capabilities, but capable-of-detecting-satellites-in-leo/.

currently appear to be very limited in capability and coverage. In 2013, a center 52 Jim Lamson and Jeffrey Lewis, “Iranian Pres-
in Delijan was opened that was intended to provide Iran with space object ident Raisi’s Renewed Emphasis on Space is
Likely to Create New Tensions,” War on the
monitoring capabilities via electro-optical, radar, and radio methods.50 In Rocks, December 20, 2021, https://waronth-
2018, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of Iran’s erocks.com/2021/12/iranian-president-raisis-
renewed-emphasis-on-space-is-likely-to-cre-
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said that Iran had the ability to monitor ate-new-tensions/.
satellites in LEO.51
53 Lamson and Lewis, ibid.

Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization 54 “Iran plans to turn into exporter of space-re-
01
lated services: Min.,” Islamic Republic News
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has recently put a lot of emphasis on Iran’s Agency, February 7, 2023, https://en.irna.ir/
space program. He chaired a meeting of the Supreme Space Council in 2021 news/85022430/Iran-plans-to-turn-into-ex-
02
porter-of-space-related-services-Min.
(which had not convened in over a decade), where he said that Iran would
be able to reach GEO by 2026.52 The meeting also resulted in a launch schedule 55 “Collateral Damage to Satellites from an EMP
03
Attack,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
going through March 2023 to deal with some of the backlog of Iranian August 2010, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/full-
satellites waiting to be launched.53 In February 2023, it was reported that the text/u2/a531197.pdf.
04
Raisi administration wishes to turn Iran into an exporter of space technology
services within a year or the end of the Raisi administration, again, 05
demonstrating the government’s continued interest in enhancing its
domestic space capabilities.54 06

Potential Military Utility / 07

Iran’s current counterspace capabilities likely have very limited military utility.
Iran’s current efforts appear focused on electronic warfare and cyber attacks, 08
and not on destructive counterspace capabilities. Its current satellites are very
short-lived, and without sophisticated rendezvous and proximity technology or 09
C2 capabilities, it is extremely unlikely Iran could command a co-orbital ASAT
to deliberately collide with another satellite with any degree of certainty. The 10
best it could hope for would be to increase the possibility of a risk of collision
to a degree that might force its adversary to alter the trajectory of their satellite. 11
Iran is not known to possess the technology for a kinetic kill vehicle that
would be capable of a DA-ASAT attack. If Iran can produce a working nuclear 12
weapon and miniaturize it, develop a ballistic missile or SLV that can carry it,
and mate the two, it would theoretically be possible to conduct a crude EMP 13
attack against LEO satellites. However, it would be extremely difficult to direct
such an attack against specific satellites, and most U.S. military satellites are 14
hardened against radiation and EMP effects. Such an attack would also have
indiscriminate effects against many other non-military satellites in LEO.55 15
08-05
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
139.6503°E
09

JA PA N
35.6762°N
Assessment / 1 Laura Grego, “The AntiSatellite Capability of the

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense,”
Japan has long been a well-established space actor and its space activities Federation of American Scientists Public Interest
have historically been non-military in nature. In 2008, Japan released a Basic Report, Winter 2011, p. 3, https://fas.org/pubs/
pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf.
Space Law that allowed for national security-related activities in space and
since then, government officials have begun to publicly speak about developing 2 Grego, ibid.

various counterspace capabilities or developing military SSA capacity. Japan 3 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic
is currently undergoing a major reorganization of its military space activities Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress Updated,”
and the development of enhanced SSA capabilities to support military and Congressional Research Service Report RL33745,
civil applications. While Japan does not have any acknowledged offensive December 17, 2019, p. 3, https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf; “U.S. Successfully
counterspace capabilities, it is exploring whether to develop them. Japan Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test
does have a latent ASAT capability via its missile defense system but has Against an Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile Target,” US DoD Press Release,
never tested it in that capacity. November 17, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2417334/
us-successfully-conducts-sm-3-block-iia-inter-
Specifics / cept-test-against-an-intercontinen/.

4 Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Two Japanese Destroyers

DA-ASAT Technologies Score in Ballistic Missile Defense Test off Ha-
Japan has no designated DA-ASAT systems under development or in operation. waii,” USNI News, November 21, 2022, https://
news.usni.org/2022/11/21/two-japanese-de-
However, it does have the SM-3 sea-based ballistic missile defense interceptor, stroyers-score-in-ballistic-missile-defense-test-
which the United States demonstrated in 2008 could be used to intercept a off-hawaii.
01
satellite with only a software modification (see U.S. Direct-Ascent ASAT, 5 “Satellite interceptor sought by mid-2020s,”
Section 1-2). A similar software modification might enable Japan to have The Japan News, August 19, 2019, https://the-
02
japan-news.com/news/article/0005948349.
a DA-ASAT capability against satellites 600 km or lower, although Japan has
never tested the SM-3 in that capacity nor expressed a desire to develop it.1 6 Ibid.
03
Japan is also working with the United States on the 3rd stage rocket motor 7 Daniel Darling, “Japanese Government
and nose cone of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which is intended to be a Considers Launching a Satellite Interceptor,”
04
Defense and Security Monitor, August 26, 2019,
more capable hit-to-kill missile interceptor. The SM-3 Block IIA has a faster https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/word-
burn-out speed than its earlier iteration and thus could theoretically reach press/2019/08/26/japanese-government-con-
05
siders-launching-a-satellite-interceptor/.
any satellite in LEO if used in a DA-ASAT role.2 It successfully intercepted a
threat-representative ICBM target during a flight test in November 2020.3 Two 8 “Satellite interceptor sought by mid-2020s,”
06
ibid.
Japanese destroyers launched SM-3 Block IIAs (done so for the first time from
a Japanese vessel) and successfully made exo-atmospheric intercepts of their 9 “Japan requests record $50 billion defense
07
budget in eighth straight increase,” The Defense
targets during a ballistic missile defense test run jointly in Hawaii with the Post, August 30, 2019, https://thedefensepost.
United States in November 2022.4 com/2019/08/30/japan-record-defense-bud-
08
get-50-billion.

Co-Orbital Technologies 09
In August 2019, the Japanese government announced that it was deliberating
whether to develop a satellite that could be used to intercept foreign threat 10
satellites.5 The goal would be to decide in the coming fiscal year so that if
Japan decided to go ahead with such a capability, it could be launched by the 11
mid-2020s. According to a senior Ministry of Defense official, this is because
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) “don’t have any defense capability for the 12
satellites.” 6 To develop this counterspace capability, the Japanese government
reportedly will also research different ways in which to interfere with threat 13
satellites, including cyber attacks, RFI, and robotic arms.7 It is not known
whether this future counterspace capability will be defensive or offensive. 14

Electronic Warfare 15
The Japanese government has considered developing jamming capabilities
that could be used against both airborne warning and control system
(AWACS) planes (possibly by the mid-2020s) and then foreign satellites.8 In
August 2019, the Japanese MoD released a budget request for FY2020 that
included a request for a 4.0 billion yen (USD$38 million) program for a “study
on electromagnetic disruption system” and purchasing equipment that could
detect when its satellites are being electromagnetically interfered with.9
09-01
 10 Doug Messier, “Preventing Collisions Space Situational Awareness
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Between Debris and Spacecraft,” Parabolic

Arc, May 9, 2017, http://www.parabolicarc.
The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency ( JAXA) has been the primary source
com/2017/05/09/preventing-collisions-be- of Japan’s SSA capabilities until recently. JAXA’s Kamisaibara Space Guard
tween-debris-spacecraft/#more-61468.
Center (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-57) has a radar facility that can see up
11 “Japan, US to collaborate on space surveil- to 10 objects of a diameter of 1 meter or greater to an altitude of 2000 km,
lance,” The Mainichi Japan, March 30, 2019,
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190330/
and the Bisei Space Guard Center (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-56) has an
p2a/00m/0na/002000c. optical telescope for SSA tracking to GEO.10 Japan is also developing an SSA
12 Ibid.
analysis system at Tsukuba Space Center. By FY 2023, JAXA plans to have a
new telescope in place in the Bisei Space Guard Center that can detect objects
13 Ibid.
10 cm in diameter out to 650 km.11
14 “ASDF space operations unit established to
monitor space debris and satellites,” The
In 2019, the United States and Japan announced they were planning to connect
0 4/202 3

Yomiuri Shimbun, March 19, 2022, https://

japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-secu- their SSA data starting in FY 2023.12 Japan’s SDF does not have its own SSA
rity/20220319-12551/.
capabilities but has been working on developing them via U.S. technical
15 Debra Werner, “Japan Air Self Defense Force assistance since FY 2018. The SDF hopes to be able to monitor GEO and is
awards contract to LeoLabs,” Space News, May
24, 2022, https://spacenews.com/leolabs-con-
supposed to have the SSA system that could do it by FY 2022.13 The Japanese
tract-japan-ministry-of-defense/. MoD intends for its future SSA network to be composed of both ground- and
16 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative
space-based elements.
Committee, April 19, 2019, p. 3,
01
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000470738.pdf.
In March 2022, the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) announced the
02
17 Theresa Hitchens, “Air Force Funds Hosted creation of a new space operations unit whose mission is SSA; it will operate
Payloads On Japan Sats,” BreakingDefense,
February 19, 2020, https://breakingdefense.
a satellite that will be launched in FY 2026 and ground-based radar that is still
03
com/2020/02/air-force-funds-hosted-payloads- being built in the Yamaguchi prefecture.14 Additionally, LeoLabs announced
on-japan-sats/.
in May 2022 it had won a “multimillion” dollar contract to provide SSA data and
04
18 Maddie Saines, “QZSS hosted payloads deliv- training to the Japanese ASDF.15
ered to Japan,” GPS World, January 24, 2023,
https://www.gpsworld.com/qzss-hosted-pay-

05
loads-delivered-to-japan/. The SDF SSA system is intended to be tied to the U.S. SSA network, and both
19 “Japan to launch second couterspace
hope to be linked to JAXA’s network. The fact sheet for the April 2019 2+2
06
operations unit in fiscal 2022,” Nikkei Asia, Dialogue held between U.S. and Japanese officials mentioned the possibility of
November 14, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Politics/Japan-to-launch-second-outer-space-
putting U.S. SSA sensors on Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) GPS
07
operations-unit-in-fiscal-2022. augmentation constellation.16 The USAF’s 2021 budget documents included
20 Basic Space Law (Law No.43 of 2008),
a request for funding two U.S. SSA payloads on the QZSS that would improve
08
May 21, 2008, https://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/ “Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) Space Situational Awareness capabilities
spacelaw/country/japan/27A-1.E.pdf, p. 2.
over the Eurasian theater and facilitates resilient capabilities in the Space
09
21 Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, “One Small Step for Surveillance Network (SSN).” 17 In January 2023, the USSF delivered two hosted
Japan’s Space Security Strategy,” East Asia Fo-
rum, April 1, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.
payloads for SSA that will be integrated into two future QZSS satellites.18 As of
10
org/2020/04/01/one-small-step-for-japans- 2022, the Japanese Defense Ministry was actively developing space situational
space-security-strategy/.
awareness (SSA) laser-detecting capabilities and setting up a second space
11
22 Japanese Ministry of Defense, National Defense operations unit that will utilize electromagnetic waves to monitor and discern
Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond,
December 18, 2018, p. 20, https://www.cas.
threats to its satellites.19
go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf.
12
23 Guidelines, p. 4.
Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization
13
Japan historically defined peaceful uses of outer space to be non-military, a
definition that was made official by a 1969 Diet resolution. However, in 2008,
14
the Japanese Diet passed the Basic Space law that allowed space to be used
for national security purposes so long as it would be defensive in nature.20 This
15
was part of a larger shift to thinking about incorporating space into national
security needs. The Cabinet office created two organizations within to help
focus on the foundations for space security policy: what is now the National
Space Policy Secretariat in July 2012, and the Strategic Headquarters for Space
Development in 2015.21 The 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines
stated, “To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to
armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including
mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command,
control, communications and information.” 22 The guidelines also discussed
how for space and cyber, “establishing international rules and norms has been
a security agenda.” 23 The guidelines directed Japan to build a “Multi-Domain
Defense Force,” as its defense capability which would bring together “capabilities
09-02
in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; 24 Guidelines, p. 11.

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during 25 Guidelines, p. 12.
all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies.” 24 The SDF would, in cases
26 Outline of the Basic Plan on Space Policy
of armed attack against Japan, be permitted to “block and eliminate the attack (Provisional Translation), National Space
by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.” 25 Policy Secretariat, Cabinet Office, Japan,
June 30, 2020, https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/
english/basicplan/2020/abstract_0701.pdf, p. 6.
In June 2020, Japan released its “Outline of the Basic Plan on Space Policy.”
27 “Japan To Stand Up Space Domain Mission Unit
This document identifies “ensuring space security” as one of the Basic Space In April 2020 To Counter Threats To Satellites,”
Plan’s goals and focuses on satellites for positioning and maritime domain SpaceWatchGlobal, January 2020,
https://spacewatch.global/2020/01/japan-to-
awareness, cooperation with allies on SSA sharing, becoming involved in stand-up-space-domain-mission-unit-in-april-
international discussions on rules, and focusing on mission assurance.26 2020-to-counter-threats-to-satellites/.

28 Mari Yamaguchi, “Abe says new unit will defend

Japan has also announced steps to reorganize its military space activities. In Japan from space tech threats,” Associated
Press, January 20, 2020, https://apnews.
January 2020, during remarks at the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual com/2d88b7c34a5d004eaa59791b8587579d.
Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, Prime Minister
29 “Japan to Stand Up,” ibid.
Shinzo Abe noted the need to make the U.S.-Japan alliance more “robust” and
“to make it a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space 30 Yoshitako Ito, “SDF’s 1st Outer Space Unit
Begins Satellite Mission At Base In Tokyo,”
and cyberspace.” 27 Abe also announced at a session of the Diet in January Asahi Shimbun, May 18, 2020,
2020 that Japan will “drastically bolster capability and systems in order to http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13383396.
01
secure superiority.” 28 During that speech, he announced that Japan would be 32 Park Si-soo, “Japan budgets a record $4.14
establishing its Space Domain Mission Unit (SDMU) in April 2020, with the goal billion for space activities,” SpaceNews.com,
02
March 9, 2021, https://spacenews.com/japan-
of having it be fully operational by 2022.29 It was indeed stood up in May 2020 budgets-a-record-4-14-billion-for-space-ac-
with 20 personnel but is now expected to reach full operations in FY 2023.30 tivities/; Hana Kusumoto, “Japan seeks record
03
$50 billion defense budget to counter an in-
The SDMU is expected to grow to 100 personnel and will carry out SSA to creasingly aggressive Chain,” Stars and Stripes,
protect Japanese satellites. The SDMU will be part of Japan’s Air Self-Defense August 31, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/
04
theaters/asia_pacific/2021-08-31/japan-record-
Force and is intended to work with both USSPACECOM and JAXA. In December defense-budget-f-35-china-2727340.html.
2022, Japanese officials announced their intention to change the name of the 05
33 Park Si-soo, “Japan to launch 2nd space defense
Air Self-Defense Force to the Aerospace Self-Defense Force (ASDF) in order to unit to protect satellites from electromagnetic
better represent its interest in strengthening space defense.31 attack,” SpaceNews.com, November 15, 2021,
06
https://spacenews.com/japan-to-launch-2nd-
space-defense-unit-to-protect-satellites-from-
In 2021, Japan had a record space budget of nearly $50 billion, up about 23% electromagnetic-attack/.
07
from the previous year.32 The Japanese Defense Ministry received a similar 34 Jesse Johnson and Gabriel Dominguez,
budget in 2022. Additionally, the Japanese ASDF and USSPACECOM signed an “Japan approves major defense overhaul in
08
dramatic policy shift,” Japan Times, Decem-
agreement to increase collaboration on space security. Under the agreement, ber 16, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
an ASDF officer will receive an assignment in the U.S. Space Command news/2022/12/16/national/japan-dramatic-de-
09
fense-shift/.
headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.33
35 National Security Strategy of Japan, Govern-
10
ment of Japan, December 2022, https://www.
Japan released a new National Security Strategy in December 2022 that would cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/
allow it, for the first time, to be able to conduct counterstrike operations using nss-e.pdf.
11
long-range missiles.34 This move is intended to integrate Japan’s air and missile 36 “Japan Eyes Space Security Framework,” The
defense systems, and is not intended to be used in its space operations, but Yomiuri Shimbun, December 22, 2022, https://
12
japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-se-
does signal a change to Japan’s historically defensive posture. The new National curity/20221222-78718/.
Security Strategy also notes that “Japan will drive forward measures to capitalize 13
37 Statement released by the Governments of the
on Japan’s overall space-related capabilities in the field of security, such as United States of America and Japan following
strengthening cooperation between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
14
(SCC) in Washington, D.C., January 11, 2023,
(JAXA) and the SDF.” 35 The same month, it was reported that the Japanese cabi- https://jp.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-se-
net would be working on a de facto space security strategy that is planned to curity-consultative-committee-2plus2/.
15
be completed at the earliest in summer 2023.36

At a January 2023 meeting of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee

convened by the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State and the Japanese
Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the ministers released a statement
noting that they considered “attacks to, from, or within space present a clear
challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain
circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty;” invocation of Article V would be made “on a case-by-case basis, and
through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would
be the case for any other threat.” 37
09-03
 Potential Military Utility /
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Japan currently possesses very limited potential counterspace capabilities.

Japan could potentially use its limited SSA capabilities to detect, track, and
target a modified SM-3 missile as a DA-ASAT against an adversary satellite in
LEO, perhaps with additional tracking assistance and intelligence from the
United States. Japan likely possesses the technological foundations to conduct
EW against space capabilities, but the military utility and effectiveness of its
ability to do so is unknown.
0 4/202 3

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
09-04
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
125.8198°E
10

KOREA
NORTH
39.0738°N
Assessment / 1 Ankit Panda, “North Korea has Tested a New

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Solid-Fuel Missile Engine,” The Diplomat,
North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea October 25, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/
(DPRK), has no demonstrated capability to mount kinetic attacks on space 2017/10/north-korea-has-tested-a-new-solid-
fuel-missile-engine/.
assets: neither with a direct ascent ASAT nor a co-orbital system. In its official
statements, North Korea has never mentioned anti-satellite operations or intent, 2 Ankit Panda, “North Korea’s Musudan Missile
Test Actually Succeeded. What Now?” The
suggesting that there is no clear doctrine guiding Pyongyang’s thinking at this Diplomat, June 23, 2016, https://thediplomat.
point. North Korea does not appear highly motivated to develop dedicated com/2016/06/north-koreas-musudan-mis-
sile-test-actually-succeeded-what-now.
counterspace assets, though certain capabilities in their ballistic missile program
might be eventually evolved for such a purpose. The DPRK has exhibited 3 Jeffrey Lewis, “North Korea’s Hwasong-12
Missile: Stepping Stone to an ICBM,” Nuclear
the capability to jam civilian GPS signals within a limited geographical area. Threat Initiative, July 20, 2017, http://www.nti.
Their capability against military GPS signals is not known. There has been no org/analysis/articles/north-koreas-hwasong-
12-missile-stepping-stone-icbm/.
demonstrated ability of the DPRK to interfere with satellite communications,
although their technical capability remains unknown. 4 Choe Sang-hun, “Kim Jong-un Says North
Korea is Preparing to Test Long-Range Missile,”
The New York Times, January 1, 2017,
Specifics / https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/
asia/north-korea-intercontinental-ballistic-mis-
The North Korean ballistic missile program traces its start back to the 1980s sile-test-kim-jong-un.html.
with the acquisition of Soviet-era Scud technology. At present, no dedicated
5 David Wright, “North Korean ICBM Appears
ASAT program exists separate from the country’s ballistic missile programs. Able to Reach Major U.S. Cities,” Union of Con-
North Korean systems comprise two primary components: rapidly maturing cerned Scientists, July 28, 2017,
01
http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/new-north-
ground-launched ballistic missile capabilities and the development of some korean-icbm; and, Ankit Panda and Vipin
radar systems. Narang, “North Korea’s ICBM: A New Missile
02
and a New Era,” The Diplomat, July 7, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/north-ko-
DA-ASAT Technologies reas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era.
03
North Korea has multiple ballistic missile systems, including those in the
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and ICBM class, which could possibly 04
be used as the basis for future DA-ASAT capabilities. The first is the
Pukguksong family of IRBMs, which include the KN-11 (Pukkuksong-1) and the 05
KN-15 (Pukkuksong-2). The KN-11 is a two-stage solid-fuel SLBM with a purported
range of 500-2,500 km, while the KN-15 is the land-based variant. North Korea 06
conducted a successful cold-launched test of the KN-15 in May 2017.1
07
The Hwasong-10 (Musudan) is an IRBM reportedly modeled off of the Soviet
R-27/SS-N-6 missile system. The system is liquid-fueled with a maximum 08
range of 3,500 km. The Musudan has a spotty testing record, but the sixth
test of the system reportedly was a success.2 09

The Hwasong-12 (KN-17) is a newer ballistic missile, tested May 14, 2017, 10
August 28, 2017, and September 14, 2017, using liquid propellant and a high-
thrust engine and mounted on a TEL. An additional, possibly ICBM-relevant 11
flight test, using a similar engine to the KN-17, was conducted in March. This
was possibly just a larger variant of the existing Hwasong-10 IRBM, but the test 12
indicates the ability to comfortably overshoot Guam and reach lower satellite
orbital altitudes. The Hwasong-12 is presumed to be a one-stage missile with 13
a range of 3,700-4,500 km.3
14
Kim Jong Un announced in the annual 2017 New Year’s Address that the country
was nearly ready to flight-test an ICBM.4 There were then two ICBM tests in 15
2017 of a relatively new system, the Hwasong-14. North Korea tested the
Hwasong-14 (KN-20) on July 4, 2017, and July 28, 2017, using a lofted trajectory.
Several estimates place the range around 10,000 km, placing U.S. cities and
targets in space above LEO potentially at risk.5 The Hwasong-14 is a two-stage
liquid fuel design.
10-01
 6 Ankit Panda, “The Hwasong-15: The Anatomy The Hwasong-15 (KN-22) was launched for the first time on Nov. 29, 2017, when
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

of North Korea’s New ICBM,” The Diplomat,

December 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.
the liquid-fueled ICBM flew on a lofted trajectory to an altitude of 4,500 km.6
com/2017/12/the-hwasong-15-the-anatomy- If flown on a standard trajectory, it could have a feasible reach of 13,000 km,
of-north-koreas-new-icbm/.
which, according to David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, “is
7 David Wright, “North Korea’s Longest significantly longer than North Korea’s previous long range tests.” 7 According
Missile Test Yet,” All Things Nuclear blog,
November 28, 2017, http://allthingsnuclear.
to North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), this flight test was of
org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet. “an intercontinental ballistic rocket tipped with super-large heavy warhead”
8 Ankit Panda, “The Hwasong-15: The Anatomy
which could reach “the whole mainland of the U.S.” 8 There was another
of North Korea’s New ICBM,” The Diplomat, launch of an ICBM-class launch vehicle in March 2022; this rocket (either the
December 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/
2017/12/the-hwasong-15-the-anatomy-of-
Hwasong-15 or possibly the newer Hwasong-17) flew a distance of 1100 km
north-koreas-new-icbm/. and reached an altitude of 6000 km (placing objects in LEO within reach).9
A Hwasong-17 is suspected to have been launched in November 2022; it
0 4/202 3

9 Mike Wall, “North Korea launches most pow-

erful missile yet in 1st ICBM test since 2017: failed during its flight test.10 North Korean officials announced that they had
reports,” Space.com, March 24, 2022, https://
www.space.com/north-korea-launches-most-
launched a Hwasong-15 in February 2023; it flew a heavily lofted flight and
powerful-icbm-test. reached a distance of nearly 1000 km at an altitude of about nearly 5800 km.11
10 Elizabeth Howell, “Launch of North Korea’s
If it had flown a less lofted trajectory, it is thought that it could reach the
most powerful ballistic missile fails: reports,” continental United States, indicating it could likely reach objects in LEO as well.12
Space.com, November 3, 2022, https://
www.space.com/north-korea-ballistic-mis-

01
sile-launch-failure-november-2022. North Korea has other presumed ICBM-range systems that have not yet been
11 Jesse Johnson, “North Korea says surprise ICBM
flight-tested or deployed. The first is the Hwasong-13 (KN-08), a three-stage
02
drill is ‘proof’ of ‘nuclear counterattack’ capabil- road-mobile ICBM first seen in the 2012 military parade, and a variant of
ities,” Japan Times, February 19, 2023, https://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/02/19/
this missile known as the KN-14, shortened to two stages. These are alleged
03
asia-pacific/north-korea-icbm-suprise-launch/. road-mobile ICBMs displayed in past military parades but have not yet been
12 Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Launches ICBM,”
flight-tested or deployed.13 Finally, what appeared to be an as yet to be flight
04
New York Times, February 18, 2023, https:// tested solid fuel ICBM was displayed during a February 2023 parade.14
www.nytimes.com/2023/02/18/world/asia/
north-korea-missile-launch.html.

05
North Korea’s only known operational space launch vehicle is the Unha-3. It
13 Jeffrey Lewis, “New DPRK ICBM Engine,”
Arms Control Wonk, April 9, 2016,
appears to derive design components from the Taepodong-2, which was originally
06
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/ believed by U.S. intelligence to be a possible ICBM.15 Although operational,
1201278/north-korea-tests-a-fancy-new-
rocket-engine/.
the reliability of the Unha-3 is not assured. The TD-2 failed in several tests
07
throughout the 2000s, raising some questions regarding both its relationship
15 John Schilling, “Where’s That North
Korean ICBM Everyone Was Talking About?”
to the Unha-3 and the latter’s reliability. The first attempt to use the Unha-3 to
08
38 North, March 12, 2015, launch the Kwangmyŏngsŏng 3 satellite in April 2012 resulted in failure, but in
https://www.38north.org/2015/03/jschil-
ling031215/.
December 2012, the Unha-3 successfully placed the first North Korean satellite,
09
Kwangmyŏngsŏng 3-2 (KMS 3-2, 2012-072A, 39026) in orbit.16 The Unha-3 was
16 Center for Strategic and International Studies,
“Taepodong-2 (Unha-3),” https://missilethreat.
used to put the second satellite, Kwangmyŏngsŏng 4 (KMS 4, 2016-009A, 41332)
10
csis.org/missile/taepodong-2/. into orbit in 2016.17 Commercial imagery in March 2019 of North Korea’s Sohae
17 Andrea Shalal and Idrees Ali, “North Korea
Satellite Launching Station (see Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-23) indicated that it
11
Satellite Tumbling in Orbit Again: U.S. may have returned to normal operations.18
Sources,” Reuters, February 18, 2016,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northko-
rea-satellite/north-korea-satellite-tumbling-
12
in-orbit-again-u-s-sources-idUSKCN0VR2R3.
FIGURE 9-1 — KWANGMYONGSONG-4
18 Jack Liu, Irv Buck, and Jenny Town, “North
13
Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launch Facility:
Normal Operations May Have Resumed,”
38North.org, March 7, 2019,
14
https://www.38north.org/2019/03/
sohae030719/.

15
19 “North Korea successfully launches the Star 4
satellite using the light star rocket at 08:30 of
February 7th,” chinaspaceflight.com, February
11, 2016, https://www.chinaspaceflight.com/
default/DPRK-201602.html.

Two views of the purported earth-observation satellite Korea launched in January 2016.
Image credit: chinaspaceflight.com.19
10-02
The Unha-3 is known to be a multi-stage rocket with liquid propellant requiring 20 Center for Strategic and International Studies,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
“Taepodong-2 (Unha-3),” https://missilethreat.
a conventional launch pad and extensive visible preparations. The first stage csis.org/missile/taepodong-2/.
consists of four Nodong engines, making it too large for mobile use.20
21 “Kim Jong Un Watches Ground Jet
Test of Newly Developed High-Thrust Engine,”
Aside from the active ballistic missile and SLV programs, North Korea also has Korean Central News Agency, March 19, 2017,
https://kcnawatch.org/new-
active solid motor and liquid fuel programs and uses both in active missile stream/1489876327-
systems and in development tests. Work is underway on the creation of more 610396847/kim-jong-un-watches-ground-jet-
test-of-newly-developed-high-thrust-engine/.
advanced rocket engines. This has been evidenced in attempts to create a
compact SLBM with two Hwasong-10 engines, similar to that in the Soviet R-27 22  Josh Smith and Sangmi Cha, “North Korea
Shows Off New Submarine-Launched Missiles
SLBM, in a single stage, and known now as the March-18 engine after testing After Rare Party Congress,” Reuters,
at Sohae. The March-18 engine is intended as a “high-thrust engine [to] help January 14, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-northkorea-politics/north-korea-
consolidate the scientific and technological foundation to match the world-level shows-off-new-submarine-launched-missiles-
satellite delivery capability in the field of outer space development.” 21 A parade after-rare-party-congress-idUSKBN29J2YG.

in January 2021 showed off what appears to be a new SLBM.22 23 Jeffrey Lewis, “Welcome to the Thermonuclear
Club North Korea,” Foreign Policy,
September 4, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.
Some have speculated that North Korea could be able to combine a ballistic com/2017/09/04/welcome-to-the-thermonu-
missile and a nuclear warhead into an EMP weapon, targeted against either clear-club-north-korea/.

U.S. satellites or domestic infrastructure. However, it seems unlikely at this 24 Kyle Mizakomi, “North Korea Can’t Kill Ninety
point that North Korea would dedicate one of its limited nuclear warheads to Percent of Americans,” Popular Mechanics,
01
March 3, 2017, http://www.popularmechanics.
an unproven task.23 Additionally, it is unknown how large of a yield from a com/military/weapons/a25883/north-korea-
nuclear warhead is necessary to affect the U.S. electrical grid.24 Although cant-kill-ninety-percent-of-americans/.
02
North Korea likely demonstrated a thermonuclear capability in September 25 North Korea: Overview, Nuclear Threat Initiative,
2017,25 the country’s nuclear warheads do not approach the megaton range last updated October 2020, https://www.nti.
03
org/learn/countries/north-korea/.
yield that would likely be necessary. Additionally, North Korea’s ICBM force,
while growing in technical sophistication and performance, is not currently 26 Richard Hollingham, “The Cold War nuke that
04
fried satellites,” BBC News, September 11, 2015,
capable of carrying such a heavy warhead. Historical nuclear tests, such as http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150910-
the U.S. Starfish Prime test in 1962, are known to have generated effects that the-nuke-that-fried-satellites-with-terrifying-
05
results.
damaged or destroyed satellites in orbit at the time.26 However, it would be
difficult to predict the ability of creating such effects against military satellites, 27 David Todd, “Kwangmyongsong 3-2 is in orbit
06
but is “tumbling” and not transmitting”, Serad-
particularly since many U.S. military satellites are hardened against radiation ata, December 17, 2012, https://www.seradata.
and EMP effects. com/kwangmyongsong_3-2_is_in_orbit/; Nash
07
Jenkins, “North Korea’s Satellite Is Tumbling
in Orbit”, Time, February 9, 2016, http://time.
com/4213428/north-korea-satellite-tumbling/.
08
Co-Orbital ASAT Technologies
North Korea currently possesses a very rudimentary satellite development 09
and command and control capability, but it has not demonstrated any of the
rendezvous and proximity operations or active guidance capabilities necessary 10
for a co-orbital satellite capability.
11
There are currently six objects in orbit from two North Korean space launches.
Two of these objects are satellites, as outlined above. Both of the two 12
Kwangmyŏngsŏng satellites are thought to have failed soon after launch.
This is evidenced by the lack of detected signals and instability of the platforms. 13
Kwangmyŏngsŏng 3-2 was reported to be tumbling on December 17, 2012,
five days after launch, and Kwangmyŏngsŏng 4 was reported to be tumbling 14
as early as February 9, 2016, only three days after launch.27 The satellites can
be determined to be tumbling by space tracking radars systems, or even by 15
amateur astronomers observing periodic variations of the intensity of the light
reflected from the sun as the objects pass over observers near local dawn and
dusk. However, the satellites are still following a relatively predictable orbital
trajectory and have not posed a collision threat to other space objects.
10-03
 28 TLEs for the Kwangmyŏngsŏng satellites are Although both satellites were announced as remote sensing systems, it is
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

available from the Space Track web site (https://

www.space-track.org/). Orbital maneuvers can
doubtful if they conducted much sensor activity due to their early failures.
be detected from the TLE data. The North Korean satellite expertise is considered to be rudimentary, with
29 Lee Je-hun, “N. Korea claims it will finish prep on
the payloads likely being capable of only producing low resolution imagery at
spy satellite by April 2023,” Hankyoreh, December best, and it is doubtful if either of the two satellites would have been militarily
20, 2022, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_
edition/e_northkorea/1072411.html.
useful, even had they not failed prematurely.

30 “North Korea ‘jamming GPS signals’ near

South border,” BBC News, April 1, 2016,
There is no indication that the Kwangmyŏngsŏng series of satellites had any
http://www.bbc.com/news/world- counterspace capability nor that there is any indication of intent, on the part
asia-35940542.
of North Korea, to attempt to develop such a capability. Neither of the satellites
31 “Pentagon concerned about North conducted orbital maneuvers.28 Any serious attempt at orbital counterspace
Korea jamming GPS signals, officials say”,
would require a sophistication that is far beyond the capacity of North Korea
0 4/202 3

Fox News US, April 6, 2016,

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/04/06/ for the foreseeable future.
pentagon-concerned-about-north-korea-
jamming-gps-signals-officials-say.html.
Tests were held at Sohae in December 2022 for what is thought to be preparation
32 Julian Ryall, “North Korea ‘aggressively’ jam-
for a launch by April 2023 of a reconnaissance satellite that, according to the
ming BBC’s new Korean-language service”, Rodong Sinmun paper, would be launched to an altitude of 500 km with one
The Telegraph, September 27, 2017,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/
camera that could take pictures of up to 20 m resolution and also carry two
01
09/27/north-korea-aggressively-jamming- multispectral cameras.29
new-bbc-broadcasts/.

02
33 Martyn Williams, “Report: DPRK Jams South Electronic Warfare
Korean Satellite Comms,” North Korea Tech, No-
vember 17, 2012, https://www. northkoreatech.
On numerous occasions, North Korea has demonstrated the capability to
03
org/2012/11/17/report-dprk-jams-south-kore- interfere with civilian GPS navigation used by passenger aircraft, automobile,
an-satellite-comms/.
and ship systems in the vicinity of the South-North border and nearby coastal
04
areas.30 This type of interference (downlink jamming) targets GPS receivers
within range of the source of the jamming signal but has no impact on the
05
GPS satellites themselves nor the service provided to users outside the range
of the jammers. The area affected will depend on the power emitted by the
06
jammer and the local topography. In the case of the reported North Korean
incidents, the range was estimated to be several tens of kilometers.
07
According to unnamed U.S. officials, this type of jamming would not affect U.S.
08
military members who use the military GPS signals.31 The GPS interference
incidents along the South-North border appear to have been deliberately
09
targeting civilian receivers, presumably as part of a North Korean political
strategy or tactic. Some events have coincided with joint South Korea - U.S.
10
military exercises. North Korea could also be developing jammers that are
effective against the military GPS signals, but to date, there is no public evidence
11
of such development, testing, or use.

12
There is extremely limited public information about whether North Korea
could jam satellite communications. North Korea does routinely jam terrestrial
13
broadcasts from foreign sources, such as the BBC, Voice of America, Radio
Free Asia, and South Korea’s KBS, to prevent their citizens from listening.32
14
However, there is only one report about North Korea possibly jamming
military communications being broadcast from a South Korean satellite and
15
it dates from 2012.33 It is assessed that uplink jamming of communication
satellites has otherwise not or has rarely occurred, since that would likely have
been reported by the targeted satellite operators. Downlink jamming, which
affects only the receivers in a local area, may be occurring within North Korea,
but there is no publicly-available information available on this subject.
10-04
Space Situational Awareness 34 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “NADA General

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Satellite Control Building,” 38North.org,
There is little publicly available information about North Korea’s SSA capabilities. March 22, 2018, https://www.38north.
North Korea does have a General Satellite Control Building, which is its org/2018/03/nada032318/.

headquarters for its National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), 35 Dave Schmerler, “Revealed: North Korea’s
and the facility from which it tracks and monitors its own satellite launches.34 under-development space environment test
center,” NKPro.com, June 25, 2019,
Since May 2017, imagery has detected construction on an adjacent facility https://www.nknews.org/pro/revealed-north-
(which most likely is intended to be a space environment test center and most koreas-new-space-environment-test-center/.

likely does not have SSA capabilities).35 North Korea has been reported to have 36 Dave Majumdar, “If Donald Trump Attacks
Iranian phased array radars as part of its air defense network; their capabilities North Korea: Beware of Kim’s Air Defense
Systems,” National Interest, April 14, 2017,
are unknown.36 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
if-donald-trump-attacks-north-korea-beware-
kims-air-defense-20207.
Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization
To date, there is no clear doctrine for counterspace weapons in the DPRK. 37 Most state media references to space cite
DPRK efforts to successfully launch satellites,
Furthermore, there is an absence of discussion on counterspace weapons in the ostensibly for Earth observation purposes.
DPRK state media. Surveying the archives since 2010 does not reveal a single These references discuss the development of
high-thrust engines (usually referenced as the
mention of ASAT or counterspace. Satellites and space are only mentioned March 18th engine) for delivery of satellites into
in the context of peaceful programs in the DPRK parlance.37 North Korean orbit, and the development of the earth obser-
vation satellite technology (only EO satellites so
state media clarified in April 2020 that “The purpose of the republic’s space far (Kwangmyongsong-4), launched in 2016).
development is to adhere to the interests of the state and to use science See: “Kim Jong Un Watches Ground Jet Test of
01
Newly Developed High-Thrust Engine,” Korean
and technology to solve scientific and technological problems essential to Central News Agency, March 19, 2017. Thus far,
economic construction and people’s lives.” 38 In November 2021, the North official statements from North Korea have em-
02
phasized space as a common good: “Space is
Korean aerospace sector facilitated a space conference to discuss peaceful wealth common to man,” and have emphasized
space development plans and linking satellite technology to economic growth. peaceful uses. “Peaceful Development and Use
03
of Space Are Legitimate Right of Sovereign
The conference occurred after Kim Jong Un ordered the development of State: DPRK Delegation,” Rodong Sinmun, June
military reconnaissance satellites earlier in 2021, demonstrating a potential 21, 2017. State media also references work
04
on meteorological atmospheric observation
increase in desire to develop space assets and technology.39 North Korean systems, which may have some applications for
leader Kim Jong Un visited Sohae in March 2022 and called for it to be radar tracking systems. See: “A Breakthrough,”
05
Naenara News, July 12, 2015.
“modernized” so to “enable large carrier rockets to be launched there,” 40 which
indicates that SLV capabilities continue to be an increased priority for the 38 Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea highlights space
06
program in state media,” UPI, April 6, 2020,
North Korean government. Satellite imagery taken later in 2022 indicate that https://www.spacewar.com/reports/North_Ko-
construction is in full swing at Sohae, presumably to carry out the modernization rea_highlights_space_program_in_state_me-
07
dia_999.html.
called for by Kim.41
39 Colin Zwirko, “North Korea holds space
08
conference, says launching satellites will help
Potential Military Utility / economy,” NK News, November 22, 2021,
North Korea likely possesses very limited military counterspace capabilities. It https://www.nknews.org/2021/11/north-korea-
09
holds-space-conference-says-launching-satelli-
lacks significant SSA capabilities, demonstrated hit-to-kill capabilities, or any tes-will-help-economy/.
sort of RPO capabilities, and has very limited space launch capabilities. This 10
40 “N.Korea calls for satellite site ‘expansion’ as
very likely limits North Korean counterspace options to broad area attacks such US slams ICBM tests,” Agence France-Presse,
as nuclear detonations in LEO that could damage large numbers of satellites March 11, 2022, https://www.spacewar.com/
11
reports/NKorea_calls_for_satellite_site_expan-
over a long period of time. Such an attack would have very limited military sion_as_US_slams_ICBM_tests_999.html.
utility in a conflict and would likely engender intense international outrage. 12
41 Peter Makowsky, Jack Liu, and Jenny Town,
“Sohae Satellite Launch Station: Site Upgrades
Begin in Earnest,” 38North.org, September
13
6, 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/09/
sohae-satellite-launch-station-site-upgrades-
begin-in-earnest/.
14

15
10-05
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
126.9780°E
11

SOUTH
KO REA
37.5665°N
Assessment / 1 “South Korea launches first homegrown space

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
rocket Nuri,” BBC News, October 21, 2021,
Over the last several years, South Korea has had a growing focus on military https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
space capabilities. It is working to enhance the space capabilities of its Air 58990718.

Force through the establishment of a Space Operations Center, cooperating 2 “South Korea tests 1st domestically made
with the United States on sharing SSA capabilities, and developing its own rocket as it pursues satellite launch program,”
Associated Press, October 21, 2021,
longer-range ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles; it also has expressed https://www.npr.org/2021/10/21/1047901483/
interest in developing its own reversible counterspace capabilities. south-korea-tests-1st-domestically-made-rock-
et-as-it-pursues-satellite-launch-pr.

Specifics / 3 Yosuke Onchi, “South Korea chases global

ambitions in space and defense,” Nikkei Asia,
November 7, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Busi-
DA-ASAT Technologies ness/Aerospace-Defense/South-Korea-chases-
global-ambitions-in-space-and-defense.
There is no public evidence that South Korea has developed, or is developing,
a dedicated DA-ASAT capability. However, it does have a significant ballistic 4 Mike Wall, “South Korea’s homegrown Nuri
rocket launches satellites into orbit for 1st
missile program, and is putting an extensive amount of resources into developing time,” Space.com, June 22, 2022, https://www.
its indigenous space launch program, which could theoretically be used as space.com/south-korea-nuri-rocket-launch-
success.
part of a future DA-ASAT capability. It would still need to be combined with
several other technologies that South Korea has not yet tested either, such 5 Kim Boram, “3rd launch of space rocket Nuri
slated for May: space institute,” Yonhap News
as HTK intercepts. Agency, January 10, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/
view/AEN20230110006400320.
01
In October 2021, South Korea launched its first domestically built rocket (“Nuri”) 6 “Fire breaks out at space center during fuel
with a dummy satellite (which failed to make it to orbit); Nuri is estimated to test for next generation space rocket,” Yonhap
02
News Agency, February 1, 2023, https://en.yna.
have cost $1.6 billion to develop.1 The three-stage liquid-fueled rocket was co.kr/view/AEN20230201009700320.
built by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), the civilian space 03
7 Jeongmin Kim, “South Korea tests indigenous
agency in South Korea.2 President Moon Jae-in said, “We will use our launch solid-fuel rocket week after North’s ICBM
vehicles to achieve the dream of landing on the moon by 2030.” 3 A June 2022 launch,” NK News, March 30, 2022, https://
04
www.nknews.org/2022/03/south-korea-tests-
launch of the Nuri SLV was reported to have put six satellites into orbit, marking indigenous-solid-fuel-rocket-week-after-
the first time an indigenously built South Korean launch vehicle was able to norths-icbm-launch/?t=1656492835423.
05
do so.4 The next launch of the Nuri SLV, also known as KSLV-II, is scheduled 8 Jeongmin Kim, “Seoul boasts of space vehicle
for May 2023, marking the first of four launches of the rocket through 2027.5 launch as it looks to better surveil North
06
Korea,” NK News, January 2, 2023, https://www.
A fire broke out at the Naro Space Center in January 2023 while researchers nknews.org/2023/01/seoul-boasts-of-space-
were working on a follow-on SLV for the Nuri, known as KSLV-III, a launch vehicle-launch-as-it-looks-to-better-surveil-
07
north-korea/.
vehicle which is intended to be launched three times by 2032.6
9 Ji Da-gyum, “S.Korea ranks 9th in defense
08
tech, but needs ‘intensive’ R&D in space
In March 2022, South Korean officials announced the successful launch of a weapons,” The Korea Herald, January 10,
“solid-fueled space projectile” which tested separating a dummy satellite from 2022, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
09
php?ud=20220110000713.
the launch vehicle as part of a test run by Agency for Defense Development
(ADD).7 A second test of the solid-fueled launch vehicle was successfully flown 10
in December 2022, and was justified by the South Korean Ministry of Defense
as, “The South Korean military will greatly develop its own space-based 11
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities based on the technology and
know-how associated with solid propulsion engines.” 8 12

Additionally, South Korea’s military technology agency, the Korea Research 13

Institute for Defense Technology Planning and Advancement (KRIT), released
a report “Defense Science & Technology Level Assessment by Country“ in 14
January 2022 that argued the country needed “strategic” and “intensive”
investments in space weapons in order to keep up with other military powers.9 15
According to KRIT, “The space weapon system is the field that requires
intensive research and development, considering the conditions of the future
battlespace and South Korea’s possession of some projectile technologies
including the test-launch of Nuri…But as South Korea is far behind the US in
the technology, we view that strategic investment is needed.” It is unclear what
sort of space weapons the report is calling for more R&D on.
11-01
 10 “Air Force Sets up Space Center,” KBS News, Electronic Warfare
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

September 30, 2021, https://world.kbs.

co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_
As part of its Space Odyssey 2050 program, the South Korean Air Force is
Code=164568. working on EW counterspace capabilities that can be used to deter or counter
11 Park Si-soo, “US-South Korea joint space drills
adversary space capabilities.10 Few public details are known about the state of
to focus on space situational awareness,” development or planned capabilities for this system.
Space News, October 27, 2021, https://space-
news.com/us-south-korea-joint-space-drills-to-
focus-on-space-situational-awareness/. Space Situational Awareness
12 Park Si-soo, “US, South Korea agree to
As part of an August 2021 agreement between the ROK and U.S. militaries,
enhance security cooperation in outer the two countries will hold joint drills to improve SSA. The ROK is working
space,” Space News, August 30, 2021,
https://spacenews.com/us-south-ko-
to enhance its indigenous SSA capabilities through developing its own SSA
rea-agree-to-enhance-security-coopera- infrastructure that can be operational by the mid-2020s.11 It is anticipated to
tion-in-outer-space/.
include a space weather forecast system, reconnaissance satellites, and an
0 4/202 3

13 Park, August 30, 2021, ibid. electro-optical satellite surveillance system. In August 2021, military officials
14 Park Si-soo, October 27, 2021, ibid.
from South Korea and the United States agreed to cooperate on security
space issues. Signed between Gen. Park In-ho, ROK Air Force chief of staff, and
15 “ROK, US defense ministries hold 18th ROK-US
Space Cooperation Working Group,” Office of
General Raymond, USSF chief of space operations, this agreement established
the President, Republic of Korea, May 16, 2022, a joint consultative body on space policy.12 They also agreed to share information
https://eng.president.go.kr/briefing/ZrBC4wVq;
Park Si-soo, “U.S., South Korea agree to cooper-
on SSA and work to enhance joint space operations capabilities.13 ROK Air
01
ate on space situational awareness for military Force Colonel Park Ki-tae, chief of the Space Operations Center, indicated
purposes,” Space News, April 26, 2022, https://
spacenews.com/u-s-south-korea-agree-to-co-
SSA is a priority for the South Korean Air Force, stating in October 2021 that
02
operate-on-space-situational-awareness-for- “What we urgently need is ‘eyes’ to look at what’s happening in outer space.” 14
military-purposes/.
The bilateral Space Cooperation Working Group that met in Washington, DC,
03
16 “Air Force Sets up Space Center,” KBS News, in April 2022 resulted in another signed agreement on cooperation on space
September 30, 2021, https://world.kbs.
co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_
security issues, including sharing SSA data, and the creation of a joint space
04
Code=164568. policy research organization.15
17 “Air Force Sets up Space Center,” KBS World,

05
September 30, 2021, https://world.kbs. Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization
co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_
Code=164568.
In 2013, the South Korean Air Force unveiled its “Space Odyssey 2050”, a three-
06
part strategy that aims to build its own space capabilities by 2050 to protect
18 Kwon Hyuk-chul, “S. Korean Air Force opens
space center to bolster space strategy,”
South Korea’s military forces. As part of the strategy, the South Korean Air
07
Hankyoreh, October 1, 2021, https://english. Force plans to develop the ability to monitor and “counter” space threats.16
hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_nation-
al/1013584.html.

08
The ROK Air Force launched its Space Operations Center in September 2021,
19 Park Si-soo, “South Korea’s double-digit space
budget boost,” Space News, April 21, 2022,
which is charged with creating and carrying out space policy, as well as working
09
https://spacenews.com/south-koreas-double- with other branches of the South Korean government on enhancing space
digit-space-budget-boost/.
capabilities.17 It will have three departments: one for sharing space information,
10
one for space policy development, and one for developing space weapons.
According to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Park In-ho, “The Air Force’s space
11
center will focus its capabilities on developing our national defense space
force through building space weaponry, training professionals, and strengthening
12
the organization. That will strengthen our national security in space and enable
the Air Force to become a space force.” 18
13
South Korean officials announced that they intended to spend $619 million
14
on space programs in 2022, a 15% increase from 2021 levels; of this, $175.8
million was slated for SLV development.19 $70 million was intended to be
15
spent on developing the Korea Positioning System, South Korea’s planned PNT
constellation of eight satellites to be deployed between 2027 and 2034.
11-02
Potential Military Utility

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
In theory, South Korea’s indigenously-developed space launch and ballistic
missile expertise could be leveraged for a future DA-ASAT capability. However,
given that South Korea has not tested additional technologies, such as hit-to-kill
intercept, it is unlikely to be very capable. Also, since South Korea does not
have an indigenous SSA capability yet, its ability to target objects in orbit is
questionable; however, it does intend to develop its SSA capabilities within
the middle of the decade and it has signed an SSA-sharing agreement with
the United States, it is possible that this could change. The South Korean Air
Force may have a basic EW counterspace capability through its Space Odyssey
2050 program, although again this is in very early stages (if it does indeed
exist anywhere outside a planning document).

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G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
0.1276°W
12

UNITED
THE

KING DOM
51.5072°N
Assessment / 1 RAF Fylingdales: The Station, Royal Air Force,

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
accessed February 21, 2022,
The United Kingdom has long played a supporting role in military space https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/sta-
activities through its participation in NATO and its bilateral relationship with tions/raf-fylingdales/.

the United States. Over the past few years, the United Kingdom has begun to 2 “RAF Fylingdales,” Wikipedia, last edited
add additional elements to increase its indigenous military space capabilities, February 6, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/RAF_Fylingdales#Systems.
primarily in SSA and policy, organization, and doctrine. To date, the United
Kingdom has not publicly announced any specific plans to develop offensive 3 “UK technology scans the skies for space haz-
ards,” RAL Space, accessed February 26, 2023,
counterspace capabilities. https://www.ralspace.stfc.ac.uk/Pages/UK-tech-
nology-scans-the-skies-for-space-hazards.aspx.

Specifics / 4 “UK technology scans the skies for space

hazards,” ibid.

Space Situational Awareness 5 “DOD Signs Space Data Sharing Agreement

RAF Fylingdales (See Imagery Appendix, pg. 15-31) has been the site of an with UK,” U.S. Strategic Command Public
Affairs, September 25, 2014,
operational radar since 1963, providing ballistic missile early warning to the https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/
U.S. and U.K. governments.1 Furthermore, as part of its participation in the News-Article-View/Article/983787/dod-signs-
space-data-sharing-agreement-with-uk/.
Space Surveillance Network, its solid-state phased array radar can track objects
to an altitude of 3000 nautical miles.2 UK space surveillance technology is 6 “Case Study: Monitor Your Satellites,” UK Space
Agency, May 10, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/gov-
being incorporated into the European Space Agency (ESA)’s first coordinated ernment/case-studies/monitor-your-satellites.
tracking campaign by contributing, via the UK Space Agency (UKSA), the 01
7 “How satellite operators are shaping a new
capabilities of the Chilbolton Observatory (a meteorological radar experimental collision assessment service,” UK Space
facility) and Space Insight’s Starbrook (an optical space surveillance sensor Agency Blog, October 18, 2022, https://space.
02
blog.gov.uk/2022/10/18/how-satellite-oper-
system).3 The Chilbolton Advanced Meteorological Radar (CAMRa) can detect ators-are-shaping-a-new-collision-assess-
objects with a radar cross section as small as 1 square meter as far as 1000 ment-service/.
03
km in altitude, while the Starbrook sensor can detect objects down to 1 meter 8 Guidance: UK Space Command, UK Ministry of
as far as 40,000 km in altitude.4 Defence, April 1, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/
04
guidance/uk-space-command.

The United Kingdom and the United States signed an SSA data sharing 9 National Space Strategy, HM Government,
05
September 2021, https://assets.publishing.
agreement in September 2014.5 service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/1034313/nation-
06
al-space-strategy.pdf.
In early 2022, the UKSA announced a pilot program called “Monitor Your
Satellites,” a service where operators of UK-based satellites could get warnings 10 National Space Strategy, ibid, p. 6.
07
of close approaches between their satellites and other space objects.6 While 11 National Space Strategy, ibid, p. 20.
it was invite-only at the beginning, it was eventually opened up to all UK 08
operators and by October 2022, one-third of all UK satellite operators had
signed up for the service.7 09

Counterspace Policy, Doctrine, and Organization 10

The United Kingdom participates in the US-led Combined Space Operations
Center; other participants include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and 11
New Zealand.
12
The UK Space Command was formed in April 2021 (at RAF High Wycombe,
where the RAF Air Command is located as well) with the goal of providing 13
command and control of all the United Kingdom’s space capabilities; oversight
of the development of space-based capabilities; strengthen space workforce 14
development; and continue the United Kingdom’s participation in the Combined
Space Operations initiative. 8 It is operated jointly by the RAF, Royal Navy, 15
and the Army.

The United Kingdom released its national space strategy (NSS) in September
2021.9 In it, the United Kingdom identified its national vision for space, which
included “the UK will grow as a space nation” and “We will protect and defend
UK interests in space. 10 It had five goals for the United Kingdom in space; number
four was “Protect and defend our national interests in and through space,”
mostly through resiliency, collaboration, and integration.11 It also highlighted
the need for diplomacy, stating, “The UK will deliver global leadership on a safe,
sustainable, and secure space environment working through international
12-01
 12 National Space Strategy, ibid, p. 33. and intergovernmental forums and with our partners and allies.” 12 Specifically
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

13 National Space Strategy, ibid, p. 34.

relevant to this document, the NSS also said, “We will support global stability
through arms control and non-proliferation regimes and will work with allies
14 Defence Space Strategy: Operationalising
the Space Domain, UK Ministry of Defence,
to deter hostile activity against space systems including the use of weapons
February 2022, https://assets.publishing.ser- in space.” 13
vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/1051456/
20220120-UK_Defence_Space_Strategy_ The United Kingdom released its defence space strategy (DSS) in February
Feb_22.pdf, p. 6.
2022. In it, the United Kingdom noted the need “to both protect and defend
15 Defence Space Strategy, ibid, p. 7. the UK’s equities in space and the services derived from space assets.” 14 UK
16 Defence Space Strategy, ibid.
Space Command is tasked with leading the country’s approach to space.
Investments in SDA, space control, and command and control are prioritized;
17 Defence Space Strategy, ibid, p. 11-12.
a joint military-civilian National Space Operations Centre will be created
0 4/202 3

18 Defence Space Strategy, ibid, p. 19. through the enhancement of the UKSpOC (UK Space Operations Centre) and
19 Defence Space Strategy, ibid, p. 20.
cooperation with the UKSA.15 The “own, collaborate, or access” framework was
used to define how the United Kingdom will work to achieve space capabilities.16
20 Defence Space Strategy, ibid, p. 32.
It should be noted that space was described as the UK’s fifth operational
21 Sandra Erwin, “U.K. announces $2 billion domain, not a warfighting domain. China and Russia were identified as examples
in new funding for military space programs,”
Space News, February 1, 2022,
of international threats to space.17 One of the strategic themes was to protect
01
https://spacenews.com/u-k-announces-2- and defend; it called out SDA as a way in which the United Kingdom “will improve
billion-in-new-funding-for-military-space-
programs/.
our ability to generate appropriate measures to protect and defend our critical
02
space capabilities. This suite of integrated, high-tech capabilities that can
22 Erwin, “U.K. announces,” ibid.
collect, process, exploit and transmit data, information, and intelligence activity
03
23 Joint Doctrine Publication ( JDP) 0-40, UK Space in space.” 18 It also stated that the United Kingdom will work “to enhance
Power,’ UK Ministry of Defence, September
2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
space diplomacy, leveraging existing alliances and partnerships to establish
04
government/uploads/system/uploads/attach- norms of behaviour for the space domain.” 19 Finally, in discussing space control,
ment_data/file/1111805/JDP_0_40_UK_Space_
Power_web.pdf.
it stated that “we will invest over £145M in additional funding over the next 10
05
years. We will investigate mechanisms to deliver carefully calibrated effects to
24 JDP 0-40, ibid, p. v.
assure our access to, and operational independence in, space.” 20
25 JDP 0-40, ibid, p. 29.
06
26 JDP 0-40, ibid, p. 34.
As part of its new military space strategy, the United Kingdom intends to invest
07
$1.9 billion in military space satellite capabilities.21 Most of it is dedicated to the
27 JDP 0-40, ibid, p. v.
Istari program, which is planned to provide military ISR and laser communications
08
28 JDP 0-40, ibid, p. 80. capabilities; as well, it has the Minerva program, which is intended to create a
satellite network in support of military operations that can take in information
09
and process it from UK and ally satellites. According to Jeremy Quin, Minister
for Defense Procurement, these two satellite networks will be “building blocks”
10
of the United Kingdom’s future military space architecture.22

11
The United Kingdom released its keystone military doctrine publication on
space, Space Power, in September 2022.23 It is intended to “provide a basis for
12
understanding the utility of the space domain in the military context,” 24 and
identifies four key space power roles: space domain awareness, space control,
13
space support to operations, and space service support.25 Space control is
defined as “the use of defensive and offensive capabilities to assure access
14
and freedom of action in space.” 26 While the overall document is written to
follow what it calls a “NATO-first approach” (for example, it calls space one of
15
five interconnected “operational domains”), it notes that, “given the close ties
with United States Space Forces, it is also coherent with current United States
space doctrine.” 27 The doctrine notes that “deterrence in, through or using
space capabilities is not an independent activity but must form part of the wider
strategy. It is a whole-of-government activity to which Defence contributes,”
and emphasizes that UK deterrence posture “remains enshrined in NATO”
through article 5 of the NATO treaty.28
12-02
Potential Military Utility

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Although it possesses some of the underlying technologies, such as indigenous
ballistic missile expertise, the UK is very unlikely to develop DA-ASAT capabilities.
It has not expressed any interest in doing so and has not developed policies
allowing it as an option (its military space doctrine focuses largely on SSA
capabilities). It does not have an indigenous space launch capacity. The UK
has also not shown an interest in or the technological capability for a future
co-orbital ASAT program. Based on the UK’s solid existing SSA capabilities and
the evolution thereof (in terms of offering conjunction warnings to UK satellite
operators), it is possible that its SSA capabilities could provide some military
utility for both offensive and defensive counterspace operations.

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 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Cyber Counterspace
Capabilities
⁕
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
13

C A PA BIL I–
COUNTER–
C YB ER

S PAC E
GLOB AL

TIES
Assessment / 1 Eric Chabrow, “Aligning Electronic and Cyber

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Warfare,” Gov Info Security, July 10, 2012,
Multiple countries likely possess cyber capabilities that could be used against https://www.govinfosecurity.com/align-
space systems; however actual evidence of cyber attacks in the public domain ing-electronic-cyber-warfare-a-4930.

is limited. The United States, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have all 2 Andrea Gini, “Cyber Crime – From Cyber
demonstrated the ability and willingness to engage in offensive cyber attacks Space to Outer Space,” Space Safety Magazine,
February 14, 2014, http://www.spacesafe-
against non-space targets. Additionally, a growing number of non-state actors tymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/
are actively probing commercial satellite systems and discovering cyber cyber-security/cyber-crime-cyber-space-
outer-space/.
vulnerabilities that are similar in nature to those found in non-space systems.
This indicates that manufacturers and developers of space systems may not 3 Mark Holmes, “Cybersecurity Expert Assesses
Potential Threats to Satellites,” Via Satellite,
yet have reached the same level of cyber hardness as other sectors. But to date, February 21, 2017, http://www.satellitetoday.
there have only been a few publicly disclosed cyber attacks directly targeting com/technology/2017/02/21/cybersecurity-ex-
pert-assess-potential-threats-satellites/; David
space systems. Livingstone and Patricia Lewis, “Space, the
Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?,” Chatham
House research paper, September 2016,
There is a clear trend toward lower barriers to access, and widespread https://www.chathamhouse.org/
vulnerabilities coupled with reliance on relatively unsecured commercial sites/default/files/publications/re-
search/2016-09-22-space-final-frontier-cy-
space systems create the potential for non-state actors to carry out some bersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf; Madeline
counter-space cyber operations without nation-state assistance. However, Moon (Rapporteur), “The Space Domain and
Allied Defence,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
while this threat deserves attention and will likely grow in severity over the Defence and Security Committee, Sub-Com-
next decade, there remains a stark difference at present between the cyber mittee on Future Security and Defence Capa-
01
bilities, October 8, 2017, https://www.nato-pa.
attack capabilities of leading nation-states and other actors. int/download-file?filename=sites/default/
files/2017-11/2017%20-%20162%20DSCFC%20
02
17%20E%20rev%201%20fin%20-%20SPACE%20
Specifics / -%20MOON%20REPORT.pdf.
Cyber capabilities include a broad set of different tools and techniques aimed 03
4 Eric Sterner and Jennifer McArdle, “Cyber
at exploiting ever-changing vulnerabilities in each layer of the infrastructure that Threats in the Space Domain,” The American
underpins space access. Extant capabilities have demonstrated the capacity Foreign Policy Council, Defense Technology Pro-
04
gram Brief, March 31, 2016, https://www.afpc.
to produce a wide range of strategic and tactical effects, both destructive and org/uploads/documents/Defense%20Brief%20
non-destructive. These include theft, alteration, or denial of information, as Issue%2015.pdf; Mark Holmes, “Cybersecurity
05
Expert Assesses Potential Threats to Satellites,”
well as control or destruction of satellites, their subcomponents, or supporting Via Satellite, February 21, 2017, http://www.sat-
infrastructure. As space capabilities continue to shift towards incorporating ellitetoday.com/technology/2017/02/21/cyber-
06
security-expert-assess-potential-threats-sat-
more advanced on-board processing, all-digital components, software-defined ellites/; Jason D. Wood, “Strategic Security:
radios, packet-based protocols, and cloud-enabled high-performance computing, Toward an Integrated Nuclear, Space, and
07
Cyber Policy Framework,” accessed
the attack surface for cyber attacks is likely to increase. March 23, 2018, https://csis-website-prod.
s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/110916_
08
Wood.pdf.
Cyber attacks against space capabilities are similar to cyber attacks against non-
space systems. They often involve attempts to feed user-provided information to 09
a system that causes the software to perform in unexpected ways, commonly
known as “bugs”. In some cases, bugs can be exploited to crash systems, run 10
unauthorized code, and/or gain unauthorized access. Other common cyber
attacks exploit the lack of, or faulty, authentication of users and commands. 11
The more software features or components a system has, and the more types
and channels of data it processes, the higher the attack surface of potential 12
vulnerabilities that an attacker can exploit. There is also an unclear distinction
between cyber attacks and electronic warfare, with some arguing for a merger 13
of the two fields.1
14
Any cyber attack requires four things: access, vulnerability, a malicious payload,
and a command-and-control system.2 Three primary points of access exist for 15
exploitation, attack, and service denial of space assets in the cyber domain:
the supply chain, the extended land-based infrastructure that sustains
space-based assets—including ground stations, terminals, related companies,
and end-users—and the satellites themselves.3 Successful penetration of
any one of these may be sufficient to produce the desired espionage, ‘soft’-,
or ‘hard’-kill effects, and also enables the launching of additional follow-on
cyberattacks in other vectors.4 A wide and rapidly growing array of tools and
techniques threaten each of these levels.
13-01
 5 “Significant Security Deficiencies in NOAA’s As a result, cyber capabilities are critically important to the overall counter-
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Information Systems Creates Risks in its

National Critical Mission,” National Oceanic
space environment.5 One former senior military official has gone so far as
and Atmospheric Administration, July 15, 2014, to identify cyber vulnerabilities as the “No. 1 counter-space threat,” further
https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-
14-025-A.pdf; Mark Clayton, “Can military’s
underscoring their strategic significance. All major players appear extremely
satellite links be hacked? Cyber-security firm likely to continue the development and use of such capabilities.6 In 2017, the
cites concerns.,” Christian Science Monitor, April
25, 2014, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/
U.S. Intelligence Community testified in its annual report before the Senate
Passcode/2014/0425/Can-military-s-satellite- Select Committee on Intelligence that both Russia and China, driven by a
links-be-hacked-Cyber-security-firm-cites-
concerns; David Livingstone, “Cyberattacks
perceived need to offset U.S. military advantages, are certain to continue to
in Space: We Must Defend the Final Frontier,” pursue a “full range” of counter-space capabilities.7 Moreover, integration
Newsweek, November 26, 2014,
http://www.newsweek.com/cyberat-
and complementary use of an array of ASAT capabilities—and particularly an
tacks-space-we-must-defend-final-fron- increased “blending of EW and cyber-attack” capabilities—is likely to occur,
tier-287525; David Livingstone and Patricia
representing a growing sophistication in tools and techniques for the denial
0 4/202 3

Lewis, “Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecu-

rity?,” Chatham House research paper and degradation of C4ISR networks.8
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/publications/research/2016-09-22
-space-final-frontier-cybersecurity-living-
stone-lewis.pdf.

6 Kevin Pollpeter, ”Testimony Before the U.S.

-China Economic and Security Review Commis-
sion: Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons,”
CNA, February 2017, https://www.cna.org/CNA_
01
files/PDF/CPP-2017-U-014906-Final.pdf; Daniel
Coats, “Statement for the Record – Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
02
Community,” Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, February 13, 2018, https://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimo-
03
nies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.

7 Daniel Coats, “Statement for the Record –

04
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, May 11, 2017,
05
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News-
room/Testimonies/SASC%202017%20ATA%20
SFR%20-%20FINAL.PDF.
06
8 Ibid; see also Pollpeter, “Testimony Before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
07
Commission: Hearing on China’s Advanced
Weapons.”

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
13-02
Categories of Cyber Attacks on Space Systems 9 These are largely beyond the scope of this as-

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
sessment. For a brief discussion of such efforts
Parsing the exact nature and extent of cyber capabilities or development as part of broader counterspace programs,
efforts with any precision based on open sources is a fraught exercise. There see James Clapper, “Statement for the Record
– Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
have been only a few cases of publicly acknowledged cyber attacks against Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director
satellites, and even the information on those is incomplete. And cyber weapon of National Intelligence,” February 26, 2015,
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclas-
development is one of the most sensitive and closely guarded secrets kept by sified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf. For a
nation states. Still, some general conclusions may be drawn about the capabilities useful taxonomy of supply chain attacks, refer
to John Miller, “Supply Chain Attack Framework
in existence based on a technical assessment of vulnerabilities and a review of and Attack Patterns,” The MITRE Corporation,
known instances of use. December 2013, https://www.mitre.org/sites/
default/files/publications/supply-chain-at-
tack-framework-14-0228.pdf.
First, the risks to global supply chain security posed by the increasing use of
10 One high-profile instance was the discovery by
faulty or counterfeit microelectronics and materials produced abroad have a Cambridge security researcher of a backdoor
been well-documented.9 Deliberate installation of hidden back doors in built into nonencrypted Microsemi chips
utilized in a range of sensitive assets including
hardware or software products is another primary threat vector. Such back weapons systems. Some experts alleged that
doors have been found in Chinese electronics 10 and Russian software packages 11 this could be leveraged to attack and disable or
destroy millions of systems. See Steven Musil,
used by U.S. aerospace companies. The United States, meanwhile, has engaged “Experts Dispute Threat Posed by Backdoor
in a broad and persistent campaign of computer network exploitation (CNE) Found in Chinese Chip,” CNET, May 29, 2012,
https://www.cnet.com/news/experts-dispute-
operations for decades, with targets including foreign telecommunications threat-posed-by-backdoor-found-in-chinese-
and aerospace infrastructure.12 There have also been media reports of U.S. chip/; Others disagreed, contending that the
01
backdoor was either accidental or so difficult to
intelligence agencies intercepting shipments of commercial equipment to exploit as to be largely irrelevant. See Robert
install “implants” 13, and creating backdoors in commercial encryption software.14 Graham, “Bogus Story: No Chinese Backdoor
02
in Military Chip,” Errata Security, May 28, 2012,
Similar cyber-espionage operations can be directed against satellite https://blog.erratasec.com/2012/05/bogus-
manufacturers, parts suppliers, software brokers, launch service providers, story-no-chinese-backdoor-in.html.
03
and telecommunications companies are also common. Physical infiltration, 11 For example, Russia-based Kaspersky was
social engineering, and network exploitation of these targets can provide used extensively by numerous governmental
04
agencies, contractors, and private companies,
access to the design schematics, physical components, and software packages and has been implicated in allowing Russia
of a given satellite. backdoor access to various networks including
05
that of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).
See Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “Russian
The second category of cyber attacks are those directed against the links Hackers Stole NSA Data on U.S. Cyber Defense,”
06
The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2017,
between satellites and ground control stations. Most of these are likely to be https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, an umbrella term that involves an attacker hackers-stole-nsa-data-on-u-s-cyber-de-
07
fense-1507222108.
inserting themselves between the sender and receiver, thus able to monitor
information being passed or perhaps even modify it. It is also possible - although 12 Of particular note are the operations of the
08
Office of Tailored Access Operations (TAO)
often very difficult—to use a cyber attack against the command and control in the NSA, housed jointly with U.S. Cyber
(C2) link to gain access to the satellite bus or payloads. This type of attack is Command (Cybercom) at Fort Meade. The
09
TAO has consistently and comprehensively
made easier if the C2 system is unencrypted or does not properly authenticate penetrated foreign computer and telecommu-
commands. If such an attack is successful, there is little limit to the damage nications systems, through an ever-evolving
10
range of methods including the installation of
that can be done. physical backdoors in Chinese components
or systems at various stages of production,
11
distribution, and use to ensure remote access.
See Matthew Aid, “Inside the NSA’s Ultra-Se-
cret China Hacking Group,” Foreign Policy,
12
June 10, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2013/06/10/inside_the_nsa_s_ultra_se-
cret_china_hacking_group; “Documents Reveal
13
Top NSA Hacking Unit,” Der Spiegel, December
29, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-ef-
14
fort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html.

13 Sean Gallagher, “Photos of an NSA’Upgrade’

15
Factory Show Cisco Router Getting Implant,”
Arstechnica, May 14, 2014, https://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-
upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-
implant/.

14 Joseph Menn, “Exclusive: Secret Contract Tied

NSA and Security Industry Pioneer,” Reuters,
December 20, 2013, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-security-rsa/exclusive-se-
cret-contract-tied-nsa-and-security-indus-
try-pioneer-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220.
13-03
 15 Jill Stuart, “Comment: Satellite Industry Must Over the last decade, there have been a few public examples of satellite C2
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Invest in Cyber Security,” The Financial Times,

April 10, 2015, https://www.ft.com/con-
links being attacked (or alleged instances of attacks). In 2007, it was reported
tent/659ab77e-c276-11e4-ad89-00144feab7de. that the Tamil Tigers extremist separatist group successfully hacked ground
16 “2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China
C2 nodes and gained control of the broadcasting capabilities of a U.S.
Economic and Security Review Commission,” commercial satellite.15 From 2007 through 2009, there were multiple incidents
U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission,
November 2011, p. 216, https://www.uscc.gov/
of attacks against C2 links for NASA satellites that are thought to be attributed
sites/default/files/annual_reports/annual_re- to China, as detailed in the 2011 report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
port_full_11.pdf.
Review Commission.16 In October 2007, the Landsat 7 (1999-020A, 25682)
17 Jim Wolf, “China Key Suspect in U.S. Satel- remote sensing satellite experienced twelve minutes of interference. In June
lite Hacks; Commission,” Reuters, October
28, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/
2008, the Terra (1999-068A, 25994) remote sensing satellite experienced two
us-china-usa-satellite/china-key-suspect- minutes of interference, and the attackers achieved “all steps required to send
in-u-s-satellite-hacks-commission-idUSTRE-
commands but did not.” On July 23, 2008, Landsat 7 experienced another
0 4/202 3

79R4O320111028.
twelve minutes of interference, but the attackers did not gain access to the
18 Ibid.
C2 link. But on October 22, 2008, the Terra satellite experienced another nine
19 This allows easy access for signal interfer- minutes of interference, and once again the attackers gained control of the
ence or hijacking. See Andy Greenberg, “How
to Hack the Sky,” Forbes, February 2, 2010,
satellite but did not exercise it. Initial reports traced events to the Kongsberg
https://www.forbes.com/2010/02/02/hack- Satellite Services ground station at Svalbard, but they said their systems could
ers-cybercrime-cryptography-technology-se-
curity-satellite.html#2153b10f731f; Andrea
not command NASA satellites.17 General Robert Kehler, then commander of
01
Gini, “Cybercrime – From Cyber Space to United States Strategic Command, said there was no evidence to attribute the
Outer Space,” Space Safety Magazine,
February 14, 2014, http://www.spacesafe-
attacks at the time.18
tymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/
02
cyber-security/cyber-crime-cyber-space-
outer-space/.
The third category involves attacks on terrestrial C2 or data relay stations.
03
Techniques could include fly-overs with manned aircraft, unmanned aerial
20 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Daniel Porras,
“Cyber Arms Race in Space: Exploring India’s
systems (UAS), or weather balloons;19 signal disruption or hijacking through
04
Next Steps,” Observer Research Foundation proximate positioning of broadcasting equipment using a more powerful
Issue Brief, Issue No. 113, November 2015,
http://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/up-
signal, tapping the structure’s Internet or Ethernet cables, or piggybacking
05
loads/2015/12/Issue-Brief_113.pdf; Juliet Van off of the station’s own data relays; 20 physical access, through either covert
Wagenen, “WTA Urges Teleport Operators to
Improve on Cybersecurity,” Via Satellite,
infiltration or social engineering; 21 and network exploitation or attack, using
06
August 5, 2015, http://www.satellitetoday.com/ traditional means.22 Although many satellite C2 facilities are hardened against
innovation/2015/08/05/wta-urges-teleport-op-
erators-to-improve-on-cyber-security/.
cyber attacks and take precautions such as “air-gapping” critical networks,
07
there are examples of sophisticated State attackers being able to penetrate
21 Ibid.
such systems (albeit not specifically space-related air gapped networks).23 In
08
22 Ibid; this approach has been taken by China in June 2018, cybersecurity firm Symantec reported on a wide-ranging cyber
particular, see: Robert Lai and Syed Rahman,
“Analytic of China Cyberattack,” The Internation-
espionage campaign by a group named Thrip, likely based in China, that
09
al Journal of Multimedia and Its Applications, Vol included attacks against defense and space-related companies. According
4 No 3, June 2012, https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/267363551_Analytic_of_Chi-
to Symantec, Thrip targeted computers at a commercial operator running
10
na_Cyberattack. software that monitors and controls communications satellites.24
23 David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,”
IEEE Spectrum Magazine, February 26, 2013,
11
https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/
the-real-story-of-stuxnet.

12
24 Security Response Attack Investigation Team,
“Thrip: Espionage group hits satellite, telcoms,
and defense companies,” Symantec,
13
June 19, 2018, https://www.symantec.com/
blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satel-
lite-telecoms-defense-targets.
14

15
13-04
Also in this third category are cyber attacks against ground systems that process 25 Paul Martin, “NASA Cybersecurity: An

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Examination of the Agency’s Information
spatial data. NASA, for example, has long been the target of cyberattacks, Security,” testimony before the House Sub-
as have other space agencies around the world.25 In 2011, attackers gained full committee on Investigations and Oversight,
February 29, 2012, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/
access to 18 servers supporting multiple missions at the Jet Propulsion FINAL_written_statement_for_%20IT_%20
Laboratory and stole 87 gigabytes of data.26 In late 2014, attackers breached hearing_February_26_edit_v2.pdf; Nafeesa
Syeed, “Outer-Space Hacking a Top Concern for
NOAA’s computer network, including systems used to manage and disseminate NASA’s Cybersecurity Chief,” Bloomberg, April
satellite weather data and products for the National Environmental Satellite, 12, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-04-12/outer-space-hacking-a-
Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) and the National Earth System Prediction top-concern-for-nasa-s-cybersecurity-chief.
Capability (ESPC).27 Although the attack itself did not disrupt satellite data,
26 NASA Office of the Inspector General, “Cyber-
NOAA stopped providing satellite images to the National Weather Service and security Management and Oversight at the Jet
public-facing services were taken offline for two days while the systems were Propulsion Laboratory,” National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Report No. IG-19-022,
cleaned. While the U.S. government did not publicly attribute the attack, U.S. June 18, 2019, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-19-
Rep. Frank Wolf declared that “NOAA told me it was a hack and it was China.” 28 022.pdf.

The Symantec report on Thrip also claimed that the group attacked computers 27 Mary Pat Flaherty, Jason Samenow, and Lisa
running Geographic Information System (GIS) software used for tasks such Rein, “Chinese Hack U.S. Weather Systems,
Satellite Network,” Washington Post,
as developing custom geospatial applications or integrating location-based November 12, 2014, https://www.washing-
data into other applications and software for processing satellite imagery.29 In tonpost.com/local/chinese-hack-us-weath-
er-systems-satellite-network/2014/11/12/be-
a similar fashion, attackers from the hacker collective Anonymous reportedly f1206a-68e9-11e4-b053-65cea7903f2e_story.
breached the website of the Russian Space Research Institute (IKI) in March html?utm_term=.d01b2f4051a7.
01
2022 in response to the invasion of Ukraine.30 28 Ibid; Timothy Cama, “Report: Chinese
Hacked U.S. Weather Systems,” The Hill,
November 12, 2014, http://thehill.com/policy/ 02
A fourth category involves cyber attacks against the user segment of a space energy-environment/223871-report-chi-
system, often the terminals or devices used to receive or process a satellite nese-hacked-us-weather-systems.
03
signal. In many cases, these attacks are very similar to cyber attacks against 29 Security Response Attack Investigation
other types of computer equipment and focus on exploiting hardware or 04
30 Joseph Cox, “Hackers Breach Russian Space
software vulnerabilities in the devices. As an example, a group of U.S. university Research Institute Website,” Vice, March 3,
students developed a technique for attacking the software in common 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/z3n8ea/
05
hackers-breach-russian-space-research-insti-
commercial GPS receivers.31 The attack uses a specially built box that modifies tute-website.
the data content of real civil GPS signals and rebroadcasts them. When a GPS 06
Team, “Thrip: Espionage group hits satellite,
receiver tries to decode these malicious GPS signals, they can crash or go into telcoms, and defense companies,” Symantec,
constant reboot loops, effectively succumbing to a denial-of-service attack. June 19, 2018, https://www.symantec.com/
07
blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satel-
Another report in 2014 found that over 10,000 allegedly-secure very small lite-telecoms-defense-targets.
aperture terminals (VSATs) used for transmission of critical information— 08
31 Tyler Nighswander et al, “GPS Software
including classified defense-relevant communications, sensitive financial data, Attacks”, Carnegie Mellon University, 2012,
and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system data essential to https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~dbrumley/pdf/
09
Nighswander%20et%20al._2012_GPS%20soft-
the continued operation of power grids and oil rigs in the United States—were ware%20attacks.pdf.
easily scanned and penetrated from abroad due to a simple failure to change 10
32 Office of Inspector General, “Significant
default factory password settings or disable outward-facing virtual network Security Deficiencies in NOAA’s Information
(telnet) access.32 Systems Create Risks in Its National Critical
11
Mission,” U.S. Department of Commerce, July 15,
2014, https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublica-
tions/OIG-14-025-A.pdf; Ruben Santamarta, “A
Wake-Up Call for SATCOM Security,” IOActive, 12
2014, https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOAc-
tive_SATCOM_Security_WhitePaper.pdf; Bonnie
Zhu, Anthony Joseph, and Shankar Sastry, “A 13
Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems,”
Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference
on Internet of Things and 4th International 14
Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Com-
puting, October 19-22, 2011, https://ieeexplore.
ieee.org/document/6142258; Darlene Storm, 15
“Hackers Exploit SCADA Holes to Take Full Con-
trol of Critical Infrastructure,” ComputerWorld,
January 15, 2014, https://www.computerworld.
com/article/2475789/cybercrime-hacking/
hackers-exploit-scada-holes-to-take-full-con-
trol-of-critical-infrastructure.html.
13-05
 33 Matt Burgess, “A mysterious satellite hack Case Study: Russian Wiper Malware Attack on Viasat’s KA-SAT Service
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

has victims far beyond Ukraine,” Arstechnica,

March 24, 2022, https://arstechnica.com/infor-
A concrete example of cyber attacks against the user segment of a space system
mation-technology/2022/03/a-mysterious-sat- occurred in February 2022. Within hours of Russian troops crossing the
ellite-hack-has-victims-far-beyond-ukraine/.
border into Ukraine, tens of thousands of end user modems for the KA-SAT
34 “‘Cyberattack’ knocks thousands offline in satellite communications service, managed by the U.S.-based company Viasat,
Europe,” Insider Paper, March 4, 2022, https://
insiderpaper.com/cyberattack-knocks-thou-
went offline.33 The affected users included thousands of wind turbines in
sands-offline-in-europe/. Germany and many other individuals and businesses across Europe, including
35 “KA-SAT Network cyber attack overview,” Via-
the Ukrainian government and police, and other networks that resold the
sat, March 30, 2022, https://news.viasat.com/ KA-SAT service in France, Hungary, Greece, Italy, and Poland.34 Subsequent
blog/corporate/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-
overview.
details from Viasat revealed that the attack began with a denial-of-service
attack within Visat’s customer network that appeared to emanate from
36 Juan Andres-Guerrero-Saade, “AcidRain:
equipment located within Ukraine.35 This was followed by tens of thousands
0 4/202 3

A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe,”

SentinelLabs, March 31, 2022, https://www. of customer modems disconnecting from the network. Further analysis
sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wip-
er-rains-down-on-europe/.
discovered an external attacker used a misconfigured VPN appliance to gain
access to the management network for the KA-SAT service and sent a series
37 Dan Goodin, “US and its allies say Russia waged
cyberattack that took out satellite network,”
of malicious commands to overwrite data on user modems. Although Viasat
Arstechnica, May 10, 2022. https://arstechnica. originally claimed the modems were not permanently damaged, analysis
com/information-technology/2022/05/us-and-
its-allies-say-russia-waged-cyberattack-that-
done by the cyber security firm SentinelOne discovered a new type of
01
took-out-satellite-network/. destructive wiper malware called AcidRain was used in the attack, a claim
38 Anthony J. Blinken, “Attribute of Russia’s
later confirmed by Viasat.36
Malicious Cyber Activity Against Ukraine,” U.S.
02
Department of State, May 10, 2022, https://
www.state.gov/attribution-of-russias-mali-
On May 10, 2022, the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union
03
cious-cyber-activity-against-ukraine/. publicly attributed the cyber attack against Viasat’s KA-SAT services to Russia,
39 Jon Bateman, “Russia’s Wartime Cyber Opera-
and specifically to hackers working for the Main Directorate of the General
04
tions in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commonly known as the
and Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace, December 16, 2022, https://
GRU.37 U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that there were strong
05
carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/16/rus- similarities between the AcidRain wiper malware and other wiper malware
sia-s-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-mil-
itary-impacts-influences-and-implica-
used by Russian military cyber operators as part of the armed conflict in
06
tions-pub-88657. Ukraine.38
40 Jeff Foust and Brian Berger, “SpaceX shifts

07
resources to cybersecurity to address Starlink Independent analysts suggested that the aim of the cyber attack was to cripple
jamming,” Space News, March 5, 2022, https://
spacenews.com/spacex-shifts-resources-to-cy-
Ukrainian communications, noting that the attack occurred one hour before
08
bersecurity-to-address-starlink-jamming/. the first Russian troops crossed the border, although evidence of the attack’s
41 J.M. Porup, “It’s Surprisingly Simple to Hack
actual impact on the war remains under debate.39
a Satellite,” Motherboard, August 21, 2015,
09
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
bmjq5a/its-surprisingly-simple-to-hack-a-
Shortly after the attack, Ukrainian officials publicly called on SpaceX CEO Elon
10
satellite. Musk to provide Ukraine terminals for the Starlink broadband communications

42 Ibid.
system, which he did by the thousands. Ukraine was able to use Starlink to
11
replace many links in its civilian and government communications system,
and even used the service to directly support military operations against
12
Russia. As part of the rollout, Mr. Musk stated that SpaceX had “reprioritized to
cyber defense and overcoming signal jamming” and as of February 2023, the
13
Starlink service appears to have been remarkably resistant to further cyber
attacks.40
14
Iridium, a satellite communications company whose single largest client is the
15
Pentagon, provides another example of commercial satellite systems being
behind other sectors in cyber hardening. In 2008, Iridium reportedly boasted
that “the complexity of the Iridium air interface makes the challenge of
developing an Iridium L-Band monitoring device very difficult and probably
beyond the reach of all but the most determined adversaries”.41 A group of
hackers promptly determined that it was possible to effectively eavesdrop on
Iridium traffic with nothing more than a cheap, easily-accessible software-
defined radio and the processing power of an old, low-end laptop.42 While
development and launch of next-generation satellite networks including Iridium
NEXT should assist somewhat, this highlights the severity of the threat posed
by reliance on legacy infrastructure, and the insecurity of satellite architectures
13-06
generally. Other techniques, including the use of ransomware in embedded 43 Mark Holmes, “Cybersecurity Expert Assesses

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Potential Threats to Satellites,” Via Satellite,
space and aerospace systems and the transmission of malicious code from February 21, 2017, http://www.satellitetoday.
compromised ground stations, have also begun to emerge, with one large- com/technology/2017/02/21/cybersecurity-ex-
pert-assess-potential-threats-satellites/.
scale 2016 attack costing a mere estimated $1,000 worth of hardware to execute,
albeit with a substantial investment in time and effort.43 Even modern platforms 44 Ruben Santamarta, “A Wake-Up Call for
SATCOM Security,” IOActive, 2014,
with a “high degree of security” engineered-in are vulnerable to such attacks https://ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_SATCOM_
due to the degree to which they necessarily rely upon and interact with highly Security_WhitePaper.pdf; Office of Inspector
General, “Significant Security Deficiencies in
vulnerable legacy and civilian systems.44 NOAA’s Information Systems Create Risks in Its
National Critical Mission,” Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Commerce,
In 2014, Crowdstrike released a report tracking the activities of an advanced OIG-14-025-A, July 15, 2014, https://www.
persistent threat (APT), based in Shanghai and affiliated with the PLA General oig.doc.gov/Pages/Significant-Security-Defi-
ciencies-in-NOAA-Information-Systems-Cre-
Staff Department Third Department 12th Bureau Unit 61486—that subset of ate-Risks-in-Its-National-Critical-Mission.aspx.
what is “generally acknowledged to be China’s premier SIGINT collection and For more on penetration of ground stations
and upstream communications networks, see
analysis agency” dedicated specifically to “supporting China’s space surveillance also Kazuto Suzuki, “Satellites, the Floating
network” with a “functional mission involving satellites...inclusive of intercept Targets,” The World Today, February and March
2016, pp 15-16, https://www.chathamhouse.
of satellite communications.” 45 Dubbed “Putter Panda,” the group was found org/publications/the-world-today/2016-02/
to have conducted comprehensive and sustained penetration and cyber- satellites-floating-targets.

espionage operations targeted at the U.S. defense and European satellite and 45 CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda,”
aerospace industries since at least 2007.46 This included, among other things, CrowdStrike, June 9, 2014, https://cdn0.vox-cdn.
01
com/assets/4589853/crowdstrike-intelli-
the use of Remote Access Tools (RATs) on space technology targets, controlled gence-report-putter-panda.original.pdf.
from the physical location of the 12th Bureau’s headquarters. This toolset, the 02
46 Ibid.
report notes, “provide[d] a wide degree of control over a victim system and
can provide the opportunity to deploy additional tools at will.” 47 Another RAT 47 Ibid.
03
campaign labeled GhostShell, potentially linked to Iran, was discovered in July 48 Cyberreason Nocturnus, “Operation Ghost-
2021 targeting aerospace and telecommunications companies, mainly in the Shell: Novel RAT Targets Global Aerospace and
04
Telecoms Firms,” Cyberreason, October 6, 2021,
Middle East.48 https://www.cybereason.com/blog/opera-
tion-ghostshell-novel-rat-targets-global-aero-
space-and-telecoms-firms. 05
In August 2020, a presentation at the Blackhat USA 2020 conference outlined
multiple examples of insecure internet communications traveling over satellite 49 Dan Goodin, “Insecure satellite Internet
06
is threatening ship and plane safety,”
links.49 A researcher built an inexpensive setup that allows him to eavesdrop Arstechnica.com, August 5, 2020,
on Ku band signals from 18 geostationary communications satellites covering https://arstechnica.com/information-tech-
07
nology/2020/08/insecure-satellite-inter-
the Atlantic Ocean, South America, Europe, and Africa. The captured data net-is-threatening-ship-and-plane-safety/.
included numerous examples of sensitive data, such as aircraft navigational 08
50 Lily Hay Newman, “Researchers Used a Decom-
information, system administrator credentials for computer networks, and missioned Satellite to Broadcast Hacker TV,”
personal identifying data. The researcher also showed how an attacker can take Wired, March 30, 2022. https://www.wired.com/
09
story/satellite-hacking-anit-f1r-shadytel/.
advantage of the high latency of satellite internet links to hijack a connection.
In 2022, researchers demonstrated the ability to broadcast a signal through 51 Matt Burgess, “The Hacking of Starlink Ter-
10
minals Has Begun,” Wired, August 10, 2022,
the unused portion of a commercial satellite being decommissioned in GEO, https://www.wired.com/story/starlink-inter-
highlighting the lack of authentication and controls on many older satellites.50 net-dish-hack/.
11
In August 2022, another hacker demonstrated how to use physical access to 52 Stefan Tanase, “Satellite Turla: APT Command
a Starlink terminal to bypass security measures and access protected software, and Control in the Sky,” SecureList,
12
September 9, 2015, https://securelist.com/
and potentially the ability to upload custom firmware.51 satellite-turla-apt-command-and-control-in-
the-sky/72081/.
13
A related category, not strictly “counterspace” but nevertheless an important 53 Jack Stubbs and Christopher Bing, “Hacking
consideration in the context of cyberattacks on space assets, is the exploitation the Hackers: Russian Group Hijacked Iranian
14
Spying Operation, Officials Say,” Reuters,
of satellite links to facilitate the hacking of other targets. This recently made October 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
headlines when Kaspersky Labs discovered that Russian criminal syndicate article/us-russia-cyber/hacking-the-hack-
15
ers-russian-group-hijacked-iranian-spying-op-
Turla had been doing so to great effect since at least 2007.52 Turla’s technique, eration-officials-say-idUSKBN1X00AK.
which couples a compromised PC using satellite-based Internet with a MITM
54 Ibid.
attack, hijacks the IP addresses of legitimate users. American and British
officials have stated that the Turla group also attempted to masquerade as
Iranian hackers to mislead investigators.53 This approach allows the hacker to
anonymize Internet connections, impersonate legitimate high-speed Internet
users, spoof DNS requests, and gain access to private networks.54 When used
as an anonymizer for subsequent attacks against high-value targets, this
approach makes it very difficult for network analysts and law enforcement
agencies to correctly attribute operations, or to locate and disable command
13-07
 55 Ibid; Kim Zetter, “Russian Spy Gang Hijacks servers.55 Perhaps worst of all, information on these techniques is readily
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Satellite Links to Steal Data,” Wired,

September 9, 2015, https://www.wired.
available in the public domain, and the steps are easily replicable by any
com/2015/09/turla-russian-espionage-gang- motivated attacker with an intermediate skill level. Notably, the necessary tools
hijacks-satellite-connections-to-steal-data/.
(a low-budget satellite receiver card, open-source Linux applications, and
56 One amateur hacker’s presentation at a widely available network sniffing tools) cost only around $75 in total.56 A more
BlackHat conference in 2010 is illustrative:
Leonard Nve Egea, “Playing in a Satellite
sophisticated version of the technique that is harder to detect, differentiate,
Environment 1.2,” Black Hat, and counter can be achieved with only a satellite dish, cheap cables, and a
August 2010, http://www.blackhat.com/presen-
tations/bh-dc-10/Nve_Leonardo/BlackHat-DC-
satellite modem—a total cost of roughly $1,000.57 The downsides of this approach
2010-Nve-Playing-with-SAT-1.2-wp.pdf. are that satellite-based Internet is slow, and access through a hijacked account
57 Kim Zetter, “Russian Spy Gang Hijacks Satellite
is unreliable and user-dependent. The benefits to an attacker seeking to carry
Links to Steal Data,” Wired, September 9, 2015, out a sustained campaign with little risk of detection or successful attribution,
https://www.wired.com/2015/09/turla-rus-
however, are enormous.58
0 4/202 3

sian-espionage-gang-hijacks-satellite-connec-
tions-to-steal-data/.

58 Ibid.
Most leading subject matter experts maintain that across each of these areas,
despite some increase in awareness of the threat in recent years, the state of
59 David Livingstone and Patricia Lewis, “Space,
the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?”, Chatham
cybersecurity for satellite infrastructure remains dismal.59 This, in turn, provides
House, September 2016, https://www.chatham- both state and non-state actors with a back door into a wide array of space-
house.org/sites/default/files/publications/
research/2016-09-22-space-final-frontier-cy-
and ground-based critical infrastructures.
bersecurity-livingstone-lewis.pdf.
01
60 Ben Elgin, “Network Security Breaches
While little information is publicly available regarding other Russian cyberattacks
02
Plague NASA,” Bloomberg, November 20, targeted at space assets, Russia has demonstrated significant cyber attack
2008, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2008-11-19/network-security-breach-
capabilities in a range of other contexts, as well as the willingness to use them.
03
es-plague-nasa; Jason Fritz, “Satellite Hacking: In one of the few publicly known attacks against a satellite, in 1998 hackers
A Guide for the Perplexed,” The Bulletin of the
Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic
based in Russia hijacked control of a U.S.-German ROSAT deep-space monitoring
04
Studies, Vol 10 Issue 1, Article 3, 2013, satellite, then issued commands for it to rotate toward the sun, frying its optics
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Sat-
ellite-hacking%3A-A-guide-for-the-perplexed-
and rendering it useless.60 More recently, since the end of 2015, Russia has
05
Fritz/b7ba156257c4a3fef16183a4f153a46a- engaged in a coordinated, escalating cyber attack campaign in Georgia and
f821ee7b.
Ukraine that ranges from prolonged low-level cyber-espionage, sabotage,
06
61 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s and information warfare to the use of offensive cyber operations with kinetic
Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CNA, March 2017,
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-
effects.61 Most notably, this campaign included the physical incapacitation of
07
U-014231-1Rev.pdf; Azhar Unwal and Shaheen Ukrainian power grids.62 Cyber experts believe that, while the damage was
Ghori, “Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Infor-
mation War and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,”
limited and the resultant outages temporary, this was the result of deliberate
08
Military Cyber Affairs, Vol 1 Issue 1, Article 7, restraint on the part of Russia for signaling purposes, and that the sophistication
2015, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/
vol1/iss1/7/.
of the cyberattack and degree of access achieved would have allowed the
09
attackers to inflict extensive physical damage and bring the power stations
62 Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprec-
edented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,”
permanently offline had they wished to do so.63 As part of its ongoing war
10
Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired. against Ukraine since February 2022, Russia has systematically attacked the
com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedent-
ed-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.
Ukrainian power grid with destructive weapons.64
11
63 Ibid; “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the
Ukrainian Power Grid,” SANS Industrial Control
Systems, March 18, 2016, https://ics.sans.org/
12
media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf.

64 Joseph Majkut and Allegra Dawes, “Responding

13
to Russian Attacks on Ukraine’s Power Sector,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
November 8, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analy-
14
sis/responding-russian-attacks-ukraines-pow-
er-sector.

15
13-08
These examples have caused significant concern in other countries, including 65 “Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sec-
the United States. Since at least March 2016, for example, Russian governmental tors,” US-CERT, March 15, 2018,
actors have carried out a systematic and wide-ranging cyber offensive targeted https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-
074A; “Dragonfly: Western Energy Sector
at key U.S. government agencies and critical infrastructure sectors. A joint Targeted By Sophisticated Attack Group,”
report released in March 2018 by the Department of Homeland Security Symantec Corporation, October 20, 2017,
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intel-
(DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and supplemented by threat ligence/dragonfly-energy-sector-cyber-attacks.
intelligence from cybersecurity firms including Symantec, chronicled penetration
66 “Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting
and exploitation of computer networks and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sec-
across the nuclear, water, defense, aviation, critical manufacturing, and tors,” US-CERT, March 15, 2018,
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-
energy sectors, among others.65 Of particular note is the highly-sophisticated 074A.
character of these attacks, which appear to have deliberately chosen hard but
67 Dorothy Denning, “Iran’s Cyber Warfare
strategically vital targets and tested a flexible and advanced array of tools and Program is Now A Major Threat to the United
techniques, deployed as part of a two-step operation in which access would States,” Newsweek, December 12, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/irans-cyber-
first be gained to less-secure “staging targets,” whose networks were then used warfare-program-now-major-threat-united-
as additional attack vectors and malware repositories.66 Given these examples states-745427.

and many others, there is no reason to believe that Russia is incapable of 68 Mark Thompson, “Iranian Cyber Attack on
conducting similar operations in the space domain. New York Dam Shows Future of War,” Time,
March 24, 2016, http://time.com/4270728/iran-
cyber-attack-dam-fbi/; Evan Perez and Shimon
While there is no public evidence of government-sponsored Iranian cyber Prokupecz, “First on CNN: U.S. Plans to Publicly
01
Blame Iran for Dam Cyber Breach,” CNN, March
attacks directly targeted at space assets, Iranian cyber capabilities have 10, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/10/
exhibited steady growth in recent years. By the mid-2000s, a range of Islamic politics/iran-us-dam-cyber-attack/index.html.
02
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed Iranian hacktivist organizations had 69 For more on these attacks, as well as a com-
begun carrying out computer network attack and exploitation operations prehensive treatment of the past, present,
03
motivations, and likely future of Iranian oper-
against other nation-states. These escalated steadily over the ensuing decade: ations in cyberspace, refer to: “Iran’s External
by 2012, Iranian hackers were conducting cyberattacks with kinetic effects Targets,” Carnegie Endowment for International
04
Peace, January 4, 2018, http://carnegieendow-
against Saudi oil and gas infrastructure and engaging in sustained distributed ment.org/2018/01/04/iran-s-external-targets-
denial-of-service (DDOS) campaigns against major U.S. banks causing tens of pub-75141.
05
millions of dollars in losses.67 In 2013, hackers with apparent ties to the IRGC 70 Daniel Coats, “Statement for the Record –
successfully penetrated critical infrastructure in the United States, temporarily Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
06
Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director
gaining control over a dam in the New York suburbs.68 In late 2016 and early of National Intelligence, February 13, 2018,
2017, Iranian hackers engaged in a comprehensive cyber-espionage campaign https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/News-
07
room/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-
aimed at identifying and gaining leverage over certain outgoing and incoming SSCI.pdf.
American officials, particularly those affiliated with the State Department.69 08
71 Morgan Chalfant, “New Attacks Spark Con-
During the same time period, Iranian cyberattacks against Saudi Arabia resulted cerns About Iranian Cyber Threat,” The Hill,
in mass-deletion of data across “dozens” of networks, both government-owned March 11, 2018, http://thehill.com/policy/
09
cybersecurity/377672-new-attacks-spark-con-
and private.70 In early 2018, cybersecurity firm Symantec announced that cerns-about-iranian-cyber-threat; Morgan
“Chafer,” an Iran-based hacking group believed largely due to its choice of Chalfant, “Iranian Hacking Group Appears to
10
Expand International Operations,” The Hill,
targets to be government-affiliated, had successfully penetrated a range of February 28, 2018, http://thehill.com/policy/cy-
targets including defense contractors, aviation forms, a major Middle Eastern bersecurity/376015-iranian-hacking-group-ex-
11
pands-operations-to-international-targets.
telecommunications provider, and a variety of networks in Israel, Jordan, the
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, using both original tools and 12
exploits previously stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in 2017
by a third party.71 Given the consistent pattern of interest in and willingness 13
to use offensive cyber capabilities, as well as the tactical and strategic context
in which Iran finds itself, eventual deployment of such capabilities against 14
space-related infrastructure in at least limited ways appears highly likely, and
may have already occurred. 15
13-09
 72 David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, and Nicole North Korea’s cyber capabilities appear to be even more sophisticated, and
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North

Korean Cyberpower. No More,” New York
are likely to continue advancing rapidly, absent significant disruption on the
Times, October 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes. Peninsula.72 Particularly prominent examples of offensive cyber operations
com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hack-
ing-cyber-sony.html.
by North Korea-backed hackers include a highly-publicized 2014 hack of
Sony Pictures Entertainment, intended to prevent the theatrical release of a
73 Ibid.
film satirizing Kim Jong-un; 73 hacks of U.S. and South Korean civilian critical
74 Ibid. It is worth noting that these operations infrastructure and military networks, with outcomes ranging from insertion
are in no way one-sided: there is substantial
evidence of similar operations by both the U.S.
of digital kill-switches intended to paralyze power supplies on-demand to
and South Korean governments. successful theft of war plans; 74 WannaCry, a global ransomware attack in May
75 Thomas Bossert, “It’s Official: North Korea
2017 which made use of existing North Korean capabilities supplemented by
is Behind WannaCry,” The Wall Street Journal, stolen NSA tools and demonstrated a capability to shut down large swathes
December 18, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/
of the economy and critical industries around the world; 75 and frequent and
0 4/202 3

articles/its-official-north-korea-is-behind-wan-
nacry-1513642537; Ellen Nakashima and sustained cyber-espionage and cyber crime campaigns targeted at, among
Phillip Rucker, “U.S. Declares North Korea
Carried Out Massive WannaCry Cyberat-
other things, large banks and financial institutions,76 cryptocurrency exchanges,77
tack,”Washington Post, December 19, 2017, and defense and defense-adjacent companies.78 Many of these capabilities,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-set-to-declare-north-
especially those highlighted in the WannaCry incident, could cause tremendous
korea-carried-out-massive-wannacry-cyber- damage if targeted at terrestrial infrastructure supporting space operations.
attack/2017/12/18/509deb1c-e446-11e7-
a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html; “Investigation:
Other cyber tools and techniques with counter-space implications likely either
01
WannaCry Cyber Attack and the NHS,” National already exist or will in the not-too-distant future.
Audit Office, October 27, 2017,
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/up-

02
loads/2017/10/Investigation-WannaCry-cy- In February 2019, multiple anonymous sources claimed that the United States
ber-attack-and-the-NHS.pdf.
had an ongoing program of offensive cyber attacks aimed at undermining
03
76 David Sanger, David Kirkpatrick, and Nicole Iran’s ballistic missile program.79 The sources claimed that the program included
Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North
Korean Cyberpower. No More.” New York
cyber sabotage of Iran’s missiles and rockets and may have led to an increase
04
Times, October 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes. in recent launch failures. If true, the program would be the first public example
com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hack-
ing-cyber-sony.html; Choe Sang-Hun, “North
of cyber attacks being used to physically damage space capabilities.
Korea Tries to Make Hacking a Profitable
05
Center,” New York Times, July 27, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/world/
Potential Military Utility /
06
asia/north-korea-hacking-cybersecurity.html. Cyber weapons offer tremendous utility as both a situational replacement for
77 Rosie Perper, “New Evidence Reportedly
and complement to conventional counter-space capabilities. Several advantages
07
Puts North Korean Hackers Behind a List of are particularly noteworthy, although there are disadvantages as well.
High-Stakes Bitcoin Heists,” Business Insider,
January 19, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.

08
com/north-korea-lazarus-group-behind-cryp- The first advantage is the flexibility and nature of producible effects. Extant
tocurrency-cyber-attack-wannacry-so-
ny-2018-1.
cyber and electronic warfare capabilities can produce a range of effects,
09
including theft, alteration, or denial of information, as well as control or
78 Joe Uchil, “North Korean Hackers Target
U.S. Military Contractors,” The Hill,
destruction of satellites, their subcomponents, or supporting infrastructure.
10
August 15, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/ This allows the type and degree of counter-space operation to be narrowly
cybersecurity/346594-with-leaders-talking-nu-
clear-war-north-korean-hackers-target-us-mil-
tailored to the desired objective, in contrast to the comparatively blunt and
11
itary; Anthony Kasza, “The Blockbuster Saga single-note instrument that a kinetic ASAT represents. No other capability can
Continues,” Palo Alto Networks, August 14,
2017, https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.
fulfill such an espionage or data manipulation role, while the ability to reliably
12
com/2017/08/unit42-blockbuster-saga-con- produce kinetic outcomes of the desired severity and permanence holds
tinues/.
obvious appeal.
79 David Sanger and William Broad, “U.S. revives
13
secret program to sabotage Iranian missiles
and rockets,” New York Times, February 13,
The second advantage for cyber attacks in a counterspace role is access.
14
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/ Unlike conventional weapons which typically require either proximate
us/politics/iran-missile-launch-failures.html.
positioning or closing to target, both of which necessarily involve penetration
15
80 Eric Sterner and Jennifer McArdle, “Cyber of defended space, some types of cyber attacks require little or no direct
Threats to the Space Domain,” The American
Foreign Policy Council, March 2016, https://
access or can be effectuated by gaining access far in advance or targeting less
www.afpc.org/uploads/documents/De- closely-guarded nodes.80
fense%20Brief%20Issue%2015.pdf.
1 3-10
The third advantage is the difficulty of attributing cyber attacks. Cyber attacks 81 Todd Harrison et al, “Escalation and

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
Deterrence in the Second Space Age,”
are often substantially more difficult to trace and confidently attribute than Center for Security and International Studies,
conventional counter-space weapons, particularly kinetic weapons. This can October 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
escalation-and-deterrence-second-space-age.
be valuable, but also carries some risk of unintended escalation. The military
value of being able to carry out operations either undetected or in a deniable 82 For example, even the most rudimentary KKV
capability requires a comprehensive, reliable,
fashion is clear. However, many strategic theorists have noted the danger of and ideally relatively rapid and resilient launch
quick escalation that can attend such deliberately opaque approaches, as the infrastructure, launch vehicles, rocket engines,
onboard sensors and guidance systems, and a
difficulty of guaranteeing a reliable and proportional response can create warhead or highly-maneuverable satellite.
structural incentives for each side to move first in the event of an impending
83 “China’s Advanced Weapons,” Hearing Before
crisis. 81 These dangers are magnified by the potential for misattribution, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
whether incidental or deliberately engineered by actors intending to provoke Commission, February 23, 2017, https://www.
uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Chi-
a hostile response against another state. na’s%20Advanced%20Weapons.pdf.

84 Kevin Pollpeter et al, “China Dream, Space

Fourth, a rudimentary cyber capability can be dramatically faster, easier, and Dream: China’s Progress in Space Technolo-
less expensive to procure than kinetic alternatives. The barrier to entry for gies and Implications for the United States,”
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
basic capabilities can be exceptionally low as evidenced by the increased Commission, March 2, 2015, https://www.uscc.
number of hobbyists and students researching cyber vulnerabilities in space gov/research/china-dream-space-dream-chi-
nas-progress-space-technologies-and-impli-
systems. Advanced capabilities remain challenging to develop but will almost cations-united-states; “China’s Advanced Weap-
certainly become easier for new nation-states and even non-state actors to ons,” Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic
01
and Security Review Commission, February 23,
acquire in the coming years. In contrast, conventional counterspace operations 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
require expensive, time-consuming, and highly-visible development of an transcripts/China’s%20Advanced%20Weapons.
02
pdf; Daniel Coats, “Statement for the Record
extensive space program, including systems for space situational awareness Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intel-
and space tracking, telemetry, and command operations, as well as the ligence Community - Senate Select Committee
03
on Intelligence,” Office of the Director of National
counter-space capability itself and its supporting infrastructure.82 Thus, cyber Intelligence, May 11, 2017,
capabilities provide newcomers with an especially asymmetric means of https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/de-
04
fault/files/documents/os-coats-051117.pdf.
access-denial or cost infliction when confronting established space powers.
05
The main disadvantages of cyber capabilities are similar to that of other non-
kinetic counterspace methods: lack of ability to do strategic signaling, and 06
challenges in doing battle damage assessment. The inherent challenges in
attributing cyber capabilities also have the effect of making it difficult to use 07
the existence or use of offensive cyber counterspace for deterrence, signaling
intent, or preventing escalation. And it can also be difficult for an attacker to 08
know if their cyber attack will succeed, particularly in a militarily useful timeframe,
and if it will have the desired effect. It is always possible that the target has 09
detected the preparations, or patched the vulnerability, and may even be
able to deceive the attacker into thinking the attack worked, thus potentially 10
undermining the broader military campaign it supported.
11
A final point of note is the potential for joint “combined arms” anti-satellite
operations, leveraging ASAT interoperability to produce a multiplier effect 12
on the scale and effectiveness of counter-space operations.83 This approach
seeks to leverage cyber capabilities in ways complementary to physical ASATs 13
and vice-versa - by, for example, using co-orbital KKVs as a delivery vehicle
for EW capabilities, or using pre-installed back doors to deactivate sensors 14
or countermeasures in advance of a kinetic operation. China and Russia have
both explored such an idea from both the technical and doctrinal sides, and 15
there is clear evidence of interest and significant evidence pointing to actual
development on the part of the former.84
1 3-11
 The February 2022 cyber attack against Viasat exemplifies all of these advantages
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

and disadvantages. It was on the surface an extremely successful, and relatively

low-cost, attack that was expertly timed to synchronize with a joint combined
arms offensive and eliminate a critical space service in order to cripple Ukrainian
defenses. However, there is mixed evidence as to its actual impact on the
military operation and unlikely that those impacts lasted more than a few weeks
into the war. Within a month of the attack, Ukraine had procured access to
another satellite broadband communications system, Starlink, that has so far
proven much more resistant to cyber attacks.
0 4/202 3

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
1 3-12
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Appendix
One
⁕
G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
14

A NT I –
HISTORI–
CAL

SATELLITE

SPAC E
IN
TESTS
Historical Anti-Satellite Tests in Space by Country /

G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
This appendix lists known or suspected anti-satellite (ASAT) tests in space by
country. It provides known information about each test, including the date it
was conducted, launch site, launch vehicle, interceptor, and target (if known).
It also provides a short summary of the outcome of the test and whether it
generated any orbital debris.

Note that there may be different definitions for “success.” In some cases, the
goal of the test was to have an actual intercept of another space object, but in
other cases, the objective of the test was to track a specific star or pass within
a specific distance of another space object without an actual collision or
detonation of the warhead of the kill vehicle.

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
14-01
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

TABLE 14-1 — HISTORICAL U.S. ASAT TESTS IN SPACE

DATE ASAT SYSTEM ASAT TYPE LAUNCH SITE TARGET NOTES

Sept. 22, 1959 High Virgo (TX-20) Direct Ascent Unknown None Unknown results due to loss of telemetry

Oct. 13, 1959 Bold Orion Direct Ascent Unknown Explorer VI Success (passed within kill radius)

Oct. 1, 1961 SIP (NOTS-EV-2) Direct Ascent San Nicholas Island None Successful rocket test

Oct. 5, 1961 HiHo (NOTS-EV-1) Direct Ascent F4D-I None Rocket failure

Mar. 26, 1962 HiHo (NOTS-EV-1) Direct Ascent F4D-I None Rocket failure

May 5, 1962 SIP (NOTS-EV-2) Direct Ascent San Nicholas Island None Successful rocket test
0 4/202 3

Aug. 26, 1962 HiHo (NOTS-EV-1) Direct Ascent F4-C None Successful rocket test

Dec. 17, 1962 Program 505 Direct Ascent WSMR None Success (reached designated point in space)
(Nike Zeus)

Feb. 15, 1963 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None Successful intercept of designated point in space
(Nike Zeus)

Mar. 21, 1963 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None Unsuccessful attempt to intercept simulated satellite target
(Nike Zeus)
01
Apr. 19, 1963 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None Unsuccessful attempt to intercept simulated satellite target
(Nike Zeus)
02
May 24, 1963 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein Agena D Successful close intercept
(Nike Zeus)
03
Jan. 4, 1964 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None Successful intercept of a simulated satellite target
(Nike Zeus)
04
Feb. 14, 1964 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Transit 2A Success (passed within kill radius)
Rocket Body
05
Mar. 1, 1964 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown Success (primary missile scrubbed, backup missile passed
within kill radius)
06
Apr. 21, 1964 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown Success (passed within kill radius)

07 May 28, 1964 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown Failed (missed intercept point)

Nov. 16, 1964 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown Successful Combat Test Launch (passed within kill radius)
08
March 1965 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None –
(Nike Zeus)
09
Apr. 5, 1965 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Transit 2A Successful Combat Test Launch (passed within kill radius)
Rocket Body
10
June-July 1965 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None Four test intercepts, of which three were successful
(Nike Zeus)
11
Jan. 13, 1966 Program 505 Direct Ascent Kwajalein None Successful intercept with simulated target
(Nike Zeus)
12
Mar. 30, 1967 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown piece of Successful Combat Evaluation Launch (passed within kill
space debris radius)
13
May 15, 1968 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown Successful Combat Evaluation Launch (passed within kill radius)

14 Nov. 21, 1968 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown Successful Combat Evaluation Launch (passed within kill radius)

Mar. 28, 1970 Program 437 (Thor) Direct Ascent Johnston Atoll Unknown satellite Success (passed within kill radius)
15
Jan. 21, 1984 ASM-135 Direct Ascent Aircraft None ASM-135 missile fired from F-15 fighter, successful missile test

Nov. 13, 1984 ASM-135 Direct Ascent Aircraft Star Failed test

Sept. 13, 1985 ASM-135 Direct Ascent Aircraft Solwind Successful test, created 285 pieces of trackable orbital debris

Sept. 5, 1986 Delta 180 PAS Co-Orbital Cape Canaveral Delta 2 R/B Successful collision, debris generated

Aug. 22, 1986 ASM-135 Direct Ascent Aircraft Star Successful test in tracking

Sept. 29, 1986 ASM-135 Direct Ascent Aircraft Star Successful test in tracking

Feb. 20, 2008 SM-3 Direct Ascent USS Lake Erie USA 193 Successful test, debris generated
14-02
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
TABLE 14-2 — HISTORICAL RUSSIAN ASAT TESTS IN SPACE
DATE ASAT SYSTEM ASAT TYPE LAUNCH SITE TARGET NOTES

Nov. 1, 1963 Polyot 1 Co-orbital Baikonur None Engine and maneuvering test

Apr. 12, 1964 Polyot 2 Co-orbital Baikonur None Engine and maneuvering test

Oct. 27, 1967 IS Co-orbital Baikonur None First launch of KKV

Oct. 20, 1968 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 248 Two successful intercepts, debris created

Oct. 23, 1970 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 373 Two successful intercepts, debris created

Feb. 25, 1971 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 394 Intercept, debris created

Mar. 18, 1971 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 400 No intercept, different approach of target

Dec. 3, 1971 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 459 Successful intercept, debris created

Feb. 16, 1976 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 803 Two successful intercepts, debris created

July 9, 1976 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 839 Potential intercept, no debris created

Dec. 17, 1976 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 880 Successful intercept, debris created

May 23, 1977 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 909 Two unsuccessful intercepts, no debris created
01
Oct. 26, 1977 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 959 Successful intercept, no debris created

Dec. 21, 1977 IS Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 967 Unsuccessful intercept 02

May 19, 1978 IS-M Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 970 Successful intercept, debris created
03
Apr. 18, 1980 IS-M Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 1171 Unsuccessful intercept, debris created

Feb. 2, 1981 IS-M Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 1241 Two failed intercepts, no debris created 04

June 18, 1982 IS-M Co-orbital Baikonur Cosmos 1375 Successful intercept, debris created
05
Nov. 20, 1990 Naryad Co-orbital Baikonur None No intercept

Dec. 20, 1991 Naryad Co-orbital Baikonur None No intercept 06

Dec. 26, 1994 Naryad Co-orbital Baikonur None Potential intercept, debris created
07
Aug. 12, 2014 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Rocket test (unsuccessful)

Apr. 22, 2015 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Rocket test (unsuccessful) 08

Nov. 18, 2015 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Rocket test (successful)
09
May 25, 2016 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Rocket test (successful)

Dec. 16, 2016 Nudol Direct Ascent Central Russia None Rocket test (successful) 10

Oct. 30, 2017 Cosmos 2521 Co-orbital – – Released subsatellite at relatively high speed
(Burevestnik?) 11

Mar. 26, 2018 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None First test from TEL
12
Dec. 23, 2018 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Potential KKV, no intercept

June 14, 2019 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Potential KKV, no intercept 13

September 2019? Cosmos 2536 Co-orbital Plesetsk Cosmos 2535 High speed RPO pass, potential ASAT test
(Burevestnik?) or collision 14

Apr. 15, 2020 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Potential intercept, debris created
15
July 15, 2020 Cosmos 2536 Co-orbital Plesetsk None Released subsatellite at relatively high speed
Burevestnik?

Dec. 16, 2020 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Potential KKV, no intercept

April 2021 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk None Unknown

Nov. 15, 2021 Nudol Direct Ascent Plesetsk Cosmos 1408 Successful intercept, debris created
14-03
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

TABLE 14-3 — HISTORICAL CHINESE ASAT TESTS IN SPACE

DATE ASAT SYSTEM ASAT TYPE LAUNCH SITE TARGET NOTES

July 5, 2005 SC-19 Direct Ascent Xichang None known Likely rocket test

Feb. 6, 2006 SC-19 Direct Ascent Xichang None known Likely near-miss of orbital target

Jan. 11, 2007 SC-19 Direct Ascent Xichang FY-1C satellite Destruction of orbital target,
debris created

Jan. 11, 2010 SC-19 Direct Ascent Korla CSS-X-11 ballistic missile launched from Jiuquan Destruction of target

Jan. 27, 2013 Possible SC-19 Direct Ascent Korla Unknown ballistic missile launched from Jiuquan Destruction of target

May 13, 2013 Possible DN-2 Direct Ascent Xichang None known Likely rocket test
0 4/202 3

July 23, 2014 Possible DN-2 Direct Ascent Korla? Likely ballistic missile launched from Jiuquan Likely intercept test
( Jiuquan?)

Oct. 30, 2015 Possible DN-3 Direct Ascent Korla None known, possible ballistic missile Likely rocket test

July 23, 2017 Possible DN-3 Direct Ascent Jiuquan? Likely ballistic missile Likely intercept test

Feb. 5, 2018 Possible DN-3 Direct Ascent Korla CSS-5 ballistic missile Likely intercept test

Feb. 4, 2021 Possible DN-3 Korla Likely ballistic Suborbital Likely intercept test
01 missile

Jun. 21, 2022 Possible DN-3 Korla Likely ballistic Suborbital Likely intercept test
02 missile

03

04
TABLE 14-4 — HISTORICAL INDIAN ASAT TESTS IN SPACE
DATE ASAT SYSTEM ASAT TYPE LAUNCH SITE TARGET NOTES
05
Feb. 12, 2019 PDV-MK II Direct Ascent Abdul Kalam Island Microsat-R Unsuccessful intercept

06 Mar. 27, 2019 PDV-MK II Direct Ascent Abdul Kalam Island Microsat-R Successful intercept, debris created

07

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Appendix
Two
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G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
15

RE L AT ED
OF

TIES
SPACE
CO U N TE R–

FACILI–
I M AGERY
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-1 — FORT GREELY GBI FIELD

9 July 2017
UNITED STATES >
Fort Greely N
20 x GBI silos

63.953987°N -145.725365°W
(GBI Silos—image shown)

14 x GBI silos

6 x GBI silos

01

Fort Greeley ABM site, United States 02

03
Fort Greely, located in Alaska, Function: ABM Field
possesses 40 silos for the GBI
04
missile, the interceptor component Associated Programs: GBI
for the GMD system.
05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-01
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-2 — VANDENBERG SPACE LAUNCH COMPLEX 6

10 July 2016
UNITED STATES >

N
Vandenberg Air Force Base

34.751622°N -120.619366°W SLC 6

(SLC 2E)
0 4/202 3

34.755560°N -120.622473°W
(SLC2W)

34.640221°N -120.589544°W
(SLC 3E)

01 34.581422°N -120.626792°W
(SLC 6—image shown)
02 Vandenberg space launch center, United States

34.739657°N -120.619205°W
03 (LC 576-E)
Vandenberg Air Force Base in Function: Space Launch Complex
California houses various launch
04
facilities used to deliver military Associated Programs: —
payloads into orbit. Shown here
05
is Space Launch Complex 6 (“Slick Key Dates: —
Six”) that was planned to support
06
the Manned Orbital Laboratory
(MOL) and West Coast Space Shuttle
07
launches. Most recently, it has
supported Athena and Delta IV
08
launches.

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-02
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LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-3 — CAPE CANAVERAL X-37B HANGAR

3 February 2020
UNITED STATES > X- 37B hangar

N
Cape Canaveral

28.583414°N -80.582891°W
(SLC 41)

28.532311°N -80.566601°W
(SLC 37)

28.532311°N -80.566601°W
(X-37B Hangar—image shown)

01

Cape Canaveral space launch center, United States 02

03
Cape Canaveral Space Force Station Function: Space Launch Complex
in Florida houses various launch
04
facilities used to deliver military Associated Programs: X-37B
payloads into orbit and is co-located
05
with the Kennedy Space Center, which Key Dates: —
supports NASA’s human spaceflight
06
program. Most recently, Cape
Canaveral has become the home
07
of the USSF’s X-37B spaceplane.
It launches from SLC 41 and began
08
landing at the Kennedy Space
Center’s Shuttle Landing Facility
09
with OTV-4 in May 2017.

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-03
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-4 — KAPUSTIN YAR MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE

28 December 2020
RUSSIA >
Kapustin Yar N

Radar complexes

48.794055°N 45.734890°E
Tactical SAM test area
(SAM test complex)
0 4/202 3

48.662984°N 45.685747°E
(SAM checkout complex)
Strategic SAM test area
48.569969°N 45.903070°E
(Ballistic missile test complex—
image shown)
01
48.770544°N 46.303367°E
02 (Missile test complex) Kapustin Yar missile test complex, Russia

03
Kapustin Yar, located in Astrakhan Function: Missile test and training
Oblast, has long supported Russian complex
04
ballistic missile and missile defense
testing as well as some early space Associated Programs: Nudol
05
launches. The mobile ICBM training
and launch area at Kapustin Yar is a Key Dates:
06
possible location for the December
December 16, 2016
16, 2016, Nudol ASAT test.
07 (Possible Nudol ASAT test)

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-04
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-5 — PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER MOBILE MISSILE
LAUNCH COMPLEX

11 July 2005
RUSSIA >
Plesetsk N

63.008092°N 41.551308°E
Launch position
(Mobile missile launch complex—
image shown) TEL shelter

01

02
Plesetsk missile test complex, Russia

03

The Plesetsk mobile missile launch Function: Missile launch complex

04
complex consists of a TEL garage
with a retractable roof for conducting Associated Programs: Nudol
05
mobile ICBM launches and a separate
launch pad. Either location represents Key Dates:
06
a possible site for the Nudol ASAT
August 12, 2014
tests conducted at Plesetsk.
(Nudol ASAT test) 07

April 22, 2015

08
(Nudol ASAT test)

November 18, 2015 09

(Nudol ASAT test)

10
May 25, 2016
(Nudol ASAT test)
11
November 15, 2021
(Nudol ASAT test) 12

13

14

15
15-05
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-6 — PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SITE 133

9 May 2020
RUSSIA >
Plesetsk N

Rockot launch pad

63.008092°N 41.551308°E
(Site 133—image shown)
0 4/202 3

01

02 Plesetsk Site 133, Russia

03
Site 133 at Plesetsk contains the Function: Space launch complex
launch pad for the Rockot booster,
04
which was used to launch the first Associated Programs: Nivelir
set of Russian RPO payloads into
05
LEO in 2013-2015. Key Dates:

06 November 20, 1990

(Potential Naryad-V launch)

07
December 20, 1991
(Potential Naryad-V launch)
08
December 26, 1994
09 (Potential Naryad-V launch)

December 25, 2013

10
(Launch of Cosmos 2491)

11 May 23, 2014

(Launch of Cosmos 2499)

12
March 31, 2015
(Launch of Cosmos 2504)
13

14

15
15-06
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-7 — PLESETSK SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SITE 43

25 September 2020
RUSSIA >
Plesetsk N

62.927217°N 40.449530°E Pad 4, Soyuz-2-1v

(Site 43, Pads 3 and 4—image shown)

Pad 3, Soyuz-2-1b

01

Plesetsk Site 43, Russia 02

03
Site 43 at Plesetsk contains the launch Function: Space launch facility
pad for the Soyuz-2-1v rocket, which
04
was used launch multiple Russian Associated Programs: Nivelir,
RPO payloads into LEO since 2017, Burevestnik
05
including Cosmos 2519, Cosmos 2535,
and Cosmos 2542 that were involved Key Dates:
06
in potential co-orbital ASAT tests.
June 23, 2017
(Launch of Cosmos 2519) 07

July 10, 2019

08
(Launch of Cosmos 2535 and Cosmos 2536)

November 25, 2019 09

(Launch of Cosmos 2542)

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-07
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-8 — PLESETSK AREA 141 BUREVESTNIK FACILITIES

28 August 2022 New structure

RUSSIA >
Plesetsk N

62.769056°N 40.373730°E
(Burevestnik construction —image shown)
0 4/202 3

01
New structure under construction

02 Plesetsk Area 141, Russia

03
Area 141 at Plesetsk is under Function: Support facility
construction to support the
04
Burevestnik program, which is Associated Programs: Burevestnik
believed to include an air-launched
05
co-orbital ASAT. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-08
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-9 — SARY SHAGAN ABM SILOS

Date not given

RUSSIA >
Sary Shagan N

ABM silo

46.443219°N 72.849398°E
(Site 35 ABM test complex—image shown)

ABM silo

01

Sary Shagan ABM test complex, Kazakhstan 02

03
Sary Shagan is a long- Function: Key Dates:
standing Russian anti- Support facility
November 2, 1999 04
ballistic missile testing
(ABM test launch, 53T6)
facility located in Associated
05
Kazakhstan. Site 35 Programs: 51T6, October 2, 2002
possesses two silos for 53T6, 53T6M (ABM test launch, 51T6)
06
conducting tests and
November 29, 2004
training launches of the
(ABM test launch, 53T6) 07
53T6 ABM.
December 5, 2006
08
(ABM test launch, 53T6)

October 11, 2007 09

(ABM test launch, 53T6)

10
October 30, 2007
(ABM test launch, 53T6)
11
October 29, 2009
(ABM test launch, 53T6) 12

December 20, 2011

13
(ABM test launch, 53T6M)

October 30, 2013 14

(ABM test launch, 53T6)

15
May 8, 2014
(ABM test launch, 53T6)

June 9, 2015
(ABM test launch, 53T6)

June 21, 2016

(ABM test launch, 53T6)

June 16, 2017

(ABM test launch, 53T6
or 53T6M)
15-09
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-10 — BAIKONUR COSMODROME SITE 90

18 June 2019
RUSSIA >
Baikonur N

Launch pad Launch pad

46.079749°N 62.932500°E
(Site 90, IS launch complex—image shown)
0 4/202 3

01

02 Baikonur space launch center, Kazakhstan

03
While the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Function: Space launch complex
Kazakhstan is most famous as the
04
historical launch site for Russia’s Associated Programs: IS, IS-M
human spaceflight program, it has
05
also supported many military Key Dates:
launches. Site 90 was operated as
06 October 27, 1967
a test launch site for the IS co-orbital
(First test launch of IS ASAT)
ASAT program, using the UR-200
07
and Tsyklon-2A boosters.

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
1 5-10
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-11 — JIUQUAN SUBORBITAL LAUNCH COMPLEX

16 October 2014
CHINA > TEL pad
Jiuquan N

41.281777°N 100.306390°E
(ASAT/ABM target launch site—image shown)

TEL pad

01

Jiuquan missile test complex, China 02

Function: Missile launch complex 03

A launch complex at the Jiuquan
Space Launch Center in the Gobi
Associated Programs: SC-19, DN-1, 04
Desert, Inner Mongolia, is used for
testing mobile ballistic missiles. DN-3
05
The image shows two TEL launch
pads that may be used to launch Key Dates:
06
suborbital targets for ASAT testing. January 11, 2010
(Target launch supporting SC-19 launch
07
from Korla)

January 20, 2013 08

(Target launch supporting SC-19 launch
from Korla) 09

July 23, 2014 10

(Target launch supporting DN-2 or SC-19
launch from Korla)
11
October 31, 2015
(Possible target launch supporting DN-3 12
launch from Korla)
13
December 9, 2016
(Possible target launch supporting DN-3
14
launch from Korla,

July 23, 2017 15

(Possible target launch supporting DN-3
launch from Korla)
1 5-11
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-12 — KORLA WEST TEST COMPLEX

25 October 2020
CHINA >
Korla West N

41.537300°N 86.353317°E
(Garrison complex—image shown)
0 4/202 3

41.537667°N 86.372073°E
(ABM/ASAT launch pad)

New construction
Test site garrison

01

02 Korla missile test complex, China

03
The Korla West test complex Function: ASAT complex
near the city of Korla in Xinjiang
04
is used for testing various ASAT Associated Programs: SC-19/DN-1,
and ABM/ATBM systems. A garrison DN-3
05
complex serves the facility, with
ASAT launches occurring from a Key Dates:
06
launch pad to the east.
January 11, 2010
07 (SC-19 ASAT test)

January 20, 2013

08
(SC-19 ASAT test)

09 July 23, 2014

(SC-19 ASAT test)
10
October 31, 2015
(DN-3 ASAT test)
11
December 9, 2016
12 (DN-3 ASAT test)

July 23, 2017

13
(DN-3 ASAT test)

14

15
15-12
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-13 — KORLA WEST LAUNCH PAD

25 October 2020
CHINA >
Korla West TEL Shelter
N

41.537667°N 86.372073°E
(ABM/ASAT launch pad—image shown)

Launch pad

01

Korla missile test complex, China 02

03
The ASAT launch pad at Korla West Function: —
employs a relocatable shelter for TEL
04
concealment. The image shows a Associated Programs: —
TEL shelter placed on the launch pad.
05
Key Dates:

January 11, 2010 06

(SC-19 ASAT test)

07
January 20, 2013
(SC-19 ASAT test)
08
July 23, 2014
(DN-2 or SC-19 ASAT test) 09

October 31, 2015

10
(DN-3 ASAT test)

December 9, 2016 11
(DN-3 ASAT test)

12
July 23, 2017
(DN-3 ASAT test)
13

14

15
15-1 3
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-14 — TAIYUAN SPACE LAUNCH CENTER MOBILE LAUNCH PAD

16 September 2020
CHINA >

N
Taiyuan

Launch pad

Launch pad
38.840519°N 111.604648°E
(Possible ASAT/ABM target launch site—
0 4/202 3

image shown)

TEL shelter

Launch pad
01

02 Taiyuan space launch center, China

03
Taiyuan Space Launch Center in Function: Missile test complex
Shanxi Province possesses multiple
04
launch pads serving mobile missile Associated Programs: DN-3
development. The northern pad,
05
constructed between 2012 and 2013, Key Dates:
possesses a TEL shelter translating
06 December 9, 2016
on rails for launches. Of the
(Possible target launch supporting DN-3
southern pads, the northernmost
07 launch from Korla)
one possesses a large relocatable
shelter for concealing ICBM-sized July 23, 2017
08
TELs. The TEL shelter is large enough (Possible target launch supporting DN-3
to permit erecting of the missile launch from Korla)
09
tube under cover.

10

11

12

13

14

15
1 5-14
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-15 — XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER NORTH ASAT PAD

28 January 2020
CHINA >
Xichang N

TEL shelter

28.249140°N 102.022942°E
(Northern ABM/ASAT and target
Construction ongoing
launch pad—image shown)

Launch pad

01

Xichang space launch center, China 02

03
Xichang Space Launch Center in Function: Missile test complex
Sichuan possesses launch pads at
04
the northwest and southeast end of Associated Programs: SC-19
the facility possibly supporting SC-19
05
and DN-2 ASAT tests. This image Key Dates:
shows the pad to the NW, which has
a relocatable shelter and ongoing July 5, 2005 06
(SC-19 ASAT test)
construction.
07
February 6, 2006
(SC-19 ASAT test)
08
January 11, 2007
(SC-19 ASAT test) 09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-15
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-16 — XICHANG SPACE LAUNCH CENTER SOUTH ASAT PAD

28 January 2020
CHINA >
Xichang N
Launch pad

28.242775°N 102.032946°E
(Southern ABM/ASAT and target launch
0 4/202 3

pad—image shown)

01

02 Xichang space launch center, China

03
This image shows the SE ASAT Function: Missile test complex
launch pad at Xichang, which was
04
the likely launch site for the ASAT Associated Programs: DN-2
test on May 13, 2013, that went
05
nearly to GEO. Key Dates:

06 July 5, 2005
(SC-19 ASAT test)

07
February 6, 2006
(SC-19 ASAT test)
08
January 11, 2007
09 (SC-19 ASAT test)

May 13, 2013

10
(DN-2 ASAT test)

11

12

13

14

15
1 5-16
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-17 — SATISH DHAWAN SPACE CENTRE

5 January 2019
INDIA >

N
Satish Dhawan

13.733280°N 80.234840°E
(First Launch Pad—image shown)

13.719751°N 80.230431°E First Launch Pad

(Second Launch Pad)

01

Satish Dhawan Space Center 02

03
Satish Dhawan Space Centre, located Function: Space launch complex
in Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh, is
04
India’s primary space launch center. Associated Programs: PSLV

05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
1 5-17
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-18 — ABDUL KALAM ISLAND LAUNCH COMPLEX

28 February 2020
INDIA >
Abdul Kalam Island N

20.755135°N 87.088511°E
(Launch Complex IV—image shown)
Launch position
0 4/202 3

Retractable shelter

01

02 Wheeler Island, India

03
The Integrated Test Range complex Function: Missile test complex
at Abdul Kalam Island (formerly
04
Wheeler Island) is the primary test Associated Programs: PDV
site for India’s antiballistic missile
05
systems. It was also the launch site Key Dates:
for both of India’s DA-ASAT tests in
06 February 12, 2019
February and March 2019.
(Unsuccessful DA-ASAT test)

07
March 27, 2019
(Successful DA-ASAT test)
08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
1 5-18
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-19 — SEMNAN SPACE CENTER

6 February 2019
IRAN >

N
Semnan

Retraction tracks

35.23472°N 53.92083°E
(Safir Launch Pad—image shown)

35.2583°N 53.9547°E
Launch pad
(Imam Khomeini Spaceport)

Retractable gantry

01

Semnan, Iran 02

03
Semnan Space Center is Iran’s Function: Space launch complex
primary space launch facility, located
04
50 kilometers southeast of the Associated Programs: Safir, Simorgh
city of Semnan in the north of the
05
country. The image shows the Imam Key Dates: —
Khomeini Spaceport, which is the
06
site for the Simorgh SLV.

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
1 5-19
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-20 — SHAHRUD LAUNCH SITE

26 October 2014
IRAN >

N
Shahrud

Launch pad
36.200599°N 055.333928°E
0 4/202 3

Retractable gantry

Retraction tracks

01

02 Shahrud, Iran

03
Shahrud space launch facility was Function: Space launch complex
built approximately 40 kilometers SE
04
from the town of Shahrud in Semnan Associated Programs: Qassed
province and appears to be the launch
05
site for Iran’s military space launches. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-20
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-21 — TANEGASHIMA SPACE CENTER

8 December 2015
JAPAN >

N
Tanegashima

Launch pad 2

30.402291°N 130.974102°E

Vehicle assembly building

Launch pad 1
01

Tanegashima Island, Japan 02

03
Tanegashima Space Center is Japan’s Function: —
largest space launch facility and
04
is located on the southeast coast Associated Programs: —
of Tanegashima island, just south
05
of Kyushu. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-21
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-22 — TONGHAE SATELLITE LAUNCHING GROUND

5 November 2019
NORTH KOREA >
Tonghae N

Abandoned, incomplete launch pad

40.85°N 129.666667°E
0 4/202 3

Derelict launch pad

01

02 Kalma, North Korea

03
Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground, Function: Space launch complex
also known as Musudan-ri, is a
04
ballistic missile and space launch Associated Programs: TD-1
site in North Korea.
05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-2 2
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
LAUNCH COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-23 — SOHAE SATELLITE LAUNCHING STATION

1 December 2020
NORTH KOREA >

N
Sohae
Moveable structure

Assembly hall
39.660°N 124.705°E
Retraction tracks

Launch gantry

01

Sohae, North Korea 02

03
Tonghae Satellite Launching Function: Space launch complex
Ground, also known as Tongch’ang-
04
dong Space Launch Center and Associated Programs: Unha
Pongdong-ri, is a ballistic missile and
05
space launch site in North Korea. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-2 3
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS FIGURE 15-24 — MIRACL LASER

AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
COMPLEXES /

UNITED STATES >

Fixed laser sites

32.632037°N -106.333804°W
0 4/202 3

01

02

03
The Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Function: Fixed laser site
Laser (MIRACL) is a megawatt-class
04
laser weapon research and test Associated Programs: MIRACL
facility located at White Sands Missile
05
Range in New Mexico. It first became Key Dates: —
operational in 1980 and in 1997 was
06
used to attempt to blind the MSTI-3
satellite in an Air Force test.
07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-24
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS FIGURE 15-25 — PERESVET DEPLOYMENT SITE NEAR BARNNAUL
AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
12 September 2020
COMPLEXES / N

RUSSIA >
Peresvet shelter
Mobile laser
deployment sites

56.899222°N 40.578117°E
(Teykovo)

Peresvet
56.573328°N 48.039010°E
(Yoshkar Ola)

58.133634°N 60.522106°E
(Svobodnyy) Sliding shelter retracted

55.270300°N 83.017993°E 01
(Novosibirsk)
Barnaul Peresvet site, Russia 02
53.555585°N 83.825132°E
(Barnaul—image shown) 03
Russia has recently deployed its Function: Mobile laser deployment site
new Peresvet mobile laser dazzler
04
system to five sites, all of which are Associated Programs: Peresvet
located near mobile ICBM garrisons.
05
The above image shows the Peresvet Key Dates: —
shelter near Barnaul in the Altai Krai
06
region, with the Peresvet vehicle
itself partially emerging from the
07
building.

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-2 5
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS FIGURE 15-26 — KALINA LASER COMPLEX NEAR ZELENCHUKSKAYAUDE
AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
23 March 2022
COMPLEXES /

RUSSIA > Lidar building

Fixed laser site

43.717130°N 041.227706°E
0 4/202 3

01 Possible Kalina laser

02 Storozhevaya-2, Russia

03
Russia is constructing a new laser Function: Fixed laser site
system called Kalina at the site of the
04
Krona space surveillance complex, Associated Programs: Kalina
located several kilometers west of
05
Zelenchukskaya. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-26
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS FIGURE 15-27 — TOBOL ELECTRONIC WARFARE COMPLEX NEAR ULAN-UDE
AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
COMPLEXES /

RUSSIA >
Tobol Electronic
Warfare sites

56.014836°N 38.006669°E
(8282/1—Shcholkovo)

51.856779°N 107.986240°E
(8282/3—Ulan-Ude—image shown)

44.019977°N 131.756142°E
(8282/4—Ussuriysk Primorskiy)

58.445332°N 092.269218°E 01
(8282/5—Yeniseisk)
02
54.939364°N 20.240636°E
(8282/6— Mobile site near Pionerskiy) 03
The Tobol complexes contain Function: Fixed EW complex
multiple satellite antennas that
44.931381°N 40.989706°E can be used for both offensive Associated Programs: Tobol 04
(8282/7— Mobile site near Armavir)
and defensive electronic warfare
05
purposes. Two of the sites, 8282/6 Key Dates: —
near Pionerskiy and 8282/7 near
06
Armavir, are parking locations for
mobile sensors.
07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-27
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS FIGURE 15-28 — LASER TEST SITE NEAR MIANYANG
AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
28 February 2020
COMPLEXES /
Sliding-roof shelter N
CHINA >
Laser test sites
Gas storage tank

31.532158°N 104.740708°E
(Mianyang—image shown)
0 4/202 3

31.901428°N 117.162222°E
(Hefei)

41.761422°N 87.418331°E
(Bohu) Gas storage tank

01 34.7475°N 113.781767°E Sliding-roof shelter

(Zhengzhou)
02 Mianyang possible laser site, China

43.790506°N 125.442814°E
03 (Changchun)
China currently has five potential Function: Fixed laser site
facilities for conducting research and
04
development of high-power directed Associated Programs: —
energy weapons in a counterspace
05
role. The image above shows one Key Dates: —
suspected facility near Mianyang in
06
Sichuan Province.

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-28
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS FIGURE 15-29 — LASER TEST SITE NEAR BOHU
AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
15 November 2013
COMPLEXES /
Sliding-roof shelter N
CHINA >
Laser test sites
Possible covered gas storage tank

Sliding-roof shelter

31.532158°N 104.740708°E
(Mianyang)

31.901428°N 117.162222°E Sensors

(Hefei)

41.761422°N 87.418331°E
(Bohu—image shown)
Sliding-roof shelter

34.7475°N 113.781767°E 01
Gas storage tank
(Zhengzhou)
Bohu possible laser site, China 02
43.790506°N 125.442814°E
(Changchun) 03
The above image shows a second Function: Fixed laser site
suspected laser test site near Bohu,
04
which is close to the Korla West Associated Programs: —
missile test facility that is prominent
05
in Chinese DA-ASAT testing. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-29
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-30 — CAPE COD MISSILE WARNING RADAR

6 October 2018
UNITED STATES >

N
Space surveillance network

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)
0 4/202 3

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod—image shown)
AN/FPS-123 PAVE PAWS

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

01 64.290006°N 149.191381°W
(Clear)
02 Cape Cod Air Force Station, United States

54.3616°N 0.6697°W
03 (Fylingdales)
The U.S. military operates multiple Function: Radar
phased array radars with the
04 52.736644°N 174.091617°E primary purpose of missile warning Associated Programs: SSN
(Cobra Dane)
but also with a space situational
05
awareness secondary function. The Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W above image shows one of these
06 (PARCS)
radars, the AN/FPS-123 PAVE PAWS,
located at Cape Code Air Force
07 30.573°N 86.215°W Station in Massachusetts, from which
(Eglin)
it has coverage over much of the
08
northeastern coast of the United
8.723375°N 167.718564°E States.
09 (Space Fence)

10 42.620033°N 71.490289°W
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
12 (Globus II)

13 9.394789°N 167.47925°E
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
15 (GEODSS Diego Garcia)

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-3 0
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-31 — FYLINGDALES MISSILE WARNING RADAR

1 July 2018
UNITED STATES >

N
Space surveillance network

39.136111°N 121.350831°W AN/FPS-132 UEWR

(Beale)

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

64.290006°N 149.191381°W 01
(Clear)
RAF Fylingdales, United Kingdom 02
54.3616°N 0.6697°W
(Fylingdales—image shown) 03
The above image shows the AN/ Function: Radar
FPS-126 radar located at Royal Air
52.736644°N 174.091617°E Force (RAF) Fylingdales in North Associated Programs: SSN 04
(Cobra Dane)
Yorkshire, England. Note that the
05
RAF Fylingdales radar has three Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W faces, giving it 360-degree coverage,
(PARCS) 06
compared to the two faces of the
Cod radar.
30.573°N 86.215°W 07
(Eglin)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
(Space Fence) 09

42.620033°N 71.490289°W 10
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
(Globus II) 12

9.394789°N 167.47925°E 13
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
(GEODSS Diego Garcia) 15

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-31
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-32 — EGLIN SPACE SURVEILLANCE RADAR

29 March 2013
UNITED STATES >

N
Space surveillance network
AN/FPS-85 transmitter

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)
0 4/202 3

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

01 64.290006°N 149.191381°W AN/FPS-85 receiver

(Clear)
02 Eglin Air Force Base, United States

54.3616°N 0.6697°W
03 (Fylingdales)
The above image shows the AN/FPS- Function: Radar
85 phased array radar located at
04 52.736644°N 174.091617°E Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. It has Associated Programs: SSN
(Cobra Dane)
one face but can track objects at
05
altitudes up to 36,000 kilometers. Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W
06 (PARCS)

07 30.573°N 86.215°W
(Eglin—image shown)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
09 (Space Fence)

10 42.620033°N 71.490289°W
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
12 (Globus II)

13 9.394789°N 167.47925°E
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
15 (GEODSS Diego Garcia)

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-32
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-33 — KWAJALEIN S-BAND SPACE FENCE

3 March 2019
UNITED STATES >
Space surveillance network N

Space fence transmitter

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)
Space fence receiver
64.290006°N 149.191381°W 01
(Clear)
Kwajalein Island, Kwajalein Atoll 02
54.3616°N 0.6697°W
(Fylingdales) 03
The above image shows the S-Band Function: Radar
Space Fence located on Kwajalein
52.736644°N 174.091617°E Atoll in the South Pacific. This system Associated Programs: SSN 04
(Cobra Dane)
became operational in 2020 and
05
can track objects as small as a few Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W centimeters in size out to 36,000
(PARCS) 06
kilometers.

30.573°N 86.215°W 07
(Eglin)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
(Space Fence—image shown) 09

42.620033°N 71.490289°W 10
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
(Globus II) 12

9.394789°N 167.47925°E 13
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
(GEODSS Diego Garcia) 15

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-33
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-34 — LINCOLN SPACE SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX

23 June 2019
UNITED STATES > N
Space surveillance network
Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar

Haystack Auxiliary Radar

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)
0 4/202 3

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)
Millstone Hill Radar

01 64.290006°N 149.191381°W
(Clear)
02 Lincoln space surveillance complex, United States

54.3616°N 0.6697°W
03 (Fylingdales)
The above image shows the Lincoln Function: Radar complex
Space Surveillance Complex located
04 52.736644°N 174.091617°E near Boston, Massachusetts, which Associated Programs: SSN
(Cobra Dane)
has multiple dish and phased array
05
radars for tracking and characterizing Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W space objects out to 36,000
06 (PARCS)
kilometers.

07 30.573°N 86.215°W
(Eglin)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
09 (Space Fence)

10 42.620033°N 71.490289°W
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex
11 —image shown)

12 70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
(Globus II)

13
9.394789°N 167.47925°E
14 (Reagan Test Site)

15 7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
(GEODSS Diego Garcia)

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-3 4
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-35 — GLOBUS II RADAR

UNITED STATES >

Space surveillance network

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

64.290006°N 149.191381°W 01
(Clear)
02
54.3616°N 0.6697°W
(Fylingdales) 03
The above image shows the Globus Function: Radar
II radar, located in Vardø, on the
52.736644°N 174.091617°E island of Vårberget in Norway. It is Associated Programs: SSN 04
(Cobra Dane)
a single dish mechanical tracking
05
radar for tracking and characterizing Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W space objects out to 36,000
(PARCS) 06
kilometers and contributes to the
U.S. SSN.
30.573°N 86.215°W 07
(Eglin)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
(Space Fence) 09

42.620033°N 71.490289°W 10
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
(Globus II—image shown) 12

9.394789°N 167.47925°E 13
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
(GEODSS Diego Garcia) 15

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-35
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-36 — REAGAN TEST SITE

7 October 2019
UNITED STATES >
N
Space surveillance network

TRADEX radar

ALCOR radar
39.136111°N 121.350831°W ALTAIR radar
(Beale)
0 4/202 3

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod) MMW radar

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

01 64.290006°N 149.191381°W
(Clear)
02 Roi-Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll

54.3616°N 0.6697°W
03 (Fylingdales)
The image above shows the Reagan Function: Radar complex
Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll, which
04 52.736644°N 174.091617°E contains multiple radars that were Associated Programs: SSN
(Cobra Dane)
originally used for missile defense
05
testing and currently support both Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W missile defense and SSA missions.
06 (PARCS)

07 30.573°N 86.215°W
(Eglin)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
09 (Space Fence)

10 42.620033°N 71.490289°W
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
12 (Globus II)

13 9.394789°N 167.47925°E
(Reagan Test Site—image shown)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
15 (GEODSS Diego Garcia)

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-3 6
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-37 — GEODSS DIEGO GARCIA

UNITED STATES >

Space surveillance network

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

64.290006°N 149.191381°W 01
(Clear)
02
54.3616°N 0.6697°W
(Fylingdales) 03
The above image shows the Ground- Function: Optical telescope complex
based Electro-Optical Deep Space
52.736644°N 174.091617°E Surveillance (GEODSS) complex Associated Programs: SSN 04
(Cobra Dane)
located on Diego Garcia, British Indian
05
Ocean Territory, which includes a Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W 1-meter optical telescope. The Diego
(PARCS) 06
Garcia installation is one of three
GEODSS sites, the other two are
30.573°N 86.215°W located in Socorro, New Mexico, and 07
(Eglin)
on the island of Maui, Hawaii.
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
(Space Fence) 09

42.620033°N 71.490289°W 10
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
(Globus II) 12

9.394789°N 167.47925°E 13
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
(GEODSS Diego Garcia—image shown) 15

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-37
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-38 — HOLT C-BAND RADAR IN EXMOUTH

18 November 2020
UNITED STATES >

N
Space surveillance network

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)
0 4/202 3

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)
C-Band radar
76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

01 64.290006°N 149.191381°W
(Clear)
02 Exmouth, Australia

54.3616°N 0.6697°W
03 (Fylingdales)
The image above shows the C-Band Function: Radar
radar moved from Antigua Island in
04 52.736644°N 174.091617°E the Atlantic to Naval Communication Associated Programs: SSN
(Cobra Dane)
Station Harold E. Holt near Exmouth,
05
Western Australia, to augment the Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W SSN’s coverage in the Southern
06 (PARCS)
Hemisphere.

07 30.573°N 86.215°W
(Eglin)
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
09 (Space Fence)

10 42.620033°N 71.490289°W
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
12 (Globus II)

13 9.394789°N 167.47925°E
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
15 (GEODSS Diego Garcia)

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar—image shown)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-3 8
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-39 — SPACE SURVEILLANCE TELESCOPE IN EXMOUTH

UNITED STATES >

Space surveillance network

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

64.290006°N 149.191381°W 01
(Clear)
02
54.3616°N 0.6697°W
(Fylingdales) 03
The image above shows the Space Function: Optical telescope
Surveillance Telescope (SST), which
52.736644°N 174.091617°E is a 3.5-meter wide field of view Associated Programs: SSN 04
(Cobra Dane)
telescope originally developed by
05
DARPA in New Mexico before being Key Dates: —
48.724475°N 97.899864°W relocated to Naval Communication
(PARCS) 06
Station Harold E. Holt near Exmouth,
Western Australia, to augment the
30.573°N 86.215°W SSN’s coverage in the Southern 07
(Eglin)
Hemisphere.
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
(Space Fence) 09

42.620033°N 71.490289°W 10
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
(Globus II) 12

9.394789°N 167.47925°E 13
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
(GEODSS Diego Garcia) 15

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope—image shown)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and
Supercomputing Observatory)
15-39
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-40 — AIR FORCE MAUI OPTICAL AND SUPERCOMPUTING
OBSERVATORY

14 January 2013
UNITED STATES >

N
Space surveillance network 1.6 m telescope

AEOS telescope

39.136111°N 121.350831°W
(Beale)
0 4/202 3

41.752219°N 70.538061°W
(Cod)
2 x 1.2 m telescopes

76.570308°N 68.299256°W
(Thule)

01 64.290006°N 149.191381°W
(Clear)
02
54.3616°N 0.6697°W Air Force Maui Optical and Supercomputing observatory, United States

03 (Fylingdales)

The image above shows the Air Force Function: Optical telescope complex
04 52.736644°N 174.091617°E Maui Optical and Supercomputing
(Cobra Dane)
Observatory located on the island of Associated Programs: SSN
05
Maui in Hawaii. It includes multiple
48.724475°N 97.899864°W electro-optical sensors for tracking Key Dates: —
06 (PARCS)
objects in deep space, including the
Advanced Electro Optical System
07 30.573°N 86.215°W (AEOS) telescope that can image
(Eglin)
objects in LEO.
08
8.723375°N 167.718564°E
09 (Space Fence)

10 42.620033°N 71.490289°W
(Lincoln Space Surveillance Complex)
11
70.36639722°N 31.12687500°E
12 (Globus II)

13 9.394789°N 167.47925°E
(Reagan Test Site)
14
7.41227222°S 72.45240556°E
15 (GEODSS Diego Garcia)

21.816631°S 114.165617°E
(Holt C-Band Radar)

-21.895703°S 114.089939°E
(Space Surveillance Telescope)

20.7088°N 156.2578°W
(Air Force Maui Optical and Supercomputing
Observatory—image shown)
15-40
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-41 — VORONEZH RADAR AT ORSK

30 October 2020
RUSSIA >

N
Radar complexes

Control center

60.275210°N 30.545593°E
(77Ya6M)

51.273673°N 58.959036°E
(77Ya6M—image shown)

58.506337°N 92.045261°E
77Ya6M radar array
(77Ya6DM)

53.139759°N 83.680803°E 01
(77Ya6DM)
Orsk Voronezh-M site, Russia 02
54.857482°N 20.182510°E
(77Ya6DM) 03
The image above shows the Function: Radar
Voronezh-VP array near Orsk, one
44.925428°N 40.983915°E of several such radars in operational Associated Programs: Voronezh 04
(77Ya6DM)
use or under construction.
05
Key Dates: —
52.855571°N 103.232513°E
(77Ya6VP) 06

67.613910°N 63.752342°E 07
(under construction)
08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-41
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-42 — DARYAL RADAR AT PECHORA

30 September 2020
RUSSIA >
Radar complexes

N
65.209966°N 57.285247°E
(Daryal—image shown)
0 4/202 3

5N79 Daryal receiver

52.848887°N 26.470524°E
(Volga)

5N79 Daryal transmitter

01

02 Pechora Daryal site, Russia

03
The image above shows the Daryal Function: Radar
bistatic array near Pechora.
04
Associated Programs: Daryal/Volga

05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-42
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-43 — DNEPR SITE RADAR AT SARY SHAGAN

1 September 2019
RUSSIA >
Radar complexes N

Dnepr radar
52.874943°N 103.260566°E
(Dnestr)

52.877874°N 103.272584°E
(Dnepr—image shown)

46.603278°N 74.530860°E
(Dnepr—image shown)

68.113720°N 33.910522°E 01
(Daugava)
Sary Shagan Dnepr site, Kazakhstan 02

03
The image above shows a Dnepr Function: Radar
radar array at Sary Shagan.
04
Associated Programs: Dnepr/Dnestr

05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-43
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-44 — DON-2N SITE AT SOFRINO

4 June 2019
RUSSIA > Don-2N radar complex
Radar complexes N

Circular radar array

56.173299°N 37.769327°E
(Don-2N—image shown)
0 4/202 3

55.219146°N 37.294505°E
(Dunai-3M)

01

02 Sofrino Don-2N site, Russia

03
The image above shows the Don-2N Function: Radar
radar, whose NATO codename is Pill
04
Box, near Sofrino outside of Moscow. Associated Programs: A-135
It is a critical part of the A-135 ABM
05
system. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-4 4
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-45 — DUNAI-3M RADAR AT CHEKHOV

17 June 2020
RUSSIA >

N
Radar complexes
Dunai-3U transmitter

14Ts031 transmitter
56.173299°N 37.769327°E
(Don-2N)

Dunai-3U receiver
55.219146°N 37.294505°E
(Dunai-3M—image shown)

14Ts031 receiver

01

Chekhov radar site, Russia 02

03
The image above shows a Dunai-3M Function: Radar
radar at Chekhov, which was part of
04
the A-135 ABM system. Associated Programs: A-135

05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-45
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-46 — KRONA RADAR COMPLEX NEAR STOROZHEVAYA

23 October 2020
RUSSIA >

N
Radar and optical
telescope complexes

Centimeter-band parabolic antennas

43.826155°N 41.343355°E
(Radar—image shown)
0 4/202 3

42.935368°N 132.576247°E
(Radar)

43.718100°N 41.227653°E
(30J6 Electro-optical)
Decimeter-band radar antenna
01

02 Storozhevaya Krona site, Russia

03
The above image shows the Krona Function: Radar
complex near Storozhevaya. Krona
04
employs both electro-optical Associated Programs: Krona
and radar sensors for satellite
05
identification and tracking. Pictured Key Dates: —
are the decimeter and centimeter
06
band radar antennas.

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-46
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-47 — KRONA 30J6 OPTICAL COMPLEX NEAR STOROZHEVAYA

23 October 2020
RUSSIA >

N
Radar and optical
telescope complexes

43.826155°N 41.343355°E
(Radar) Laser housing

42.935368°N 132.576247°E
(Radar)

43.718100°N 41.227653°E
(30J6 Electro-optical—image shown)

01
Optical telescope

Storozhevaya 30J6 site, Russia 02

03
The above image shows the 30J6 Function: Optical telescope
component of the Krona complex
04
near Storozhevaya, which contains Associated Programs: Krona
the optical telescopes and lasers.
05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-47
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-48 — OKNO COMPLEX NEAR NUREK

17 October 2019
RUSSIA >
Optical telescope complexes Command and control facility N

38.280551°N 69.224786°E
0 4/202 3

Detection complex

01 Tracking complex

02 Nurek Okno site, Tajikistan

03
The above image shows the Okno Function: Optical telescope complex
complex near Nurek in Tajikistan.
04
It is part of Russia’s Centre for Associated Programs: Okno
Outer Space Monitoring and uses a
05
variety of electro-optical sensors to Key Dates: —
track space objects, mainly in the
06
geosynchronous region.

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-48
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-49 — LPAR SITE NEAR KORLA

3 February 2020
CHINA >
Radar complexes N

Support structure

46.527890°N 130.755269°E
(Huanan)

36.024737°N 118.091972°E
(Yiyuan) LPAR

30.286623°N 119.128566°E
(Hangzhou)

41.641212°N 86.236834°E 01
(Korla—image shown)
Korla LPAR, China 02
35.482983°N 106.571819°E
(Kongtong) 03
China operates numerous LPARs Function: Radar
which provide SSA data and could
04
serve as acquisition sensors for ABM Associated Programs: LPAR
and/or ASAT systems. The image
05
shows the LPAR site near Korla. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-49
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-50 — PURPLE MOUNTAIN OBSERVATORY

29 February 2020
CHINA >
Optical telescope complexes N

Sensor positions

32.065°N 118.8297°E
0 4/202 3

Sensor positions

01

02 Purple Mountain Obsevatory, China

03
China’s main optical SSA capabilities Function: Optical telescope complex
are operated by the Purple Mountain
04
Observatory (PMO), which operates Associated Programs: Purple
multiple telescopes in seven separate Mountain Observatory
05
locations that can track satellites
throughout all orbital regimes. Key Dates: —
06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-50
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-51 — GRAVES RADAR TRANSMITTER

31 August 2015
FRANCE >
Radar complex N

47.3480°N 5.5151°E
(Transmitter—image shown)

44.0715°N 5.5346°E
(Receiver) GRAVES transmitter arrays

01

Montseugny, France 02

03
The image above shows the Grand Function: Radar
Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale
04
(GRAVES) system operated by the Associated Programs: GRAVES
French military for SSA. It is a bistatic
05
radar, consisting of a geographically Key Dates: —
separated transmitter and receiver and
06
is capable of tracking objects in LEO.

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-51
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-52 — GRAVES RADAR RECEIVER

28 May 2011
FRANCE >
Radar complex N

GRAVES receiver array

47.3480°N 5.5151°E
(Transmitter)
0 4/202 3

44.0715°N 5.5346°E
(Receiver—image shown)

01

02 Revest-du-Bion, France

03
The image above shows the Grand Function: Radar
Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale
04
(GRAVES) system operated by the Associated Programs: GRAVES
French military for SSA. It is a bistatic
05
radar, consisting of a geographically Key Dates: —
separated transmitter and receiver
06
and is capable of tracking objects
in LEO.
07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-52
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-53 — TAROT-CALERN TELESCOPE

FRANCE >
Optical telescope complex

6.92388889°N 43.75222222°E

01

02

03
The image above shows the Function: Optical telescope complex
Télescope à Action Rapide pour les
04
Objets Transitoires (Rapid Action Associated Programs: TAROT-CALERN
Telescope for Transient Objects,
05
TAROT) a pair of 25 centimeters Key Dates: —
optical telescopes near the Calern
06
Observatory in France that are used
to track deep space objects.
07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-53
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-54 — SWORDFISH RADAR NEAR GARHBANGOR

20 December 2020
INDIA > N
Radar complex

19.854052°N 85.969496°E
(Image shown)
0 4/202 3

13.195549°N 78.173603°E

Swordfish radar

01

02 Garhbangor, India

03
The image above shows the Function: Radar
SWORDFISH radar installation near
04
Garhbangor, India. Associated Programs: SWORDFISH

05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-54
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-55 — DELIJAN SPACE TRACKING CENTER

21 August 2018
IRAN >
Space surveillance complex N

Sensor positions

Possible radome

34.119728°N 50.877829°E

01

Varan, Iran 02

03
The image above shows the Delijan Function: Space surveillance complex
Space Tracking Center, located in
04
Varn, Iran, about 200 kilometers south Associated Programs:
of Tehran. The site includes multiple
05
radar and electro-optical sensors for Key Dates: —
tracking space objects.
06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-55
S E C U R E W O R L D F O U N D AT IO N

SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-56 — BISEI SPACEGUARD CENTER

20 May 2016
JAPAN >

N
Optical telescope complex
Bisei Astronomical Observatory

34.672225°N 133.544089°E
(Bisei—image shown)
0 4/202 3

35.3123°N 133.941364°E
(Kamisaibara)

Bisei Spaceguard Center

01

02 Bisei, Japan

03
The image above shows the Bisei Function: Optical telescope complex
Spaceguard Center at Bisei-chō
04
in Okayama, which is Japan’s main Associated Programs: Spaceguard
optical tracking facility for SSA.
05
Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-56
 G L O B A L C O U N T E R S P A C E C A P A B IL I T I E S
SENSOR COMPLEXES / FIGURE 15-57 — KAMISAIBARA SPACEGUARD CENTER

21 May 2018
JAPAN >
Radar complex N

Kamisaibara Spaceguard Center

34.672225°N 133.544089°E
(Bisei)

35.3123°N 133.941364°E
(Kamisaibara—image shown)

01

Kamisaibara, Japan 02

03
The image above shows the Function: Radar
Kamisaibara Spaceguard Center,
04
which is also in Okayama, and is Associated Programs: Spaceguard
the location of a radar that can
05
track objects in LEO. Key Dates: —

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
15-57
525 Zang Street, Suite D
Broomfield, Colorado 80021
+1 305 554 1560

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20036
+1 202 568 6212

SWF Publication: 23.03

Published: 23.04

@SWFoundation / [email protected] / swfound.org