PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THARPARKAR – A PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVE

MEHAK RATHORE

HONORS FINAL YEAR PAPER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
BSC IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY

HABIB UNIVERSITY
KARACHI, PAKISTAN
MAY 2022
Property Rights in Tharparkar – A People’s Perspective

© Copyright 2022 by Mehak Rathore

All Rights Reserved
Habib University, Karachi, Pakistan
 Mehak Rathore

I have read this document and certify that it is adequate in scope and quality as
honors project for the Bachelor of Science in Social Development and Policy. I
confirm that a secondary evaluator with appropriate credentials assessed this
Final Year Paper.

Aqdas Afzal

Dr. Aqdas Afzal, Principle Advisor

 STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY

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the content of this thesis entitled PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THARPARKAR – A
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Number of words: 7597 words

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1st May, 2022

Date
 ABSTRACT

Many developing countries struggle with economic growth. While there are
several factors that assist in economic growth, property rights as an institution is
perceived as an important component to the overall development of a country. Strongly
enforced and well-defined property rights also reflect the strength and credibility of the
state. However, property rights in developing countries are principally vague,
constitutionally unclear, and very diverse. Afzal (2017) explains that Western-style
property rights, thus, cannot be applied to developing countries. The author suggests a
deviation away from the new institutional economics approach and instead encourages
researchers to focus on critical institutionalism – a more appropriate economic
approach takes into account dynamics and multi-dimensionality of institutions such as
property rights (Afzal, 2017). This paper aims to substantiate the aforementioned
research by conducting primary research in the form of qualitative interviews in the
region of Tharparkar. This research confirms that property rights are indeed very
diverse and complex in the region of Tharparkar. Moreover, the research uses the
theoretical framework of critical institutionalism to analyze property rights in
Tharparkar. Some of the key findings of the research reveal that land ownership
decisions pertaining to village settlements are taken by the elder representatives of the
region and this type of land is not officially registered, agricultural land is officially
registered and can be bought and sold, gowcher is common cattle grazing land that does
not belong to any specific community or person, and that coal mining companies have
caused villages to shift and resettle.

KEYWORDS
Critical Institutionalism, Institutionalism, Property Rights, Tharparkar, Land
Ownership, Land Rights, Developing Countries, Pakistan.
 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank God for giving me the strength to complete this four-year journey
successfully. I would like to thank my father, Amolakh Das, who truly understands the
value of education and who chose to educate me despite the criticism he received from
the community – Abu, I hope I have made you proud. I would like to thank my brother,
Aman Rathore, for always making me laugh through tough times. I would like to thank
my best friend, Tasbiha Asim, for sitting through my complaints and always motivating
me to give my best. I would like to thank Dr. Aqdas Afzal for being the most kind,
considerate, humble, and above all, patient advisor. Last but not the least, I would like
to thank each and every person who has made this day come to life (you all know you
are). Now that I finally have the opportunity – I would like to dedicate this work to the
people of Tharparkar.
Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1
A Brief Overview ......................................................................................................... 2
The Rationale of the Study .......................................................................................... 4
Research Question ........................................................................................................ 4
Critical Institutionalism as a Theoretical Framework ............................................. 5
Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 8
What are institutions? .................................................................................................... 8
How do institutions emerge? ........................................................................................ 9
How are institutions measured? ................................................................................... 10
Property Rights as an institution .................................................................................. 12
Research Methodology .............................................................................................. 13
Sampling and Data Collection ..................................................................................... 14
Research Findings and Analysis ............................................................................... 15
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 21
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 22
Appendices .................................................................................................................. 25
Appendix A ................................................................................................................. 25
Appendix B ................................................................................................................. 26
Appendix C ................................................................................................................. 28
Appendix D ................................................................................................................. 30
Appendix E ................................................................................................................. 32
Appendix F ................................................................................................................. 34
 INTRODUCTION

Before the emergence of the institution of property rights, there persisted a common
grazing land in England causing the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the
commons refers to an economic problem whereby individuals have open access to a
natural resource (in this case, land) that is not regulated or monitored by any social or
formal institutions; eventually, resulting in the depletion of that natural resource. As a
result, an enclosure movement “began in the 12th century and proceeded rapidly in the
period 1450–1640” (Britannica, 2013) that encouraged people living in the pastoral
areas to build fences in order to mark their respective territories and avoid mass
exploitation of a single resource. Several outcomes emerged due to this new
arrangement such as migration (from rural to urban), competition, and privatization of
an otherwise common natural resource. This case study functions as the foundation for
our understanding of the emergence of the institution of property rights. Thus, it is not
surprising that property rights today in developing countries are highly influenced by
their colonial predecessors – mainly, the British (or metaphorically, the West).

However, the meaning of property, even in terms of land, has very different
implications as compared to those in the Western regions. There are many cultural,
religious, legal, social, economic, and historical aspects to the notion of property rights
in developing countries that are often neglected. Needless to say, such a dynamic and
multi-faceted institution cannot go beyond the narrow definition provided by New
Institutional Economics (NIE). Afzal (2017) also reveals that property rights in
developing countries encompass more than mere deeds, titles, and ownership.
Therefore, the NIE framework embedded in the Anglo-Saxon-style of property rights
cannot be applicable to developing countries (Afzal, 2017). Likewise, Scott (1998)
explains that “‘scientific agriculture’ based on the modern property rights regime has
been an unmitigated ecological disaster, especially in Africa” (Afzal, 2017, p.381).
There is a substantial lack of contextual, cultural, and subjective analysis when
examining property rights in developing countries.

Most importantly, there is an overall absence of research and data on the perceptions of
people regarding property rights in the rural areas of developing countries such as
Pakistan. One major reason for this, other than the lack of resources required to carry

1
out extensive research in the area, is the underlying complexities that entail property
rights in rural areas. It is, hence, crucial to go beyond the objective evaluation and
instead, incorporate the subjectivity i.e. the views, perceptions, and histories of rural
communities in relation to land in order to achieve a holistic analysis of property rights
in rural areas of developing countries. This research aims to examine property rights in
Tharparkar by bringing into light the views, opinions, and narratives of the people of
Tharparkar regarding land ownership. In doing so, the research will initially provide a
brief overview of the socio-economic and the geography of Tharparkar. This will be
followed by the rationale, which will reveal the intention of the study and the main
research and sub-research questions. Furthermore, Critical Institutionalism (CI) is used
as a theoretical framework for this study. The literature review for this research paper
is an extensive exploration of institutions and property rights. Additionally, this study
is a small-scale qualitative project that serves as a starting point for and encourages
large-scale research in Tharparkar in the future. A rich analysis incorporating results
from the primary data, theoretical framework, and literature review forms the backbone
of this study. Lastly, the conclusion will reinstate the main arguments and findings
discussed in this research along with the provision of valuable insights and suggestions
for future course of action regarding property rights in Tharparkar.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Most people occupying the region of Tharparkar are surviving on “agro-pastoral

economy for their livelihood and live nomadic lives” (Jamali, 2018). However,
agricultural activities in Tharparkar are mainly dependent on monsoon rains that largely
vary on a yearly basis and to a certain extent on unsalted groundwater, which is
available at a few selected places, suitable for farming (Jamali, 2018). Rural
communities of Tharparkar have been struggling since a very long time. For them, land
plays a crucial role not only as a key source of economy but also survival. According
to the forest department, Tharparkar is made up of 109, 516 hectors of rangelands
(Jamali, 2018). Rangeland, in the context of Tharparkar, refers to land that cannot be
cultivated but can utilized as open spaces for the livestock to feed on or rest. Nobody
restricts anyone to leave their livestock resting in the rangeland but the only restriction
is that people cannot destroy trees that do not belong to them (Jamali, 2018). A lot of

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ambiguity follows in this form of land arrangement. Firstly, the historical background
to this arrangement is necessary i.e. how has this form of arrangement emerged and
most importantly, who enforces this kind of mechanism in Tharparkar. Secondly, who
defines certain rules such as the prohibition of cutting of trees? In order to assess these
questions and concerns, it is essential to understand the topography and socio-economic
disparity within the region.

The district of Tharparkar is situated around 400 km southeast to Karachi, with a total
area of 19,389 sq km and is further divided into seven Talukas namely: Mithi, Islamkot,
Nagarparkar, Chachro, Diplo, Kaloi and Dahli (Qureshi and Shaukat, n.d). While
“ninety seven per cent of the region comprises desert” (Qureshi and Shaukat, n.d),
Tharparkar is unlike deserts like the Sahara. There are farming opportunities, as
discussed above, but these are highly dependent on nature. Currently, there are 3,500
unsanctioned villages and a population of 1,649,661 that is spread over the region of
Tharparkar living in huts and/or houses over which they do not officially possess any
entitlement rights (Ali, 2019). As per the Agriculture Census of 2010, most farmers
living in Tharparkar an average of 2.5 acres of fertile land (Qureshi and Shaukat, n.d).
Thus, the economy of Tharparkar mainly thrives on “rain-fed agriculture, livestock,
wage labour and remittances (mostly from internal migration)” (Qureshi and Shaukat,
n.d).

Thar ranks 16th on the chart of largest coal reserves in the world and Pakistan ranks 7th
on a list of 20 countries (Jamali, 2018). The 175 billion tonnes worth of coal is said to
generate enough energy to meet the country’s requirement of fuel for centuries (Jamali,
2018). Therefore, after the discovery of coal in Tharparkar, 9,000 sq km out of 19, 000
sq km has been marked for the coal project (Hassan, 2017). This has led to the
interference of a third-party – capitalists backed by the state – in regulating land
ownership in the area of Tharparkar. Justifying land acquisition via the Land
Acquisition Act of 1984, SECMC claims that it has only taken 1,400 acres of land while
villagers reveal that the real number is 2,700 acres of land (Qureshi and Shaukat, n.d).
The underlying issue here relates back to what Afzal (2017) has highlighted – property
itself carries a lot of variations in the context of developing countries. There exists
undocumented inherited land, communal land, and common grazing land
(gowcher/rangeland) to name a few types of land in the region of Tharparkar. Thus,

3
developing a contextual understanding and addressing the issue of property rights is a
necessary step towards resolving socio-economic stagnation.

THE RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Little research has been done on the types of land and its distribution in Tharparkar.
While there are state laws regarding property rights, it is believed that villages have set
their own institutions regarding land. This research intends to explore how the people
of Tharparkar perceive property rights and whether the intervention of coal mining
companies such as SECMC (Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company) have influenced or
caused a shift in land ownership in the district of Tharparkar. The purpose of the
research is to provide an insight into the cognitive thought-process of people belonging
to rural communities so that future laws pertaining to property rights can take into
account their well-being. Moreover, the study also aims to empower the, otherwise
neglected, voices of the people of Tharparkar. This small-scale qualitative study
materializes and confirms Afzal’s (2017) research work – Revisiting the Glorious
Revolution: Property Rights, Economic Institutions and the Developing World – which
theoretically explores the notion of property rights in developing countries and
criticizes the New Institutional Economic (NIE) framework used to examine property
rights. An interdisciplinary framework, discussed by Afzal (2017), i.e. Critical
Institutionalism (CI) is used to evaluate property rights in Tharparkar. Future studies
and analysts can build on this research and incorporate a larger sample so that findings
can initiate an inclusive policymaking process in Tharparkar too.

Research Question
Are the people of Tharparkar aware of what property rights are? How do they perceive,
enforce, and/or categorize the concept of property?

Sub-Research Question
Have property rights shifted in meaning or regulation after the intervention of the
coalmining companies in the region of Tharparkar? If yes, how?

4
 CRITICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Before exploring Critical Institutionalism (CI) as an appropriate and suitable

framework for developing countries, it is essential to evaluate why other frameworks
such as New Institutional Economics (NIE) have proven to be unsuccessful. To begin
with NIE presupposes that economic agents are rational, utility-maximizing, and
optimizing individuals (Afzal, 2017). There is an obvious “lack of contextual analysis
for developing countries” (Afzal, 2017, p.379) within the NIE framework and this is
most evident in NIE’s Anglo-Saxon interpretation of property rights. NIE’s
understanding of protected property rights as a necessary step towards achieving
economic growth largely ignores “that people in the developing world, at times, require
completely different type of property rights” (Bardhan, 2006; Afzal, 2017, p.380).
Afzal (2017) highlights that the promotion of Anglo-Saxon centered property rights
that NIE advocates discard the realities of developing countries where “either Anglo-
Saxon-style property rights often are absent, or very different property rights are
desired” (p.380) that “go beyond the asset or land ownership through titles and deeds”
(p.380). Milonakis and Fine (2007; Afzal, 2017) explain that the notion of property
relations or social relations between economic agents is an effective way of
understanding the diversified aspect of property rights. Conclusively, NIE as a
framework fails to deliver a multi-dimensional comprehensive analysis of property
rights. Instead, NIE ignores ecological or environmental implications, contextual
analysis, historical progression, “culture, vested interests [of various stakeholders], and
collective action” (Afzal, 2017). Most importantly, Schneider and Nega (2016) reveal
that NIE does not take into account the role of the state, “at least for the developing
world” (Afzal, 2017, p.382). It is precisely due to its reductive outline that deems NIE
incapable of explaining institutional dynamics, changes, and dysfunctionalities in
developing countries.

Critical Institutionalism, on the other hand, examines how “institutions dynamically

mediate relationships between people, natural resources and society” (Cleaver and de
Koning, 2015, p.1). CI, as a theoretical framework, emphasizes on how institutions are
interwoven with culture, historical progression, informal and formal settings,
traditional and modern social arrangements, and embedded power relations (Cleaver
and de Koning, 2015). In fact, a “social justice lens” (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015,

5
p.1) is also employed to evaluate institutional outcomes within the CI framework.
Critical Institutionalism, in itself, serves as a an all-encompassing structure that deals
with every aspect of institutions i.e. analyzing the formation and maintenance of
culture-specific institutions and especially considering the role of individuals and their
relations to other communities, “physical and material environment” (Cleaver and
Koning, 2015, p.1) . CI analysis, thus, incorporates methodological holism and by
associating purpose with human agency, it “puts the agents back into the calculus
behind social action” (Afzal, 2017, p.384). Therefore, in essence, CI provides a
contextualized framework that can be applied to developing as well as developed
countries. Moreover, in recent academic scholarship there is an absolute need of more
subjective frameworks that focus on “socio-historical or social-anthropological
dimensions of interactions” (Mosse 1997; Roth 2009; Cleaver and de Koning, p.3) that
transcend the boundaries of objectivity, economic gains, and West-imposed universal
terminologies. Perhaps the most rewarding aspect of CI is its acceptance of institutions
as an adaptive structure that is not specially created but is simply borrowed and/or
inspired by other existing rules or functional frameworks (Cleaver and de Koning,
2015). The catch here is how institutions need to be molded into cultural and
geographical specific structures rather than out rightly copying Western laws and
applying them to developing countries, which the NIE fails to address. But, CI address
this issue extensively by recognizing that “people’s motivations to cooperate in
collective arrangements are a mix of economic, emotional, moral and social
rationalities informed by differing logics and world-views” (Cleaver and Koning. 2015,
p.4). Thus, any form of future analysis on how institutions can be more culture-specific
must engage with what motivates people to adhere to and sustain certain institutions
over others – even when these institutions may not necessarily align with formal laws
enforced by the state.

Critical Institutionalism extends its branches further to explore how institutions change
or evolve with relation to the social lives of individuals and communities by introducing
a unique technique within its framework – institutional bricolage. An institutional
bricolage here refers to the construction of an institution (formal or informal) by an
individual or community using existing knowledge that is readily available. Whaley
(2018) defines institutional bricolage as an effort “to capture the ways in which people
both consciously and non-consciously patch together institutional arrangements from

6
the social and cultural resources available to them” (p.139). In other words, institutions
that emerge out of this bricolage may serve multiple purposes and can be modified
according to the circumstances (Cleaver 2007; Jones 2015; Schnegg and Linke 2015;
Whaley 2018). These circumstances can be political, social, and/or economic –
considering the three are mostly overlapping and rarely independent of one another.
The concept of institutional bricolage, thus, implies that institutions are not entirely
original, they are, at best, a reworking or recycling of existing institutional mechanisms.
This is mainly why institutions that may have been formed to serve as a solution to a
specific problem may eventually end up serving a different unintended purpose entirely.
De Koning (2011, 2014; Cleaver and De Koning 2015) identifies a three-way linear
process through which formalized institutions are established in a local areas –
aggregation, alteration, and articulation. Aggregation means the remodeling of
institutions using different social and cultural components; alteration means readjusting
the institutional framework to better fit the livelihood of the concerned community;
and, articulation means emphasizing traditional values in the new arrangement as a
result of the formation of renewed institutions (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). Suffice
to say, under the umbrella term of institutional bricolage, “actors innovate, but they do
so within the limits of their resources, social circumstances and what is perceived as
legitimate” (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015, p.5)

Peter (1987; Whaley 2018) introduces that institutions comprise of a complex-

embeddedness which is rooted in economic and political structures. This is reflective
of historically perpetuating power relations that institutions most often mirror (Mosse
1997; Whaley 2018). The role of power before any institutional formation, during
institutional formation, and even after institutional formation is crucial when applying
the theoretical framework of critical institutionalism because imbalanced power
relations generate socio-economic and political disparity in any given society. Cleaver
and de Koning (2015) reveal that it is especially challenging for the poor and
marginalized to bargain for their rights or play an active role in shaping formal
institutions. The authors further disclose that “the cost and benefits of institutional
functioning” (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015, p. 10) impact the poor very differently than
the elite. Moreover, Cleaver and de Koning (2015) also clarify that the struggle and
bargaining supremacy stemming from power is not simply “over natural resources as
material access and rights, but also over meanings and discourses, representation and

7
participation, as well as individual identities” (p.10). Similarly, Delgado and
Zwarteveen confirm that the ability to exercise control over institutions and largely
depends “on the possession of resources (land, knowledge, family networks)” (Cleaver
and de Koning, 2015, p.10). Since critical institutionalism embraces every aspect of
institutions, it is far “superior to NIE for providing a workable theory of institutional
change and for explaining the persistence of dysfunctional institutions, especially in
developing countries” (Afzal, 2017, pp. 386-387)

LITERATURE REVIEW

What are institutions?

Institutions can be best understood as rules, laws, and principles that are applied to
bring a sense of order in any given society or state. The original institutional economics
approach defines institutions as “a special type of social structure with the potential to
change agents, including changes to their purposes or preferences” (Hodgson, 2004,
p.14). Here, a ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ is implemented whereby social
structures (methodological collectivism) are prioritized over human agency when
explaining institutions (Hodgson, 2004). However, new institutional economics
approach upholds the interpretation of institutions “in terms of the interactions of
individuals with given purposes or preference functions” (Hodgson, 2004, p.5). Here,
the rational, utility-maximizing, and optimist individual (methodological
individualism) is given priority over social structures when explaining institutions.

The underlying issue with the new institutional economics approach that supports
methodological individualism is the false assumption that humans can be viewed
independent of social structures. Giddens clarifies that “human beings are reflective of,
and reactive to, their circumstances, as well as being conditioned by them” (Hodgson,
2004, p.31). Moreover, to categorize all humans as rational economic agents is to also
falsely assume that everyone has access to perfect information. Likewise, social
structures cannot be viewed entirely independent of all individual in society. Hodgson
(2004) further explains that “structure does not exist apart from all individuals, but it
may exist apart from any given individual” (Hodgson, 2004, p.36). Therefore,
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism should be perceived as

8
complementary forces rather than opposing concepts. It is both methodological
individualism and methodological collectivism that form institutions and sustain it.

Academic scholarship has evolved and has attempted to incorporate other forms of
literature aiming to explain institutions from various other perspectives. Among these,
Greif and Kingston (2011) have most recently demonstrated two different approaches
to institutions – institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. North (1996; Greif
and Kingston, 2011, p. 14) characterizes institutions-as-rules as an approach that
encompasses the rules of the game. These ‘rules’ can be formal and informal. Formal
rules refer to the state officiated laws such as the constitution, whereas, informal rules
refer to “codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions” (Greif and Kingston,
2011, p14) that are more cultural such as the practice of dowry in certain South-Asian
communities. On the other hand, institutions-as-equilibria explicates that “a social
situation is ‘institutionalized’ when this structure motivates each individual to follow a
regularity of behavior in that social situation” (Greif and Kingston, 2011, p.25) i.e. a
self-enforcing mechanism is put in place. These approaches present a different
description of what institutions are; however, institutions should be perceived as a
multi-faceted systems that require a combination of various approaches.

How do institutions emerge?

There are several contested theories when addressing how institutions have surfaced in
societies. While some institutions emerge as a result of linear historical development
and rigorous competition, other institutions can surface spontaneously. Carl Menger
(1871; Hodgson, 2004) provides a case study for this by explaining the institution of
money. In doing so, Menger further elaborates that the institution of money emerged
all of a sudden as a result of the complications such as the ‘double coincidence of wants’
that existed in the barter system (Hodgson, 2004). Such an incident is indicative of how
institutions have the potential to emerge “simply out of the interactions of individuals,
each pursuing their given purposes and preferences” (Hodgson, 2004, p.19). The
intention of such institutions is to ease the discomfort or fix the errors in the already
existing social systems. Yet another institution that has surfaced spontaneously is that
of language (Hodgson, 2004). Language is perhaps one of the oldest institutions and it
is one that emerged purely on the basis of spontaneous human interactions.

9
Sergei Guriev, who is a Russian economist, emphasizes that the emergence of
institutions should be treated as a multi-faceted project that must take into account
political science, legal frameworks, sociology, psychology, and anthropology (Society
for Institutional & Organizational Economics). Guriev (n.d) also explains that it is
absolutely necessary to incorporate historical progression when analyzing the
emergence of institutions. This is because institutions are modifications of previously
existing institutions and carry within itself a temporal dimension. Furthermore,
Demsetz (1967) presents a chance-based argument revealing that “rules develop and
adjust as a result of ‘legal and moral experiments’ which ‘may be hit-and-miss
procedures to some extent’” (Greif and Kingston, 2011, pp.16-17). Here, the emergence
of institutions is viewed as a system of trial and error. Yet another explanation
pertaining to the emergence of institutions deals with the sub-branch of the evolutionary
debate i.e. institutions surface as a direct consequence of causal interactions. This
relates back to Darwinism, whereby causal interactions are defined as a transfer of
matter or energy (Hodgson, 2004, p.8). Thus, both internal (within the economy, for
instance) and external (natural disasters, for instance) circumstances can also play a
vital role in the emergence of specific institutions.

How are institutions measured?

Measuring institutions can be a very time-consuming, complex, and an overall
challenging task because “not only do we require measures that capture the essence of
property rights and democracy [as institutions], but we also want measures available
over time and across countries” (p.10). The World Justice Project has designed a
customized scale intended to measure the strength and weaknesses of institutions in
different countries. Countries are ranked as well as measured on the aforementioned
scale with 0.00 indicating the weakest and 1.00 indicating the strongest. This scale is
referred to as the Rule of Law Index and consists of eight categories. These include –
constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government,
fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and
criminal justice. Countries are ranked accordingly in each of the aforementioned
categories and given an overall index score.

In the category of constraints on government, countries are measured in terms of how

accountable its government agents are. This is inclusive of “non-governmental checks

10
on the government’s power, such as a free and independent press” (Abbasi, 2021). An
elaboration on this category by Abbasi (2021) comprises constitutional as well as non-
constitutional restrictions “by which the powers of the government and its officials and
agents are limited”. This category addresses the key issue of the exploitation of power
by government representatives. Absence of constraints on the government would result
in what Hobbes terms as absolute Leviathan (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019).

The category – absence of corruption – considers three types of corruptions; namely,

“bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of
public funds or other resources” (Abbasi, 2021). These types are then measured against
the credibility of “government officers in the executive branch, the judiciary, the
military, police, and the legislature” (Abbasi, 2021) responsible for controlling these
frauds.

The category of open government measures to what extent is the government of a given
country sharing honest information regarding state decision-making and to what extent
is the state empowering its “people with tools to hold the government accountable, and
fosters citizens’ participation in public policy deliberations” (Abbasi, 2021). This also
includes if information on basic laws is accessible to the public and “the quality of
information published” (Abbasi, 2021) by the state as well. In most countries, a
constitution is such a complex document that citizens have almost never read or
understood it.

The category of fundamental rights measures the extent to which human rights are
guaranteed in a given country. Obviously, the interpretation of human rights drastically
varies from country to country and because it is nearly impossible to adhere to these
extensive rights, rights established under the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is considered as the foundation for this category (Abbasi, 2021).

The category of order and security measures to what extent a country’s government
“ensures the security of persons and property” (Abbasi, 2021). Security is not only the
“fundamental function of the state” (Abbasi, 2021) but also “a precondition for the
realization of the rights and freedoms” (Abbasi, 2021) of the citizens of a country.
Security also ensures a level of trust that citizens develop towards the state.

11
The category of regulatory enforcement measures to what extent regulations are
“effectively implemented and enforced” (Abbasi, 2021) in a country. These regulations,
legal and administrative, can function within the government and outside the
government (Abbasi, 2021). The intention is not to examine “which activities a
government chooses to regulate, nor does it consider how much regulation of a
particular activity is appropriate” (Abbasi, 2021); instead, this category precisely deals
with how actively regulations are executed and enforced.

The category of civil justice measures to what extent citizens of a given country can
resolve conflicts effectively through the civil judiciary system. This is inclusive of how
“accessible and affordable as well as free of discrimination, corruption, and improper
influence by public officials” (Abbasi, 2021) the civil justice system is. Additionally,
the category takes into account the “unreasonable delays” (Abbasi, 2021) and effective
enforcement of decisions with reference to court hearings. The “accessibility,
impartiality, and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms” (Abbasi,
2021) is also given equal weightage.

Last but not the least, the category of criminal justice examines the “conventional
mechanism to redress grievances and bring action against individuals for offenses
against society” (Abbasi, 2021). This evaluation encompasses “the police, lawyers,
prosecutors, judges, and prison officers’ (Abbasi, 2021). Countries are measured on
how effectively their criminal justice system deals with high-end and low-end offenders
to maintain peace within the country.

Property Rights as an institution

Leblang (1996) explains that property rights are indicative of a thing that belongs to an
individual and is legally recognized as belonging to that individual. In other words, “an
individual has a property right over something if he has the right to control that
property, consume that property, and alienate (sell) that property” (Leblang, 1996, p.7).
This further implies that the property of an individual is not only recognized by other
members of the community but also the state. Property rights are, thus, “construed as
supported by the force of etiquette, social custom, ostracism, and formal legally enacted
laws supported by the states' power of violence or punishment” (Alchian, 1965, p.817).

12
Additionally, apart from providing security, clear and well-defined property rights
greatly reduce transaction cost (Leblang, 1996, p.7). However, Feder and Feeny (1991)
reveal that “most economic analyses presume Western-style exclusive, transferable,
alienable, and enforceable private property rights in land” (p.135). Therefore, there is a
substantial lack of contextual analysis with reference to property rights in developing
countries, where property rights are more than “titles, deeds, and ownership” (Afzal,
2017).

Rafi Ullah and Najib (2022) emphasize that, in Pakistan, “the terms ‘land’ and
‘property’ are often used interchangeably in Pakistan” (p.1). Land is actually defined
as a type of immovable property in Pakistan (Rafi Ullah and Najib, 2022, p.1). For
people living in the rural areas of Pakistan, property rights are vague, diverse, and in
most cases, open to interpretation. Villages built in the rural areas are collectively
traditionally owned properties rather than individually legally owned property.
Lawson-Remer (2013) makes a case against the narrow reductionist capitalist
perception of property rights. The author claims that such a narrative “ignores the
improvements to efficiency, sustainable resource use and investment, and community
resilience that can be generated by community-level collective ownership property
rights” (p.317). Thus, property rights, like any other institution, should be analyzed
using a multi-dimensional lens that incorporates history, context, culture, socio-
economics, politics, and power.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This is a small-scale qualitative case study that takes into account experiences of five
individuals from Tharparkar who are willing to share their perceptions and narratives
of property rights or/and land distribution methods in Tharparkar. Though Tharparkar
covers a total area of 19,389 sq km (Qureshi and Shaukat, n.d) and the data gathered is
neither representative of the overall population nor can be generalized to encompass
the majority of the people’s lived experiences, this research still serves two very crucial
objectives. Firstly, it paves way for further quantitative and qualitative large scale study
so that the findings can assist impactful policymaking and laws in future that are
especially made in accordance to people’s cognitive realities and perceptions that they

13
have formed regarding land distribution. Secondly, the study provides valuable insights
into the thought processes of people in the rural areas whose ideas and opinions are
often neglected.

Sampling and Data Collection

For this study, five semi-structured interviews were taken through a phone call. The
participants were two women and three men aged between 25 to 60 years were
randomly selected. In order to safeguard the participants’ identities, pseudonyms are
used for each one of them – Shanti Kumari and Naina Sajnani (women), and Bhushan
Kumar, Sachdev Hirani, and Asim Riaz (men). An informed consent form was read
out to the participants and a verbal consent was recorded. Since the participants’ first
language is not English, interviews were conducted in Urdu and Dhatki (one of the
regional languages spoken in Tharparkar). The questionnaire (see Appendix A) used
for this research includes questions that are mainly directed at understanding the
history, opinions, and affiliation that people of Tharparkar have with the land. Time
duration of the interview was 20 to 30 minutes. The interview was recorded (with the
consent of the participants) and the recordings were immediately discarded after
interviews had been transcribed. As a researcher, I have access to the participants’ real
names, geographical data, and phone number. However, none of this information will
be revealed to the public or future researchers who aim to build on this study.

14
 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Name Gender Age Types of land Have Who Influence of Suggestions on

in Property decides coal mining Property Rights
Tharparkar Rights property companies on in Tharparkar
remained rights? Property
the same? Rights in
Tharparkar
Naina Female 25 Gowcher, Yes Residential – No Property Rights
Sajnani residential, Elders of the should be a joint
agricultural community partnership
Agricultural between the state
– individual and the people

Shanti Female 45 Gowcher, Yes Residential – Not really Government

Kumari residential, Elders of the should ask the
agricultural community people of
Agricultural Tharparkar how
– Not sure property rights
should be in
Tharparkar
Sachdev Male 60 Gowcher, Yes Residential – Not really Government
Hirani residential, Elders of the should assign
agricultural, community nominal charges
hotels, Agricultural and register
businesses – individual villages/residentia
(coal power l properties
plant)

Asim Male 32 Gowcher, Yes Residential – Yes Government

Riaz residential, Elders of the should assign
agricultural, community nominal charges
hotels, coal Agricultural and register
power plants – individual villages/residentia
l properties
Bhushan Male 54 Gowcher, Yes Residential – Yes Government
Kumar residential, Elders of the should assign
agricultural community nominal charges
Agricultural and register
– individual villages/residentia
l properties

Table 1.1 – Research Findings

Although the sample size for this research is not representative, this small qualitative
case study analysis still manages to offer some valuable insights into people’s
perceptions of property rights in Tharparkar. Before research findings are discussed, it
is yet again important to clarify that ‘property’ in this research paper strictly refers to
land only. It is equally necessary to mention that seven women were approached to talk
about property rights in Tharparkar. Out of the seven, five (those living in Tharparkar
currently) said they did not know much about property rights, while the other two
agreed to volunteer for this research. Table 1.1 shows a summary of the main research

15
findings of this study. The research findings reveal that all five individuals, despite
belonging to different age groups, believe that property rights have remained the same
i.e. village property rights are dealt by elder male representatives and agricultural land
rights are dealt on individual basis because that involves proper purchasing and selling.
While three of the five people in this study share the view that property rights have not
really been influenced by the intervention of coal mining companies in Thar, two other
individuals believe otherwise. All males involved in the study suggested that property
rights should be guaranteed to the people of Tharparkar by the state with the placement
of nominal charges for the paperwork. Females, on the other hand, shared different
opinions. Naina Sajnani suggested that property rights in Tharparkar should be a joint
partnership between the state and the people of Tharparkar. She further clarifies in her
interview (see Appendix D) that by partnership, she does not mean the term strictly in
the business sense. Instead, she wishes for a partnership where people of Tharparkar
are given rights to land and the government simply aid the process of legalizing those
rights without charging a financial amount. She also believes that gowchers should be
regulated as well. Shanti Kumar, however, suggests that the government should first
take into account the views of the people of Tharparkar on property rights and then
incorporate those. Additionally, all individuals highlighted three types of land that were
most common in Tharparkar – gowcher or gaucher, residential, and agricultural.
Sachdev Hirani and Asim Riaz revealed that after the intervention of the coal mining
companies, land is also used to build hotels (since tourism has also increased) and to
set up coal power plants. The following analysis is a three-fold critical evaluation
beginning from the rural communities of Tharparkar, followed by the role of state, and
lastly, the intervention of companies in remote areas.

Besley (1995) writes that “the evolution of property rights and their effect on
investment are central issues in the political economy of development” (p.903). This is
mainly why we need to regulate the institution of property rights effectively. However,
Afzal (2017) rightly identifies that the new institutional economics approach
incorporates the Anglo-Saxon style of property rights that completely discard the
complexities attached to the property rights in developing countries. Therefore, in order
to address the evolution of property rights as an issue in the political economy of
development, we must apply the critical institutionalism approach to pay attention to
the context – historical, cultural, political, and socio-economic – to understand how

16
property rights function in the rural areas of Tharparkar. There are three most common
types of land identified by the individuals – gowcher, residential (villages), and
agricultural. Diplai (2013) reveals that gowchers date back to the time of the Mughal
Emperor, King Akbar. At the time, gowchers were used as grazing grounds for sacred
animals (Diplai, 2013). The land policies of 1986 and 2002 specifically mention the
protection of gowchers and are still followed (Diplai, 2013). Agricultural land is
registered and can be bought and sold, thus, the decision to transfer, consume, or sell
the land is entirely taken by the official owner of the fertile land. Villages, on the other
hand, function very differently. Participants in this study highlight that although the
land in Tharparkar is state-owned, decisions pertaining to villages i.e. shifting and
allotment are taken by the elder male representatives of the region and this has remained
the case for decades, if not centuries. Another point worthy of mention here is that
villages in Tharparkar are not officially registered. Ostrom (1990; Greif and Kingston,
2011) discovered that “successful rules were more likely to emerge in groups with small
numbers of decision makers, long time horizons, and members with similar interests”
(p.19), which is likely the case in the villages of Tharparkar because each village
consists of families that are blood related and share similar interests. This is mainly
how the “aggregate expected behavior” (Greif and Kingston, 2011, p.25), which is the
essence of institutions-as-equilibria, of others in the community transcends individual
control and instead influences, regulates, and reinforces similar behavior. Formal rules
then merely function outside these villages because they follow their own customs and
practices. Scott (1998) defines customs as “negotiated tissue of practices which are
continually being adapted to new ecological and social circumstances” (p.34).
However, Scott (1998) also emphasizes that “customary systems of tenure should not
be romanticized” (p.34) because it discriminates against gender, class, and ancestry
status. Such a pattern is prevalent in Tharparkar too because elders that take the
decisions pertaining to village settlements are mostly men. This type of exclusivity is
perhaps the reason why many rural women of Tharparkar are unware of property rights
and/or land ownerships. Another interesting point worthy of analysis is raised by
Bhushan Kumar in his interview (see Appendix F) where he states that due to
population scarcity and abundance of land, there are no communal disputes – everyone
is free to settle wherever they like. And since residential (village) land is not officially
registered, it allows for a greater freedom of movement unlike agricultural land.
Engerman (1973; Feder and Feeny, 1991) elucidates that when land was plenty and

17
labor was scarce, property rights in labor (such as slavery) were more clearly defined
than that of land. Likewise, Feder and Feeny (1991), in presenting a case study of early-
nineteenth-century Thailand, reveal that abundance of land and scarcity of labor at the
time actually led to slaves serving as “collateral in financial markets” (p.138) rather
than land. Land rights were not entirely developed and in theory all land belonged to
the king (Feder and Feeny, 1991, p.138). What was the case for early-nineteenth-
century Thailand is currently the case for twenty-first-century Tharparkar. It is the
intervention of coal mining companies in some areas that led to rural protests causing
pressure on the state to finally establish property rights.

Feder and Feeny (1991) explain that “the demand for institutional arrangements to
describe and enforce property rights in land with more precision” (p.139) is very
common in developing countries. This is mainly because the state “is the most
important source of formal rules, including laws, constitutional rules and decrees”
(Greif and Kingston, 2011, p.21). In fact, the primary function of the state “is to provide
security of property rights and contract enforcement” (Greif and Kingston, 2011, p.21).
Research has also proven that nations that protect their property rights are more likely
to climb the ladder of economic growth than nations that lack proper enforcement of
property rights (Leblang, 1996). So crucial is the role of state that Besley (1995) shares
that “a state structure governing property rights needs to be developed before growth
can resume” (p.903). Additionally, it is equally clear that all the participants are also
demanding property rights, one way or the other, from the state. Land grant policies
were only initiated in 1930, 1986, 2000, and 2002 and have not been revised since then
(Diplai, 2013). We then question why is the state not paying attention to property rights
Tharparkar, in this case? One explanation for this is provided by Feder and Feeny
(1991). The authors explicate that enforcement of property rights requires “mechanisms
such as courts, police, financial institutions, the legal profession, land surveys, record-
keeping systems, and titling agencies, in addition to the social legitimacy of property
rights in land” (p.137) – all of these are time-consuming processes. Besides, the list
demonstrates that property rights go beyond formal rules. The state is not only
responsible for officiating property rights but also ensuring that they are internalized in
the society and religiously followed. In developing countries, several administrative
issues emerge when the state intends to implement any kinds of laws, especially those
pertaining property rights. These include technological shortfalls such as hand-written

18
record keeping, insufficient workforce, and lack of appropriate document storage
facilities (Feder and Feeny, 1991). In countries like Pakistan, the situation is so complex
that registration of property in rural areas such as Mithi “require various types of
documents and affidavits which may be useful in an urban context but not in an
agricultural context” (Feder and Feeny, 1991, p. 142). Such complexities further cause
agitation, trust issues, and tension between the state and its citizens. In Tharparkar, for
instance, petitioners gathered in the city of Hyderabad to demand for land surveys (Ali,
2019). The petitioners shared their disappointment with the government by stating that
“the authorities have dealt with the issue with unjustified procrastination” (Ali, 2019).
Moreover, the petitioners also revealed that “the survey continued for a couple of
months and was then shelved for over two decades until it was notified again in 2016”
(Ali, 2019) and the second attempt was also suspended after it met 10% of its
completion target. Cadastral surveys using GIS and not merely land surveys are a
crucial starting point for the formation of property rights in Tharparkar, especially
considering its vastness. In the absence of such cadastral surveys, “these government
departments cannot regulate the construction of residential and commercial buildings
nor can they effectively plan development” (Ali, 2019).

It is a common sight worldwide that some countries prosper economically at a faster

rate than others. Although there are many factors that can be accounted for when
assessing the economic growth rate of a country, Leblang (1996) emphasizes that to
fully grasp differences in economic growth rates “we must not only understand the
institutions that regulate political behavior, but we must examine those institutions that
govern economic behavior as well” (p.21). And one such economic entity is capitalism.
The enclosure movement of the seventeenth-century Britain led to its rapid economic
advancement, however, less attention is paid to the socio-economic disparities such a
movement created. The enclosure movement “strengthened the property rights security
of landed elites but eroded that of cottagers who previously had rights to use the
commons” (Lawson-Remer, 2013, p.318). Therefore, the act of privatization, a
significant branch of capitalism, is bound to generate inequalities. Feder and Feeny
(1991) explain, with reference to Thailand, that the intensification in the value of land
leads to land disputes. This pattern can be seen in Tharparkar today. With the
intervention of the coal mining companies, villages in Tharparkar have been asked to
move to other places. Figure 1.1 shows the location of the project and the specific

19
boundary demarcating the area chosen for building the coal power project. All villages
and/or agricultural land located within the vicinity have been asked to migrate, provided
with an alternative village, or given a financial amount as compensation.

Figure 1.1: Location of the Thar Coal Project

Source: Resettlement Policy Framework - Thar Coal Fields. Environmental and Social
Studies including Resettlement Frameworks, Land Use Plan for Thar Coal Fields (Lupton et
al., 2015)

As previously stated, people in the villages lack official rights over the land they occupy
and since hereditary attachment is also overlooked, “they are likely to receive meager
remuneration” (Lawson-Remer, 2013, p.319) from the company. In fact, “if they
receive anything at all, often it is no more than the very small value of their hut or that
year's crop” (Lawson-Remer, 2013, p.319), which is “nothing compared to the profit
that will be made” by the company (Lawson-Remer, 2013, p.319). Currently, the Land
Acquisition Act of 1894 is being used to acquire land from the rural communities of
Tharparkar. “The application of the Land Acquisition Act means that the land owners
and local communities lose all future claims to the land” (Hasan, 2017). Bhushan
Kumar and Asim Riaz both acknowledge in their interviews (see Appendix F and
Appendix E, respectively) that the intervention of companies have caused a lot of
protests and pressure on the state to establish well-defined property rights for
Tharparkar.

20
 CONCLUSION

Property rights have always been a complex institution in developing countries. Afzal
(2017) identifies that Eurocentric property rights cannot be applicable to developing
countries because property rights in developing countries transcend the terms of titles,
deeds, and mere ownerships. In this research paper, primary data from a small-scale
qualitative study reveals that people in Tharparkar still follow the traditional method of
assigning residential land i.e. elders of the village vote on resettlement patterns. Data
also reveals that residential (villages) properties are not officially registered.
Agricultural land, on the other hand, is registered and can be purchased, transferred, or
sold as per the decision of the official owner. Common grazing land, gowcher, still
exists and is, as the name suggests, cattle grazing land that is commonly owned by the
villagers. Nobody can grow crops on the land assigned as gowcher. With the
intervention of the coal mining companies, a shift has occurred in land ownership in
Tharparkar as the former has set up coal power plants in areas once occupied by
villagers. Although villagers have been compensated one way or the other, many are
now demanding their rights over the land that they occupy. Since most of the land is
hereditary and not officially registered under the names of the villagers occupying that
land, the state has met with several challenges. The situation is especially difficult for
Pakistan because the latter ranks 130th out of the 139 nations on the Rule of Law Index
(Abbasi, 2021). As for the scoring itself, Pakistan has poorly obtained 0.39 out of 1.00
(Abbasi, 2021) – way below the threshold. Before taking any legal actions on the issue
of property rights, Pakistan needs a government that has “the capacity to enforce laws,
control violence, resolve conflicts, and provide public services but is still tamed and
controlled by an assertive, well-organized society” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019).
This should be followed by organizing a team that is responsible for digitally
conducting cadastral surveys using GIS instead of tedious land surveys that require
hand-written record keeping. Lastly, “respect and affection for the Thari population and
its culture and history” (Hasan, 2017) should be incorporated into future policies. It is
absolutely essential to break away from Eurocentric property rights and instead, analyze
the case of land ownership in Tharparkar using critical institutionalism. Only then we
can strengthen and modify our own institutions.

21
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24
Appendices

APPENDIX A
Questionnaire
Since this is a qualitative pilot study project, I followed a semi-structured
questionnaire. Although the questions below were developed prior to the interviews,
they merely served the purpose of prompting the participant and aiding the overall
interview process.

Research Question: Are the people of Tharparkar aware of what property rights are?
How do they perceive or categorize the concept of property?

Sub-Questions: Have property rights shifted in meaning or regulation after the

intervention of the coal mining companies in the region of
Tharparkar? If yes, how?

1) Which region/taluka of Tharparkar do you belong to? How long have you
lived or have been associated to this place?

2) Does your family own a specific part of land in Tharparkar? How do they own
this land? Is it official or unofficial? Is it registered?

3) Is there an ancestral history/connection that you share with the land that you
occupy in Tharparkar?

4) What type of property (land) is there in Tharparkar?

5) What do you think property rights in Tharparkar are? Have they changed or
remained the same over the years?

6) How are decisions pertaining to land taken now vs before?

7) Have coal mining companies influenced land ownership/property rights in

Tharparkar?

8) What do you suggest property rights should look like in Tharparkar? Who
should decide? And what should be decided?

25
APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW (1)

Interviewee: Shanti Kumari

Interviewer: Mehak Rathore
List of Acronyms: SK = Shanti Kumari, IN = Interviewer

IN: Which region/taluka of Tharparkar do you belong to? How long have you lived or
have been associated to this place?
SK: I belong to Chehlar, it is a small town that was once a village. Although I live in
Karachi now, my family has been living there for ages. I make yearly visits to my
parents who still live there. I am over 40 so you can imagine how long I have
known the place.

IN: Does your family own a specific part of land in Tharparkar? How do they own
this land? Is it official or unofficial? Is it registered?
SK: Yes, my parents own land. Actually, my grandmother’s brother lived in Chehlar.
At that time, Chehlar was only a village. Anyway, my grandmother told us that
her brother is was suggesting to build a room or two near his house. She agreed
and built the two rooms for my parents. I don’t know if the land is officially
registered or not. I highly doubt it. Maybe my father’s backyard is registered but
that is about it. Nobody really asks about the papers either.

IN: So you can simply build a house and live anywhere in Tharparkar?
SK: Pretty much. It’s an open land, you can build your house anywhere. But, I don’t
know if the system has changed now. During the time my parents built their
house, there was no registration. My grandmother had simply said that her
brother lives nearby and that was it.

IN: But Chehlar is not really a village, it is a town, even then there are is no
registration?
SK: Like I said, I am not sure what the situation is now but back in 1980-1981, there
was no official registration. People built homes where they had family and that is
how a village or community was formed.

IN: What type of land is there in Tharparkar?

SK: Well there is a common grazing land for the animals that is called gowcher.
Gowchers are not really owned by any community – these are vast lands that
anyone can use for their animals to feed on. Then there is the farming land. A
family living in a village can add fences on a piece of land and grow crops there.
Again, this not really officially registered but other families in the village
acknowledge the boundary and do not yield or steal that specific family’s crops.
They understand that it is that family’s hard work. The elders – male heads – of
the village also assign faming land to families in the villages to avoid disputes. I
am not sure how property rights work. In villages, elders make the decision.

IN: What do you think property rights in Tharparkar are? Have they changed or
remained the same over the years?

26
SK: Property rights are very vague and open-ended in Tharparkar. Anyone can settle
at any place without any third party interference. I know of entire villages that
have migrated to other spaces in Tharparkar. They abandon their old villages and
build new ones. The old villages are then occupied with other Thari people
seeking shelters. So far, this system has remained intact. There is never a fear of
running out of land because Tharparkar is huge and mostly, people migrate to
cities or urban centers to seek better opportunities. It is never the other way
around.

IN: What do you suggest property rights should look like in Tharparkar? Who should
decide? And what should be decided? Do you think there should be an official
body allocating land?
SK: Government hasn’t created any positive impact or cared for the people of
Tharparkar so I don’t expect them to allocate land suddenly. And even if the state
decides to introduce property rights in Thar, it will demand money from the
people of Tharparkar to register their land. People are extremely poor, they will
avoid the hassle entirely. I think if property rights need to be introduced, then the
government should ask the people of Tharparkar how to go about it by
conducting surveys.

IN: Have coal mining companies influenced land ownership/property rights in

Tharparkar?
SK: I have heard they had to move one-two villages but then they did give them the
equivalent amount. I have heard they also built model villages for these people.
So, there hasn’t been much influence just resettlement. They have also given
money for farm lands if the farm lands have fallen under the company’s power
plant.

27
APPENDIX C

TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW (1)

Interviewee: Sachdev Hirani

Interviewer: Mehak Rathore
List of Acronyms: SH = Sachdev Hirani, IN = Interviewer

IN: Which region/taluka of Tharparkar do you belong to? How long have you lived or
have been associated to this place?
SH: I belong to Mithi, it’s a taluka of Tharparkar. I have lived here my whole life,
basically. Though my village is a few hours away from Mithi, I have spent much
of my time in this region.

IN: Does your family own a specific part of land in Tharparkar? How do they own
this land? Is it official or unofficial? Is it registered?
SH: Our joint family owned a piece of agricultural land registered under the name of
my grandfather. It is official and registered in the revenue record. Once he
obtained the agricultural land, he settled around the area. The settlement itself is
not registered.

IN: Is there an ancestral history/connection that you share with the land that you
occupy in Tharparkar?
SH: Yes, I do. For generations we have lived here. Our life is built around this region.
Occupation of land goes beyond its physical and materialistic value; it is
sentimental and shaped by the culture and traditional values that people of the
region uphold.

IN: What type of property (land) is there in Tharparkar?

SH: It is mostly agricultural land. Then there are also villages that occupy land. Other
types include gowcher, which is a common grazing land for the cattle. Nowadays,
hotels (due to tourism) and businesses (such the coal power plant) are also
occupying land.

IN: What do you think property rights in Tharparkar are? Have they changed or
remained the same over the years?
SH: Firstly, people of Tharparkar are aware of property rights. They know what right
of possession, right of control, and right of deposition is but it is not entirely a
formal institution. In many villages, elders of the village take such decisions and
this system has remained intact for years. It is still functional today and very
effective, too.

IN: How are decisions pertaining to land taken now vs before?

SH: The elders of the village took most of these decisions. For instance, agricultural
land cannot be forcefully taken, it has to be purchased but if you want to migrate
to a different place, then you may not need to purchase the new land but simply
require the permission from the elders or the representatives of the villages
nearby.

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IN: Have coal mining companies influenced land ownership/property rights in
Tharparkar?
SH: Not really, there has been mainly resettlement. Companies have purchased
surveyed agricultural land on a set price and people have shifted from their
villages to another place as well. So yes, resettlement and migration has occurred
but land ownership itself is not really influenced.

IN: What do you suggest property rights should look like in Tharparkar? Who should
decide? And what should be decided?
SH: Personally, I think the government should start registering villages and charge a
minimum affordable fee.

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APPENDIX D

TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW (1)

Interviewee: Naina Sajnani

Interviewer: Mehak Rathore
List of Acronyms: NS = Naina Sajnani, IN = Interviewer

IN: Which region/taluka of Tharparkar do you belong to? How long have you lived or
have been associated to this place?
NS: Although I am currently based in Karachi, I belong to a village in Tharparkar. It
is near Islamkot. I have spent my childhood there and visit the region twice every
year.

IN: Does your family own a specific part of land in Tharparkar? How do they own
this land? Is it official or unofficial? Is it registered?
NS: Yes, my grandfather owns a strip of agricultural land there. It was passed down
to him by my great-grandfather. The land is officially registered. However, our
village is not really registered in any legal record.

IN: Is there an ancestral history/connection that you share with the land that you
occupy in Tharparkar?
NS: Yes. Our village is more than a piece of land. It is where people interact. It is
where a specific culture and values are produced and sustained. While residential
land does not carry much monetary value, it does serve as a safe space for many
communities because the houses are really closely built. Agricultural land, on the
other hand, does has monetary value because it is registered and can produce cash
crop/subsistence farming when it rains.

IN: What type of property (land) is there in Tharparkar?

NS: It varies. I only know of three types – gowcher, residential, and agricultural.

IN: What do you think property rights in Tharparkar are? Have they changed or
remained the same over the years?
NS: I don’t think they have changed at all. Previously, the representatives of different
villages would decide on residential allotment, which is still the case now.
Agricultural land was bought and sold and that has also remained the same – it is
still bought and sold much the same way.

IN: Have coal mining companies influenced land ownership/property rights in

Tharparkar?
NS: I wouldn’t say they have influenced and ownership but definitely caused
migration. They provided money as compensation to the people of the villages
that they had asked to move in order to set up the power plant. For some, they
have even built a new village as compensation. Obviously, migration, impacts
people differently too. Some of the villagers in Gorano (in another area of
Tharparkar), for instance, are protesting because the company – without seeking
the permission of the villagers – left their waste water nearby. So, there is a
negative impact on land as a natural resource for sure.

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IN: What do you suggest property rights should look like in Tharparkar? Who should
decide? And what should be decided?
NS: I think property rights in Tharparkar should be a joint partnership between the
state and people of Tharparkar. And by partnership here, I do not mean the
narrow business kind but of quality. Like democracy of sorts where people are
granted rights over the land that they occupy and the government simply helps
them legalize it without any cost. In my opinion, gowcher should also be
regulated.

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APPENDIX E

TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW (1)

Interviewee: Asim Riaz

Interviewer: Mehak Rathore
List of Acronyms: AR = Asim Riaz, IN = Interviewer

IN: Which region/taluka of Tharparkar do you belong to? How long have you lived or
have been associated to this place?
AR: I am from village near Mithi. I have been living here since birth.

IN: Does your family own a specific part of land in Tharparkar? How do they own
this land? Is it official or unofficial? Is it registered?
AR: I am not sure if ‘owning’ would be the right term because we do have any
official documentation. Besides, it is a village so everyone lives together. The
community collectively occupies a strip of land. If today my family chooses to
leave the village, nobody will occupy our house. The other villagers will keep a
watch over it. Even the villagers themselves won’t occupy our house. There is no
such element of greed because everyone is somehow blood-related to each other.
There is also a graveyard for the community at a distance from the village. So,
the villagers know that even though a certain family may not choose to live there,
they will come back to bury their dead.

IN: Is there an ancestral history/connection that you share with the land that you
occupy in Tharparkar?
AR: Yes, it is more than just a land to me. I grew up here – there are cultural,
traditional, communal, and emotional ties. This is mainly why villagers don’t feel
the need to annex others’ property – there is no reason for them to do so. There is
more land available than people. So, people usually struggle to fight for hunger
and basic facilities, not land per se.

IN: What type of property (land) is there in Tharparkar?

AR: Before the coal mining companies entered Tharparkar, three types of land were
most prominent – agricultural, residential, and gowcher. However, now land is
also used as hotels because of the sudden rise of Thar tourism and as sites for
building coal power plants.

IN: What do you think property rights in Tharparkar are? Have they changed or
remained the same over the years?
AR: Property rights in Tharparkar are very vague. Decisions pertaining to land in
villages is taken by elders, men mostly, while that of agricultural land are entirely
dependent on the person who officially owns that fertile land. I don’t know what
property rights are like in towns such as Mithi. But, in villages, the system has
remained the same.

IN: Have coal mining companies influenced land ownership/property rights in

Tharparkar?

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AR: Yes, definitely. Our village was initially located somewhere else. Then we were
asked to leave because the coal mining companies wanted to build their power
plant there. I am not sure if we got paid. I don’t remember that clearly but we did
move. We shifted somewhere nearby. The intervention of the coal mining
companies led to disputes – villagers protested. So, now the government is taking
measures to bring about land reforms. At least this is what I have heard.

IN: What do you suggest property rights should look like in Tharparkar? Who should
decide? And what should be decided?
AR: I think the government should grant property rights to the people of Tharparkar,
especially villages. However, before doing so, the state representatives should
engage in a dialogue with various community members.

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APPENDIX F

TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW (1)

Interviewee: Bhushan Kumar

Interviewer: Mehak Rathore
List of Acronyms: BK = Bhushan Kumar, IN = Interviewer

IN: Which region/taluka of Tharparkar do you belong to? How long have you lived or
have been associated to this place?
BK: I belong to a village near Islamkot. I have spent my entire childhood there and
my parents still live there. So, I have been associated with the place practically all
my life

IN: Does your family own a specific part of land in Tharparkar? How do they own
this land? Is it official or unofficial? Is it registered?
BK: There used to be a Goth Abad (village settlement) scheme before. It was initiated
by the government. This scheme was implemented on selected areas not
everywhere. I’m not sure which politician started it. Apart from the villages
registered under the scheme, all other types of land are not registered. There is no
documentation. It is the state owned land entirely. If the state wishes, it can ask
people to leave.

IN: Do people have a say in this?

BK: No, they don’t. People are mostly only responsible for their agricultural land
because they have property rights over that type of land. So, they do have a say
on their agricultural land but other than that, they don’t really have a say.
Especially, if the village is not even registered under the Goth Abad scheme.

IN: How does settlement work then?

BK: People can settle anywhere as they like as long as no one objects to it. For
instance, if people from a certain village decide to move to a new location, a
meeting would be called. In the meeting, elder representatives of the nearby
villages will join and give their consent. If the people who wish to move to the
east side of the region, for example, obtain majority votes, they will be allowed to
shift. From the government, there are no restrictions. Tharparkar is huge and the
population is very less so people never really fight over land. They don’t need to.

IN: What types of land is there?

BK: There is gowcher. Gowcher is basically land surrounding a village that is
specifically used for cattle grazing. Every village is given a gowcher by the
government just for the livestock. Nobody is allowed to farm on any gowcher, it
is assigned for the livestock, only. Then there are residential and agricultural
forms of land

IN: How did government specify gowcher?

BK: It was decided on the basis of the demands from the villagers. The administration
of that taluka then registers where and how much land is assigned as gowcher and
to what village. Though obviously, not everything is registered.

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IN: Are property rights more defined elsewhere in Tharparkar?
BK: To a greater extent, in Mithi. Representatives of the provincial government did
conduct a survey. They said they would come again but they never did. In Mithi,
land possession is simply equivalent to documented property rights even if they
lack a direct translation. For instance, if I want to give away a certain portion of
my land to someone and ask money for it, I can. When the person gives me the
amount, the land is his or hers. There is no official documentation but everyone
accepts it as it is. Land is sold on the basis of possession.

IN: Have they changed or remained the same over the years?
BK: This has been the case since centuries now. Land in Tharparkar never generated
value before and we are talking about decades ago. There is a lot of land and the
population is less so the intention even then was to populate the area; thus, there
are no strict laws on movement and migration. People are free to live and build
homes wherever they like. It is a community based system in Tharparkar so the
entire village moves, not just one family. One of the reasons for migration is
population growth. When people have children, they require more space, so then
they try to build a bigger village nearby after calling for a meeting as I previously
mentioned. They don’t even have to ask anyone from the government or the DC.
No application is required either. It’s the elders that make the decision and it is
implemented.

IN: Have coal mining companies influenced land ownership/property rights in

Tharparkar?
BK: Yes, the companies have caused a lot of upheaval. The government is now
working on developing new land reforms. They have formed a committee
specifically for the purpose of resolving land issues in Tharparkar.

IN: Are they taking into account the views and opinions of villagers?
BK: The representative is elected by the people of Tharparkar so he/she is chosen for
this purpose – to bring forth the views and perceptions of the pubic. These
changes are taking place because of the land mining companies. They caused
people to move and intervened in the villages. A lot of disputes emerged between
the company and the people because the companies set up their power plants
without asking the villagers. The villagers began to protest and caught the
attention of the state. So, now they are working on land reforms.

IN: What do you suggest property rights should look like in Tharparkar? Who should
decide? And what should be decided?
BK: I think the government should assign nominal charges and establish well-defined
property rights. In Mithi, this is the case.

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