ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cover: Detail from a painting by Michael Turner depicting

C Company's attack on Objective LEAD in the Gulf War. Reproduced
by permission of 1st Battalion The Staffordshire Regiment (Prince of
Wales's).

Back cover: Detail from 'The Duke of Wellington signalling the

general advance at Waterloo' by J A Atkinson, reproduced by
permission of the Trustees of the British Museum.
 Army Code No 71451

Design for Military Operations -

The British Military Doctrine

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff

1996

D/CGS/50/8
 CONTENTS

Foreword

ONE Introduction 1-1

TWO The Purpose and Roles 2-1

of the Armed Forces
THREE Modern Warfare 3-1

FOUR Military Effectiveness 4-1

ANNEX A The Principles of War

B Mechanics of Command

C Forms of Manoeuvre
 FOREWORD

When The British Military Doctrine (BMD) was first issued in 1989 it was breaking new ground - we had not
before sought to articulate doctrine at a level above the tactical. Seven years on, I am heartened to see that
professional interest amongst present day officers and NCOs has never been higher. And given that conflict is
becoming increasingly complex it is as well that the Army has made headway in appreciating how to tackle the
very varied situations it often now confronts. Whilst progress in the doctrinal field has probably been most
marked at the tactical level, the existence of a high level doctrine has influenced the way in which the Army thinks.
The explanation of fighting power, which is very much the essence of BMD, now lies at the root of much of what
we do. It forms the basis of all our tactical doctrine. It is the framework for the way in which we are about to
measure our military capability. And it is now used to explain the Army’s reason for being as it is and needing to
act as it does.

But despite BMD’s essentially enduring nature, it was always acknowledged that it would be necessary to re-issue
it at appropriate moments in the army’s development. Now is such a moment, though the change required is not
great. The analysis of military effectiveness in Chapter 4, which is the principal part of BMD, has only required
minor updating, mainly to include a wider understanding of the manoeuvrist approach. It is worth reminding
ourselves why this is so, for at a time when many of the wide ranging tasks that come the Army’s way do not
directly concern war fighting, some may express surprise that we are not re-defining military effectiveness mark-
edly. The answer is that Armies exist to fight and their structure, organization, equipment and thought processes
must reflect this fundamental fact. The essential nature of fighting power has not, therefore, altered.

Finally, let me lay some emphasis on the function of BMD which remains to establish the framework of under-
standing of the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application. The
important word is ‘understanding’. Little these days is predictable. Our people do so well in many parts of the
world because our officers and NCOs have an understanding of warfare that is broadly based and they are not
reliant, except where necessary, on rigid adherence to prescriptive rules. It is for this reason that BMD is, as
before, issued to all officers in the Army of the rank of Captain and above and it is essential that we all become
thoroughly conversant with it.

Chief of the General Staff

 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

CONTENTS

What is Doctrine? 1

The Functions and Levels of Doctrine 1

The Importance of Doctrine 3

Development 4

The Applicability of Military Doctrine 5

Cross Reference 5
“War is delightful to the inexperienced.”

Inscription on the tomb of Henry III in

Westminster Abbey

What is Doctrine?

Put most simply, doctrine is what is taught. In the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) it is described as ‘fundamental principles by which
the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgement in application.’ There are various levels
at which it can be written. The British Army defines military doctrine as
follows:

“Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and

thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time,
which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the
preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of
engaging in them to achieve success.”

The Functions and Levels of Doctrine

In some cases doctrine will be written to put across straightforward

instruction; in others it will aim to impart understanding; elsewhere it may
do both. In the British Army there are three levels at which it is written:

l Military Doctrine. A Military Doctrine is the highest level of Army

doctrine and is issued by the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). It is
termed military in the sense conveyed by the dictionary definition: ‘of,
done by, befitting, soldiers, the army, or all armed forces’. It is
concerned with conveying understanding not instruction. It is based
directly upon Government policy manifest primarily in White Papers
(which represent strategic doctrine), but is quite specifically designed
 for the user - the Army. Yet, since it is unclassified, it will have a
readership outside the Army. Its function is to establish the
framework of understanding of the approach to warfare in order to
provide the foundation for its practical application. Doctrine at this
level must address the questions: why we have an Army (Chapter 2),
what is the nature of the war the Army may be called upon to fight
(Chapter 3) and how does it succeed in such a war (Chapter 4).

l Higher Level Doctrine. Higher level doctrine is concerned with the

principles that govern the conduct of operations at all levels and with
the operational level of conflict (see Chapter 4). It seeks to impart both
understanding and instruction, although the emphasis is on
understanding. It will be based upon the Military Doctrine. The Army
Doctrine Publications (ADP) series is the core of such doctrine.

l Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine provides the main body of

doctrinal instruction within the Army. It is essential to ensure that all
commanders, whatever their specialization, have a common foundation
on which to base their plans. Most commonly it appears in pamphlets,
sponsored by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and establishments
within the Training Organization and is usually classified
RESTRICTED. The Army Field Manual (AFM) series, together with
the range of subsidiary documents (such as the Tactical Aide Memoir),
is the core of such doctrine.

The diagram below (Fig 1) shows these levels of doctrine related to the
functions that they perform.

MILITARY
(CGS)
=
Understanding/Direction
HIGHER LEVEL
(Army Doctrine Publications) THEATRE
= INSTRUCTIONS
Understanding/Instruction (Directives etc)
TACTICAL =
(Army Field Manual etc) Orders/Guidance
=
Instruction/Training
l Theatre/Operation Instructions. Theatre and Operation Instructions
provide a vital supplement to doctrine. They will be sponsored by the
relevant commander. They will seek to impart both understanding and
instruction concerning probable or existing operations and will define
the levels of command (see Chapter 4) within the theatre. Theatre and
Operation Instructions will be closely based on Military, Higher Level
and Tactical Doctrine, interpreting these in the light of the particular
circumstances of the theatre concerned. Unlike the other strands of
doctrine, some or all of these Instructions are likely to be highly
classified.

The Importance of Doctrine

There is an argument that attempting to codify doctrine leads to rigidity of

thought and even dogma. Whether or not this is the case is a question of
approach. The Army, like many comparable organizations, has a
requirement to be able to resolve complex activity. Yet warfare is an activity
for which few hard and fast rules can exist. At low levels activities can be
reduced to a number of drills. But an Army that is to succeed in war must
have the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances to endure chaotic
conditions; for this mere drills will not suffice. If it is to represent an
effective deterrent in peacetime, an Army must be seen to be physically
capable of fighting and mentally and morally prepared to do so. Such an
Army must be clear how the complex situations, difficulties and hardships
that will inevitably arise in war are to be tackled. Conduct of war is a matter
of applying both science and art. As Captain Liddell Hart explained:

“War is a science which depends upon art for its application.”

The Army’s doctrine must attend to both aspects, but its Military Doctrine
must primarily seek to influence the way in which its officers and non-
commissioned officers think. Hence the function of a Military Doctrine is to
‘establish the framework of understanding of the approach to warfare’- not
a set of rules but to provide direction as an aid to understanding. The
importance to an Army of being able to think was put by Major General
Fuller as follows:

“. . . `what to think’ of itself is not sufficient; it may be said to supply

the raw material - historical facts etc - in which `how to think’
operates. `What to think’ supplies us with the bricks and mortar,
`how to think’ with craftsmanship.”

It is that craftsmanship which formal doctrine must develop in peacetime by

engendering, above all, a sense of purpose in what is done.

Development

Whilst doctrine should be regarded as neither infallible nor dogmatic, it

nevertheless has authority and is to be followed. Its nature is enduring yet
dynamic in order to drive development of both the science and art of war in
the Army at the fastest practicable rate. It provides the focus for debate
within and outside the Army and constructive criticism and assessment of it
is to be encouraged. What will cause it to endure will be the fact that it is
based on the hard won and often bitter experience gained in war. What will
cause it to alter are:

l Defence Commitments and Resources.

l Technology.

l The Threat.

l Research, Development and Experiment.

l Experience on Active Service and Trial on Exercise.

Responsibility for the development and dissemination of doctrine rests with

the General Staff, specifically the Director General Development and
Doctrine (DGD&D).

The Military Doctrine will be reviewed every five years and if necessary re-
issued. It will in any event be re-issued every ten years.

The Applicability of Military Doctrine

Chapter 3 discusses the spectrum of conflict and the range of operations in

which the Army may be involved. Military Doctrine is appropriate to
operations throughout the spectrum. It is as relevant to the conduct of
general war and regional conflict as to counter insurgency or peace support
operations.

It is possible that future conflict will witness the use of weapons of mass
destruction (that is to say nuclear, chemical and biological weapons). There
is, however, no empirical evidence for the nature of the doctrine that would
be appropriate if such weapons were ever to be used. This publication is
therefore written within the context of conventional operations.

Cross Reference

Definitions used are, where possible, taken from the NATO Glossary AAP-
6(Q), and the NATO Land Force Tactical Doctrine ATP-35(B). Expanded
discussion of doctrinal statements in this booklet is to be found in the ADPs
and the volumes of the AFM. Cross reference to these volumes is made in
the form: ‘See AFM Vol I Part 1,...’
 CHAPTER TWO

THE PURPOSE AND ROLES

OF THE ARMED FORCES

CONTENTS

British Defence Policy 1

Aim 1
NATO, OCSE, and Other European Alliances 1
The United Nations 1
Commonwealth and Colonial Responsibilities 2

Britain’s Defence Roles 2

Defence Roles 2
Deterrence 2
Mission Types 3
Military Tasks 3
Categories of Forces 4
Forces Declared to NATO 4
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities 5

Control of the Armed Forces 5

Constitutional Position 5
The Higher Management of Defence 6
Dissemination and Scrutiny of Policy 7
Crisis Management 7

The Allocation of Resources 9

The Funding of Defence 9
Managing Resources Within Defence 9
Budgets 9
Financial Planning 9
Influences 10
 British Defence Policy

Aim. The goal of British security policy is to maintain the freedom and
territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its Dependent Territories, and
the ability to pursue its legitimate interests at home and abroad. Security
defined in this way encompasses sustaining the rule of law and internal
order within the United Kingdom and its Dependent Territories; reducing the
possibility of, or if necessary deterring or defending against, external
aggression against the United Kingdom, its Dependent Territories or its vital
national interests; and creating and preserving the conditions of peace and
stability within which the United Kingdom can pursue its national interests.
Defence policy is designed to support this wider security policy. It guides
the contribution the Armed forces make to the achievement of the country’s
defence and security goals and shapes their structure and capabilities. It is
exercised to a large extent through international security structures and
institutions designed to promote peace and international stability.

NATO, OSCE, and Other European Alliances. NATO which has been
the cornerstone of western European Defence strategy for over 40 years, is
set to expand and adapt to meet changing security conditions. In
conjunction with the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), the European Union, and the Western European Union (WEU),
initiatives are being developed to enhance stability and security throughout
central and eastern Europe and to promote wider international peace and
security. Britain’s commitment to collective security is central to her
defence policy, and the most tangible expression of this in Europe is her
position as the lead and framework nation in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC).

The United Nations (UN). The United Nations Charter gives it prime
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the
aftermath of superpower confrontation, the UN has played a larger part in
conflict resolution than was ever the case during the Cold War and is likely
to face continuing pressure to mount peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain
attaches great importance to strengthening the authority and influence of the
UN in pursuit of its Charter.

Commonwealth and Colonial Responsibilities. Britain has certain residual

defence responsibilities that stem from her colonial past, and prominent
position within the Commonwealth. The extent of commitment varies from
country to country, and may range from military advice and consultation
through to guaranteed assistance against internal and external threats.

Britain’s Defence Roles

Defence Roles. Britain’s defence policy is defined in terms of three

overlapping roles:

l Defence Role One. To ensure the protection and security of the United
Kingdom and her dependent territories even when there is no external
threat.

l Defence Role Two. To ensure against major external threat to the United
Kingdom and her allies.

l Defence Role Three. To contribute to promoting the United Kingdom’s

wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace
and stability.

Deterrence. Underpinning these Defence Roles is the desire in the first

place to deter. The term deterrence is associated with the NATO/WP
confrontation but is no less relevant to the post Cold War era. The aim of
deterrence is to preserve peace by facing a potential aggressor with a clear
risk that the costs of aggression would outweigh any conceivable gain; and
that the use of force is hence no longer a rational option. Successful
deterrence depends on the possession of adequate forces, but the threat of
their use must be credible by being appropriate in the circumstances and by
conveying clearly that the will exists to execute and sustain them.
Deterrence requires a flow of information to be effective; intentions must be
clearly enunciated and communicated. Deterrence is both a physical
process and a matter of perception.

Mission Types. As an analytical tool, seven types of operation have been

identified which might involve the use of the United Kingdom’s military
forces. These mission types are:

l Military Aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom.

l A challenge to the internal or external security of a Dependent Territory.

l General War - a large scale attack against NATO.

l A limited regional conflict involving a NATO ally who calls for

assistance under Article V of the Washington Treaty.

l A British contribution to the missions of NATO and the WEU.

l A serious conflict (but not an attack on NATO or one of its members)

which, if unchecked, could adversely affect European security, or
which could pose a serious threat to British interests elsewhere, or to
international security.

l Other military assistance and limited operations, characteristically of

lower intensity and longer duration, to support international order and
humanitarian principles, often under United Nations auspices.

Military Tasks. The demands which these Roles and Missions place on the
Armed Forces are in turn broken down into 50 Military Tasks. These define
the military activities which the armed forces are required to undertake to
give effect to the Government’s security and defence policies. Between
them, the Tasks cover the entire spectrum of activities undertaken by the
armed forces. Forces and capabilities are identified to carry out each Task
and the analysis thus provides an explicit link between policy goals and the
forces required to achieve them.
Categories of Forces. Forces are categorized as follows:

l Forces for General War generated by the mobilisation of reserves to

reinforce current units, completion of the necessary training, and
generation of stockpiles and equipping of units to war levels, possibly
together with the raising, training and equipping of wholly new units.

l Permanently Committed Forces, including strategic nuclear forces and

our garrisons.

l National Contingency Forces available for all seven mission types.

They provide:

m An immediate response to regional tensions that may escalate

into conflict, whether on NATO’s periphery or further afield.

m A core capability for credible response should the United

Kingdom’s national interests be challenged.

m A foundation on which to build in the event of a major external

threat to our security.

m And the pool from which to draw for operations in support of

international security and stability.

Forces Declared to NATO. All three categories above contribute to forces

declared to NATO which will consist of:

l Immediate Reaction Forces such as the Allied Command Europe

Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)).

l Rapid Reaction Forces, of which the UK Land component comprises

our contribution to HQ ARRC, one armoured and one mechanised
division, and an airmobile brigade.

l Main and Augmentation forces held at the lowest state of readiness.

l Special Forces.
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). Military Aid to Civil
Authorities can take three forms:

l Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). MACC is the

provision of Service personnel and equipment, both in emergencies
(e.g natural disasters)and in routine situations, to assist the community
at large.

l Military Aid to Civil Ministries (MACM). MACM is the use of

military forces for non-military Government tasks, including
assistance to maintain the essentials of life in the community or to
undertake urgent work of national importance

l Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). MACP is provided in the

United Kingdom and Dependent Territories for the direct maintenance
or restoration of law and order in situations beyond the capacity of the
civil power to resolve in any other way. The military role is to respond
to a request for assistance, resolve the immediate problem and then
return control to the civil power.

Control of the Armed Forces

Constitutional Position. The command of the Services formally rests with

the Crown. In practice the authority of the Crown is represented by the
Government of the day and responsibility for the Armed Forces is delegated
to the Secretary of State for Defence, supported by the Defence Council
which is the legal authority for the Services. Command over all officers and
soldiers and the detailed administration of the Army is delegated by the
Sovereign, through Letters Patent, to the Defence Council. The Service
Chiefs of Staff are the professional heads of their Services and members of
the Chiefs of Staff Committee. They are fully responsible for the fighting
effectiveness, management, overall efficiency and morale of their Services.
They normally report and tender advice through the Chief of the Defence
Staff (CDS) to the Secretary of State while retaining their right of direct
access to him and to the Prime Minister. CGS directs the work of the Army
in accordance with policy directives and budgets for the main areas of
expenditure determined in conjunction with the Central Defence Staffs in
the Ministry of Defence. Detailed management of the Army is the
responsibility of the Executive Committee of the Army Board, chaired by
CGS.

The Higher Management of Defence. The main principles of policy are

decided by the Government. Major questions of defence policy are dealt
with by the Standing Committee of the Cabinet concerned with defence and
oversee policy matters, which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes
senior ministers with responsibilities relating to defence. Within these broad
guidelines defence policy issues are resolved by the Secretary of State, his
ministers and his two principal advisers: CDS and the Permanent Under
Secretary (PUS) (Head of Department and Principal Accounting Officer).

Under the control and direction of the Secretary of State, the MOD ensures
effective co-ordination of all policy and administrative matters affecting the
fighting Services. This includes:

l Formulation and Execution of Defence Policy. This involves

determining long-term strategy and doctrine, force planning, assigning
priorities and allocating resources.

l Conduct of Operations.

l Manpower Planning.

l Equipment Requirements and Procurement.

l Detailed Financial Control.

The Central Staffs of the MOD are responsible for advising ministers on,
and co-ordinating, defence-wide policy, determining priorities and allocating
resources. They are also concerned with common arrangements and
planning for operations, intelligence, logistics and pay and personnel
matters. The single-Service staffs are responsible for the management of
their Services and execution of delegated operations. The Procurement
Executive is responsible for the development, production and purchase of
all warlike equipment and stores.

Dissemination and Scrutiny of Policy. Defence policy is presented to

Parliament in the form of a Statement on Defence Estimates (SDE or the
Defence White Paper) each spring. This may be supplemented by other
Command documents reviewing policy or commitments. The individual
Services and the SDE are debated annually in Parliament. Parliament may
also enquire into defence issues in the following ways:

l Parliamentary Questions and Parliamentary Enquiries. MPs may

ask Parliamentary Questions on any aspect of defence or may write to
a defence minister.

l The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the National Audit Office
(NAO). The NAO, headed by the Comptroller and Auditor General
(C&AG) and independent of ministerial control, audits departmental
accounts to see that public funds have been managed efficiently and
for the objects specified by Parliament. The C&AG’s reports are
submitted to the Public Accounts Committee.

l Select Committees. In addition to the Public Accounts Committee,

the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) is the
committee principally concerned with defence issues.

Crisis Management

The then Prime Minister summarized in 1986 the division of responsibility in

high level crisis management:

“You cannot run the details of an operation by politicians around the

Cabinet table. You can set straight criteria, strict parameters, strict
rules of engagement. Then, the precise way in which those are
carried out is up to the Military.”
Crisis management is exercised at the highest level by ministers, either
individually or in committee. Most crises will be handled by the Overseas
Policy and Defence Committee of the Cabinet (OPDC), but if necessary a
special cabinet committee may be set up to co-ordinate the work of all the
government departments involved. Within the guidelines determined by
ministers, the MOD is responsible for the higher direction of operations.
This is done through the Defence Crisis Management Organisation
(DCMO).

For NATO operations the DCMO, in conjunction with the Cabinet Office,
liases with the NATO Military Committee. For forces in Allied Command
Europe (ACE) command is exercised by Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) through Major Subordinate Commands (MSC - for
example AFCENT) and Principle Subordinate Commands (PSC - for
example LANDCENT) to national formations.

For non-NATO operations the DCMO issues directives to the Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO) at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). A two-star
Joint Force Commander (JFC) to command formations engaged in battle
will be nominated from:

l The Joint Force Command Group (JFCG):

m Commander UK Task Group.

m Commandant General Royal Marines.

m Headquarters 3 (United Kingdom) Division.

m Headquarters No 1 Group RAF.

m An existing force or garrison headquarters if appropriate.

For both NATO and non-NATO operations forces are provided by one or
more of the single-Service Headquarters:

l Fleet (FLEET at Portsmouth).

l Land Command (LAND, at Wilton).

l Strike Command (STC, at High Wycombe).

The Allocation of Resources

The Funding of Defence. Each year, ministers consider collectively the

allocation to spending departments of the resources available to the
Government, as part of the annual Public Expenditure Survey (PES). The
results are announced in late November/early December in the Chancellor’s
Budget speech, and published in the “Financial Statement and Budget
Report”. This sets out the Government’s plans for public expenditure for
the financial year starting the following April (the Estimates year) and for the
following two years, along with plans for taxation.

Managing Resources within Defence. In 1991, the New Management

Strategy (NMS) was introduced. The principles of the NMS are:

l Objectives and responsibility must be clear, and authority must match

responsibility.

l Management must be accountable.

l Authority must be delegated to the greatest possible extent.

Budgets. Top Level Budgets (TLB) are now held by senior commanders
and managers throughout the department in order to meet the costs of their
organisations, and a hierarchy of Higher Level (HLB) and Basic Level
Budgets (BLB) ensures that budgets are delegated as far down the chain of
command as possible. Commanders of stores depots, repair workshops and
front line units have their own budgets and must ensure value for money in
day to day business.

Financial Planning. The overall vehicle for defence expenditure planning

is the Long Term Costing (LTC), which provides a framework for the
coming 10 years. Defence policy, commitments and capabilities are decided
by ministers. They are set out in the Departmental Plan, and reflected in the
form of increasingly detailed objectives through the Army Plan, the TLB
plans and lower level plans to the units that must fulfil them. Budget
holders at all levels use their Management Plans as a framework for
constructing the LTCs. LTCs are submitted up the budgetary hierarchy and
scrutinised at each level for tautness, realism and compliance with agreed
plans and assumptions. Proposed changes to the programme are set out in
Alternative Assumptions. The central staffs compile the overall Defence
Programme, embracing both the TLB costings and the equipment
programme, and adjust it to fit within the resource levels agreed in the Public
Expenditure Survey. The finalised programme is submitted to the Financial
Planning and Management Group (FPMG) around Christmas each year and,
following the Secretary of State’s agreement, TLB holders receive their
budgets for the coming year. Plans are adjusted to take account of changes
to the programme, and the finalised LTC forms the starting point for the
next LTC.

Influences. The process of constructing the Defence Programme has to

take many factors into account. Among these are:

l The Tri-Service Nature of Defence. The needs and priorities of all

three Services have to be met from a single finite budget. Thus the
Army’s financial plans and requirements (as well as doctrine and
concepts) can never be taken in isolation.

l The Varied Roles of the Army. The roles of the various Arms and
Services in the Army are very diverse and they require a wide range of
equipment and training. In addition, the design of equipment must
take into account the varying requirements of the Army’s many
commitments and often the needs of other Services. For example,
strategic mobility imposes design limitations on Army equipment
which must be air or sea transportable.

l The Need for Balance. It follows that there is a need for balance, for
example in the following areas:
 m Breadth and Depth. There is a balance to be struck between the
size of the front line, and support for it. At the basic level the balance
can be characterized as that between manpower and equipment, but it
also involves the question of the range of capabilities offered by the
front line.

m General War and Contingency Force Operations. The Army

needs both to ensure that it has the basis to regenerate to a full General
War ORBAT over a period of time, and to engage in Contingency Force
operations at much shorter notice. This involves judgements about the
balance between, for example, in-service equipments and war stocks.

m Training Ammunition and Simulation. At a less strategic level,

balance needs to be achieved between investment in live firing (training
ammunition) and in simulation to meet training requirements.

l Cost Effectiveness. The drive for value for money is an essential

element in defence planning. Strenuous efforts are made in
equipment development and procurement to achieve the most cost-
effective solutions to defence problems. Solutions are judged by the
standard of what is militarily effective for the achievement of
commitments. Measures may include the reassignment of roles
between Services or, more often, between Arms in the Army,
purchase of suitable equipment ‘off-the-shelf’ or collaborative
equipment development. The MOD also ensures that the possibilities
for competition are maximized to give the best value for money in
procurement and all activities in which military personnel are not
essential. Inefficient use of resources results in less money being
available for other essential projects.
 CHAPTER THREE

MODERN WARFARE

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

The Nature of the Conflict 1

General War 2
Regional Conflict 2
The Concept of Limitation 2
The Concept of Intensity 4
Other Uses of Armed Forces 4

Military Activities in Peace 5

The Characteristics of the Modern Battlefield 6

 Introduction

Predicting the nature of modern warfare is a notoriously unreliable process.

Armies must, however, plan and train for future conflict on the basis of
some indication of the likely nature of war. A middle course must be
steered between experience (armies are often accused of training for the war
they fought last) and projections of futuristic weapons (whose technology
may be unproven and whose cost may be prohibitive). The first safe as-
sumption is that war will occur where it is little expected and that warfare
will assume at least a partly unforeseen form. The assumptions on modern
warfare which follow are based on deductions from existing and projected
intentions and capabilities tempered by experience from recent conflicts.
The effect of the factors on each other will shape warfare at any particular
time. This process, unique to any conflict, is, however, dynamic. In peace-
time, therefore, the Services must have a sound idea of what may occur and
how it might be countered. To be effective in war they must be able to react
positively to the unexpected, adjusting their methods of operation rapidly to
the circumstances actually prevailing. To understand modern warfare it is
first necessary to consider the nature of conflict.

The Nature of Conflict

Conflict is a situation in which violence is either manifest or threatened. It is

a struggle or a clash between opposing forces or contending wishes. It does
not always explicitly demand violence although the risk or threat of violence
is implied: even when violence has broken out, diplomacy, or other non-
violent activity may continue. The parties to a conflict who have set out to
impose their will on enemies will be at war. Other involved parties, whilst
not at war, may nevertheless engage in military activity to resolve or termi-
nate conflict. In either case a military response to conflict will require armed
forces to be deployed commensurate with the level of violence.
It is therefore useful to consider conflict as a spectrum, for this then provides
a general guide to the way in which armed forces may be used in response
to the varying levels of violence. The spectrum extends from full scale
warfighting at one end to the use of armed force in extremely constrained
circumstances at the other, and only lends itself to a degree of definition.
The following paragraphs consider the term ‘General War’ and ‘Regional
Conflict’ and consider the concepts of limitation and intensity as well as
other uses of armed forces.

General War. The term ‘General War’ is commonly used to define a major,
unrestricted conflict in which national survival is at stake. Its unrestricted
nature has led in the past to the terms ‘General’ and ‘Total War’ being re-
garded as synonymous. General war implies a total national effort in which
all elements of society will be involved, including of course the armed
forces. Whilst it is difficult to foresee any prospect of this condition arising
in current circumstances, the Government’s responsibility for national sur-
vival is inescapable; the Army must be capable of responding, after due
warning, to the demands that General War will make upon it.

Regional Conflict. As its name implies, regional conflict occurs in a spe-

cific geographic area. The political and economic effects of such a conflict
may reverberate much further afield but the fighting is contained within a
particular region. This may be the only limitation that applies, since there is
no implication that the size of forces deployed, the types of weapons em-
ployed, or the duration and intensity of the fighting will in any way be lim-
ited. Indeed regional conflict is likely to equal the intensity of general war
for those directly involved. It follows that the deployment of a lower level
of sophistication in weapons systems than in General War is likely to be a
false economy. A British joint force committed to action will be carefully
structured according to the threat and the force’s mission.

The Concept of Limitation. In the Cold War the term ‘Limited War’ was
used principally to distinguish conflict in which it was thought there would
be no recourse to nuclear weapons. But as the discussion of regional con-
flict reveals, forces engaged in conflict will invariably be subject to limitation
and constraint and therefore it would no longer be useful to single out ‘Lim-
ited War’ as a specific type in the spectrum. The concept of limitation does,
however, remain valid.

l Limits. The limits fall into four general categories:

m Objective. In General War the means required to achieve objec-

tives are selected. Implicit in other types of conflict is the fact that the
objectives sought must be appropriate to the means available or accept-
able in terms of public and international opinion.

m Means. Although the only widely agreed limitation on means is

that nuclear weapons should not be used, constraints may be imposed
on weapons, eg chemical, or their employment, for instance against
civilian targets, as well as on the scale of forces employed.

m Area. Geographical limits may be accepted so that a conflict

does not involve neutral parties or draw in other participants. Such
limits may be designated as exclusion of war zones to avoid casualties
to those not involved.

m Time. Those undertaking a war usually believe that the issue

can be settled quickly: reality is often different. Rapid achievement of
objectives so that escalation will not occur remains the prime consid-
eration: states may wish to prevent a fait accompli before there is politi-
cal involvement by the Superpowers or the United Nations. Time limi-
tations are not always present, although they are often imposed on
belligerents from outside.

l Political Aspect. The size of forces committed by the UK and the

constraints imposed upon them will be decided by the Cabinet Com-
mittee concerned according to the objectives and the level of threat.
Consultation with allies will usually be necessary. The principles of
reasonable force and minimum cost will apply and there may be spe-
cific legal requirements to be taken into account - limits of this sort will
usually be incorporated in the Rules of Engagement for the theatre.
There will be a need to reach a speedy conclusion to a conflict: the
pressure of time will be conditioned by international support for the
 UK’s aims. Constraints may therefore be imposed or lifted for
reasons only indirectly related to the fighting.

The Concept of Intensity. Intensity in warfare terms refers to the degree

and frequency of violence encountered. Frequency speaks for itself and
bears on tempo: degree concerns the destructive power of the means used
(usually a weapon system). So intensity can be ‘high’ when violence occurs
often (frequency) or when the encounters are particularly violent (degree).
Given this interpretation, it adds nothing to the understanding of conflict to
classify it in terms of intensity. For a conflict that is low in intensity at its
outset can become high when the frequency and degree of encounters in-
crease. On the other hand, the spectrum of conflict can usefully be under-
stood in terms of the ‘low’ to ‘high’ - low being where the likelihood of
violence (both frequency and degree) is assessed as being low, high being
where it is thought very likely to occur. There is logically some, but only
some, connection between the spectrum of intensity and the forces required.
The ‘low’ end will seldom call for the full range of weapon systems to be
deployed; the ‘high’ end is much more likely to require the widest armoured
capability. But it does not follow from this that the low end will exclude
sophisticated systems (such as STA, aviation etc) or those which minimize
casualties.

Other Uses of Armed Forces.

l Operations to Resolve or Terminate Conflict. Where armed forces

are used to resolve or terminate conflict, operations may often be
conducted in support of a United Nations Mandate or directives from
other international organizations, such as the WEU. The forces com
mitted will invariably be joint and are likely to be part of an allied or
coalition multi-national force. The standard of military effectiveness
(described in Chapter 4) will be that which must always apply as the
level of intensity may change, regardless of the mission. In principle,
a force should be equipped to achieve its objectives in the shortest
possible time and may often include war fighting elements. The com
position, deployment, equipment (and, consequently, mission) of a
force will be constrained by the transport lift available. This will also
 affect what can be sustained logistically: a secure forward base from
which air cover can be provided and an operation supplied is as indis
pensable for a limited conflict conducted at any great distance from
the home base as it is for more warlike operations.

l Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN). COIN operations are

carried out to complement those political, economic, psychological
and civic actions necessary to defeat an armed insurgency. Insur-
gency embraces forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with
national or international political aims. These frequently include the
overthrow of the established government. Each situation is unique
but the range of activities could include:

m Subversion. Illegal measures, short of the use of force, em-

ployed to overthrow a government or to persuade or force people to
do things they do not want to do.

m Terrorism. The use of violence to intimidate a population for

political ends.

m Armed Insurrection. Illegal measures, including the use of

force, aimed at the overthrow of government. In this context revolu-
tionary war differs in that its aim would not only be the overthrow of
the state but also the reversal of the social and cultural systems per-
taining at the time.

Military Activities in Peace

Military activities discharged during peace are likely to be based on the need
to deter, but will include:

l Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA). MACA is described in

Chapter 2 in the discussion of Britain’s Defence Roles.

l Military advice to HM Government.

l Training for war and other operations.

l Activities that support the UK’s wider national interest. Manning
overseas garrisons, providing attachés, intelligence gathering and other
activities that support the UK’s wider national interest.

l Training teams, Military Assistance Overseas (MAO) and second-

ments.

l Arms control.

l Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

l Monitoring and Observation.

l Public duties (ceremonial).

l Military security.

The Characteristics of the Modern Battlefield

Some aspects of warfighting are enduring. Fear, chaos, friction, uncertainty,

boredom, the human contest in which soldier faces soldier in mortal opposi-
tion; these will characterize the battlefield until warfare ceases as a method
of pursuing political ends. As Clausewitz reminds us: “If war is an act of
force, the emotions cannot fail to be involved”. Furthermore, the strategies,
operational gambits and tactics that will be used invariably have historical
precedent. But technological advance and new sociological and geo-politi-
cal circumstances will inevitably change the detail of how war is fought.
Modern warfighting has the following features that are particular to the late
20th Century:

l Continuous Battle. Night and bad weather no longer slow the tempo
of operations. Battle will continue until one side or the other is ex-
hausted.

l The Pace of Battle. The increasing speed of ground and air vehicles
has increased the rate at which events will occur. The pace of battle
 will appear to be greater because of the complex interaction between
the volume of information that will be available and the inevitable
circumstance in which a breakdown of communications, deception
and surprise will take effect.

l The Information Battle. Information technology seeks to provide

commanders at all levels with the precise information that they require
precisely when they need it. It seeks to give them total visibility of the
battlefield and, thus, an unbeatable advantage over the enemy. Whilst
this ideal is unlikely to be achieved in full, significant progress towards
it has already been made. The quantity and quality of information,
and the intelligence which flows from it, that will be available gives
modern warfare a new character.

l The Extent of Battle. The high cost of manning and equipping mod-
ern armies will ensure that war will be fought by forces almost cer-
tainly smaller in size than at any time in the 20th Century. This gives
rise to the idea of ‘the less dense battlefield’ in which there will be
more room to manoeuvre, at the operational level at least, and where
the dividing lines between forces will be much less well defined.

l The Range and Precision of Battle. Improvements in weapon capa-

bilities and the means to acquire their targets will allow battle to be
fought at longer range and with greater precision than before.

Ä The Multi-Dimensional Battle. War will be fought in the deep, close

and rear battles (see ADP - 1 Operations). It will be fought in and
from the air and in the electro-magnetic spectrum. It will be fought
simultaneously and at all levels of intensity, in all dimensions

l The Effects on the Soldier. Although it is impossible to quantify, it is

likely that modern battlefields will be even more demanding than
those of the past. The tempo, the intensity created by modern weapon
systems and the scope for unfamiliar threats are likely to increase the
‘friction’ of war (described in more detail in Chapter 4) and so put
new and greater demands on soldiers.
 CHAPTER FOUR

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

CONTENTS

FIGHTING POWER 1

Military Effectiveness 1

What Constitutes Fighting? 2

The Concept of Fighting Power 3

Conceptual Component 3
Moral Component 5
Physical Component 6

MILITARY DOCTRINE - THE CONDUCT OF CAMPAIGNS

AND OPERATIONS 7

Command 7
The Levels of Conflict 7
Levels of Conflict and Levels of Command 10
The Operational Level and Operational Art 11
The Command Philosophy 13
The Basis for Success in Fighting a War 14
The Environment 14
Requirements 16
The Exercise of Command 17
The Manoeuvrist Approach 21
A Joint/Combined Approach 27
Unity of Effort 33
Mobility 35
Surprise 35
Ground 36
Sustainability 37
Organizations and Systems Development 38
Development 39
Analysis 39
Guiding Principle 40
Requirements 40
Training Essentials 44
Matching Doctrine 44
Coping With Stress and Uncertainty 46
Learning from Experience 47
 FIGHTING POWER

Military Effectiveness

Military effectiveness is the standard by which the Army is judged in peace

and war, from platoon to the highest levels. In this chapter military
effectiveness is explained using the concept of Fighting Power. This is not
measured against an absolute standard but in relation to other armies. The
components of Fighting Power provide the intellectual and practical
justification for the structure of the Army. Fighting Power conveys an
understanding of what constitutes the ability to fight and to succeed.

Whilst this approach provides a basis for some objective assessment of

military effectiveness, this assessment cannot be made solely in terms of
economics, or mathematical formulae. Clausewitz made the point this way:

“War admittedly has its own grammar but not its own logic.”

The business of war and the necessary preparation for it will remain that
combination of science and art that was noted in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, it
will be necessary to come to a judgement about the Army’s effectiveness
and to show how that judgement was made. For some aspects this is
straightforward: equipment performance and sustainability can usually be
quantified readily and objectively. Other aspects of fighting power such as
morale, doctrine and leadership do not easily lend themselves to objective
measurement, but they do manifest themselves in collective performance
which may be defined as:

“An element of Military Capability: the ability of units or formations

to function as cohesive entities and so perform collective tasks to
specified standards.”
Assessment of collective performance is the responsibility of the chain of
command, using military judgement supported where appropriate by other
analytical techniques.

What Constitutes Fighting?

Before explaining what constitutes an Army’s ability to fight it is worth

being clear - in so far as this is possible on paper - about what constitutes
fighting. Professor Sir Michael Howard, in his book on Clausewitz, gives us
this feel for it:

“In short, `Action in war is like movement in a resistant element. Just

as the simplest and most natural of movements, walking, cannot
easily be performed in water, so in war, it is difficult for normal
efforts to achieve even moderate results.’

“It was this friction, said Clausewitz, that `distinguishes real war
from war on paper’, and an understanding of its importance had to
be the starting point for any theorist. A commander in the field could
seldom be sure exactly where the enemy was or in what strength, much
less what he was likely to do. Sometimes he did not know the location
and condition even of his own troops. He, and even more the men
under his command, was likely to be tired, hungry, and apprehensive
if not actually physically frightened.”

Clausewitz tells us to have a healthy regard for the friction of war, but it is
also necessary to understand how dreadful war actually is. The ruthless
violence, the squalor, the noise, the smell, the fear, the confusion and
uncertainty, the physical misery and often the intense boredom stand out in
many accounts. It is clear that even mere existence can be an ordeal.

Fighting embraces more than just contact with the enemy. It involves
surviving in an alien environment. Whilst resisting the stress that an
opponent is attempting to impose on us, we must impose on him so great a
degree of physical and moral stress that he is compelled to abandon his
objective. So war is a clash of wills. An opponent’s will must be subdued
and his courage killed. To succeed, an Army needs to be able to create order
out of the chaos of war. For this reason clear doctrine and all that stems
from it is an important ingredient in that success. And although many point
to the role that luck has to play in defining the outcome of conflict, luck
tends to favour those who have prepared both mentally and physically for
what they have to do.

The Concept of Fighting Power

The term ‘Fighting Power’ defines an Army’s ability to fight. The hierarchy
of Fighting Power is shown in the diagram below (Fig 3) and explained after
it.
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

FIGHTING POWER
(The ability to fight)

CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT
(The thought process)

Principles Military Development

of War Doctrine

PHYSICAL COMPONENT MORAL COMPONENT

(The means to fight) (The ability to get
people to fight)

Combat Power

Manpower Equipment Motivation Leadership

Logistics Training and

Readiness Management

Fig 3

There are three inter-related components: conceptual, moral and physical:

l The Conceptual Component. This heading can be described as the

thought process behind the ability to fight. It is a necessary
component, for as Clausewitz puts it:
 “Theory exists so that one does not have to start afresh every
time sorting out the raw material and ploughing through it, but
will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to
educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately,
to guide him in his self-education; not accompany him to the
battlefield.”

The conceptual component is made up of:

m Principles of War. Principles of War are broad precepts which

influence the conduct of war. The ten selected by the British Army
(and its sister Services) are explained in Annex A. They have relevance
at the high levels of war where they assert criteria against which courses
of action can be tested. At lower levels they provide a guide for the
planning and conduct of activity on the battlefield. The Principles of
War are based on past experience where their application with
judgement has led to victory. They are not rules yet blatant disregard
for them involves risk and could result in failure.

m Military Doctrine. The function of Military Doctrine has been

discussed in Chapter 1. In establishing the framework of understanding
of the approach to war it complements the Principles of War. This
entire booklet represents the Military Doctrine, but the appearance of
the term here is necessary to show its part in contributing to Fighting
Power. The subjects that it addresses specifically in relation to Fighting
Power are covered separately in the next three sections and shown
diagrammatically (Fig 4):
m Development. Development requires an innovative approach to
all aspects of Fighting Power. Doctrine will evolve in the manner
described in Chapter 1. Development will be clearly seen in the work
of Research Establishments and in the application of operational
analysis techniques. The views of commanders at all levels will also
have major influence in the development of the ability to fight.
Development of organizations and systems is more specifically covered
in Section 3 of this Chapter.
 MILITARY DOCTRINE

Command The Basis for Success in Organizations and Systems Training Essentials
Fighting a War Development

Levels of Conflict The Environment Development Matching Doctrine

The Operational Level Analysis Coping with Stress and
and Operational Art Requirements: Guiding Principle Uncertainty
The Command Learning from Experience
Philosophy The Exercise of Command Requirements:
The Manoeuvrist Approach
A Joint/Combined Approach Standardization
Unit of Effort Wide Utility
Mobility Ease of Use
Surprise Reliability
Ground Anticipation
Sustainability Quick Reaction to Cover
Capability Gaps
Fig 4

l The Moral Component. The moral component concerns the ability to

get people to fight. Many theorists and all practitioners of war have
pointed to the significance of the moral aspect in fighting. For
Clausewitz it was so important because

“With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must

be thrown into the other to correct the balance.”

The moral factor is difficult to define. It is often summed up in the

term morale which Napoleon quantified in his saying that: ‘Morale is to
the material (physical) as three is to one’. Maintenance of morale is a
Principle of War and as such embraces both the moral and physical
aspects of Fighting Power. High morale will stem from sound training,
confidence in equipment and good administration as well as confidence
in commanders, discipline, self-respect and clear knowledge of what is
going on and what is required. Yet the ability to get people to fight is
not just a question of morale. It will also involve:

m Motivation. Getting people to do things is a function of

leadership but is made difficult in the absence of motivation. Soldiers
who are well motivated and well led work as a team. From teamwork
 comes comradeship and there are few closer bonds in human
relationships than comradeship-in-arms. It leads to that pride in
belonging best described by the term esprit de corps. Motivation will
follow from high morale but will also depend upon a continuing sense
of purpose. It is the job of the commander to instil purpose. But in the
first instance the national will, reflected in public opinion, will give the
soldier that purpose. Soldiers will generally be less easily led in pursuit
of causes that they do not understand.

m Leadership. Military leadership is the projection of personality

and character to get soldiers to do what is required of them. Skill in the
techniques of leadership is the foremost quality in the art of command
and contributes very largely to success at all levels of war. There is no
prescription for leadership; different individuals will motivate soldiers
in different ways - by example, by persuasion, by compulsion, by force
of personality, by charm or by any combination of techniques. What is
clear is that no military leader will succeed if he does not know the
organization, however large or small, that he is privileged to command.

m Management. Management involves making the best use of

resources. It is a facet of command and certainly no substitute for
leadership. Good management can have considerable bearing upon
morale and on military effectiveness. Management skills are essential
in the efficient structure and running of organizations and systems
starting at MOD level and extending to the field.

l The Physical Component. The physical component is the means to

fight. It is the equivalent of the term ‘combat power’, defined in
NATO as: ‘the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which
a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given
time’. The total means include the organization of the main elements
of combat power, which are:

m Manpower.

m Equipment.
 m Logistics.

m Training and Readiness.

The full hierarchy of Military Effectiveness is shown on the fold

out section of the back cover. It may be helpful to have it folded out
when reading the remaining Sections of this Chapter - which follow the
hierarchy.

MILITARY DOCTRINE - THE CONDUCT OF

CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

Command

Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction,

coordination and control of military forces. It is concerned primarily with
leadership, responsibility and decision making. The activity of control
complements command and embraces management and the technicalities of
execution, and as such is largely the province of the staff and
communications technology. The qualities that are important for the
commander to possess are described in ADP - 2 Command pages 2-15 to 2-
27.

l Levels of Conflict. The way in which command is exercised is related

directly to the levels at which war is controlled, and the commander’s
responsibility varies accordingly. The levels may be defined both
nationally and in Alliance terms (‘British Grand Strategy’ and ‘NATO
Military Strategy’ for example). The levels of conflict are:

m Grand Strategic. Grand Strategy is the application of

national resources to achieve policy objectives. The purpose of
grand strategy is to direct and provide coherence to overall national,
alliance or coalition policy, including all military and non-military
aspects. Grand strategy is therefore the exclusive province of
governments, whether acting independently or in concert with other
governments through a multinational organisation such as the United
Nations, an alliance established by treaty such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation or an ad hoc coalition such as that formed to
prosecute the 1990-1991 Gulf War. From this definition three broad
responsibilities flow:

r To lay down the policy objectives for the activities to be

instituted.

r To stipulate the limitations to be imposed on those

activities, including the circumstances in which military activity
should cease.

r To make available the requisite resources, including, when

necessary, direction of the national industrial base.

m Military Strategic. Military Strategy is the application of

military resources to achieve the military aspects of grand strategic
objectives. A national, multinational or alliance strategic authority will
consider the realistic contribution that military force can make to the
achievement of the grand strategic objectives and set such activity in
hand. Specifically, the military strategic authority will:

r Decide what campaign or campaigns need to be fought to

achieve the strategic goals and in the light of political, legal
and economic circumstances, decide those in which British
Forces should participate.

r Identify the military strategic goals and define the

campaign objectives which will constitute success - in other
words - to identify the end-state. This is defined as ‘That state
 of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign
either to terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms’.

r Recognize any political, financial or legal limitations on

the use of the force, with particular regard to alliance or coalition
partners.

r Allocate forces and resources to each campaign theatre

and appoint theatre commanders who will exercise operational
level command.

r Agree operational objectives with theatre commanders

and where necessary adjust resources.

r Establish the outline command arrangements.

m Operational. Joint campaigns and major operations are

constructed and directed at the Operational Level in fulfilment of a
strategic directive. It is the level that provides the gearing between
military strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre of
operations. It is at the operational level that military resources are
directed to achieve the campaign objectives - the end-state - defined by
the military strategic authority, within any limitations imposed. An
operational level commander will design a campaign within his
delegated theatre of operations; he will plan and direct the major
operations within the campaign. He will be responsible for:

r Deciding what tactical objectives are necessary to achieve

the campaign objective. These decisions will be taken with due
regard to political and coalition considerations.

r Deciding in what sequence these tactical objectives

should be achieved.

r Allocating forces and resources as necessary for

subordinate commanders to be able to achieve their tactical
missions.
 r Setting priorities for the provision of combat service
support to sustain the tactical battles.

r Directing the activities of those formations, ships, aircraft

and other units or assets not delegated to subordinate
commanders, especially those earmarked as operational level
reserves.

Because of its pivotal importance in the successful conduct of any

campaign, whether Warfighting or in Operations Other Than War, this
level of conflict is considered in more detail below.

m Tactical. Battles and engagements within a sequence of major

operations are planned and executed at the Tactical Level in order to
achieve the operational objectives of a campaign. At the tactical level
battles and engagements are fought to achieve tactical missions, within
the overall campaign design. It is at the tactical level that troops are
deployed directly for combat.

The descriptions above may give the impression that each is a separate and
clearly defined entity. In practice there is likely to be overlap. This is
particularly the case in Operations Other Than War and Peace Support
Operations. The distinction between the military strategic and operational
levels of war will rarely be tidy. In seeking to differentiate between these
two levels the key delineation is, that whereas the operational level
commander orders the activities of his assigned formations and units in
pursuit of his own plan of campaign, the military strategic authority is
confined to allocating objectives and resources and setting necessary
limitations.

l Levels of Conflict and Levels of Command.

m It is important to recognize that levels of conflict and command

are not permanently linked. The corps level of command is often
correctly associated with the operational level of conflict. But the corps
may also operate at the tactical level, while, as in the Falklands, the
equivalent of a division may operate at the operational level. It
 depends on the circumstances and the levels of force deployed.

m More than one level of command may operate at each level

while each level of command may operate in more than one level of
conflict. The essential matter is that the functions as defined above are
carried out by a commander who knows that it is his duty to carry them
out.

l The Operational Level and Operational Art. The vital link between
the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment
of forces on the battlefield is the exercise of command at the
operational level. The skilful execution of the operational level of
command is described as ‘Operational Art’. That art embraces both
decisions taken at the operational level and the outcome of those
decisions, often tactical activity but bearing on the strategic level. For
action at the operational level must be planned with a view to seeking a
decisive result. The scope of operational art - generalship - can be
shown diagrammatically thus:

Action Decision
Strategic Decision Making
at the and Action Outcome or
Direction and at the
Operational at the Endstate
Resources Operational Level
Level Tactical
Level

OPERATIONAL ART

Fig 5

The diagram shows both the continuous nature of the art and the fact
that whilst it was possible in the previous section to identify levels of
conflict, in the exercise of command firm lines between the levels
cannot be drawn. No amount of operational brilliance will make up for
lack of strategic or tactical competence. Nor is it possible to be precise
about the nature of the art, though characteristics which illustrate its
importance can be stated:

m Freedom of Action. As the definition implies, activity at the

operational level must contribute directly to the military strategic aim.
Such aims will invariably be broadly set and to achieve them the
operational commander must be given wide ranging freedom of action
to originate and execute plans which will allow him to gain and retain
the initiative. He must also be given appropriate resources under his
own hand to influence the situation decisively.

m Joint and Combined Nature. At the operational level activity

on land, at sea and in the air must be conceived, planned and
conducted as a single entity, usually involving all three Services and is
therefore ‘joint’. Within an Alliance such as NATO, activity will
invariably involve forces of more than one nation operating together
and is therefore ‘combined’. Consequently the operational
commander will always seek to concentrate his effort within the
freedom of action that he has been given by the direction of joint and
combined resources. So, whereas at the tactical level battles can be
fought by land forces within an environment created by independent
maritime or air action, at the operational level the campaign must be
one in all respects, embodied in a joint directive. The operational
commander should therefore command all joint forces in the theatre.

m Concentration of Force. This Principle of War, together with its

corollary economy of effort, is of particular importance at the
operational level. Identification of the point against which to
concentrate effort so that it will have the greatest effect upon an
enemy’s force, whilst sustaining minimum loss, is a major component
of operational art. That point must be that element of the enemy’s
overall capability whose elimination will lead to the enemy’s inevitable
defeat or render the attainment of his objectives impossible. It is
known as the Centre of Gravity: it could consist of any characteristic,
capability or locality from which the enemy derives his freedom of
 action, physical strength or will to fight. The keys to unlocking the
centre of gravity are called Decisive Points - those events, the
successful outcome of which is a precondition to the elimination of the
enemy’s centre of gravity. The event may not necessarily be a battle
and may not therefore have geographical significance; the key
consideration is the effect on the enemy. The identification of decisive
points is a fundamental part of the campaign planning process.

m Scale. The scale of the operational level is fundamentally

different from the tactical in terms of area and time and - often - size of
forces. This has implications for the decision making process: in
particular the gathering and evaluation of intelligence and the need for
decisions long in advance of formations crossing their lines of
departure in order to allow time for deployment.

m Total Effect. Without the operational level military strategy

cannot be implemented in the most effective way. There is every
chance that limited resources, finite moral and physical effort and
soldiers’ lives may be squandered in tactical battles that are either
fought in the wrong place at the wrong time or are entirely unnecessary.
The operational commander should ensure that he executes campaigns
rather than a series of disconnected battles. His function is not just one
of co-ordination. Operational art requires deep thought on how to
apply the principles of concentration of force and economy of effort
and so where to deploy the joint, and usually combined, resources to
achieve a decisive result on a scale that justifies the freedom of action
given. To succeed in this way the commander must ensure that the
power of the whole - the campaign - is greater than the sum of its parts
- the battles. This is often described as the synergistic effect

l The Command Philosophy. A command philosophy provides the

basis for the exercise of command. The three tenets of the British
Army Command Philosophy are:

m The importance of making a timely decision.

 m The importance of understanding the intention of the
commander both generally and specifically.

rClear responsibility to fulfil that intention based on:

rClear understanding of common doctrine.

rMutual trust between commanders.

rObedience to orders.

rInitiative to act within any freedom of action given, or

purposefully in the absence of further orders.

The Basis for Success in Fighting a War

This pivotal section of the booklet sets out the basis of the British Army’s
approach to warfighting and operations other than war, throughout the
spectrum of conflict.

The Environment. Military activity does not take place in a vacuum. No

Army today is going to succeed in fighting unless it appreciates the
environment - natural and enemy-induced - in which it exists. Only
commanders who understand the conditions they will encounter will not be
over-awed by them and will be able to turn them to their advantage. The
dominant elements of the environment are shown below.

l The Political Situation. The Clausewitzian dictum that “war is not

merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of
political intercourse, carried on with other means” holds as good today
as it did in the 19th Century. A British military force will always
operate in a political context. That context is defined in terms of a
directive to the relevant commander and most particularly in the Rules
of Engagement (ROE) set for the operation.
l The Mind. The dimension of the mind is of paramount importance in
any conflict. The Army that believes it is fighting in a just cause under
leadership that inspires its confidence, is capable of achieving the
seemingly impossible; whereas one which lacks conviction and
motivation, however well equipped and provisioned, will quickly
crumble. Measures which enhance our own morale and undermine
that of the enemy form an essential component of any campaign.
These psychological operations (psyops) require careful research and
execution if they are to be credible and so effective.

l The Population. Operations will frequently take place in populated

areas where account will have to be taken of those caught up in
hostilities. The Law of Armed Conflict will be applied so there will be a
need for the Services to comply with certain legal provisions as regards
the local population, even in wartime. There will be an effect upon
movement by road and rail and there may be a requirement to provide
food and medical care for the local population. The population will be
sources of information useful to both sides, and of local geographical
information. In operations other than war success will ultimately
depend upon their support. Consideration of the amount of collateral
damage allowed in a war zone which is populated will have
implications for manoeuvre and firepower. If denied information,
protection and careful treatment, the uncontrolled movement of large
numbers of civilians may greatly hinder operations. Civil-military
liaison and instructions to the civil population will therefore assume
considerable importance in war.

l The Air Situation. An air situation which is at least not unfavourable

and which allows local air superiority to be won for short periods at the
decisive time and place is essential if forces on the ground are to
manoeuvre and the logistic system is to operate without prohibitive
losses. New technology will ensure that night and poor weather has
ceased to be a major limitation in the use of air power.
l The Electro-Magnetic Spectrum. Armed forces must be equipped
and trained to fight as successfully in the environment of the electro-
magnetic spectrum as in any other. This will involve the use of
technical and procedural means, including deception, both to attack
enemy systems and to neutralize the threat to our own.

l The Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environment. NBC

conditions impose severe penalties upon all military activity,
particularly command and control and logistics. The penalties, in
relation to the chemical threat in particular can be reduced by good
defensive equipment and procedures, and rigorous training in its use.

l Climate and Weather. Soldiers are physically and psychologically

affected by climate and the weather. The performance of many
weapons systems, notably sensors and communications, can be
degraded in poor weather. Rain, snow and mud hamper mobility. At
the tactical level observation and engagement ranges can be
dramatically reduced. On the other hand, heavy cloud and poor
visibility can reduce the opportunities for aircraft and satellite
surveillance and some weather conditions can make the use of chemical
agents unworthwhile. Whilst the effects of weather and climate must
be taken into account they can be turned to advantage - for example to
enhance the achievement of surprise - by motivation and good
leadership.

l Terrain. The nature of the terrain over which the campaign or battle is
to be fought will inevitably affect the way in which operations will be
conducted by friend and foe. Successful commanders will extract the
maximum advantage from the ground over which they are fighting.
They will choose the ground that suits their own purpose and
confounds the enemy’s.

Requirements. Given this environment, there are a number of

requirements for the successful fighting of a war. They stem from the
Principles of War and apply both to offensive and defensive operations,
throughout the spectrum of conflict. They are
The Exercise of Command, The Manoeuvrist Approach, A Joint/Combined
Approach, Unity, Mobility, Surprise, Ground and Sustainability.

l The Exercise of Command. ‘Mission Command’ is the practical

manifestation of the Command Philosophy and is the basis on which
all direction and orders are given by commanders to their subordinates.
‘Mission Command’ derives its strength and value from the intention
to tell subordinates what to achieve and why, rather than what to do and
how. Most essentially, commanders do this by issuing missions rather
than tasks (a mission is a task + a purpose [AAP - 6]).

m Decision Making Process. The exercise of command is

primarily concerned with the decision making process. Major factors in
this process are time and information available. Both vary with the
levels of command - in general the higher the level the more time but
also the more information with which to contend. At any level quick
reaction will be paramount and there will always be the need to reach a
timely decision in relation to an opponent’s own decision-action
process. Otherwise there is no possibility of gaining or retaining the
initiative. Decisions will often have to be made by a commander on the
basis of his own instinctive judgement. Such decisions cannot follow
from a careful analysis of the situation, weighing all the advantages and
disadvantages of various alternative courses. Nor may they follow as a
logical consequence of earlier events, but will result from instinct that
the moment has come for a particular course of action. Even when a
very rapid decision is required some method in the decision making
process is essential. The stages in that process are:

r Direction. During the direction stage an initial analysis is

made by the commander of what is required of him either by
reference to his mission or in the circumstances in which he finds
himself. The time by which the decision has to be made will also
be determined. Intelligence (G2) staffs are tasked by the
commander stating the intelligence requirements, so initiating or
continuing the intelligence cycle (See ADP - 2 Command para
0315). Operations (G3) and supporting advisers and staffs execute
preliminary action (movement and resupply for example) and
carry out staff checks. Priorities for work may well have to be set
at this stage.

r Consultation. In the second stage, if time allows,

consultation occurs at three levels:

u Upwards. The commander will talk to his superior if he is

in any doubt about what he is to do, and also to ensure that he
is keeping him informed of his intentions.

u Sideways. He will speak to his advisers within his own

headquarters, but this will only be necessary if they are not
fully in his mind as a result of the Direction stage. He will
also liaise with his neighbouring commanders in accordance
with the principles and procedures for establishing liaison laid
down in STANAG 2101. In war accurate reporting by
capable liaison officers will be of great value.

u Downwards. Consultation downwards is the means by

which he will obtain an impression of what is feasible as well
as gaining ideas, though in the process he must beware that
his resolve is not weakened. Whenever possible a
commander should go forward for discussions on the ground,
where he can get a feel for the situation and be in a position to
make his own judgements. The use of trunk communications
may be necessary when time is short, but it is very much a
second best. At the end of whatever discussions are held the
commander must leave his subordinates in no doubt as to his
intentions. Consultation, Consideration and Decision making
will frequently be telescoped into one continuous phase, with
little time for consultation, which may have been restricted to
asking a few questions over the trunk system.
m Consideration. Before reaching his decision it will be
necessary for the commander to consider the work of his staff from the
Direction stage, and to apply his judgement to it influenced by any
consultation that has been possible. Conferences should be avoided.
The staff may present the commander with options but they do not
make the decision.

r Decision. The commander makes the decision.

r Execution. Although the decision has been made the

process is not complete until the commander has assured himself
that dissemination in the manner that he requires has been carried
out (see Annex B on the Mechanics of Command). He will also
subsequently wish to see that his decision is executed correctly
and adjusted in the light of events. In the words of General Patton:

“Promulgation of an order represents not over 10 per cent

of your responsibility. The remaining 90 per cent consists
in assuring through personal supervision on the ground by
yourself and your staff, proper and vigorous execution”.

The full process can be shown diagrammatically (Fig 6):

NOW DECISION POINT

Direction Consultation Consideration Execution

Fig 6

When time is short, as has been explained, the process will have to be
condensed and activities undertaken concurrently rather than
consecutively. The time by which a decision has to be taken may be
self evident from the circumstances, but if not, it must be clearly
established during the Direction stage. Thereafter, Consultation and
 Consideration become inseparably blended, leading to a decision
being taken on the spot (Fig 7).

NOW DECISION POINT

Direction Consultation Execution

Consideration

Fig 7

While encouraging full discussion during Consultation, the

commander must never permit decision by committee. Fuller is
perceptive on this point:

“The common deficits in command are ...calling conferences in

order to pick the brains of subordinates and lack of originality
which often leads to doing something which the enemy expects in
place of what he does not look for.”

m Information Requirement. No decision can be made in the

absence of information but modern means of acquisition threaten to
swamp commanders. The danger is particularly apparent at the
operational level where the commander will receive information from a
multiplicity of sources, both in theatre and strategic. It is therefore
necessary to identify what information is essential to each level of
command, which can only be achieved by initially restricting area
coverage. Less urgent information can be disseminated selectively as a
lower priority. Reaching a decision will always involve the commander
exercising his own judgement on incomplete information. Risk cannot
be avoided; to wait in hopeful anticipation of complete clarification will
result in a paralysis of inactivity. The risk can be minimized if critical
information requirements at a theatre’s various levels of command are
identified in peacetime and regularly refined. The areas of intelligence
interest and responsibility, described in AFM Formation Tactics para
0205, should also be laid down since depths and frontages may alter
 according to the surveillance, target acquisition and weapons systems
available at the different levels of command. It will also be important to
establish a single focus for intelligence at each level, especially in
operations other than war. On operations there will be a need to task
complementary sources to confirm or refute apparent theories,
primarily to guard against the possibility of being deceived. Procedures
for this requirement and the necessary systems must exist in peace.

m Delegation. Delegation in the exercise of command will be

both necessary and desirable and commanders must possess the
judgement to know what to delegate and to whom. They must be clear
that whilst they may delegate their authority, they are never absolved
from overall responsibility. When a commander is absent from his
headquarters, though he should make every endeavour to remain in
touch with the situation and be ready to intervene when necessary, this
may not always be possible. In these circumstances his deputy or
principal Staff Officer must have the clear responsibility to act on his
behalf.

m Mechanics. The way in which headquarters are organized and

run is shown at Annex B.

l The Manoeuvrist Approach. The manoeuvrist approach is defined as

an approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall
cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of
mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking
originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.
The principles and thought process that underpin the theory of
manoeuvre warfare are equally applicable to Operations Other Than
War. This is because the successful application of the manoeuvrist
approach inspires a particular attitude of mind and a method of analysis
that is relevant to any circumstances involving the use of military force
to resolve conflict.

m The Nature of Manoeuvre Warfare and Attrition Warfare.

Manoeuvre is the ‘employment of forces on the battlefield through
movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a
position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish
the mission’ (AAP-6). It is the chief means of applying the principles
of concentration of force, economy of effort and surprise. Attrition is
‘the reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of
personnel and materiel’ (AAP-6). But these definitions do little to
explain the distinctions between manoeuvre warfare and attrition
warfare. The latter implies that success will depend upon which side
can last the longer in the process of gradual reduction of effectiveness.
The theory of manoeuvre warfare on the other hand, seeks to inflict
losses indirectly by envelopment, encirclement and disruption, while
minimizing the need to engage in frontal attrition. It is the destruction
of the enemy’s will and cohesion as much as his materiel that is the
key. But this is not to say that neither theory contains an element of the
other: it is a case of where the emphasis lies and of how the
commander thinks about the execution of the mission he has been
given. Though skill in the manoeuvrist approach is the more difficult
art to acquire and requires the greater investment in training and
equipment, it provides for greater flexibility in combat, the opportunity
to seize fleeting opportunities and the means to overcome greater force
with less by inflicting on him a series of rapid, violent and unexpected
actions which create a turbulent and deteriorating situation with which
he cannot cope. It is therefore the characteristics of manoeuvre warfare
and the requirements for it which must be primarily addressed in
doctrine and reflected in the British Army’s overall capability.

m Characteristics of Manoeuvre Warfare. Manoeuvre warfare

has the following characteristics:

r It is joint and combines the resources of all arms and

services. The air dimension, both fixed wing and rotary, is of
crucial importance.

r Generally it aims to apply strength, in the form of

firepower, against weakness, in contrast to attrition where strength
tends to be applied against strength.
 r The emphasis is on the defeat and disruption of the
enemy rather than attempting to hold or take ground for its own
sake.

r It depends for its success on the precise application of

force against identified points of weakness.

r It aims to defeat the enemy by destroying his will and

desire to continue by seizing the initiative and applying constant
and unacceptable pressure at the times and places that the enemy
least expects.

r It will invariably include elements of movement,

application of firepower and positional defence. There will almost
always be a requirement to fix the enemy, to deny him access to
routes and objectives, and to secure vital ground and key points.
The manoeuvrist should not be afraid to take up a defensive
posture provided always that he never sees it as an end in itself,
but for example as a preliminary to resuming the offensive or to
regain balance.

r Significant features of manoeuvre are momentum and

tempo which in combination lead to shock action and surprise.

m Manoeuvrist Concepts.

r The Decision Cycle. In order to exercise command

effectively, a commander must make timely decisions and take the
appropriate action. This is a fundamental principle of manoeuvre
warfare. If a commander can consistently decide and act quicker
than his opponent, he gains a significant advantage. The process
of assessing the situation, making a decision and acting is known
as the decision cycle. For more detail on this subject see ADP - 2
Command pages 3-6 to 3-9.

rMomentum. In military terms, momentum is a measure of the

effect that a formation or unit that is moving can have. It is the
product of that moving force’s size and speed (mass x velocity).
Momentum can have effect upon an opponent following the
principles of leverage, or turning effect, but leverage is not possible
unless the enemy is held at one point before being struck a blow at
another. It follows that the commander must first decide where to
hold his opponent and then how to obtain the necessary
momentum. To achieve effect he can vary the ratio of mass and
velocity. He may opt for a small force going deep and creating the
shock effect by its speed, classically the way in which an airmobile
force is used, or for a larger force relying on its mass more than its
speed. Momentum will not be achieved and maintained without:

A flexible and responsive logistic system that puts the

spur to operations.

Uncommitted follow on forces (reserves) capable of

rapidly reinforcing success and exploiting opportunities.

Formations and units that are prepared to take calculated

risks in pursuit of the commander’s intention.

rTempo. Tempo, or the rate of activity (between battles at the

operational level and within battles at the tactical level), in military
terms is a measure of the extent to which the potential speed of
a formation or unit is exploited relative to the enemy. It is not
an absolute and should not be confused with mere speed. It is
largely a matter of responsiveness and agility. These depend upon
the decision making process and the time taken to execute the
decision and complete movement, the total process often being
referred to as the decision cycle. Since manoeuvre relies upon the
precise application of force, not least in terms of time, it is vital that
one’s own decision-action cycle is quicker than (or ‘within’) that
of the enemy. So the higher the tempo, the greater the likelihood
of outmanoeuvreing an opponent. This holds good both in
mounting and conducting operations. The analogy of kinetic
energy (½ mass x velocity2) is relevant here. This reminds us that,
provided the force (mass) has sufficient combat power, more
 benefit may be gained by quick, forceful action by small forces
than by maximising strength at the expense of the time taken for
that force to take action. High tempo is unlikely to be possible
without:

u An information system at the operational level of

command which provides intelligence that is timely and
accurate enough for the commander to assess enemy
weaknesses.

u Command being decentralized through the use of

directives which give a considerable degree of freedom of
action to subordinate commanders.

u Formations possessing a high degree of mobility and a

flexible logistic system.

u Movement skills being of the highest order.

u Response at low level being rapid as a result of being

based upon clearly understood and regularly practised
procedures and drills.

m Forms of Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is not confined to ground

based forces. It has an air dimension in which helicopters play an
increasing part. Remembering that manoeuvre is not just movement
but movement with fire, there are certain classic forms of manoeuvre
that remain as relevant as they ever were. These are described in
Annex C.

m The Manoeuvrist Approach and the Commander. Manoeuvre

warfare requires commanders who have the mental capacity to:

r Operate successfully within confusion and disorder. Little

will be predictable. Decisions will often need to be made on the
basis of incomplete information. Much will then depend upon the
nerve and instinctive feel of the commander.
 r Think quickly and act in an original way, if the enemy are
to be surprised and disrupted, before eventually being destroyed.
Adopting an indirect approach and achieving rapidity of
manoeuvre will nearly always be essential prerequisites for
success.

r Study the mind and doctrine of an opponent.

r Understand the operational level of conflict and the

associated operational art. This is essential if the Army is to be
capable of using manoeuvre to effect against a powerful enemy
also employing manouevrist techniques.

m Manoeuvre Warfare and Firepower.

r The ability to deliver concentrated fire is essential if an

Army is to exert physical force. Such firepower, whether it be
delivered directly, indirectly, from the ground, sea or by air, is
brought to bear through manoeuvre. Having been concentrated,
firepower can then:

u Demoralize an enemy, and destroy his will and ability to

fight.

u Facilitate our own ability to manoeuvre by hampering the

enemy and neutralizing his forces.

u Disrupt an enemy’s command and control arrangements,

his means of firepower and his ability to sustain operations.

m The full effect and flexibility of firepower will not be realized

unless:

u It is synchronized with other battlefield activities in terms

of time, space and purpose to achieve the maximum unity of
effort.
 u It is fully co-ordinated at all levels. Control will invariably
be exercised at a low level but command will often be vested
in a high level commander to achieve the necessary flexibility
and concentration in its application.

u Target acquisition means are dedicated.

u The necessary communications are provided to exercise

command and control effectively.

u Its own mobility, protection and re-supply matches that of

the forces it is supporting.

l A Joint/Combined Approach. The joint battle is indivisible. The

various tasks which the other two Services will have to undertake and
the principles which will be applied in their fulfilment must be
understood by all ground force commanders.

m Air Operations.

r The Critical Importance of Air Power. Air power has a

vital role to play in modern warfare and will have a decisive
influence on the outcome of any conflict. It permits the
projection of concentrated force at short notice over long
distances. The three inherent qualities of speed, reach and
responsiveness, including the ability to switch rapidly from
defensive to offensive action, form a flexible combination that
gives the joint commander the opportunity to use air power to:

u Achieve and maintain sufficient control of the air to allow

friendly air and land operations to be conducted without
interference from enemy air operations.

u Restrict enemy movement as much as possible.

u Provide concentrated fire support for both offensive and

defensive operations.
 u Pose a threat to the enemy over a wide area well beyond
the range of ground weapons and so force him to divert vital
resources to defensive operations that might otherwise be
devoted to offensive action.

u Assist in the process of strategic and tactical mobility by

redeploying, reinforcing or resupplying forces quickly.

rHow Air Power is Used. Air Power Doctrine is published in AP

3000 which outlines all Air Operations. The employment of air
power in co-ordination with ground forces will include elements of
the Counter-Air Campaign, the Anti-Surface Force Campaign and
Combat Air Support Operations.

u Counter-Air Campaign. The counter-air campaign is

‘directed against the enemy’s air offensive capability to
achieve and maintain the desired degree of air superiority’
(AAP-6). It will involve attacking enemy airfields, air defence
and command and control systems (Offensive Counter Air
operations) and the use of friendly air defence fighters and
missiles to destroy enemy forces in the air (Defensive Counter
Air operations).

u Anti-Surface Force Campaign. There are two elements

of relevance to land operations:

u Air Interdiction. Air interdiction is conducted ‘to

destroy, neutralize or delay the enemy’s military potential
before it can be brought to bear effectively against
friendly forces’ (AAP-6). Air interdiction is planned
jointly but as the targets are generally beyond the range
of land-delivered weapons it does not usually require
detailed integration with the fire and movement of
friendly forces.
u Offensive Air Support.

- Close Air Support. Close air support is

applied ‘against hostile targets which are in close
proximity to friendly forces and which require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire
and movement of those friendly forces’ (AAP-6).
Ground force commanders must be clear that there
will be few occasions in warfighting when close air
support will be the most effective way of using air
power.

- Battlefield Air Interdiction. Battlefield air

interdiction is the shorter range element of air
interdiction. It is directed against enemy targets
which are beyond the immediate proximity of
friendly forces but in a position directly to affect
them - for example columns of armour or artillery.
Its use is planned jointly but requires less co-
ordination in execution than close air support.

u Combat Support Air Operations. The following

Combat Support Air Operations are relevant to Land
operations:

- Tactical Air Reconnaissance. Tactical air

reconnaissance collects information on the enemy,
weather and geographical features required for the
planning and conduct of land operations. It is part
of wider aerospace, surveillance and reconnaissance
operations, which include collection from a wide
variety of sensors, including photographic, radar,
optronic and electronic systems mounted in space,
air and ground platforms.
 - Air Transport Operations. Air transport
support will include strategic (inter-theatre) and
tactical (intra-theatre) operations conducted by fixed
wing aircraft and helicopters. The support will
encompass 5 major roles: Scheduled services,
airborne operations, special air operations, air
logistic support operations and aeromedical
evacuation.

- Airborne Operations. Airborne operations

include the delivery of troops by air-landing,
parachute or helicopter. Such operations may
involve both troop-carrying and attack helicopters
and fixed wing aircraft. They will require the close
co-ordination of aircraft with ground forces either
for rapid movement across the battlefield or for
manoeuvre in the land battle. The characteristics of,
and the requirements for, manoeuvre apply as much
to air-delivered as to ground force operations.

- Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare

operations involve the military use of electronics to
determine, exploit, reduce or prevent the hostile use
of the electromagnetic spectrum and actions taken
to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

u Principles of Joint Land and Air Operations.

- Land and air commanders must work

together at all levels, with planning staffs being co-
located.

- The responsiveness of air power demands

centralized command at a high level to ensure its
effective and timely use. The reach of aircraft
largely determines the level of control, though this is
not the only determining factor. Control may also
be delegated to a relatively low level formation for a
 specific operation or period of time. Under these
circumstances, the air adviser’s cell or the
headquarters will have an important role in advising
on the tactical employment of aircraft, and ensuring
their subsequent co-ordination.

- Effective airspace control arrangements must

be established over the combat zone to minimize the
risk of destroying our own aircraft, without
degrading the effectiveness of our own air defences.
Responsibility for airspace control should normally
be vested in the air commander.

- Delivery by air can offer ground forces some

of the advantages of air power, and so surprise and
high tempo can be achieved. Such forces must,
however, have a reasonable balance of ground and
air-mounted weapons and sufficient equipment for
the fulfilment of their mission once surprise has
been gained. Speed of execution is dependent upon
joint planning, starting with the ground plan.
Responsiveness and flexibility are directly related to
the level of training of the staffs, troops and aircrew
involved. Planning for operations by air-delivered
forces should aim to counter or avoid enemy air
defence systems. Air-delivered forces may have
problems sustaining operations and logistic
arrangements are necessarily complex.

m Maritime Operations. Maritime power in the broadest sense is

military, political and economic power exerted through an ability to use
the sea. Military maritime power has also had a longstanding ability to
influence events on land through amphibious and ship launched land
attack operations. This power projection capability has greatly
expanded with the advent of modern amphibious techniques and the
advent of sea based aircraft and land fighting from the sea components.
The utility of maritime forces is most evident when they form part of a
joint force in the execution of a strategy designed to achieve objectives
ashore by using access from the sea. Land forces may only be able to
obtain access if they are landed by naval forces in amphibious
operations. Even when this is not the case, ground forces may be
prevented from achieving their objectives unless maritime forces can
safeguard their lines of support. Maritime Doctrine is published in BR
1806, which outlines all Maritime Operations. These are joint by
definition as they involve forces operating both afloat and ashore - and
nowadays in the air. Through providing an amphibious capability they
regularly practise what could be considered the ultimate joint operation.
Naval forces can provide afloat headquarters for joint forces, offering
advantages in flexibility and access.

m Amphibious Operations. Captain Marryat described inter-

Service co-operation at Cartagena in 1741 as follows:

“The Army thought that the Navy might have beaten down stone
ramparts ten feet thick; and the Navy wondered why the Army
had not walked up the same ramparts which were thirty feet
perpendicular.”

Experience in the Falkland Islands in 1982, although more successful

than Cartagena, was a timely reminder of the complexity of
amphibious operations, now invariably tri-Service. An understanding
of the following principles is essential if earlier experience, confirmed
by that of the South Atlantic, is to be put to good effect.

rCommand, Control and Communications. A joint force

undertaking an amphibious operation requires clear operational
level objectives. These will include:

u Achievement of surprise which is particularly important in

amphibious operations.
 u At least local superiority at sea and in the air for the
duration of the landings.

u Clearance of the bridgehead to protect the landing area

from indirect fire.

u Early establishment of port facilities.

A trained and experienced joint planning staff for the operational level
headquarters and preferably for the landing force will be required. Joint
plans inevitably involve a degree of compromise, but once firm in
outline changes should be avoided. Dedicated shipborne headquarters
facilities including communications to naval, air and landing forces, and
to supporting merchant ships taken up from trade (STUFT) are
necessary. Inter-Service communications, often through land force and
naval liaison parties are vital. Information concerning both enemy
dispositions and the nature of the landing area (the beach above and
below water, and its exits) will have to be collected. The joint plan
should also specify the states of command of an embarked force and
when they are to change for those landed.

rSupport. Support for joint operations will be limited both by

weather and sea conditions and the quantities of supplies that can
be shipped and unloaded across beaches. Fire support may also
be limited by natural conditions and the capabilities of carrier
borne aircraft. The problems of airspace management over a
beach area are considerable, and detailed co-ordination of air
defence weapons, air support and helicopters is necessary.

rDoctrine and Training. Common tri-Service doctrine and

procedures are vital for successful amphibious operations. They
must be up to date and rehearsed regularly by those with
amphibious roles. Inexperienced troops will need considerable
training before they can be effective in amphibious operations.
 m Combined Operations. The UK’s security policy and the size
and capabilities of its armed forces mean that operations involving only
national forces will be rare. Commanders of combined formations
should be aware of the political constraints which may be imposed
upon Allied contingents, their differing national characteristics,
doctrines and equipment.

l Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is required to produce a total effect on

the battlefield at all levels through:

m Complementary Use of Systems. Only a balance of weapons

systems will enable the wide range of threats to be defeated. At the
tactical level this is achieved by all Arms grouping, and understanding
how different weapons can be fought to best effect.

m Main Effort. To achieve concentration of combat power and

logistic support on the main effort (defined as: “a concentration of
forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to
bring about a decision” [See ADP - 2 Command page 8-C-1]),
formations and support will have to be switched from points of lesser
importance. Considerable ingenuity may be required by formations
left in areas of lesser emphasis to conceal or overcome their lack of
resources.

m Co-ordination. Attacks throughout enemy forward and rear

areas must be co-ordinated so that a cumulative effect can be created in
the decisive place. In conventional operations the need to concentrate
pressure on the enemy in some depth was summarized by General
Guderian as:

“Boot `em, don’t spatter’ em.”

This co-ordination of battlefield activity in time and space for

maximum effect at the decisive point is also known as
synchronization. The synergistic effect of taking action
simultaneously in several different places is far greater than the sum of
the individual actions. In operations other than war it may be reflected
in the single overall plan. Although the need for minimum force will be
 present, unity of effort will apply by directing the maximum
appropriate pressure on to all the various elements of the belligerent’s
structure.

l Mobility. Mobility is the capability of forces to move from one place

to another whilst retaining the ability to fulfil their mission. Speed of
movement is what is significant in war. It is important that:

m Within a formation the components that are essential for the

fulfilment of that formation’s primary mission (typically armour,
infantry, artillery, air defence, engineers, aviation and headquarters)
have comparable mobility.

m Logistic mobility and organization is such that it can support the

tempo of operations envisaged, not least in terms of range and speed.

m Procedures for the planning and execution of movement are

highly refined and automated where practicable to produce the most
rapid response possible.

m A positive attitude is taken to the requirement to move by using

ground to best advantage. Commanders must be prepared to go where
the enemy cannot go, or even where he thinks one cannot go. To
achieve momentum it may be necessary to employ smaller forces
which are able to move faster than more powerful and better protected
ones.

l Surprise. Surprise is a Principle of War. Its inclusion here is

recognition of the fact that it is a vital ingredient of success in modern
warfare. It is a significant way of seizing the initiative at all levels of
war, though it tends to be neglected in peace. Historical examples,
some very recent, show that even the simplest surprise can confer
disproportionate advantage. It is necessary that commanders at all
levels attempt surprise wherever practicable, and that all soldiers are
aware that in war attempts will be made to surprise them. There is no
prescription for the achievement of surprise but it is the case that:
 m Surprise is not an end in itself. It cannot be effective on its
own as it is a condition of success not success itself. For Clausewitz
there were two universal desires in war: first to achieve superiority at
the decisive point, and second to take the enemy by surprise, since
‘without (surprise) superiority at the decisive point is hardly
conceivable’. Although surprise may occur by accident, planning is the
key to success. The benefits of surprise may be short-lived so planning
should seek to exploit its effects rapidly.

m Surprise should primarily be directed at the mind of the enemy

commander rather than at his forces. The aim should be to paralyse
the commander’s will. It follows that study and assessment in
peacetime of an opponent’s theoretical vulnerabilities is profitable.

m Surprise need not be total. Surprise results from striking an

enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. It
is not essential that the enemy is taken unawares, but only that he
becomes aware too late to react effectively.

m Major factors in achieving surprise are intelligence, security,

originality, speed and deception. Deception, in particular, covers
‘measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion
or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner
prejudicial to his interests’ (AAP-6). The subject is covered in detail in
ADP - 1 Operations paras 0448 - 0451.

l Ground.

m Value of Ground. Despite advances in technology ground still

confers advantages and imposes limitations on those engaged in
manoeuvre, target acquisition and movement. It continues to give
‘cover from view’ and cover from fire’ from even the most
sophisticated weapons systems, and mobility depends upon its nature.
Detailed knowledge of an area is of particular value:
 r In the Estimate Process. In an estimate it is necessary to
assess, and in battle to reassess, ground for the value it confers on
the immediate commander and on the higher level of command.
This is so that the efforts devoted to taking or holding ground
remain in proportion to its value. For example, a successful
tactical defence, if conducted for too long, may result in defeat by
an operational envelopment or encirclement of the defenders.

r At the Tactical Level. Appreciation of ground at the

tactical level is indispensable for the following reasons:

u To make the best use of all available weapons systems.

u To ensure an appropriate tasking, grouping or

concentration of forces for an area.

u To conceal troops and logistic assets from reconnaissance

or surveillance and to detect areas of ‘dead ground’.

u To assess ‘going’ so that mobility and counter mobility

resources can be used to best effect.

m Terrain Analysis. Detailed advice from terrain analysis staffs

will be valuable in any map study. Areas and routes should seldom be
considered impassable. Defending forces have often been surprised by
determined troops traversing ground thought impassable, the German
attacks through the Ardennes (1940 and 1944) and the ‘yomp’ to Port
Stanley (1982) being examples.

l Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability of forces to sustain the

necessary level and duration of fighting to achieve their objectives. The
key word is ‘duration’. Sustainability is more than just logistics (the
science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of
forces). The term embraces the organization of manpower, equipment
and logistics - three of the four elements of combat power - as all
directly affect a force’s physical potential to complete its mission.
 A commander must make a judgement about his force’s sustainability
as above all things it will limit his freedom of action. In peacetime the
judgement is difficult to make. It hinges on the likely duration of
operations, tempered by the pattern of demand, and will be detailed in
the sustainability statement. Sustainability therefore requires having
sufficient men, equipment and stocks on hand and the ability to
resupply and reinforce. This last requirement will depend upon the
resilience of the logistic system, interoperability of equipment and
commonality of ammunition, factors which are discussed in the next
section.

It is clear that an army which in peace ignores sustainability is depriving

itself of a significant proportion of its means to fight (combat power).
A commander who ignores the question in training or in war deceives
himself and those under his command.

Organizations and Systems Development

Since the aim in manoeuvre warfare is to avoid trials of strength and attack
points of weakness, this approach must be reflected in the design of
equipment and organizations. These requirements will need to be
continually refined to reflect changes in a potential enemy’s operating
techniques and equipment capabilities. Once a potential enemy becomes an
actual one, theoretical requirements will become real ones. An ability to
adapt rapidly to unanticipated demands will then be essential.

The aim of this section is to provide a framework upon which the thinking
of those who organize the Army and procure its systems can be based. It is
concerned with the process of development. More specifically it describes
the need for analysis and the Guiding Principle and requirements that
influence the result. ‘Systems’ is used in its structural sense to mean a set of
connected parts making up a complex whole: ‘organization’ provides form
to that whole.
 Development. Doctrine must bear upon the way in which the Army is
organized and equipped. Inevitably the speed of change in modern
technology means that organizations and systems (O&S) do not always
follow directly from doctrine as theoretically they should. The inter-
relationship between doctrine and O&S is therefore better viewed as cycles
by which the development process takes place. (See Fig 8)

Government Policy
ed
ct
je
Re

Defence
Staffs
Operational
ORGANISATIONS AND SYSTEMS Concepts

Combat Power Technology

Manpower Approved Research,
Defence Development Military
Equipment Concept
Programme & Experiment Doctrine
Logistics
Training & Readiness Experience
& Trial

DOCTRINE

Tactical Doctrine Higher Level Doctrine

Fig 8

The Defence Programme (see Chapter 2) imposes the inescapable fact of

resources, often summarized as ‘The Rule of the Four M’s’ - Manpower,
Material, Minutes and Money. If approved by the Programme, a concept
will be converted into combat power. If it is not, it must re-enter the cycle
and be re-considered in relation to government policy. Doctrine itself
develops in the manner described in Chapter 1 which is shown in the lower
cycle.

Analysis. The process of analysis, which should include risk assessment,

should always feature in any O&S decision, whatever the level or range of
activity, as it is the means by which conflicting factors or requirements are
placed in their proper order. It is a similar process to that applied in the field:
mission analysis and the estimate. The merit of a systems approach, that is
consideration of the effect of the complex whole rather than individual parts,
to the Army’s acquisition of equipment needs little emphasis. It is, however,
necessary that both systems and organizations are considered in the
approach from the start. Only in this way will the whole be given a definite
structure early on and any re-organization take place by the time the system
enters service.

The actual analysis may take the form of Operational Analysis (OA). It
should determine the balance between cost and gain within a system or
between systems and the system’s relationship to the organization in which
it will operate. Although the process will often seek to model the
performance of a system, no analysis can hope to cover every facet of it.
Even with the advent of more capable computers, analysis will always rely
on assumptions to provide data for the process of mathematical examination
which underpins OA techniques. The assumptions will often deal with
intangibles and matters for subjective decision. Such assumptions are made
by military and scientific advisers often formed into a Military Judgement
Panel. Such a panel comes into play at the beginning of any analysis by
setting values, as assumptions, and after the examination in interpreting the
results. An essential element of this interpretation is testing the sensitivity of
the results against the assumptions made. Military judgement is therefore an
intrinsic part of analysis.

Guiding Principle. The guiding principle in any O&S decision is the need
for total consistency with the Military Doctrine, especially:

l The characteristics of modern warfare.

l The implications of the manoeuvrist approach to operations.

Requirements. The principal requirements that bear upon the O&S

development process are:

l Standardization. Within NATO, standardization is ‘the process of

developing concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and
 maintain the most effective levels of compatibility, interoperability,
interchangeability and commonality in the fields of operations,
administration and materiel’ (AAP-6). Standardization is therefore the
ideal upon which decisions should be based. It is worth noting that the
definition embraces more than just equipment and that it applies
equally in relation to the other Services. In practice the ideal will often
not be met. The minimum levels for the British Army to seek with
Allies and the other Services in the field of O&S are:

m Compatibility. ‘The capability ... to function in the same

system or environment without mutual interference’ (AAP-6) applies to
all systems and organizations.

m Interoperability. ‘The ability ... to provide services to and

accept services from other systems, units or forces ...’ (AAP-6) applies
to communication and information systems at the operational level of
command and above.

m Interchangeability. The capability of ‘being exchanged one for

the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining
items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and
performance’ (AAP-6) applies to combat supplies.

m Commonality. ‘A state achieved when groups of individuals,

organizations or nations use common doctrine, procedures or
equipment’ (AAP-6) requires common standards and measurements.

l Wide Utility. The diverse nature of the Defence Roles described in

Chapter 2 and the fact that they overlap means that O&S must have as
wide utility as possible. Furthermore, the ability to switch from one
task or target to another confers a number of advantages by:

m Enhancing tactical freedom.

m Simplifying planning.
 m Increasing the ability to act in an unexpected manner, and so
introducing an element of surprise.

m Reducing capital costs and manpower overheads avoided.

In meeting the demands for wide utility, it is important that:

m The minimum essential level of capability is retained. An anti-

tank weapon for light forces must be able to defeat the required target.
A guided weapon used in both ground and air defence roles must be
able to defeat the appropriate targets in both environments.

m Numbers of systems are not reduced to the extent that the most
demanding requirements are not met.

m O&S are not made unduly complex.

l Ease of Use. At the design and development stage it is necessary to

make equipment simple and easy to use in order to help tired and taxed
soldiers operate it effectively. If ease of use is accorded high priority
benefit should also accrue in a reduced training burden. Ease of use
may be achieved through:

m Effort in design and technology, albeit complex, to ensure the

best ergonomic solution.

m A comprehensive and imaginative training package as part of

the development of the whole system.

l Reliability. Reliability is an important factor for two reasons. First, it

affects all the performance characteristics of a piece of equipment and
drives the cost of equipment support and hence what can be afforded.
Second, it influences the user’s confidence in that equipment and
therefore the degree to which it is used in training and war. Reliability
is the ‘ability of an item to perform a required function under stated
 conditions for a specified period of time’ (AAP-6). Three other factors
are inter-related, and together the four are often known by the acronym
‘RAM-D’:

m Availability. In simple terms availability is the proportion of

time which a piece of equipment spends in a usable state. In terms of
reliability it is the principal issue. The standard of availability set will
require careful analysis of roles, conditions of use and cost. Once set,
the following should ensue:

r Examination of the harshness of the working environment

to determine the level of durability needed.

r A decision on how often it is likely that the equipment or

a component will fail (reliability) and how long that state can be
tolerated - a function of ease of repair (maintainability).

m Maintainability. The key issue of maintainability is the

capacity to keep material in, or restore it to, a serviceable condition. It
depends, amongst other things, upon speed of fault finding and
subsequent repair. Quick methods of doing this, such as built-in test
equipment (BITE) and forward repair facilities, must be considered at
the analysis stage.

m Durability. Durability is a measure of the system’s capacity to

withstand the pressures and demands of the environment in which it is
expected to be used.

l Anticipation. Anticipation in the field of O&S is concerned with the

efficient management of change. In this context it means thinking
ahead and preparedness to take action on any conclusions reached.
The requirement is to react to opportunities rather than crises - to seize
the initiative and act before the event rather than after it. To inculcate
the ability to anticipate, resources will have to be devoted to it in
peacetime despite the difficulty of justifying the expense in the short
term. Anticipation requires a sense of awareness of:
 m Potentially useful developments in technology and research, not
only related to land systems but also in commercial fields and that done
by the other Services.

m An opponent’s capability.

l Quick Reaction to Cover Capability Gaps. Despite efforts to

anticipate, unpredicted capability gaps are likely to occur. As on the
battlefield, a reserve of capability must be earmarked to meet such
challenges. Procedures must exist to ensure that once the unforeseen is
detected a response can be made promptly and effectively. Awareness
is the key, together with the preparedness to accept unwelcome news.
There must also be a sound method of validation of such news if the
false alarm rate is to be kept low. Speed of reaction will then depend
upon teamwork, the quick passage of information, and willingness to
devise and execute unconventional solutions.

Training Essentials

Matching Doctrine. The aims, objectives and principles of training are

described in ADP-4 Training, and it is worth repeating General MacArthur’s
statement, which is included in that publication:

“In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained

personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.”

Training must be related directly to the task of the formation or unit

concerned and must also follow from the doctrine in this booklet. There is a
requirement for training to be validated by field commanders,
establishments within the training organization and by the use of operational
analysis techniques.

Two specific themes in training stand out if the needs of the command
philosophy, the exercise of command and the manoeuvrist approach are to
be met:
l Development of the Right Approach. The successful exercise of
command and a quick reaction to orders will depend amongst other
things upon an attitude of mind which must be fostered from the start
in officer and NCO training. In particular:

m All commanders must have a good understanding of the level of

command two above them. If they have this they will be able to
interpret the overall plan and so understand the intention of the superior
commander generally.

m Regular study of command one level above is necessary if

commanders are to be able to analyse their missions properly and so
understand the intention of the superior commander specifically.

m All officers must have a sound knowledge of the capabilities of

armour, infantry and supporting Arms at battlegroup level.

m Officers and NCOs must be encouraged to experiment and to

test their powers of initiative on exercise.

l Establishment of Mutual Trust. Mutual trust and professional respect

are necessary for good command relationships. The environment in
which trust can flourish is one where:

m Common doctrine is absorbed at all levels. The levels, starting

with this booklet, are explained in Chapter 1. Clearly, the bulk of
absorption will be through tactical doctrine which must be regarded by
the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army as the
minimum professional knowledge they should have.

m A constructive attitude is taken to mistakes, from which much

can be learned. There is no excuse for making mistakes which can be
avoided - for example by prior reading of tactical doctrine or proper
obedience to orders - but one aim of training is to teach. Learning from
mistakes on training should breed confidence, eradicate unnecessary
‘fear of failure’ and engender in commanders the creative imagination
necessary to make them good trainers of men.
Coping with Stress and Uncertainty. Training must be specifically
designed to ensure that the Army is prepared for the fact that uncertainty
will play a major part in any future war. Commanders must understand the
effects that this fact will have upon morale, the planning and decision
making process and the significance therefore of quick reaction to the
unexpected. Hence the importance in peacetime of:

l Creating Realism and Friction in Training. Once low level drills are
mastered, what happens on exercise must, from a player point of view,
be totally unpredictable. It is essential that commanders are placed
under stress and that their flexibility is tested. New factors must be
introduced so that plans have to be changed. Commanders must also
be faced with a non-compliant enemy and the friction of war - not least
logistic - so that they have to fight the battle as well as deploy. This can
only be fully achieved on a two sided exercise in the field. But
simulation techniques must be adopted at all levels of command in the
Army, sometimes to enable training to be better done, but invariably to
allow it to be done more quickly, cheaply and efficiently.

l Developing Criteria in Peacetime for the Selection of Commanders.

The qualities of the commander are documented in ADP-2 Command
Chapter 2. In peacetime many of them may not come to the fore.
Selection must therefore focus on the quality of robustness, not least
mental robustness, and in particular the:

m Preparedness to exercise responsibility in the appointment.

m Preparedness to make timely and relevant decisions.

m Capability to withstand stress and persevere in uncertainty.

m Ability to select and train subordinates.

Learning from Experience. In peacetime the Army’s experience of
warfighting (as opposed to operations other than war) may be very limited:
to compensate for this, some vicarious experience may be gained from
study of military history. In war, however, there is a requirement to learn
rapidly from very recent battles so that newly-gained experience is put to
good use. Learning from experience is, therefore, both a long and short
term process.

l Long Term.

m Normal Military Experience.

m Military History. Professor Sir Michael Howard recommends

three general rules for the professional study of military history. It
should be studied:

r In depth to get beneath the historian’s necessarily

imposed pattern of seeming orderliness and to try to understand
what war is really like - to get an idea of the confused nature of
fighting.

r In breadth so that the development of war over a long

period can be understood.

r And in context to appreciate the political, social, and

economic factors that exercise important influences on the military
part of the equation.

Military history, however, will not provide universal remedies. It

offers accounts of problems and options, particular solutions and the
reasons for historical successes and failures. It should not be used
selectively to prove a theory or support a particular course, or followed
slavishly, for, as Napoleon concluded: “what is good in one case is bad
in another”.
l Short Term. The real test of military effectiveness is war.
Assessments must be made in, or soon after, battles so that
improvements to tactics, equipment and organization can be devised.
This is particularly important at the outset of a conflict when the actual
performance of men and equipment is seen. This short term
experience needs to be disseminated very quickly and widely.
 ANNEX A

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

The Principles of War, which form part of the conceptual component of

fighting power, are listed below. With the exception of the master principle,
which is placed first, undue emphasis should not be accorded to the order in
which the others appear.

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

In the conduct of war, and therefore in all military activity, it is essential to

select and define the aims clearly. The ultimate aim may be absolute, the
overthrow of a hostile government, or more limited, the recovery of
occupied territory. Within his strategic directive, a commander may have
several courses of action open, each of which would fulfil the aim. The
selection of the best course will lead to the mission and outline plan being
issued, the mission being a statement of the aim and its purpose. The aim
passed on to subordinate commanders may be precise or expressed in
unambiguous and attainable with the forces available. Once decided the aim
must be circulated as widely as security allows so that all can direct their
efforts to achieve the aim.
Maintenance of Morale

Because success in war depends as much on moral as physical factors,

morale is probably the single most important element of war. High morale
fosters the offensive spirit and the will to win. It will inspire an army from
the highest to the lowest ranks. Although primarily a moral aspect it is
sensitive to material conditions and a commander should look after the well-
being of his men.

Offensive Action

Offensive action is the chief means open to a commander to influence the

outcome of a campaign or a battle. It confers the initiative on the attacker,
giving him the freedom of action necessary to secure a decision. A
successful defence must be followed by offensive action if it is to achieve a
decisive result. Offensive action embodies a state of mind which breeds the
determination to gain and hold the initiative: it is essential for the creation of
confidence and to establish an ascendancy over the enemy, and thus has an
effect on morale.

Surprise

The potency of surprise as a psychological weapon at all levels should not

be underestimated. It causes confusion and paralysis in the enemy's chain
of command and destroys the cohesion and morale of his troops. In
recognition of its vital part in achieving success surprise is covered in more
detail as a Requirement for Success in Chapter Four.

Concentration of Force

Military success will normally result from the concentration of superior

force at the decisive time and place. This does not preclude dispersion
which may be valuable for the purposes of deception and avoiding
discovery and attack. Rapid concentration and dispersion depend on good
communications and an efficient traffic control system. They also depend
on balance, the essence of the next two principles.
Economy of Effort

The corollary of concentration of force is economy of effort. It is impossible

to be strong everywhere and if decisive strength is to be concentrated at the
critical time and place there must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where
it cannot significantly affect the issue. In order to gain a substantial
advantage a commander will have to take a calculated risk in a less vital area.
The application of the principle may be summed up as planning for a
balanced deployment combined with a prudent allocation of resources
strictly related to the aim.

Security

A degree of security by physical protection and information denial is

essential to all military operations. Security should enable friendly forces to
achieve their objectives despite the enemy's interference. Active measures
include the defence of bases and entry points, a favourable air situation,
flank protection and maintenance of adequate reserves. The principles of
concentration of force, economy of effort and security are all closely inter-
related.

Flexibility

"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first
meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is
compelled ... to reach decisions on the basis of situations which
cannot be predicted."
General Field Marshal von Moltke

Although the aim may not alter, a commander will be required to exercise
judgement and flexibility in modifying his plans to meet changed
circumstances, taking advantage of fleeting chances or shifting a point of
emphasis. Flexibility depends upon the mental component of openness of
mind on the one hand, and simple plans which can easily be modified on
the other. A balanced reserve is a prerequisite for tactical or operational
flexibility.

Co-operation
Co-operation is based on team spirit and training, and entails the co-
ordination of the activities of all Arms, of the Services and of Allies, for the
optimum combined effort. Goodwill, a common aim, a clear division of
responsibilities and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of
others are essential for co-operation.

Administration

Sound administration is a prerequisite for the success of any operation.

Logistic considerations are often the deciding factor in assessing the
feasibility of an operation. A clear appreciation of logistic constraints is as
important to a commander as his ability to make a sound estimate of the
operational situation. No tactical plan can succeed without administrative
support commensurate with the aim of the operation: it follows that a
commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan
proportionate to the degree of his responsibility for the operation. Scarce
resources must be controlled at a high level: the administrative organization
must be flexible enough to react to changes in the situation with the most
economic use of the available resources.
 ANNEX B

MECHANICS OF COMMAND

Organization of Headquarters

Headquarters at all levels must be responsive and able to survive. The

criteria of small size and hardness will contribute towards survivability, as
will frequent movement. In many cases geographical dispersion of
command facilities will help to diffuse the headquarters' electronic signature.

Headquarters must be organized and staffed to be able to conduct sustained

operations. The need to move frequently must not hinder responsiveness.
At brigade level and above there is a need for an organizational division into
present and future plans; only in this way can a smooth transition between
battles or operations be achieved and the continuous nature of warfare be
recognized.

The span of command is the number of subordinate organizations one

commander can command and control directly. Technology, particularly
modern communications and information handling techniques, make it
possible to widen the span of command. But as command is essentially a
human function, pure technological considerations are not the only criteria
in deciding the span. Three factors need also to be considered.

l The Threat. A headquarters with too great a span of command will

necessarily be large physically and in terms of its signatures. It will
therefore be vulnerable and its destruction may confer undue advantage
on an enemy.

l Command. The need for the commander to think 'two down' and for
subordinate commanders to think 'one up', and indeed understand what
is going on two levels above them is important.

l Logistic Control. A headquarters must be able to exercise logistic

control over all those in the span of command. Since logistics often
determine what is operationally feasible, this factor will be a major
limitation.

Experience has shown that a ratio of more than four or five subordinate
organizations to one headquarters is unlikely to work.

Procedures

Command and control procedures must be simple, efficient and flexible to

meet the criterion of responsiveness in headquarters.

l Operations Security. Operations security is part of the planning

process and is a function of the staff, requiring close co-operation
between G2 and G3 staffs. It will entail physical defensive and
offensive measures, often related to deception.

l Mission Analysis. Mission analysis occurs during the Direction stage

of the decision making process. It is the first and most important part
of the appreciation process. The mission analysis procedure is
designed to enable a subordinate commander to identify his tasks and
the purpose behind them, so that he is then in a position to use his
initiative where appropriate and act purposefully in the confusion of
battle.
l Dissemination of Orders. Clarity of intension is of paramount
importance in orders. Recourse to detailed orders should be the
exception but will be necessary to cover situations such as initial
deployment, some low level tactical situations, when there is a low
degree of training amongst commanders and staffs and where for good
operational or tactical reasons tight control is required. More often
commanders' intentions are better relayed by directive outlining:

m The Concept of Operations.

m The Mission.

m The Tasks. Tasks are listed as definite objectives one level down
and do not usually specify the way in which the objective is to be
achieved. Read in conjunction with the concept of operations and the
mission they must convey the commander's intention precisely.

m Resources. Troops and resources are allocated to achieve the

necessary force ratios. Their suitability for the task must be considered.
Particular care needs to be taken in the tasking of reserve units.
Regrouping should be avoided wherever possible and therefore tasks
should be structured to groups rather than vice versa. Groupings
should almost invariably contain a mixture from all Arms. Lack of
resources, particularly logistic, may well be a major constraint upon
freedom of action.

The use of directives, short though they may, does not absolve the
commander and staff from detailed work - quite the opposite. The cerebral
aspect of command is arguably more tested in control by directive than by
detailed order because:

m If freedom action is to occur, all the implications of the superior

commander's missions must be exhaustively examined. Translation of
intention into a simple directive requires more thought than listing
things in great detail for a set-piece plan.
 m To make the concept of operations of a directive work calls for
very wide ranging supporting staff work. For instead of simply relating
to a set plan it must cater for subordinates acting at speed within the
freedom of action they have been given. This will involve a good deal
of detailed movement and logistic calculation.

l Planning Norms, Standard Procedures and Drills. An aspect of the

high level of training required for directive control is the use of planning
norms, standard procedures and drills. In staff work they ensure,
through the existence of standing operating procedures, that orders are
kept short whilst the use of planning norms, for example standard
loads, speeds up calculations.
 ANNEX C

FORMS OF MANOEUVRE

Introduction

Some enduring forms of manoeuvre are described below. They are not firm
rules or schemes: one form of manoeuvre may embrace or develop or be
turned into another. Generally their aim is to defeat enemy intentions by the
disposition of forces with only the minimum of essential tactical fighting. It
is important to relate forms of manoeuvre to the overall objectives they are
designed to seek. For example, the classic Napoleonic manoeuvre sur les
derrières was usually intended to hold one part of the enemy forces to
prevent its concentration and so allow the successive defeat of all the parts
in detail. It cannot be divorced from the individual objectives Napoleon
sought. However, many followers trying to codify his system ignored this
and developed it slavishly into theories, often with disastrous results.

Three general headings have been chosen:

l Deliberate Operations. The aim of deliberate operations is to

manoeuvre so that enemy forces can be engaged or to defeat an enemy
 with the minimum of fighting by forcing him into a disadvantageous
position. Offensive action in the form of a major attack to break into or
through a defended area is included since it will invariably include
manoeuvre at lower levels and provides the basis for other forms of
operation.

l Exploitation. The exploitation of success gained in deliberate

operations is not straightforward. It requires a different mental
approach, new directives and fresh command, control and logistic
arrangements. It therefore justifies categorization and study on its own.

l Manoeuvre Terms.

All provide means to achieve objectives: they may form part of an offensive
or defensive strategy and embrace all phases of war. They are the forms in
which operational art may be manifest and as such must be read in
conjunction with the section on Manoeuvre.

Deliberate Operations

Envelopment

REAR
Holding attacks AREA
to pin down enemy
and divert reserves HQs
LOGISTICS

Fig. 8
'An offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or
over the enemy's principal defensive position to secure objectives to the
enemy's rear' (AAP-6). It is a basic form of manoeuvre designed to apply
force against enemy weakness, and will normally require diversionary
attacks against the enemy's main defensive front. Considerable speed of
movement and identification of weak points is required if the enveloping
force is to be able to reach its objectives in depth. The envelopment may
cause the enemy to redeploy or to withdraw; it may cause disruption to his
command and control or logistic systems or open the way to objectives
which he was trying to defend. It may be undertaken with a view to
outflanking, ousting or trapping enemy forces possibly against a
geographical feature. Airmobile or airborne forces may be employed as part
of an enveloping force: this is also known as a 'vertical envelopment'.

Turning Movement

REAR
Holding attacks AREA
OBJECTIVE
to pin down enemy
HQs
and divert reserves
LOGISTICS

Fig 9.

'A variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around
or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to objectives deep in the
enemy's rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major
forces to meet the threat' (AAP-6). The critical word here is deep: this may
result in objectives being taken with little fighting except in the initial stages,
or the enemy having to deploy reserves at some distance from their main
body. As such it is a riskier operation.
Double Envelopment

REAR
Holding attacks AREA
to pin down enemy
and divert reserves HQs
LOGISTICS

Fig. 10
An envelopment operation mounted with two axes may be designed to
outflank an opponent from both sides with a view to forcing abandonment
of his intentions, a general withdrawal or as a prelude to encirclement and
destruction of the forces trapped. This is also loosely known as a pincer
movement.

Encirclement

Fig. 11

If the 'pincers' are strong enough to meet having trapped a force, and to
hold an encircled force from breaking out, large forces with all their
equipment may be neutralized or destroyed. Larger encirclements are
costly operations in terms of troops and the time taken to reduce the
trapped forces. Encircled forces can only be resupplied by air, and unless
an early decision to relieve them by breakout and break-in is made then
their resources may be inadequate to force a breakout or fight their way
back to rejoin the main body.
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 'When a dam is broken, the water cascades with irresistible force"
Sun Tzu.

The concept was examined by Captain Liddell Hart in his study of the
March 1918 offensives: it was subsequently developed by Guderian in
Germany and by Tuchachevsky and Triandfillov in the Soviet Union. This
form of deep battle requires a very heavy concentration of force in the area
of the breakthrough so that once a passage is cleared through the defended
zone sufficient force can be passed through to fan out and exploit success in
many directions. Once the attacker has broken through into operational
depth he has the advantage of interior lines (see below): to concentrate
successfully against an 'expanding torrent' operational reserves have to be
committed early and move fast if they are to achieve more than stabilization
on a new line of defence. This manoeuvre was perfected by the Red Army
on many operations, notably at Kiev (October-November 1943), at Lass-
Kishinev (August-September 1944) where a double envelopment led to a
multiple encirclement and the destruction of four armies (two German, two
Romanian) and Vistula-Oder (January-February 1945). In the Vistula-Oder
operation, the largest offensive mounted by Soviet Armies on the Eastern
Front, twenty armies were initially deployed with tactical superiority of
between 6:1 and 40:1. By D+21, 2 February 1945, when the 1st Belorussian
and 1st Ukrainian Fronts went over to the defensive along the line of the
River Oder, they had advanced, in places, more than 350 miles. Thirty-five
German divisions had been destroyed; a further 25 had suffered 50-70 per
cent casualties. If conducted in sufficient strength, an operation of this type
can rapidly overrun large tracts of territory with comparatively little fighting.

Narrow Thrust

In Chapter Four it was stated that momentum could be achieved by various

combinations of size and speed, a commander having the option of selecting
a small force able to penetrate deeply, thereby creating a shock effect by its
sudden appearance. The point of main emphasis may result in a narrow
thrust, itself possibly part of an envelopment, as in France in 1940. (Fig 13).
The unexpected arrival of forces in rear areas to secure important objectives
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will undoubtedly create a major shock effect. The narrow thrust may be
difficult to sustain: an operational reserve and a favourable air situation
could turn the tables and threaten its envelopment.

Manoeuvre Terms

Interior and Exterior Lines

A B

REAR
AREA

1xR

2 x R+

Army A, operating on interior lines has far to move (one x R) to

concentrate force at or supply any part of its front. Army B,
operating on exterior lines has further (up to two x R) to move to
concentrate or supply its forces. Army A should therefore be able to
manoeuvre more quickly against Army B.

Fig. 14

The concept of lines of operation applies both to manoeuvre and logistics. If

a formation is interposed between two enemy forces it is said to be
operating on interior lines. This has the advantage that the formation is able
to move against either opposing force, or switch its resources over a shorter
distance than its adversary. Such a concept depends on the ground and the
state of mobility of both sides: relative mobility may have a similar effect.
For example, the successful switch of the German 8th Army from North of
the Masurian Lakes to concentrate against the Russian 2nd Army near
Tannenberg (August 1914) was possible owing to the superior mobility of
the German Armies.

Mobile Defence. The options for a defensive battle range from positional to
mobile defence, the former involving a reconnaissance screen for warning of
enemy intentions, a main defensive area in some depth and a reserve. If a
force is insufficiently strong to hold its allotted frontage in depth then it may
consider fighting a mobile defence. This could, at the extreme, consist of a
warning and delaying (guard) force in front of a series of less well prepared
positions from which defensive battles may be fought. Such a battle would
involve reliance on a much larger reserve being deployed and redeployed to
engage the enemy. The requirements for such an option to be feasible are:

l Good communications and mobility, and a favourable air situation.

l A higher standard of proficiency than in more positional forms of

defence, especially among junior commanders, will be needed for this
operation to work

Mobile defensive operations will tend to be based on a framework of

positions from which actions of the ambush type can be mounted. Once
troops are engaged in defensive positions it will be difficult to move them,
particularly if the opponent is strong in armour, artillery and ground attack
aircraft. As a result, mobile defence may result in delay to the enemy rather
than destruction. The essence of such a defence is that mobility should
allow troops to be used in several successive positions. Nevertheless, once
in those positions they will have to be prepared and equipped to fight
defensive engagements. Of necessity, however, troops engaged in mobile
defence will tend to be less effective, partly because of the time spent in
movement, and partly because more positions will have had to be prepared -
to a lesser standard. To quote Colonel J N Alford:

"Mobility of defensive forces in such circumstances, while it may be

essential, is not a substitute for numbers. It merely tends to offset an
inherent disadvantage."
A sounder defence may be based on good positions, taking account of the
capabilities of the Arms, to channel an opponent into areas in which he can
be destroyed by the offensive manoeuvre of all Arms, particularly armour,
and indirect fire. This will be preferable if destruction rather than delay is to
be achieved. In this case the balance of reserves is more reasonable but the
normal principle remains that once a reserve is committed, a new reserve
must be created from elsewhere.

Culminating Point. Unless a decisive success is achieved, an offensive

may reach a point when the remaining fighting power of the attacker is no
longer sufficient for the operation to proceed. Losses to the attacker may
result in an opponent being strong enough proportionately to be able to
defeat subsequent attacks. Alternatively the attacker may not be able to
sustain his operations for lack of supplies as well as shortage of manpower
and equipment replacements. This has been described as the culminating
point. After such a point has been reached the attacker may be forced to
revert to the defensive in order to rebuild his fighting power. The
implications are that:

l Sufficient capabilities must be allocated to a commander undertaking

an offensive so that he can achieve a decisive success.

l Enemy culminating points must be predicted so that countermoves

can be planned.

For example, Eisenhower, in late 1944, halted the advance into Holland and
Germany to build up stockpiles. He feared that otherwise insufficient fuel
would be available to sustain operations: in the event this proved to be the
problem for the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes (December
1944).

Centre of Gravity. The concept of centre of gravity stems from the

interpreters of the Napoleonic system. Clausewitz, for example, in
explaining what constitutes defeat, suggested that the centre of gravity was
'the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends ... the
point at which all our energies should be directed'. Its application at the
strategic level might be interpreted as the destruction of the principal army,
the seizure of the capital city or the disintegration of an alliance.

A related term is 'decisive point'. It was explained in Chapter Four that

manoeuvre depends for success on the application of force against identified
points of weakness - concentration of force at a decisive point. A decisive
point is usually a physical objective to which fighting power is committed to
achieve a decisive result.

The decisiveness of a point is determined with reference to the enemy's

intentions and centre of gravity. The concepts of decisive point and centre
of gravity are therefore related. At the operational level the centre of gravity
is likely to refer to major forces. For example, an operational commander
will consider action with reference to the centre of gravity identified at the
strategic level, but will order action at the decisive point. The term centre of
gravity is not used at the tactical level.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
What is Doctrine, functions, levels and development of doctrine

Chapter 2
THE PURPOSE AND ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES
British Defence Policy, main defence roles, control of the armed
forces, crisis management and the allocation of resources.

Chapter 3
MODERN WARFARE
The Nature of Conflict, General War, Regional Conflict, Comments
of
Limitation and Intensity, Other Uses of Armoured Forces, The
Modern
Battlefield, Military Activities in Peace.

Chapter 4
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
Fighting Power: what constitutes fighting and the concept of
Fighting Power.

Military Doctrine: command, the basis for success in fighting a war,

organizations and systems development and training essentials.
 MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

FIGHTING POWER
(The ability to fight)

CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT
(The thought process)

Principles Military Development

of War Doctrine

PHYSICAL COMPONENT MORAL COMPONENT

(The means to fight) (The ability to get
people to fight)

Combat Power

Manpower Equipment Motivation Leadership

Logistics Training and

Readiness Management

Command The Basis for Success in Organizations and Systems Training Essentials
Fighting a War Development

Levels of Conflict The Environment Development Matching Doctrine

The Operational Level Analysis Coping with Stress and
and Operational Art Requirements: Guiding Principle Uncertainty
The Command Learning from Experience
Philosophy The Exercise of Command Requirements:
The Manoeuvrist Approach
A Joint/Combined Approach Standardization
Unit of Effort Wide Utility
Mobility Ease of Use
Surprise Reliability
Ground Anticipation
Sustainability Quick Reaction to Cover
Capability Gaps