Ui vs. Bonifacio, A.C. No.

3319, June 8, 2000

FACTS: In 1971, complainant married Carlos L. Ui. Sometime in December 1987,
however, complainant found out that Carlos Ui was carrying on an illicit relationship
with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter, and that they
had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in
Muntinlupa City.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant

then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced
herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that
she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband had a second child. Complainant then met again with
respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her
illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted, and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her
husband in his company.

ISSUE Whether Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.

RULING: NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant
must possess good moral character. Possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. A lawyer
may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude".

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is

"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as
"that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."

Respondent’s relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree. Respondents act of immediately distancing
herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged
moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession.

PETER T. DONTON vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, AC. No. 6057, June
27, 2006
FACTS: Donton filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public
document against Stier, Maggay and respondent, as the notary public who notarized
the Occupancy Agreement. Donton averred that respondent’s act of preparing the
Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP
Commissioner found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice
of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct.

RULING: YES. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code. A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will
involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits
an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. Respondent admitted
that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. He prepared the
Occupancy Agreement that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner
of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent
advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of lands by preparing said documents. The court ruled that he is
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Advincula vs. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007

FACTS: Advincula seek the legal advice of the Atty. Macabata regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. February 10, 2005, they met at
Zencho at Tomas Morato, Quezon city to discuss the possibility of the complaint
against said travel agency. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and
while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold complainant’s arm and
kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.

About past 10 o’clock in the morning of March 5, complainant met again the
respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the
draft of the complaint. Respondent offered again a ride, Along the way, complainant
felt so sleepy. Along the road, when she was almost restless respondent stopped his
car and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Even in state of
shocked, complainant manage to go out of the car.

After the incident, both are communicating in text message in which the complainant
decided to refer the case to another lawyer and the respondent is asking for
forgiveness.

Respondent in the text message clearly manifested admission of guilt. Respondent

admitted that he agreed to provide legal service, that he met the complainant on said
dates to discuss relevant to the case, and that both occasions, complainant offered
her lips to him; and, that where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed
to him. Hence, this complaint of disbarment

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.

RULING: NO. Respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to
warrant disbarment or suspension

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Good moral character
was defined as what a person really is and that it is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.

Good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public;
(2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4)
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.

In this case immoral conduct is a conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless

as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. It must be grossly immoral, so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The Court perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral. It also found that respondent of act of kissing the complainant on
the lips is not motivated by malice as respondent immediately apologize through text.
It also noted that incident happened in place where there are several people and
should the respondent had malicious designs, he would brought

Atty. Alan F. Paguia vs. Atty. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014
FACTS: The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound
named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim,
clients of Atty. Molina, entered into a contract covered by a document titled "Times
Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters
such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking
areas, and security with the other unit owners. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant,
Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the
terms concerning the parking arrangements. On 3 August 2010, Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended dismissal for lack of merit the IBP
Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Molina should be administratively dismissed for dishonesty.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the complaint held that when it
comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of
proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis.
The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either in the
complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if
Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or
malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith.

Crisostomo et al. vs. Atty. Nazareno, A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014
FACTS: In 2001, the complainants purchased housing units from Rudex and due to
some construction defects in the housing units and the subdivision itself,
complainants sought for rescission. The rescission cases were filed by herein
complainants Sioting, Crisostomo and Marquizo while the second batch of rescission
cases were filed by complainants Balatucan, Solis and Villanueva. Rudex was
represented by respondent Atty. Nazareno.

Judgement of default was rendered against Rudex during the first batch of rescission
cases.
In 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) assailing the same. Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not
commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency despite the fact that they
have previously filed an ejectment case on 2002 against Sioting and her husband in
the MTC of Cavite.

In 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint

against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and
the latter’s ejectment, with a certification that they had not commenced any action
involving the same issues before any court. It was notarized by Atty. Nazareno
himself.

In the same year, Atty. Nazareno filed six (6) more complaints against complainants
before the HLURB together with the same certification against forum shopping.

ISSUES: Whether Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable.

RULING: YES. In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code) which provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

It has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he
should be held administratively liable. Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of
Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared
the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.

The Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes
Guarin vs. Atty. Limpin, A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
FACTS: In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso de los Angeles as Chief Operating
Officer and thereafter as President of One Card Company, Inc., a member of the
Legacy Group of Companies.

On August 11, 2008, he resigned and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center On
November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc.
(LCI), another corporation under Legacy Group, filed with SEC a General Information
Sheet (GIS) for LCI which identified Guarin as its Chairman of the Board of Directors
and President. Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and
practices, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution on December 18, 2008

Guarin filed a complaint for disbarment with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) against Atty. Limpin for violation of Canon
1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
CPR and recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three
months.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the
CPR

RULING: YES. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.

Members of the Bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.

There is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is
ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company, It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of the
LCI in the GIS.

Thus, in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin has violated Canon
1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Moreover, in allowing herself to be swayed by the
business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and
officers of the Corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with
respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of
the CPR
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. vs. FASGI, G.R. No. 137378,, October
12, 2000
FACTS: ASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), entered into a distributorship
arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated ("PAWI"), a Philippine
corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian corporation. The
agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United
States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Pursuant to the contract, PAWI
shipped to FASGI a total of eight thousand five hundred ninety four (8,594) wheels.
Thereabouts, FASGI paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI
later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with stated
requirements.

FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract. During the
pendency of the case, the parties entered into a settlement. PAWI president Romeo
Rojas expressed the company's inability to comply with the foregoing agreement and
proposed a revised schedule of payment. Again through a telex message, PAWI
informed FASGI that it was impossible to open a letter of credit but assured that it
would do its best to comply with the suggested schedule of payments. FASGI
insisted that PAWI should meet the terms of the proposed schedule of payments,
specifically its undertaking to open the first LC within April of 1980, and that "If the
letter of credit is not opened by April 30, 1980, then [it would] immediately take all
necessary legal action to protect [its] position.

PAWI, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the supplemental settlement
agreement. While it opened the first LC on 19 June 1980, it, however, only paid on it
nine (9) months. FASGI promptly shipped to PAWI the first container of wheels.
Again, despite the delay incurred by PAWI on the second LC, FASGI readily
delivered the second container. Later, PAWI totally defaulted in opening and paying
the third and the fourth LCs. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted
without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot,
without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation
even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's
interest.

ISSUE: Whether a client may repudiate the action of his attorney after being aware
of the compromise.

RULING: NO. It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the
compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his
attorney, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it. Nor could PAWI claim
any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared from possibly paying FASGI
substantial amounts of damages and incurring heavy litigation expenses normally
generated in a full-blown trial. PAWI, under the agreement was afforded time to
reimburse FASGI the price it had paid for the defective wheels. PAWI, should not,
after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the agreement, be allowed to later
disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate
against its hopeful expectations.

PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready's authority to sign on its behalf the Supplemental
Settlement Agreement but denounced likewise his authority to enter into a stipulation
for judgment before the California court on 06 August 1982 on the ground that it had
by then already terminated the former's services. For his part, Mr. Ready admitted
that while he did receive a request from Manuel Singson of PAWI to withdraw from
the motion of judgment, the request unfortunately came too late. In an explanatory
telex, Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson that under American Judicial Procedures when a
motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel would not be permitted to
withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From the time the stipulation for judgment
was entered into on 26 April 1982 until the certificate of finality of judgment was
issued by the California court on 07 September 1982, no notification was issued by
PAWI to FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready's services. If PAWI were
indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready who purportedly acted in collusion with FASGI, it
should have aptly raised the issue before the forum which issued the judgment in
line with the principle of international comity that a court of another jurisdiction should
refrain, as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of passing
judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the evaluation of the facts
of the judgment issued by another tribunal.

Garcia vs. Atty. Sesbreno, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu convicted Atty. Sesbreño of
homicide. While he was on parole, the lawyer represented Garcia’s daughters, in
filing an action for support against their father and their aunt while Melvyn Garcia
was in Japan. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Atty. Sesbreño filed a Second
Amended Complaint against Melvyn Garcia but Garcia filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Sesbreño. In 2010, the Court ordered the IBP for investigation, report,
and recommendation regarding the disbarment case against Atty. Sesbreño. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) ruled that
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. The IBPCBD reviewed the decision the RTC and found that the
circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude.

ISSUE: Whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide.

RULING: YES. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the

private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD
that the circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude. The Decision showed
that the victim (Amaprado) and his companion (Yapchangco) were just passing by
Sesbreño’s house when the lawyer aimed his riffle at them and started shooting.
Both Amparado and Yapchangco started running away but Amparado was hit. There
was an eyewitness supporting their claims and another witness who saw Amparado
fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño walking back towards the gate of his
house while carrying a long firearm. As correctly stated by the IBP-CBD the victims
were just at the wrong place and time.

Heenan vs. Atty. Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013

FACTS: Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio.
Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in
need of money and wanted to borrow PhP 250,000 from Victoria. Victoria agreed to
accomodate Atty. Espejo. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo
simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009
for PhP 275,000 covering the loan amount and agreed interest.

In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the
amount of PhP 50,000 representing the interest which accrued due to the late
payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her
dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay
despite Victoria's repeated demands.

Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money.
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty.
Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Espejo violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for issuing worthless checks.

RULING: YES. Atty. Espejo violated 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for issuing worthless checks.

In Wilkie v. Limos, the Court reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless
checks, which is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this case, shows the
remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act
to the public interest and public order. It also, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her
commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined.

The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her
private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As held in
several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in
his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or
removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s
professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.

Teodoro III vs. Atty. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6760, January 30, 2013
FACTS: Anastacio Teodoro III related in his complaint that Atty. Romeo Gonzales
acted as counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases the latter filed against
him. The first case, Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, involved the settlement of the
intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement proceeding was pending,
Atty. Gonzales assisted Teodoro-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207, for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the
special proceeding earlier tiled.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Commissioner Caesar Dulay found Atty.
Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping. Commissioner Dulay asserted
that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other. Thus, Atty.
Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207
without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In
committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular
prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Commissioner Dulay recommended Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month

from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would
merit a more severe penalty. The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the
commissioner’s recommendation and dismissed the case against Atty. Gonzales for
lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violated
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING: YES. Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping, thus violating Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in

anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through
means other than appeal or certiorari.

There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b)
identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought.
Under this test, the Court found Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he
filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.

An identity of parties exists in both cases because the initiating parties are the same
and they both espoused the same interest. Meanwhile, the test of identity of causes
of action does not depend on the form of an action taken, but on whether the same
evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action.
The heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying
the form of their action or by adopting a different method of presenting it.

In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust
had to be decided by the trial court. The initiating parties’ claim in the two cases
depended on the existence of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus,
the evidence necessary to prove their claim was the same.

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration, the liquidation of Manuela’s estate, and its distribution
among her legal heirs. While, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela
asked for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of
Anastacio. They likewise asked the court to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate
of Title issued in favor of the latter, and to issue a new one in their names.

While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in
form, a ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa, thus an
identity of relief sought also exists.

Saladaga vs. Atty. Astorga, A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014
FACTS: Complainant Saladaga and Atty. Astorga entered into a Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase on December 2, 1981 wherein respondent sold to complainant
a parcel of coconut land located in Leyte, with TCT No. T-662 for P15, 000. Under
the deed, it provided that it has 2 years within which to repurchase the property, and
if not the parties shall renew the agreement. However, respondent failed to exercise
his right to repurchase and no renewal was made even after the complainant sent
the respondent a final demand letter for the latter to repurchase the property.
Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property until he received
letters from Rural Bank of Albuera Inc. (RBAI) that the property was mortgaged by
respondent to RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property and
that in turn, complainant should vacate the property. Due to this, the complainant
learned that TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by T3211 in the name of PNB as
early as November 1972after foreclosure proceedings, and T-3211was in turn
cancelled by T-7235 in the names of Atty. Saladaga and his wife on January
1982pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 1979 between PNB and respondent.
Lastly, respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 1984. It is here
where RBAI foreclosed on the property and subsequently obtained a new TCT
number. The IBP investigating commissioner found that respondent was in bad faith
when he dealt with complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was one of equitable
mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he represented in the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the property
was covered by T662, even giving complainant the owner's copy of the said
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on November 1972
by T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB).

ISSUE: Whether the IBP Board of Governor’s Finding as to the suspension of

respondent from the practice of law is correct.

RULING: YES. Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and
complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage,
respondent’s actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as in the present
administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held administratively liable.

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he
entered into the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981
with the latter. He made it appear that the property was covered by T-662 under his
name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said certificate of title, when
the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine years earlier by
T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in
the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of T-7235 on January 1982,
or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly
committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.

He indeed violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” clearly fall within the concept of unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1. They violate Article 19
of the Civil Code. The respondent also showed a disregard for Sec. 63 of the Land
Registration Act. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

Foster vs. Atty. Agtang, A. C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

FACTS: Foster sought the legal services of Atty. Agtang regarding a legal dispute of
a Deed of Absolute Sale she entered with Tierra Realty. Agtang agreed and Foster
paid ₱20,000 as acceptance fee and ₱5,000 for incidental expenses. On a later
date, Agtang visited Foster in her home asked for a loan of ₱100,000 for the repair of
his car. Foster agreed to lend the loan without interest having confidence and trust in
Agtang as her lawyer.

When Tierra Realty attempted to transfer to its name a lot that Foster had previously
purchased, Agtang recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of
contract with damages and requested the amount of ₱150,000 as filing fee. Agtang
justified that the amount was due to the high value of the disputed land and coverage
for the sheriff’s travel expenses and accommodations for the service of summons to
the defendant corporation. However, Foster confirmed with the trial court records
that the filing fee would only amount to ₱22,410. Foster also discovered that it was
Agtang who notarized the Deed being questioned in the case.

Agtang again visited Foster and demanded the sum of ₱50,000, purportedly to be
given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Although Foster expressed her
misgivings on the proposition, she eventually gave the amount of ₱25,000. Foster
gave the latter half of Agtang’s requested amount on a later date.

Foster’s case was dismissed on September 29, 2010, but she was only made aware
of such ruling on December 14, 2010 when she personally checked the status of the
case; as Agtang never updated her on such matter. While in the process for
reconsideration, Agtang’s driver delivered to Foster a copy of the reply and
requested ₱2,500 on Agtang’s directive as reimbursement for a bottle of wine given
to the judge as a present. Foster finally terminated Agtang’s services as her counsel
when her friend presented documents showing that Agtang was acquainted with
Tierra Realty since December 2007.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Agtang Violated the CPR.

RULING: YES. For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant,
for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the
Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and
the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves
no less than the penalty of disbarment. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that
“[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is
well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”

Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his

professional and private capacity. Agtang resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as
filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00.

Agtang received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all
of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged
filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for
the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.
Agtang displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in
exchange for a favorable decision. Agtang himself signed a receipt showing that he
initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been
dismissed.

The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a
bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust
but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession
and the entire Judiciary. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to
public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in
any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts.

Malcampo-Sin vs. Sin, GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS: On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence
and respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter Philipp), a Portuguese citizen, were married
at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence
filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary
and testimonial evidence.

On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial
the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he
found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. Other
than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was
heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the
fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision, dismissing the appeal. Thus, the decision appealed from is
affirmed with cost against the Appellant. On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. On
January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecuting attorney took steps to prevent collusion between
the parties .

RULING: NO. The prosecuting attorney did not take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and declaration of nullity cannot be declared in absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings. The Family Code mandates:

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed (underscoring ours).

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based

upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to
be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of
participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere
pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well. This is made clear by the following pronouncement: “

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensorvinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (underscoring ours).”
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution
of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well.
Other than the manifestation filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the
State did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the
proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, while we upheld the validity
of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as
prematurely rendered since the investigating prosecutor was not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
This stresses the importance of the participation of the State. Having so ruled, The
court decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province
of the trial court upon proper re-trial.

Navarro vs. Solidum, A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014

FACTS: Respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the
release of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the DAR. Presbitero engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case.
Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the
case, but nothing came out of it. Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo),
also engaged respondent’s services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare
lot. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of
the property. Respondent undertook to register the property. Navarro later learned
that the registration decree was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo.

Respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading
business and additional ₱1,000,000 covered by two MOA. They also agreed that
respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as
well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro.
Respondent then sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks for the loan
under the second MOA. Respondent then obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from
Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a
263-square-meter property. Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-
square-meter property mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent promised to
execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter. Respondent did not
execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. Thereafter, he failed to
pay either the principal amount or the interest. Checks issued by could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already
closed.

Respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. Presbitero terminated the services of

respondent as counsel. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

As defense, Atty. Solidum alleged that it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and
Navarro to extend him loans; Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because
he needed the money; that their business transactions were secured by real estate
mortgages and covered by postdated checks; denied that the property he mortgaged
to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan; that he was able to pay
complainants when business was good but he was unable to continue paying when
business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because
Presbitero did not help him; denied making any false representations. He claimed
that complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current account and
they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Solidum violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01.

RULING: YES. The Court DISBARS him from practice of law.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to
pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet,
when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted
on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but
he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as
to the real value of the mortgaged property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued belonged to his son. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to
Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch
of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the
checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s

professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private
capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and
Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent
misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his
loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of
Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so. Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client,
Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both
Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan
agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were
exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same
MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account
whose name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is
nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the
loans he obtained from complainants.

Mercullo vs. Atty. Ramon, A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016
FACTS: The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) sent several
demand letters to Carmelita T. Vedañoregarding her unpaid obligations secured by
the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City. To
avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita
Mercullo and Raymond Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC
about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's
arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage was
under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was not around at that time.
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of RTC in Caloocan
City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in July 2013.

Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their intention to
redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and
scheduled an appointment. On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the
designated meeting place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and
Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they inquired on the status of their mother's
property. After the respondent had oriented them on the procedure for redemption,
the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an
acknowledgment receipt. The respondent issued two acknowledgment receipts for
the redemption price and for litigation expenses, presenting to the complainants her
NHMFC identification card. Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as
soon as the documents for redemption were ready for their mother's signature.

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the
redemption, but discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected
with the NHMFC. They discovered that the respondent had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the property.

ISSUE: Whether the Atty. Ramon is guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility .

RULING: YES. The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from
the complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in
ensuring the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her
ability to work on the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did
not inform them soon enough, however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be
connected with the agency. It was her duty to have so informed them. She further
misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by falsely informing them
about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them the real
story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had
assured them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order
to have them part with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took advantage of
the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to
perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.

As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she
should serve with competence and diligence. Her duty required her to maintain fealty
to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her
neglect in connection therewith rendered her liable. Moreover, the unfulfilled promise
of returning the money and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the
matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her
dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the
respondent within the coverage of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law and
legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.

Chu vs. Guico, A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015

FACTS Complainant Chu retained Respondent Guico as counsel to handle the labor
disputes involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Guico’s
legal services included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal. According to Chu,
during a Christmas party held at Atty. Guico’s residence, Atty. Guico asked him to
prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner
handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Months later, Chu called Atty.
Guico to inform him that he had raised PhP 300,000.00 for the purpose and which he
later delivered to the latter’s law office.

In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Guico then handed Chua a copy of an alleged
draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. Atty. Guico told Chu to raise another
PhP 300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision but
Chu could only produce PhP 280,000.00, which he again brought to Atty. Guico’s
office. Finally, the NLRC issued an adverse decision against Chu’s company and
there was no other recourse but to file an appeal to the CA.

In response to the administrative complaint, Atty. Guico described the administrative

complaint as replete with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was
only meant for harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a
denial that Atty. Guico’s assistant Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit. He
further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating from
his office, surmising that the used paper must have been among those freely lying
around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the criminal
complaint he had handled for Chu.

IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules
1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the CPRL and recommended his disbarment from the
practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors, however, adopted leniency and
reduced the penalty to three (3) years suspension.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon I of the CPRL for demanding and receiving a huge sum of money from
his client to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC.

RULING: YES. By the acts committed by Atty. Guico, he has transgressed the
parameters of conduct and ethics as embodied in the CPRL.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish

respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed,
this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the
imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty.

Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses, and presented the draft decision that
Atty. Guico had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly
insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper
emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed
documents on used paper in his law office.

Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu, Atty.
Guico’s participation in the generation of the draft decision was undeniable. For one,
Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that the used paper
had originated from his office, claiming only that used paper was just “scattered
around his office.”

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses,
espe-cially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision
sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by
demanding and receiving PhP 580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision.
Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in his defense, but such
denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. The Court cannot but
conclude that the production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to
motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result
in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to
establish his complaint against Atty. Guico.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every
lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation,
every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would
involve defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or
she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and comport
himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits
his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to
raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor
case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded his
violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from
the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts
constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical
commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or malice;
and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant
conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the
Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law. Atty.
Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession.

Grave misconduct is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” There is no
question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private
capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral
character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the
continuance of such privilege.

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him

from the practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he
should be disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in
the legal profession.

Conjugal Partnership of Spouses Cadanedo substituted by Heirs vs. Atty.

Lacaya, GR No. 173188 (2014)
FACTS: The present controversy arose when Spouses Cadavedo engaged the
services of Atty. Lacaya in filing an action against Spouses Ames for sum of money
and voiding of contract of sale of their homestead lot after the latter failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price.

The Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis for the said
complaint and later engaged his services in two other cases involving the said lot in
which the lower courts’ ruled in their favor and placed them in possession of the
subject lot.

Subsequently, Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees.
He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions and selected the
more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the
spouses Cadavedo.

Unsatisfied with the division, petitioners entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and filed a case to eject them. In the said ejectment case, petitioner
entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement) with Atty.Lacaya,
readjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Pursuant to this agreement, Atty.
Lacaya acquired 10.5 hectares of the subject lot as attorney’s fees.

Six years later, petitioners filed an action before the RTC assailing the compromise
agreement praying that respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the
subject lot.

ISSUE: Whether the agreement is champertous and contrary to public policy.

RULING: YES. That Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo and
assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in exchange
for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is champertous and is
contrary to public policy.
Any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the
expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of
the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."In Bautista v. Atty.
Gonzales,the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the
former is against public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the
action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in
dispute.

In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case
expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
“a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the
expense of litigation”

Atty. Renerio Paas, A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC, April 4, 2003

FACTS: In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his
coemployees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in
and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus amounting to
insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent from work or made
it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning, only to stay
out of the office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00
before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for amounts in excess of
what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the difference; once
failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the amount
given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential information to litigants in
advance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving
undue advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000, denied Judge Paas' charges, and
alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because
she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his
marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information from him, she resorted
to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6, 2000, she
hurled at him the following invectives before the other employees of the court:
"Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang utang na loob,
pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong "; and she insisted that he sign a
prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed
that Judge Paas’ husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife’s office
as his office address in his law practice, in support of which were submitted copies of
a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109
and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs. Louie Manabat,
et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas address to be Room 203, Hall
of Justice, Pasay City, the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC, Branch 44.

Judge Paas and Atty Paas denied the charge that the latter was using Room 203 of
the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, claiming that Atty. Paas actually
holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio
Martinez; that Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he has a hearing
before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutors Office, or when he lunches with or
fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party
and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent
nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities. On January 24, 2002,
Judge Paas admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for
notices and orders in “People vs. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz
y Salita”, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the
cases were terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Paas and Atty. Paas should be penalized for allowing the
latter to use the office of the former as his return address in his private practice.

RULING: YES.
On the charges against Judge Paas

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule
2.03 thereof provides that:
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent
to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

SC Circular No. 3-92, 33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR

RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be
used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts
of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential
quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or
profession.

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other
courts, Judge Paas indeed "allowed him to ride on her prestige for purposes of
advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct" and of the
above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious
charge under the Rules of Court and is punishable under the same Rule. A judge's
official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his
behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life
should be beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judge's official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a
Judge's attributes depend the public perception of the Judiciary.

On Atty. Paas’ part

He was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that had no
purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or
his client, that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the
following rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Rule3.01. A lawyer
shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

Dacanay vs. Baker & Mckengie, A.M. No. 2131, May 10, 1985
FACTS: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin
Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of
Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to
H. E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel
is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of
another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.

RULING: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could
"render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment.”. This is unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here. Wherefore, the respondents are
enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

General Bank and Trust Co. vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125440, January 31,
2000
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent Assistant Solicitor General
(ASG) Magdangal M. de Leon, accusing the latter of violating Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon with
the Ombudsman is the alleged “inconsistent position” of said respondent in Spec.
Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil Case No. 0005 filed with Sandiganbayan. Civil Case
No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) through the OSG against Lucio Tan, former President
Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et al. Petitioners wrote respondent ASG De
Leon that he inhibit himself from appearing in said case and to defend the interest of
the Government as against the interest of Lucio Tan in the Civil Case. When
respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the Central Bank,
petitioners then filed the complaint against respondent with the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, the Ombudsman dismissed the case filed by the petitioners,
holding that OSG as counsel of the Central Bank of the Philippines in the aforesaid
case is defending its client, the Central Bank. It is not defending the interest of Lucio
Tan. The fact that, under the Liquidation Plan approved by the Monetary Board of
the Central Bank, the Lucio Tan Group purchased the assets and assumed the
liabilities of GBTC, is merely incidental.

ISSUE: Whether the OSG violated RA 3019 for representing conflicting interest.

RULING: NO. ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating Section 3
(e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal
duty to defend the interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the position
taken by it. Whatever legal services respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of
the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in
his official capacity as a member of the legal staff of the OSG.

In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de Leon was
merely acting in the interest of the Central Bank, which is the client of OSG. It may
be true that a successful defense of the interest of the Central Bank in said case
would also inure to the benefit of the Lucio Tan group. However, such benefit would
just be an incidental result. Certainly, it cannot be deemed as an act of causing
undue injury to a party by giving it unwarranted benefits or advantage.

Jose vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 38581, March 31, 1976
FACTS: Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of
explosives (handgrenade) seeks a new trial which was denied him by the Court of
First Instance and by respondent Court of Appeals. He claimed to be an agent of the
Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the
handgrenade in question. Hence, this motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner, which was opposed by the Solicitor General. Later on, a Manifestation
was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the Court that in view of the
“persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this Honorable Court
and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as Philippine
Constabulary Agent and/or authority to possess handgrenade,” in the interest of
justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel
V. Ramos. The latter in his letter confirmed the appointment of petitioner Lorenzo
Jose as a PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command. Thereafter, the
Solicitor General conceded that the interests of justice will best be served by
remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s motion for new trial should be granted.

RULING: YES. The Court gave due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for
upholding the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in
Suarez vs. Platon, et al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a
sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the
public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer.

The Court found and held that the circumstances of petitioner justify a reopening of
his case to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating evidence. An outright
acquittal from the Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not proper.
As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance
of examining the documentary evidence sought to be produced, and of cross-
examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now
petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the evidence during the trial.

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in the GenBank’s liquidation.
Mendoza gave advice on the procedure to liquidate the GenBank. Subsequently,
President Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos, his family and cronies. The PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against Tan, et al. and issued several writs of sequestration on properties
they allegedly acquired. Tan, et al. were represented by former SolGen Mendoza,
who has then resumed his private practice of law. The PCGG filed motions to
disqualify Mendoza as counsel for Tan, et al., alleging that then SolGen and counsel
to Central Bank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of GenBank, which was
subsequently acquired by Tan, et al.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

respondent Mendoza.

RULING: NO. The “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the
said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila.” Said procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No.
265, section 29. Thus, the Court held that this advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Supreme Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a
litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent
legal representation - the danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an
opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork