Material Time
Material Time
Material Time
John Robb
The Oxford Handbook of History and Material Culture
Edited by Ivan Gaskell and Sarah Anne Carter
Print Publication Date: Jun 2020 Subject: History, Social and Cultural History
Online Publication Date: May 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199341764.013.19
Material culture theorists have had limited success in integrating the material qualities of
objects into social and historical interpretations. Following Ingold, this chapter argues
that material qualities have to be understood as experientially mediated affordances for
human action. One of the most salient material qualities of an object is its inherent tem
porality—how the processes it forms unfold in time. The temporal qualities of materials
demonstrably structure how people understand and use them in both obvious and subtle
ways. Building upon this, I argue that much of what people do when they work with mate
rials is to cope with their temporality to align them with human needs and the rhythms of
social life. The chapter finishes by pointing out some important implications of the materi
ality of time for historical analysis.
IN the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures outside Paris, there is a platinum alloy
bar that was, for almost a century, the meter—the permanent international reference
standard for how long a meter really is. What would be the equivalent for time? Can one
imagine an official metal bar recording how long a minute is? The obvious, common-sense
reply is that this is silly: you cannot represent time materially because time is not materi
al. It is invisible, intangible, fleeting. By definition, time is transient and material things
have duration.
But precisely the opposite is true. For humans, time is inherently a material process. Ma
terial things have inherent temporalities and it is through materials’ processes that we
know time. Moreover, this is not a trivial fact. Materiality theorists have argued persua
sively that the material qualities of objects are central to how human interaction with
things unfolds, but they have typically discussed qualities such as color and hardness. A
material’s temporality is at least as important as its visual qualities and texture, and it
lies at the heart of both the experiential rhythms of social life and some of the most fun
damental strategies people develop for dealing with things—scheduling and storage, for
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The most useful approach to materiality is via seeing material qualities as affordances,
following Ingold and building upon James Gibson’s work in environmental psychology.3 In
this model, an external, material world certainly exists independent of human perception,
but in order for people to act in it, they have to perceive and understand it. Thus, the spe
cific material qualities of things—weight, hardness, color, texture, workability, taste,
smell, and many others—exist as potentialities until people experience and cognize them.
Material qualities are thus not physical properties which dictate how people perceive or
use substances, in an unmediated way. Instead, they provide affordances for humans’ per
ception and use; they emerge from a process of negotiation between the material world
and humans’ abilities to understand it and work with it. This is obvious: iron-bearing min
erals afford a raw material which can be transformed into metal only once you under
stand that they do and have the technology to extract iron; through most of human histo
ry, they afforded a source of color. A forest affords the possibility of leisure and an en
counter with nature only for people to whom “leisure” and “nature” are concepts through
which they orient themselves in the world; to other people, it may afford other possibili
ties, from a foraged dinner to primal terror. Affordances do not dictate how people under
stand and work with materials, but we have to negotiate with them. We do not have to
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comment on the solidity of a stone, but people are ethno-realists whose action is ground
ed in encounter with the world; given stone’s contrast with other materials we commonly
interact with, if we choose to do so, it is much more likely that we will say that it is hard
than that we will say it is soft.
This approach has two further implications for understanding materiality. One is that ma
terial qualities do not merely provide convenient signifiers in the construction of meaning
(e.g., stone provides a convenient signifier of durability); instead, they are emergent
properties which are interwoven with all the processes of interacting experientially with
materials. For instance, basic production techniques and strategies will integrate and
even produce specific material qualities. Temporality provides a good example of this. Se
condly, although our intellectual instinct is to draw a hard and fast line between the quali
ties which the world has regardless of the observer and those which human observers im
pute to it, the properties which happen independently and (p. 125) those which are caused
by human intervention—between “nature” and “culture” in other words—such a distinc
tion is more misleading than useful here; for understanding materiality, the real action is
in the indivisible mediating zone in which humans perceive and act.
To start in the obvious place, how do humans understand the passage of time? The an
swer is straightforward: we measure time entirely by the material processes which unfold
in it. Most basic frameworks of chronometry rests upon dates, which are a notational way
of reckoning time based upon the earth’s physical processes of rotation (days) and orbit
around the sun (years and seasons). Within a day, clocks measure time through any of
several usefully regular physical processes: the tension of a metal spring mediated by a
geared mechanism, the swing of a pendulum, and the vibrations of quartz crystals or even
atomic particles. Indeed, the history of both chronometry in general and absolute dating
methods in archaeology is all about the search for observable physical processes regular
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enough to measure the passing of time by: in archaeology this includes not only radioac
tive decay (as in radiocarbon and uranium/thorium dating) but the accumulation of sub
atomic particles (optically stimulated luminescence dating, or thermoluminescence), and
even the seasonal growth of trees (dendrochronology). We equally depend upon material
processes to know time in daily experience. Clock time is our conventional framework,
but if one is deprived of it, one judges the time by various clues which are either material
in themselves or represent material processes: events which have or have not occurred
(the mail being delivered, the morning train passing by), the quality of light and dark
ness, rhythms of noise (the traffic in the streets, the birds in the hedges). As experiments
of people living in isolation chambers or deep caves show, when other clues are taken
away, humans understand time through the yardstick of their own bodily rhythms.
From here, it is a simple step to argue that among a material’s relevant qualities
(p. 126)
is how it behaves temporally. The possibility that material things have inherent temporali
ties has rarely been discussed, creating the impression that things are temporally neu
tral, that they are fitted into time entirely by social use and convention. Temporality as a
material quality has been discussed only by Ingold.6 Ingold argues that materials are al
ways in flux, never free from time and change. While Ingold is interested philosophically
in matter as an almost animate substance, this Heraclitean formulation misses the point.
In a philosophical sense, it is true that a rock is embedded in time as much as a soap bub
ble is: a boulder may be always eroding fluidly. But from the point of view of a human sit
ting on the boulder, it is a static fixture. Similarly, a human’s body is always in flux, but it
forms a static, planetary world to the bacteria living on his teeth or in her gut. And, in
deed, the human may change the temporality of the stone by eroding it more quickly, just
as the bacteria may change the temporality of the body they inhabit by maintaining its
health or by infecting it. The point is that it is not the absolute fact of temporal change
which is important, but the temporality which emerges from an object’s material qualities
as they afford possibilities of use, inhabitation, and understanding to the subject.
The temporality of an object derives from the nature of the relational processes it can be
involved in. These processes are not uniform; different processes happen to, and with, dif
ferent materials and objects. Clearly, except for those rare processes so linear and regu
lar that we can use them for chronometry, this temporality will only be an approximation,
a generalization, a center of gravity for a material’s possibilities: most processes involv
ing stone may unfold slowly, but it can be transformed in an instant through a catastroph
ic earthquake or through dynamite. But this contingency is true for all material qualities;
the redness of a stone vanishes in the dark, water can undergo a phase change into ice or
steam, without undermining their general affordances of redness or liquidity. As a gener
alization, the temporality of a material is defined by the speed and pattern with which its
most salient and characteristic processes unfold. For the student of material culture, this
is enormously encouraging. As with the grain in wood, the signs of melting and crystal
lization in metal, or the remodeling of bone, it means that all things have their past
locked up in their physical structure, whether we can read it readily or not.
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The time of words illustrates this point. Although spoken words may seem immaterial,
they consist of vibrations in air; you cannot transmit speech in a vacuum. To the extent
that they have an inherent temporality, words are proverbially fleeting. This is a material
quality of their vehicle of transmission; sound vibrations can be produced rapidly in al
most infinite variety, spread almost instantaneously, and dissipate rapidly. These material
features are so fundamental that speech evolved around them, and they condition how
sound is used socially. We usually acknowledge the fluidity of words in disparaging terms
(for instance, by saying that spoken promises have little value because they vanish, unlike
written words or deeds). But the temporality of words runs much deeper than that. Com
munication, in fact, presupposes the temporality of words. Communicating with sound re
quires the speed, flexibility, and nuance with which we can speak; holding a conversation
in written rather than spoken form (for instance, via a (p. 127) typed Internet chat) re
quires linguistic adaptation to compensate for the reduced speed and narrower band of
communication. Beyond this, acting socially often requires change and situationality, los
ing the past and acting spontaneously, the fungibility of words, the ability to communicate
in a given moment without being straitjacketed by all the fossilized wordage one has ever
uttered. And imagine a world in which any sound did not dissipate quickly but remained
floating in the air indefinitely; in the dense sonic clutter, any kind of detailed utterance
would rapidly become incomprehensible.
In some ways, the temporality of words becomes most apparent when we transpose them
into media other than sound waves; this not only changes how long they last but also
makes them into different speech acts. For example, until the invention of recording me
dia allowed sounds to be reproduced and heard in a place and at a time other than when
and where they were first made, all music was live music; all speech was live speech. Un
til the invention of writing systems about five thousand years ago, the only way to ensure
faithful reproduction and transmission of spoken words would have been by liturgical
means, such as ritual practices stressing the verbatim reproduction of a fixed wordage.7
Writing itself is a transformative act which gives fixity and authority to speech, a distinc
tion replicated in further distinctions between ephemeral or erasable writings and ones
given the authority of permanence by inscription in media such as stone.
Just as earth time is almost always originally rooted in the materiality of astronomical cy
cles, human time is originally rooted in the materiality of the body. The temporality of hu
mans as material objects is their biography, an elastic story with a tough core extending
from conception and birth through growth and maturation, reproduction, degeneration,
death, and, frequently, transformation into postmortal social beings. As historical changes
in the ages of menarche, puberty, parenthood, and death illustrate, the temporality of the
body is not a fixed biological temporality overlaid by sociality, but a temporality of some
thing which is always simultaneously biological and social. For instance, dividing the hu
man biography into stages such as infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old
age may be a cultural interpretation of the biological processes of growth, maturity, and
degeneration, but once someone is assigned to such a category, the decision may have bi
ological consequences which shape how her body changes physically (for instance,
through patterns of work, nourishment, sexuality, and exposure to risk and harm).8 We in
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tervene in the temporality of the body both in life, around the time of death—both to re
tard death and to speed it up (withdrawing life support from the terminally ill, for in
stance), and after death in processes such as embalming, cremation, mummification, and
memorialization.
The biography creates a scale of narrative time mediating between day-to-day social in
teraction and the cosmological or ritual time.9 Birth, growth, aging, and death provide
metaphors for understanding change in other things, and generalized biographies pro
vide units of time such as the generation, the unit of time marking the maximum change
in an individual’s social capacity. The human body provides a yardstick of time in other
ways, for instance, in our capacity to cope with change. We learn our basic framework of
perception, categorization, and language in early childhood, along with many motor
skills, and these things thenceforth are deeply embedded psychologically: if these things
(p. 128) change slowly, we can cope with change, even if we are keenly aware of it. But if
change happens with a rapidity that outstrips our capacity to relearn, the result may be
psychological dislocation and trauma.
These examples give some important and common illustrations of how material things are
enmeshed in processes which have characteristic temporalities. Moreover, they show how
people are usually keenly aware of the temporal characteristics of things, not merely in
order to be able to manage things practically, but often as the basis for cultural senses of
time of different natures. Indeed, we often play with temporality by transposing things to
a different temporal key. For example, beyond shaping our ability to communicate, the
temporality of sounds shapes how we think about communication. The transience of
speech forms part of our sense of what speech as a social genre means (as opposed to
writing). And when permanence is needed, we transfer speech to more enduring material
forms: writing on paper, inscription in stone. Thus, the ability to shift communication
through media with different temporalities like a set of gears provides a social resource
for responding to social need. Similarly, transferring a social being from a medium which
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and things, and temporality forms one of the key characteristics of actants which condi
tion how actions unfold.12 Things have processes unfolding at different paces. This means
that humans need constantly to coordinate and manage the pace of things. Such time
management is built into the basic fabric of how people interact with material culture. Ex
amples are legion, and they range from simple to subtle and complex. On a superficial
level, such interactions are often a way of adapting the rhythms of things to the needs of
human schedules. But things are not infinitely malleable; each material offers a limited
envelope for how far its processes may be rescheduled, and every such intervention im
poses its own technological subroutines and space-time demands on people. They are
therefore anything but the simple imposition of human structure upon passive material.
Four examples of types of material change involving material things and people in dynam
ic relationships follow. The first is what can be termed accelerating processes. Material
processes can be catalyzed in many ways; many interventions which fragment or heat ma
terials speed up processes. Plowing speeds up water absorption, air uptake, and root pen
etration of the earth, just as manuring speeds growth and sheltering seedlings allows
growth earlier in the growing season. Processing foods in specific ways—for instance,
grinding grain—and cooking change the speed with which we can eat and break down
food. Drying lumber in heated environments shortens the time before it can be used for
carpentry. Careful composting converts waste to useful material more quickly; indeed,
cremation accomplishes rapidly a bodily transformation which otherwise could take a
much longer period.
The second example is retarding processes. Conversely, we often retard material process
es to coordinate their times with our scheduling needs. This is usually done either by al
tering the environmental conditions to render them more stable—storing food in cold,
frozen, oxygen-deprived, salty, or acidic conditions—or by transforming them material in
to a more stable object. Pottery is fired to render it stone-like; leather is tanned to make it
less perishable; grain is dried to prevent bacterial and fungal growth so that it can be
consumed when people need it rather than when it is about to spoil.
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Maintenance schedules form the third example. Human projects often involve stability or
stasis; nobody wants a castle built upon sand, or even one which requires constant paint
ing and repair. Things, conversely, often want to change. Many objects, particularly large
and complex ones such as bodies, houses, cars, and roads, form ongoing projects of con
stant maintenance whose schedule is set by the nature of the material and its inherent
tendencies to change. This is an argument which will ring true to those who have to get
their hair cut, mow lawns, repaint houses, and change the oil in their car. But such needs
typify the past as well—for instance, the constant need to rethatch and replaster houses,
to coppice woodland, prune fruit trees and maintain herds, and to maintain agricultural
terraces and irrigation canals in working order. Buying a house or building up a family
herd may take years from planning to fruition and involve constant attention and mainte
nance once accomplished. In this sense, our important possessions are not merely things;
they are projects, often ones which involve intricate scheduling and commitment over
long time spans, and they possess as well as are possessed by people.
Fourth is storage and scheduling. Scheduling coordinates need with the availabili
(p. 130)
These examples illustrate the general directions of how people manage the temporality of
things, but the effects of material temporality can be much more subtle when worked out
in detail. For instance, things that are available in limited temporal windows impose par
ticular demands and conditions on human use. They often have a higher cost, or the cost
can vary wildly through seasons of abundance and scarcity, as with highly perishable pro
duce. Similarly, hearing singers and actors in time-restricted live performance is differ
ently valued, and priced than hearing their performance stored reproducibly and trans
ferrably. Another example is furnished by speed in capitalist production. In a world in
which time and money are interconvertible via the cost of labor or the opportunity cost of
land and materials, inherently slow things also have different costs and social careers.
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Slow food costs more than fast food, and if a factory manager can cut a few minutes off
the cost of producing something the result is more profit. Wood is a fascinating example
of how material temporality affects both economics and design. It takes a long time to
grow a tree with a thick trunk. Moreover, the slower trees grow, the tougher their wood
is; but hardwood forests tie up capital longer and deliver profits more slowly than fast-
growing conifer plantations; hence, oak and other hardwoods are much more expensive
than softwoods such as pine and fir. Thus, commercially planted forests grow fast-grow
ing softwoods almost exclusively. Moreover, trees in many commercial forests are har
vested at a standard diameter of about 40 centimeters. This produces a large yield of nar
row softwood timbers. Hence, pieces of wood larger than about 20 centimeters across are
relatively costly, and many uses (such as floorboards, paneling, and furniture) which once
used wide or solid timbers have been redesigned to use either narrow strips of wood or
composite wood-based materials such as plywood, chipboard, or boards made from thin
strips bonded together. In this example, material (p. 131) culture design has shifted direct
ly in response to how the temporality of wood meshes with the needs of the economic sys
tem.
To understand how the time of materials helps generate the rhythms of social life, it is
useful to turn from disparate illustrations to a single historical scenario. Here let’s make
a foray into the Central Mediterranean Neolithic. This is Italy and adjacent areas such as
Dalmatia, Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta between about 6000 and 4000 BCE (as this example
has already been described in detail, it can be summarized briefly here13). This is a low-
tech, slow-tech world, a world of small hamlets and villages, settlements of a few dozen
people farming wheat, barley, and pulses, and keeping sheep, goats, cattle, and pigs.
They did a little hunting and gathering, and a fair amount of low-key ritualism. It is not a
world of hierarchy; nor is it a world of elaborate ritualism like the Neolithic of Stone
henge. It is a world of everyday social projects such as building villages, exchanging ani
mals, and journeying to visit neighbors, the pursuit of which generated the relations and
preoccupations of social life. Managing the time built into the basic materials of life was
integral to these projects.
Aside from the basic ecological seasonality of farming—which meant an ongoing rhythm
of sowing and harvests, and a commitment to storage and sedentism—other projects had
their own rhythms. Houses were small wattle-and-daub huts, rarely longer than 5 meters,
sheltering a few people. As a technology, such structures had a lifespan of perhaps twen
ty or thirty years, and they required regular maintenance of daub and thatch to remain in
condition. They also required embedded routines with their own temporal structure; for
instance, house building would have required a long preparation period during which one
quarried heaps of clay, gathered stacks of straw and sticks (perhaps from woods coppiced
a year or two in advance), and twisted huge lengths of twine to tie the frame together.
Then there was the temporality of animals. The vegetable staples—grains and pulses—
once dried could be stored indefinitely and prepared in any quantities at any time. In con
trast, meat came in large, perishable packages; when cattle were slaughtered, a small
household was faced with the problem of consuming large quantities of soon-to-decay
meat within a short window of time. The solution was to hold a feast, converting quanti
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ties of perishable meat far too large for a household to consume into social obligation and
reciprocity—a form of the “social storage” strategy common in Neolithic Europe.14 On a
larger scale, livestock were important social valuables, and building up and managing a
family herd would have been a multiyear, careful undertaking whose pace was set not on
ly by household needs and ambitions, but also by parameters such as animal reproduction
and demography.
Among made objects, making pottery was an art of expert timing, with a highly struc
tured chaîne opératoire, each stage of which required careful understanding of the
changes clay underwent. Weathering gathered clay would have taken weeks or months.
Molding a vessel, adding features such as handles and lugs, impressing decoration, dry
ing vessels, burnishing surfaces, and firing all had to be carried out within specific win
dows of time, on the order of hours, as the clay being worked dried, heated, or cooled.
Firing rendered vessels permanent, placing them into another scale of time. On a larger
scale, the lifespan of finished pots affected the historic career of pottery types. Large,
thick, (p. 132) durable, and rarely moved storage vessels provided long-lasting prototypes
for potters making new pots and thus reproducing this “distributed object” (in Alfred
Gell’s sense of the term15). Consequently, such vessels changed little throughout the
1,500 years of the Early and Middle Neolithic. In contrast, much as it is the coffee cups
and cereal bowls which break most commonly in today’s household pottery, it was the
small, relatively fragile, frequently handled ornate bowls which broke most often in the
Neolithic. Hence, these had a much more rapid turnover, and the assemblage at any giv
en point which provided prototypes for potters making new vessels had a much shallower
time depth. The result was that these styles underwent much more rapid stylistic drift.
Stone axes provide another example of how an object’s lifespan was conditioned by its
material temporality. Axes were an important Neolithic valuable, often made from meta
morphic stone such as amphibolite imported over long distances and worked with great
labor to take aesthetically attractive forms and a shining, high-gloss surface. While stone
changes and weathers in geological time, in a human time scale it is stable, virtually stat
ic; the management of stasis or change in axes depended entirely upon how humans
chose to shape their biographies. In making an axe, by far the greatest amount of time
would have been the final polishing to obtain its lucid surface. This lucid surface was not
functionally needed, but it was important for axes’ social roles as valuables and perhaps
magical objects, and its perfection was immediately visible to the eye; axes thus stored
and displayed the time put into making them. An unused axe could last in pristine condi
tion forever (at least in terms of human time), as many in museums still demonstrate. But
axes were also working tools, for woodcutting, carpentry, and other tasks, and they may
have served as weapons as well. When they were used as working tools, axes were liable
to break or dull, after which they needed reshaping or resharpening. Reshaping axes af
ter wear or breakage rapidly made them smaller. Use, breakage, and reworking were
thus reductive one-way processes, and after a certain point an axe would become too
small to use further. Axes thus had bifurcated biographies depending upon how humans
chose to use them. Axes found on living sites are usually worn and broken fragments,
while axes found in caches or ritual depositions are usually intact and ready to resume
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their lives as social valuables. The biographies of axes, thus, were managed; some were
rapidly consumed as working tools, while others put them in a kind of temporal stasis and
preserved them as social capital.
We could review the temporality of other Neolithic Mediterranean projects—the fast and
unidirectional reduction of flint and obsidian, the strategies of storage and scheduling of
all kinds of material, the seasonality of sea travel, the cultural demography shaping the
growth and abandonment of little communities—but these instances illustrate four impor
tant points that have implications for historical analysis.
First, the temporality of materials acts as an affordance in Ingold’s sense. It does not de
termine what one does with a material; there are often alternative ways of dealing with it.
For instance, our Neolithic villagers could decide whether to consume an axe quickly or
reserve it for future use; they could have developed ways of storing meat rather than
holding feasts to consume it rapidly. But it establishes one of the parameters of the situa
tion one has to think about, one of the claims the material as an actant makes upon the
unfolding chain of events.
operational sequence, with which anthropologists of technology are familiar. This speci
fies the sequence of steps which must be carried out to make something, or in a wider
sense to effect a social operation.16 In an immediate, analytical sense, the chaîne opéra
toire is where the temporality of materials enters the equation. Productive acts have not
only a sequence but a duration. Some, such as weathering a heap of clay for potting or
leaving an animal in its pasture, can be extended or compressed elastically, allowing a
project to be hurried up or shelved until it suits a social need. Others, such as dealing
with a freshly killed cow or molding and finishing a complex vessel, require specific kinds
of actions within quite narrow windows of time. A key step in socializing the temporality
of materials, therefore, is managing each step—aligning a step which requires intense ac
tivity with a lull in other rhythms or with an event which will bring together lots of
helpers, or figuring out how to convert a highly structured moment into an elastic one
(such as processing a volatile object to make it storable).
Third, the temporality of materials often acts at several scales of time. There is the se
quence of actions needed to deal with transforming or using materials in an immediate
sense—whether you have to strike while the iron is hot or can leave a pot to simmer unat
tended. But in a larger scale, these rhythms are also built into larger institutions, which
are mediated and shaped by other needs. Killing an animal may trigger a feast, but one
does not kill an animal haphazardly; it is part of a calculated decision to convert social
capital on the hoof into action. The decision of which temporal track to channel an axe in
to is a social decision integrated into micro politics of other kinds. Material temporality
will be most obviously seen in social worlds dependent upon a few resources with tightly
defined temporalities—the staple harvest, the annual salmon run, and so on. But it re
mains a pervasive if often quite subtle conditioning factor in many situations. In the earli
er example of modern wood production, basic schedules of growth percolate through the
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economics of the industry as far as the design of furniture which consumers can buy. As
another instance, in the Central Mediterranean Neolithic, the normative burial rites made
use of the gradual dissolution of the body to allow the remembered individual to merge
gradually with the history of the group. This is a typical role of funerary rites and ideolo
gies, which mediate the visible material changes triggered by dying, death, and a shift
from metabolism to decomposition and map them onto a larger narrative of individual bi
ography and a larger scale of group history.
Fourth, as one expands the scope of analysis, material temporalities become cross-linked.
The master narrative which coordinates many schedules in most societies is that of sea
sonal cycles, which are always both ecological and economic and social. But other cross-
linkings also are often established. For example, in the Italian Neolithic, houses were of
ten intentionally burnt down, probably to mark the death of the people living in them or
the dissolution of the social unit they represented. In effect, the history of the group is
written in a generational time made from the merged biographies of the people compos
ing the local group, and this forms a temporal framework into which the lifespans of
houses were fitted by rituals of intentional destruction. The composite effect of such
cross-linkings among the many projects people undertake is to place material temporali
ties at the heart of the compelling rhythms of social life. In this sense, (p. 134) people live
in “taskscapes” (in Ingold’s term), the accumulated rhythms and commitments of all their
activities; this is the key point that Ingold draws our attention to in his wonderfully in
sightful phrase “the temporality of the landscape.”17
Finally, the temporality of materials not only conditions how people interact with them; it
can also form a symbolic resource as well. One example is the symbolism of stone, noted
earlier, used to transform both words into lasting statements and people into beings exist
ing on another plane of time. Temporal structure also provides drama via the contrast be
tween times of fast and slow activity, free or coordinated activity, low-risk and hazardous
activity; for instance, in pottery production on most scales from craft to early industry, the
highly structured, irreversible moment of firing is often the dramatic climax of the opera
tion. And when time is understood as a proxy for labor, objects which store and display
time visibly can form special kinds of valuables; polished stone axes took on this role in
the Neolithic, much as high-end textiles which condensed huge amounts of labor did in
the Iron Age and Classical periods.
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of an object is its temporality—how the processes it forms unfold in time. The temporal
qualities of materials demonstrably structure how people understand and use them in
both obvious and subtle ways.
Much of what people do when they work with materials is to cope with their temporality.
Humans develop complex strategies for speeding up and slowing down material process
es to align them with their needs and the rhythms of social life. Scheduling and storage
regimes superimpose multiple fields of activity to create an overall time map of human
life. Moreover, many of these strategies of temporal management are not trivial matters
of putting an object on a shelf until you are ready to use it; they involve major transforma
tive efforts such as plowing fields, converting milk into cheese and butter, and tanning
leather, which themselves structure other things. Beyond this, the inherent temporality of
things is apparent in the chaînes opératoires and maintenance schedules they impose on
humans in order to simply remain usable. Managing the temporality of objects is thus not
really a matter of imposing a human social logic on (p. 135) a receptive material world; it
creates a world of negotiation where the social and the material reciprocally and inextri
cably structure each other.
There are four sets of theoretical implications for historical analysis—ideas which really
require further exploration. The first concerns object biographies and materiality. How
does this discussion help the historian or archaeologist trying to interpret a specific case
of material culture? Returning to the question of materiality, it is clearly not enough sim
ply to reinsert the object in its historical context and read it semiotically as a social text.
Without coming to grips with the material qualities of the object and how they structure
its social life, we can at best only partially understand why objects were important to an
cient people, how they gave form to ancient lives, and why they were the way they were.
Using temporal qualities as an example, we see that materials never determine the uses
people make of them, nor do people impose their projects randomly upon materials,
sculpting the Colosseum out of ice or writing emails carved in stone. Rather, making and
using things is a prolonged negotiation in which humans recognize, respond to, use, or
redefine the material qualities of an object, often with remarkable attention, knowledge,
and skill—not only technical skill but often conceptual and organizational acuity as well.
In analyzing the temporality of objects, this leads us methodologically toward the familiar
concepts of the chaîne opératoire and the object biography18—both ways of conceptualiz
ing the sequence of operations involved in making and using a thing. These are usually
established by a combination of close analysis of the actual substance of a thing (often
with scientific techniques to characterize its sources and working methods), analyses of
its use contexts, traces of wear, signs of repurposing, and depositional context, often with
experimental work as an adjunct. But the difference is that these sequences are not inter
preted merely as necessary or functional technological pathways; rather, the temporal
trajectory of an object is in itself an achievement, a reworking of the temporal possibili
ties of the material which is frequently both technically accomplished and conceptually
astute.
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The second implication concerns reflexivity in the practices of both history and archaeolo
gy, and the character of objects as “time travelers.” It is obvious that there is a link be
tween the material qualities of objects and their long-term historical careers. From words
upward, evanescent or even moderately ephemeral materials vanish from our historical
and archaeological consciousness. The freak preservation of “Ötzi,” the Tyrolean Ice Man,
and his organic finds, has taught us almost all we know about what clothing Europeans
wore at 3000 BCE;19 learning a single Neolithic song would transform our knowledge of
the period entirely. But the material qualities of things also condition their historical ca
reers in subtler ways. To take an example, Neolithic pottery design typically required de
tailed local social knowledge to interpret its stylistic cues. This defines a temporal brack
eting, even if it is one not apparent at first sight: local social knowledge decays rapidly,
and even within the thousand-year span of the Earlier and Middle Neolithic, earlier pot
tery styles probably meant little to people encountering fragments of old pottery. In con
trast, Neolithic axes had (literally and figuratively) more superficial designs; their aes
thetic emphasized readily cognized features such as the (p. 136) color of stone and surface
gloss, which require much less context. This conceptual portability, which allowed them
to travel across widely separated Neolithic societies, has also helped them to slide down
through the ages. They were thus repeatedly collected and reinterpreted by later peo
ples, from Classical Greeks and Romans to modern farmers, antiquarians, and archaeolo
gists. There are important studies yet to be done about the other means by which objects
make their way through time via strategies of translation which make them less ephemer
al or localized, freer from restrictions of medium or knowledge base (for instance, by
replication into drawings, photographs, imitations, free-floating designs, or generic
styles).
The third implication emerges from what we might term the political logic of temporality
regarding, in particular, storage and control. Ways of dealing with temporal challenges
have political implications. For example, when key resources are available for short, per
haps unpredictable intervals, humans have developed three basic options: mobility to ac
cess a range of resources as they become available, reciprocity to even out local short
falls, and storage to make good shortfalls. But these have very different political effects;
for instance, the first two tend to inhibit the development of inequality, while the third
creates a resource which can be used as political capital. The shift over human history
from scheduling to storage goes hand in hand with a historical increase in inequality.
Property and wealth provide another example. What is the intergenerational transmission
of wealth if not a way of having specific people–thing relations outlast the materiality of
the body? The development of property rights allows the individual body to be substituted
by a collective kin or corporate body which, ideally, lasts as long as the thing worth pos
sessing. Such arrangements act as check-dams in the historical flow of material value,
making it pool temporarily before flowing on. Looking at the same relationship from the
other side, the needs of things, the relationship of accumulation rather than production or
use poses new needs for nonperishable, infinitely convertible, and hence increasingly im
material forms of value. The point is that coordinating different material temporalities
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creates a host of issues for social and economic engineering, as well as lying at the heart
of religious and ethical considerations of familial reproduction and social relations.
Finally, material temporality has implications for understanding the shape of human histo
ry. Is there a relationship between the kinds of materials humans engage with and the
overall shape of history? The pace of change has been speeding up throughout human
history; on the scale of grand narrative, is plastic or silicon a faster material than stone,
bone, or metal? It seems unlikely that any one material alone can determine the charac
teristics of a technological system. We can leave aside here the fact that the “Stone Age”
is so called because its stone objects have survived to be found by archaeologists, not be
cause people then particularly used stone more than other materials such as wood, skins,
basketry, or bone. More to the point, somewhat counterintuitively for any simple evolu
tionary story, the Paleolithic use of stone—flaking it to make sharp cutting edges—is a dis
tinctly fast technology in which an entire chaîne opératoire may be accomplished in a few
minutes and many artifacts were made and discarded expediently; it is only from the Ne
olithic onward that the use of stone in polished axes, monuments, and statuary began to
exploit its qualities of slow working and durability.
probably lies in the technological style of overall systems through which materials are
used—systems which provide the lenses through which people see the affordances of ma
terial qualities. For example, systems encompassing varied technologies are likely to be
more dynamic than those with fewer technologies, as each new component or technique
will enable more recombinations and pathways, opening up new possibility spaces. Such
systemic factors may underlie the repeated pattern of alternating rises and plateaus in
the long-term history of material complexity.20 Moreover, systems which maximize pro
ductivity are likely to be more unstable than systems which maximize security, as the de
velopment of capitalism since medieval times may demonstrate. Moving to a yet more ab
stract level, innovations in human–thing relations such as the concept of enduring, exclu
sive rights over things may themselves change the dynamic of a material culture system
over the longue durée. But in the present state of the discussion, these are questions and
hypotheses, not answers.
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Anthropological Archaeology 26 (2007): 198–223.
Bradley, Richard. “Ritual, Time and History.” World Archaeology 23 (1991): 209–219.
Gell, Alfred. The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and
Images. Oxford: Berg, 1996.
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Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Gosden, Chris, and Yvonne Marshall. “The Cultural Biography of Objects.” World Archae
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Ingold, Tim. Perceptions of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill.
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Notes:
(1.) Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell, eds., Thinking through Things:
Theorising Artefacts Ethnographically (London: Routledge, 2007); Daniel Miller, ed., Ma
teriality (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
(2.) Tim Ingold, “Materials against Materiality,” Archaeological Dialogues 14 (2007): 1–16.
(3.) Ingold, “Materials against Materiality,” Tim Ingold, Perceptions of the Environment:
Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (London: Routledge, 2000); James Gibson, The
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979). Cf. Christo
pher Y. Tilley, The Materiality of Stone (Oxford: Berg, 2004).
(4.) Alfred Gell, The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and
Images (Oxford: Berg, 1996); Chris Gosden, Social Being and Time (London: Blackwell,
1994); Jan Harding, “Rethinking the Great Divide: Long-Term Structural History and the
Temporality of the Event,” Norwegian Archaeological Review 38 (2005): 88–101; Gavin
Lucas, The Archaeology of Time (London: Routledge, 2005).
(5.) Geoff Bailey, “Time Perspectives, Palimpsests and the Archaeology of Time,” Journal of
Anthropological Archaeology 26 (2007): 198–223; Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Mate
rial Life, 1400–1800 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973); R. I. Moore, “World His
tory,” in Routledge Companion to Historiography, ed. Michael Bentley (London: Rout
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Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
ledge, 1997): 918–936; John Robb and Timothy R. Pauketat, Big Histories, Human Lives:
Tackling Problems of Scale in Archaeology (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 2012); Andrew
Shryock and Daniel Lord Smail, Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
(8.) John Robb and Oliver Harris, The Body in History: Europe from the Paleolithic to the
Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Chris Shilling, The Body and So
cial Theory, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2003); Joanna Sofaer, The Body as Material Culture:
A Theoretical Osteoarchaeology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
(9.) John Robb, “Time and Biography,” in Thinking through the Body: Archaeologies of
Corporeality, ed. Yannis Hamilakis, Mark Pluciennik, and Sarah Tarlow (London: Kluwer/
Academic, 2002), 145–163.
(10.) Richard Bradley, “Ritual, Time and History,” World Archaeology 23 (1991): 209–219.
(11.) Tilley, The Materiality of Stone; M. Parker Pearson and Ramilisonina, “Stonehenge
for the Ancestors: The Stones Pass on the Message,” Antiquity 72 (1998): 308–326; Stefa
nia Casini and Angelo Fossati, Le Pietre Degli Dei: Statue-Stele Dell’età Del Rame in Eu
ropa—Lo Stato Della Ricerca (Notizie Archeologiche Bergomensi 12) (Bergamo: Civico
Museo Archeologico, 2004); Francesco Fedele, “Statue-Menhirs, Human Remains and
Mana at the Ossimo ‘Anvòia’ Ceremonial Site, Val Camonica,” Journal of Mediterranean
Archaeology 21 (2008): 57–79; John Robb, “People of Stone: Stelae, Personhood, and Soci
ety in Prehistoric Europe,” Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 16 (2009): 162–
183.
(12.) Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor Network Theory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
(13.) John Robb, “Beyond Agency,” World Archaeology 42 (2010), 493–520; John Robb, The
Early Mediterranean Village: Agency, Material Culture and Social Change in Neolithic
Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
(14.) Paul Halstead and John O’Shea, “A Friend in Need Is a Friend Indeed: Social Storage
and the Origins of Ranking,” in Ranking, Resource and Exchange, ed. Colin Renfrew and
Stephen Shennan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 92–99.
(15.) Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998).
(16.) André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993).
Page 17 of 18
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(17.) Tim Ingold, Perceptions of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill
(London: Routledge, 2000), 189 ff.
(18.) Chris Gosden and Yvonne Marshall, “The Cultural Biography of Objects,” World Ar
chaeology 31 (1999): 169–178.
(19.) Konrad Spindler and Ewald Osers, The Man in the Ice: The Preserved Body of a Ne
olithic Man Reveals the Secrets of the Stone Age (London: Phoenix, 2001).
(20.) Andrew Shryock and Daniel Lord Smail, Deep History: The Architecture of Past and
Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
John Robb
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