fire % protection planning report BUILDING CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION FROM THE CONCRETE AND MASONRY INDUSTRIES NO.11 OFA Si Fire Protection for Industrial and Warehouse Buildings In one of the most costly structure fires ever, ‘one of the world’s largest and most modern retail distribution centers burned to the ground along with allof ts contents, Losses to K-Mart’s 4.1 miliion-sq ft warehouse located near Phila~ delphia are expected to exceed $110 million. ina little over one hour the huge warehouse and its contents were totally destroyed inspite of the presence of an operating, full-coverage. ‘automatic sprinklersystem and quick response by dozens of firetrucks. Only the general of- ® fibes and eonputercevior sursved seperated from the restof the structure by masonry walls. How could such a fire happen? There were ‘many factors contributing to the destruction, all of which appear common to storage-type ‘occupancies. This report presents a rationele tor good fire protection design in industrialand warehouse buildings. Since World War Il, national economic growth and increasing consumer demand have resulted in the construction of more and larger commercial andindustrial buidings. These facilties oltenhave fire areas in excess of 900,000 sq ft and house total operations —from raw materials to production to siorage of finished goods—under one root The rationale for creating these so-called super plants are greaier operational efficiency, cost conirol, and econamy of scale However, there isa high concentration of goods and property at risk «with potential iosses upwards of $100 mition from, @ single fire Not only has the physicalstructure and layoutot these buildings changed, but a dramatic change has also occurred in plant occupancies. The oe velopmentof high-rack storage is one such occu- pancy, with storage of materials {rom 20 to 80 ft high. Also, the wide use of plasticsin products and packaging has created fire hazards too severe ‘or ordinary measures of protection Unless some- thing is done to reduce the risk of catastrophic loss, multimillion dollar tres will continue fo occurIsit impossible to preventihese large-loss tres? Certainly not. The olc lessons fromthe past simply reed carelul study and application, Two time- tested approaches need to be used more fully 1. Compartmentation—to reduce the value al risk 2. Zealous tire prevention, ‘These measures are neededin addition toauto: matic sprinkler systems because sprinkiers alone cannot ensure adequate protection. A brief lookat some recent large Industrial and warehouse fires should make this more apparent ay Large-Loss Fires « In Cctobor 1977, a fire al the Ford Parts Depart- in Merkenich, Germany, caused destruction of 800,000 sq fi of warehausing valued at over $100 million and loss of business estimated at ver $50 milion, Despite the presence of auto- matic sprinkler systems that were in operation al the time, negative factors such as nigh-piled storage, temporary siorege of highly combus tibie materials, delayed alarm, and lack af con: {rols on employee smoking permitted the lossto ‘occur. Only a masonry tire wal separating an additional 500,000 sq fi of warehousing and manutacturing halted the fire in Septembar 1978, afirein a Montgomery Ward distributoncenterin Bensenville, llino's,caused 1a $25 mullion loss in this fully sprinklered ware house, The fire, of suspicious origin, was fueled byidie storage af merchandise andpatetsin the aisles, The operating sprnkler system wasover powered, intenior concrete block walls helped (vo 100,000 sq ft of this 300,000-sq ft ware house Only 18 minutes after discovery of the fire, the metal-deck-on-bar-loist root system Collapsed. destroying the sprinkler system # In January 1979, ire was discovered in a 20+ high-rack storage warehouse in Edison, Ni Jersey, Although the building was fully sprin kiered, the lire progressed sorapialy that manual {ietighting elforts were not possibe, The build ing began to collapse only 12 minutasatter ds. covery of the fire. The 267,000-sq{t warehouse was totally destroyed with a esultingloss valued at $30 millon In these catastrophies, oven the full-coverage, automatic sprinkler systems proved to be insuffi- cient {ite protection (2) The large ossesandmeny others like them are a costly reruinder that even the best of fie extinguishing contro! hardware by itself is not exough Many of today’s large warehouses and manu- facturing plants are built under unlimited-area provisions of the model building codes. These pro- visions permit buildings of assembly, business, factory, mercantile, and storage occupancies 10, ‘Superscript nummbars n pateniheses denote references at be built one story high (two stories are permitted by the Uniform Building Code) and of uniirrites area. Under this provision no built-in fire resist ‘ance is necessary Only the installation of a fully automatic sprinkler system and comptance with minimum separation distances are required. How. ever, as witnesced by recent larga-loss res, when the Sorinkler system fails to operate or is nade quate, litle can be done to prevent total loss. The need for large undivided buluings isrecognizable, ‘especially in occupancies such as automobile and aircratt assembly plants. Nevertheless, the eed for unlimited open areas in other occupan- cles, such as Warehouses, snot so apparent and the effective use of compartmentation would reall limit the total value at risk without hampe ing operations, A reevaluation of the unlimited area provisions Is therefore recommended. Fie at Ford warehouse, Merkenich Germany, Fie ai Montgarery Ward warehovse, Sonsomvilo tins. Photo courlesy of National Fie Pretecion AssociaionArson—Leading Cause of Industrial Fires Arson is tho leading cause of fre mlindustnal ‘Accupancies. representing 24% of the in ‘ustria total (1981 National Fire Incident R= porting System, U.S. Fire Administration). in storage occupancies, incendiary or suspi- cious fires are by tar the number one cause Arson Fires in Industrial Occupancies 1977-1981" with Unknowns Allocated % of fires. % of dollar 105s caused by arson caused by argon Manufacturing of fire and total dollar loss (see Table).©) With the arson rate as high as it , add. tional fire protection measures are neces sary. Arson fires are chaigcterized by the se of accelerants,-trullipl@jgnitions, and, lampering wih fre deteeion anaesippres- sion systems. Because oftiiig redugdant defenses should be used|Sames should include fire-resistive consirdelionshaican- plglé Sprinkler protection, pamieualy. in SlOiage areas, A security systemrabgterds BAU ection devices should Sareciisid- Bred 9 detect intrucers. Provide anigmionitor fifeyéa!s and other cutotts (verticalandino apfaN including fire doors and other epeq= ing prataetion. Provcie inside hose conne-< tions and equip met, and portable fite extin- guisherS-Also, properly (solgl.cnd sectre ail Jammablesliqudsjand fraiblain a hi Gogiee of novsekcenina hata crwiseeauld be Used to acvantage by an arsonist Exterior Slorage yards aia a'so highly-vulnereble and should Be cainplotsly fenced. qanc ude uate it 10.deio. arssniste: Where: any oF these factors Of contd! are tackiag) eres an excellent chanc2 that an incendiary fire will produce # large toss.) Itis significant that in none of the above inci- dents was the sprinkler system impaired at the time ofthe fire. In aiher words, full protection was in sorvicewhon ignition tock piace. Cther negative factors permitted the fire 10 grow uncontrolled. These negative factors include — * Absence of adequate fice separations ** Absence of adequate fire resistance in root construction + Storage of more hazardous materals than orig- inally anticipated (Such as aerosols, plastics, flarrimable liquids) = Temporary storage in aisle spaces «© Deliverately set fires (multiple gnitions or use of accelerants) ‘© Poor housekeeping and lack of employee smoking controls ‘© Storage materials stacked higher han assumed in design * Delayed alarm 1977 84% 23.3% 4978 83 184 4979 a9 28.3 7980 96 30.5 7981 92 243 Avg. a9 24.9 Storage 197 23.1% 22.3% 3978 290 528 1979 285 35.3 1980, 23.1 40.8 1984 288 32.7 Ava. 207 36.8 Source VS77- 198 NARS Gate anc FEWA oraysi ational Pie Pralscign Aesocation cirvey dal Most of these tactors are the result of human error in the sense that someone deliberately or un- knowingly permitted them fo exist Such orror can have disastrous effects. undermining even the best automatic extinguishing systems. Efforts to prevert poor storage practices, housekeeping, and maintenance afe nol always etfective, Fire separations and minmum specifiedfre resistance jor roofs, which are not as easily affected by human error, are necessary 1o assure adequate levels of fire protection Essentials of Firesafe Construction Unfortunately fire protection is being treated in many sectors of the building industry as an exact science when in reality it has not progressed b yond the slate ofa refined art.) Past experience must sill serve as a guide in designing today's buildings for fresatety.This section ideniifies. those iro protection measures that have proved through experience to plovide adequate fire protection in industrial and storage buidings (®) Folloving sections will pro- vide more details of application and design for ‘some of these measises Important points tocon- sider include the following 1. For highly combustible contents and for mus ‘istory bisldings, select building materiais (such as reinforced concrete, concrete block or brick) that resist fre 2. For industrial occupancies, use construction hal wil not cantnbule tothe spread offire and thal hes a fire resistance of two nous 3, f construction or contents are combustibie, subdivide largo areas by fro walis with ade quately protected openings tolimit the poten tial damage. Provide as much yard space as S practical between buildings 4, Provide complete automatic sprinkler protec tion wherever there is combustible construc ion of combustible contents, 5. if the building is of more than one story, en: close stairs, elevator wells, conveyors, and chutes with two-hour tire-resistve walls, ard install automatic fire doors at openings. 6 Processes involving flammeble liquids or other explosion hazards should be isolated in celached dulldings. if an isolated location §s not possible, hazardous material shoud be stored al exterior walls of main buildings ard ssolated from the rest of the building by fre walls 7. Provide for smoke removal trom windowless duilaings by ‘ans, dampers, or vents, Sprinklers? Yes, but not alone In spite of the failures previously cited, sprinklers have proved tobe an effective measure for provid ing fre protection for industrial buildings. Sprin. klers are most effective when combined with other fire protection measures to form @ series ot Tenses, This is because sprinklers are suscepti tomany adverse conditions that could render tiem inoperative or inadequate, These include poor mainienance, shutdown for repairs, inadvertently shut valves, malfunctioning pumps, and lack ot electrical power, Also, i the combustible contents of the building have increased dueto a chango in fccupaincy since the system was first installed. the water supply maybe nadequate to handle the greater fre hazard, A study ol fire-loss statistics indicates the haz ards of inadequate sprinslor systoms,*) Table | shows that the average loss in an inadequately sprinklered area is nearly five times that in an ul spnnkiered area. Having an inadequate sprinkler system results in greater risk of fire damage than having none at all, because dulding codes allow certain fire arotection features to be eliminated if Table 1. Fire Losses in Sprinkiered and Unsprinklered Areas” ‘Average lose in sprinklered area § 42.575. ‘Average loss in unsprinklered area 160,839 ‘Average loss where sprinilers failed 780,251 *Souco insta pe nauors—anaiss of 80 spores Iaogses ara 13 ungroatres We oss. Automatic sorinlers have proved to be effective provising ine protection for ndustnal uidngs. However, othe spree system i inoperative of inadequate, the ire-esistiveinegriy 0! he sructure must be relied on 10 conine and im there protection measures. such as fie-resistve construcion and is ara patiions. Topettir these maesures frm & better chance ot controling te fie ‘han any one defen‘Table 2. U.S. Large-Dollar-Loss* Building Fires 1979-1981 ®ofdotar | Average | Average | Avorege No.of tage | sot ine, | ieee ioe, oss tes, | speinkiered | sprinkled uneprinkiered | sprinered ‘Year | all buildings | “Buldings | ‘buvdings | buisings | “"buitainge.~ | “butomgs 1970 368 08 155 | Staap.o0s | $160.62 | ¥2.100;08 1980 483 10 197 | 150264 | 1.688.413 | 3.025.655 1961 366, 120 213 | 1668817 | 1.480.628 | 2.964.200 Tota’ Rerige| 1219 2 191 | serrose | 152170 | 2.00860 ‘ing ea aun $500,000 or mow are papery axnage ‘Shure Nowra Fee Polecen sacral Prt net Dats gant Sar a spiinkeer system isincludedin the design. When system {® ‘Therefore, in_agcition to sprinklers the sprinkler system is inadequate to cortrola fre, backup systems such as fire separations are ‘needed to confine the fire end limit the loss, Such protection should never be traded of! because of the presence of an automatic sprinker system In addition, people have ile dificulty n identi- fying sprinklered anc unsprinKered property and are more careful about the kind and quantity of combustibles stored in unsprinkiered buildings, See Table 2. On the other hand, people are cener- ally unawate of the design limtations of sprinkier systems. Not realizing that an inadequate system may be lustasineifectiveasa nonexistent system, they neglect to limit the amount of combustibles stored thera. This raises the fire loadof the pocely protected area and almost guarantees that the system will be overloaded in an emergency. The large-loss fires examined earlier also indi- ate @ problem thal has become noticeable in other less costly and thus less oramatic losses; that is, he increasing trend toward highiy refined protection specifications incorporating litle if any satety actors beyond those inherent in hydraulic design, Minimal sprinkler densities and applied areas of demand are specitied based on antioi- pated type and kind of siorage However. the type ‘| material stored can change markedly over tne ite of the structure, paricularly in storage occu- pancies. II more hazardous materials are later allowed to be stored, the design densties may not be adequate anda system upgrade may be nec- essary, An annual reevaluation of the sprinker system's capability with respect to the materials. currently being stored should be considered. Itis Unlikely, however, that such an evaluation is very common The sorinkier design is further refined vy use of computer design for selecting minimum pipe sizes to meet the hydraulic criteria, which 1s usually based on watertiow tests taken near the building Snoe the available watertiow may also change, periodic testing is recorrmended. Allof this leaves. litle room for error. Even if the existing water sup- ply iscapable of handling much more than minimal demands, the selected piping effectively throttles ‘1 prevents it irom being utilized by the sprinkler olher fire protaction measures aro nocessary. Fire Walls Large propertios orproperties withhigh-valuecon- tents should be subdivided intoseparate ‘re areas to himitine spread of re, Horizontaitire spread can be limited by providing adequate space between buildings o” by fire walls or lire partitions. Inmult slory buildings vertical spread from one story to another is imited by he floor construction andby fire-rated wall enclosures with fire doors around slairways, elevator satis, and other openings ‘The primary purpose of fire walls isto limit the amount of property exposed to a single fire, Fre walls are designed to prevent the passage of fire fromone area to anothereven ifthe instaled sprin- kler sysiem is outof service oris overwhelmed by the tire. ‘Separation of occupanciesby fire walls, suchas manufacturing operations from storage areas. is. particularly important. Should the contents of 2 warehouse catch fire, ine manufacturing faciity wil be able to continue in operation, preventing large losses and service disruption. Similarly. in- ventory in @ warehouse can support normal ship- ments for some time in the event of a fre in the rranufactuting facility, ‘Areas of high value or large areas of combus- tibie construction or contents should also be sub- divided. In warehouses particulerly, hazardous materials suchas tlammable liquids, a2rasols, and. plastics should be stored inareas separated irom the rest of the facility by fire wails The construction o fire walls must be sufficient to estrict the transmission of heat by conduction, convecton, and radiation, Fire wails usually have three- or four-hour fire resistance ratings. but higher ratings may be necessary depending on the uel loading To be completely effective, tre walls must ex- tend through and above any combustible roots they are intended to protect Parapets for combus- tible 10's sioUd be a least 30 ncheshigh, Acor- Crete roof does not need a parapet Endwalls toprevent passage of fire around the ends of the fire walls should span fiom three to six feet on either side of the fire wall and nave alwo-hour fre esist~ ance rating, (9 The most important property of a fire wall is the ablity t0 fetein is structural integrity when ex. posed to fire, Such a wall must be stable enough to remain standing even when structuralmembers, n zach side of 1 collapse. Strength is desirable so that the wall can resist minor explosions, glen tring blows from falling materials, or pressure from, collapsed portions of floors and root leaning, agains! it Fre walls snould be planned in the early stages of the building design, The location of the walls should be selected 10 provide maximum fife pio tection without interiering with the intended func ion of the bulaing, Substantial reductions in fire insurance premiums can de achieved with the judicious use and placement of fire walls. See Table 3, itis recommended that the designer work closely win the tire insurance carrier Fire Partitions Fire panttions or fire barriers are used to further jodivide major aroas. They are intended to iso late hazardous processes, equipment, or mate- fials and protect vital equipment or records. They can be used in industrial occugancies to separate parallel lines of operating equipment so that fie in one line wil nol damage companion unis, ced freval wih adequately rrotected ‘properly con openmgs can slop ara trom spreadng even when automatic ‘and manual fresghing ffors heve aed Inthe design of fire partitions it is assumed that sprinklers are in service so that the primary func tion of the fire partition is to limit the lateral spread of heat and smoke to the immediate fire area. With sprinklers in service, fire parttions require only ‘wo-hour fire cesstance and do not need to be freestanding, Fire partiions form an important first-line de. fense against the spread of ire, By restricting the iitial flow of heat and smoke to tho area of origin, they limit the unnecessary operation of sorinklers ‘outside the fire zone. They also provide sufficient Ime to Coordinate and begin manual firefighting efforts ‘rom adjacent areas Thus fire walls and partitions. installed in con- junction with automatic sprinklers and smoke and heal vents, form an elfective fire cefense system. A series of delonses are so! up that together have 4 better chance of controlling and limiting the spread of & fire than any one defense mechanism acting alone, Roof System Is Important In August of 1953 the General Motors Corpora: tion's fransmssion plant in Livonia, Michigan, burned in what was the largest industrial fire joss, to that date, $32 millon. It was later learned that the metal-deck roof containing a commen bituni nous adhesive and vapor barrier was the main factor coniributing te the destruction of the plant Extensive testing was conducted and construc: tion compositons were developed to reduce the hazard inherent in this type of system.) In Jenuary 1967 another lesson was learned aboul the importance of the root system. The McCormick Place exhibiticn hall in Chicago sus- tained a fire wih losses of $40 milion to the struc- ture and $100 milion to the contents. Its stoe! root high above the floor was left unprotected, based on the erroneous assumption thattemperaturesat thal elevation would not be hot enough during a fire 1o cause collapse. However,collapseoccurred only 30 minutes after the start of the fire. ‘The noncombustibility of steel lends unwerrant- ed confidence ints suitability for uses where tire is of concer. Sigel loses approximately halt its strength when heatad to 11C0°F. However. the standard time-temperaturecurve eaches 1300? F only 10 minutes, In an actual fe, this tempera- ture can be reached even sooner, and collapse of ‘an unprotected steol-roof system, ragardiess of height, can occur quickly, Experiences such as the McCormick Piace fire point out the need to liminale building cade provisions based on the unwarranted assumption that height alone can prolect exposed-steel framing from fire. Check your building code fo make sure that such provi- sions co not exist Inthe last several years we have witnessed very destructive fires in several large superplants. The K-Mart and Ford warehouse ‘ires have providedTable 3. Fire Insurance Cost Comparison—Warehouse and General Storage Building Coverage. Fite and extended; puiding $1,500,000, contents $225,000 Iroestarding.dtidosbuldingin ral Fate ate pasea on sorecoisura {lass-8 public protection in Coo County based 9» Insurance Service item ot tincs eat semaoule fect 18, psng 150 HULE hstr= Sal underpin lan cand for ach Structure, and an average ope find eapenat factor fr insurers Conparies. Rates calculated by NATLSCO, onal Lo Cantal Series Caro. bsiinryst Kampor Crp. for Ne ‘Some othe cost vents of sing to wats, uo ates 8, ara Ye-tosate cosiction a roe consi a oot axanon ooo spore Pent OF 9 WE la Conroe ‘gna! cont euros cn bn fleadin weed esuarce roms or Neve constuction Baldr wi cone Wy woefical wer wea in ea re rate howe ‘neonng one's tig mat {Ent non alrost aay paves he ossiance rings of Yor Zhou valuable lessons about the importance of the roof system, In spite of the presence and operation of complete automatic sprinkler systems, these fires. wontunconirolled.Celing temperatures increased ta the point where the exposed-stee! roofs co!- laosed, dringing the sprinkler sysiem down and ‘any hope of controling the tire along with it, Per hhaps the dosignor of the new McCormick Place foresaw the lessons to be learned fromthese tres. The ‘aciity wes designed with an exiensive au- tomatic sprinkler system, elaborate alarm and ‘smoko. venting provisions, and was provided with ‘a one-hour-rated fire-resistive (00) (One-hour-rated root systems ofler several ad- vantages. They resist high temperatures thai can cause distortion and rupture of sprinkler piping Mostimportanty, one-hour-rated roofsresist early Collapse in jres uncontrolled by the sprinkler sys tem. This keeps the sprinkle's in place and apply- ing Water to the firo.aroa, Aiso, the roo sysioms. Jessen the possibilty of sudden collapse ol the fool, which is a seve‘e hazard to freighters, and. permit an internal ire attack thal would otherwise. be too risky to attempt ‘The insurance Industry hes longrecognized the advantages of a rated roo! system, Consequently they provide significant reductions in premiums when a rated foo! system is used. See Table 3 CONCLUSIONS The responsibly forthe tie protection of anew warehouse or industral aciity snould be shared bybath the owner ofthe facility andthe comm nity inwhich itis to be constructed ‘Concrete rd taisonry inumry Fiesty Comatan ocaly uno Pot on wrvatae roa Prowang a igmacary fo redieng nauanco premium By iO Company management must be aware of the high concentration of value it has at nsk from a single incident, They must show more concern for providing fire protection in the naw plant and re- ducing risk concentration than just the purchase of lire insurance Providing automatic sprinklers in the piant is a very positive first step. However, the consequences should a failure occur are too great for plant management or even an insurer to as- sume, A reasorabee limitation of values subject 10 one fire is necessary and easly accomplished with tire walls and partitions. For added sataty. ‘@ minimum one-hour-fire-rated roof assembly shoule be provided to assist in the continuity and ‘operation of the sprinkler system even though i may be overpowered by the fire and permit an internal fire attack by the local fre department. Comunity interestin a new pants tre-protec- tion features shoulo behigh. Provisions inthe local building code for adequate builtin fire protection to assist the local liefighting forces in preventing a catastrophic loss shouldbe required by the com: munity, This should include automatic detection and extinguishing equioment, use o! fire-resistive Construction sush as fire walls and partitons to limit maximum probable loss, and at least one: hour-fated roo! construction to prevent collapse and permit effective use of automatic and manual firefighting capebiliies. itis apparent that both the private and public sectors haveaninterestinpreventing catastrophic oss and should work together. Past large-loss fires have shown that reliance on any one system ‘or method 0! protection js not adequale, What is needed is @ well-balanced design that provides ¢ ‘series of defensas acting together te provice max- imum protection,REFERENCES 1. Fire Protection Handbook, 15th Edition, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy,Massachu- setts 2.Special Article on Warehouses, the Sentinel, Industrial Risk Insurers, Sept-Oct, 1979, Spe- cial Sentinel Reprint. 3. Handbook of industria! Loss Prevention, Seo~ ‘ond Edition, Factory Mutual Engineering Corpo- ration, 4.""When Isa Sorinklered Property Nota Protected Property?," the Sentinel, Industrial Fisk insurers, Second Quarter 1981 5. Building Construction for the Fire Service, Fran- cis L. Brannigan, National Fire Protection Ass0- ciaton, Quincy, Massachusetts. 6 Fire in the United States, Fourth Edtion, 1981, Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA-22, September 1982 7.C W. Conaway. "Incendiary Fires In Industriel Gccupancies” Arson: Some Problems and Solutions, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts 8. Fighting Arson with Fire-Resisiive Construction Fire Protection Planning Report No, 8, Concrete and Masonry Industry Firesafety Committee. 9. Fire Protection and Community Planning, Fire Protection Planning Report No. 9, Concrete and Masonty Industry Firesafety Commitee izations represented on the CONCRETE AND MASONRY INDUSTRY FIRESAFETY COMMITTEE BIA Brick Institute of America CASI Concrete Reinforcing Stee! Insitute ESCs) Expanded Shala Clay ard Sate Instituie NCMA National Concrete Masonry Association NFMCA atonal lacy Mixed Concete ‘seccialion PCA Portland Cement Association PCI Prestressed Concrete Institute This publication is inlended for the use of professional persorne| competent to vvaluale the significance and limtations of 48 contents and who will accept respon sibility or he appicaiionof he materialit contains. The Gonctete ano Mesonry Industry Firesafety Commitee: disclamme any and allresponsibilty for application of the stated principles or for the accuracy of the sources: other {nan werk performed or information daveroped by the Committes, Concrete and Masonry Industry Firesafety Committee 5420 Old Orchard Road. Skokie, Illinois 60077-4321 Printed inUS.A, $R244.018