Arch Flash Study Manual and Note
Uploaded by
okereson BenjaminArch Flash Study Manual and Note
Uploaded by
okereson BenjaminELECTRIC
ARC FLASH
PROTECTION
Tab 12C
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ELECTRIC ARC-FLASH PROTECTION
ARC SUIT
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-ARC-S (M)
Material Specification:
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
• NFPA 70E - Standard for electrical safety
requirements for employee workplaces.
Washing Guide
• Do not overload washer
• Use high water level
• Wash at temperature necessary to clean the garment.
Maximum 165 deg.F, or 74 deg.C
• Use recommended amount of quality detergent
(phosphate can be used).
• Do not use chlorine bleach or hydrogen peroxide either
separately or in detergents.
• Do not use softeners or starch
• Do not use tallow soap, i.e., one containing animal fats.
• For optimum results when industrial laundering, use an acid sour.
• Softened water provides best results.
Our Protection ARC Suit + Flame Retardant Ratings Arc Suit
ATPV Rating ATPV Rating
min. 8 cal/cm.sq min. 45 cal/cm.sq
Item Voltages HRC Level 2 HRC Level 4
1 LV Yes Yes
2 11 kV - Yes
3 33 kV - Yes
Note 1) HHazard Risk Category Level (PPE Level)
2) AArc Thermal Performance Value ( Cal/cm.sq. )
ARC HOOD
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-ARC-HOOD
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ELECTRIC ARC PROTECTION
LAW VOLTAGE - SAFETY SHIRT
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-SHIRT
Type : Style 301
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
Weight : 7oz/sq yd ( 237 g/m2 )
Fabric blend : 88% Cotton / 12% High Tenacity Nylon
Color : Navy Blue , Royal Blue , Yellow , Green ,
Red , Orange
ATPV Rating : 8.7cal/cm²
PPE Level ( HRC ) : 2 ( Single Layer )
Shirt Size Chart
Shirt
Size Chest Collar Sleeve Collar
Length
2XS 26.0 38.0 14.5 22.0 17.0
XS 27.0 40.0 15.0 22.5 17.5
S 27.5 42.0 15.5 22.5 18.0
M 28.0 44.0 16.0 23.5 19.0
L 28.5 46.0 16.5 24.0 19.5
XL 29.0 48.0 17.0 24.5 20.0
2XL 29.5 50.0 17.5 25.0 20.5
3XL 29.5 52.0 18.0 25.5 21.5
4XL 30.0 54.0 18.0 26.0 21.5
5XL 30.0 56.0 18.5 26.0 22.0
6XL 31.0 58.0 19.0 27.0 23.0
7XL 31.0 60.0 19.0 27.0 23.0
Note :
* All measurement are in inches
* Tolerance level +/- 0.5 inches.
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ELECTRIC ARC PROTECTION
LOW VOLTAGE - SAFETY PANTS
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-PANTS
Pant Pant
Size Waist Buttocks Thigh Croth
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
Length Bell
2XS 28.0 34.0 24.0 24.0 38.0 15.0
XS 30.0 36.0 24.0 24.0 38.0 15.0
S 32.0 37.0 25.0 25.0 39.0 16.0
M 34.0 39.0 26.0 26.0 39.0 16.0
L 36.0 41.0 27.0 27.0 40.0 16.0
XL 38.0 43.0 28.0 28.0 41.0 17.0
2XL 40.0 45.0 29.0 29.0 42.0 17.0
3XL 42.0 47.0 31.0 31.0 42.0 17.0
4XL 44.0 49.0 31.0 31.0 43.0 18.0
5XL 46.0 51.0 32.0 32.0 43.0 18.0
6XL 48.0 54.0 33.0 33.0 44.0 18.0
7XL 50.0 57.0 34.0 34.0 45.0 18.0
Note :
* All measurement are in inches
* Tolerance level +/- 0.5 inches.
LOW VOLTAGE - SAFETY JACKET
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-JACKET
Shirt
Size Chest Collar Sleeve Shoulder
Length
XS 25.0 40.0 15.0 22.5 17.5
S 25.5 42.0 15.5 22.5 18.0
M 26.0 44.0 16.0 23.5 19.0
L 26.5 46.0 16.5 24.0 19.5
XL 27.0 48.0 17.0 24.5 20.0
2XL 27.5 50.0 17.5 25.0 20.5
3XL 28.0 52.0 18.0 25.5 21.5
4XL 28.5 54.0 18.0 26.0 21.5
5XL 29.0 56.0 18.5 26.0 22.0
6XL 29.5 58.0 19.0 27.0 23.0
7XL 30.0 60.0 19.0 27.0 23.5
Note :
* All measurement are in inches
* Tolerance level +/- 0.5 inches.
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ELECTRIC ARC PROTECTION
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAPS-COVER
Feature & Benefit:
• Tripe stitches with FR thread
• 6 x 2" FR reflective
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
• FR properties will never wash
• Comfortable to wear
• Excellent after wash appearance
Material : 48% Modacrylic, 37% Lyocell, 15% P-Aramid
Grams : 197gsm, 238gsm
Comply : NFPA 2112, NFPA 70E HRC 2,
EN ISO 11612:2008, EN ISO 11611:2007
Size : S - 6XL
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SUPERIOR COVERALL ELECTRICAL ARC & FLASH FIRE PROTECTION
Sizes S M L XL 2XL 3XL 4XL 5XL 6XL
Collar 41 41 42 43 43 45 45 48 48
Shoulder 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 64 66
Chest 112 118 124 130 136 142 148 158 164
Waist 96 100 104 108 112 116 120 126 132
Back Length 43 47 51 55 59 61 63 64 65
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
Hip 108 114 120 126 132 138 144 150 156
Thigh 58 61 63 66 68 70 73 76 77
Pant Length 98 100 103 106 109 111 113 117 117
Sleeve Length 53.0 54.0 55.5 57.0 58.5 60.0 62.0 64.0 65.0
Cuff 26 26 27 27 28 28 28 30 32
Leg Opening 41 43 46 49 51 53 55 56 56
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FLAME RESISTANT BIB COVERALL
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-EIH
Level 4~ (11kV & 33kV) ARC Flash Protection Kit Set
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
Outer Layer : Style 851 Sateen
Inner Layer 1 : Style 851 Sateen
Weight : 18.0 oz/sq yd (610g/m2)
Fabric Blend : 87% Cotton, 12% High Tenacity Nylon and 1% Antistatic
Colour : Navy Blue / Grey / Orange / Royal Blue
Fabric : Westex Ultrasoft by Milliken
ATPV Rating : 45.0 cal/cm2
HRC's Level : 4 ( Double Layer)
Body Lth Bip Top Width
Size Waist Buttocks Thigh Crotch Pant Lth Pant Bell
Front Back Front Back
XS 13 11 11 11 30 36 24 24 37 16
S 14 12 11.5 11.5 32 37 25 25 38 17
M 14 12 12 12 34 39 26 26 38 17
L 15 13 12.5 12.5 36 41 27 27 39 18
XL 15 13 13 13 38 43 28 28 40 18
2XL 16 14 13.5 13.5 40 45 29 29 41 19
3XL 16 14 14 14 42 47 31 31 41 19
4XL 17 15 14.5 14.5 44 49 31 31 42 20
5XL 17 15 15 15 46 51 32 32 42 20
Note: All measurement are in inches
Tolerance level ± 5 inches
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RUBBER INSULATING GLOVES
EN Special
Item Code Description Sizes
Properties
CLASS 00
DSSB-SSE-GLOVE-C00 AZC 2,500 Volt Tested 7 · 8 · 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
500 Volt Working
CLASS 0
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
DSSB-SSE-GLOVE-C0 RC 5,000 Volt Tested 7 · 8 · 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
1,000 Volt Working
RC CLASS 1 7 · 8 · 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
DSSB-SSE-GLOVE-C1 RC 10,000 Volt Tested 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC 7,500 Volt Working 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC CLASS 2 7 · 8 · 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
DSSB-SSE-GLOVE-C2 RC 20,000 Volt Tested 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC 17,000 Volt Working 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC CLASS 3 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
DSSB-SSE-GLOVE-C3 RC 30,000 Volt Tested 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC 26,500 Volt Working 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC CLASS 4 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
DSSB-SSE-GLOVE-C4 RC 40,000 Volt Tested 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
RC 36,000 Volt Working 9 · 10 · 11 · 12
Complies to : EN 60903 & ASTM D120
EN Special Properties Category
Category Resisting In
A Acid
Z Ozone
R Acid, Oil & Ozone
C Very Low Temperature
Please go to the next page for Glove size measurement info.
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GLOVE SIZE - MEASURING YOUR HAND
We recommends the Palm Measurement where you measure the circumference around
the palm to detemine the size of the glove. This would equate to the probable size of
glove to select. Personal preference for tightness and finger length will ultimately
determine the glove size that is deemed most comfortable. Allow for additional room if
glove liners are to be worn.
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
EU Sizes
152 - 178mm EU - 6
171 mm EU - 7
182 mm EU - 8
192 mm EU - 9
204 mm EU - 10
215 mm EU - 11
226 + mm EU - 12
LEATHER WORK GLOVES / OVERGLOVES
Item Code Material Used With EN 388 Rating Length Size
• Class 00 - 0 Glove
DSSB-SSE-LPG-10 Goat Skin 10" 7 - 12
• Zig-zag Elastic Wrist
Goat Skin, • Class 1 - 2 Glove
DSSB-SSE-LPG-12 2121X 12" 7 - 12
Cowhide Gauntlet • Nylon Strap with Buckle
Goat Skin, • Class 3 - 4 Glove
DSSB-SSE-LPG-13 13" 9 - 12
Cowhide Gauntlet • Nylon Strap with Buckle
Our leather protectors provides an extra layer of safety for rubber insulating gloves. They are used only for
mechanical protection against abrasions, cuts, tears and punctures for rubber insulating gloves. It should
always be worn over rubber insulating gloves when live working, Our leather protectors meet ASTM F696,
EN 388 & EN 420 standards.
Our leather protectors are manufactured from top grade cowhide
or goat skin. The uniqueness of our leather protectors is that it fits
comfortably with the rubber insulating glove. A rubber insulating
glove Size 9 will fit a leather protectors Size 9.
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CLASS 2 DIELECTRIC SAFETY BOOT
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-ESRS
Class 2 Dielectric Safety Boot are a
new product which eliminates the
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
need to wear a dielectric shoe along
with an overshoe by combining both
products into one shoe.
Our Class 2 Dielectric Safety Boot is
tested up to 20kV and is also a
certified Safety Shoe.
Colour • Orange / Green
Size range • Euro : 36-50
Type of Construction • Vulcanized Rubber Upper and Sole
Last / Sole Patter • VSV / SNV
Test / Application • 20,000 VAC
• For working environment with high voltage hazards
• Power Station operations
• Substation (Step-up / Step-Down / Distribution) Operations
Recommendation
• Electrical Hazards with wet condition / water exposure)
• Current Leakage Hazards
• Ellectrical Installation
Upper Construction • Waterproof (Electrically Verified), Easy For Cleaning
Sole / Heel • Good abrasion resistant for extra durability
Steel Toe Cap • Epoxy coated toe cap for anti corrosion
• Double ribbed ladder shank to improved midfoot stability and
Steel Shank
support
Chemical Resistance • Sole & Upper - Resistant towards strong acids and alkalis
Lining Materials • Comes with extra comfort and durability
Finishing • Lacquer coating for weather protection
• EN 20345 – Standards For Safety Footwear For Professional Use
• EN 50321 – Live Working – Footwear for Electrical Protection –
Insulating footwear and overboots
Product Certification
• CSA Z195 – Protective Footwear
• ASTM F-1117 – Standard Specification for Dielectric Footwear
• ASTM F-2413- Standard Specification for Performance Requirements
for Protective (Safety) Toe Cap Footwear
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ELECTRICAL INSULATED HELMET
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-EIH
Standard Compliance : ANSI Z89.1-2003 Type 1 certified
Helmet Colour : White ( Top )
Electrical : Class E
ELECTRIC ARC FLASH PROTECTION
Voltage : 20,000 volts
ELECTRICAL INSULATED HELMET
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-ASV
Color : Light Green
Material : Anti-Fog Molded Polycarbonate
UV Protection : 99.9%
FLAME RESISTANT BALACLAVA
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-FRBL
Style : Style 131
Type : Rib Knit
Weight : 6.5 oz/sq yd
Fabric Blend: 87% Cotton, 12% High Tenacity Nylon
and 1% Antistatic
Colour : Navy Blue
Fabric : Westex Ultrasoft by Milliken
ATPV Rating : 12.1 cal/cm2
HRC's Level : 2 (Single Layer)
HARVIK 18kV ELECTRICAL SHOCK RESISTANT SHOE c/w STEEL TOE CAP
Item Code
DSSB-SSE-EAP-ESRS
** Withstand 18kV of life current at dry condition
** Fuel oil resistant sole suitable for inimical environment
** Slip resistant vulcanized rubber outsole
** Excellent abrasion resistant for extra durability
**Waterproof / Reinforced rubber
EURO SIZE 38 40 41 42 43
UK SIZE 5 6.5 7.5 8 9
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NOTICE
This document contains the expression of the professional opinion of SNC-Lavalin Inc. (SLI)
as to the matters set out herein, using its professional judgment and reasonable care. It is to
be read in the context of the agreement between SLI and the City of Winnipeg, and the
methodology, procedures and techniques used, SLI’s assumptions, and the circumstances
and constraints under which its mandate was performed. This document is written solely for
the purpose stated in the agreement, and for the sole and exclusive benefit of the City of
Winnipeg, whose remedies are limited to those set out in the agreement. This document is
meant to be read as a whole, and sections or parts thereof should thus not be read or relied
upon out of context.
SLI disclaims any liability to the City of Winnipeg and to third parties in respect of the
publication, reference, quoting, or distribution of this report or any of its contents to and
reliance thereon by any third party.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 4
1.1 Background ................................................................................................ 4
1.2 Objective ..................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Scope of Study ........................................................................................... 5
2.0 METHOD OF STUDY ...................................................................................... 6
2.1 Standards.................................................................................................... 6
2.2 System Model ............................................................................................. 6
2.3 Configuration Scenarios............................................................................ 8
3.0 SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY ............................................................................... 9
3.1 Short Circuit Calculation Method.............................................................. 9
3.2 Utility Contribution ................................................................................... 10
3.3 Short Circuit Fault Levels ........................................................................ 10
4.0 COORDINATION STUDY ............................................................................. 12
4.1 Objectives ................................................................................................. 12
4.2 Utility Services ......................................................................................... 12
4.3 Flood Pump Coordination ....................................................................... 13
5.0 ARC FLASH STUDY ..................................................................................... 15
5.1 Arc Flash Method ..................................................................................... 15
5.2 Arc Flash Results ..................................................................................... 15
5.3 Recommended Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) ......................... 17
6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 19
6.1 Phase 1 Required Work ........................................................................... 19
6.2 Phase 2 Recommendations..................................................................... 19
6.3 Additional Consideration......................................................................... 20
APPENDIX A : LIST OF ASSOCIATED DRAWINGS ........................................ A-1
APPENDIX B : MANITOBA HYDRO FAULT LEVEL REPORTS ....................... B-1
APPENDIX C : SKM INPUT DATA ..................................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D : ANSI FAULT SUMMARY ........................................................... D-1
113286-0179-47ER-0001 2 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX E : ARC FLASH OPTIONS ...............................................................E-1
APPENDIX F : ARC FLASH RESULTS (PHASE 1 MITIGATION) ..................... F-1
113286-0179-47ER-0001 3 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Roland Flood Pumping Station is located at 16 Watt Street on the east side of the Red
River. The pumping station is operated by the City of Winnipeg to provide additional
pumping capacity during high river levels. As excess flows can not flow by gravity during
high river levels, the flood pumping station is utilized to pump the excess flow, not handled
by the wastewater lift station, to the river.
Roland Flood Pumping Station is powered via a bank of three, single phase 150 kVA, City of
Winnipeg owned transformers, which are located in a vault. The pumping at the station is
comprised of two 150 HP pumps.
1.2 Objective
The City of Winnipeg’s flood pumping stations and wastewater lift stations utilize electrical
power, which is supplied by Manitoba Hydro and then distributed to various loads in the
facilities. City personnel are responsible for operating and maintaining the electrical
distribution equipment and must be provided safe working guidelines to perform work on or
near the equipment.
The purpose of an arc flash study is to identify and quantify potential arc flash hazards
associated with electrical distribution equipment, and establish safe working guidelines for
personnel. The safe working guidelines consist of identifying arc flash protection boundaries
and the personnel protective equipment (PPE) required for each piece of electrical
equipment. This information is identified on a label, which is to be applied to each piece of
electrical equipment.
The arc flash hazard analysis is performed in association with a short circuit study and
protection device coordination study. Results of the short circuit study are used to
determine the available fault current levels at each piece of equipment and results from the
coordination study determine the time required for the electrical circuit protective devices to
clear the fault condition. The results of these two studies are combined to calculate the
incident energy at assigned working positions from the electrical equipment and categorize
the arc flash hazard to determine the required PPE to provide adequate protection.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 4 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
1.3 Scope of Study
The scope of this study is to analyze the electrical distribution as detailed below:
• Investigate the facility to collect data regarding the electrical distribution, equipment
nameplate data, and existing protection settings.
• Create or update the electrical system single line diagram to accurately represent the
installed electrical system. The drawings will be in AutoCAD format, and transferred
to the City for ownership.
• Contact Manitoba Hydro for available utility fault current to the facility.
• Create a software model of the electrical distribution at the station, using the SKM
Power Tools software.
• Obtain or create software libraries for protective devices to be utilized in the model.
• Perform a short-circuit study to determine the available fault current at each relevant
point within the electrical distribution.
• Perform a coordination study to determine if the existing protection settings of the
main distribution breakers are adequate.
• Make recommendations regarding the electrical distribution configuration and
protection settings, where required to improve device coordination, or reduce arc
flash energies. These recommendations are provided in two phases. Phase 1
recommendations will include minor changes to protective device settings, which can
be implemented immediately. Phase 2 recommendations will be comprised of
upgrade work to the electrical distribution system.
• Perform an arc flash study to determine the existing potential arc energy levels at the
various distribution points, incorporating the proposed Phase 1 recommendations.
• Provide capital costs to perform equipment upgrades to lower fault energies where
necessary and practical.
• Provide arc flash labels for electrical equipment.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 5 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
2.0 METHOD OF STUDY
2.1 Standards
The study is based upon the guidelines specified in the following standards:
• IEEE-1584 – IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations
• NFPA-70E – Standard for Electrical Safety In the Workplace
• CSA-Z462 – Workplace Electrical Safety
• IEEE 242 – IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of
Industrial and Commercial Power Systems
• IEEE 141 – IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution for
Industrial Plants
2.2 System Model
The facility electrical distribution was modelled in software, to allow for software calculation
of the study results. This study utilizes software from SKM Systems Analysis Inc. (SKM
Power Tools Version 6.5.2.2 - Build 3) to perform the fault current calculations, to produce
the required protection coordination curves, and to calculate arc flash energy levels.
Following are the methods utilized in developing the system model.
2.2.1 Utility Contribution
The utility fault levels are provided by Manitoba Hydro at the primary terminals of the supply
transformers. Refer to Appendix B for the actual fault reports provided by Manitoba Hydro.
2.2.2 Feeder Conductors
Parameters used in modeling the feeder conductors include: cable type, size, length,
conductors per phase, conduit type (magnetic or nonmagnetic), and conductor material. All
data was based on available existing single line diagrams, site layout drawings, and visual
inspections.
2.2.3 Transformers
Parameters used in modeling the transformers include: transformer type, winding
connection, secondary neutral-ground connection, primary and secondary voltage rating,
kVA rating, and impedance. Transformer taps and phase shift were unknown and default
113286-0179-47ER-0001 6 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
values are used. Utility transformer data is based as per information provided by Manitoba
Hydro. City owned transformer data is based upon visible nameplates. Where transformer
impedance data is not available and cannot be determined from site inspections, values
from Table 1, in IEEE Std 242, are used.
2.2.4 Motor Contribution
This short circuit study takes into account the continuous sub-transient fault current
contribution of induction motors within the system. The large flood pumping motors are
modeled individually in order to accurately determine the motor’s fault current contribution.
Parameters used in the modeling of induction motors include: operating voltage,
horsepower, full-load amps, power factor, efficiency and RPM. Where data was not
available, default values (based on similar conditions found at another station) were used.
2.2.5 Assumptions
The following is a list of assumptions that were made about the electrical distribution:
• A Manitoba Hydro owned fused cutout (FDS-XFMR-F1) is feeding three 150 kVA
transformers. The size and rating of this fuse could not be obtained and is assumed
to be a Cooper T-tin, 140T fuse.
• A nominal transformer impedance of 2.29%, for XFMR-F1, was utilized based on
nameplate data. A minimum impedance of 2.06% was utilized based upon the
criterion that minimum impedances for City of Winnipeg owned transformers are
taken to be 10% less than the nominal impedance. Typical X/R transformer ratios
were utilized.
• CP-SPL-F1 is assumed to be 350 MCM, with a length of 1.8m.
• The flood pump motor cable size could not be confirmed through site investigations
as it is installed in rigid conduit and the exposed cable in the starters did not have
markings. The cable size utilized is based on an original electrical data sheet
provided by the City.
• The flood pump reduced voltage starters (autotransformer type) are assumed to limit
the starting inrush to less than 4.5x FLA.
• The power fail relay, RLY-F1, is assumed to contain 15A midget supplemental fuses
and fed via 12 AWG wire.
• Information on the CEFCO (30A) fuses (FDS-PU-F10 and FDS-FN-F1) found on site
could not be obtained. A similar Gould Shawmut NRS fuse was used in the model.
• Cable lengths were measured on site, however they can only be considered as
approximations with a tolerance of + 1.0m.
• The 25 kVA, 120/240V utility pole-top transformer is assumed to have an impedance
of 1.5% based on the Winnipeg Electrical By-Law No. 74/2009.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 7 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
• The cable from the 120/240V utility pole-top transformer is assumed to be 2 AWG,
aluminum to the pole mounted masthead and 78.7m long. The cable from the pole-
mounted masthead to PNL-F1, is assumed to be 1/0 AWG copper, and 12m long.
• A ground fault detection system is not present.
2.3 Configuration Scenarios
Worst case incident energy levels do not necessarily occur when fault current levels are the
highest. Circuit protection normally consists of a combination of time overcurrent and
instantaneous overcurrent where lower level fault currents can cause longer clearing times
that may result in higher incident energy levels. The additional clearing time may offset the
lower arcing current to produce higher incident energy and consequently a more hazardous
condition.
Therefore, different possible electrical distribution configuration scenarios must be analyzed
to determine which scenario produces the worst-case arc flash safety hazard and each
piece of electrical equipment must be categorized based on the worst-case result.
The following are the electrical distribution configurations at the flood pumping stations that
are analyzed as part of this study.
2.3.1 Scenario A – Baseline Fault Level (Normal Operation)
Scenario A is based upon a system configuration which would generate typical short circuit
fault levels. The system configuration includes:
• Normal utility fault level.
• Nominal utility transformer impedance.
• The pump motors are not operating.
2.3.2 Scenario B – Maximum Fault Level
Scenario B is based upon a system configuration which would generate maximum short
circuit fault levels. The system configuration includes:
• Maximum (horizon) utility fault level.
• Minimum utility transformer impedance (nominal – 10%)
• The pump motors are running.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 8 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
3.0 SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY
3.1 Short Circuit Calculation Method
A short circuit study is performed to determine the available fault levels for the major 600V,
240V and 208V busses within the pumping station’s electrical distribution. This study is
necessary in order to find the symmetrical RMS bolted fault current at each point of concern
in the electrical distribution, which is then used to calculate the arc fault current. Arc
currents are lower than bolted fault currents due to the arc impedance, however they can
persist longer than the full bolted fault depending on the protective device time current
curves. The results of this study are also used to ensure that interrupting current ratings of
the equipment exceeds the calculated maximum available fault current and in determining
selectivity and protection settings, as part of the coordination study.
The calculations were performed using the A_FAULT module from SKM Systems Analysis
Inc. This module follows the specifications of the ANSI standard C37.010, C37.5 and
C37.13 and IEEE Standard 141 (Red Book).
The short circuit calculations are based upon Scenario B, described in Section 2.3.2. Note
that the Winnipeg Electrical Bylaw requires that an infinite bus be assumed at the primary of
the utility transformer, when calculating short circuit currents for equipment ratings of new
construction. The requirement of this clause in the bylaw, is based upon the authority’s
desire to avoid the case where changes in the utility’s distribution system will cause
equipment within a customer’s facility to be incorrectly rated. However, in this case, the
installation is existing. By assuming a minimum transformer impedance and horizon utility
fault levels, the short circuit values produced in this study are deemed to be safe and
conservative, for evaluation of equipment ratings. However, for any new construction within
the facility, the requirement to assume an infinite utility bus would apply, which would
increase the short circuit currents and potentially the required equipment ratings.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 9 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
3.2 Utility Contribution
The following table is a summary of the available fault levels at the pumping station provided
by Manitoba Hydro. Refer to Appendix B for the official fault study report.
Normal Horizon
(Amps) (Amps)
3 Phase (L-L-L) 3359 3545
Single Phase – GND (S-L-G) 2241 2284
Pos. 2.7704 + j 3.0654 pu Pos. 2.7545 + j 2.9247 pu
System Impedances (ohms)
Zero. 5.7488 + j 8.6286 pu Zero. 5.7201 + j 8.5147 pu
Table 3-1: Roland Station - Manitoba Hydro Fault Level Summary
3.3 Short Circuit Fault Levels
The following table summarizes the calculated short circuit fault levels at the electrical
equipment in the flood pumping station. The fault levels presented are based on the
calculations for the maximum fault level scenario.
3P SLG
ID Description I SC I SC
X/R X/R
(Amps) (Amps)
XFMR-F1 Flood Pump Station – Incoming Transformer 13,393 2.9 0 1.0
SPL-F1 Flood Pump Station – Main Splitter 13,256 2.9 0 1.0
CB-P-F1 Flood Pump Station – P-F1 Circuit Breaker 13,148 2.9 0 1.0
CB-P-F2 Flood Pump Station – P-F2 Circuit Breaker 13,148 2.9 0 1.0
RLY-F1 Flood Pump Station - Power Fail Rely 11,905 1.8 0 1.0
Flood Pump Station – Dewatering Pump
FDS-PU-F10 12,380 2.1 0 1.0
Fused Disconnect Switch
Flood Pump Station – Fan Fused
FDS-FN-F1 12,381 2.1 0 1.0
Disconnect Switch
Flood Pump Station – Fused Disconnect
FDS-SPARE 12,380 2.1 0 1.0
Switch
MS-P-F1 Flood Pump Station – P-F1 Motor Starter 12,936 2.9 0 1.0
MS-P-F2 Flood Pump Station – P-F2 Motor Starter 12,936 2.9 0 1.0
Flood Pump Station – Dewatering Pump
MS-FN-F1 5,715 0.5 0 1.0
Starter
113286-0179-47ER-0001 10 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
3P SLG
ID Description I SC I SC
X/R X/R
(Amps) (Amps)
PNL-F20 Flood Pump Station - 120/240V Panelboard 3,863 0.8 3,436 0.8
Table 3-2: Roland Station - Short Circuit Currents
Notes:
1. Utility fault currents were not obtained for the 120/240 VAC service (PNL-F1). For the
120/240V service, the fault current calculated is based upon an assumed 1.5%
transformer impedance and an infinite utility bus.
The short circuit currents were compared against the interrupting ratings of the protective
equipment. In all cases, the existing equipment ratings exceeded the short circuit current,
except as noted below:
• The fuses in FDS-PU-F10, and FDS-FN-F1, are assumed to be Class H, which have
a 10KA interrupting rating. This fuse rating is below the available fault current. It is
recommended to investigate these fuses and replace the fuse/fused disconnect as
required to achieve sufficient interrupting capacity. For any new equipment, a
minimum 22KA interrupting rating is recommended.
• The power fail relay, RLY-F1, is assumed to be protected by 15A midget fuses,
which have a 10KA interrupting rating. The fault current is above this rating
therefore, it is recommended to install appropriately rated branch circuit protection
upstream of the power fail relay.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 11 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
4.0 COORDINATION STUDY
4.1 Objectives
A review of the protection settings is performed to ensure that protection devices are set
properly for the supplied loads, and to minimize arc flash and potential equipment damage in
the event that a fault occurs.
There are three main objectives, in order of priority, to the selective coordination of
overcurrent protection devices:
• The first objective is life safety. If reasonable, protective devices should be set at the
lowest possible setting that allows normal operation of the connected loads. In the
event that a fault does occur, lower protection settings will often provide faster pickup
of the fault condition, and consequently reduce the resultant arc fault energy levels.
• The second objective is equipment protection. Protection requirements are met if
overcurrent devices are set above load operating levels and below equipment
damage curves. This allows normal operation without causing nuisance trips while
still protecting equipment against damage should a fault occur.
• The third objective is selective coordination. Where possible, overcurrent protection
devices are coordinated such that in the event of a fault, the smallest possible
distribution area is removed from service.
Often it is impossible to meet all three objectives because they have conflicting
requirements. In order to reduce arc flash energies, protection settings must be set to
pickup as fast as possible and clear the fault quickly. However, coordinating upstream
breakers with downstream breakers is often achieved by introducing time delays in the
upstream breakers to allow the downstream breakers time to trip first. This results in longer
fault clearing times for the upstream equipment and increased arc fault energies.
This study attempts to meet all three objectives, but where it is not possible, life safety and
equipment protection requirements take precedence.
4.2 Utility Services
Currently, Roland Flood Pumping Station has two utility services. A 600V service powers
the pumps and a 120/240V service powers miscellaneous loads including lighting and pump
controls. The 600V service is dedicated to the pumping station, but the 120/240V service is
shared with nearby residential customers. It is possible, although not a frequent situation,
that an event on a nearby residential property could cause the 120/240V utility transformer
fuse to blow, resulting in a power failure for the pumping station 120/240V loads.
It is also noted that the 600V distribution system is a delta connected system and no ground
fault detection device is installed. As per CEC 10-106(2), ungrounded (delta) systems
113286-0179-47ER-0001 12 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
require a suitable ground detection device to indicate the presences of a ground fault. A
ground fault detection device would allow maintenance electricians to identify that a ground
fault has occurred, and make repairs before a second ground fault takes place. Should a
second ground fault occur on a different phase from the first, there is the possibility of
disruption in station operation due to an overcurrent device opening. In some installations, a
simple three-light ground fault detection system is utilized. However, give that this facility is
unmanned, it is recommended to provide ground fault alarming through the SCADA system.
Alternatively, the 4160V-600V transformer could be replaced with a delta-wye transformer,
which does not require ground fault detection.
4.2.1 Proposed Phase 1
No work is proposed as part of Phase 1.
4.2.2 Proposed Phase 2
It is recommended that the City modify the electrical distribution and install a 120/240V
transformer to feed PNL-F20 from the 600V service.
4.3 Flood Pump Coordination
4.3.1 Existing
The selective coordination of the protective devices associated with the flood pumps was
accessed. The existing time current curves are shown in Figure 4-1.
4.3.2 Proposed Phase 1
There are no proposed Phase 1 changes to the protective device configuration of the flood
pump.
4.3.3 Proposed Phase 2
There are no proposed Phase 2 changes to the protective device configuration of the flood
pump.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 13 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
100K
10K
100
1K
10
1000
XFMR-F1
FDS-UTIL
COOPER
T-Tin Fuse Link, 27kV
Trip 140.0 A
Settings Phase
140.0 Amps
100
XFMR-F1
10 Damage Curve 3 Phase + SLG
TIME IN SECONDS
CB-P1-D
KLOCKNER
UTILITY NZM 9
Trip 200.0 A
FDS-UTIL
Settings Phase
LTD
INST 12.0 (2400A)
P
XFMR-F1
1 S
CP-SPL-F1 MTR-P1
150.0 hp
FLA 160.0 A
SPL-F1
CP-CB-P1
CB-P1
TX Inrush
0.10 CB-P1-D
CP-MS-P1
MS-P1
CP-P1
MTR-P1
0.01
100K
10K
100
1K
10
CURRENT IN AMPERES
TCC Name: Flood Pump Current Scale x 1 Reference Voltage: 600
Scenario: Existing
Figure 4-1 - Roland Flood Pump - Existing TCC Curve
113286-0179-47ER-0001 14 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
5.0 ARC FLASH STUDY
5.1 Arc Flash Method
The arc flash calculations are calculated utilizing
• The arc flash analysis methodology is based on IEEE Standard 1584-2002.
• The arc flash results are based on worst case incident energies calculated from the
scenarios established in Section 2.3.
The results of the arc flash study are based on the available fault currents calculated at each
piece of equipment and the coordination study results which determine the time required for
the electrical circuit protective devices to clear the fault condition. The worst case arc flash
energies calculated from the two scenarios identified in section 2.3 were used to classify the
arc flash hazard for each piece of equipment.
Safe working guidelines and recommended personnel protective equipment (PPE) required
for each arc flash category are given.
5.1.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions were used in the arc flash analysis:
• Electrical equipment, 240V and less, that is fed from a single transformer less than
125 kVA is assumed to have a classification of Category 0, as per IEEE Std 1584.
• The maximum arcing time duration is 2 seconds for incident energy calculations as
per IEEE Std 1584. This is a reasonable time to expect a person exposed to an arc
flash to move away from the location.
• The cleared fault threshold is 80% of the total arcing fault current. In other words, for
busses with multiple sources of fault current, the fault is considered cleared when
protection devices have clear 80% of the total arcing fault.
• Low voltage arc fault tolerances are defined as -15% and 0% as per IEEE Std 1584.
Incident energies are calculated at the low and high tolerances to account for arcing
fault current variability which can produce varying protection trip times. The largest
incident energy is reported.
5.2 Arc Flash Results
The following arc flash results are based on a system model configured with the proposed
Phase 1 settings. The arc flash levels were considered while developing the proposed
settings, and arc flash energies are set as low as possible without compromising facility
113286-0179-47ER-0001 15 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
operation. As described in Section 2.3, the presented incident energy is the higher of two
scenarios analyzed. The arc flash results can be summarized as follows:
• All 600V distribution equipment at or prior to the first protective device is a
Dangerous arc flash hazard. No protective equipment will protect the worker in the
event of as fault. Energized electrical work should be prohibited.
Incident Hazard/
ID Description Energy Risk
2
(cal/cm ) Category
XFMR-F1 Flood Pump Station – Incoming Transformer 54.9 Dangerous!
SPL-F1 Flood Pump Station – Main Splitter 55.5 Dangerous!
CB-P-F1 Flood Pump Station – P-F1 Circuit Breaker 55.9 Dangerous!
CB-P-F2 Flood Pump Station – P-F2 Circuit Breaker 55.9 Dangerous!
RLY-F1 Flood Pump Station - Power Fail Relay 58.2 Dangerous!
Flood Pump Station – Dewatering Pump Fused
FDS-PU-F10 59.1 Dangerous!
Disconnect Switch
Flood Pump Station – Fan Fused Disconnect
FDS-FN-F1 59.1 Dangerous!
Switch
FDS-SPARE Flood Pump Station – Fused Disconnect Switch 59.1 Dangerous!
MS-P-F1 Flood Pump Station – P-F1 Motor Starter 0.4 Category 0
MS-P-F2 Flood Pump Station – P-F2 Motor Starter 0.4 Category 0
MS-FN-F1 Flood Pump Station – Dewatering Pump Starter 0.2 Category 0
PNL-F20 Flood Pump Station - 120/240V Panelboard Note 1 Category 0
Table 5-1: Roland Station - Arc Flash Hazard Classification
Note:
1. The transformer hazard/risk category is based on the higher of the primary or
secondary energy levels. In this case the utility pole-top transformer voltage is
240 volts or less, and the transformer size is less than 125 kVA, thus the
transformer secondary hazard/risk category is Category 0, along with any
downstream equipment.
5.2.1 Proposed Phase 2 Mitigation
It is recommended that a main incoming breaker that offers adjustable LSI trip settings be
introduced into the existing distribution in order to reduce the dangerous arc flash hazard
seen by most of the equipment within the flood pump station. A new distribution panel,
113286-0179-47ER-0001 16 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
which also addresses the interrupting ratings of the fused disconnects, as discussed in
Section 3.3, is recommended. Appropriate settings to provide protection, coordination and
lowest possible arc flash energies would be determined as part of detailed design.
5.3 Recommended Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
The following is a summary of the personal protective equipment recommended by CSA
Z462-08 for each hazard category. Refer to the CSA Z462-08 standard for more detailed
information.
Category 0 PPE requirements:
• Natural fibre long sleeve shirt and pants (no synthetic shirts, pants, or
undergarments)
• Safety glasses or safety goggles
• Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)
• Leather gloves as needed (optional)
Category 1 PPE requirements:
• Arc-rated long sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall (minimum arc rating of 4
cal/cm2)
• Hard hat with arc-rated face shield or arc flash suit hood (minimum arc rating of 4
cal/cm2)
• Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear as needed
• Safety glasses or safety goggles
• Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)
• Leather gloves
• CSA approved safety boots with dielectric rating and leather uppers as needed (for
work with exposed live conductors)
Category 2 PPE requirements:
• Arc-rated long sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall (minimum arc rating of 8
cal/cm2)
• Hard hat with arc-rated face shield or arc flash suit hood (minimum arc rating of 8
cal/cm2)
• Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear as needed
• Safety glasses or safety goggles
• Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)
113286-0179-47ER-0001 17 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
• Leather gloves
• CSA approved safety boots with dielectric rating and leather uppers
Category 3 PPE requirements:
• Total FR clothing system and hood (minimum arc rating of 25 cal/cm2)
• Hard hat
• Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)
• Arc flash rated gloves
• CSA approved safety boots with dielectric rating and leather uppers
Rubber gloves with leather protectors are required for work near exposed energized
conductors. Ensure that the rubber gloves are voltage rated to a minimum of 1000V. Non-
rated rubber gloves should not be used around electrical equipment as the perceived safety
may not be provided.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 18 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Phase 1 Required Work
The following work is required to achieve the goals set forth in this study:
• Apply the arc flash labels provided as part of this study.
• Attach new identification lamacoids to equipment, as noted on the single line
drawing.
6.1.1 Cost Estimate
A cost estimate for the Phase 1 work is shown below:
Description Cost
New identification lamacoids $ 100
Total $ 100
Notes:
1. It is assumed that the work will be performed by City forces, and thus no cost
allowance for labour or field materials has been included.
6.2 Phase 2 Recommendations
It is recommended that the City initiate a project to perform the following additional work.
Note that the provided arc flash stickers do not include these Phase 2 recommendations,
and updated arc flash stickers will be required as part of the proposed Phase 2 work.
1. Install a new 600V distribution panel with a main incoming breaker that offers
adjustable LSI trip settings. Appropriate settings to provide protection, coordination
and lowest possible arc flash energies will have to be determined.
2. Replace the separate 120/240V service with a 600V-120/240V dry type transformer
within the station.
3. Replace the existing vault containing three transformers with a single delta-wye
padmount transformer.
4. If the ungrounded 600V system is retained, install a ground fault detection system
with a connected SCADA alarm.
5. Replace overcurrent protection for the power fail relay.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 19 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
6.2.1 Cost Estimate
A cost estimate for the proposed Phase 2 work is shown below:
Description Cost
Replace pumping station electrical distribution $ 65,000
Replace the separate 120/240V service with a transformer $ 8,000
Replace the transformer vault with a padmount transformer Note 2
Install ground fault detection system Note 3
Indirect Costs $ 6,000
Total $ 79,000
1. The above cost estimate is a Class C estimate and includes contractor costs
only.
2. The costs for a padmount transformer are highly dependent upon the
configuration and whether the transformer is utility owned. Thus, no costs are
provided. It is recommended that the City initiate a preliminary design project to
prepare a preliminary design and cost estimate.
3. A ground fault detection system is only required if the 4160V-600V transformers
are retained. Approximate cost would be $5000.
6.3 Additional Consideration
The flood pump motor starters (MS-P-F1, MS-P-F2) were installed in the 1950’s and are
obsolete. Therefore, due to age, it is recommended to consider replacement with a modern
reduced voltage starter. However, this upgrade is not related to arc flash mitigation or
selective coordination and thus is only offered as potential related work.
113286-0179-47ER-0001 20 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX A : LIST OF ASSOCIATED DRAWINGS
Drawing Number Title
1-0179F-E0001 Single Line Diagram
113286-0179-47ER-0001 A-1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX B : MANITOBA HYDRO FAULT LEVEL
REPORTS
113286-0179-47ER-0001 B-1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX C : SKM INPUT DATA
ALL PU VALUES ARE EXPRESSED ON A 100 MVA BASE.
FEEDER INPUT DATA
===============================================================================================================
CABLE FEEDER FROM FEEDER TO QTY VOLTS LENGTH FEEDER
NAME NAME NAME /PH L-L SIZE TYPE
===============================================================================================================
CP-CB-P-F1 SPL-F1 CB-P-F1 1 600 0.914 METER 3/0 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 0.2641 + J 0.1703 Ohms/1000 m 0.0671 + J 0.0433 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.8323 + J 0.4193 Ohms/1000 m 0.2114 + J 0.1065 PU
CP-CB-P-F2 SPL-F1 CB-P-F2 1 600 0.914 METER 3/0 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 0.2641 + J 0.1703 Ohms/1000 m 0.0671 + J 0.0433 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.8323 + J 0.4193 Ohms/1000 m 0.2114 + J 0.1065 PU
CP-FDS-FN-F1 SPL-F1 FDS-FN-F1 1 600 0.914 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 0.9833 + J 0.0712 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 3.10 + J 0.1753 PU
CP-FDS-PU-F10 SPL-F1 FDS-PU-F10 1 600 0.914 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 0.9833 + J 0.0712 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 3.10 + J 0.1753 PU
CP-FN-F1 MS-FN-F1 BUS-0046 1 600 2.0 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 2.15 + J 0.1557 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 6.78 + J 0.3833 PU
CP-MS-FN-F1 FDS-FN-F1 MS-FN-F1 1 600 10.3 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 11.14 + J 0.8066 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 35.12 + J 1.99 PU
CP-MS-P-F1 CB-P-F1 MS-P-F1 1 600 1.8 METER 3/0 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 0.2641 + J 0.1703 Ohms/1000 m 0.1342 + J 0.0865 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.8323 + J 0.4193 Ohms/1000 m 0.4228 + J 0.2130 PU
CP-MS-P-F2 CB-P-F2 MS-P-F2 1 600 1.8 METER 3/0 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 0.2641 + J 0.1703 Ohms/1000 m 0.1342 + J 0.0865 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.8323 + J 0.4193 Ohms/1000 m 0.4228 + J 0.2130 PU
CP-MS-PU-F10 FDS-PU-F10 MS-PU-F10 1 600 0.914 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 0.9833 + J 0.0712 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 3.10 + J 0.1753 PU
FEEDER INPUT DATA
===============================================================================================================
CABLE FEEDER FROM FEEDER TO QTY VOLTS LENGTH FEEDER
NAME NAME NAME /PH L-L SIZE TYPE
===============================================================================================================
CP-P-F1 MS-P-F1 BUS-0011 1 600 4.2 METER 3/0 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 0.2641 + J 0.1703 Ohms/1000 m 0.3131 + J 0.2018 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.8323 + J 0.4193 Ohms/1000 m 0.9866 + J 0.4970 PU
CP-P-F2 MS-P-F2 BUS-0012 1 600 4.2 METER 3/0 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THHN
+/- Impedance: 0.2641 + J 0.1703 Ohms/1000 m 0.3131 + J 0.2018 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.8323 + J 0.4193 Ohms/1000 m 0.9866 + J 0.4970 PU
CP-PNL-F20-1 BUS-0033 MASTHEAD 1 240 15.0 METER 2 Aluminum
Duct Material: Non-Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THWN
+/- Impedance: 1.10 + J 0.1214 Ohms/1000 m 28.62 + J 3.16 PU
Z0 Impedance: 1.75 + J 0.3089 Ohms/1000 m 45.50 + J 8.04 PU
CP-PNL-F20-2 MASTHEAD PNL-F20 1 240 12.0 METER 1/0 Copper
Duct Material: Non-Magnetic Insulation Type: Insulation Class: THWN
+/- Impedance: 0.4167 + J 0.1417 Ohms/1000 m 8.68 + J 2.95 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.6624 + J 0.3606 Ohms/1000 m 13.80 + J 7.51 PU
CP-PU-F10 MS-PU-F10 BUS-0035 1 600 2.0 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 2.15 + J 0.1557 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 6.78 + J 0.3833 PU
CP-RLY-F1 SPL-F1 RLY-F1 1 600 0.914 METER 12 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 6.14 + J 0.2986 Ohms/1000 m 1.56 + J 0.0758 PU
113286-0179-47ER-0001 C-1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
Z0 Impedance: 19.34 + J 0.7352 Ohms/1000 m 4.91 + J 0.1867 PU
CP-SPARE SPL-F1 FDS-SPARE 1 600 0.914 METER 10 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 3.87 + J 0.2802 Ohms/1000 m 0.9833 + J 0.0712 PU
Z0 Impedance: 12.20 + J 0.6900 Ohms/1000 m 3.10 + J 0.1753 PU
CP-SPL-F1 XFMR-F1-S SPL-F1 1 600 1.8 METER 350 Copper
Duct Material: Magnetic Insulation Type: PVC Insulation Class: TW
+/- Impedance: 0.1240 + J 0.1611 Ohms/1000 m 0.0620 + J 0.0806 PU
Z0 Impedance: 0.3907 + J 0.3967 Ohms/1000 m 0.1954 + J 0.1984 PU
TRANSFORMER INPUT DATA
=============================================================================================
TRANSFORMER PRIMARY RECORD VOLTS * SECONDARY RECORD VOLTS FULL-LOAD NOMINAL
NAME NO NAME L-L NO NAME L-L KVA KVA
=============================================================================================
XFMR-F1 XFMR-F1-P Y 4160.00 XFMR-F1-S D 600.00 450.00 450.00
Pos. Seq. Z%: 1.07 + J 4.88 (Zpu 2.37 + j 10.85 ) Shell Type
Zero Seq. Z%: 9999. + J 9999. (Pri Open, Sec Open)
Taps Pri. 0.000 % Sec. 0.000 % Phase Shift (Pri. Leading Sec.): -30.0 Deg.
XFMR-F2 BUS-0032 YG 4160.00 BUS-0033 YG 240.00 43.30 43.30
Pos. Seq. Z%: 0.491 + J 1.42 (Zpu 11.35 + j 32.73 ) Shell Type
Zero Seq. Z%: 0.491 + J 1.42 ( Pri - Sec: 11.35 + j 32.73 )
Taps Pri. 0.000 % Sec. 0.000 % Phase Shift (Pri. Leading Sec.): 0.000 Deg.
GENERATION CONTRIBUTION DATA
=====================================================================================
BUS CONTRIBUTION VOLTAGE
NAME NAME L-L MVA X"d X/R
=====================================================================================
BUS-0032 UTILITY-120/24 4160.00 5177.59
Three Phase Contribution: 718577. AMPS 1.74
Single Line to Ground Contribution: 484783. AMPS 0.9360
Pos Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 0.0096 + J 0.0167 PU
Zero Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 0.0435 + J 0.0252 PU
XFMR-F1-P UTILITY 4160.00 24.20
Three Phase Contribution: 3358.97 AMPS 1.11
Single Line to Ground Contribution: 2240.64 AMPS 1.31
Pos Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 2.77 + J 3.07 PU
Zero Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 5.75 + J 8.63 PU
MOTOR CONTRIBUTION DATA
=====================================================================================
BUS CONTRIBUTION VOLTAGE BASE Motor
NAME NAME L-L kVA X"d X/R Number
=====================================================================================
BUS-0011 MTR-P-F1 600 166.89 0.1692 10.0 1.00
Pos Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 10.14 + j 101.38 PU
BUS-0012 MTR-P-F2 600 166.89 0.1692 10.0 1.00
Pos Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 10.14 + j 101.38 PU
BUS-0046 MTR-FN-F1 600 1.14 0.1692 10.0 1.00
Pos Sequence Impedance (100 MVA Base) 1480.20 + j 14802.0 PU
113286-0179-47ER-0001 C-2 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX D : ANSI FAULT SUMMARY
F A U L T S T U D Y S U M M A R Y
(FOR APPLICATION OF LOW VOLTAGE BREAKERS)
PRE FAULT VOLTAGE: 1.0000
MODEL TRANSFORMER TAPS: NO
BUS RECORD VOLTAGE A V A I L A B L E F A U L T D U T I E S (KA)
NO NAME L-L 3 PHASE X/R LINE/GRND X/R
==============================================================================
CB-P-F1 600. 13.148 2.91 0.000 1.00
CB-P-F2 600. 13.148 2.91 0.000 1.00
FDS-FN-F1 600. 12.381 2.06 0.000 1.00
FDS-PU-F10 600. 12.380 2.06 0.000 1.00
FDS-SPARE 600. 12.380 2.06 0.000 1.00
MASTHEAD 240. 4.476 0.90 4.072 0.82
MS-FN-F1 600. 5.715 0.52 0.000 1.00
MS-P-F1 600. 12.936 2.85 0.000 1.00
MS-P-F2 600. 12.936 2.85 0.000 1.00
MS-PU-F10 600. 11.495 1.59 0.000 1.00
PNL-F20 240. 3.863 0.80 3.436 0.75
RLY-F1 600. 11.905 1.75 0.000 1.00
SPL-F1 600. 13.256 2.94 0.000 1.00
XFMR-F1-P 4160. 3.658 1.45 2.337 1.47
XFMR-F1-S 600. 13.393 2.93 0.000 1.00
113286-0179-47ER-0001 D-1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX E : ARC FLASH OPTIONS
Standard IEEE 1584 - 2002/2004a Edition
Unit Metric
Flash Boundary Calculation Adjustments
Equipment above 1 kV and Trip Time <= 0.1 seconds, use 1.5 cal/cm^2 (6.276 J/cm^2) for flash boundary calculation
Equipment 240 V and Below
Report calculated incident energy values from equations
Short Circuit Options
Include Transformer Tap Yes Pre-Fault Option No Load with Tap
Include Transformer Phase Shift No Define Grounded as SLG/3P Fault >= 5%
Include Induction Motor Contribution 5.0 cycles Current Limiting Fuse Specified in library
Reduce Generator/Synch. Motor Contribution to Do not represent generator and synchronous motor decay
Line Side Incident Energy Calculation Include line side + load side fault contributions
Recalculate Trip Time Using Reduced Current No Mis-Coordination Levels to search 1
Use Arc Flash Equations for Breakers and Fuses Yes Mis-Coordination Ratio 80%
Report Options
Report Option Bus Report Arcing Fault Tolerance
Label and Summary View Report Main Device Low Voltage In Box (-15%) 0%
Check Upstream Device for Mis-Coordination Yes Low Voltage Open Air (-15%) 0%
Cleared Fault Threshold 80.00% HV/MV In Box 0% 0%
Max Arcing Duration 2 seconds HV/MV Open Air 0% 0%
Increase PPE Category by 1 for high marginal IE No
113286-0179-47ER-0001 E-1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
APPENDIX F : ARC FLASH RESULTS (PHASE 1
MITIGATION)
Prot Prot Required
Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Dev Dev Trip/ Breaker Equip Gap Arc Flash Working Incident Protective
FR Clothing
Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Boundary Distance Energy Category
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time (mm) (mm) (cal/cm2)
(kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.)
FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
CB-P-F1 F1 0.600 13.2 8.6 11.4 7.44 1.753 0 PNL 25 4764 457 55.9 (*N3) (*S3)
FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
CB-P-F2 F1 0.600 13.2 8.6 11.4 7.44 1.753 0 PNL 25 4764 457 55.9 (*N3) (*S3)
FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
FDS-FN-F1 F1 0.600 12.4 8.13 10.7 7.04 1.959 0 PNL 25 4926 457 59.1 (*N3) (*S3)
FDS-PU- FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
F10 F1 0.600 12.4 8.13 10.7 7.04 1.959 0 PNL 25 4926 457 59.1 (*N3) (*S3)
FDS- FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
SPARE F1 0.600 12.4 8.13 10.7 7.04 1.959 0 PNL 25 4926 457 59.1 (*N3) (*S3)
Category 0
MaxTripTime (*N2) (*N9)
MASTHEAD @2.0s 0.240 4.48 2.56 4.48 2.56 2 0 PNL 25 458 457 1.2 (*N15) (*S3)
FDS-FN-F1- Category 0
MS-FN-F1 D 0.600 5.71 4.69 5.71 4.69 0.01 0 PNL 25 149 457 0.2 (*S3)
Category 0
MS-P-F1 CB-P-F1-D 0.600 12.9 9.96 12.1 9.28 0.01 0 PNL 25 245 457 0.4 (*S3)
Category 0
MS-P-F2 CB-P-F2-D 0.600 12.9 9.96 12.1 9.28 0.01 0 PNL 25 245 457 0.4 (*S3)
Dangerous!
MaxTripTime (*N2) (*N9)
MS-PU-F10 @2.0s 0.600 7.72 6.19 7.72 6.19 2 0 PNL 25 4518 457 51.3 (*S2)
Category 0
(*N9)
PNL-F20 CB-PNL-F20 0.240 3.86 2.3 3.86 2.3 2 0 PNL 25 458 457 1.2 (*N15) (*S3)
Dangerous!
FDS-XFMR- (*N3) (*N9)
RLY-F1 F1 0.600 11.9 7.84 10.3 6.79 2 0 PNL 25 4881 457 58.2 (*S3)
FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
SPL-F1 F1 0.600 13.3 8.66 11.5 7.5 1.725 0 PNL 25 4741 457 55.5 (*N3) (*S3)
FDS-XFMR- Dangerous!
XFMR-F1 F1 0.600 13.39 8.74 11.61 7.58 1.687 0 PNL 25 4711 457 54.9 (*N3) (*S3)
FDS-XFMR- Category 0
XFMR-F1-P F1 4.160 3.66 3.61 3.45 3.41 0.197 0 SWG 104 542 914 0.7 (*S3)
(*N2) <
80%
Category 0: Cleared
Untreated 0.0 - 1.2 #Cat 0 = Fault
Cotton cal/cm^2 6 Threshold
(*N3) -
Arcing
Category 1: Current Low
FR Shirt & 1.2 - 4.0 #Cat 1 = Tolerances
Pants cal/cm^2 0 Used
Category 2:
Cotton (*N9) - Max
Underwear Arcing
+ FR Shirt & 4.0 - 8.0 #Cat 2 = Duration
Pants cal/cm^2 0 Reached
113286-0179-47ER-0001 F-1 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
Prot Prot Required
Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Dev Dev Trip/ Breaker Equip Gap Arc Flash Working Incident Protective
FR Clothing
Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Boundary Distance Energy Category
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time (mm) (mm) (cal/cm2)
(kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.)
(*N15) -
Category 3: Report as
Cotton category 0 if
Underwear fed by one
+ FR Shirt & transformer
Pant + FR 8.0 - 25.0 #Cat 3 = size < 125
Coverall cal/cm^2 0 kVA
Category 4:
Cotton
Underwear
+ FR Shirt &
Pant + Multi
Layer Flash 25.0 - 40.0 #Cat 4 =
Suit cal/cm^2 0
IEEE 1584 -
2002/2004a
Edition Bus
Report
(80%
Cleared
Category Fault
Dangerous!: Threshold,
No FR mis-
Category 40.0 - 999.0 #Danger coordination
Found cal/cm^2 =9 checked
(*S2) -
Worst Baseline
Case Fault Level
(*S3) -
Maximum
Fault Level
113286-0179-47ER-0001 F-2 Roland Flood Pumping Station
Arc Flash Study
CABLE JOINTS, CABLE TERMINATIONS, CABLE GLANDS, CABLE CLEATS
FEEDER PILLARS, FUSE LINKS, ARC FLASH, CABLE ROLLERS, CUT-OUTS
11KV 33KV CABLE JOINTS & CABLE TERMINATIONS
FURSE EARTHING
www.cablejoints.co.uk
Thorne and Derrick UK
Tel 0044 191 490 1547 Fax 0044 191 477 5371
Tel 0044 117 977 4647 Fax 0044 117 9775582
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
White Paper
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
By:
H. Wallace Tinsley III
Member, IEEE
Eaton Electrical
130 Commonwealth Drive
Warrendale, PA 15086
Michael Hodder
Member, IEEE
Eaton Electrical
4120B Sladeview Cres
Mississauga, ON L5L 5Z3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract .................................................................... 1
I. Introduction .......................................................... 2
A. Standards
B. Arc Flash Analysis
II. Generalization of Arc Flash .............................. 3
A. Fault Magnitudes
B. Constant Energy
C. Overcurrent Device Responses
III. Time, Current, & Energy Relationship ........... 6
A. Relationship Equations
B. Software Application
IV. System Models & Analysis .............................. 11
A. Data Collection
B. Unbalanced Faults
C. Analysis Philosophy
V. Considerations & Solutions ............................... 12
VI. Conclusions ........................................................ 12
Acknowledgement ................................................. 13
References ............................................................... 13
Presented at the 2004 IEEE IAS Pulp and Paper Industry Conference in Victoria, BC: © IEEE 2004 - Personal use of this material is permitted.
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
ABSTRACT
Recent efforts to quantify the dangers
associated with potential arc flash hazards
rely on overcurrent protection to remove a
given fault condition. The effectiveness of
various devices is determined by a clearing
time related to the maximum available
fault current for each system location. As
industrial and commercial facilities begin to
embrace arc flash labeling procedures and
begin to recognize arc flash prevention as
a part of a complete safety program, the
current method of calculation will allow them
to quantify the incident energy ( cal/cm2 )
associated with a maximum, three-phase
fault condition. Most faults produce
current magnitudes less than the three-
phase maximum. This paper will consider
fault current magnitudes less than that
of the maximum, threephase condition
and discuss the resulting calculations for
incident energy across the range of cur-
rent magnitudes. Under these additional
scenarios, the performance of various
overcurrent protection devices will be
demonstrated. Associated considerations
for design, modeling, and maintenance
will be presented.
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 1
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
I. INTRODUCTION
Extensive research and experimentation have led to B. Arc Flash Analysis
the development of detailed calculation methods for
determining the magnitude and intensity of Arc Flash The Arc Flash analysis requires the completion of a
Hazards. These methods have been presented in IEEE Short Circuit Study and a Coordination Study. The
Standard 1584™– 2002 and the NFPA 70E – 2000 results of the Arc Flash calculations are based on the
Edition. Recommended practice now requires that calculated values of fault current magnitudes found
the incident energy due to an Arc Flash be quantiied in the short circuit study and the associated
at each system location potentially accessed by clearing times of overcurrent protection devices
authorized personnel while the equipment is as determined by the coordination study.
energized.
The goal of this type of analysis is to determine the
This requirement suggests the need for a thoughtful incident energy potentially present during an arc
understanding of the power system and the meth- lash event. The magnitude of the incident energy is
ods of calculation. This paper provides a framework calculated on the basis of the available fault current,
of considerations on which to base the methods of the clearing time of associated system protection,
calculation presented in the most current standards. and the physical parameters of the system location.
These considerations include worstcase scenarios, Associated with this calculation is the determination
data collection for analysis, design concerns, and of an approach distance within which the incident
maintenance. energy level is above 1.2 cal/cm2 . “Appropriate Per-
sonal Protection Equipment (PPE) shall be used when
working on or near energized equipment within the
A. Standards
lash protection boundary.”[1]
NFPA 70E-2000 Edition, Table 3-3.9.1 requires facil-
ity personnel to wear Personal Protective Equipment The results of the approach boundary and incident
(PPE) when performing various tasks in locations energy calculations may be displayed in labels
susceptible to potential Arc Flash Hazards.[1] These on equipment enclosures to inform and direct
requirements are mandated on the basis of ield facility personnel with respect to the potential arc
experience and are categorized by associated voltage lash hazard.
levels. The Hazard/Risk Category is determined by the
nature of the work to be completed, the operating
voltage, and the available short circuit current for that
general location in the electrical distribution system.
The Hazard/Risk Category refers to the appropriate
protective clothing and personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) to be utilized.
In 2002, the IEEE reported the results of extensive
laboratory experiments and calculations. IEEE
Standard 1584™– 2002 describes the procedures
and provides direction for an accurate means of
determining a safe Arc Flash Boundary and
associated Hazard Level.
The basis for this method is experimental data
recorded from simulated arcs corresponding to bolt-
ed, three-phase fault current magnitudes measured
at the terminals of an experimental enclosure.
2 www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash Index Terms – Constant Energy C-Line, Arc Flash Hazard,Unbalanced Faults, Worst-Case Scenario
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
II. GENERALIZATION OF ARC FLASH
For proper evaluation of a power system with respect conditions, one must relate potential fault magni-
to potential Arc Flash hazards, accurate generalization tudes to the clearing time associated with various
of these hazards is imperative to describe the overcurrent devices.
worst-case scenario. To understand the worst-case
Figures 1 & 2
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 3
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
A. Fault Magnitudes
IEEE Standard 1584™– 2002 cautions, “it is important
to determine the available short–circuit current for
modes of operation that provide both the maximum
and the minimum available short-circuit currents.”[2]
The importance of this statement is demonstrated
when an off-peak maintenance scenario is compared
with the full load operating condition. A hazardous
arc lash condition may arise from various causes,
and often occurs during maintenance. Maintenance
tasks are often performed at times when the facility
and/or its processes are not fully operational.
Although the power system is energized, some of
the contributing motor loads may be shut down.
Therefore, during maintenance operations, when
the propensity for arc lash conditions is high, the
available fault current may be signiicantly lower
than the calculated maximum.
To demonstrate the effect of various scenarios, we
have modeled a sample system that represents three
facilities that are supplied by a single utility substa-
tion. A portion of this system is shown in Figures 1
and 2. In the Figure 1, all contributing motors are in
service and the utility contribution is at a maximum.
In Figure 2, the low voltage motors have been
reduced to 10% of full-load and the medium voltage
motors have been removed. The same is true for the
adjacent neighbors and the total fault contribution at
a typical 480V substation is signiicantly decreased.
The magnitude of the available bolted fault current
is decreased from Figure 1 to Figure 2 by approxi-
mately 30%. The arcing current is also reduced by Figure 3
approximately 30% between the two igures. For the
calculation of incident energy, we should consider the
range deined by this minimum calculation and this For a given location, there exists a series of potential
maximum calculation for any given location. arcing fault current magnitudes and theoretical
clearing times for which incident energy remains
B. Constant Energy constant. Several of these series are shown in Figure
3. On a log-log plot, these combinations of constant
By the method presented in IEEE Standard 1584™ energy points with respect to time and current
– 2002, incident energy (E) is calculated for speciic appear as a linear line segments. For a typical low-
system locations. This calculated value of energy is voltage, grounded, enclosed substation, these
determined by the physical environment at the given selected lines correspond to the PPE classes outlined
location and the duration of a previously calculated in IEEE Standard 1584™– 2002. The lowest line shown
magnitude of arcing fault current. The duration of the in Figure 3 represents a constant energy of 1.2 cal/cm2 .
fault condition is dependent on the clearing time of This corresponds to the upper limit of PPE Class 0.
the upstream overcurrent protection. This clearing The uppermost line represents the maximum value
time is determined by the actual magnitude of of 40 cal/cm2 for which PPE Class 4 provides suficient
arcing fault current for a given occurrence. protection. Above this line, no PPE class has been
4 www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
C. Overcurrent Device Responses
For the majority of system locations that are
protected by a fuse, the minimum available arcing
fault current is the basis of the worst-case calculation
for incident energy. (See Figure 4.)
For a system location protected by a circuit breaker,
the worstcase calculations vary with the regions of
the clearing characteristic. When the considered range
of fault current magnitudes falls completely within
any region of the timecurrent curve (TCC) across
which the time remains constant, the maximum
available fault current will result in the calculation of
the worst-case incident energy. Such regions include
deinite-time relays and deinite-time delay regions of
electronic trip unit characteristics. (See Figure 5.) For
regions of the TCC where the tripping characteristic
is inverse or based on the I2t or I4t model, the
lower arcing fault values will correspond to longer
clearing times; resulting in the worst-case scenario.
(See Figure 5.)
Figure 4
Figure 5
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 5
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
III. TIME, CURRENT, & ENERGY RELATIONSHIP
A. Relationship Equations Equation (2):
In order to demonstrate the worst-case arc-lash
scenario across a given range of arcing fault currents,
constant-energy lines can be plotted on the TCC plot E (0.20) 4.1667
• •
in conjunction with tripping characteristics of various t = ____________________________________
K + K + 1.081 log [Ia] + 0.0011G] 610x x
(4.184) C 10[ 1 2 [ / ]
•
devices. •
f
• •
D
For voltage levels less than 15kV, the IEEE 1584™
– 2002 presents the equation for incident energy as
shown in Equation (1) [2]. The values for the variables
Where:
shown in this equation are presented in Table 1. In
equation (1), the units of energy are Joules/cm2 . t is the duration of the arc (seconds).
Equation (2) shows Equation (1) algebraically E is energy in cal/cm2 .
rearranged in order to calculate values for time with Cf is a calculation factor, equal to
respect to a given set of parameters. The conversion 1.0 for voltages above 1kV and
factor between Joules and calories has also been 1.5 for voltages at or below 1kV.
K1 is -0.792 for open conigurations (no enclosure) and
included so that the units of Energy (E) in Equation (2)
is -0.555 for closed conigurations (enclosed).
are cal/cm2 . K2 is 0 for ungrounded and HRG systems and
is -0.133 for grounded systems.
Equation (1): Ia the magnitude of the arcing fault current (kA)
that may be determined according to IEEE
1584™– 2002, equation (1).
G is the gap between conductors (mm).
log [Ia] + 0.0011G] t
E=(4.184) Cf 10[K1 + K2 + 1.081
x
[/ 0.20] [610/ D ]
•
• • • • x x is the distance exponent.
D is the distance from the arc to the worker (mm).
Equation (3) shows the linear relationship between
time and arcing current with respect to a given
Where: energy and speciic system parameters shown in
Table 1. With the aid of curveitting software [3], this
E is energy in Joules/cm2 .
Cf is a calculation factor, equal to
relationship was found consistent for all system
1.0 for voltages above 1kV and conigurations considered.
1.5 for voltages at or below 1kV.
K1 is -0.792 for open conigurations (no enclosure) and Equation (3):
is -0.555 for closed conigurations (enclosed).
K2 is 0 for ungrounded and HRG systems and
is -0.133 for grounded systems.
b
Ia the magnitude of the arcing fault current (kA) t = k (Ia)
•
that may be determined according to IEEE
1584™– 2002, equation (1).
G is the gap between conductors (mm).
t is the duration of the arc (seconds). Where:
x is the distance exponent.
D is the distance from the arc to the worker (mm).
t is time in seconds.
k is a unique constant based on speciic system
parameters (See Table 1 for a summary and the
discussion below for details.)
Ia is the magnitude of arcing fault current.
b is a constant value = -1.081.
6 www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
Constant k is determined for each system location The system parameters are shown in Table 1 and
according to system parameters and a distance factor include: system voltage, equipment type, bus gap
related to the equipment type and the system location (mm), working distance (mm), enclosure conigura-
voltage. tion, and grounding. For some typical system
locations, Table 1 shows the resulting values for
This determination was made according to the the unique constant k.
following steps:
With a point deined on a TCC plot by the magnitude
1. For each system location considered, a inite for arcing fault current and the associated clearing
series of time-current ordered pairs (Ia, t) was time for a speciic device; it is useful to deine a
found, for which incident energy remains corresponding line that represents all combinations
constant. (See Equation (1) and Figure 3) of time and arcing current for which energy remains
2. This series of ordered pairs (Ia, t) was constant with respect to the given point. This line on
provided as input for the curve-itting the TCC plot is called a C-line, and the points (Ia, t)
software [3]. along this line of constant energy can be deined by
3. The resulting time versus current plot was the constant C in Equation (4).
consistently itted with a curve of the form
shown in Equation (3). The constant b (-1.081)
remained constant regardless of the system
parameters. The constant k was found to be
unique for each new set of parameters.
Table 1
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 7
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
Equation (4):
t
C = ________
-1.081
k (Ia)
•
For a given system location (deined by k), C is a
unique constant describing the relationship of a inite
series of time and current combinations for which
energy remains constant. For increasing energy, C
is also increasing. Using this relationship, any two
regions on a TCC can be compared to determine the
“worst-case” scenario.
Consider the clearing time for both the maximum and
minimum fault conditions and let the ordered pair,
(Ia1, t1), represent the maximum arcing fault current
and the associated clearing time. Let the ordered pair,
(Ia2, t2), represent the minimum arcing fault current
and the associated clearing time. Compare as follows:
Set C1 =
t1
/ •
-1.081
k (Ia1)
and C2 =
/
t2
-1.081
k (Ia2)
•
If C1 > C2, then E1 > E2 and vice versa. The larger value
for C will correspond to the energy (E) greater value.
Using the relationship one can quickly determine
the worstcase condition between any number of sce-
narios (time and arcing current) at a given location. Figure 6
B. Software Application
On a standard time-current curve (TCC), software After determining maximum and minimum
packages could use a location-speciic C-line to magnitudes of the available bolted fault currents
provide a visual representation for the severity of at the substation bus, the corresponding arcing fault
several incident energy calculations within the range magnitudes can be calculated. These arcing fault
of possible arcing fault conditions at a given location. current magnitudes are calculated according to
Provided with the values shown for k in Table 1, a IEEE Standard 1584™– 2002 using speciic system
C-line can be generated for each device with respect parameters. Given these parameters, the appropriate
to the bus location immediately downstream or with value for k may be selected from Table 1 or alterna-
respect to a selected bus downstream of several tively, k can be calculated for system parameters not
devices. To aid in overcurrent device coordination, the found in the table.
unique C-line will visually demonstrate which setting
regions might be adjusted to reduce the arc lash haz- In Figure 6, the maximum arcing fault current magni-
ard. Figure 6 shows the tripping characteristics of two tude (Ia1) of 15.7kA is shown. For an arc lash event at
devices. The electronic-trip circuit breaker is shown as the substation bus, the associated clearing time of the
the 480V main breaker of a typical unit substation. The main breaker will be used to determine the incident
fuse characteristic is representative of the primary energy for this ordered pair (Ia1, t1). A clearing time of
device on the 13.8kV side of the source transformer. 0.323 seconds is shown for t1.
8 www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
Similarly, for an arc lash event on the line side of Using the points that correspond to the maximum
the main breaker or the secondary terminals of the value of arcing fault current, a unique C-line is drawn
substation transformer, the incident energy is deter- for each protective device characteristic in Figure 7.
mined by the clearing time of the primary fuse. This From Equation (4), the C-line for each device is deter-
point on the plot for the maximum arcing current and mined with the value of k selected from Table 1 and
associated clearing time is shown as (15.7kA, 4.1s). the time-current pairs associated with the maximum
available arcing fault current.
Figure 6 also shows the minimum magnitude of the
available arcing fault current at the substation bus. By visual inspection of Figure 7, it is shown that, for
This minimum value of available fault current both protective devices, the greatest incident energy
(Ia2 = 9.1kA) relates to the systemoperating scenario is present under the minimum fault condition. This is
when motor contributions are the lowest. The time evident because the point on the tripping characteris-
required to clear the potential arc lash event from tic of each device that is associated with the minimum
the substation bus is 2.7 seconds, and is shown in arcing fault magnitude is shown above the C-line
the long-delay region of the circuit breaker trip unit. that passes through the similar point associated with
Likewise, for an event on the line side of the substa- the maximum available fault current. Each time-cur-
tion main breaker or the secondary terminals of the rent point on a TCC that is above a given C-line has
transformer, the time required for the primary fuse a corresponding value for incident energy (E) that is
to clear the fault is found to be 90 seconds. greater than the value of incident energy (E) associ-
ated with all points shown on or below this C-line.
Figure 7 Figure 8
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 9
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
The plotting of the C-Line line may be automated
within a software package, but can be quickly plotted,
by hand. For the main substation breaker in this par-
ticular scenario, the following steps are demonstrated
in Figure 8:
1. For a typical, solidly grounded, low voltage
switchgear location, select the value for k
from Table 1: 0.6841.
The tripping characteristic of the main breaker is
plotted in Figure 8. The breaker’s maximum clearing
time at the maximum arcing fault current of 15.7kA is
shown to be 0.323 seconds.
2. Select (Ia1, t1) to correspond to the maximum
arcing fault current and the associated
clearing time: (15.7kA, 0.323).
3. Calculate C from Equation (4):
t 0.323
C = ________ < C = ________________ < C = 16.213 • 10
3
-1.081 -1.081
k (Ia)
•
(
0.6841 • 15.7 • 10
3
)
Remember, C is only an energy specific constant.
4. Select Ia2: 9.1kA
This value can be any other current value on the plot, but
it is convenient to use the calculated minimum value.
5. Calculate t2 using Equation (4):
Figure 9
t2
C = 16.213 • 103 = ________________ < t2= 0.583s
-1.081
(
0.6841 • 9.1 • 103 )
6. Connect the two points with a line segment. scenario, but the potential incident energy has been
reduced in comparison to the primary fuse type that
This is the C-Line associated with the substation
main breaker. is shown in Figures 6 and 7. Figures 6 to 9 represent
only one speciic scenario. Coordination with
Using the C-Line in Figure 8, one can be visually upstream and downstream devices, the protection
observe that the minimum arcing fault condition has of the transformer damage curve, and other consider-
a higher incident energy that the maximum arcing ations have not be plotted or included in this exam-
condition. Following the determination of the worst- ple. The results of this method of analysis will vary
case scenario, system changes may be recommended for each system location studied.
or speciied to reduce the incident energy potentially
present at the substation bus. In additional to this visual tool, software packages
should be able to provide a comparison between
Figure 9 shows a change in settings for the main multiple scenarios, cases, or revisions of a project.
breaker and a change in fuse type for the primary At the user’s discretion, the system could be analyzed
device. In both cases, the original C-lines are still according to the maximum available fault current and
shown for comparison. For the electronic-trip circuit with respect the minimum available fault currents.
breaker, the maximum magnitude for arcing fault The resulting energy levels for each location could be
current now corresponds to with the worst-case compared between the two scenarios and the result-
scenario. For the primary fuse, the minimum magni- ing worstcase calculations could be reported and
tude for arcing fault current remains the worst-case used for the arc lash labeling of the equipment.
10 www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
IV. SYSTEM MODELS & ANALYSIS
Successful determination of the appropriate range C. Analysis Philosophy
of fault magnitudes requires careful consideration
during the development of the system model. In order to perform a careful arc lash hazard analysis,
the generally accepted approaches to short circuit and
A. Data Collection coordination studies should be modiied. With respect
to a device evaluation study, maximum available fault
In order to provide accurate calculations for incident currents are always considered.[6] For this type of
energy, the system data should be as accurate as study, “extreme precision [in data collection] is
possible. System cables should be modeled with unnecessary.”[5] For arc lash hazard analysis, the
accurate lengths.[2] For existing equipment, this safety of the facility personnel is directly related to
distance cannot be measured, but must be estimated. the precision of the data collection. Inaccuracies
The more accurately this distance is estimated, the and conservative assumptions during the collection
more accurately the equipment can be labeled to of data may result in a compromised situation for
protect facility personnel. Transformer impedances workers for whom a particular Class of PPE has
should be modeled according to nameplate imped- been prescribed.
ance values. While design impedances may differ
only slightly, the smallest variation of available fault The accepted philosophy for coordination of
current may signiicantly effect the magnitude of the protective devices must also be reconsidered when
incident energy calculated for a given location. performing an arc lash hazard analysis. For a
Contributions from utility substations may luctuate coordination study “effort…is directed toward
during various switching scenarios or maintenance minimizing the impact of short circuits on system
procedures. A range of possible contributions components and the industrial process the system
should be obtained and evaluated to facilitate the serves.”[4] This is accomplished by considering the
determination of the worst-case scenario. appropriate compromise between selectivity and
system continuity and the careful analysis of the
B. Unbalanced Faults relationship between “primary and backup protec-
tion.” [4] With the additional analysis required for the
Of the various types of fault geometry a power reduction of potential arc lash hazards, personnel
system may experience – 3-phase, line-to-line, single- protection is now considered (in addition to system
line-to-ground, and double-line-to-ground; single-line- and equipment protection). Properly coordinated
to-ground faults are the most common.[4] For a given settings now require an appropriate compromise
power system, the magnitudes of these various fault between selectivity, system continuity, and the
conditions may be calculated. While extensive tests greatest reasonable reduction of incident energy.
have only described the magnitude of the arcing fault
currents associated with 3-phase faults, we do
understand that hazardous arcing conditions can
occur under unbalanced faults. As a “rule of thumb”
IEEE Std 141-1993 describes the arcing current magni-
tudes with respect to the calculated 3-phase fault
current.[5] The magnitudes of unbalanced arcing
faults are signiicantly lower than those arcs associ-
ated with 3-phase faults. As previously noted, the
worst-case scenario may be represented by the fault
condition supplying the maximum magnitude of
fault current to a location or it may be the minimum
magnitude condition that results in the most danger-
ous calculation with respect to incident energy. While
many unbalanced faults may escalate, after some
interval of time, to a 3-phase fault, requirements for
personnel protectionshould be established on the
worst-case scenario. While no standard currently
provides direction in this area, the associated hazards
should not be ignored and continued research and
testing should further quantify these conditions.
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 11
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
V. CONSIDERATIONS & SOLUTIONS VI. CONCLUSIONS
The challenge of reducing potential arc lash hazards; In conclusion, the worst-case scenario for an
affords engineers, designers, and maintenance staff Arc Flash Hazard cannot be stated with a simple
the opportunity to implement creative solutions to generalization. Dependent on the clearing time
protect personnel. For new systems, the design characteristics of overcurrent devices, the worst-case
process should be an integral component in the scenario must be determined across the range of
reduction of incident energy at various system possible fault current magnitudes.
locations. Transformer sizing and the thoughtful
distribution of contributing loads will reduce the Continued research and testing will further enhance
levels of available fault current throughout the the understanding of the worst-case conditions
system. Subsequently, the incident energy levels for each system location. Unbalanced arcing faults
may be further reduced by properly specifying and present a particularly important area for continued
sizing overcurrent protection. Current-limiting circuit research. Creative use of existing system protec-
breakers and fuses may be a possible solution if the tion devices provides some relief from the potential
arcing fault current causes them to operate in their intensity of an arc lash hazard, and careful sizing and
current limiting range. Additional protection schemes, loading of equipment increases the safety of facility
such as differential relays and zone-interlocking personnel. Research and development efforts should
should be considered as a part of the system design. continue to develop arc lash protection capable of
Engineers responsible for system studies should responding to the unique qualities of an arc lash
carefully utilize the available devices and thought- condition. Until then, overcurrent protection is an
fully consider the recommended sizing and settings effective means of reducing the intensity of arc lash
for various means of system protection. Maintenance hazards. Various tools, such as the constant energy
personnel may ind creative solutions to allow for a C-lines presented in this paper, should be employed
more practical class of PPE. Remote racking equip- to aid engineers, designers, and facility personnel in
ment for breakers and small, pre-installed apertures the sizing and calibrating of overcurrent devices for
for IR cameras are among the practical solutions the protection of equipment and personnel.
currently available.
12 www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash
A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors thank W. S. Vilcheck for his sponsorship,
advice, and encouragement; and D. M. Wood, J.
Rankin, and T. Dionise for their comments.
REFERENCES
[1] Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee
Workplaces, NFPA 70E 2000 Ed.
[2] IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations, IEEE Std 1584™– 2002.
[3] D. Hyams, CurveExpert 1.38.
[4] IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and
Coordination, IEEE Std 242-2001.
[5] IEEE Recommended Practice for Electrical Power
Distribution, IEEE Std 141-1993.
[6] IEEE Recommended Practice for Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems Analysis, IEEE
Std 399-1990.
www.eatonelectrical.com/arclash 13
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Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education Vol.12 No.9 (2021) ,2869-2873
Research Article
Arc Flash Analysis based on IEEE 1584-2018 and NFPA70E-2018
Dr. M.Gopila a, S. Purushotham b and Vetrivel Perumal c
a
Assistant Professor, Department of EEE, Sona College of technology, Salem.
bAssistant Professor, Department of EEE, Sona College of technology, Salem.
c PG Scholar, Department of EEE, Sona College of technology.
Article History Received: 10 January 2021; Revised: 12 February 2021; Accepted: 27 March 2021; Published
online: 20 April 2021
Abstract: Arc flash is the dangerous hazard, with possible release of energy caused by an electric arc which can
cause damage to the equipment and personal. The purpose of the IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70Es is to calculate the
energy level and help to achieve the appropriate protection to the working personals. Using IEEE 1584-2018 and
NFPA 70E – 2018, we can achieves more accurate calculations and Personal Protective Equipments
recommendations compared with IEEE 1584 -2002 and NFPA 70E -2002 with the parameters Open circuit voltage,
electrode configuration, bolted fault current, gap width, arc flash duration working distance and enclosure size.
Keywords: Arc Flash, IEEE 1581, NFPA 70E, Electrode configuration.
1. Introduction
Electric arc is produced in Electrical System due to the opening of energizing conductors, insulation
failures, Error caused humans while operating etc…, due to the thermal energy released by the arc [1], temperature
and pressure around the are builds up and strike up and cause damage to the things and the living things around it
by severe burns and casualties [2], in industries it leads to the plant shutdown, unemployment and financial losses.
So it is important to know the thermal energy released by the arc and to determine the safe working area, also the
personal protective equipment according to the thermal energy released by the arc.
Energy released by the arc is determined by the standard by using calculation given in the IEEE 1584, the
personal protective equipment selection and the safe working area is determined by the NFPA 70E, NFPA 70E is
analysis and updated with the duration five years, IEEE 1584 also updated on 2018 for the accurate analysis.
In this paper carry out the Arc Flash Studies of the power system network for the Mylan Laboratories
Limited, Unit-8 at Chodavaram, Visakhapatnam. Arc Flash study has been carried out on the electrical system
with the objectives of ensure personnel safety against electrical arcs or shocks, Establishing the maximum incident
energy at Switchgear, Establishing the Arc flash boundary based on the arc fault current and fault clearing time,
Specifying the rating of Hazard / Risk category, Recommendation of appropriate PPE to be Worn during live work.
Arc Flash study was carried out using the latest ETAP version 19.0 (Electrical Transient Analyzer
Program) developed by Operation Technology Inc, USA. ETAP is so popular for its capability for modelling of
power system networks and analyzing various studies and Real Time simulations.
Arc Flash Methodology And Calculation
In Arc Flash analysis, analysis and calculation are based on the standards of 1584 and NFPA 70E, which
are periodically updated for more accurate analysis, so updating the arc flash analysis very important to calculate
the thermal energy released more accurately.
In the calculation based on the IEEE 1584-2002 [3], the thermal energy released is calculated for the 85%
expected arcing current. Result of the arcing current having higher incident energy levels and arc current duration
also. While using the updated version of IEEE 1584 – 2018 [4], In the incident thermal energy is calculation,
arcing current variation factor based on the electrode configuration and it is not by the percentage expected,
Compared the arrangements of Electrodes, the horizontal arrangement of electrodes will cause arc flash energy
release level compared to the vertical arrangements of electrodes.
For the Voltages 240V and below in three Phase systems, the arcing currents are possible and sustainable
with the range of short circuit current of less than 2000A.
So we do the calculation for the voltages for below two levels, working distance and fault clearing range.
1. 600V < Voc ≤ 15kV with the frequency of 50 /60HZ,
1. RMS Symmetrical Bolted fault current value of 200A to 65kA
2. Gap between conductors are 19.05mm to 254mm
2. 208V < Voc ≤ 600V with the frequency of 50 /60HZ,
1. RMS Symmetrical Bolted fault current value of 500 A to 106 000 A
2. Gap between conductors are 6.35 mm to 76.2 mm.
3. Working distance greater than or equal to 305 mm or 12 inches
4. Fault clearing time is no limit.
5. Electrode Configuration
1. VCB - Vertical conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure.
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Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education Vol.12 No.9 (2021) ,2869-2873
Research Article
2. HCB – Horizontal conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure.
3. VCBB -Vertical conductors/electrodes terminated in an insulating barrier inside a metal
box/enclosure.
4. VOA - Vertical conductors/electrodes in open air.
5. HOA - Horizontal conductors/electrodes in open air.
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Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education Vol.12 No.9 (2021) ,2869-2873
Research Article
A. Procedures and Calculation:
Following steps are required to calculate the Arc flash incident energy calculations
1. Determining the arc current
a. Determine the Electrode configuration.
b. Determine the final value of arcing current from the following equations.
2. Determine the arc fault clearing time, reasonable assumptions is 2s max.
3. Determine the incident energy by using enclosure correction factor.
4. Determine the Arc Flash Boundary by using enclosure correction factor.
5. Select the appropriate PPE based on the incident energy level, The recommended table as per the NFPA
70E is given here
Sl.No Level Cal/cm2 PPE Requirements
Minimum 4 cal/cm2 Arc-rated Coverall, Arc-rated face shield or
arc flash suit hood, Arc rated jacket, Hard hat liner, Hard hat, Safety
1 1 4 glasses or safety goggles, Hearing protection (ear canal inserts),
Heavy duty leather gloves, Leather footwear
Minimum 8 cal/cm2 Arc-rated Coverall, Arc-rated face shield or
arc flash suit hood, Hard hat liner, Arc- rated gloves, Hard hat, Safety
2 2 8
glasses or safety goggles, Hearing protection (ear canal inserts),
Heavy duty leather gloves, Leather footwear
Minimum 25 cal/cm2 Arc-rated coverall- Long Sleeve shirt, Arc-
rated arc flash suit Hood & Pant, Arc-rated gloves, Hard hat, Safety
3 3 25
glasses or safety goggles, Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)
Leather footwear
Minimum 40 cal/cm2 Arc-rated coverall- Long Sleeve shirt, Arc
rated jacket & pant, Arc-rated arc flash suit Hood & Pant, Arc-rated
4 4 40
gloves, Hard hat, Safety glasses or safety goggles, Hearing protection
(ear canal inserts) Leather footwear
B. Usage of software:
To avoid human error and faster result we using the software ETAP 19.0.1, which having the updated
model of incident energy calculations and recommended PPE as per IEEE 1584 – 2018 and NFPA 70E -2018.
3. Model, resdult and analysis
Arc Flash Studies of the power system network for the Mylan Laboratories Limited, Unit-8 at
Chodavaram, Visakhapatnam.
▪ Collecting the system data: This includes the plant single line diagram, equipment details and protective device
details. The system model developed for the arc flash study by adding the protective device details and setting
provided by Mylan laboratories. single line diagram is provided in annexure A
▪ Determining the bolted fault current at each switchgear: This involves calculating the RMS value of bolted
fault current at each switchgear. The short circuit study is performed to determine the bolted fault current for
various operating scenarios.
▪ Determine the arc fault current: The arc fault current is normally less than the bolted fault current. The software
calculates the arc fault current from the bolted fault current.
▪ Determine the duration of arc fault current: The duration of arc fault current is decided by the fault clearing
time. This is determined by the protective device coordination study.
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Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education Vol.12 No.9 (2021) ,2869-2873
Research Article
▪ Select the working distance: The arc flash study always considers the incident energy on the face and body of
a person at the working distance. It is not based on the incident energy on hand or arm. The typical working
distance is selected from the IEEE 1584-2018. The typical working distance is the sum of the distance of the
worker from the front of the panel and the distance of the arc source to the front of the panel. 61 cm is
considered as working distance.
▪ Determine the incident energy for each switchgear at the working distance.
▪ Determine the flash protection boundary. This is the distance from the arc source within which the incident
energy can cause second degree burn. It is based on the incident energy of 1.2 cal/cm2.
4. Results And Discussion
Here we given the table of arc flash simulation result of power house 1 example and the result of
simulation is provided in the Annexure B.
Based on the Arc flash study and simulation results during incident energy are exceeding the PPE
requirements hence live maintenance is not recommended in this condition. Proper LOTO in this respect will aid
safety.
From the protection coordination point of view, there is no discrimination between incomer and outgoing
feeders in many places and hence it is recommended to revisit the relay coordination studies.
5. Abbreviations And Definition Of Terms
AFB - Arc Flash Boundary
B/C - Bus Coupler
CB - Circuit Breaker
CT - Current Transformer
DT - Definite Time
EI - Extremely Inverse
FPB - Flash Protection Boundaries
DG - Diesel Generator
HV - High Voltage
I/C - Incomer
IDMT - Inverse Definite Minimum Time
IEC - International Electro Technical Commission
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
kA - Kilo Ampere
kV - Kilo Volt
kW - Kilo Watt
LV - Low Voltage
LTI - Long Time Inverse
LAB - Limited Approach Boundary
LOTO - Lockout-tagout
MVA - Mega Volt Ampere
MW - Mega Watt
NI - Normal Inverse
NR - Numerical Relay
NFPA - National Fire Protection Association
O/G - Outgoing
PPE - Personal Protective Equipment
p.u - per unit
pf - Power Factor
RAB - Restricted Approach Boundary
SLG - Single Line to Ground
Top - Time of operation
TMS - Time Setting Multiplier
VCB - Vertical conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure
VI - Very Inverse
a) Arc-Flash:
An electric arc event with thermal energy dissipated as radiant, convective, and conductive heat.
b) Arc-Flash Hazard:
A dangerous condition associated with an electric arc likely to cause possible injury.
c) Arcing Current Or Arc-Fault Current.
A fault current flowing through an electrical arc plasma.
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Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education Vol.12 No.9 (2021) ,2869-2873
Research Article
The amount of arcing current is a function of the voltage, available bolted fault current, and the gap
between the conductors. Particularly at lower voltages the arcing current can be significantly lower than the
available bolted fault current.
d) Bolted Fault Current:
A short-circuit condition that assumes zero impedance exists at the point of the fault.
e) Fault Clearing Time:
The total time between the beginning of a specified overcurrent and the final interruption of the circuit at
rated voltage. Syn: arc duration.
f) Incident Energy:
The amount of thermal energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from the source, generated during
an electric arc event.
Note 1 - the incident energy is calculated at the working distance. Incident energy increases as the distance
from the potential arc source decreases, and the incident energy decreases as the distance increases. See: working
distance.
Note 2 - the units used to measure incident energy are joules per square centimeter (J/cm 2) or calories per
square centimeter (cal/cm2).
g) Flash Hazard Analysis:
A method to determine the risk of personal injury as a result of exposure to incident energy from an
electrical arc flash. A study investigating a worker’ s potential exposure to arc-flash energy, conducted for the
purpose of injury prevention and the determination of safe work practices and the appropriate levels of PPE.
h) Shock Hazard:
A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused by contact or approach to
live parts.
i) Arc Flash Boundary:
A distance from a prospective arc source at which the incident energy is calculated to be 5.0 J/cm 2 (1.2
2
cal/cm ).
j) Limited Approach Boundary:
An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within
which a shock hazards exists.
k) Restricted Approach Boundary:
An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized electrical conductor or circuit part within
which there is an increased likelihood of electric shock, due to electric arc-over combined with inadvertent
movement
l) Working Distance:
The distance between the possible arc point and the head and body of the worker positioned in place to
perform the assigned task.
m) Hazard/Risk Category:
Quantification of the level of hazard or risk. The Hazard/Risk categories related to arc- flash PPE is as
shown in Table 130.7 (C) (16) of NFPA 70E-2018. The typical distances provided in IEEE 1584 - 2018 are used
to determine the potential Incident Energy Level exposure for a worker on a given piece of equipment.
6. References
1. N. Bardat, “ IEC and CENELEC standards used to protect the electrical worker against an Arc
Flash,” 12th International Conference on Live Maintenance (ICOLIM), 2017
2. W. Lee, T. Gammon, Z. Zhang, B. Johnson and J. Beyreis, "Arc flash and electrical safety,"
2013 66th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, TX, 2013, pp.
24-35.
3. IEEE 1584-2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations; New York, NY,
IEEE.
4. IEEE 1584-2018, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations; New York, NY,
IEEE
2873
Arc Flash Causes Analysis
Arc Flash Causes
In the previous article entitled Arc Flash: Definition, Hazards and Risks have been briefly
reviewed understanding, danger and the level of risk associated with arc flash. This
article will discuss more in depth the analysis of some common root causes of the arc
flash phenomenon.
In brief, the causes of arc flash and common electrical work accidents are:
Carelessness
Isolation failure
Bad or loose connections
Poor maintenance of circuit breakers
Failure when disconnecting short-circuit (short-circuit)
Water or liquid enters into electrical equipment
High voltage cable
Static electricity or electrostatic
Damaged tools and equipment
An object or animal accidentally hits or passes over an open conductors
This article will analyze several things which according to facts and data are the most
common causes of arc flash.
———————————————
Carelessness The Most Dominant Cause
Arc flash usually occurs when doing work in a live electrical equipment. Even the senior
electric technicians sometimes make unintentional carelessness. For example,
technicians working on live electric panels accidentally drop work tools such as
insulated screwdrivers or wrenches into bus-bar of the panels. This may cause a short-
circuit between the live conductor or between the conductor and the body of panel
that connected to the ground. The cause of arcs with hugh energy incidents is when
carelessness causes a bolted short-circuit, a condition in which all three conductors in a
3-phase system are accidentally connected.
The video below illustrates the description arc flash cause analysis above:
Fail to break short-circuit
Water or liquid enters into live electrical equipment
Animals are accidentally passing on open conductors
Poor equipment especially circuit breaker maintenance
———————————————
References:
NFPA 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
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Arc flash hazard analysis
Comprehensive solutions to minimize risk
from arc flash hazards
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comprehensive services to meet minimize risk from arc flash hazards
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Experienced power system
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NFPA and IEEE guidelines, and related services designed to enhance the
providing systematic and accurate safety of your personnel and improve the
Arc Flash Hazard Studies. reliability of your operations— while satisfying
OSHA requirements.
Arc flash is a type of electrical explosion that
OSHA NFPA 70E requires that an Arc Flash
results from an arc fault, and can cause serious
Hazard Analysis be performed prior to
injury in numerous worker cases each year. As
working on or near electrical equipment
power grids and facilities grow, regular analysis
containing exposed energized conductors.
and maintenance of power distribution systems
An Arc Flash Hazard Study helps you:
are imperative.
• Improve employee safety
How arc flash analysis works
Siemens will analyze data from your power • Enhance your electrical system safety
distribution systems, determine incident and efficiency
energy levels, arc flash boundary (AFB), and • Supply safety information to
the required level of personal protective subcontractors
equipment (PPE) your employees and
contractors need to safely service the • Assist in compliance in regulations
equipment. • Provide documentation for lowered
In addition, Siemens provides consulting, insurance rates
documentation, and training to advise your • Provide documentation for workers
organization on the operation of power compensation cases
distribution systems and minimizing the risk of
arc flash.
Service offerings for minimizing arc flash hazard risk
Siemens Remote Racking Devices
Scope of an arc flash hazard analysis Safety Remote Breaker Racking System – complete arc
1) Short circuit calculations – Siemens will either use flash protection for switchgear racking procedures
your data or make calculations for you to identify Traditionally, breaker racking on an energized system required
bolted and arcing fault levels at key points in a power operators to work within the arc flash boundary, at risk from
distribution system. intense heat, percussion forces, and airborne debris should a
fault explosion occur. Now, with Siemens Remote Racking
2) Protective device coordination – Using your electrical Devices, the operator can be positioned safely outside the arc
systems coordination study, Siemens determines the flash boundary while racking any manufacturer’s breaker in
duration of the arcing faults. If you require an up or out of a live bus. In addition, some units feature Profile
to date study or one-line diagram, Siemens can Torque Protection technology allowing monitoring and
provide one as an option. protection of breakers and switchgear during racking.
3) Arc flash hazard calculations – The incident energy
level, the flash hazard boundary, and the PPE required
are determined for each location.
4) Documentation – The data and calculations are
compiled for you in a comprehensive report, which
contains information necessary to comply with
regulatory requirements.
5) Unsafe work locations – The report identifies work
locations having incident energy levels in excess of
available PPE ratings.
6) Arc flash hazard mitigation – Recommendations will
be made for minimizing arc flash hazards through
changes in system protection or operational
procedures.
7) Arc flash hazard labels – In addition to the report,
you will receive a label for each device containing the
flash hazard boundary distance, incident energy level,
PPE category, and shock hazard.
Published by Siemens Technical Support: The technical data presented in this document is based on an actual case
Siemens 2020 1-800-333-7421 or on as-designed parameters, and therefore should not be relied upon for
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reason, we reserve the right to modify, at any time, the technology and
product specifications contained herein.
Arc Flash Calculation Methods
Arc Flash Hazard Calculations
In the previous article we have discussed the definition, hazards, level of risk (read: Arc
Flash: Definition, Hazards and Risks) and the causes of arc flash (read: Arc Flash Causes
Analysis). This article will discuss in more detail the standards and methods of
calculation or how to calculate the value of the arc flash hazards or incident energy and
boundary with a mathematical calculating formula developed by IEEE 1584.
———————————————
IEEE 1584 – Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations
IEEE Std 1584-2018, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, is a standard
of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers that provides a method of
calculating the incident energy of arc flash event.
Arc Flash Hazard calculations are currently implemented in most of the industry plants
due to Safety regulations. The IEEE 1584 is an international standard that empirically
derived model accurately accounts for a wide variety of setup parameters including:
Voltages in the range of 208–15,000 V, three-phase.
Frequencies of 50 Hz to 60 Hz.
Bolted fault current in the range of 700–106,000 A.
Grounded or ungrounded.
Equipment enclosures of commonly available sizes with various conductor
configurations, or open air.
Gaps between conductors.
Faults involving three phases.
For cases where voltage is over 15 kV or gap is outside the range of the model, the
theoretically derived Lee method can be applied
———————————————
Arcing Short-Circuit Calculations
The formula or equation for estimating arcing short-circuits based on IEEE 1584-2002 is
as follows:
which of:
Ia = arcing current (kA)
k = – 0.153 for open air and – 0.097 for arcs in a box
Ibf = bolted short-circuit current (kA)
V = system voltage (kV)
G = conductor gap (mm)
Factors for Equipment and Voltage Classes
———————————————
Incident Energy Calculations
The next step is to calculate the incident energy in calories/cm2 (cal/cm2). Incident
energy is defined as the amount of energy impressed on a surface at a certain distance
from the source. The distance from the source is referred to as working distance.
Two equations are used for this step. The first equation is used to determine the
incident energy based on a normalized working distance of 24 inches and a clearing
time of 0.2 seconds. The second equation is used to adjust the normalized data to
specific conditions. The clearing time is normally determined from the upstream
protective device’s time current curve using the estimated arcing current.
———————————————
Arc Flash Boundary Calculations
The Arc Flash Boundary (AFB) known as Flash Hazard Boundary in IEEE 1584, is defined
as an approach limit at a distance from exposed live parts within which a person could
receive a second degree burn if an electrical arc flash were to occur. This boundary is
typically calculated as the distance where the incident energy falls off to 1.2 cal/cm2.
Work performed within the AFB requires adequate PPE based on NFPA 70E
requirements. It is always better to place the equipment in an electrically safe
condition and not to perform live work.
To determine the Arc Flash Boundary
DB = distance from arc in mm
EB = incident energy at the arc flash boundary, typically 1.2 cal/cm2 or 5
Joules/cm2
Ein = incident energy
Cf = calculation factor
t = arcing time in seconds from overcurrent device time current curve
x = distance exponent from Table 1
conversions: 1 inch = 25.4 mmm and 0.24 cal/cm2 = 1 Joule/cm2
———————————————
References
https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1584-2018.html
https://brainfiller.com/arcflashforum/download/Arc%20Flash%20Calculation%20G
uide%20Jim%20Phillips.pdf
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Copyright © 2022 Omazaki Group
10/25/2018
October 25, 2018
Arc Flash Studies
An Introduction on How to Not End Up Like a
Scout Camp Hot Dog
Presented by: Wyatt Parsons, P.E.
Why me?
• University of Wyoming: BSEE 1999
• Idaho National Laboratory – 2000-2012
» Electrical Design Engineer –Test Reactor Area
» Electrical System Engineer – Test Reactor
Area/Advanced Test Reactor
» Electrical Safety Committee Chair – 2008-2012
• POWER Engineers, Inc. – 2012-present
» Electrical Systems Studies
I’ve been doing arc flash calculations since 2001.
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10/25/2018
Overview
• Electrical Hazards
• Standards
• Do you Need to Comply?
• How to Comply
Electrical Hazards and Arc Flash
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10/25/2018
Electric shock
• Occurs when a person completes an electric circuit.
• Currents as low as 6mA can be fatal due to heart fibrillation and
respiratory paralysis.
• Tissues burn at higher current levels (~5A).
• Most understood and addressed hazard
Arc Flash
• Sudden release of energy due to
uncontrolled electric arc.
• Product of short circuit current and arc
duration.
• Plasma cloud created when metals
vaporize.
• Gas temperatures can reach 35,000°F.
• Temperatures and Incident Energy (IE)
levels required to ignite normal clothing
and cause tissue burns are fairly low.
• Severity based upon
» Proximity, temperature, and time to clear
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10/25/2018
Arc Blast
• Rapid expansion of gases due to an
electric arc flash.
• Possible shrapnel, molten metal
expulsion
• Copper expansion of 67,000 times
(similar to TNT).
• If the arc flash intensity is high enough,
blast hazards can be more dangerous
than flash hazards.
• Pressure wave due to expanding metal
and air.
• Pressure waves can cause injury or death
even if the AR PPE prevents burns.
• Shrapnel speeds can exceed 700 mph.
Arc Flash Theory
• Thermal aspects of arc flash were first described
mathematically by Ralph Lee in a 1982
• “The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns”.
Based upon maximum power transfer theorem
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10/25/2018
Arc Flash Theory
• Incident Energy (IE) is reported in Joules/cm2 or
Calories/cm2
• Energy on a surface at a distance (d) from the source is
inversely proportional to the distance squared
Energy ∝ (Volts*Current*Time)
d2
Why Do You Need to Know About
Electrical Hazards and Arc Flash?
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10/25/2018
Arc Flash Causes
• Human error (the #1 cause)
» Accidental contact by person or tool (engineers are not exempt)
» Incorrect assembly/repair
» Incorrect tool use
• Mechanical failure
» Lack of maintenance
» Material defect
• Foreign object intrusion
» Dust/debris
» Water
» Animals
• Faults or Current overload
» Stressed/weakened components
11
What do these pictures have in common
(besides blown up gear)?
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14
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15
16
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• Engineers were involved in the initiation of the arc
flash events pictured.
• Engineers were injured in those arc flash events.
17
Electrical Engineer Responsibilities
• You may be asked to perform arc flash studies.
• You may be asked to interpret arc flash studies.
• You may be asked to scope or contract out arc
flash studies.
• You most likely will need to abide by the results of
an arc flash study.
• #$!@&! this up could result in the loss of life and/or
property.
18
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10/25/2018
Standards
Standards
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10/25/2018
Standards
• OSHA 29 CFR 1910 (revised 2014)
» Effective April 1, 2015
• NEC - NFPA 70-2017 (revised every 3 years)
• NFPA 70E-2018 (revised every 3 years)
• IEEE 1584-2002
» Update presently in approval process with IEEE
» Expected adoption late 2018
» Complete overhaul of 2002 standard.
21
OSHA 29 CFR
• 1910 Sub part S
» General electrical safety standards
– Training, analysis, PPE, proper tools
• 1910.269
» Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and
Distribution
– Applicable to electric utilities as well as equivalent
installations of industrial establishments.
22
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10/25/2018
OSHA 29 CFR
• 1910.269
» New update
– Requirement for employer to determine the maximum anticipated per-
unit transient overvoltage through engineering analysis or assume
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage's ( up to 3.5 ) this
must be used on all minimum approach distances
» No later than April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts
» Based upon 2007 NESC and IEEE 516-2009
» (l)8
– (i)The employer shall assess the work place to identify employees
exposed to hazards from flames or from electrical arcs
– (ii)for each exposed hazard the employee shall make a reasonable
estimate of the incident heat energy to which the employee will be
exposed.
» Appendix E provides guidance via tables or calculation methods
23
NEC – NFPA 70
• Article 110.16
» Requires electrical equipment that that are in other
than dwelling units and are likely to require
examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance
while energized shall be field marked to warn qualified
persons of potential electric arc flash hazard
» Points to NFPA 70E and ANSI Z535.4 for labels
• Electrical equipment
» Switch boards, panel boards, MCCs, meter
enclosures, industrial control panels, etc…
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10/25/2018
NFPA 70E
• Details method to identify, analyze, and document electrical safety-related
work practices when safe work conditions must be established
• Article 130
» 130.1 states “ All requirements of this article shall apply whether an incident
energy analysis is completed or if tables are used in lieu of incident energy
analysis in accordance with 130.5”
• AC circuits operating over 50V and DC operating over 100V
• Hazard/Risk Categories are no longer defined
» Article 130.7 defines arc flash hazard identification
• Approach boundaries
• Tables for common conditions
• Label minimum requirements
• Points to several methods for arc flash calculations
» IEEE-1584 is industry preferred standard for calculations for 3-phase
analysis up to 15 kV
• No method for single phase analysis is included in the standards.
» Several approaches have been developed.
25
Boundaries
• Arc Flash (not a fixed
distance)
• 1.2 cal/cm^2
• Limited Approach
• Qualified personnel
only
• Restricted Approach
• Shock protection
(>50V)
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10/25/2018
IEEE
• IEEE 1584
» Guide for performing Arc Flash analysis(revised 2002, next
update late 2018)
» Does not cover DC
» Will still only cover 3-ph AC from 208V to 15kV.
» Used for most software analysis
• Non IEEE 1584 methods:
» Duke Heat Flux
» ArcPro (by Kinectrics)
» Others (EPRI, IEEE published studies, NESC studies)
27
Do you Need to Comply?
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10/25/2018
Who Needs to Comply?
• OSHA general rules require a work place free from known hazards
» OSHA 29 CFR 1910.296 provides clear direction and defines arc flash as a
known hazard.
• Employer
» Provide electrical safety program
» Safety polices
» Safety training
» Documentation/labels
» Proper PPE
» Proper Tools
• Employee
» Implementing and following the procedures
• Property owner
» Responsible for all employees and contractors onsite
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How to Comply
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10/25/2018
Arc Flash Risk Assessment Process
• Identify requirements
• Data collection
• Determination of calculation method
• System modeling and initial analysis
• Mitigation
• Document and implement
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Identify Requirements
• Multiple branches/ departments may require different procedures
and documentation
• May require development of:
» Safety training procedure
» Procedure to transfer knowledge
» Label standards
» Change of tools and PPE currently used
• Identify all electrical equipment at sites that have an arc flash
hazard
» Equipment greater than 50V that are likely to require examination,
adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized.
» This can be maintenance operations center, substations, generation
facility, industry facility, etc….
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10/25/2018
Identify Requirements
• Select one method for selecting PPE, but not both (NFPA 70E).
• Incident Energy Analysis Method
• Preferred method
• Arc Flash PPE Table Method
• Will require evidence that the allowed short circuit and clearing time
values are not exceeded.
33
Data Collection
• Conductor/Cable lengths
• Protection elements,
» Size, model information, and settings
• Sources with short circuit MVAs
• All major equipment name plate
» Motors, generators, transformers, ….
• Enclosure sizes/ type
» open air, tank, NEMA arc-resistant….
• Description of the area surrounding the work area
34
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10/25/2018
Determination of Calculation Method
• What are the voltage levels?
• How many calculations?
• Software
• What software do you already use?
• Many software packages have the ability to perform
arc flash calculations. Some require additional
modules to be purchased.
• Spreadsheets or hand calculations.
• Not recommended for large systems or multiple
scenarios.
• New IEEE-1584 equations will be much more
complex than previous equations so this may not be
an option.
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OSHA Guidelines for IE Calculations
36
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10/25/2018
System modeling and Initial Analysis
• Develop a system model in a program capable of
determining fault currents as well as arcing currents
» Some typical software packages include:
– ETAP, SKM Power Tools, EASY POWER, and ARCPRO.
• Determine all modes of operation
» Worst case may not be highest fault current
» Develop TCCs to analyze coordination/operation
• Determine select working distances
» This will be modified based upon enclosure
• Determine duration of faults
• Calculate incident energies
• Calculate protection boundaries
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System modeling and Initial Analysis
38
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10/25/2018
System modeling and Initial Analysis
39
System modeling and Initial Analysis
What happens to the Incident
Energy levels as the curve is
moved to improve
coordination?
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10/25/2018
System modeling and Initial Analysis
41
System modeling and Initial Analysis
Considerations:
• Be aware of available evacuation space or lack thereof.
• Make sure to take into account type of enclosure and main
PD isolation.
• Higher fault currents and longer clearing times compete for
worst case arc flash conditions.
• Be aware of interrupting device ratings.
» Device may not operate in all conditions.
• Remember to include the time required for the breaker
operation (typical 3-5 cycles).
» This is included in the Time Current Curves for low voltage
breakers and trip units.
42
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10/25/2018
Mitigation
• Arc Rated (AR) clothing
» Flame-Resistant (FR) clothing without an arc rating has not been tested for
exposure to an electric arc.
• Additional PPE
• Prohibit energized work
• Faster clearing time
» Resize equipment
» Added additional equipment
» Reduce pickup/ time dial (may require maintenance mode settings)
» Cubicle flash detecting instantaneous elements (arc flash/ optical relays)
• Remote operation
• Reduce available fault current
• Arc Rated electrical equipment
» Vents arc energy and debris in a direction away from the worker
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Document
Develop labels per NFPA 70E
• Labels must included:
» Nominal System Voltage
» Arc Flash Boundary
» At least one of the following:
– Available incident energy and
corresponding work distance,
or the arc flash PPE category
per table 130.7(C)(15) but not
both
– Minimum arc rating of clothing
– Site specific level of PPE Labels are not an OSHA
• Labels applied prior to September 30, 2011 requirement and may
are acceptable if they have available incident
energy or PPE level required 2011 not be required by 70E
in some cases.
44
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10/25/2018
Document
• Develop report detailing all required mitigation
• Develop a final detailed report with all incident
energies and appropriate labels.
• Update safety/training documents
• Update operational/ maintenance procedures
• Update procurement and asset management
• Ensure labels and training are implemented and
documented
45
Follow-Up
• Labels and studies must be kept up to date
» Update whenever major modification or renovation
takes place
» Reviewed at least every 5 years
• Maintenance
» Failure to maintain equipment may result in
– Slower clearing times that may cause an increase in the arc
flash hazard
– Increased probability of an arc flash event
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10/25/2018
Arc Flash Studies
Questions?
24
Arc Flash Study & Assessment
What is Arc Flash Study?
An arc flash study or risk assessment is engineering studies that identifies and analysis
the specific arc flash hazard for an electrical equipment within a facility. The study or
assessment of the arc flash hazard risk is an engineering study. This is with certain
procedures to determine the amount of incident energy at an electrical facility or
device. From the amount of incident energy, the arc flash hazard level will be
determined, personal protective equipment that must be used when working on this
device —Omazaki Consulant is a consultant that provides arc flash studies or risk
assessments consulting service. Contact us if you are looking for consultants who
provide arc flash study and analysis consulting services for your systems in Indonesia
and South East Asia by sending an email to [email protected] or by filling in the form in
contact. Our arc flash analysis study mostly using ETAP software.
Arc flash study provides actual calculated short circuit currents, tripping times and
incident energy (arc flash energy). Arc flash assessment also reviews coordination to
mitigate arc flash energy levels while focusing on eliminating nuisance tripping, both
during a ground fault and/or phase fault condition.
The objectives of the flash arc assessment are to:
Identify arc flash hazards
Estimate the likelihood of occurrence and potential severity of injury or damage to
health
Determine whether additional protective measures are required.
The arc flash study will calculate the short circuit current and the tripping time (opening
or breaking of the electrical safety). Arc flash assessment is also carried out by reviewing
coordination to reduce incident energy levels while focusing on eliminating
disturbances, both during ground faults and/or inter-phase fault conditions.
Currently the majority of studies and assessments of arc flash hazard risk refer to IEEE
1584 and NFPA 70E. According to the NFPA 70E standard, arc flash studies must be
carried out every 5 (five) years or whenever major modifications are made to the facility.
———————————————
Why Need to Conduct Arc Flash Study or Assessment?
The main reason why we need to do arc
flash studies or assessments is for the
safety of personnel. Short circuit and arc
flash fault are very dangerous and
potentially fatal phonemes for personnel.
Arc flash exposure often results in a variety
of serious injuries such as severe burns. In
addition, it can cause visual impairment, ruptured eardrums, damaged lungs,
psychological trauma and even death.
Arc flash hazard analysis is required to determine the arc flash risk to personnel and to
alert personnel or workers to what types of personal protective equipment they should
wear when working on live electrical equipment.
The second reason why it is necessary to conduct an arc study or assessment is that
there are obligations and government regulations.
———————————————
Scope of Study
In general, the scope of work in an arc flash study or assessment is as follows:
Short circuit current analysis (worst case short circuit current)
Evaluation and coordination analysis of electrical protective devices
Arc flash hazard analysis
———————————————
Practical Steps for the Arc Flash Study
Step 1: Identify all sites and equipment to be assessed
Arc flash studies or assessments are required only for locations where workers are
exposed to arc flash risk. Therefore, studies need not be carried out on every piece of
equipment in the power system. Panels and switchboards with a value less than 208
volts can be ignored when fed by a transformer with a capacity of less than 125kVA. This
is because the arc will not be sustainable at a lower voltage and the available fault
current is smaller. This comes from the IEEE 1584-2002 recommendations. All panels
with breakers and fuses should be included in the study if there is a significant potential
for arc flash injury. Incidents can occur when a fused disconnect is operated, even with
the door closed.
Step 2: Data Collection and Verification
The greatest single attempt at conducting an arc-flash study is in data collection. For
systems with the most recent single-line diagrams, data collection can take up 25-40
percent of the research effort.
Details of the electrical distribution system are required to accurately calculate the
hazard level. Here is a list of information that is usually required:
Data for short circuit analysis: voltage, size (MVA/kVA), impedance, X/R ratio, etc.
Data for protective device characteristics: device type, existing settings for relays,
breakers and trip units, amp rating, current vs time curve, and total clearing time.
Data for arc flash studies: type of equipment, type of enclosure (open air, box, etc.),
gap between conductors, type of grounding, number of phases and approximate
working distance for equipment.
The data collection approach could also include:
Utility data, list or log of tampering and protection settings
One Line Diagram showing major electrical equipment
When a one-line diagram does not show a complete distribution, an additional list
should be obtained from all three-phase power distribution panels. This is the
location that will be labeled (and counted). Single-phase loads and distributions
do not apply.
List of cables by size & length
Schedule of relay settings and circuit breakers.
Step 3: Updating One Line Diagram and System Modelling
After data collection and verification is
carried out, it is usually necessary to
update the single-line diagram It is to
makes sure that the drawings match those
installed in the field.
After the one-line diagram is confirmed to
be the latest diagram, then the electrical
installation system modeling is carried out.
System modeling is carried out in application software such as ETAP, EasyPower, SKM,
EDSA, and so on.
It should be noted that the study results will only be as good as the system model. Every
effort should be made to model actual equipment as found in the field.
Step 4: Defining Possible Operation Scenarios
Record all possible connections (system
operation mode) using diagrams and
tables. The status of the circuit breaker,
switch, or fuse may change during
abnormal operation. Parallel feeders can
greatly increase the fault current and
produce an arc hazard. The motor also
contributes to the disturbance and
increases the danger. Arc flash studies or assessments should cover normal operating
conditions as well as worst-case scenarios. In general, the higher the fault current
present, the greater the arc energy. Since arc energy is a function of arc duration and
current, it cannot automatically be assumed that the highest fault current will always be
the worst arc flash risk. From the various established operating scenarios, the arc flash
study must find the worst hazard conditions.
Operation Scenarios
For example, the following scenario could be created:
Maximum Utility – full contribution from all sources, including the motor
Minimum Utilities – the minimum contribution of utilities and all rotating
equipment out of service
Emergency – with an emergency generator supplying part of the system
A calculation needs to be done for all applicable scenarios, the evaluation must be
based on the worst case results. Which scenario produces the worst case outcome is
determined for each location separately.
For installations with a simple radial service from the utility, there is usually only one
mode of operation – normal. However, for larger installations, there may be several
modes of operation. Other scenarios that could be developed include:
Multiple source utilities that are enabled or removed.
Multiple generator sources are operated in parallel or isolated depending on
system configuration.
Emergency operating conditions. This is possible only with a small backup
generator.
Maintenance conditions where the short circuit current is low and the travel time
is high.
Source operating in parallel for toast switchgear or MCC.
The operable tie breaker is open or closed.
Large motor or process part is not operating
What is important to realize is that each of these conditions can change the level of
short circuit current, which in turn changes the clearing time of the protective device.
These changes can have a significant impact on arc flash hazard and PPE requirements
for individual equipment.
Step 5: Short-Circuit Current Analysis
In this step, the short circuit fault current will be calculated. The bolted short-circuit
current for each apparatus will be calculated and compared with the equipment short-
circuit rating. The short circuit analysis aims to check whether the design capacity of the
switchgear and the electrical protection device is adequate to cut short circuit current
calculated or simulated.
The analysis is carried out at this stage:
Calculation of the maximum 3-phase fault current (bolted short-circuit current)
Calculation of short-circuit current for each branch and contributing load.
The above calculations are carried out for each of the operating scenarios defined in
Step 4. If there is insufficient design capacity of protective equipment, it should be
reported immediately, as it can create unsafe working conditions.
Bolted Short-Circuit Current Calculation
Bolted fault is a short circuit that occurs without any resistance or zero resistance. While
the bolted short-circuit current is the maximum short-circuit current that may be
generated at a specified location or system configuration. This current is often used to
select withstand and interrupt ratings as well as for setting protection relays.
The scenario for calculating the bolted short-circuit is carried out by considering the
following conditions:
Power sources where it is scenarioed that each source is OFF or ON serving the
load
Parallel operated or isolated generation generator depending on system
configuration
During emergency operating conditions
A maintenance condition where the short circuit current is low but the arc
duration may be long
Parallel feeder to switchgear or MCC
Bus-tie in a closed or open position
Large motors or non-operating process parts.
Step 6: Evaluation and Coordination of Electrical Protection Devices
Is performed to ensure selection and arrangement of protective devices limits the
effects of an over-current situation to the smallest area. We perform this study in
accordance with IEEE Std. 242-2001 (Buff Book)
Step 7: Arc Flash Analysis
Is based on available short circuit current, protective device clearing time and distance
from the arc. Calculations of incident energy levels and flash protection boundaries are
completed for all relevant equipment locations. The magnitude of arc hazards are
determined using the ‘Incident Energy Analysis Method’, per NFPA 70E-2015, IEEE Std.
1584 or NESC Tables.
Step 8: Reporting
Upon completion of the calculations, final report will be prepared as an Arc Flash Hazard
Analysis Report and full size one-line drawings. The report will be certified by a Licensed
Engineer (PE).
Arc flash consultant who provide arc flash consulting services will provide them above.
———————————————
Contact Omazaki Consultant if you are looking for arc flash study and risk assessment
consultants who provide consulting service to analyze your electrical system
in Indonesia and South East Asia, both existing and planning systems.
———————————————
Related Articles
Arc Flash: Definition, Hazards and Risks
Arc Flash Causes Analysis
Arc Flash Calculation Methods
Arc Flash Boundary and Requirements of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Electric Shock Protection Study
Power System Study and Analysis
Short Circuit Study and Analysis
Reference
NFPA 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
IEEE 1584 – IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations
Book of Practical Solution Guide to Arc Flash Hazards by EasyPower
———————————————
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Arc Flash: Definition, Hazards and Risks
What is Arc Flash Definition?
Arc flash definition according to NFPA 70E is the sudden release of unexpected heat
and light energy produced by electricity passing through the air like a lightning. Arc
flash is also a phenomenon that is usually caused by accidental connection between
live conductors, or between live conductors and the ground. Temperature at the arc
point can reach or even more than 35000 Fahrenheit. It is four times the surface
temperature of the sun. The air and gas around the arc rapidly heats up and the
conductor becomes steam which causes waves called arc blasts. Arc blast is an
advanced phenomenon of arc flash events. This article will discuss what the definition,
hazard category and risk level of arc flash and arc blast is according to or based on
NFPA 70E .
Metric of Arc Flash
To determine the potential effects of arc flash, we need to understand a few basic
terms. Arc flash produces high heat at the point of occurrence of the arc. Heat energy is
measured in units such as BTU, joules, or calories.
Calorie is the amount of heat energy needed to raise the temperature of one gram of
water by one degree Celsius.
Energy is equivalent to power multiplication with time, and power (watts) is equal to
volts x Amperes. We can see that calories are directly related to current (amperes),
voltage (volts), and time. The greater the current, voltage and time, the greater the
calorie produced.
To determine the magnitude of the arc flash and its associated hazards, some basic
definitions were made. The amount of heat energy released immediately by an arc
flash is called incident energy or incident energy. Incident energy is usually expressed
in units of calories per cm2 (cal/cm2) and is defined as heat energy that passes through
every 1 cm2. However, some calculation methods state the incident energy in units of
Joules/cm2. The unit can be converted into calorie/cm2 units by sharing with a factor of
4.1868.
If we place an instrument that measures incident energy at various distances from a
controlled arc flash. We can learn that the magnitude of incident energy varies with the
distance from the point at which the arc occurred. The magnitude of the incident
energy decreases proportional to the square of the distance in feet. Like walking into a
burning room, the closer we get, the greater the heat energy is felt. Tests show that the
incident energy of 1.2 cal/cm2 will cause level 2 fires on exposed skin.
———————————————
Arc Flash Hazards
Personnel who are directly exposed to an
arc flash and arc blast may experience
level 3 fires, possibly blindness, shock, or
hearing loss. Even relatively small arcs can
cause serious injuries. Secondary effects of
arc flash include toxic gas, flying dust, and
the potential for damage to electrical
devices, enclosures and raceways. High arc temperatures, metal materials that melt
and evaporate rapidly will trigger any flammable materials.
Every electrical conductor connected accidentally to another conductor or by ground
will produce an arc flash. Frost current will continue to flow until the over-current
protection devices (OCPD) open the circuit or until there is something else that makes
the current stop flowing. The magnitude of the arc current varies with a maximum of a
bolted fault current or a bolted short-circuit current.
To understand the potential effects of the arc flash hazard category, we must first
determine the working distance from being able to touch the voltage on the
equipment or electrical system. Most measurements or calculations are performed at a
working distance of 18 inches or 45cm. This distance is used because it is an
approximate distance at which the face or upper body of the worker can be safe from
arc flash if it occurs. Some parts of the worker’s body may be less than 18 inches apart,
but in other jobs the work might be done more than 18 inches apart. Working distance
is used to determine the level of arc flash risks and the types of personal protective
equipment (PPE) to protect yourself from danger.
———————————————
Arc Flash Risks Level
NFPA 70E, Electric Work Safety Standards in the workplace, categorizes arc flash levels
into five Hazard Risk Categories (HRC 0 to 4).
Based on the amount of energy released at a certain working distance on the
occurrence of arc flash:
Arc flash studies show that many events in
industries where arc-flash produces energy
of 8 cal/cm2 (HRC 2) or less. But, other
accidents can produce 100 cal/cm2 or more
(exceeding all HRC). It is important to
remember that only 1.2 cal/cm2 (HRC 0) is
needed to cause second-degree burns to
unprotected skin.
Determinants of Arc Flash Severity
Several groups and organizations have developed formulas to determine the energy
available at various working distances from the arc flash. In all cases, the severity of the
arc flash depends on one or more of the following criteria:
Short circuit current
System voltage
Gaps
Distance from bow
Opening time of over-current protective devices (OCPD)
When the arc flash is severe enough to occur, the over-current protection device (fuse
or circuit breaker) upstream from the interference must cut off the current or the
power supply. The magnitude of the incident energy that can be exposed to workers
during the arc-flash is directly proportional to the total disconnection time (I²t) of the
over-current protection device. The greater the current setting and the opening time of
a breaker, the greater the incident energy will be generated. Regarding arc flash, the
only variable that can be controlled directly is the time needed for over-current
protection devices to extinguish the arc. A practical way to reduce arc-flash is to use an
OCPD where the protection device will limit the arc duration.
———————————————
Arc Blast Effect
Definition of arc blast is the aftereffect of arc
flash. Arc blast is gas and hot air that can cause
an explosion equivalent to TNT due to arc flash.
The gases released from the explosion also
carry products from the arc including molten
metal droplets similar to buckshot. High
temperatures will vaporize copper expands at a speed of 67,000 times its mass when
changing from solid to vapor. Even large objects such as electric panel doors can be
ejected a few feet at very high speeds. In some cases, the bus bar comes out from
inside the electrical panel which breaks down the panel wall. Explosion pressure can
exceed 2,000 pounds/ft2, dropping workers from stairs or even breaking workers’ lungs.
This event happened so fast with speeds exceeding 700 miles/hour that it was not
possible for a worker to move away.
———————————————
Related Articles
Arc Flash Study & Assessment
References:
NFPA 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
IEEE 1584 – IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations
Littelfuse article about Arc Flash Hazard
What is Arc Flash? What is Arc Blast?
———————————————
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Copyright © 2022 Omazaki Group
ELECTRICAL SAFETY HAZARDS HANDBOOK
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make fewer compromises.
For over 75 years, Littelfuse has maintained its focus on
circuit protection. As we expand in global reach and technical • Products that comply with applicable industry
and government standards, as well as our own
sophistication, you can continue to count on us for solid circuit
uncompromising quality and reliability criteria.
protection solutions, innovative technologies, and industry
leading technical expertise. It is a commitment that only a • Forward thinking, application-specific solutions
world class leader with staying power can support. that provide the assurance your most demanding
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Littelfuse Electrical Safety HAZARDS Handbook
Littelfuse is Committed to Safety
Littelfuse has a continuing commitment to improved
electrical safety and system protection. As the leader in
circuit protection, Littelfuse offers a variety of products and
services designed to help you increase safety in your facility.
For assistance with Arc-Flash, products and services, or
application information, call 1-800-TEC-FUSE (832-3873).
Electrical Safety is a Serious Issue
Electrical Safety in the workplace is the most important
job of an electrical worker. No matter how much training
one has received or how much employers try to safeguard
their workers, Electrical Safety is ultimately the responsibil-
ity of the electrical worker. The human factor associated
with electrical accidents can be immeasurable. No one can
replace a worker or loved one that has died or suffered the
irreparable consequences of an electrical accident.
This Electrical Safety Hazards Handbook was developed for general education purposes only and is not intended
to replace an electrical safety-training program or to serve as a sole source of reference. The information herein is
also not intended to serve as recommendations or advice for specific situations. It is the responsibility of the user to
comply with all applicable safety standards, including the requirements of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and other appropriate governmental and
industry accepted guidelines, codes, and standards. Use the information within this Handbook at your own risk.
Table of Contents
Introduction 6 Who is Qualified? 24
Energized Electrical Work Permit 24
Why is Electrical Safety so Important? 6 Employer and Employee Responsibilities 26
Electricity Basics 8 Arc-Flash and Other Electrical Safety Hazards 27
Ohm’s Law 8 Electrical Safety Hazards 27
Types of Electrical Faults 9 Electric Shock 27
Overloads 9 Arc-Flash and Arc Blasts 28
Short Circuits 9 Arc-Flash Metrics 29
Overcurrent Protective Devices 9 Arc-Blast Effect 31
Interrupting Rating 10 Light and Sound Effects 31
Current Limitation 11
Fuses 12
Circuit Breakers 12 Electrical Hazard Analysis 32
Circuit Protection Checklist 15
Shock Hazard Analysis 32
Approach Boundaries 32
History of Electrical Safety 16 Flash Hazard Analysis 34
Arc-Flash Calculations 35
Electrical Safety Organizations 19 Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation Examples 36
OSHA 19 IEEE 1584 Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation 38
The General Duty Clause 19 NFPA 70E Table Method 40
OSHA Regulations 19 Steps Required to Use the
NFPA 20 NFPA 70E Table Method 40
IEEE 20
NRTL 20
NEMA 21 Minimizing Arc-Flash and Other
ANSI 21 Electrical Hazards 42
ASTM 21
NECA 21 1. Design a Safer System 42
2. Use and Upgrade to Current-limiting
Overcurrent Protective Devices 43
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards 22 3. Implement an Electrical Safety Program 45
4. Observe Safe Work Practices 45
Working on Deenergized Equipment 22 5. Use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 47
Establish a Safe Work Condition 22 6. Use Warning Labels 49
Working on Energized Equipment 23 7. Use an Energized Electrical Work Permit 49
8. Avoid Hazards of Improperly Selected or
Maintained Overcurrent Protective Devices 50
9. Achieve or Increase Selective Coordination 51
Electrical Safety Summary 53
Annex A 54
Electrical Safety Terms and Definitions 54
Annex B 61
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards 61
Annex C 63
Energized Electrical Work Permit 63
Annex D 65
Arc-Flash Calculation Steps 65
Annex E 67
Arc Flash Calculator Tables 67
Annex F 71
Resources for Electrical Safety 71
Annex G 73
References 73
Annex H 74
Electrical Safety Quiz 74
Introduction
Electrical Safety Hazards Overview
97% Safety in the workplace is job number one for
employer and employee alike. It is especially
important for those who install and service
meet the standards and reduce the hazards.
While parts of the standards, regulations,
and codes especially relating to electrical
of all electrical systems. Nothing can replace a safety are quoted or summarized herein, it is
electricians worker or loved one that has died or suffered the responsibility of the user to comply with
the irreparable consequences of an electrical all applicable standards in their entirety.
have been accident. No matter how much an employer
shocked or tries to safeguard its workers or how much
safety training is provided; the ultimate Why is Electrical Safety so Important?
injured responsibility lies with the worker. The human
on the job. factor is part of every accident or injury. Electrical hazards have always been recognized,
yet serious injuries, deaths, and property
damage occur daily. Organizations like the US
The purpose of this handbook is to identify Department of Labor and the National Safety
electrical safety hazards and present ways Council compile statistics and facts on a
to minimize or avoid their consequences. It regular basis. The following table demonstrates
is a guide for improving electrical safety and the importance of electrical safety.
contains information about governmental
regulations, industry-accepted standards
and work practices. It presents ways to
FACTS...
• 97% of all electricians have been shocked or injured on the job.
• Approximately 30,000 workers receive electrical shocks yearly.
• Over 3600 disabling electrical contact injuries occur annually.
• Electrocutions are the 4th leading cause of traumatic occupational fatalities.
• Over 2000 workers are sent to burn centers each year with severe Arc-Flash burns.
• Estimates show that 10 Arc-Flash incidents occur every day in the US.
• 60% of workplace accident deaths are caused by burn injuries.
• Over 1000 electrical workers die each year from workplace accidents.
For more information: • Medical costs per person can exceed $4 million for severe electrical burns.
• Total costs per electrical incident can exceed $15 million.
800-TEC-FUSE • In the year 2002, work injuries cost Americans $14.6 billion.
www.littelfuse.com
Information derived from Industry Surveys, the NFPA, The National Safety Council, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CapSchell, Inc.
The moral obligation to protect workers
who may be exposed to electrical hazards is
fundamental, but there are legal and other
factors that require every facility to establish
a comprehensive Electrical Safety Program.
Meeting OSHA regulations, reducing insurance
costs, and minimizing downtime and repair
costs are additional benefits of Electrical Safety
programs. When electrical faults occur, the
electrical system is subjected to both thermal
and magnetic forces. These forces can severely
damage equipment and are accompanied
by fires, explosions and severe arcing. Such
violent damage often causes death or severe
injury to personnel. Costs of repairs, equipment Littelfuse offers a variety
replacements, and medical treatment can run of products and services
into millions of dollars. Loss of production designed to help you
and damaged goods are also important increase safety in your
considerations. Other major factors include facility, such as:
the cost of OSHA fines and litigation. Severe
electrical faults may shut down a complete
• Current-Limiting Fuses
process or assembly plant, sending hundreds
or thousands of workers home for weeks while • Fuse Holders and
repairs are being made. It is also possible that Accessories
one tragic event could close a plant permanently.
• Training Seminars
& Presentations
Implementing and following a well designed
Electrical Safety Program will protect employees • Arc-Flash Calculators
and employers against:
• Electrical Safety
Literature
• Injury to personnel • Electrical Safety Video
• OSHA citations and fines • Warning Labels
• Increased costs for insurance
• Electrical Designers
and workman compensation
Reference (EDR) Software
• Lost or unusable materials
• Technical Papers
• Unplanned equipment
repair or replacement costs • MROplus Fuse
Inventory Analysis
• Multi-million dollar lawsuits
• Technical Support &
• Possible bankruptcy Engineering Services
Electrical Safety is not an option — it is absolutely
necessary for workers and employers alike.
Electricity Basics
Ohm’s Law: Even the simplest electrical system can Ohm’s Law
become dangerous. Unless proper procedures
The Current (I) in Amperes
are instituted, personnel installing or servicing In 1827, George Simon Ohm discovered that the
is equal to the electromotive
these systems are frequently exposed flow of electric current was directly proportional
force, or Voltage (V) divided
to the hazards of shock, arc flash and arc to the applied voltage and inversely proportional
by the Resistance (R)
blast. Eliminating and/or reducing these to the “resistance” of the wires or cables
in “ohms.”
hazards require a basic knowledge of electric (conductors) and the load. This discovery became
circuits. The following is a brief overview. known as Ohm’s Law.
Current (I) = Voltage (V) Ohm’s Law:
Resistance (R)
Electricity can be defined as the flow of electrons The Current in Amperes (I) is equal to the
through a conductor. This is similar to the
å CURRENT FLOW
electromotive force, or Voltage (V) divided
I= V flow of water through a pipe. Electromotive by the Resistance (R) in “ohms”.
R force, measured in volts, causes the current
to flow similar to a pump moving water. The
higher the water pressure and the larger the Current (I) = Voltage (V)
LOAD
pipes, the greater the water flow. In electrical
Resistance (R)
GEN.
circuits the rate of current flow is measured
I= V
in amperes, similar to gallons of water per
second. Figure 1 illustrates a simple circuit. R
System voltage and load resistance
determine the flow of current.
å CURRENT FLOW ç SHORT CIRCUIT
Accidental
LOAD
Connection
LOAD
GEN.
GEN. Creates Fault
(red lines indicate increased current)
For more information: System voltage and load resistance
During a short circuit, only the resistance of
determine the flow of current.
the fault path limits current. Current may
800-TEC-FUSE increase to many times the load current.
www.littelfuse.com Figure 1
ç SHORT CIRCUIT
Accidental
AD
Connection
When two of the variables are known, the third An Overload is defined as an overcurrent that is
can be easily determined using mathematical confined to the normal current path. Excessive
equations as shown above. Current seeks connected loads, stalled motors, overloaded
the path of least resistance; whether it is a machine tools, etc. can overload a circuit. Most
conductor, the ground, or a human body. For conductors can carry a moderate overload for a
example, at a given voltage, the higher the short duration without damage. In fact, transient
resistance is the lower the current will be. The moderate overloads are part of normal operation.
lower the resistance is, the higher the current Startup or temporary surge currents for motors,
will be. Materials that have very low resistance pumps, or transformers are common examples.
such as metals like copper and aluminum Overcurrent protection must be selected that will
are termed conductors, while non-metallic carry these currents. However, if the overload
materials like rubber, plastics, or ceramics persists for too long, excessive heat will be
that have very high resistance are termed generated ultimately causing insulation failure.
insulators. Conductors are usually insulated to This may result in fires or lead to a short circuit.
confine current to its intended path and to help
prevent electrical shock and fires. Conductor
cross-section and material determine its Short Circuits
resistance. Current produces heat as a function
of current squared X resistance (I2R). The NEC®
publishes tables that show the rated current
Current
carrying capacity of various sizes and types of
conductors (wire and cables). Currents that
exceed the rating of the conductor increase
temperature and decrease insulation life.
Time
Types of Electrical Faults
Current flow during a short circuit condition. Figure 3
Types of
Together, current and voltage supply the A Short Circuit is any current not confined to
power we use every day. Any electric current the normal path. The term comes from the Electrical
that exceeds the rating of the circuit is an fact that such currents bypass the normal load Faults:
Overcurrent. When the current exceeds (i.e., it finds a “short” path around the load).
the rated current carrying capacity of the Usually, when a current is greater than 6 times
conductor, it generates excess heat that can (600%) the normal current, it should be removed • Overloads
damage insulation. If insulation becomes as quickly as possible from the circuit. Short
damaged, personnel may be severely injured Circuits are usually caused by accidental contact • Short Circuits
and equipment or property compromised or or worn insulation and are more serious than
destroyed. Overcurrents can be divided into overloads. Damage occurs almost instantly.
two categories: Overloads and Short Circuits. Examples of Short Circuits include two or more
conductors accidentally touching, someone
touching or dropping tools across energized
Overloads conductors or accidental connection between
energized conductors and ground. Such ground
faults may vary from a few amperes to the
Current
maximum available short circuit fault current.
Time Overcurrent Protective Devices
Overcurrent protective devices (fuses and
Current flow during an overload condition. Figure 2 circuit breakers) are used to protect circuits
and equipment against overloads and
ELECTRICITY BASICS
Always use short circuits (faults). These devices vary in Interrupting Rating
overcurrent characteristic, design and function. Fuses
protective and circuit breakers are designed to sense Interrupting Rating (sometimes called
devices that abnormal overloads and short circuits and Interrupting Capacity) is the highest available
have interrupting open the circuit before catastrophic events symmetrical rms alternating current (for DC
ratings greater occur. Each device, however, has different fuses the highest DC current) at which the
than the maximum time characteristics and must be used and protective device has been tested, and which it
available fault applied according to the appropriate standards has interrupted safely under standardized test
current of your and manufacturer’s recommendations conditions. Fuses and circuit breakers often
electrical system. for the individual application. have very different interrupting ratings. Current-
limiting fuses have interrupting ratings up to
300,000 Amperes. UL Class H fuses and most
Fuses and circuit breakers must be able common molded case circuit breakers have
to discern the difference between normal interrupting ratings of only 10,000 Amperes. If
current variations that pose no threat to an overcurrent protective device with 10,000
equipment, and dangerous overloads or short AIR (Amperes Interrupting Rating) is used in
circuits that can cause extensive damage to a circuit that is capable of delivering a short
equipment and compromise safety. Not all circuit over 10,000 amperes, a violent explosion
devices are designed to protect against both or flash fire can occur. Always use overcurrent
overloads and short circuits. Most motor protective devices that have interrupting
starters provide only overload protection, ratings greater than the maximum available
while some circuit breakers provide only fault current of your electrical system.
short-circuit protection. Overcurrent protective
devices should be selected carefully to make
sure they will open the circuit safely under any
abnormal overcurrent condition. Interrupting
ratings and opening times, especially
under short-circuit conditions, must also
be carefully observed. Failure to select the
properly rated overcurrent protective device
can result in fires, explosions, and death.
For more information:
UL CLASS RK 1
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
10
Current Limitation with a Current-limiting Fuse
Available Peak Current
Current
NOTE:
Total Clearing I2t =
Melting I2t + Arcing I2t
Current Limitation:
Fault Occurs Peak Let-Thru / Current (lpeak)
Fuse Elements Melt
A current-limiting
device is one that
Arcing Energy (l2t)
opens and clears
Melting Energy (l2t) a fault within the
first half cycle.
Time One half cycle of
standard 60 hz cur-
Melting Arcing
Time rent is equivalent
Time
Arc is Extinguished to .00833 seconds.
Fuse Total Clearing Time Article 240.2 of the
(less than ½ cycle) National Electrical
Code (NEC) further
Figure 4 states that a
current-limiting
Current Limitation device will reduce
of standard 60 Hz current (8.33 milliseconds).
What exactly is “Current Limitation” and why Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the the peak let-thru
is it important? Article 240.2 of the National effect of current limitation on a faulted circuit. current to a value
Electrical Code® (NEC®) defines a Current-
substantially less
Limiting Overcurrent Protective Device as: “A
device that, when interrupting currents in its As seen above, the total clearing time “t” occurs than the potential
interrupting range, reduces the current flowing before the first zero. The I2t energy is the area peak which would
in the faulted circuit to a magnitude substantially under the curves. It is clear that I2t through
occur if the
less than that obtainable in the same circuit if the fuse is much less than would otherwise
the device were replaced with a solid conductor occur. Heating is a direct function of current current-limiting
having comparable impedance.” What this really squared x time (I2t). Reducing current in half device were not in
means is that a current-limiting device is one that reduces heat by 75%. Generally, the lower the
the circuit.
opens and clears a fault before the first current peak instantaneous current is, the lower the
zero after the fault occurs, and limits the peak I2t energy will be. The square of peak current
fault current. In most cases the current-limiting determines the amount of magnetic stress.
device will clear a fault in less than one half cycle For a given circuit, cutting the peak current
in half reduces magnetic stress by 75%.
. National Electrical Code® and NEC® are registered trademarks of the
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.
11
ELECTRICITY BASICS
Low Voltage Fuses a silica sand “filler” material that safely
UL Fuse Classes: quenches the arc and stops the current flow.
A fuse is an intentional weak link in a
circuit. It is a thermally responsive device
• Class R
designed to provide overcurrent protection. Figure 5 illustrates the components of a
• Class J The main function of a fuse is to protect Littelfuse LLSRK_ID current-limiting dual
conductors and equipment from damaging element time-delay fuse with blown fuse
• Class CC overcurrents and quickly deenergize faulted indication. It consists of two current sensing
• Class CD circuits minimizing hazards to personnel. elements in series with each other. The
first element is made with a very precise
• Class L elastomeric silicone overload section that
Fuses may be classified as fast-acting or time- protects against sustained overloads. The
• Class T
delay and as current-limiting or non-current- second element opens quickly under short
• Class G limiting. Fast-acting fuses are designed to circuit conditions, limiting the damaging heat
respond quickly to overload currents, while time- energy during short circuits and Arc-Flash
• Class H delay fuses are required to carry an overload events. Finally and perhaps just as important,
• Class K current for a predetermined amount of time. This the blown fuse indication makes trouble-
permits time-delay fuses to carry starting current shooting and replacement safe, fast, and easy.
• Plug and other temporary overloads. Fuses that limit
the maximum peak current (Ip) that could flow
Refer to UL 248 for during a short circuit are classified as current- A fuse is designed to safely open the circuit
more information. limiting fuses. Whether the fuse is classified as only once. Therefore, it must be carefully
fast-acting or time-delay, current-limiting fuses selected to keep the equipment operating unless
will open quickly during short-circuit conditions. there is danger of severe overheating or if a
short circuit or arcing fault occurs. Selecting
the right fuse for the application is critical to
Standard electrical fuses are available in overall safety and reliability. At the same time,
current ratings from 1/10 to 6000 Amperes fuses are fail-safe. Unlike mechanical devices,
and for voltages up to 600 Volts. Underwriters nothing can happen to a fuse that will prevent
Laboratories (UL) and CANENA (Council it from opening or increase its opening time.
for the Harmonization of Electrotechnical
Standards of the Americas) classify low
voltage fuses (600VAC and less) into several Circuit Breakers
main classes such as R, J, CC, CD, L, T, G,
H, K and Plug, as well as Semiconductor or Like fuses, circuit breakers are designed to
Supplemental fuses. Each class is defined protect circuits from overload and short circuit
by its performance characteristics, size, and conditions when applied within their ratings.
function. Low voltage cartridge fuses are Most circuit breakers utilize a mechanical
further classified as either current-limiting or latching, spring assisted switching mechanism
non-current-limiting types. Cartridge fuses and a thermal, thermal-magnetic, hydraulic-
have ferrules, blades, or screw type methods magnetic, or electronic current sensing circuit
of installation. They are generally intended that causes the switching mechanism to
for and suitable for branch circuit, feeder, and unlatch and open the circuit. Typical circuit
service entrance overcurrent protection in breakers are not current-limiting. However,
accordance with ANSI/NFPA 70, commonly current-limiting circuit breakers are available
known as the National Electrical Code®. in some ratings, but at a higher cost.
For more information: Inside a typical fuse, the current flows through Standard circuit breakers are available with
the fuse elements, or “links”. When enough current ratings up to 6300A and voltage ratings
800-TEC-FUSE heat is generated, the fuse element will melt
and open (blow). Most power fuses incorporate
up to 1000V. As current levels increase, the
type of circuit breaker may vary from Molded
www.littelfuse.com
12
Plated
End Caps
Precision Formed
Short Circuit Element
Blown Fuse
Elastomeric Silicone Indicator Assembly
Overload Section
Granular
Quartz Filling
BEFORE OPENING (blowing) AFTER OPENING (blowing)
Current-limiting
Figure 5 fuses usually have
much higher inter-
rupting ratings and
react much faster
Case Circuit Breakers (MCCB) to Insulated- Common Molded Case Circuit Breakers
Case Circuit Breakers (ICCB) to Low-Voltage (MCCB’s) such as the one shown in Figure 6 to short circuits and
Power Circuit Breakers (LVPCB) types. Some usually have “Thermal-Magnetic” trip units. Arc-Flash events,
circuit breakers have magnetic only trip units This means they have two sensing circuits in making them safer
or electronic trip sensors that can be adjusted series with a spring assisted latching switch.
for long, short, or instantaneous delays. The first sensing circuit uses a “thermal” and more reliable
In all cases, the sensing circuit causes the sensing element that reacts to overloads. to use than most
switching circuit within the circuit breaker The second sensing circuit is a “magnetic” circuit breakers.
to operate (open). Due to the mass of the coil that reacts to short circuits. Either the
contacts and mechanical switching components thermal sensing circuit or the magnetic sensing
and other factors, opening times of non- circuit can cause the mechanically latched
current-limiting circuit breakers under short switching circuit to open the circuit. This
circuit conditions can vary from ¾ cycles (13 provides time-current characteristics similar
msec.) to 8 cycles (130 msec.) or more. to dual-element fuses. However, most fuses
have much higher interrupting ratings and
react much faster to short circuits and Arc-
Flash events, making them safer and more
reliable to use than most circuit breakers.
13
ELECTRICITY BASICS
Failure to follow Whether you use fuses or circuit breakers,
NFPA and all both types of overcurrent protective devices
must be tested and approved by a nationally
applicable standards recognized safety agency, such as Underwriters
and guidelines along Laboratories. The device must also be applied
with the the manu- in accordance with the National Electrical Code®
or other codes and standards required by the
facturers’ recommen- Authority Having Jurisdiction over the facility. It
dations can result in a is also important to remember that even if a fuse
catastrophy. or circuit breaker is approved by a recognized
safety agency like UL, it must be installed
and used in accordance with any instructions
included with its labeling or listing. There are
Figure 6 differences, for example, in UL standards used
(Drawing courtesy of AVO Training Institute, Dallas, TX) to qualify fuses and circuit breakers such as UL
248, UL489, and UL1077. Always check the
Circuit breaker manufacturers typically applicable standards and the manufacturer to
recommend that their circuit breakers be cycled determine if their devices meet the required
ON and OFF at least once each year to keep interrupting ratings, voltage ratings, current
the tripping mechanism from seizing under limitation, etc. for each application. Failure to
certain environmental conditions. Most apply overcurrent protective devices within their
manufacturers of industrial and commercial ratings can result in fires, explosions, and deaths.
circuit breakers publish field-testing and
maintenance instructions. This often includes
annual testing and recalibration that requires Short Circuit Current Rating (SCCR)
special equipment and qualified personnel.
Instructions for thermal-magnetic breakers With all of the advances in engineering and
require many of these tests to be performed at safety, why is it that every day 1 maintenance
room temperature that can take breakers out of person is either killed or injured in electricity
service for several hours. After a circuit breaker related accidents? Is it possible the majority
has opened, it is very important to examine the of effort that has gone into engineering and
circuit to determine if the cause was a short inspecting for safe electrical systems has
circuit or an overload. Article 225.3 of NFPA 70E ended when the electricity reaches the line
requires that if a circuit breaker interrupts a side terminals of the equipment? The 2005
fault at or near its interrupting rating, it must be National Electrical Code addresses this
inspected by a trained technician and tested, situation with the advent of required labels on
repaired or replaced in accordance with the equipment that clearly state the equipment’s
manufacturer’s specifications. Short Circuit Current Rating (SCCR). The NEC
specifically addresses this for industrial control
panels [Article 409], industrial machinery
Circuit breakers must be carefully selected electrical panels [670], multiple motor HVAC
according to the application and NEC® equipment [440], meter disconnect switches
requirements. Current ratings that are too low [230] and multiple motor controllers [430].
will cause nuisance tripping and excessive
downtime. Current ratings that are too
high can cause excessive overheating or The most dangerous and common
higher arc-flash hazards. Failure to follow misconception of SCCR by equipment
NFPA standards and guidelines and the manufacturers is that the interrupting capacity
For more information: manufacturers’ recommendations can or rating of a circuit protection device is also
result in catastrophic consequences. the SCCR of the end use equipment in which
800-TEC-FUSE it is installed. Meaning, the manufacturer
www.littelfuse.com
14
that labels the equipment with a 22kA SCCR, What kind of environmental
solely because the main circuit breaker or extremes are possible? Dust,
fuse has an interrupting capacity of 22kA, humidity, temperature extremes
is mislabeling its equipment and creating a and other factors need to be
potentially dangerous condition in your plant. considered.
What is the maximum available
In order to build and label a safe piece of fault current the protective device
equipment, the manufacturer must determine may have to interrupt?
the component in the primary electrical path
with the lowest SCCR or withstand rating. Is the overcurrent protective device
The SCCR of the equipment then must match rated for the system voltage?
the rating of that component with the lowest
SCCR. Just as every device within the electrical Will the overcurrent protective
distribution system of your facility must be device provide the safest and most
rated to handle a worst-case scenario in order reliable protection for the specific
to completely protect the people and equipment equipment?
within your facility, every component within your
equipment must be designed to handle a worst- Under short-circuit conditions, will
case scenario for exactly the same reason. the overcurrent protective device
minimize the possibility of a fire or
explosion?
The NEC® recognizes and specifically requires
equipment to have accurate SCCR labels. Does the overcurrent protective
These labels will allow you and inspectors to device meet all the applicable
compare fault current studies to the SCCR and safety standards and installation
minimize potential hazards in your facilities. requirements?
Answers to these questions and other criteria will Unlike fuses,
Circuit Protection Checklist help to determine the type of overcurrent protective circuit breakers
device to use for optimum safety and reliability.
require annual
Before a system is designed or when maintenance to
unexpected events may occur, circuit designers meet manufacturer’s
should ask themselves the following questions:
specifications.
What is the normal or average
current expected?
What is the maximum continuous (three
hours or more) current expected?
What inrush or temporary surge
currents can be expected?
Are the overcurrent protective
devices able to distinguish
between expected inrush and surge
currents and open under sustained
overloads and fault conditions?
15
History of Electrical Safety
Thomas Edison Contrary to popular belief, Benjamin Franklin did Westinghouse confronted each other on the
is said to have not “discover” or “invent” electricity. The flow relative benefits and dangers of Direct Current
of electricity and its effects have been known (DC) vs. Alternating Current (AC). Concerned
developed the first for centuries, especially when traveling through with electrical safety, Thomas Edison tried to
“fuse” by using a air in the form of lightning. It wasn’t until the establish DC current as the standard in the US.
wire between two late 18th and early 19th centuries, however, He argued that DC current was not as dangerous
that scientists began to discover and analyze as AC, which George Westinghouse was
terminals that what electricity really is and how to harness promoting. In 1889, the state of New York
would melt if too it for man’s benefit. Thus began the need to commissioned the development of the electric
much current regulate electrical installations to protect people chair for their capital punishment program. Even
and equipment from its unintended effects. though Edison was not a proponent of capital
flowed through it. punishment, he was asked to design the electric
chair and assumed Westinghouse would be
With the advent of the electric light bulb and approached if he refused. Edison viewed this as
electric motors in the late 19th Century, it was an opportunity to prove that AC was more
soon discovered that electricity could also cause dangerous than DC and designed the “chair”
fires and kill people. Thomas Edison is said to using AC. In 1893, George Westinghouse
have developed the first “fuse” by using a wire received the contract to design the “Palace of
1860s 1889 1897 1913 1970
First fuses Electric chair First NEC 1 Edition
st
developed Electrician’s Handbook OSHA is formed
was developed released
1880s 1890s 1897 1940s 1979
AC/DC Electrical systems Circuit breakers Current-limiting fuses NFPA 70E is
were expanded developed UL is formed were developed Released
between two terminals that would melt if too Electricity” at the World’s Columbian Exposition
much current flowed through it. In 1882, Edison in Chicago. AC was used and shown to be
opened the world’s first central electric light safely applied. Obviously, Edison was proven
power station in New York City. It produced wrong regarding the safe application of AC.
enough DC current to power 7200 electric Westinghouse also had a better plan for
For more information: lamps. In 1887, Edison was issued the first generating and distributing electrical energy
fuse patent. Ever since, controlling electricity over long distances at higher voltages and then
800-TEC-FUSE and protecting wires from fire has become
more and more complex. In an effort to increase
transforming it to lower useable voltages. Thus
began the need for increased electrical
www.littelfuse.com electrical safety, Thomas Edison and George construction and safety standards.
16
Because insurance companies were concerned not exceed 250 and is often convenient to
about fire safety and electricity, the Underwriters locating a blown-out fuse or for ascertaining
Electrical Bureau (later to become UL) was whether or not a circuit is alive. Some men
established in 1894 to review various electrical can endure the electric shock that results
safety standards and building codes that were without discomfort whereas others cannot.
quickly being developed. In the 1890’s, the first Therefore, the method is not feasible in
crude circuit breakers were also developed. In some cases. Which are the outside wires
1896, the National Fire Protection Association and which is the neutral of a 115/230-volt,
was formed in New York City. Because electricity three-wire system can be determined in
was viewed as a fire hazard, the National Board this way by noting the intensity of the shock
of Fire Underwriters unanimously approved the that results by touching different pairs of
first “National Electrical Code” in June of 1897. wires with the fingers. Use the method with
Thus, the “NEC” was born. caution and be certain the voltage of the
circuit does not exceed 250 before touching
the conductors.
Many electric generating plants and transmission
lines were built and installed in the US in the
early 20th Century. Construction and safety
standards were quickly developed. In 1904
159. The presence of low voltages
can be determined by tasting.
The method is feasible only where the
Underwriters Laboratories published the first pressure is but a few volts and hence is
fuse standard. In 1913, the first edition of the used only in bell and signal work. Where the
“American Electricians’ Handbook” was issued. In voltage is very low, the bared ends of the
the 1930’s, the Wiggington Voltage Tester conductors constituting the circuit are held a
(a.k.a. the “Wiggie”) was developed for testing short distance apart on the tongue. If voltage
the presence of voltage, etc. In June of 1940, is present a peculiar mildly burning sensation
UL published the first circuit breaker standard, results, which will never be forgotten after
UL489, entitled “Branch-Circuit and Service one has experienced it. The taste is due to
Circuit-Breakers.” It was later in the 1940’s when the electrolytic decomposition of the liquids
the first current-limiting fuses were developed. on the tongue, which produces a salt having
1980 1990 1995 2002 2005
First burn OSHA Subpart S Arc-Resistant NEC requires NEC is updated with
centers opened updated switchgear introduced warning labels new safety definitions
1982 1995 2000 2004
Ralph Lee’s NFPA 70E recognizes NFPA 70E expands NFPA 70E is expanded
Arc-Flash paper Arc-Flash on Arc-Flash and revised
Despite advances in technology and as a taste. With voltages of 4 or 5 volts, due to
hard as it may be to believe, the American as many cells of a battery, it is best to test
Electricians Handbook of 1942 had the for the presence of voltages by holding one
following to say about Electrical Safety: of the bared conductors in the hand and
touching the other to the tongue. Where a
terminal of a battery is grounded, often a
“158. Electricians often test for
the presence of voltage by
touching the conductors with the fingers.
taste can be detected by standing on moist
ground and touching a conductor from the
other battery terminal to the tongue. Care
This method is safe where the voltage does should be exercised to prevent the two
17
HISTORY OF ELECTRICAL SAFETY
At OSHA’s request, conductor ends from touching each other at most comprehensive dissertations on the
the National Fire the tongue, for if they do a spark can result causes and effects of Arc-Flash hazards. It
that may burn.“ was also the first notable publication that
Protection Associa- attempted to analyze and quantify the potential
tion was asked to energy released during an Arc-Flash event.
research and pro- After World War II, the demand for electric
power increased for new construction and
vide guidelines for advances in productivity created the need for In 1990, OSHA updated subpart S of the Code
electrical safety in circuit protection devices with higher current of Federal Regulations, CFR 29 Section 1910,
the workplace. ratings and interrupting capacities. Electrical which deals specifically with the practical
safety standards and practices needed to safeguarding of electrical workers at their
keep pace with the ever-increasing growth workplaces. In 1995, NFPA 70E was revised
As a result the of electrical power use and generation. to include formulas to establish shock and
NFPA 70E “Standard flash protection boundaries. Also in the mid
1990’s, equipment makers began to design their
for Electrical Safety In 1970, when the Williams-Steiger Act was equipment to be more arc resistant. In the year
in the Workplace.” signed into law, the Occupational Safety and 2000, NFPA 70E was again revised to include
was issued. Health Administration (OSHA) was created. It an expanded section on Arc-Flash hazards. In
took OSHA several years before they issued 2002, the National Electrical Code (NEC)® was
comprehensive regulations that governed updated to include the requirement of shock
aspects of all workers safety. At OSHA’s request, and Arc-Flash hazard warning labels on all
the National Fire Protection Association, which equipment that is likely to be worked on while
issues the National Electrical Code®, (NFPA 70), energized. Also in 2002, the IEEE (Institute of
was asked to research and provide guidelines for Electronic and Electrical Engineers) published
electrical safety in the workplace. In 1979, the IEEE 1584 “Guide for Performing Arc‑Flash
NFPA issued the first edition of NFPA 70E, Hazard Calculation”. The latest edition of
entitled “Standard for Electrical Safety NFPA 70E recognizes IEEE 1584 as a preferred
Requirements for Employee Workplaces” (since method of calculating Arc-Flash hazards.
renamed the “Standard for Electrical Safety in
the Workplace.”) This was the first nationally
accepted standard that addressed electrical In addition to OSHA, NFPA, and the IEEE, there
safety requirements for employee workplaces. are several other safety organizations and
standards such as American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), American Society of Testing
In the 1970’s, in addition to the known shock and Materials (ASTM) and the International
hazards associated with electricity, researchers Electrotechincal Commission (IEC) that have
began to address the phenomena of arcing developed practices and have set standards
faults that released large amounts of heat and for materials and the testing of products to
light energy as well as pressure and sound protect workers from electrical hazards.
energy. In 1980, Dr. Raphael Lee opened
the first burn center in Chicago dedicated to
the care and treatment of electrical burns.
In 1982, Mr. Ralph Lee (no relation) wrote
an IEEE technical paper entitled “The Other
Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns.”
This paper introduced methods to determine
and calculate the severity of electrical arc-
flash hazards. It remains today as one of the
For more information:
. Croft, Terrell, American Electricians’ Handbook, 5th edition,
800-TEC-FUSE McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1942
www.littelfuse.com
18
Electrical Safety Organizations The General Duty Clause
Several organizations have developed and Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational
continue to revise standards to address the Safety and Health Act of 1970 reads,
numerous concerns involving electrical power.
Standards and safety organizations include:
“ 5. Duties
• OSHA
Occupational Safety & (a) Each Employer
Health Administration
(1) Shall furnish to each of his
• NFPA employees employment and a
National Fire place of employment which are
Protection Association free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely
• IEEE to cause death or serious
Institute of Electrical and physical harm to his employees;”
Electronic Engineers
The “General Duty Clause” is essentially the
• UL mission that OSHA strives to enforce. It is
Underwriters Laboratories also often cited when OSHA investigates a
workplace accident. Many OSHA regulations
• NEMA are prescriptive in nature like the “General
National Electrical Duty Clause”. In other words, OSHA is
Manufacturers Association the “shall” or the reason for addressing an
issue. In some cases, OSHA will also provide
• ANSI detailed information on how to meet the
American National requirements. In other instances, OSHA
Standards Institute refers to national safety organizations such as The primary goal
NFPA to provide the required level of detail to of OSHA is “to
• ASTM meet the regulations. In either case, OSHA
American Society for covers all employees and all employers. ensure safe and
Testing and Materials healthful condi-
• NECA tions for every
OSHA Regulations
National Electrical American worker.”
Contractors Association Published by the U.S. Federal Register,
OSHA regulations can be found in the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) under Title
OSHA
29. More specifically, and legally enforced
by OSHA, Subpart S (Parts 1910.301 to
The primary goal of the Occupational Safety
1910.399) addresses “Electrical” safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) is “to ensure
standards and covers the practical
safe and healthful conditions for every American
safeguarding of electrical workers. Subpart
worker.” OSHA currently has thousands of rules
S is divided into four major divisions:
and regulations that cover workplace safety.
Federal and state OSHA programs enforce • Design safety standards
regulations through workplace inspections,
voluntary assistance programs, and training • Safety-related work practices
activities. Citations and fines are also levied
• Safety-related maintenance
for violations found during inspections.
requirements
• Safety requirements for special
equipment
19
HISTORY OF ELECTRICAL SAFETY
OSHA and NFPA Other OSHA standards outline some of In order to help meet the required OSHA
have worked with the general requirements for electrical regulations for electrical safety and training,
installations and general safe work practices: OSHA refers to NFPA 70E as a national
each other to estab- consensus standard for electrical safety in
lish standards and the workplace. NFPA also publishes NFPA 70,
codes that ensure 29 CFR 1910.132 otherwise known as the National Electrical
Personal Protective Equipment Code®, and other standards that address
employee safety in General Requirements public safety and practices. Together, OSHA
the workplace. and the NFPA continue to work to improve
29 CFR 1910.335 workplace safety. To ensure the safety of
Electrical Personal Protective Clothing your plant and personnel, OSHA and NFPA
standards should always be followed.
29 CFR 1910.147
Control of Hazardous Energy
(Lockout / tagout) IEEE
29 CFR 1910.269 The Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Power Generation, Transmission, Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) is an association of
& Distribution electrical and electronic engineers established
to advance the theory and application of
OSHA and NFPA have worked with each other electro-technology and allied sciences. The
to establish standards and codes that ensure Industry Application Society (IAS) of the IEEE
employee safety in the workplace. One of is the group that addresses power distribution
their objectives is to minimize the hazards of in industrial and similar facilities. There are
electricity through standards that specify safe numerous sub-committees that meet regularly
design characteristics and work practices for to research, publish, and update standards
electrical equipment and systems. Many of the and guidelines for the testing, evaluation,
standards and codes are not only accepted in and application of their particular industry
the United States, but throughout the world. or specialty. In 2002, the Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Committee IAS published
IEEE1584, entitled, IEEE Guide for Performing
NFPA Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. Although there
are other methods of determining Arc-Flash
The primary organization in the U.S. for fire and hazards, IEEE 1584 has quickly become
electrical safety standards is the NFPA. Their the de facto standard for determining the
document, NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical extent of potential Arc-Flash Hazards.
Safety in the Workplace, has been adopted by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
as an American National Standard. This standard NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TESTING
covers safety related work practices, defines LABORATORIES (NRTL)
qualified and unqualified workers and provides
guidance to establish an electrical safety The best-known NRTL is Underwriters Labora-
program. It also requires an electrical hazard tories, Inc. (UL). UL is an independent, not-for-
analysis for shock and flash, discusses energized profit product safety testing and certification
work permits, and proper Lockout/tagout organization that lists and labels products for
procedures. NFPA 70E defines and establishes conformance to accepted standards. Work-
shock and Arc-Flash approach boundaries to ing with industry associations, manufacturers,
energized equipment and addresses how to experts, insurance companies, and government
For more information: select appropriate PPE (personal protective agencies, UL publishes various standards and
equipment) and protective clothing. minimum test requirements for all types of
800-TEC-FUSE electrical equipment. Manufacturers submit
www.littelfuse.com
20
their products to be evaluated for conformance ANSI
to one or more of these standards. If the
product meets or exceeds the standards, UL The American National Standards Institute
lists the product in their guides and permits (ANSI) is a private, non-profit organization
manufacturers to display the UL label on the that administers and coordinates the U.S.
product. Protective devices such as fuses and voluntary standardization and conformity
circuit breakers must meet rigid standards such assessment system. Working in conjunction
as UL248, UL489, or UL1077. There are other with organizations such as NFPA, IEEE, NEMA,
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories ASME (American Society of Mechanical
such as Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Engineers), ASCE (American Society of Civil
Electrical Testing Laboratories (ETL) that test Engineers), AIMME (American Institute of
and evaluate products to UL or other industry Mining and Metallurgical Engineers), and
standards. Equipment that has been modified ASTM (American Society of Testing and
may require new evaluation and manufacturers Materials), ANSI coordinates and adopts
routinely submit their products to UL for re- these various industry consensus standards
evaluation to maintain their listing. and publishes standards to promote US and
Global conformity. ANSI has adopted many
NFPA, NEMA, and ASTM standards for
NEMA procedures, materials, and personal protective
equipment used by electrical workers.
The National Electrical Manufacturers
Association (NEMA) has over 400 member
companies including large, medium, and small ASTM
businesses that manufacture products used in
the generation, transmission and distribution, ASTM International, formerly known as the
control, and end-use of electricity. NEMA has American Society for Testing and Materials, is a
developed and published hundreds of standards voluntary standards development organization
jointly developed by its member companies. primarily involved with establishing standards
The standards have been established in the for the testing and analysis of materials. OSHA commonly
best interests of the industry and users The ASTM has published several standards is referred to as the
of its products. NEMA works closely with accepted by ANSI and other organizations that
the American National Standards Institute govern the manufacturing, testing methods, “Shall” and NFPA
(ANSI) and the International Electrotechnical and ratings of personal protective equipment 70E as the “How
Commission (IEC) to be an advocacy group to used by electrical and other workers. to” with regards to
UL and governmental agencies. Many NEMA
publications have been adopted by ANSI as electrical safety.
American National Standards. Some address the NECA
use and application of overcurrent protective
devices including AB3-2001 Molded Case NECA, the National Electrical Contractors
Circuit Breakers and their Application; AB4- Association, is in the process of developing
2003 Guidelines for Inspection and Preventive installation standards for electrical
Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers construction work. They have also developed
Used in Commercial and Industrial Applications; electrical safety standards with emphasis
and FU1-2002 Low-voltage Cartridge Fuses, on their members. In many cases, these
while others address safety issues such standards are being adopted by ANSI.
as safety signs, tags, and barricades.
21
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards
Over 20,000 standards have been developed “Justification
. for Work.
20,000 + to reduce the risk of electrical hazards. Except
for OSHA regulations most standards do not
Live parts to which an employee
might be exposed shall be put into an
standards have automatically become law. However, they are often electrically safe work condition before
adopted by governmental bodies and become law; an employee works on or near them,
been developed to
enforced by the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). unless the employer can demonstrate
reduce the risk of Other standards are written into manufacturing that deenergizating introduces
electrical hazards. and construction specifications. Whether law or additional or increased hazards or is
not, applicable standards should be followed to infeasible due to equipment design
improve safety and reduce potential hazards. or operational limitations. Energized
parts that operate at less than 50
volts to ground shall not be required
Working on deenergized equipment to be deenergized if there will be no
increased exposure to electrical burns
OSHA 29 Part 1910.333 covers selection and or to explosion due to electric arcs...”
use of (electrical) work practices. It defines and
regulates such things as working on or near When electrical equipment has been
energized or deenergized parts, Lockout / tagout deenergized, OSHA Part 1910.147 (c) and
procedures, who is or is not considered qualified 1910.333 (b)(2) requires Lockout/tagout
to work on live circuits, approach distances, use procedures be followed. Failure to follow
of personal protective equipment, and other Lockout/tagout procedures is also consistently
requirements. Paragraph 1910.333 (a)(1) reads: listed as one of the top ten OSHA violations.
“Deenergized parts. How to establish an electrically safe
Live parts to which an employee may work condition
be exposed shall be deenergized before
the employee works on or near them, Equipment that has been deenergized and
unless the employer can demonstrate verified as such is said to be in an electrically
that deenergizing introduces additional safe work condition. Article 120.1 of NFPA
or increased hazards or is infeasible 70E outlines 6 steps that must be followed
due to equipment design or operational to insure that employees are working in an
limitations. Live parts that operate electrically safe work condition. They are:
at less than 50 volts to ground need
not be deenergized if there will be no
increased exposure to electrical burns
or to explosion due to electric arcs.”
For more information:
To demonstrate the close relationship between . Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire
800-TEC-FUSE OSHA and NFPA 70E, here is what NFPA
70E Article 130.1 has to say regarding the
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
www.littelfuse.com need for equipment to be deenergized: which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.
22
1. “Determine all possible sources Working on energized equipment
of electrical supply to the specific
equipment. Check applicable Although the best practice is to always
up-to-date drawings, diagrams, work on deenergized equipment, OSHA
and identification tags. and NFPA do recognize that in some
circumstances it may create an additional
2. After properly interrupting the load hazard or be infeasible to deenergize.
current, open the disconnecting OSHA 29 CFR 1910.333 (a)(2) states:
device(s) for each source.
3. Wherever possible, visually verify “Energized parts.
that all blades of the disconnecting If the exposed live parts are not
devices are fully open or that deenergized (i.e., for reasons of
drawout-type circuit breakers increased or additional hazards or
are withdrawn to the fully infeasibility), other safety-related work
disconnected position. practices shall be used to protect
employees who may be exposed to
4. Apply Lockout / tagout devices in the electrical hazards involved. Such
accordance with a documented work practices shall protect employees
and established policy. against contact with energized
circuit parts directly with any part
5. Use an adequately rated voltage of their body or indirectly through
detector to test each phase some other conductive object….”
conductor or circuit part to verify
they are deenergized. Test each Electrical tasks such as troubleshooting and
phase conductor or circuit part testing for the presence of voltage, current,
both phase-to-phase and phase- etc., can only be done while equipment
to-ground. Before and after each is energized. In these instances, work on
test, determine that the voltage energized equipment is allowed, but workers Establish a “safe
detector is operating satisfactorily. must follow safe work practices and use the work condition”
appropriate PPE. Other exceptions that allow
6. Where the possibility of induced work on energized equipment include: and work on
voltages or stored electrical system components
energy exists, ground the phase • Life-support equipment deenergized
conductors or circuit parts before
touching them. Where it could be • Emergency alarm systems when possible.
reasonably anticipated that the
• Hazardous area ventilation
conductors or circuit parts being
equipment
deenergized could contact other
exposed energized or circuit parts,
apply ground connecting devices Deenergizing these types of equipment
rated for the available fault duty.” could increase or create additional hazards. A
mistake often made is confusing infeasibility
It is important to note that a safe work with inconvenience. For example, meeting
condition does not exist until all 6 steps are a manufacturing production schedule does
complete. During the process of creating not qualify as infeasible. It may be very
the electrically safe work condition, the inconvenient but it still does not authorize
appropriate PPE must also be utilized. working on energized equipment. OSHA 29
CFR 1910.331-335 outlines the conditions
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for for working on energized circuits in much
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire
greater detail. When work is to be performed
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, on energized equipment, extra care must
which is represented only by the standard in its entirety be used and all applicable OSHA and NFPA
23
ELECTRICAL SAFETY CODES AND STANDARDS
As a worker, you codes and standards followed. Electrical NFPA 70E Article 110.6 (D) Employee Training
may be qualified for workers must also be trained and specially covers the requirements for “Qualified” persons
“qualified” to work on energized equipment, in more detail. In addition to being trained
some tasks and un- and the specific equipment to be serviced. and knowledgeable, qualified persons must
qualified for other. also be familiar with emergency procedures,
special precautionary techniques, personal
Who is Qualified? protective equipment, Arc-Flash, insulating
Knowing the materials and tools, and testing equipment. In
difference between The definition of a “Qualified” person continues some instances, employees receiving on-the-
to change and evolve. As a worker, you may job training may be considered “Qualified”
the two can save be qualified for some tasks and unqualified for for specific duties under supervision.
your life. others. Knowing the difference may even save
your life. It is no longer sufficient for those who
will install and/or maintain electrical systems and Ultimately, a person can be considered
equipment to be just “familiar” with the hazards qualified with respect to certain equipment and
involved. Training is the key in determining who methods but still be considered unqualified
is considered a qualified worker. All personnel for others. Unqualified persons must also
who may be exposed to electrical hazards MUST be trained in the risks they are exposed to
receive documented training in order to become and the procedures that are necessary to
qualified. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.333 (c)(2) states; ensure their safety, however, they may not
be considered “qualified” to work on specific
equipment. It is vital that Unqualified workers
“Work on energized equipment. have an understanding of what tasks can
Only qualified persons may work on only be performed by Qualified workers.
electric circuit parts or equipment
that have not been deenergized under
the procedures of paragraph (b) of Energized Electrical Work Permit
this section. Such persons shall be
capable of working safely on energized Before work is performed on energized
circuits and shall be familiar with the equipment, NFPA 70E states:
proper use of special precautionary
techniques, personal protective
equipment, insulating and shielding Article 130 (A)(1)
materials, and insulated tools.” “If live parts are not placed in an
electrically safe work condition (i.e., for
Article 100 of the National Electrical Code® and the reasons of increased or additional
NFPA 70E also defines a Qualified Person as: hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work
to be performed shall be considered
energized electrical work and shall be
“Qualified Person performed by written permit only.”
One who has skills and knowledge
related to the construction and operation The intent of an Energized Electrical Work
of the electrical equipment and Permit is to discourage the practice of working
installations and has received safety on energized equipment. The objective is to
training on the hazards involved.” get the supervisor or manager to recognize
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National Electrical . Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for
Code ® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection Association, Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire
Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete and official Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
For more information: position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is represented complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
only by the standard in its entirety. which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
24
and fully understand the additional risks 1. The location and description of
involved so they will be less likely to approve equipment to be serviced
work on energized components. In essence, 2. Justification why circuit
this shifts the decision to work on energized cannot be deenergized
equipment from the worker to management.
3. Description of safe work
practices employed
According to the NFPA 70E Handbook, work
4. Results of the shock hazard analysis
permits can also be written to cover a certain
length of time for routine tasks provided the 5. Determination of the shock
worker is trained and qualified. Other tasks that protection boundaries
are not routine should generate a work permit
as needed to insure the worker is trained and 6. Results of the flash hazard analysis
qualified for the task. Exceptions to the written 7. The Flash Protection Boundary
work permit include testing, troubleshooting,
and voltage measuring by qualified workers. 8. Description of PPE to be used
9. Description of barriers used
to restrict access
NFPA 70E does not require a specific format for
an Energized Electrical Work Permit. However, 10. Evidence of job briefing
it should contain the following 11 elements:
11. Signature of responsible management
XYZ CompanY EnErgiZEd ElECtriCal Work pErmit HOW WILL ACCESS TO THE WORK AREA BE RESTRICTED FROM UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL?
Section 1 - Work request
(to be completed by person requesting the permit)
HAS A JOB BRIEFING BEEN COMPLETED?
Work ordEr no:
loCation: EQUipmEnt:
WHAT EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE?
Start datE: timE: timE rEQUirEd: timE rEQUirEd: The intent of
dESCription oF taSk:
WERE THERE ANY JOB SPECIFIC HAZARDS? an Energized
LE LE
dESCription oF EQUipmEnt:
IN YOUR OPINION, CAN THIS JOB BE COMPLETED SAFELY? YES NO
Electrical Work
SYStEm VoltagE:
Permit is to
P P
aVailaBlE FaUlt CUrrEnt: Signature of Qualified Person Date
discourage
M M
Section 2 - Justification of Work
(to be completed by Qualified person performing the work)
Signature of Qualified Person Date
the practice
A A
WHY iS taSk BEing pErFormEd in EnErgiZEd Condition?
Section 3 - Approval to Perform Work on Energized Equipment
of working
S S
on energized
WHat Work praCtiCES Will BE UtiliZEd to inSUrE SaFEtY? (To be completed by Management)
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE SHoCk analYSiS? IS WORK ON ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT APPROVED? equipment.
limitEd: rEStriCtEd: proHiBitEd: Signature of Manufacturing Manager Date
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE FlaSH HaZard analYSiS?
Signature of Plant Manager Date
HaZard riSk inCidEnt FlaSH protECtion
CatEgorY: EnErgY: BoUndarY: Signature of Safety Manager Date
WHat iS tHE rEQUirEd pErSonnEl protECtiVE EQUipmEnt (ppE) For tHiS taSk ?
Signature of Electrical Maintenance Manager Date
HARD HAT EAR PROTECTION VOLTAGE RATED GLOVES FR PANTS
SAFETY GLASSES T-SHIRT LEATHER GLOVES FR COVERALL
SAFETY GOGGLES LONG SLEEVE SHIRT COTTON UNDERWEAR FLASH SUIT
Signature of Qualified Person Date
FACE SHIELD FR SHIRT LONG PANTS LEATHER SHOES
FLASH HOOD
Figure 7
See Appendix C for Sample Work Permit Energized Electrical Work Permit
25
ELECTRICAL SAFETY CODES AND STANDARDS
Safety is the The implementation and proper use of Energized Employees are expected to:
responsibility of both Work Permits has forced employers and
employees to perform hazard risk assessments • Be trained and “qualified”
the employer and and justify working on potentially hazardous
employee. Together energized equipment. At this time, OSHA • Use the PPE provided
does not specifically require the written by their employer
they must develop
Energized Electrical Work Permit. However, it • Inform their employers of the
and implement is implied within current OSHA regulations and need to repair or replace PPE
safe work practices will most likely be enforced in future OSHA
and procedures revisions. For an example of an Energized At the end of the day, safety is the
Electrical Work Permit refer to Annex C of responsibility of both the employer and
and an Electrical this handbook or Annex J of NFPA 70E. employee. Together they must develop
Safety Program. and implement safe work practices and
procedures and an Electrical Safety Program.
Employer and Employee Responsibilities
According to OSHA and NFPA 70E, if work
is planned or performed on energized
equipment, employers must:
• Justify why work must be per-
formed on energized equipment.
• Perform an electrical hazard
assessment.
• Inform and train employees
of the potential hazards
and how to avoid them.
• Test and verify that employees
are “qualified” to work on
specific equipment.
• Select and provide proper personal
protective equipment for employees.
• Train employees how to
use and care for PPE.
• Provide their employees with a job
briefing and written Energized Work
Permit signed by management.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
26
Arc-Flash and Other Electrical Safety Hazards
Electrical Safety Hazards Electric Shock
When electrical systems break down When personnel come in contact with energized
what are the primary hazards and what conductors they receive a shock with current
are the consequences to personnel? flowing through their skin, muscles and vital
organs. The severity of the shock depends on
• Electric shock the current’s path through the body, the current
intensity, and the duration of the contact.
• Exposure to Arc-Flash They may only experience a mild tingling
• Exposure to Arc-Blast sensation or it could result in serious injury or
death. As voltage levels increase, the effects
• Exposure to excessive light of electric shock escalate. Current may also
and sound energies cause an erratic heartbeat known as ventricular
fibrillation. If fibrillation occurs even briefly and
Secondary hazards may include burns, the goes untreated, the effects are usually fatal.
release of toxic gases, molten metal, airborne
debris and shrapnel. Unexpected events can When personnel
cause startled workers to lose their balance A clear understanding of how electric current come in contact
and fall from ladders or jerk their muscles travels through the body can help minimize
possibly causing whiplash or other injuries. injury if such contact occurs. The table below with energized
outlines the effects that various values of conductors they
electrical current have on the human body. receive a shock
with current
CONDITION EFFECTS flowing through
their skin, muscles
1-3mA of current Mild sensation
and vital organs.
10mA of current Muscles contract, releasing grip may be difficult
30mA of current Breathing difficult, possible loss of consciousness
The shock may
30-75mA of current Respiratory paralysis result in a serious
100-200mA of current Ventricular fibrillation and sometimes
fatal injury.
50-300mA of current Shock (potentially fatal)
Over 1500mA of current Tissue and organ burn
150˚ F Cell destruction
200˚ F Skin experiences “third degree” burns
27
ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL SAFETY HAZARDS
There are three basic pathways electric 3) In a touch/step potential contact, cur-
current travels through the body; rent travels from one hand, through the
As little heart, down the leg, and out of the foot.
as 50 mA 1) Touch Potential (hand/hand path)
The heart and lungs are in the direct
path of current so ventricular fibrilla-
of current tion, difficulty in breathing, collapse,
can be fatal. 2) Step Potential (foot/foot path) unconsciousness, or death may occur.
3) Touch/Step Potential (hand/foot path) Even though there may be no external signs
from the electrical shock, internal tissue or organ
Figure 8 illustrates these groups and the path of damage may have occurred. Signs of internal
current through the body. damage may not surface immediately; and
when it does, it may be too late. Any person
1) In a touch potential contact, current experiencing any kind of electrical shock should
travels from one hand through the seek immediate medical attention. Using
heart and out through the other hand. the correct personal protective equipment
Because the heart and lungs are in (PPE) and following safe work practices will
the path of current, ventricular fibril- minimize risk of electrical shock hazards.
lation, difficulty in breathing, uncon-
sciousness, or death may occur.
Arc-Flash and Arc Blasts
2) In a step potential contact, current travels
from one foot through the legs, and out An Arc-Flash is an unexpected sudden release
of the other foot. The heart is not in the of heat and light energy produced by electricity
direct path of current but the leg muscles traveling through air, usually caused by
may contract, causing the victim to col- accidental contact between live conductors.
lapse or be momentarily paralyzed. Temperatures at the arc terminals can reach or
exceed 35,000 degrees Fahrenheit (F), or four
Figure 8
Source Ground Source
Source Ground Ground
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE TOUCH POTENTIAL
(hand/hand path)
STEP POTENTIAL
(foot/foot path)
TOUCH/STEP POTENTIAL
(hand/foot path)
www.littelfuse.com
28
times the temperature of the sun’s surface. The Since energy equals power multiplied by time,
air and gases surrounding the arc are instantly and power (wattage) is volts X amps, we can
heated and the conductors are vaporized see that calories are directly related to amperes,
causing a pressure wave called an Arc Blast. voltage, and time. The higher the current,
voltage and time, the more calories produced.
Personnel directly exposed to an Arc-Flash
and Arc-Blast events are subject to third To define the magnitude of an Arc-Flash and
degree burns, possible blindness, shock, blast the associated hazards, some basic terms have
effects and hearing loss. Even relatively small been established: The amount of instantaneous
arcs can cause severe injury. The secondary heat energy released by an Arc-Flash is generally
effect of arcs includes toxic gases, airborne called incident energy. It is usually expressed
debris, and potential damage to electrical in calories per square centimeter (cal/cm2) and
equipment, enclosures and raceways. The high defined as the heat energy impressed on an
temperatures of the arc and the molten and area measuring one square centimeter (cm2).
vaporized metals quickly ignite any flammable However, some calculation methods express
materials. While these fires may cause extensive the heat energy in Joules/cm2 and can be
property damage and loss of production, the converted to calories/cm2 by dividing by 4.1868.
hazards to personnel are even greater.
If we place instruments that measure incident
Any energized electrical conductor that makes energy at varying distances from a controlled
accidental contact with another conductor or Arc-Flash, we would learn that the amount
with ground will produce an Arc-Flash. The arcing of incident energy varies with the distance
current will continue to flow until the overcurrent from the arc. It decreases approximately as Incident energy is
protective device used upstream opens the the square of the distance in feet. Just like the instantaneous
circuit or until something else causes the current walking into a room with a fireplace, the
to stop flowing. The arc current can vary up to closer we are, the greater the heat energy. energy released by
the maximum available bolted fault current. Tests have indicated that an incident energy an Arc-Flash and is
of only 1.2 cal/cm2 will cause a second-degree usually expressed
burn to unprotected skin. A second-degree
Arc-Flash Metrics burn can be defined as “just” curable. in calories per
square centimeter
In order to determine the potential effects of an (cal/cm2).
Arc-Flash, we need to understand some basic For the purpose of understanding the potential
terms. An Arc-Flash produces intense heat at effects of an Arc-Flash, you must determine
the point of the arc. Heat energy is measured the working distance from an exposed “live”
in units such as BTU’s, joules, and calories. The part. Most measurements or calculations are
following data provides a basis for measuring made at a working distance of 18 inches. This
heat energy: distance is used because it is the approximate
distance a worker’s face or upper body torso
A Calorie is the amount of heat energy may be away from an arc, should one occur.
needed to raise the temperature of one Some parts of a worker may be less than 18
gram of water by one degree Celsius. inches away, but other work may be performed
at greater distances. The working distance
arc-flash metrics is used to determine the degree of risk and
the type of personal protection equipment
Energy (E) = Power (P) × Time (t) necessary to protect against the hazard.
Power (P) = Volts (V) × Amps (I)
Calories (E) = Volts (V) × Amps (I) × Time (t)
1 Calorie = 4.1868 watt-seconds NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace categorizes Arc-Flash Hazards into
1 Joule = 1 watt-second
five Hazard Risk Categories (HRC 0 through 4)
29
ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL SAFETY HAZARDS
The amount of incident energy
results/example
incident energy a (cal/cm2)
worker may be 0.0033 Amount of energy the sun produces in 0.1sec. on the ground’s surface at the equator.
exposed to during
1 Equivalent to a finger tip exposed to a cigarette lighter flame for one second
an Arc-Flash is
directly proportional 1.2 Amount of energy that will instantly cause 2nd degree burns to bare skin
to the clearing time
4 Amount of energy that will instantly ignite a cotton shirt
of the overcurrent
8 Amount of energy that will instantly cause incurable 3rd degree burns to bare skin
protective device.
based on the amount of energy that can be When a severe enough Arc-Flash occurs, the
In general, a released at a certain working distance during an overcurrent protective device (fuse or circuit
current-limiting Arc-Flash event. They are: breaker) upstream of the fault interrupts the
current. The amount of incident energy a worker
fuse will clear a incident energy may be exposed to during an Arc-Flash is directly
hazard risk category
fault much quicker (cal/cm2)
proportional to the total clearing ampere-squared
than a standard 0 to 1.2 0 seconds (I²t) of the overcurrent protective
device during the fault. High current and longer
circuit breaker. 1.21 to 4 1
exposure time produces greater incident energy.
4 .1 to 8 2 The only variable that can be positively and
effectively controlled is the time it takes for the
8.1 to 25 3
overcurrent protective device to extinguish the
25.1 to 40 4 arc. A practical and significant way to reduce the
duration of an Arc-Flash and thereby the incident
Studies show that many industrial Arc-Flash energy is to use the most current-limiting
events produce 8 cal/cm2 (HRC 2) or less, but OCPD’s throughout the electrical system.
other accidents can produce 100 cal/cm2 or more
(exceeding all HRC). It is important to remember
that it only takes 1.2 cal/cm2 (HRC 0) to cause a Current-limiting devices such as Littelfuse type
second degree burn to unprotected skin. LLSRK_ID or JTD_ID fuses will open in ½ AC
cycle (8.33 milliseconds) or less under short
circuit conditions. Studies have shown that many
What determines the severity of existing molded case circuit breakers take up
an Arc Flash? to 6 AC cycles (100 milliseconds) or longer to
open under short circuit conditions. Refer to the
Several groups and organizations have table on page 31 showing the typical opening
developed formulas to determine the times for various overcurrent protective devices.
incident energy available at various working
distances from an Arc-Flash. In all cases,
the severity of the Arc-Flash depends on Arc Blast Effect
one or more of the following criteria:
• Available short circuit current During an Arc-Flash, the rapidly expanding
• System voltage gases and heated air may cause blasts, pressure
waves, or explosions rivaling that of TNT.
For more information: • Arc gap The gases expelled from the blast also carry
the products of the arc with them including
• Distance from the arc
800-TEC-FUSE • Opening time of overcurrent
droplets of molten metal similar to buckshot. For
example, the high temperatures will vaporize
www.littelfuse.com protective device (OCPD) copper, which expands at the rate of 67,000
30
times its mass when it changes from solid to drop a tool or make contact between energized
vapor. Even large objects such as switchboard conductors. Faulty electrical equipment can
doors, bus bars, or other components can also produce a hazard while being operated.
be propelled several feet at extremely high Electrical safety hazards such as exposure to
velocities. In some cases, bus bars have shock and Arc-Flash can also be caused by:
been expelled from switchboard enclosures
entirely through walls. Blast pressures may • Worn or broken conductor insulation
exceed 2000 pounds per square foot, knocking
workers off ladders or collapsing workers’ • Exposed live parts
lungs. These events occur very rapidly with • Loose wire connections
speeds exceeding 700 miles per hour making it
impossible for a worker to get out of the way. • Improperly maintained switches
and circuit breakers
• Obstructed disconnect panels
Light and Sound Effects
• Water or liquid near electrical
The intense light generated by the Arc-Flash equipment
emits dangerous ultraviolet frequencies, which
may cause temporary or permanent blindness • High voltage cables
unless proper protection is provided. The • Static electricity
sound energy from blasts and pressure waves
can reach 160 dB, exceeding the sound of an • Damaged tools and equipment
airplane taking off, easily rupturing eardrums
and causing permanent hearing loss. For The severity and causes of electrical hazards are
comparison, OSHA states that decibel levels varied, but the best protection is to deenergize Circuit breakers
exceeding 85 dB require hearing protection. equipment before working on it. No one has can take up to
ever been killed or injured from an Arc-Flash
while working on deenergized equipment. If 12 times longer
Common Causes equipment cannot be deenergized, electrical
to open under
workers must be “qualified”, trained, wear
The most common cause of Arc-Flash and other appropriate personal protective equipment short circuit
electrical accidents is carelessness. No matter (PPE), and follow all applicable OSHA and conditions
how well a person may be trained, distractions, NFPA standards. It is important to remember
than current-
weariness, pressure to restore power, or over- that proper selection and application of
confidence can cause an electrical worker to overcurrent protective devices (OCPD) will limiting fuses.
bypass safety procedures, work unprotected, also substantially reduce the hazards.
typ. opening time typICAL opening time
overcurrent protective device at 8 × rating at 20 × rating
Current-limiting fuses or
0.1 to 1 second < ½ cycle = 8.3 milliseconds
current-limiting circuit breakers
Molded case circuit breakers without adj. trip 5 to 8 seconds 1.5 cycles = 25 milliseconds
Molded case circuit breakers with adj. trip 1 to 20 seconds 1.5 cycles = 25 milliseconds
Large air power breakers with electronic trip 5 to 20 seconds 3 cycles = 50 milliseconds
Medium voltage breakers with electronic trip 5 to 20 seconds 5 to 6 cycles = 100 milliseconds
31
Electrical Hazard Analysis
Electric Hazard Both OSHA and NFPA 70E require an Electrical Limited Approach Boundary
Analysis is required Hazard Analysis prior to beginning work on The Limited Approach Boundary is an
or near electrical conductors that are or may approach boundary to protect personnel
for all areas of the become energized. The analysis must include all from shock. A boundary distance is
electrical system electrical hazards: shock, Arc-Flash, Arc-Blast, established from an energized part
that operate at 50 and burns. NFPA 70E Article 110.8(B)(1) based on system voltage. To enter this
specifically requires Electrical Hazard Analysis boundary, unqualified persons must be
volts or higher. within all areas of the electrical system that accompanied by a qualified person and
operate at 50 volts or greater. The results of the use PPE.
Electrical Hazard Analysis will determine the
work practices, protection boundaries, personal
protective equipment, and other procedures Restricted Approach Boundary
required to protect employees from Arc-Flash The Restricted Approach Boundary is an
or contact with energized conductors. approach boundary to protect personnel
from shock. A boundary distance is
established from an energized part
Shock Hazard Analysis based on system voltage. Only qualified
persons are allowed in this boundary
NFPA 70E Articles 110.8(B)(1) and 130.2(A) and they must use PPE.
require a Shock Hazard Analysis. The Shock
Hazard Analysis determines the system
voltage to which personnel can be exposed, Prohibited Approach Boundary
the protection boundary requirements as The Prohibited Approach Boundary is an
established in NFPA 70E Table 130.2(C), and approach boundary to protect personnel
identifies personal protective equipment from shock. Work in this boundary is
(PPE) required to minimize shock hazards. considered the same as making direct
contact with an energized part. Only
qualified persons are allowed to enter
Approach Boundaries this boundary and they must use PPE.
NFPA 70E has established three
shock protection boundaries:
1) Limited Approach Boundary
For more information: 2) Restricted Approach Boundary
3) Prohibited Approach Boundary
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
32
Shock protection boundaries are based on In summary, a Shock Hazard Analysis is
system voltage and whether the exposed performed to reduce the potential for direct
energized components are fixed or movable. shock. It will establish shock protection
NFPA 70E Table 130.2(C) defines these boundaries and determine PPE required for
boundary distances for nominal phase-to- protecting workers against shock hazards.
phase system voltages from 50 Volts to 800kV.
Approach Boundary distances may range from
an inch to several feet. Please refer to NFPA
70E Table 130.2(C) for more information.
ry
da
un
Bo
tion
Flash Protec
1 2 3 A
Completing a shock
hazard analysis
establishes the
system voltage,
shock protection
boundaries and type
of personal protec-
tion equipment
required to protect
workers against
shock hazards.
1 Limited Approach Boundary
2 Restricted Approach Boundary
3 Prohibited Approach Boundary
A Energized Part
Figure 9
Shock Protection Boundaries
33
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
In part, Arc-Flash Flash Hazard Analysis at every point where service on energized
hazard calcula- equipment, devices, or conductors may be
A complete electrical hazard analysis must also required. The discussion and examples that
tions are based on contain a Flash Hazard Analysis. NFPA 70E Article follow are intended to introduce readers to the
the available fault 130.3 requires this analysis to be performed: required data and some of the methods for
current and the performing an electrical flash hazard analysis at
600 volts and below. Readers are cautioned that
opening time of “A Flash Hazard Analysis calculations for systems with different voltages,
overcurrent protec- shall be done in order to protect equipment, devices, and a wider range of fault
tive devices. personnel from the possibility of being currents require the more complete methods
injured by an Arc-Flash. The analysis contained in NFPA 70E Article 130 and Annex D.
shall determine the Flash Protection
Boundary and the personal protective
equipment that people within the Flash According to NFPA 70E, the default Flash
Protection Boundary shall use.” Protection Boundary is four feet (48”) based
on an OCPD clearing time of 6 cycles (0.1
sec) and an available fault current of 50 kA
The analysis requires the available fault current or other combinations not exceeding 5,000-
to be calculated and documented at every ampere seconds. For other conditions or
point in the electrical system. This includes all under engineering supervision, calculations
components contained in the electrical system. are permitted to determine the Flash
The end result of this research will be an accurate, Protection Boundary. Complete formulas
documented one-line diagram, which will provide for varying conditions are given in NFPA
the data for a short circuit analysis, and the other 70E Article 130 and NFPA 70E Annex D.
calculations that determine the Flash Protection
Boundary and required level of PPE. In part,
Arc-Flash hazard calculations are based on the The following data is required to
available fault current and the opening time of complete the Flash Hazards Analysis:
overcurrent protective devices. NFPA 70E has also
assigned Hazard Risk Categories based on the • Up-to-date one-line circuit diagram
estimated incident energy (typically expressed in of the electrical distribution system
cal/cm²), from an Arc-Flash.
• Available fault current from
the utility or generator
• Maximum available bolted fault
The Flash Protection Boundary (FPB)
currents at each location
The Flash Protection Boundary is the
distance in feet (DC ) from a given arc • Minimum self-sustaining
source that will produce a second- arcing current at each location
degree burn on exposed bare skin.
• Clearing times of all
overcurrent protective devices
Unlike the Shock Hazard Protection Boundaries
that are based solely on system voltage, the As power is distributed throughout your facility, it
Flash Protection Boundary is not fixed. In order is important to remember that although voltage
to determine the potential Arc-Flash hazard, levels may be higher at the service entrance,
Flash Protection Boundaries must be calculated secondary power distribution transformers can
produce much higher current levels and Arc-
For more information: . Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for Flash energy levels. Power utilities should be
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire consulted regularly to establish the maximum
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
800-TEC-FUSE complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.
available fault current at the service entrance
location of your building. Hand calculations or
www.littelfuse.com
34
commercial software can be used to estimate the Multiple methods are also provided in NFPA
maximum available short circuit current at every 70E Annex D for estimating incident energy
access point in your electrical system. under varying conditions. The results can vary
drastically depending on the specific system
parameters. An arcing fault will also produce very
Arc-Flash Calculations different incident energy levels depending on if
the arc is in open air or confined in a cubic box.
If the maximum available fault current at a The formula in Table B estimates the incident
particular location is known, then an analysis of the energy for a fault occurring in a 20 inch cubic
upstream overcurrent protective device (OCPD) box with one side open. This estimate simulates
will determine how fast the device will clear the the potential effect of an arc-flash while working
circuit at the fault current. If these two factors in equipment and switchgear enclosures.
are known, the amount of incident energy and
the Flash Protection Boundary can be calculated.
During arcing faults the arc impedance
(resistance) reduces arc current. Because
The Flash Protection Boundary (Dc) measured the opening times of OCPD increase as the
in feet is based on the bolted fault mega volt- short-circuit current (Isc) decreases, lower
amperes (MVAbf) and the clearing time (t) of arc fault currents may greatly increase the
the OCPD. If the bolted fault current (Isc) is not total arc energy. Studies have shown that
known, it can be calculated based on the MVA the minimum self-sustainable arc in 480 volt
rating and impedance of the source transformer. systems is 38% of the available bolted fault
An alternate method of determining the Flash current. Because of the increased time at this
Protection Boundary based on the MVA rating of reduced fault level, the incident energy may be
a source transformer with an impedance of 5% higher than under bolted fault conditions. Each
and the clearing time (t) of the OCPD is supplied point in the system needs to be evaluated for
in NFPA 70E. Table A provides a basic formula both maximum and minimum fault currents.
for calculating the Flash Protection Boundary.
NFPA 70E refers
to three methods
Table A to determine
Dc = [2.65 x MVA bf x t]½ OR Dc = [53 x MVA x t]½ the incident
DC = FPB distance in ft. from the Arc energy or Hazard
MVAbf = Available bolted fault MVA in mega volt-amps at point of fault Risk Category.
MVA = Transformer capacity in mega volt-amps
t = Clearing time of overcurrent protective device in seconds
Table B
-1.4738 2 2
E = 1038.7 D t [0.0093F -0.3453F + 5.9675] cal/cm
MB B A
EMB = Maximum 20 in. cubic box incident energy
DB = Distance from arc electrodes, (usually 18 in.)
tA = Arc duration, seconds
F = Bolted fault current in kA
Note: The formula in Table B only applies to systems where the available
short circuit current is in the range of 16kA to 50kA.
35
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
The following Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation Examples
example illustrates
the difference in The following examples break down the
incident energy calculations and compare the Hazard Risk
between a current- Category (HRC), Incident Energy (cal/cm²), Flash
Protection Boundary (FPB) and PPE (Personal
limiting fuse and a Protective Equipment) required to work on an
circuit breaker. energized 480V system protected by either
2500 Amp Class L fuses or a 2500 Amp low
voltage power circuit breaker.
Example 1 Example 2
Calculation for energized work in the Calculation for energized work in the
transformer metering section of a 2000 kVA transformer metering section of a 2000 kVA
substation. Transformer secondary substation. Transformer secondary
protected with current-limiting fuses. protected with a circuit breaker.
2000 kVA 2000 kVA
4160V/480V 4160V/480V
5.5%Z 5.5%Z
FUSE: CIRCUIT BREAKER
V A Littelfuse KLPC2500 V A
CLEARING TIME: CLEARING TIME:
0.01 sec @ 43.7kA 0.083 sec @ 43.7 kA
Refer to Annex D for Step by step instructions of this example.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
36
Example 1 (continued) Example 2 (continued)
NFPA 70E Article 130.3 (A) NFPA 70E Article 130.3 (A)
Flash Protection Boundary Distance Flash Protection Boundary Distance
Calculate MVAbf : Calculate MVAbf :
Note: 2000 kVA = 2 MVA Note: 2000 kVA = 2 MVA
MVA bf = 100 × MVA = 100 × 2 MVA bf = 100 × MVA = 100 × 2
%Z 5.5 %Z 5.5
MVA bf = 36.4 MVA MVA bf = 36.4 MVA
Calculate DC : Calculate DC :
t = 0.01 sec t = 0.083 sec
DC = (2.65 × MVAbf × t) DC = (2.65 × MVAbf × t)
DC = (2.65 × 36.4 × 0.01) = 0.98 ft ≅ 12 inches DC = (2.65 × 36.4 × 0.083) = 2.83 ft ≅ 34 inches
NFPA 70E Annex D.6.2(a) NFPA 70E Annex D.6.2(a)
Incident Energy Exposure Incident Energy Exposure
Calculate Isc: Calculate Isc:
Isc = MVA × 10 × 100 Isc = MVA × 10 × 100
6 6
3 × VAC %Z 3 × VAC %Z In this example,
the incident en-
Isc = 2 × 106 × 100 = 43,738 Amps Isc = 2 × 106 × 100 = 43,738 Amps
3 × 480 5.5 3 × 480 5.5 ergy for a current-
limiting fuse is
Calculate F:
Isc 43,738 A
Calculate F:
Isc 43,738 A
eight
F=
1000
=
1000
= 43.7 kA F=
=
1000 1000
= 43.7 kA
times
Calculate EMB: Calculate EMB: lower
For this calculation, DB = 18 inches For this calculation, DB = 18 inches than the incident
energy for a
EMB = 1038.7 × DB-1.4738 × ta × (0.0093 F 2 – 0.3453 F + 5.9675) EMB = 1038.7 × DB-1.4738 × ta × (0.0093 F 2 – 0.3453 F + 5.9675)
circuit breaker.
EMB = 1038.7 × (18) –1.4738 × (.01) × [0.0093 (43.7)2 – 0.3453 (43.7) EMB = 1038.7 × (18)–1.4738 × (.083) × [0.0093 (43.7)2 – 0.3453 (43.7)
+5.9675] + 5.9675]
EMB = 1.27 cal/cm2 EMB = 10.54 cal/cm2
In this example the incident energy is much less when
a current-limiting fuse is used to provide protection.
37
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
According to the
Data Ex. 1 - Fuse Ex. 2 - circuit breaker
previous example
the required level
of PPE needed
while working
on the equipment
protected by
the circuit breaker
would be much
greater than the Example Results Comparison NFPA 70E are based on IEEE 1584 but do
level of PPE needed not contain all the data or descriptions of
As the examples show, the Flash Protection how these methods were developed. IEEE
while working on Boundary, Incident Energy, and Hazard Risk 1584 outlines 9 steps necessary to properly
the equipment pro- Category can vary greatly depending on the perform an Arc-Flash hazard calculation.
tected by the fuse. overcurrent protective device being used. In
this particular comparison, the required level of
PPE would also be quite different between the Step 1
fuse and circuit breaker. The above calculations
can also be performed using commercially Collect the system and installation data
available software programs. Refer to Annex D
of this handbook for more details on the steps Depending on whether you are doing a
required to complete the hand calculations. complete site analysis or looking at one
individual portion, this step can take a few
minutes or several weeks to perform. Begin
IEEE 1584 Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation by reviewing the latest up-to-date single line
diagram(s) of the equipment or system you
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic are analyzing. If single line diagrams are not
Engineers (IEEE) publishes the IEEE 1584 available, you must create them. The utility
“Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard can provide you with the available fault MVA
Calculations.” It contains detailed methods and and X/R ratio at the entrance to your facility.
data that can be used to calculate Arc-Flash If you generate your own electricity, or if you
Hazards for the simplest to the most complex have emergency or standby generators and
systems. The Petroleum and Chemical Industry large motors, a more detailed analysis must be
committee of the IEEE spent many years performed. In order to calculate the bolted fault
developing these methods. They are based on current available at the point of your application,
empirical testing of Class RK1 and Class L fuses, you must record on your one line diagram all
Low Voltage Molded Case Circuit Breakers, transformers and their ratings, circuit breakers
Insulated Case Circuit Breakers and Low Voltage or fusible distribution circuits and their ratings,
Power Circuit Breakers as well as theoretical MCC’s, and all other equipment between the
modeling. Included in 1584 are spreadsheet power source and the area you are concerned
programs that simplify the calculation of with. Next, you must record the size, type,
incident energy and flash-protection boundaries. length, and number of cables or busbars, etc.
used between the utility and the distribution and
control equipment being analyzed. The type of
IEEE 1584 does not address the Safety- conduit or raceway must also be recorded. All
For more information: related Work Pratices in the same manner as transformer data must be recorded including
NFPA 70E. IEEE 1584 concerns itself primarily MVA ratings and impedance, and all overcurrent
800-TEC-FUSE with performing the calculations that may
be necessary to determine safe practices.
protective devices must be identified with their
specific characteristics or trip ratings recorded.
www.littelfuse.com The calculation methods in Annex D of
38
Step 2 immediately on the LINE side of the equipment
you are analyzing. If the fuse manufacturer
Determine the system modes of operation or circuit breaker manufacturer publishes
maximum and minimum clearing times, it is
Most installations have only one mode of important to use the maximum clearing time
operation with one utility connection. However, possible for the predicted arc fault current.
larger industrial or commercial buildings or
manufacturing plants may have two or more
utility feeders with tie switching of two or NOTE: This step can be omitted if the
more transformers, or co-generators running overcurrent protective devices are those
in parallel. Each mode can be very complex already tested and listed in the IEEE 1584
and require a detailed hazard analysis. document. See Section 4.6 of IEEE 1584.
Step 3 Step 6
Determine the bolted fault currents Document the system voltages and classes
of equipment
You can perform hand calculations or use
commercially available software programs such Make sure you document the system voltages
as the Littelfuse EDR software to calculate the and class of equipment such as 15kV switchgear,
bolted fault currents at all points between the 5kV switchgear, low-voltage switchgear, low-
utility and the distribution or control equipment voltage MCCs and panelboards, or cable runs.
you are analyzing. It will be necessary to plug
in all of the data you have recorded about the
transformers, cable sizes and lengths, and Step 7
type of conduit, etc. used in each installation
to determine the bolted fault currents. Select the working distances
IEEE 1584 is
IEEE 1584 has established three typical working one method
Step 4 distances for different classes of equipment.
As previously discussed, incident energy of determining
Determine the arc fault currents calculations and Hazard Risk Categories will incident energy
depend on the working distances selected. and Flash Protection
After determining the bolted fault currents, IEEE
1584 provides a formula to calculate the predicted Boundaries (FPB).
arc fault current due to typical arc impedance Step 8 Another method
and other factors. The predicted arc fault current will be to use NFPA
for system voltages under 1kV depends on the Determine the incident energy for
bolted fault current, system voltage, arc gap, all equipment 70E equations and
and whether the arc would most likely occur in calculations.
the open air or in an enclosed box configuration. You can use formulas included in the IEEE 1584
document or commercially available software
to calculate the incident energy possible in
Step 5 cal/cm2 at the working distance selected.
Find the protective device characteristics and
the duration of the arcs Step 9
From the data collected in Step 1 and the Determine the flash protection boundary
predicted arc fault current determined in Step for all equipment
4, the next step is to establish the total clearing
time of the overcurrent protective device The formulas given within IEEE 1584 can
39
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
The Table Method be used to determine the distance from Steps Required to Use the NFPA 70E
may be used in the arc at which the onset of a second- Table Method
degree burn will occur to unprotected
lieu of a complete skin. This distance must be established Step 1
Flash Hazard and will vary based on system parameters.
Analysis. However, Software programs automatically calculate Once the equipment is identified where work
the distance based on the arc fault current, is to be performed, review the up-to-date one
a complete analysis system voltage, arc gap, and arc duration. line drawing for information about the available
will provide more short circuit current and other details about
accurate results. the location of the equipment. If the one line
If the overcurrent protective devices (OCPD) drawing is not up to date or the available short
are something other than those covered circuit is not known, it must be determined.
by IEEE 1584, or if the voltage levels and
short circuit currents exceed the IEEE 1584 Step 2
limitations, then the opening times of
the overcurrent protective devices must Consult NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) and find
be analyzed and the corresponding Flash the task to be performed. If the desired task to
Protection Boundary and incident energy be performed is not listed, the Table Method
must be calculated by another method. cannot be used and a complete Flash Hazard
Analysis is required.
NFPA 70E Table Method Step 3
Although NFPA 70E (Article 130.3) requires Once you find your task in the table, identify the
a Flash Hazard Analysis, it also provides an Hazard Risk Category and determine if voltage
alternate method for determining Hazard rated gloves or tools are required.
Risk Categories and required PPE. This is
commonly called the “Table Method” and Step 4
is based on various tasks to be performed
on energized equipment (see NFPA 70E Verify that the conditions stated in the footnotes
Table 130.(C)(9)(a)). The Table Method may for NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), and any
be used in lieu of a complete Flash Hazard Tentative Interim Amendments such as those
Analysis in some cases. However, a complete stated in NFPA 70E, are applicable to the task.
analysis provides more accurate results.
Step 5
Caution is advised when using the Table Using NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(10-11) and
Method. All footnotes listed at the end of the corresponding notes in Table 130.7(C)(9)(a),
NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) and in any identify the required PPE for the task.
applicable Tentative Interim Amendments
must be observed and all prescribed conditions Step 6
verified. If a task is not listed in NFPA 70E
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) or cannot be verified, The NFPA 70E Table Method does not provide
then NFPA 70E leaves no other alternative the Flash Protection Boundary, but it must be
but to do a complete hazard risk assessment determined. For systems 600V and below,
using one of the other calculation methods. NFPA 70E defines the FPB as 4 feet. See NFPA
70E for more information on calculating the FPB.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
40
Whether calculations are made or NFPA 70E
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is used, the results of an
Electrical Hazard Analysis (Shock and Flash
Hazard Analysis) will determine the following:
• The Limited Approach Boundary
• The Restricted Approach Boundary
• The Prohibited Approach Boundary
• Incident Energy possible at
each location
• Flash Protection Boundary
• Hazard Risk Category
• PPE required to work on
energized equipment
OSHA regulations
must be followed
to perform a hazard
assessment, and
to determine the
PPE required for
properly protecting
electrical workers.
41
Minimizing Arc-Flash and Other Electrical Hazards
Estimates show that NFPA 70E guidelines and practices are generally 1. Design a safer system.
10 Arc-Flash considered the “How to” of conforming to the
OSHA regulations when performing a hazard Goals
incidents assessment, and determining the required PPE. When designing a safer system the following
occur every day There are many practices that will help reduce goals and factors should be considered:
in the U.S. Arc-Flash and other electrical hazards while
• Provide maximum protection to
conforming to OSHA and NFPA 70E regulations
personnel, equipment, and property.
and guidelines. Circuit designers and electrical
maintenance engineers should carefully consider • Meet all applicable code require-
each of the following recommendations: ments (OSHA, NFPA, Building
and Insurance codes, etc.)
1. Design a safer system. • Utilize current-limiting overcurrent
protective devices to minimize
2. Use and upgrade to current-limiting Arc-Flash hazards.
overcurrent protective devices. • Utilize “touch-safe” components
to minimize exposure to energized
3. Implement an Electrical Safety Program. components
4. Observe safe work practices. • Utilize fuses with blown fuse
indication to minimize exposure
5. Use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). to energized components while
trouble-shooting the circuit.
6. Use Warning Labels.
• Provide selective coordination
(only the area where the
7. Use an Energized Electrical Work Permit.
fault occurs is shut-off)
8. Avoid hazards of improperly selected or • Provide a system that is safe to
maintained overcurrent protective devices. service and maintain.
9. Achieve or Increase Selective Coordination.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
42
System Requirements • Current-limitation
Current-limiting OCPDs reduce
Once the goals for your system are established, damage from major faults. Often
the selection of the overcurrent protective devices or equipment can be easily
devices that best meet those goals can be repaired rather than face time-con-
determined. What is the best choice for your suming and costly replacement.
application; fuses or circuit breakers? Fuses offer
many safety and performance advantages over • Are your sensitive control devices such as
circuit breakers. Factors to consider include: motor starters truly protected?
After a fault, will the units be usable or will
they require replacement? Only current-
• System voltage limiting fuses can provide Type 2 Protec-
Voltage ratings for fuses are stan- tion. That means you are up and running
dardized at 250, 300, and 600 once the cause of the fault is removed.
volts. In comparison, some circuit
breakers are rated for dual volt- 2. Use and upgrade to current-limiting
ages and are often mis-applied. overcurrent protective devices.
• Interrupting rating The incident energy from an Arc-Flash depends
Most fuses have standard ratings of on the magnitude of the current and the time it
200kA at full rated voltage. Circuit is allowed to flow. Within their current-limiting
breaker interrupting ratings may range range, current-limiting devices reduce the peak
from 10kA to 100kA, but the interrupt- fault current. Current-limiting fuses have much
ing ratings of many breakers vary with faster clearing times when operating within
system voltage and type of trip unit. their current-limiting range than standard circuit
breakers. The faster the overcurrent protective
• System changes resulting in increased device clears the fault, the lower the I²t and
available fault current incident energy will be. If current-limiting fuses
If your facility grows or the utility makes are used, the incident energy and the Hazard Upgrading to
changes, fault currents have been Risk Category may be reduced significantly. Class RK1 or Class J
known to more than double. Interrupting
ratings of overcurrent protective devices current- limiting
must be regularly reviewed to insure Upgrade to Class RK1 or Class J current- fuses is the
the device will still protect the system. limiting fuses easiest way to:
• Load current characteristics One of the quickest and easiest ways to reduce
Inductive loads such as motors and potential incident energy, lower the Hazard Risk • Reduce potential
transformers and even large incandes- Categories and reduce the required PPE, is to Arc-Flash hazards
cent lamps have large inrush currents replace UL Class H, K5 or Class RK5 fuses with
that require circuit breakers to be current-limiting UL Class RK1 or Class J fuses.
oversized so that overload protection is Upgrading to time-delay Class J fuses affords the • Reduce Hazard
sacrificed. Properly selected time-delay best solution by providing the best current limitation Risk Categories
fuses can be sized close to load currents while assuring non-interchangeability with non-
and will offer better overload protection. current-limiting fuses. If an equipment manufacturer
• Reduce the
amount of
required PPE
43
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
Current-limiting fuses has specified a non-time delay fuse, standard Class circuit and maximizes safety by minimizing
that also offer blown J fuses are available. If your equipment already has exposure to energized components when
UL Class H fuse clips, it is very easy to replace the trouble-shooting. Replacing non-current-
fuse indication such Class H or K5 fuses being used with Class RK1 limiting fuses with Littelfuse current-limiting
as the Littelfuse Class fuses. For a given current and voltage rating, UL Indicator® fuses can significantly reduce the:
RK1 LLSRK_ID series Class H, K5, RK5, and RK1 fuses are the same
physical size, therefore, it is easy and strongly • Incident energy from an Arc-Flash
can help: recommended to upgrade to better fuse protection.
To assure that only current-limiting fuses are used, • The Hazard Risk Category
• reduce exposure to consider changing to Class J clips or to rejection • The level and type of PPE necessary
electrical hazards type clips that will accept only Class R fuses.
• Trouble-shooting and downtime.
• decrease downtime Current-limiting fuses that also offer blown
fuse indication such as the Littelfuse Class
J JTD_ID and Class RK1 LLSRK_ID can help
• maximize safety
reduce exposure to electrical hazards. The
unique blown fuse indicator decreases
downtime by immediately indicating the opened
Use the table below to consolidate your
fuse inventory and eliminate unsafe or
unnecessary fuses.
You Should Use This Fuse.... If You Have This Fuse....
Class L KLPC KLPC KRPC A4BQ LCL
KLLU KLU A4BY LCU
KTU A4BT
Class RK1 LLSRK_ID FLSR FRSR TRS GF6B
(600 Volts) FLSR_ID NOS* OTS* ECSR
NLS* RES* RFS* LESRK
RLS* LPSRK A6DR KOS*
LLSRK KTSR* A6KR* ERS*
KLSR*
Class RK1 LLNRK FLNR FRNR TR GF6A
(250 Volts) NLN* NON* OT* ECNR
RLN* REN* RF* LENRK*
KLNR* LPNRK A2DR KON*
KTNR* A2KR* ERN*
Class J JTD_ID JTD LPJ AJT JDL
JLS* JHC A4J* JFL*
JKS*
Class CC CCMR FLM LPCC ATDR EDCC
FLQ FNM TRM MEN
KLDR FNQ ATQ MEQ
KLK FNQR ATQR HCTR
BLS KTKR ATMR HCLR
For more information: BLF KTK SBS MCL
BLN BBS OTM EBS
KLKR BAF ATM MOL
800-TEC-FUSE * Consult Article 430 of the NEC® when substituting for loads with motors, or call 800-TEC-FUSE
BAN
www.littelfuse.com
44
3. Implement an Electrical Safety Program. as well as hand tools are often overlooked and
must be insulated and rated for the voltage
Electrical Safety Programs protect both of the circuits where they will be used. All
employees and employers and provide goals, tools and equipment used for maintenance
procedures and work practices to insure safety. must also be periodically inspected to ensure
NFPA 70E Article 110.7 requires employers they are not damaged (i.e. torn insulation)
to establish an Electrical Safety Program that and are still in good working condition.
must be documented and include the minimum
following components:
Disconnect Operation
• Scope of the Program
Operating a damaged disconnect switch,
• Company Philosophy whether it’s a fusible switch or circuit breaker,
• Responsibilities can be dangerous. Serious injury could occur if
someone is standing in front of a faulty switch
• Establishment of a Safety or circuit breaker while opening or closing
Team or Committee the device. If the handle is on the right hand
side of the device, stand to the right, use
• Written Procedures
your left hand to grasp the handle, turn your
• Work Instructions face away and then operate it. If the handle
is on the left side, reverse the procedure.
• Identification of Industry Codes Use special caution while operating circuit
& Standards to be adhered to breakers. If closed into a fault, circuit breakers
• Establishment of a Documented will trip, drawing an internal arc. The gases
Training Program from the arc are very hot, and vent through
openings in the breaker. These hot gases often
• Establishment of Assessment vent around the handle and can cause burns
and Audit Requirements unless proper protective equipment is used.
The implementation
• Company Policies and Enforcement
and enforcement
Proper Service or Repair of All
Increased safety will be possible with the Equipment or Devices of a well-designed
implementation and vigorous enforcement of Electrical Safety
a well-designed and documented Electrical a) Locate the equipment where work is to be Program in accor-
Safety Program. These programs should performed. If equipment is running, follow
be in accordance with all OSHA regulations manufacturer’s shutdown procedures being dance with OSHA
and nationally recognized safety standards sure that all unit switches are off. Do not and NFPA 70E will
such as NFPA 70E and NEC®. For more open any enclosures. Determine if there is increase safety in
information on establishing an Electrical adequate working space and that it is clear
Safety Program, refer to NFPA 70E Annex E of obstructions. your facility.
or NFPA’s Electrical Safety Program Book.
b) Locate all disconnecting means providing
power to the equipment, including all
4. Observe safe work practices sources of emergency, alternate, and control
power. This must include discharging
Maintenance capacitors and other sources of stored
energy. Turn all disconnecting devices to the
Safe maintenance practices and procedures OFF position and apply lockout/tagout
include properly training employees in the devices as required by OSHA and the
knowledge of the equipment and tools company’s Electrical Safety Program.
necessary for maintenance and repair. NFPA
70E states that employees “shall be trained c) While wearing proper personal protective
in and familiar with the specific maintenance equipment, open the enclosure door or
procedures and tests required.” Test equipment access panels. Test the voltage meter to be
45
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
It is estimated that used on a known energized source to be Equipment containing circuit breakers
Lockout/Tagout sure it is working properly. Test all exposed
wires, contacts and other components likely i) After following steps 1 through 3 above,
prevents about to be energized insuring that the equipment look for circuit breakers and examine to
120 fatalities and is in an electrically safe work condition. see if any are tripped. Examine the circuit
breaker(s) to see if the case or surround-
50,000 workday Equipment containing fuses ing area shows signs of severe venting
injuries annually. indicating a serious fault.
d) If it is suspected there is one or more
Source:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration opened fuses, remove fuses from the circuit j) Investigate the circuit for the causes of
using the proper size fuse puller. circuit breaker tripping. Correct the problem.
Note: The use of Littelfuse Indicator® If breaker is protecting motor starters,
Fuses will minimize time required to especially IEC or single-purpose type, test
locate opened fuses, and help avoid the motor starters to be sure they are still
mixing them with good fuses. functional. If the motor starters have
heaters (resistance coils) in the overloads,
e) Place fuses on a non-conductive surface and test the resistance across the heaters to
measure fuse resistance across the ends insure they are still functional.
(endcaps/blades) of the fuse with a meter. If
the fuses have knife blades be sure to test k) Test resistance across the poles of the
from blade to blade since some types of open circuit breaker to be sure all poles are
fuses have insulated end caps and will give a open and there are no shorts between
false reading. High resistance indicates that poles. Close the circuit breaker and
the fuse may be open. measure resistance across the closed
poles to insure resistances are within
f) Investigate the circuit to identify the cause of tolerances and are equal from pole to pole.
any blown fuses. Look for loose connections
or signs of overheating. Correct the problem. Placing equipment in service
g) Verify the proper fuse class, voltage, ampere, l) Following manufacturer’s instructions, close
and interrupting ratings before installing all internal switches and circuit breakers and
replacement fuses. (Caution: because fuse other procedures necessary for start-up.
characteristics may vary between manufac-
turers and fuse classes, fuses should be of m) Close enclosure door(s) and access panels
the same manufacturer and class for each and check the area for other personnel.
application.) Remove lockout/tagout devices following
OSHA and safety program procedures.
h) Examine fuse clips or mountings for signs of
corrosion, overheating, or loss of tension. n) Restore power standing to the side of the
Service if necessary. Install the replacement switch enclosures.
fuse with the proper size fuse puller.
o) Restart equipment following manufacturer’s
instructions and exercising caution until
satisfactory operation is insured.
Lockout/tagout Procedures
OSHA requires that energy sources to
For more information: machines or equipment must be turned off and
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
46
disconnected isolating them from the energy positioned or removed.
source. The isolating or disconnecting means
must be either locked or tagged with a warning c) Make sure that only the employees who
label. While lockout is the more reliable and attached the locks or tags are the ones
preferred method, OSHA accepts tagout to that are removing them.
be a suitable replacement in limited situations.
It is estimated that Lockout/tagout prevents d) After removing locks or tags, notify
about 120 fatalities and 50,000 workday injuries affected employees before starting
annually. Approximately 39 million workers are equipment or machines.
protected by Lockout/tagout practices. Failure to
comply with Lockout/tagout safety regulations 5. Use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
is frequently one of the top five OSHA violations.
In 2004 alone, there were over 4,300 violations The proper selection and use of Personal
cited by OSHA. NFPA 70E Article 120 contains Protective Equipment will significantly reduce
detailed instructions for lockout/tagout and placing the risk of Arc-Flash and other electrical
equipment in an Electrically Safe Work Condition. hazards to personnel working on energized
equipment. OSHA Part 1910.335 (a) states:
Application of Lockout/tagout Devices
“…Employees working in areas where
a) Make necessary preparations there are potential electrical hazards
for shutdown shall be provided with, and shall
use, electrical protective equipment
b) Shut down the machine or equipment that is appropriate for the specific
parts of the body to be protected
c) Turn OFF (open) the energy- and for the work to be performed.”
isolating device (fuse/circuit breaker)
A variety of PPE is available from numerous
d) Apply the lockout or tagout device manufacturers. The most common The proper
types of protective gear include: selection and use
e) Render safe all stored or
of PPE will greatly
residual energy • Nonconductive flame-resis-
tant head, face, and chin pro- reduce the risk
f) Verify the isolation and deenergiza- tection (hard hats, full face of Arc-Flash and
tion of the machine or equipment shields, switching hoods, etc.)
other electrical
• Eye protection (face shields, hazards.
Removal of Lockout/tagout Devices safety glasses, goggles)
• Body protection resistant to
a) Inspect the work area to ensure that non- flash flame (shirts, pants,
essential items have been removed and jackets, coveralls)
that machine or equipment components
are intact and capable of operating • Hand and arms protection
properly. Especially look for tools or (insulating gloves and sleeves
pieces of conductors that may not have with leather protectors)
been removed.
• Foot and leg protection (insulated
leg and footwear)
b) Check the area around the machine
or equipment to ensure that all • Insulating blankets or mats
employees have been safely
47
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
PPE that is selected Selection of PPE is dependant on the task to be V-rated
should be rated for, performed. NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(9), (10), Tools and gloves rated and tested
and (11) provide guidance for the selection of for the line-to-line voltage at the area
or greater than, the personal protective equipment to be used for where the work is to be performed.
minimum Arc-Flash specific tasks and hazard levels. The Table of PPE
rating required for requirements below provides typical clothing Flame Resistant (FR)
requirements for Hazard Risk Categories from “The property of a material whereby combustion
each Hazard 0 through 4. Note: Hazard Risk Category 0 still is prevented, terminated, or inhibited
Risk Category. requires some level of protective clothing or following the application of a flaming or non-
equipment. Manufacturers have also developed flaming source of ignition, with or without
tables and selection guides based on NFPA 70E susequent removal of the ignition source.”
recommendations. It is important to note that
the level of PPE recommended by NFPA 70E is: Breakopen Threshold Energy (EBT)
“intended to protect a person from arc-flash and The incident energy level which does not
shock hazards”. Even with PPE, some arc-flash cause flame resistant (FR) fabric breakopen
conditions may result in burns to the skin or include and does not exceed second-degree burn
arc blast pressures, toxic vapors, and propelled criteria, as defined in ASTM F 1959.
particles and materials. PPE that is selected should
be rated for, or greater than, the minimum Arc-Flash Standards such as OSHA 1910.137 also specify
rating required for each Hazard Risk Category. that protective gear must be maintained and
periodically inspected to ensure that it remains in
a safe and reliable condition. NFPA also supports
Common Personal Protective this in NFPA 70E Articles 130.7(B), 130.7(C)(8) and
Equipment Terms and Definitions 130.7(F). NFPA requirements state that PPE should
be inspected before and after each use, and be
Arc Thermal Performance repaired, cleaned or laundered according to the
Exposure Value (ATPV) manufacturer’s instructions prior to use. It is also
The incident energy level (in cal/cm²) that can extremely important to avoid contamination of
cause the onset of a second-degree burn PPE material. Contact with grease, solvents, and
as defined in ASTM F 1959 Standard Test flammable liquids may destroy the protection.
Method for Determining the Arc Thermal
Performance Value of Materials for Clothing.
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical
Personal Protective Equipment will be labeled
Safety in the Workplace, Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection
with a calorie rating (Example: 11 cal/cm²). Association, 2004. This reprinted material is not the complete and
official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is
represented only by the standard in its entirety.
PPE Requirements
Minimum
Required
Flash
Hazard Risk Minimum Typical Protective Clothing Systems
Protection
Category Arc Rating of Clothing Description
Boundary
PPE (cal/cm2)
(in.)
0 N/A 1 layer of non-melting, flammable fabric with weight of at least 4.5 oz/yd2 6
1 4 1 layer of a FR shirt and FR pants or FR coverall 15
2 8 1 or 2 layers of FR shirt and FR pants with conventional cotton underwear 45
For more information: 3 25 2 or 3 layers of FR shirt, FR pants plus FR coverall cotton underwear 60
800-TEC-FUSE 4 40 3 or more layers of FR shirt, FR pants plus multi-layer flash suit ~120
www.littelfuse.com Derived from NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(11)
48
6. Use Warning Labels. Preferred Label Approach
The National Electrical Code® recently recognized
Arc-Flash hazards and developed a warning
label requirement. NEC® Article 110.16 states:
“110.16 Flash Protection: 32 inches 35 kA
1 480 VAC
Switchboards, panelboards, industrial 2.77 cal/cm2
control panels, meter socket enclosures,
and motor control centers that are
in other than dwelling occupancies
and are likely to require examination,
adjustment, servicing, or maintenance 42 inches 12 inches 1 inch
while energized shall be field marked Bus: SERVICE4 05/12/05
to warn qualified persons of potential
electric Arc-Flash hazards. The marking
shall be located so as to be clearly
visible to qualified persons before
Figure 11
examination, adjustment, servicing, or
maintenance of the equipment.”
The use of detailed warning labels not only
While the overall requirement is very increases safety, but also minimizes the time
comprehensive, the required label format required to identify minimum levels of PPE.
can be very generic. However, if a complete Other types of warning labels should also be
electrical hazard analysis is performed, the used to include information about proper fuse
preferred approach would be to include replacements, location of disconnects and
the Hazard Risk Category, Flash Protection other sources of power, etc. Warning labels
Boundary, Incident Energy available, level can be applied directly to pieces of equipment The use of detailed
of PPE required, system voltage, and shock or on enclosure doors. Computer programs warning labels will
protection boundaries on labels. See Figures 10 and adhesive blank labels make it easy to
and 11 for examples of typical warning labels: create labels for almost every purpose. increase safety as
well as minimize
the time required to
Minimum Label Requirements 7. Use an Energized Electrical Work Permit.
identify minimum
NFPA 70E requires that a detailed written levels of PPE.
Energized Electrical Work Permit must
be used and signed by responsible
management whenever work is performed
on live energized equipment.
35 kA
480 VAC
Figure 10
See Annex C of this handbook for an
example of an Energized Electrical
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National Electrical Work Permit. For additional information
Code ® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection Association, on Energized Electrical Work Permits,
1 inch Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete and official refer to NFPA 70E Article 130.1(A).
position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is represented
05/12/05
only by the standard in its entirety.
49
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
Circuit breakers trip- 8. Avoid Hazards of Improperly Selected or closed on the short circuit before it is corrected.
ping mechanisms Maintained Overcurrent Protective Devices. This is especially important for circuit breakers
and switches because short circuit currents can
could seize up and Whether in the design or maintenance of permanently damage the equipment to the point
not operate properly an electrical system, hazards exist if the that it will not operate safely when reenergized.
if not maintained proper overcurrent device is not selected and
applied. Circuit breakers and other electrical
to manufacturer’s equipment must be maintained and serviced Circuit Breakers
specifications. regularly to ensure that they will operate
properly when needed. Unfortunately, in many Circuit breakers, like fuses, are rated to safely
industries and especially during economic interrupt their maximum interrupting current
turndowns, the tendency is to limit or eliminate only once. Molded Case Circuit Breakers
regularly scheduled maintenance on circuit (commonly referred to as MCCB’s) must meet
breakers and other electrical equipment. the requirements of UL489, “Standard for
However, the potential costs associated with Safety,” Molded-Case Circuit Breakers, Molded
OSHA violations, liability lawsuits, workers Case Switches and Circuit Breaker Enclosures.
compensation, equipment replacement, and This standard allows manufacturers to list their
lost production far exceeds the costs of circuit breakers at varying degrees of available
regular testing and maintenance of circuit fault currents, current-limiting ability and other
breakers and other electrical equipment. characteristics. They must be applied within
the maximum limitations of their ratings.
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.334(b)(2)
“Reclosing circuits after protective Circuit breaker manufacturers typically
device operation. After a circuit is recommend that their circuit breakers be cycled
deenergized by a circuit protective ON and OFF at least once each year to keep
device, the circuit may NOT be the tripping mechanism from seizing under
manually reenergized until it has been certain environmental conditions. Cycling circuit
determined that the equipment and breakers ON and OFF manually may help keep the
circuit can be safely reenergized. The switching mechanism from seizing, but may not
repetitive manual reclosing of circuit guarantee that the tripping mechanism will operate
breakers or reenergizing circuits properly. Some manufacturers also recommend
through replaced fuses is prohibited. that their circuit breakers be periodically tested and
recalibrated under carefully controlled conditions.
NOTE: When testing time-current characteristics,
When it can be determined from the recommendations state the circuit breaker
design of the circuit and the overcurrent being tested must be at room temperature. This
devices involved that the automatic practice would increase equipment downtime
operation of a device was caused while the circuit breaker to be tested cools
by an overload rather than a fault down after it is removed from service.
condition, no examination of the circuit
or connected equipment is needed
before the circuit is reenergized.” The National Electrical Manufacturers Association
(NEMA) has published standard AB 4-2003
In this section of the regulations, OSHA entitled, “Guidelines for Inspection and Preventive
recognizes the importance of knowing why Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers
the overcurrent protective device has opened. Used in Commercial and Industrial Applications.”
If the fuse or circuit breaker opened due to It deals exclusively with the maintenance and
For more information: an overload, no examination of the circuit or care of Molded Case Circuit Breakers to provide
connected equipment is necessary. However, if reliable protection. The expected lifetime of a
800-TEC-FUSE the overcurrent protective device opened due
to a short circuit fault, catastrophic results can
circuit breaker, however, depends on circuit
conditions and its’ environment. Standard AB
www.littelfuse.com occur if the fuse or circuit breaker is replaced or 4-2003 emphasizes that safe work practices
50
include regular periodic maintenance, and fuses (200,000 AIR). The circuit breaker’s
investigating what caused the circuit breakers to low interrupting rating may not be an initial
operate prior to reenergizing the circuit — similar hazard, but as available fault currents rise from
to OSHA 29 CFR 1910.334(b)(2). There are other the utility, a dangerous situation is created.
published industry standards for maintenance During service upgrades, circuit breakers with
of large Air Power Circuit Breakers. Preventive low interrupting capacities may have to be
maintenance of these circuit breakers should be replaced by higher rated devices or protected
performed at least annually, and after interruption by fuses in order to lower fault currents.
of a fault some 20 or more steps are required
before placing the circuit breaker back in service.
Non-current-limiting fuses
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Another potential electrical hazard is the
Engineers (IEEE) has also published Standard use of non-current-limiting fuses including
493-1997, otherwise known as the “Gold Book,” “renewable” fuses. Although fuse standards
entitled, Recommended Practice For the Design and fuse technology have changed greatly,
Of Reliable Industrial And Commercial Power many older machines and equipment may
Systems. The IEEE studied failure statistics of contain Class H (one-time or renewable) or
typical industrial and commercial electrical K5 one-time fuses. The continued use of
distribution systems and components over these fuses especially where available fault
several years prior to 1974 and more recently in currents exceed their interrupting ratings
1996. The results of the 1996 study concluded can be catastrophic. In addition to being
nearly 1/3 of all circuit breakers that failed while in non-current-limiting, Class H and K5 fuses
service could have been avoided if proper have lower interrupting ratings than the Class
maintenance and testing was performed. R or J fuses. Just like non-current-limiting
circuit breakers, the Class H and K5 fuses
may permit much higher current to flow for a
Article 225.3 of NFPA 70E much longer time, increasing risk to workers
requires that if a circuit breaker and the equipment. The incident energy of an
interrupts a fault at or near its Arc-Flash could be deadly to an unsuspecting
interrupting rating, it must be inspected worker who is not properly protected.
by a trained technician and tested,
repaired or replaced in accordance with
the manufacturer’s specifications. 9. Achieve or Increase Selective Coordination.
If proper maintenance and repair is neglected, When an overcurrent occurs in a system only
circuit breakers may fail to open or open more the overcurrent protective device immediately
slowly than when first calibrated. The IEEE on the line side of the overcurrent should
study noted that circuit breaker failures caused open. This reduces unnecessary shutdown
excessive equipment damage, blackouts, of other equipment and simplifies locating
unexpected repair and replacement costs, lost the problem. Such systems are defined as
production, scrap production, and most “selectively coordinated.” Refer to Figure 12.
importantly, severe blast and burn injuries to
personnel. Proper care and maintenance of
circuit breakers must be part of any Electrical If a system is not selectively coordinated, a fault
Safety Program. at point A can cause the fuses or circuit breakers
at points B, C, and D to open, needlessly
shutting off power to two or more unaffected
Other common safety hazards involve using areas. In a selectively coordinated system, a
overcurrent protective devices with improper fault at point A will cause only the fuse or circuit
interrupting ratings. Standard circuit breakers breaker immediately before the fault to open,
have relatively low interrupting ratings (typically keeping power supplied to the rest of the feeder
10,000 to 100,000 AIC) when compared to and branch circuits throughout the facility.
51
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
Achieving a selec- Feeder circuit breakers or fuses are typically It is also unsafe to replace blown fuses with
tively coordinated rated at least twice that of the downstream slightly higher ampere ratings in order to
devices. An Arc-Flash that opens the upstream compensate for nuisance openings. Doing
system not only devices means that the total I2t heat energy and so will defeat selective coordination and can
reduces downtime consequently, incident energy, is determined by dramatically increase the amount of risk to
and the risk of the largest upstream device. In this situation, the workers if an Arc-Flash occurs. In order to
electrical system is not selectively coordinated, decrease downtime and reduce the risk of
Arc-Flash exposure, and the incident energy increases as a result Arc‑Flash exposure to unsuspecting workers,
but the National of the time elapsed before the upstream it is best to replace non-current-limiting fuses
Electrical Code® overcurrent protective device clears the fault. and circuit breakers with more accurately
rated time-delay current-limiting fuses such as
requires it. the Littelfuse Class RK1 LLSRK_ID series.
Achieving a selectively coordinated system
not only reduces downtime and the risk of
Arc-Flash exposure, but Articles 240.12, 700.27, Electrical safety is important for everyone.
701.18 and 620.62 of the National Electrical Employees working on electrical systems
Code require it. These code specifications refer are at risk every day, but with the
to emergency circuits or potential life saving properly designed overcurrent protection
circuits such as alarm circuits, emergency system, the implementation of safe
lighting, and elevator circuits. For example, work practices and the utilization of the
during an emergency or in a building with an appropriate PPE, risk can be minimized.
elevator, an overcurrent on one elevator motor
must not cause the feeder circuit to open all
other elevator circuits, or alarm systems.
Figure 12
Selective Coordination
Without Selective With Selective
Coordination Coordination
D D
C C
Legend:
Fuse Opens
B B
Fuse Not Opened
Circuit Breaker Opens
A A
Unnecessary
For more information: Power Outage
FAULT FAULT
800-TEC-FUSE Examples of loads
include: motors, LOAD LOAD LOAD LOAD
www.littelfuse.com elevators, lighting, etc. #1 #2 #1 #2
52
Electrical Safety Summary
Here is a brief review of some basic 7) When working on or approaching
electrical safety concepts. energized circuits, proper protective
clothing must be worn. The minimum
1) Unless there is a compelling safety flame retardant clothing, safety
issue such as life-support equipment, glasses, and protective gloves and
alarm systems, hazardous location equipment must meet OSHA and
ventilation, or lighting required for NFPA 70E guidelines. Protective
safety, OSHA requires that circuits be insulating blankets and mats are
deenergized and the system be placed also used to minimize exposure.
in an Electrically Safe Work Condition
before any work is performed. 8) Be certain there is adequate lighting
for the tasks to be performed. Por-
2) When placing equipment in an table lighting must be fully insulated
Electrically Safe Work Condition, so that it will not accidentally cause
always follow proper Lockout/tagout short circuits when used near
procedures. energized components.
3) An Electrical Hazard Analysis must 9) Use barricades or barriers to warn Employees working
be performed on all circuits 50 volts unqualified individuals from entering on electrical systems
and higher that may be worked on the area.
while energized. are at risk every day,
10) Be prepared for the unexpected. Make but with the properly
4) The Hazards must be identified and sure emergency communications and designed overcurrent
warning labels must be applied to all trained medical personnel are avail-
equipment that may be worked on able if something goes wrong. protection system,
while energized. the implementation
11) Use current-limiting overcurrent of safe work practices
5) Workers must be trained on the protective devices wherever possible
equipment, hazards and safety to reduce the potential electrical and the utilization
precautions, and be certified as hazards. of the appropriate
“qualified” to work on energized PPE, risk can be
equipment. Training and certification Electrical Safety in the workplace can only be
must be documented. attained when workers and employers diligently minimized.
follow OSHA and industry accepted standards
6) All work performed on energized and regulations. It is our sincere hope and desire
equipment must be preceded by a that this handbook has been helpful in informing
job briefing and a signed Energized the reader of the importance of Electrical Safety
Electrical Work Permit. while providing methods and information on how
to effectively and safely reduce electrical hazards.
53
Annex A
Electrical Safety Terms and Definitions
A.I.C. or A.I.R.: fuse after the fuse link has melted
See Interrupting Capacity. and until the circuit is interrupted.
Ambient Temperature:
The air temperature surrounding a device.
Current
Peak Current which would occur
For fuses or circuit breakers in an enclosure, without current limitation
the air temperature within the enclosure.
Ampacity:
The current in amperes that a conductor can
carry continuously under the conditions
of use without exceeding its temperature Peak Let-through Current
rating. It is sometimes informally applied to Arcing Energy (l2t)
Melting Energy (l2t)
switches or other devices. These are more
Time
properly referred to by their ampere rating.
Melting Arcing
Ampere Rating: Time Time
The current rating, in amperes, that is
Figure 13
marked on fuses, circuit breakers, or other
Current Limitation
equipment. It is not to be inferred that
equipment or devices can continuously carry
rated amperes. Various derating factors may Arcing-fault:
apply. Refer to NEC® for further information. A short circuit that arcs at the point of fault.
The arc impedance (resistance) tends to
Ampere-Squared-Seconds (I²t): reduce the short-circuit current. Arcing
The heat energy passed by a fuse or circuit faults may turn into bolted faults by welding
breaker from the instant the fuse links melt of the faulted components. Arcing faults
or circuit breaker contacts part (arcing may be phase-to phase or phase-to-ground.
time). It is equal to the rms arcing current
squared multiplied by the arcing time. Arc-Blast:
A pressure wave created by the
Approach Boundaries: heating, melting, vaporization, and
Protection boundaries established expansion of conducting material
to protect personnel from shock. and surrounding gases or air.
Arcing I²t: Arc-Flash:
For more information: The heat energy passed by a fuse during The sudden release of heat energy and
its arcing time. It is equal to the rms arcing intense light at the point of an arc. Can
800-TEC-FUSE current squared multiplied by the arcing time. be considered a short circuit through
the air, usually created by accidental
www.littelfuse.com Arcing Current (See Figure 13): contact between live conductors.
The current that flows through the
54
Arc Gap: two bare bus bars, or a crossed-phase
The distance between energized conductors condition due to incorrect wiring.
or between energized conductors and
ground. Shorter arc gaps result in Boundaries of Approach:
less energy being expended in the Protection boundaries established to protect
arc, while longer gaps reduce arc personnel from shock and Arc-Flash hazards.
current. For 600 volts and below, arc
gaps of 1.25 inches (32 mm) typically Calorie:
produce the maximum incident energy. The amount of heat needed to raise the
temperature of one gram of water by one
Arc Rating: degree Celsius. 1 cal/ cm² is equivalent
A rating assigned to material(s) that relates to the exposure on the tip of a finger
to the maximum incident energy the material by a cigarette lighter for one second.
can resist before breakopen of the material
or onset of a second-degree burn. The Clearing I²t (Also Total Clearing I²t):
arc rating is typically shown in cal/cm². The ampere-squared seconds (I²t) through an
overcurrent device from the inception of the
Arcing Time: overcurrent until the current is completely
(See Figure 13): The time between interrupted. Clearing I²t is the sum of the
the melting of a fuse link or parting Melting I²t and the Arcing I²t.
of circuit breaker contacts, until
the overcurrent is interrupted. Coordination or Coordinated System:
See Selective Coordination.
Arc Voltage:
A transient voltage that occurs across Current-Limiting Fuse (Figure 14):
an overcurrent protection device during A fuse which, when interrupting currents
the arcing time. It is usually expressed within its current-limiting range, reduces the
as peak instantaneous voltage (Vpeak or current in the faulted circuit to a magnitude
Epeak), but sometimes as rms voltage. substantially less than that obtainable in the
same circuit if the device was replaced with
Asymmetrical Current: a solid conductor having comparable
AC current that is not symmetrical around impedance. To be labeled “current-limiting,”
the zero axis. Usually caused by a fault a fuse must mate with a fuse block or fuse
in circuits with low power factors. (See holder that has either a rejection feature or
Power Factor and Symmetrical Current). dimensions that will reject non-current-
limiting fuses.
Available Short Circuit Current:
(also Available or Prospective Fault Current):
The maximum rms Symmetrical Current
Current
that would flow at a given point in a system
Current which
under bolted-fault conditions. Short-circuit would flow if
not interrupted
current is maximum during the first half-
cycle after the fault occurs. (See definitions
of Bolted Fault and Symmetrical Current.)
Current before fault
Bolted Fault:
A short circuit that has no electrical
resistance at the point of the fault. It
results from a firm mechanical connection Time
Fault occurs
between two conductors, or a conductor
Fuse opens and
and ground. Bolted faults are characterized clears short circuit
in less than ½ cycle Arc is extinguished
by a lack of arcing. Examples of bolted
Figure 14
faults are a heavy wrench lying across
Current Limiting Fuse
55
ANNEX A
Current-Limiting Range: Fault Current:
For an individual overcurrent protective Same as Short-Circuit Current.
device, the current-limiting range begins at
the lowest value of rms symmetrical current Flash Hazard Analysis:
at which the device becomes current-limiting A study that analyzes potential exposure
(the Threshold Current) and extends to the to Arc-Flash hazards. The outcome of
maximum interrupting capacity of the device. the study establishes Incident Energy
levels, Hazard Risk Categories, Flash
Current Rating: Protection Boundaries, and required PPE.
See Ampere Rating. It also helps define safe work practices.
Deenergized: Flash Protection Boundary:
Equipment or components that have A protection boundary established to protect
had all energy sources removed. personnel from Arc-Flash hazards. The
Flash Protection Boundary is the distance
Device Rating: at which an unprotected worker can receive
Refers to the standard ampere rating a second-degree burn to bare skin.
of a device as defined by NEC ® Article
240.6. Standard ampere ratings Fuse:
ranges from 1 to 6000 amperes. An overcurrent protective device consisting
of one or more current-carrying elements
Distance to Arc: enclosed in a body fitted with contacts
Refers to the distance from the receiving so that the fuse may be readily inserted
surface to the arc center. The value used into or removed from an electrical
for most calculations is typically 18 inches. circuit. The elements are heated by the
current passing through them, thus
Electrical Hazard: interrupting current flow by melting
A dangerous condition caused by during specified overcurrent conditions.
equipment failure or contact with an
energized conductor. Hazards include Ground-fault:
shock, Arc-Flash, burns and arc blasts. A short circuit caused by insulation
breakdown between a phase conductor
Electrical Hazard Analysis: and a grounded object or conductor.
A study to identify the potential electrical
hazards that may be exposed to Hazard Risk Category:
personnel. The analysis should address A classification of risks (from 0 to 4) defined
both shock and Arc-Flash hazards. by NFPA 70E. Each category requires PPE
and is related to incident energy levels.
Electrically Safe Work Condition:
Condition where the equipment and Incident Energy:
or circuit components have been The amount of thermal energy impressed
disconnected from electrical energy on a surface generated during an
sources, locked/tagged out, and tested to electrical arc at a certain distance from
verify all sources of power are removed. the arc. Typically measured in cal/cm2.
Energized: I²t:
Refers to components within a system Symbol for Ampere-Squared-Seconds. A means
being connected to a “live” voltage source. of describing the thermal energy generated by
For more information: current flow. When a fuse or current-limiting
Fault: circuit breaker are interrupting currents
800-TEC-FUSE Same as Short-Circuit and
used interchangeably.
within their current-limiting range, the term is
expressed as melting, arcing, or total clearing
www.littelfuse.com I²t. (See Melting I²t, Arcing I²t, and Clearing I²t)
56
Instantaneous Peak Current Peak Let-through Current
(Ip or Ipeak): (See Figure 15):
The maximum instantaneous current The maximum instantaneous current
value developed during the first half- that passes through an overcurrent
cycle (180 electrical degrees) after fault protective device during its total clearing
inception. The peak current determines time when the available current is
magnetic stress within the circuit. within its current-limiting range.
Interrupting Capacity (AIC):
Current
The highest available symmetrical rms Peak Current which would occur
without current limitation
alternating current (for DC the highest direct
current) at which the protective device has
been tested, and which it has interrupted
safely under standardized test conditions.
The device must interrupt all available
overcurrents up to its interrupting capacity. Peak Let-through Current
Also commonly called Interrupting Rating.
Arcing Energy (l2t)
Melting Energy (l2t)
Interrupting Rating (IR, I.R., AIR or Time
A.I.R.): Figure 15
The highest rms symmetrical current, Melting Arcing Peak let-through
Time Time
at specified test conditions, which
the device is rated to interrupt. The Power Factor (X/R):
difference between Interrupting Capacity As used in overcurrent protection, power
and Interrupting Rating is in the test factor is the relationship between the inductive
circuits used to establish the ratings. reactance (X) and the resistance (R) in the
system during a fault. Under normal conditions
Limited Approach Boundary: a system may be operating at a 0.85 power
An approach boundary to protect personnel factor (85%). When a fault occurs, much of the
from shock. A boundary distance is system resistance is shorted out and the power
established from an energized part based factor may drop to 25% or less. This may cause
on system voltage. To enter this boundary, the current to become asymmetrical. See
unqualified persons must be accompanied definition of Symmetrical Current.
with a qualified person and use PPE.
PPE:
Melting I²t: An acronym for Personnel Protective
The heat energy created by an overcurrent Equipment. It can include clothing,
required to melt the fuse link(s). It equals tools, and equipment.
the rms current (or DC current) squared,
multiplied by the melting time in seconds. Prohibited Approach Boundary:
For times less than 0.004 seconds, melting I²t An approach boundary to protect personnel
approaches a constant value for a given fuse. from shock. Work in this boundary is
considered the same as making direct
Overcurrent: contact with an energized part. Only
Any current larger than the equipment, qualified persons are allowed to enter
conductor, or devices are rated to this boundary and they must use PPE.
carry under specified conditions.
Protection Boundaries:
Overload: Boundaries established to protect
An overcurrent that is confined to the personnel from electrical hazards.
normal current path (e.g., not a short
circuit), which, if allowed to persist, will Qualified Person:
cause damage to equipment and/or wiring. A person who is trained and knowledgeable
57
ANNEX A
on the construction and operation of the
equipment and can recognize and avoid
electrical hazards that may be encountered. A
Rating:
A designated limit of operating
characteristics based on definite
conditions, such as current rating,
voltage rating and interrupting rating. B C D E
Renewable Fuse:
X
A fuse that may be readily restored
to service by replacing the renewable
element after operation.
Restricted Approach Boundary: F G H J
An approach boundary to protect
personnel from shock. A boundary Y
distance is established from an energized
part based on system voltage. Only In a selective system:
qualified persons are allowed in the
For a fault at "X" only fuse "C" will open.
boundary and they must use PPE. For a fault at "Y" only fuse "F" will open.
Selective Coordination Figure 16
(See Figure 16):
In a selectively coordinated system, only
the protective device immediately on the
line side of an overcurrent opens. Upstream Short Circuit (See Figure 17):
protective devices remain closed. All other A current flowing outside its normal path.
equipment remains in service, which It is caused by a breakdown of insulation
simplifies the identification and location of or by faulty equipment connections. In a
overloaded equipment or short circuits. short circuit, current bypasses the normal
load. The amount of current is determined
Shock: by the system impedance (AC resistance)
A trauma subjected to the body by electrical rather than the load impedance. Short-circuit
current. When personnel come in contact currents may vary from fractions of an
with energized conductors, it can result ampere to 200,000 amperes or more.
in current flowing through their body
often causing serious injury or death.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
58
ratings (also called withstand ratings) apply to
equipment that will be subjected to fault
å CURRENT FLOW currents, but which are not required to interrupt
them. This includes switches, busway (bus
duct), switchgear and switchboard structures,
motor control centers and transformers. Most
short-circuit ratings are based on tests which
LOAD
last three complete electrical cycles (0.05
GEN. seconds). Some equipment may have reduced
short-circuit rating for times longer than 3
cycles. Refer to manufacturers literature. If the
equipment is protected during the test by fuses
System voltage and load resistance or by a circuit breaker with instantaneous trips,
the test duration is the time required for the
determine the flow of current.
overcurrent protective device to open the circuit.
When so protected during testing, the
ç SHORT CIRCUIT equipment instructions and labels must
indicate that the equipment shall be
protected by a given fuse class and rating, or
by a specific make, type, and rating of circuit
Accidental breaker. Certain circuit breakers equipped
LOAD
Connection with short-delay trip elements instead of
GEN.
Creates Fault instantaneous trip elements may have
withstand (short-circuit) ratings in addition to
their interrupting rating. The withstand rating
is the fault current the breaker must be able to
(red lines indicate increased current) withstand for a specified time or if it is
protected by a fuse or another circuit breaker
During a short circuit, only the resistance of
in series with it. They may also have reduced
the fault path limits current. Current may interrupting ratings.
increase to many times the load current.
Figure 17 Symmetrical Current:
The terms “Symmetrical Current” and
Short-Circuit Rating: “Asymmetrical Current” describe an
The maximum rms symmetrical short-circuit AC wave’s symmetry around the zero
current (for DC equipment DC current) at which axis. The current is symmetrical when
a given piece of equipment has been tested the peak currents above and below the
under specified conditions, and which at the zero axis are equal in value, as shown
end of the test, is in essentially the same in Figure 18. If the peak currents are not
condition as prior to the test. Short-circuit equal, as shown in Figure 19, the current
Symmertrical Current Asymmertrical Current
Zero Axis
Zero Axis
Equal Unequal
Peaks Peaks
Figure 18 Figure 19
59
ANNEX A
is asymmetrical. The degree of asymmetry Threshold Ratio:
during a fault is determined by the change The threshold current divided by the
in power factor (X/R) and the point in the ampere rating of a specific type or class
voltage wave when the fault occurs. of overcurrent device. A fuse with a
threshold ratio of 15 becomes current-
System Voltage: limiting at 15 times its current rating.
The phase-to-phase or three-phase
voltage(s) at the point being evaluated. Unqualified Person:
A person that does not possess all
Threshold Current: the skills and knowledge or has not
The minimum current for a given fuse size been trained for a particular task.
and type at which the fuse becomes current-
limiting. It is the lowest value of available Voltage Rating:
rms symmetrical current that will cause the The maximum rms AC voltage and/or the
device to begin opening within the first 1/4 maximum DC voltage at which the device
cycle (90 electrical degrees) and completely is designed to operate. For example,
clear the circuit within 1/2 cycle (180 electrical fuses rated 600 volts may be applied at
degrees). The approximate threshold any system voltage less than or equal to
current can be determined from the fuse’s their rating. [There are no specific rules
peak let-through charts. See Figure 20. for applying AC fuses in DC circuits.]
Fuses used on DC circuits must have
proper DC voltage ratings. Circuit breaker
B
ratings are more complex since some
breakers may have dual voltage ratings.
Withstand Rating:
Peak Let-Through in Amperes
See Short-Circuit Rating.
Peak let-through current
8000 Fuse approximate
threshold current = 3500
A
3500
Available Fault Current Symmetrical RMS Amperes
Figure 20
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
60
Annex B
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards
National Electrical Code® (NEC®) NEC Articles
In 1896 members of the industry met in New The following NEC paragraphs are important
York City to develop a single electrical installation when designing and servicing electrical systems:
code from the five then in use. After review
by over 1200 individuals, it was published in
1897 and has become known as the National “110.4 Voltages.
Electrical Code. In 1911 the NFPA became the Throughout this Code, the voltage
sponsor of the NEC and continues the tradition considered shall be that at which the
of wide spread consensus. The purpose of circuit operates. The voltage rating of
the National Electrical Code “is the practical the electrical equipment shall not be
safeguarding of persons and property from less than the nominal voltage of the
hazards arising from the use of electricity. The circuit to which it is connected.”
NEC contains provisions considered necessary
for safety.” The NEC is updated and revised “110.9 Interrupting Rating:
every three years. The NEC, also known as Equipment intended to interrupt
NFPA 70, is the nationally accepted standard for current at fault levels shall have an
safe electrical installation methods and practices. interrupting rating sufficient for the
Although the NEC is regarded as the “Bible” nominal circuit voltage and the current
for electrical construction practices, it does not that is available at the line terminals of
provide comprehensive details for workplace the equipment. Equipment intended
safety when servicing electrical systems. to interrupt current at other than fault
levels shall have an interrupting rating
at nominal circuit voltage sufficient for
While the NEC is not a design manual, following the current that must be interrupted.”
its provisions help ensure that electrical
systems are reasonably safe. Some of the NEC
provisions specifically addressing application
1, 2. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National
of overcurrent protective devices are listed
Electrical Code® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection
herein, however users are cautioned the Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete
NEC must be considered in its entirety. and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is
represented only by the standard in its entirety.
61
ANNEX B
“110.10 Circuit Impedance and “240.12 Electrical
Other Characteristics: System Coordination:
The overcurrent protective devices, Where an orderly shutdown is
the total impedance, the component required to minimize the hazard(s) to
short-circuit current ratings, and personnel and equipment, a system of
other characteristics of the circuit to coordination based on the following
be protected shall be selected and two conditions shall be permitted:
coordinated to permit the circuit-
protective devices used to clear a fault 1. Coordinated short-circuit protection
to do so without extensive damage
to the electrical components of the 2. Overload indication based on
circuit. This fault shall be assumed monitoring systems or devices.
to be either between two or more of
the circuit conductors or between any FPN:
circuit conductor and the grounding The monitoring system may cause
conductor or enclosing metal raceway. the conditions to go to alarm, allowing
Listed products applied in accordance corrective action or an orderly shutdown,
with their listing shall be considered to thereby minimizing personnel hazard
meet the requirements of this section.” and equipment damage.”
“110.16 Other related articles:
Flash Protection: Switchboards,
panelboards, industrial control panels, 430.32 Continuous-Duty Motors
meter socket enclosures, and motor and 430.52 Rating Or Setting for
control centers that are in other than Individual Motor Circuit.
dwelling occupancies and are likely These code articles outline sizing
to require examination, adjustment, requirements for overcurrent devices
servicing, or maintenance while when used for the protection of motor
energized shall be field marked to circuits. For more information, consult
warn qualified persons of potential NFPA 70: The National Electrical Code.
electric Arc-Flash hazards. The marking
shall be located so as to be clearly 620.62, 700.12, and 701.18
visible to qualified persons before Refer to selective coordination of
examination, adjustment, servicing, systems that provide emergency
or maintenance of the equipment.” power, signaling systems or elevator
circuits. For more information, consult
“240.2 Definition: Current-Limiting NFPA 70: National Electrical Code (NEC).
Overcurrent Protective Device:
A device that when interrupting
currents in its current-limiting
range, reduces the current flowing
in the faulted circuit to a magnitude
substantially less than that obtainable
in the same circuit if the device were
replaced with a solid conductor
having comparable impedance.”
1-. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National
Electrical Code® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection
For more information:
Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete
and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is
represented only by the standard in its entirety.
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
62
Annex C
Energized Electrical Work Permit
XYZ CompanY EnErgiZEd ElECtriCal Work pErmit
Section 1 - Work request
(to be completed by person requesting the permit)
Work ordEr no:
loCation: EQUipmEnt:
Start datE: timE: timE rEQUirEd: timE rEQUirEd:
E
dESCription oF taSk:
L
dESCription oF EQUipmEnt:
SYStEm VoltagE:
P
aVailaBlE FaUlt CUrrEnt:
M
Section 2 - Justification of Work
(to be completed by Qualified person performing the work)
A
WHY iS taSk BEing pErFormEd in EnErgiZEd Condition?
S
WHat Work praCtiCES Will BE UtiliZEd to inSUrE SaFEtY?
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE SHoCk analYSiS?
limitEd: rEStriCtEd: proHiBitEd:
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE FlaSH HaZard analYSiS?
HaZard riSk inCidEnt FlaSH protECtion
CatEgorY: EnErgY: BoUndarY:
WHat iS tHE rEQUirEd pErSonnEl protECtiVE EQUipmEnt (ppE) For tHiS taSk ?
HARD HAT EAR PROTECTION VOLTAGE RATED GLOVES FR PANTS
SAFETY GLASSES T-SHIRT LEATHER GLOVES FR COVERALL
SAFETY GOGGLES LONG SLEEVE SHIRT COTTON UNDERWEAR FLASH SUIT
FACE SHIELD FR SHIRT LONG PANTS LEATHER SHOES 63
FLASH HOOD
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE SHoCk analYSiS?
limitEd: rEStriCtEd: proHiBitEd:
ANNEX C
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE FlaSH HaZard analYSiS?
HaZard riSk inCidEnt FlaSH protECtion
CatEgorY: EnErgY: BoUndarY:
WHat iS tHE rEQUirEd pErSonnEl protECtiVE EQUipmEnt (ppE) For tHiS taSk ?
HARD HAT EAR PROTECTION VOLTAGE RATED GLOVES FR PANTS
SAFETY GLASSES T-SHIRT LEATHER GLOVES FR COVERALL
SAFETY GOGGLES LONG SLEEVE SHIRT COTTON UNDERWEAR FLASH SUIT
FACE SHIELD FR SHIRT LONG PANTS LEATHER SHOES
FLASH HOOD
E
HOW WILL ACCESS TO THE WORK AREA BE RESTRICTED FROM UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL?
L
HAS A JOB BRIEFING BEEN COMPLETED?
P
WHAT EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE?
M
WERE THERE ANY JOB SPECIFIC HAZARDS?
A
IN YOUR OPINION, CAN THIS JOB BE COMPLETED SAFELY? YES NO
S
Signature of Qualified Person Date
Signature of Qualified Person Date
Section 3 - Approval to Perform Work on Energized Equipment
(To be completed by Management)
IS WORK ON ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT APPROVED?
Signature of Manufacturing Manager Date
Signature of Plant Manager Date
Signature of Safety Manager Date
Signature of Electrical Maintenance Manager Date
Signature of Qualified Person Date
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
64
Annex D
Arc-Flash Calculation Steps
For Example on Page 36
Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations: Step 6:
Calculate the Incident Energy at 18 inches
Example 1 working distance using the NFPA 70E
With Littelfuse Class L 2500 Amp fuses formula for “Arc-in-a-box” [ref. NFPA 70E
Annex D 6.2(a)], where DB =18; ta = 0.01; and
Step 1: F = 43.7
Review the up-to-date one line drawing EMB = 1038.7 DB-1.4738 ta[0.0093F 2 -0.3453F+5.9675]
for information about the available EMB = 1038.7 x (18)-1.4738 x (.01) x [0.0093(43.7)2 –
short circuit current and other details – 0.3453(43.7) +5.9675]
about the location of the equipment. EMB = 1.27 cal/cm2
Step 2: Step 7:
The one line drawing states that the 2000 Determine the Hazard Risk Category
kVA transformer has a 4160V primary and with Littelfuse 2500 Amp Class L fuse.
480V secondary with 5.5% impedance. Since the Incident Energy is 1.27 cal/cm2
at 18 inches, NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(11)
Step 3: defines the minimum Arc Rating of PPE up
Determine the MVAbf of the transformer. to 4 cal/cm2 as Hazard Risk Category 1.
Since 2000kVA is 2 MVA, the
MVAbf = MVA x 100 / %Z =
= 2 x 100 / 5.5 = 36.4 MVA. Example 2
With 2500 Amp Low Voltage Power
Step 4: Circuit Breaker
Determine the clearing time of the
2500 Amp Class L fuse at the fault current. Step 1:
The maximum three phase bolted fault Determine the clearing time of the circuit
current at the transformer secondary is breaker at the fault level.
given by the formula, I sc = (MVA x 10 6 x 100) Since the Isc = 43,738 Amps, consulting
/ 3 x 480 x 5.5 = 43,738 Amps = 43.7 kA. the time current curve for the Circuit
Referring to the time current curve for the Breaker shows the clearing time
Littelfuse 2500 Amp Class L fuse, the clearing “t” is 5 cycles = 0.083 second.
time at 43,738 Amps is 0.01 second = ta.
Step 2:
Step 5: Determine the Flash Protection Boundary
Determine the Flash Protection Boundary (FPB) using the formula in NFPA 70E
(FPB) using the formula in NFPA 70E Article Article 130.3(A).
130.3(A). Since MVAbf = 36.4 and t = 0.083 sec.,
Since MVAbf = 36.4 and t = 0.01 sec., Dc = [2.65 x MVAbf x t] ½
Dc = [2.65 x MVAbf x t]½ D c = [2.65 x 36.4 x .083]½ = 2.83 ft. (34 inches)
Dc = [2.65 x 36.4 x 0.01]½ = 0.98 ft. (~12 inches)
65
ANNEX D
Step 3:
Determine the Incident Energy at 18 inches
working distance with the Circuit Breaker.
Since ta = 0.083 and Isc = 43,738 = 43.7 kA = F,
EMB = 1038.7 DB-1.4738 ta[0.0093F 2-0.3453F+5.9675]
EMB = 1038.7 x (18)-1.4738 x (0.083) x [0.0093(43.7)2 –
– 0.3453(43.7) + 5.9675]
EMB = 10.54 cal/cm2
Step 4:
Determine the Hazard Risk Category. Since
the Incident Energy is 10.54 cal/cm2 at 18
inches and NFPA Table 130.7(C)(11) defines the
minimum Arc Rating of PPE up to 25
cal/cm2 as Hazard Risk Category 3.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
66
Annex E
Arc Flash Calculator Tables
The following Arc-Flash Calculator tables 3) Consult the table and determine the
are based on published data in IEEE 1584 Incident Energy, Hazard Risk Category,
“Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard and Flash Protection Boundary.
Calculations”. It is meant to serve as a guide
only for determining the incident energy level 4) Select the appropriate PPE outlined in
at specific points of an electrical system. The NFPA 70E that meets the determined
purpose of a Flash Hazard Analysis is to Hazard Risk Category and Incident Energy.
determine a worker’s potential exposure to
Arc-Flash energy in order to minimize injury and Arc-Flash Calculator Table Notes
determine safe work practices and appropriate
• Even when the Hazard Risk Category
levels of PPE. Prior to using these tables,
is zero, workers should wear FR cloth-
users must know and understand the steps
ing to protect against unrecognized
required to perform a Flash Hazard Analysis.
hazards. NFPA 70E Annex H provides a
simplified approach to everyday clothing
for workers in diverse environments.
The Arc-Flash Calculator tables may be used
for systems rated 600 volts and below. The
incident energy calculations are based on
• PPE may have higher ratings than required
for the Hazard Risk Category.
data and equations in IEEE 1584 for 600V
Class RK1 and Class L fuses and 600V
circuit breakers. Incident energy for 600V • The standards and regulations establish mini-
Class J, Class T, and Class CC fuses may mum requirements for improving safety. The
also be determined by using these tables. incident energy levels used in these tables
were determined under specified test condi-
tions used in IEEE 1584. The recommended
How to use the Arc-Flash Calculator Tables: level of PPE is the minimum recommended
to reduce injury from burns that could occur
1) Calculate the available 3-phase bolted from an arcing fault. These minimums may
fault current available at every point in not be adequate, and it may be necessary to
the electrical system where workers may use PPE with higher ratings than calculated.
be exposed to energized components.
• Refer to NFPA 70E Table 130.7 (C)(10)
2) Determine the ampere rating of the Protective Clothing and PPE Matrix to
overcurrent protective device (fuse or determine specific PPE requirements.
circuit breaker) to be used to protect the
equipment where work is to be performed. • For more information on performing a
If ratings are not shown in calculator Flash Hazard Analysis, refer to NFPA 70E
tables, select the next largest rating. or IEEE 1584.
67
ANNEX E
Fault 1-100 101-200 201-400 401-600 601-800 801-1200 1201-1600 1601-2000
Current kA Amperes Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse
Fuse Rating 1
I.E.
FPB
2.39
30
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
Amperes HRC
I.E.
1
0.25
X
5.19
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
2 FPB 6 54 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
(Calories/cm² at HRC 0 2 X X X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 20.59 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
18” and Hazard 4 FPB
HRC
6
0
6
0
>120
3
>120
X
>120
X
>120
X
>120
X
>120
X
Risk Category) 6
I.E.
FPB
0.25
6
0.25
6
0.75
18
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
HRC 0 0 0 X X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.69 36.84 >100 >100 >100 >100
8 FPB 6 6 12 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 4 X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.63 12.81 75.42 >100 >100 >100
10 FPB 6 6 12 96 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 3 X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.57 6.71 49.64 73.57 >100 >100
12 FPB 6 6 12 60 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 2 X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.51 0.60 23.85 39.84 >100 >100
14 FPB 6 6 12 12 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 3 4 X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.45 0.58 1.94 11.14 24.95 >100
16 FPB 6 6 12 12 30 84 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.39 0.48 1.82 10.75 24.56 >100
18 FPB 6 6 12 12 24 84 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.38 1.70 10.36 24.19 >100
20 FPB 6 6 12 12 24 78 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.28 1.58 9.98 23.82 >100
22 FPB 6 6 6 6 24 78 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.46 8.87 23.44 29.17
24 FPB 6 6 6 6 24 72 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.34 7.52 23.07 28.91
26 FPB 6 6 6 6 24 60 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.22 6.28 22.70 28.65
28 FPB 6 6 6 6 18 60 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.01 5.16 22.33 28.40
30 FPB 6 6 6 6 18 54 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.80 2.84 17.03 27.75
35 FPB 6 6 6 6 18 36 114 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.49 1.25 9.28 27.11
40 FPB 6 6 6 6 12 18 78 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 26.47
45 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 25.83
50 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 25.19
55 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 24.55
60 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
For more information: I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 23.90
65 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
800-TEC-FUSE
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.67 21.67
70 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
www.littelfuse.com HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
I.E. = Incident Energy (cal/cm )
2
FPB = Flash Protection Boundary (in.)
68 HRC = Hazard Risk Category X = Exceeds NFPA 70E
Fault 1-100 101-200 201-400 401-600 601-800 801-1200 1201-1600 1601-2000
Current kA Amperes CB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB
I.E. >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
1 FPB >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC X X X X X X X X
I.E. 0.17 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
2 FPB 6 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 X X X X X X X
I.E. 0.33 0.33 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
4 FPB 6 6 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 X X X X X X
I.E. 0.50 0.50 0.50 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
6 FPB 12 12 12 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 X X X X X
I.E. 0.66 0.66 0.66 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
8 FPB 12 12 12 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 X X X X X
I.E. 0.82 0.82 0.82 >100 20.01 >100 >100 >100
10 FPB 18 18 18 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 X 3 X X X
I.E. 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.67 24.00 >100 >100 >100
12 FPB 18 18 18 24 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 1 3 X X X
I.E. 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.94 27.45 >100 >100 >100
14 FPB 18 18 18 30 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC
I.E.
0
1.29
0
1.29
0
1.29
1
2.21
4
31.62
X
31.62
X
>100
X
>100
Circuit Breaker
16 FPB 24 24 24 30 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 4 4 X X Rating Amperes
I.E. 1.45 1.45 1.45 2.48 35.46 35.46 >100 >100
18 FPB 24 24 24 30 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC
I.E.
1
1.60
1
1.60
1
1.60
1
2.74
4
39.29
4
39.29
X
39.29
X
>100
(Calories/cm² at
20 FPB 24 24 24 36 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 X 18” and Hazard
I.E. 1.76 1.76 1.76 3.01 43.10 43.10 43.10 >100
22 FPB 24 24 24 36 >120 >120 >120 >120 Risk Category)
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 1.91 1.91 1.91 3.28 46.91 46.91 46.91 >100
24 FPB 30 30 30 36 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 2.07 2.07 2.07 3.54 50.71 50.71 50.71 50.71
26 FPB 30 30 30 42 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 2.22 2.22 2.22 3.81 54.50 54.50 54.50 54.50
28 FPB 30 30 30 42 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 2.38 2.38 2.38 4.07 58.28 58.28 58.29 58.29
30 FPB 30 30 30 42 18 54 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 2.76 2.76 2.76 4.73 67.72 67.72 67.72 67.72
35 FPB 36 36 36 48 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 3.14 3.14 3.14 5.39 77.11 77.11 77.11 77.11
40 FPB 36 36 36 54 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 3.53 3.53 3.53 6.04 86.47 86.47 86.47 86.47
45 FPB 42 42 42 54 >120 >120 >1 20 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 3.91 3.91 3.91 6.69 95.81 95.81 95.81 95.81
50 FPB 42 42 42 60 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 4.29 4.29 4.29 7.34 >100 >100 >100 >100
55 FPB 48 48 48 60 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 4.66 4.66 4.66 7.99 >100 >100 >100 >100
60 FPB 48 48 48 66 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 5.04 5.04 5.04 8.64 >100 >100 >100 >100
65 FPB 48 48 48 72 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 2 2 2 3 X X X X
I.E. 5.42 5.42 5.42 9.28 >100 >100 >100 >100
70 FPB 54 54 54 78 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 2 2 2 3 X X X X
I.E. = Incident Energy (cal/cm2) FPB = Flash Protection Boundary (in.)
HRC = Hazard Risk Category X = Exceeds NFPA 70E 69
ANNEX E
Arc-Flash Calculator Table Example Example #2:
Determine the Incident Energy (I.E.), Flash
Example #1: Protection Boundary (FPB), and Hazard Risk
Determine the Incident Energy (I.E.), Flash Category (HRC) for equipment supplied by a
Protection Boundary (FPB), and Hazard Risk 600V 400A main circuit breaker panelboard.
Category (HRC) for equipment supplied by a
600V 400A fusible safety switch. Step 1:
Review the up-to-date one line drawing
Step 1: for information about the available
Review the up-to-date one line drawing short circuit current and other details
for information about the available about the panelboard location.
short circuit current and other details
about the safety switch location. Step 2:
The one line diagram shows that
Step 2: 26 kA is available at the terminals
Assume the one line diagram shows that 26 kA of the panelboard and it has a 400 A
is available at the terminals of the switch and main molded case circuit breaker.
the switch has 400A Class RK1 fuses installed.
Step 3:
Step 3: Using the Circuit Breaker Calculator Table from a
Using the Fuse Calculator Table from a preceding preceding page, determine the incident energy
page, determine the incident energy of 0.25 of 2.07 cal/cm², Flash Protection Boundary of
cal/cm², Flash Protection Boundary of 6 inches, 30 inches, and a Hazard Risk Category of 1 for
and a Hazard Risk Category of 0 for a 400A Class a 400A circuit breaker when 26kA is available.
RK1 current-limiting fuse when 26kA is available.
Step 4:
Step 4: Using NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(10-11),
Using NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(10-11), determine the required level of PPE needed
determine the required level of PPE needed for work in Hazard Risk Category 1.
for work in Hazard Risk Category 0.
Example Comparison
The table below illustrates the
difference between the fuse and
circuit breaker for this example:
DATA COMPARISON Class RK1 Fuse Circuit Breaker
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 0.25 2.07
Flash Protection Boundary 6” 30”
Hazard Risk Category 0 1
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
70
Annex F
Resources for Electrical Safety
OSHA The federal OSHA program is operated under
Occupational Safety and Health Administration a multi-million dollar budget with a staff of
U.S. Department of Labor over 2200 people. Inspectors, which comprise
Washington D.C. 20210 more than 50 percent of OSHA’s workforce,
www.osha.gov conduct several thousand inspections every
year. Fines are often levied for violations
found during inspections. In addition to the
federal program, twenty-five states operate
their own OSHA programs that are supported
by a staff of 2600 people including over 1200
inspectors.
NFPA Founded in 1896, the National Fire Protection
National Fire Protection Association Association (NFPA) was originally formed to
1 Batterymarch Park, PO Box 9101 standardize the installation of fire sprinklers.
Quincy, MA 02269-9101 This nonprofit organization also operates on
Ph. 800-344-3555 a multi-million dollar budget and is support-
www.nfpa.org ed by a staff of several hundred people.
Although the NFPA has no power to enforce
its standards and codes, many governmental
agencies on the local and national level have
adopted the NFPA’s standards and codes and
in essence, have made them into law.
IEEE The Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) was officially named
445 Hoes Lane in 1963, but its predecessors, the AIEE
PO Box 1331 (American Institute of Electrical Engineers)
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331 and the IRE (Institute of Radio Engineers),
Ph. 800-678-IEEE date back to 1884. Just as its name indicates,
www.ieee.org the IEEE is an association of electrical and
electronic engineers organized to advance the
theory and application of electro-technology
and allied sciences.
71
ANNEX F
UL Underwriters Laboratories (formerly the
Underwriters Laboratories Underwriters Electrical Bureau) originally was
333 Pfingsten Road founded in 1894. Underwriters Laboratories
Northbrook, IL 60062 Inc. (UL) is an independent, not-for-profit
Ph. 847-272-8400 product-safety testing and certification
www.ul.com organization that tests and certifies products
for public safety.
NEMA The National Electrical Manufacturers
National Electrical Manufacturers Association Association (NEMA) was formed in 1926.
15 Inverness Way East NEMA works closely with ANSI (American
Englewood, CO 80112-5776 National Standards Institute) and IEC
Ph. 800-854-7179 (International Electrotechnical Committee)
www.nema.org and is an advocacy group to UL and
governmental agencies.
ANSI The American National Standards Institute
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) was founded in 1918. ANSI is a pri-
11 W. 42nd Street vate, non-profit organization that administers
New York, NY 10036 and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standard-
Ph. 212-642-8908 ization and conformity assessment system.
www.ansi.org
ASTM ASTM International, formerly known as the
ASTM International American Society for Testing and Materials
100 Barr Harbor Drive (ASTM) is a voluntary standards development
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959 organization that was founded in 1898. ASTM
Ph. 610-832-9585 International is primarily involved with estab-
www.ASTM.org lishing standards for materials used in manu-
facturing and methods of testing and analysis.
NIOSH The Occupational Safety and Health Act of
National Institute for Occupational Safety 1970 created NIOSH along with OSHA. NIOSH
and Health is part of the U.S. Department of Health
Hubert H. Humphrey Bldg. and Human Services Agency and provides
200 Independence Ave., SW research, education, training, and information
Room 715H to insure safe and healthful workplaces.
Washington, DC 20201
Ph. 202-401-6997
www.cdc.gov/niosh
NSC The National Safety Council (NSC) was
National Safety Council founded in 1913. Their mission is essentially
For more information: 1121 Spring Lake Drive to educate and influence people to adopt
Itasca, IL 60143 safety policies and practices. It is a nonprofit,
800-TEC-FUSE Ph. 800-845-4NSC
www.nsc.org
nongovernmental organization.
www.littelfuse.com
72
Annex G
References
Cadick, John, Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, and Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Dennis Neitzel. Electrical Safety Handbook, Inc. New York, NY. September 2002
Second Edition. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 2000
Lee, R., The other electrical hazard: electrical arc
“George Westinghouse, Thomas Edison & blast burns, IEEE Transactions on
the Battle of the Currents” Electrical IndustryApplications, vol 1A-18. No. 3, May/
Apparatus, October 2003. June 1982.
Doughty, R. L., T.E.Neal, and H.L.Floyd, Mastrullo, Kenneth G., Jones, Ray A., Jones, Jane
Predicting Incident Energy to Better G., The Electrical Safety Program Book,
Manage The Electric Arc Hazard on National Fire Protection Association, Inc.,
600 V Power Distribution Systems. Quincy, MA., 2003.
Proc. of the IEEE Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Conference, pp. Modern Physics, Trinklein, Holt, Rinehart
329-346, September 28-30, 1998. and Winston 1990.
Doughty, R. L., et.al, The Use of Low-Voltage National Safety Council, 1121 Spring Lake
Current Limiting Fuses to Reduce Drive, Itasca, IL 60143-3201.
Arc-Flash Energy, IEEE Transactions
on Industry Applications, Vol.36, No. NEMA Standard AB 4-2003, Guidelines for
6, November/December 2000. Inspection and Preventive Maintenance
of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Used in
Essig, Mark, Edison & the Electric Chair, New Commercial and Industrial Applications,
York: Walker Publishing Company, 2003. National Electrical Manufacturers
Association, Rosslyn, VA. 2003.
Gregory, G. D., I. Lyttle, and C.M. Wellman,
Arc-Flash Energy Limitations Using Low- NFPA 70 – National Electrical Code®, Quincy, MA:
Voltage Circuit Breakers. Proc. of the National Fire Protection Association, 2005.
IEEE Petroleum and Chemical Industry
Conference, Industry Applications Society NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in
49th Annual, New Orleans, LA, Sept. 2002. the Workplace, Quincy, MA: National
Fire Protection Association, 2004.
IEEE Standard 493-1997, Recommended Practice
For The Design of Reliable Industrial OSHA Regulations 29 CFR 1910.300-399,
And Commercial Power Systems, The Subpart S, “Electrical” Washington,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics DC: Occupational Safety and Health
Engineers, Inc. New York, NY. 1997. Administration, US Department of Labor.
IEEE 1584, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash
Hazard Calculations, IEEE Industry
Applications Society, The Institute of
73
Annex H
Electrical Safety Quiz
1. OSHA requires employers to perform hazard assessments of their
T F
plants and facilities.
2. Unless it is justifiable, you should always deenergize equipment
T F
before working on it.
3. You must apply lockout/tagout devices in accordance with a
documented and established policy in order to establish an T F
electrically safe work condition.
4. According to NFPA 70E, all circuits must be analyzed for safety. T F
5. Only qualified electricians are allowed to work on energized circuits. T F
6. 1.2 cal/cm² will cause 2nd degree burns to bare skin. T F
7. Only qualified workers are allowed within the Limited
T F
Approach Boundary.
8. Unqualified workers are never allowed within the Restricted
T F
Approach Boundary.
9. Decreasing the opening time of the overcurrent protective device will
T F
decrease Arc-Flash hazards.
10. An Energized Electrical Work Permit is always required when
T F
working on any energized equipment.
11. The NEC® requires Arc-Flash warning labels on all equipment that
T F
may be worked on while energized.
12. NFPA 70E is often thought of as the ‘How-to’ Source for
T F
OSHA compliance.
13. Qualified and unqualified workers can work on or near exposed
T F
energized electrical components.
For more information:
14. Failure to perform regular maintenance on circuit breakers may
T F
result in increased Incident Energy.
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com 15. The use of Current-Limiting fuses can reduce Arc-Flash hazards. T F
For Quiz Answers see page 75.
74
Electrical Safety
Quiz Answers
(from pg 74):
1-T; 2-T; 3-T; 4-F;
5-F; 6-T; 7-F; 8-T;
9-T; 10-F; 11-T; 12-T;
13-F; 14-T; 15-T
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75
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Arc Flash Boundary and Requirements of
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Introduction to Arc Flash Boundary
In this article we will briefly discuss the distance limit and the safe and unsafe area of
an electrical equipment and equipment from the risk of electric arc flash. The distance
limit or area is often referred to as arc flash boundary. There are several terms related to
arc flash boundaries called approach boundary. Approach boundaries will also be
discussed briefly in this article. In each boundary and area requirements will be
discussed in the selection and determination of personal protective equipment or PPE
that corresponds to protection from risks of arc flash. The discussion will again be
based on the NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584 standards.
Approach Boundary
Arc flash protection boundary is the minimum distance where a person does not use a
personal protection tool but can be safe and avoid the danger of arc flash. NFPA 70E
defines an approach in setting special restrictions to protect workers when working
near stressed equipment. This is often called approach boundary. There are 4 types of
approach boundaries, namely:
1. Flash Protection Boundary
2. Limited Approach Boundary
3. Restricted Approach Boundary
4. Prohibited Approach Boundary
Arc Flash Boundaries
The arc flash boundaries are the minimum “safe” distance from conductors or open-
energy circuit components that have the potential for arc flash. Take the right steps to
ensure your safety before making any measurements, especially on energy equipment.
Know where the bow’s arc is and remember these top security measures.
Approach Boundaries for AC (Alternating-Current) Systems
Approach Boundaries for DC (Direct-Current) Systems
Requirements for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) from Danger
of Arc Flash
Related Articles
Arc Flash: Definition, Hazards and Risks
Arc Flash Causes Analysis
Arc Flash Calculation Methods
References
IEEE 158 4IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations4
NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
← Previous Post Next Post →
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Arc Flash analysis requires the consideration of several scenarios including those which produce the maximum
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Features
• Sort results from different studies by multiple criteria
• Find the worst-case incident energy results
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Work Permits, Data Sheets, Labels, . . .
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• Can be printed based on the worst case AF analysis results or
based on whatever operating condition is used to perform the
Data Sheets energized work.
The data sheet is an enhanced version of the arc
flash analysis report. It gives a detailed description
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short circuit study case and how the bus results
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Arc Flash Standards & Calculations
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Complies with Standards . . .
xx NFPAx70Ex2012 xx IEEEx1584x2002
xx CSAxZ462x2008 xx IEEEx1584ax2004
xx OSHAx29xCFRx1910 xx IEEEx1584bx2011
xx ASTMxDx120-02a xx NECx110.6
xx NESC
Single Phase Arc Flash Calculations
In addition to 3-phase systems, ETAP arc flash allows you to perform arc flash calculations for 1-phase
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DC Arc Flash Features & Calculation Methods
DC Arc Flash
The new NFPA 70E 2012 version includes one new annex section (Annex D.8) dedicated to the direct current
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Simple Operation • Automatically handle Incident Energy calculation
• Run multiple arc flash simulations with one-click & for low voltage buses (e.g., 208~240 volts or less)
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ETAP makes it easier to specify considerations that should be applied to low voltage
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Red u
ce R i
s k • Im
prove
Safet
y • Enf
orce
Comp
l i a n ce
C R N 0 8 - 0 1
Distribution System
Arc-Flash Calculation Case
Studies
FINAL REPORT
Prepared By
for
Cooperative Research Network
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
4301 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22203-1860
The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA), founded in 1942, is the national service
organization supporting more than 900 electric cooperatives and public power districts in 47 states. Electric
cooperatives own and operate more than 42 percent of the distribution lines in the nation and provide power to 40
million people (12 percent of the population).
NRECA’s Cooperative Research Network (CRN) harnesses research and development to benefit its electric co-op
members in four key ways:
• Improve productivity
• Control costs
• Increase service excellence
• Keep pace with emerging technologies
CRN strives to deliver new products and services best suited to the particular needs of electric co-ops. CRN
communicates with its members through its Web site (www.crn.coop), online and printed reports, newsletters,
Web conferences, and seminars.
In addition, CRN staff present at several annual events, including NRECA’s TechAdvantage Conference & Expo,
the NRECA/Touchstone Energy “Connect” marketing conference, and Touchstone Energy’s New & Emerging
Technologies (NET) Conference. For more information about these events and CRN’s participation, visit the
Conferences & Training section of www.Cooperative.com. For questions about CRN, call 703.907.5843.
© Distribution System Arc-Flash Calculation Case Studies
Copyright © 2008 by National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
Reproduction in whole or in part strictly prohibited without prior written approval of the National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association, except that reasonable portions may be reproduced or quoted as part of a review or other
story about this publication.
Legal Notice
This work contains findings that are general in nature. Readers are reminded to perform due diligence in applying
these findings to their specific needs as it is not possible for NRECA to have sufficient understanding of any
specific situation to ensure applicability of the findings in all cases.
Neither the authors nor NRECA assumes liability for how readers may use, interpret, or apply the information,
analysis, templates, and guidance herein or with respect to the use of, or damages resulting from the use of, any
information, apparatus, method, or process contained herein. In addition, the authors and NRECA make no
warranty or representation that the use of these contents does not infringe on privately held rights.
This work product constitutes the intellectual property of NRECA and its suppliers, as the case may be, and
contains Confidential Information. As such, this work product must be handled in accordance with the CRN Policy
Statement on Confidential Information.
Copyright © 2008, by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
Table of Contents:
Background and Goals…………………………………………………………………….1
Executive Summary……………………………………………………………….………2
Methodology………………………………………………………………………………7
Summary of Results…..…………...……………………………………………………..12
Sensitivity Analyses…………………………………………………………...…………13
Gap……………………………………………………………………………….13
Time……………………………………………………………………………...19
Arcing Current…………………………………………………………………...26
In Box/Open Air……………………………………………………………... 32
System Voltage………………………………………………………………......33
Distance…………………………………………………………………………..37
Linear Relationship of Arc Energy to Current x Time…………………………………..44
About the Authors…………………………………………………………………….….46
Appendix A—Case Study 1………………………………….…………………..47
Appendix B—Case Study 2………………………………….…………………..64
Appendix C—Case Study 3………………………………….…………………..81
Appendix D—Case Study 4………………………………….…………...……...98
Background and Goals
NRECA commissioned this project to produce Distribution System Arc-Flash
Calculation Case Studies. The need for the project lies with the requirements outlined in
Rule 410.A.3 of the 2007 Edition of the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC). This
rule requires employers having employees who work on or near energized parts or
equipment to perform an arc-flash assessment to determine the potential level of exposure
and the corresponding level of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). This rule goes into
effect on January 1, 2009 and affects all utilities covered by the NESC.
The IEEE defines arc-flash hazard as, “A dangerous condition associated with the release
of energy caused by an electric arc.”1
The goal of this project is to present the results of arc-flash calculations on various
distribution systems using two different methods, without drawing conclusions or
advocating one calculation method over the other. The two methods used to create this
report were the IEEE 1584 calculation methodology and the ARCPROTM software from
Kinectrics. This report is not meant to be a road map for cooperatives to use to develop
their own arc-flash analysis, but as a set of calculations that can be used as a comparison
for their own calculations based on their own input variables. It will be left to each
electric cooperative to draw its own conclusions concerning how the calculation methods
differ and how to conduct an arc-flash assessment on its own electric system.
Hi-Line Engineering (Hi-Line) was commissioned by NRECA to perform the arc-flash
calculations and provide a report that detailed the results of the calculations. Hi-Line, a
GDS Company, is an engineering and consulting firm headquartered in Marietta, GA.
The firm specializes in providing safe, reliable, and efficient planning, design, and
contract administration for electric distribution systems.
The scope of the project is to show calculations of arc-flash intensity levels along four
different distribution feeders. Other parameters for the set of calculations are delineated
below:
• The feeders should vary in voltage (12.5 kV and 24.9 kV);
• The low side of transformers should be included (120/240 volt single-
phase, and various three-phase banks);
• The substation transformers should represent large and small power
transformers; and
• Underground primary cables should be included in the selected points.
1
IEEE 1584-2002.
1
Executive Summary
The goal of the Distribution System Arc-Flash Calculation Case Studies project is to
present the results of arc-flash calculations using two different methods for real-world
examples, without drawing conclusions or advocating one calculation method over the
other. The two calculation methods were the IEEE 1584 calculation methodology and
the ARCPROTM software from Kinectrics, both of which are recommended by the NESC.
Using these two different methods, four separate feeders from typical electric cooperative
systems were studied. The methods produce different results, making it difficult for
utility engineers to determine the appropriate formula or method to use. This report is
intended to illustrate the differences, and to aid engineers in selecting a methodology.
When reviewing the results, cooperative engineers are encouraged to look closely at the
test methods used to verify the formulas. The following descriptions of the two methods
will aid in understanding this report.
ARCPROTM—Calculations using ARCPROTM represent single-phase arcs in open air,
and as such, are more suitable for the majority of distribution system situations. This
method was verified for a portion of the range of input values, with a focus on single-
phase arcs in open air. In general, there is no reason to believe the results are inaccurate
within the accepted range.2 This method suggests that the user apply a multiplier for
faults in a box (an enclosed space, such as a padmounted transformer or meter socket),
since it was not originally designed for these scenarios.
IEEE 1584—The calculations in IEEE 1584 represent an effort to assemble a standard
that could be verified over a wider range of conditions than the calculation methods
included in NFPA 70E.3 Development of this document included verification of
calculations for a voltage range of 208 V to 15 kV. Fault values of 700 amps to 100 kA
were verified. However, IEEE 1584 only calculates conditions for three-phase arcs in
enclosures or in open air (not single-phase faults). IEEE 1584 suggests that the Lee
Method be used for 25 kV faults. This calculation technique, developed by Ralph Lee, is
based on the theoretical behavior of arcs.4 However, no published data are available
indicating that the Lee Method methodology has been verified for 25 kV faults.
2
New Rules Address Arc Flash Safety Hazards, March 2008, by Edward S. Thomas, P.E.
3
National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 70E: Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.
4
New Rules Address Arc Flash Safety Hazards, March 2008, by Edward S. Thomas, P.E.
2
The analysis in this report finds that the two methods correlate well in the range of 12 kV
faults.5 While the results are not exact, the differences will not affect decisions on
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in most cases. This is shown below in a graph of
calculated values from the four feeders studied.
12 kV Primary
0.9
0.8
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.7
0.6
0.5 IEEE 1584
0.4 Method
ARCPRO™
0.3
Method
0.2
0.1
0
3-4 1-8 1-12 3-6 1-4 1-6 3-8 3-10 1-2 1-14 3-12 3-2 1-10 1-1 3-14 3-1
Case Study-Selection Point
Exhibit 1
As shown in Exhibit 2, there is a significant difference between calculation methods at 25
kV.3 It should be noted that, at 25 kV, IEEE 1584 shifts from its laboratory-tested
standard formula to the theoretical Lee Method. Conversely, the ARCPROTM software
has been tested at the 25 kV voltage range. Utility engineers must decide which of these
calculation methods will best represent their systems.
25 kV Primary
20
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
15
IEEE 1584
10 Method
ARCPRO™
Method
5
0
2-8 4-8 4-14 4-6 2-4 2-12 4-4 2-2 4-12 4-2 2-6 2-14 2-1 2-10 4-10 4-1
Case Study-Selection Point
Exhibit 2
5
Points in the graphs include faults “in air” and “in a box,” as well as single-phase and three-phase faults.
3
For both the 12 kV and 25 kV faults, the clearing time of the overcurrent protective
device has a significant impact on the arc energy. For the calculations in this report, it
was determined that the cooperatives operating the four feeders in the case studies used
the “fast” curve. This curve is used when a recloser is set to one-shot when hot-line work
is performed. Thus, the fault is cleared by the fast curve. This technique can help to
limit the level of arc energy, especially for a fault involving primary voltages.
Secondary faults in meter sockets and padmounted transformers are a concern for
cooperatives selecting their PPE. The enclosed space reflects the arc energy, which is
exacerbated by the high level of fault current present at low voltage. For 240 volt and
208 volt faults in a box, the correlation between the two methods is fairly good in terms
of selecting a level of PPE, as shown in Exhibit 3. It should be emphasized that, for most
points studied, the incident energy would require less than 8 calorie PPE. However, in
some cases, ARCPROTM predicted significantly higher values of incident energy. (Note
that ARCPROTM was not tested for three-phase faults in a box.)
0.208 kV & 0.240 kV Secondary*
25
20
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
15 IEEE 1584
Method
10 ARCPRO™
Method
5
0
1-7 1-13 1-15 1-5 3-7 4-15 2-11 2-15 2-3 1-9 4-7 2-9 3-5 3-13 3-3 1-3 3-9 3-11 4-11 4-5
Case Study-Selection Point
Exhibit 3
* The following points may have significantly higher Incident Energies because they are in a box: 1-7, 4-
15, 2-15, 1-9, 2-9, 3-13, 1-3, 3-9, 3-11, and 4-5.
At 480 volts, eight fault scenarios were calculated and are summarized below. At this
voltage and fault level, the PPE required will be higher than for the other voltage classes.
Based on these four case studies, a PPE level of more than 8 calories would be necessary
for 480 volt faults with long clearing times and high fault currents. The results show that,
in three cases, ARCPROTM predicts significantly higher incident energy. These cases
each have relatively long clearing times coupled, with high fault currents.
4
0.480 kV Secondary*
50
45
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
40
35
30 IEEE 1584
25 Method
20
ARCPRO™
15 Method
10
5
0
2-5 2-13 4-9 4-13 4-3 1-11 2-7 3-15
Case Study-Selection Point
Exhibit 4
* The following points may have significantly higher Incident Energies because they are in a box: 2-5, 2-
13, 4-9, 1-11, 2-7, and 3-15.
For secondary faults, it was assumed that there is no secondary conductor. The
sensitivity analysis in this report provides an indication of how an increased service
length may increase system resistance, reduce fault current, and so reduce incident
energy.
A set of sensitivity analyses was performed on the equations. The most significant
variable was the clearing time of the fault. Of all the variables, this is the one variable
that an electric utility has the option to change readily. Other variables that affect the
incident energy significantly are the fault current magnitude and the arc gap distance. A
variable that had minimal impact was the source-side impedance of a distribution
transformer. Including the source-side impedance will reduce the available fault current,
but not substantially.
In addition to the sensitivity analyses, this project examined the data to determine if a
correlation exists between the variables. After evaluating the test data, it was found that a
rough linear relationship existed between the incident energy and the product of fault
current and clearing time (Current x Time). Exhibit 5 depicts this rough linear
relationship. This relationship may be used to determine the clearing time of the
upstream overcurrent protection device, given the available fault current and a desired
level of PPE. This analysis could be used by engineers to help determine appropriate
clearing times for their systems, if a certain level of PPE is desired. This relationship is
only approximate and should be confirmed with a complete arc-flash assessment.
5
Linear Relationship for 480 Volt Secondary
Faults in a Box using IEEE method
25
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
20
15
10
0
0.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 7.000
Fault Current x Clearing Time
480 Volt Fault In a Box Linear (480 Volt Fault In a Box)
Exhibit 5
This report is not intended to be a road map to show cooperatives how to perform an arc-
flash assessment. To do this, cooperatives will need to gather a significant amount of
data regarding fault current and overcurrent protective devices. This data should include,
but not be limited to, an accurate system model that can provide system impedance
values, distribution transformer impedance information, available fault current,
overcurrent protection device information, and a set of assumptions for calculating the
arc energy on a given system. After their individual arc-flash calculations are completed,
engineers can use this report as a comparison to their own calculated arc energy values
for benchmarking the results. This report provides an applicable comparison tool,
because its calculations were based on real-world data provided by volunteer
cooperatives. Since there is a great deal of disparity between the calculation methods and
other available industry calculation methods, it is up to the individual user to choose the
calculation method that works the best for a specific electric system during the course of
the arc-flash assessment process.
6
Methodology
Rule 410 in the NESC includes two tables that show calculated values to determine the
level of PPE required, based on the phase-to-phase voltage, available fault current, and
the clearing time of the overcurrent protective device at the fault location. The PPE
requirements in these tables were calculated using the ARCPROTM software from
Kinectrics. These tables show three levels of PPE: 4-cal system, 8-cal system, and 12-cal
system. For arc-flash energy below 2 cal/cm2, it is understood at this time that non-
melting flammable material clothing could be used as PPE.
To perform the required arc-flash calculations for this study, Hi-Line worked with
NRECA to identify electric cooperative volunteers who wanted to participate in the
study. The requirements of the study included soliciting system load flow models in the
Milsoft Windmil analysis software. The ideal models would have individual distribution
transformers modeled, as well as detailed information regarding the overcurrent
protection devices. In addition, the source and transformer impedances would need to be
modeled to allow for accurate calculations. Hi-Line received many system models and
requests to provide assistance for the project; however, very few models possessed the
level of detail necessary to participate in the study. In the end, Hi-Line selected two
system models and from each model selected two feeders, for a total of four distribution
feeders. The selection requirements included two 12.47 kV and two 24.9 kV feeders. It
also was considered optimum to include a feeder that was primarily underground. The
final selection criterion involved selecting feeders that contained some transformers with
secondary voltages other than 120/240 volts, including 120/208 and 277/480 volts.
The distribution system is the focus both for the report and the arc-flash calculations
performed on the selected case studies. These calculations were limited to points on the
case study feeders downline of the substation feeder breaker or recloser. As will be
illustrated below, the fast clearing times of the feeder breaker/recloser helps to limit the
arc-flash incident energy. However, in substations, the transformer highside protective
device generally is the primary protection for faults between the lowside of the power
transformer and the feeder breaker/recloser. These protective devices—fuses,
overcurrent relays, or differential relays—have varying speeds. Slower devices, such as
fuses or overcurrent relays, will have significantly higher arc-flash incident energy than
fast devices, such as differential relays. Calculations were not preformed for faults
within the substation. In terms of developing arc-flash calculations for substations, the
user should carefully consider the approach distance. For example, many workers in
substations do not approach within 15 inches of energized conductors or bus work. For
these employees, a longer approach distance will impact the level of PPE required.
There are several engineering methods in the industry today that are available to calculate
arc-flash energy values. Below are references to some of the methods currently being
used. (These are in no particular order.)
• “IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations,” IEEE Standard
1584TM, 2002.
7
• ARCPROTM Software, Kinectrics, Inc.
• Lee, Ralph, “The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns,” IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. IA-18, No. 3, May/June 1982 (Lee
Method).
• Privette, Alan, “Duke Power Heat Flux Calculator,” 2002.
The two calculation methods used for this study were the IEEE 1584 method and the
ARCPROTM software. The IEEE 1584 method has been verified for line-to-line voltages
ranging from 208 volts to 15 kV and fault values of 700 amps to 100 kA. The arc gap
lengths for this method range from 0.5 to 6 inches. It should be noted that this method of
calculation is only for three-phase arcs in open air and in a box (enclosure).6 In addition,
the equations presented in IEEE 1584 have a confidence level of 95%.7 This method
requires that the user know the line-to-line voltage, bolted fault current magnitude, arc
duration, arc gap, approach distance, whether the arc occurs in open air or in a box, and
whether the system is grounded or ungrounded. The IEEE 1584 method uses different
calculation factors for voltages less than 1,000 volts (1.5) and a calculation factor of 1.0
for voltage ranges of 1,000-15,000 volts. This calculation factor has a very significant
impact on the arc energy for primary voltages. For voltages greater than 15 kV line to
line, this report used the Lee method of calculation to determine the arc energy based on
the recommendation in IEEE 1584. For overhead pole-mounted transformers, it was
assumed that the fault was in open air. For padmounted locations, it was assumed that
the arc was contained in a box. Note that arcs occurring in a box can yield higher
incident energy because the box will reflect some of the heat energy towards the worker.
The ARCPROTM software is a commercially available package developed by Kinectrics
(formerly Ontario Hydro Technologies). This software can accommodate fault current
values from 200 amps to 100 kA and arc approach distances from 0.4 to 400 inches. It
should be noted that this entire range of values has not been fully tested and verified.
ARCPROTM only calculates single-phase arcs in open air. The ARCPROTM software
prompts the user to input the source voltage (open circuit voltage across the gap in volts
of “any that will sustain the arc”), as well as the fault current magnitude, arc duration, arc
gap, and distance from the user to the arc. Another adjustable variable is whether the
fault occurs across stainless steel or copper electrode material. The “Help” section of
ARCPROTM lists several conversion factors for adjusting the arc energy calculation
results. Single-phase arcs in a box can be approximated by multiplying the arc energy
result by a factor of 1.5. Three-phase arcs can be estimated by multiplying the result by a
factor of 1.2 to 2.2, and three-phase arcs in a box can be approximated by multiplying the
result by a factor of 3.7 to 6.5.8 Exhibit 6 illustrates these suggested values and the
values used by this report to convert the ARCPROTM arc energy results.
6
The IEEE 1584 calculation method was used to calculate arc energy for the selection points on single-
phase lines for line-to-ground faults, but users should determine the correct evaluation method for their
own individual systems.
7
Section 9.11.3 of IEEE Std 1584-2002.
8
This report used an adjustment factor of 1.7 to convert the “in air” single-phase arc energy results to three-
phase arc energy results, a factor of 1.5 to convert single-phase arc energy results to single-phase “arc in
box” results for single-phase padmounted transformers, and a factor of 5.1 to convert single-phase arc
8
ARCPROTM Given Adjustment Factors
Energy for Range Value Used
1-phase in a box 1.5 1.5
3-phase 1.2 to 2.2 1.7
3-phase in a box 3.7 to 6.5 5.1
Exhibit 6
The ARCPROTM User Manual states that these adjustment factors have not been verified,
so the user must assume all risk when using these factors to approximate arc energy at the
selection point. The ARCPROTM software was used to calculate Tables 410-1 and 410-2
in the 2007 NESC. This report will use the same parameters assumed by the NESC
regarding the approach distance as being limited to 15 inches for voltages up to 46 kV
line to line. The arc gaps that were used for both calculation methods are as follows:
.240-15 kV: 2 inches
15.1-25 kV: 4 inches
25.1-36 kV: 6 inches
36.1-46 kV: 9 inches
It is noteworthy that the ARCPROTM software indicated that some of the case study input
voltages were not sufficient to sustain the arc. This occurred with three of the case study
transformers for the secondary voltage calculations, as well as with the sensitivity
analysis calculations, for which the arc gap distance was varied.
Exhibit 7 shows a comparison of the calculation methodologies used in this report, and
the range of input values for which each is applicable:
IEEE 1584
IEEE 1584 Lee Method ARCPRO
Voltage Range .208-15 kV >15 kV .208-46 kV
Fault Range 700-100 kA N/A 200-100 kA
Arc Gap 0.5 - 6 inches N/A 1-20 inches
Type Open or Box Open only Open only
Fault Types
3-Phase Faults 3-Phase Faults 1-Phase Faults
Exhibit 7
Before running any arc-flash calculations, Hi-Line first calibrated the two calculation
methods using available published resources. The IEEE 1584 calculation methodology
was incorporated into a spreadsheet calculator and then calibrated against published
calculated values from several sources, including online calculators and published papers.
The ARCPROTM software was calibrated by running calculations to re-create Table 410-
1 from the 2007 NESC. This calibration process was necessary to ensure that the
energy results to three-phase arc in a box results for three-phase padmounted transformers. These factors
come from a range of values given by the ARCPROTM User Manual.
9
calculations were being performed correctly prior to running calculations using the input
variables derived from the system models.
To run the arc-flash calculations, Hi-Line obtained detailed Milsoft Windmil models
from the electric cooperative volunteers. The requirements were that the models have the
correct source and line impedance and that they incorporate sufficient detail, including
modeling of the distribution transformers and consumers. The overcurrent devices also
needed to be modeled so that the correct clearing times could be used to estimate the arc
energy using the calculation methods.
After selecting the four feeder case studies, Hi-Line used Milsoft’s fault current analysis
to determine the available fault current at selection points. The selection points were
located at the substation just downline of the feeder breaker and the line, and load side of
seven different distribution transformers dispersed along the feeder. The fault current
results for the line (primary) side of the selection points were verified using hand analysis
that utilized industry-approved formulas as well as spreadsheet based fault current
calculators created by Hi-Line.
The Milsoft Windmil fault current analysis report did not display accumulated impedance
values for single-phase lines. Milsoft was contacted concerning the lack of this data on
the fault current reports and stated that the matrices used to calculate the line impedance
for single-phase lines did not allow a single accumulated value to be displayed in the
report. Due to this, the fault current values for load side faults at the selection points
were calculated by hand, using (1) the accumulated line impedance (provided by Milsoft
Windmil) at the closest upstream three-phase line section, and (2) the % Z impedance,
kVA rating, and X/R ratio of the selection point transformer. Since the fault current
values calculated by hand were larger than they would have been if the line impedance
had been included for the single-phase lines, they were deemed acceptable for use in
estimating the available arc energy on the load side of the selection point transformers. It
is important to note that, for all of the selected values of this study, the source impedance
of distribution transformers had minimal impact on the lowside fault availability.
However, it is possible that the lowside fault on long feeders would be limited, due to the
increased source impedance.
The Milsoft LightTable overcurrent protection software was used to determine the
clearing time of the upstream overcurrent devices, based on the available fault current at
the selection points provided by Milsoft Windmil and the hand calculations. In cases for
which a fuse was the fastest upstream device, the total clear fuse curve was used to
determine the clearing time. When the fastest upstream device was a breaker or recloser,
Hi-Line used the total clearing times of fast trip curves to determine the clearing time for
selection points. This models the standard practice of setting the station breaker/recloser
and downline electronic recloser to non-automatic or non-reclose prior to energized line
work. Even if the recloser is not set on non-automatic, one can assume that, if a worker
encounters a fault while working a line hot, the initial fault blast will blow the worker
away from the fault, so second fast operation or the delay curves are not relevant for the
purposes of the arc-flash calculations.
10
Once the line-to-line voltage, clearing times, and fault current values were determined
using Milsoft Windmil, LightTable, and hand calculations, they were used to calculate
the arc energy results and required PPE level with the IEEE 1584 formulas and
ARCPROTM software. Both calculation methods were used to determine the arc energy
and PPE clothing level for all 60 distribution selection points.9 The input values and
results were entered into data tables and graphs to illustrate the results. In addition,
figures of the selected feeders and the input and result data are included in this report to
illustrate the selection points and results.
To illustrate how the input variables affected the calculated arc energy results for some of
the selected test points, sensitivity analyses were prepared to show how each calculation
method varies. These analyses illustrate how the results changed based on increasing or
decreasing one input variable for each analysis at a selection point. Sensitivity analyses
included variations for the following variables:
• Varying voltage regulation + or – 10%
• Varying the arc gap distance
• Varying the approach distance
• Varying the fault current
• Selecting arc in air or arc in box (can be calculated using the IEEE method, but
only approximated using suggested factors for ARCPROTM)
The results of these sensitivity analyses are included in the results section in table as well
as graphical format.
Summary of Results
The appendices provide detailed results for the four case studies, including a circuit
diagram of the feeders, to illustrate how the distance from the source may affect the
available fault and incident energy. For each case study, 15 points along the distribution
system were selected. Approximately half of the points were on lowside of the
distribution transformers. The cases were selected to represent typical distribution
feeders found on electric cooperative systems.
Case Study 1 – 10 MVA transformer with an operating voltage of 7.2/12.47 kV
Case Study 2 – 7.5 MVA transformer with an operating voltage of 14.4/24.9 kV
Case Study 3 – 15/20 MVA transformer with an operating voltage of 7.2/12.47 kV
Case Study 4 – 12/16/20 MVA transformer with an operating voltage of 14.4/24.9 kV
Exhibit 8 is a summary of all data points studied in this report. It has been sorted by
voltage and fault magnitude to aid the user in making a comparison of the two methods
used for calculating incident energy.
9
From the two system models, two feeders were selected, for a total of four distribution feeders. Fifteen
points along the distribution systems were selected for each of these four case studies, totaling 60
distribution selection points.
11
Summary of Incident Energy for 60 Case Points Using IEEE 1584 and ARCPROTM
Line to Distance
Bolted Fault Arc Gap Between IEEE Method ARCPROTM
Line from Arc
Case Point Circuit Current Clearing kA x Sec Conductors Incident Energy Incident Energy Type
Voltage Point to
(kA) Time (Sec) (in) (cal/cm^2) (cal/cm^2)
(kV) Person (in)
4 6 24.9 0.478 0.0687 0.033 15 4 2.884 0.044 Open
2 2 24.9 0.627 0.0722 0.045 15 4 3.975 0.021 Open
4 12 24.9 1.525 0.0378 0.058 15 4 5.062 0.123 Open
4 2 24.9 0.948 0.0674 0.064 15 4 5.611 0.114 Open
2 1 24.9 1.417 0.0658 0.093 15 4 8.188 0.196 Open
2 10 24.9 1.149 0.1419 0.163 15 4 14.318 0.316 Open
4 10 24.9 2.4 0.0791 0.190 15 4 16.671 0.464 Open
4 1 24.9 3.41 0.0637 0.217 15 4 19.075 0.588 Open
2 8 24.9 0.796 0.0247 0.020 15 4 1.727 0.030 In a box
4 8 24.9 0.455 0.0447 0.020 15 4 1.786 0.081 In a box
4 14 24.9 0.461 0.0442 0.020 15 4 1.789 0.024 In a box
2 4 24.9 0.777 0.0497 0.039 15 4 3.391 0.196 In a box
2 12 24.9 1.374 0.0299 0.041 15 4 3.608 0.136 In a box
4 4 24.9 0.843 0.0489 0.041 15 4 3.620 0.216 In a box
2 6 24.9 0.983 0.0824 0.081 15 4 7.113 0.440 In a box
2 14 24.9 0.836 0.1071 0.090 15 4 7.863 0.137 In a box
3 4 12.47 1.66 0.0323 0.054 15 2 0.101 0.065 Open
1 12 12.47 1.956 0.0305 0.060 15 2 0.114 0.076 Open
3 6 12.47 2.418 0.0287 0.069 15 2 0.134 0.096 Open
1 4 12.47 3.026 0.0314 0.095 15 2 0.187 0.145 Open
1 14 12.47 2.26 0.0659 0.149 15 2 0.287 0.201 Open
3 2 12.47 2.2 0.0779 0.171 15 2 0.330 0.226 Open
1 1 12.47 3.317 0.0661 0.219 15 2 0.433 0.342 Open
3 1 12.47 6.905 0.0578 0.399 15 2 0.825 0.789 Open
1 8 12.47 1.48 0.0223 0.033 15 2 0.107 0.034 In a box
1 6 12.47 2.272 0.0247 0.056 15 2 0.187 0.067 In a box
3 8 12.47 3.387 0.0185 0.063 15 2 0.214 0.085 In a box
3 10 12.47 4.571 0.0163 0.075 15 2 0.259 0.385 In a box
1 2 12.47 3.168 0.0261 0.083 15 2 0.281 0.374 In a box
3 12 12.47 3.742 0.0233 0.087 15 2 0.299 0.126 In a box
1 10 12.47 2.254 0.0473 0.107 15 2 0.355 0.432 In a box
3 14 12.47 3.156 0.0408 0.129 15 2 0.438 0.592 In a box
4 13 0.480 3.601 1.24 4.465 15 2 8.099 7.106 Open
4 3 0.480 6.77 0.7346 4.973 15 2 8.147 9.724 Open
2 5 0.480 3.309 0.0683 0.226 15 2 0.824 1.046 In a box
2 13 0.480 20.588 0.0303 0.624 15 2 1.694 3.137 In a box
4 9 0.480 5.425 0.1653 0.897 15 2 3.020 4.871 In a box
2 7 0.480 15.81 0.2971 4.697 15 2 13.313 39.270 In a box
1 11 0.480 23.047 0.2085 4.805 15 2 12.816 49.215 In a box
3 15 0.480 7.777 0.7894 6.139 15 2 19.510 37.893 In a box
1 13 0.240 2.927 0.0692 0.203 15 2 0.307 0.298 Open
1 5 0.240 4.874 0.0962 0.469 15 2 0.608 0.816 Open
1 15 0.240 7.506 0.0707 0.531 15 2 0.602 1.078 Open
3 7 0.240 8.563 0.0779 0.667 15 2 0.727 1.418 Open
2 3 0.240 1.818 0.3942 0.717 15 2 1.256 0.881 Open
2 11 0.240 10.719 0.0833 0.893 15 2 0.909 2.074 Open
3 5 0.240 1.59 0.868 1.380 15 2 2.521 1.629 Open
4 7 0.240 13.729 0.1537 2.110 15 2 1.991 5.491 Open
3 3 0.240 4.219 0.6087 2.568 15 2 3.478 4.284 Open
4 11 0.240 2.76 1.6488 4.551 15 2 7.020 6.630 Open
1 7 0.240 4.844 0.0204 0.099 15 2 0.255 0.152 In a box
4 15 0.240 3.041 0.0995 0.303 15 2 0.899 0.404 In a box
2 15 0.240 2.92 0.1067 0.312 15 2 0.937 0.410 In a box
1 9 0.240 10.637 0.0782 0.832 15 2 1.684 1.695 In a box
2 9 0.240 24.429 0.0592 1.446 15 2 2.269 * In a box
3 13 0.240 13.731 0.1193 1.638 15 2 3.067 3.750 In a box
3 9 0.240 4.648 0.4289 1.994 15 2 5.201 3.015 In a box
1 3 0.208 12.933 0.1967 2.544 15 2 4.581 * In a box
3 11 0.208 10.716 0.3022 3.238 15 2 6.200 22.593 In a box
4 5 0.208 24.161 0.2031 4.907 15 2 7.209 * In a box
* ARCPROTM states that this case will not sustain the arc
12
Exhibit 8
Sensitivity Analyses
As with any set of equations, those used for this report are sensitive to variations in the
key variables. Understanding the impact of these variables provides insight when trying
to determine representative values to use in the equations.
The following are input values that can affect the incident energy of the electric arc:
Gap – Distance between the contacts (also referred to as arc distance)
Time – Arcing time (seconds); dictated by the clearing time of the overcurrent
protection device
Arcing Current – Current in amperes through the arc (also referred to as bolted
fault current)
In Box/Open Air – “In Box” – a fault in a padmounted switch or a padmounted
transformer; “Open Air” represents a fault in a non-confining space
Voltage – System voltage (kV)
Distance – Distance from the possible arc to the person (measured to the face
and/or body, not the hands)
Each variable and its independent effect on the resulting incident energy are discussed
below. It should be emphasized that no conclusions have been drawn from these
discussions. Rather, they are meant to provide information for understanding the impact
in terms of the magnitude of the result. This will illustrate the importance of a given
variable when compared to others.
Gap
The gap distance defines the length of the arc. Assuming that all other parameters remain
unchanged, a longer gap generates more heat. However, as the length increases, the
energy passing through the gap remains constant. This creates a limiting affect on the
magnitude of the incident energy.
The arc gap distance and approach distance are assumed to be voltage dependent and, in
this study, were determined using the same parameters assumed by the NESC in Table
410-1 for voltages up to 46 kV line to line. (See Methodology above for the specific arc
gap ranges used with both calculation methods.)
13
The following tables and graphs (Exhibits 9-20) show variations in the arc gap above and
below the values used in NESC Table 410-1. The other input variables have remained the
same, as indicated.
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 1 Point 4 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 1 0.732 0.175 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 1.5 0.756 0.181 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 2 0.781 0.187 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 2.5 0.806 0.193 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 3 0.833 0.199 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 3.5 0.860 0.206 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 4 0.888 0.212 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 4.5 0.917 0.219 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 5 0.947 0.226 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 5.5 0.978 0.234 none
Exhibit 9
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 1 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 1 0.342 0.082 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 1.5 0.479 0.115 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 2 0.607 0.145 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 2.5 0.726 0.173 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 3 0.840 0.201 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 3.5 0.949 0.226 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 4 1.052 0.252 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 4.5 1.151 0.275 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 5 1.244 0.298 none
12.47 15 3.026 0.0314 5.5 1.333 0.318 none
Exhibit 10
14
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap for 12.47kV
(Case Study 1 Point 4)
0.35
0.30
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.25
IEEE Method
0.20 ARCPRO™
Method
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
Arc Gap (in.)
Exhibit 11
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 1 Point 5 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Current Clearing Gap Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 1 2.632 0.629 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 1.5 2.587 0.618 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 2 2.542 0.608 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 2.5 2.499 0.597 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 3 2.456 0.587 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 3.5 2.414 0.577 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 4 2.372 0.567 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 4.5 2.332 0.557 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 5 2.292 0.548 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 5.5 2.252 0.538 none
Exhibit 12
15
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 1 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 1 1.972 0.476 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 1.5 2.737 0.655 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 2 3.434 0.816 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 2.5 4.029 0.969 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 3 4.641 1.110 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 3.5 5.219 1.246 none
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 4 * * *
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 4.5 * * *
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 5 * * *
0.24 15 4.874 0.0962 5.5 * * *
Exhibit 13
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap for .24kV*
(Case Study 1 Point 5)
1.40
1.20
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
1.00
IEEE Method
0.80
ARCPRO™
Method
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
Arc Gap (in.)
Exhibit 14
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
16
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 4 Point 4 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Arc Clearing Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.0489 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.1827 56.580 13.523 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.3164 98.014 23.426 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.4502 139.448 33.329 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.5840 180.882 43.232 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.7178 222.315 53.135 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.8515 263.749 63.038 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.9853 305.183 72.941 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 1.1191 346.617 82.843 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 1.2528 388.051 92.746 >12-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 1.3866 429.485 102.649 >12-cal System
Exhibit 15
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 4 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Arc Clearing Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.0489 0.908 0.216 none
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.1827 3.366 0.801 none
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.3164 5.814 1.387 none
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.4502 8.262 1.974 none
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.5840 10.761 2.560 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.7178 13.209 3.142 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.8515 15.657 3.728 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 0.9853 18.105 4.315 8-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 1.1191 20.604 4.901 8-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 1.2528 23.052 5.508 8-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.843 1.3866 25.500 6.069 8-cal System
17
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap for 25kV
(Case Study 4 Point 4)
4.0
3.5
3.0
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
2.5
IEEE Method
2.0
ARCPRO™
Method
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
Arc Gap (in.)
Exhibit 17
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 4 Point 5 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 1 35.672 8.526 12-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 1.5 32.794 7.838 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 2 30.148 7.206 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 2.5 27.716 6.624 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 3 25.480 6.090 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 3.5 23.424 5.598 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 4 21.534 5.147 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 4.5 19.797 4.732 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 5 18.199 4.350 8-cal System
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 5.5 16.731 3.999 4-cal System
Exhibit 18
18
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 4 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
from Arc Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Line to Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 1 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 1.5 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 2 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 2.5 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 3 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 3.5 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 4 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 4.5 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 5 * * *
0.208 15 24.161 0.2031 5.5 * * *
Exhibit 19
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap for .208kV*
(Case Study 4 Point 5)
9.0
8.0
7.0
IEEE Method
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
6.0
ARCPRO™
5.0 Method
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
Arc Gap (in.)
Exhibit 20
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
Time
Duration of the arc has a significant impact on the incident energy. Heat transferred from
the arc to a worker is a direct function of time. The value used for most of the
19
calculations was the clearing time of the fast curve of recloser/breaker. This is the curve
that would be employed if the recloser/relay were set on non-reclose.
For the reclosers and breakers used for this report, the minimum clearing times were
approximately 0.05 seconds (3 cycles). It would be unreasonable to use faster clearing
times, so the sensitivity analysis increased the clearing time to the delay curve of the
reclosers/breakers used in the study, or the total clearing time of the tap fuse. Exhibits
21-32 show the linear relationship between the clearing time and arc energy.
Again, it should be noted that the clearing time has a significant impact on the incident
energy and is one of the few variables the utility can easily modify.
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 1 Point 4 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Clearing Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0314 0.781 0.187 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0481 1.196 0.286 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0648 1.611 0.385 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0815 2.026 0.484 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0982 2.442 0.584 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1149 2.857 0.683 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1316 3.272 0.782 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1483 3.687 0.881 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1650 4.103 0.981 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1817 4.518 1.080 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1984 4.933 1.179 none
Exhibit 21
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 1 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Arc Clearing Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0314 0.609 0.145 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0481 0.927 0.221 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0648 1.246 0.298 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0815 1.566 0.372 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.0982 1.887 0.449 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1149 2.210 0.525 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1316 2.516 0.602 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1483 2.839 0.677 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1650 3.162 0.753 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1817 3.485 0.830 none
12.47 15 2 3.026 0.1984 3.808 0.906 none
Exhibit 22
20
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time for 12.47 kV
(Case Study 1 Point 4)
1.4
1.2
1.0
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.8
IEEE Method
ARCPRO™ Method
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0314 0.0481 0.0648 0.0815 0.0982 0.1149 0.1316 0.1483 0.1650 0.1817 0.1984
Clearing Time (sec.)
Exhibit 23
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 1 Point 5 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Clearing Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.0962 2.542 0.608 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1064 2.812 0.672 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1166 3.082 0.737 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1269 3.353 0.801 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1371 3.623 0.866 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1473 3.893 0.930 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1575 4.163 0.995 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1677 4.433 1.059 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1780 4.703 1.124 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1882 4.973 1.189 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1984 5.243 1.253 none
Exhibit 24
21
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 1 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Arc Clearing Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.0962 3.434 0.816 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1064 3.808 0.906 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1166 4.148 0.989 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1269 4.505 1.073 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1371 4.879 1.163 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1473 5.253 1.251 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1575 5.610 1.338 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1677 5.967 1.420 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1780 6.324 1.5079 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1882 6.698 1.598 none
0.24 15 2 4.874 0.1984 7.072 1.686 none
Exhibit 25
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time for .24 kV
(Case Study 1 Point 5)
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
1.0
IEEE Method
ARCPRO™ Method
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0962 0.1064 0.1166 0.1269 0.1371 0.1473 0.1575 0.1677 0.1780 0.1882 0.1984
Clearing Time (sec.)
Exhibit 26
22
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 4 Point 4 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 1 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 1.5 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 2 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 2.5 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 3 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 3.5 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 4 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 4.5 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 5 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 5.5 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
Exhibit 27
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Gap
(Case Study 4 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 1 0.244 0.058 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 1.5 0.362 0.087 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 2 0.479 0.114 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 2.5 0.587 0.141 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 3 0.699 0.167 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 3.5 0.806 0.192 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 4 0.908 0.216 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 4.5 1.000 0.239 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 5 1.091 0.261 none
24.9 15 0.843 0.0489 5.5 1.183 0.283 none
Exhibit 28
23
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time for 25 kV
(Case Study 4 Point 4)
120
100
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
80
IEEE Method
60
ARCPRO™
Method
40
20
0
0.0489 0.1827 0.3164 0.4502 0.5840 0.7178 0.8515 0.9853 1.1191 1.2528 1.3866
Clearing Time (sec.)
Exhibit 29
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 4 Point 5 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Clearing Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.2031 30.163 7.209 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.3215 47.739 11.410 12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.4398 65.316 15.611 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.5582 82.892 19.812 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.6765 100.468 24.013 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.7949 118.045 28.213 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.9132 135.621 32.414 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.0316 153.198 36.615 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.1499 170.774 40.816 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.2683 188.350 45.017 >12-cal System
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.3866 205.927 49.218 >12-cal System
Exhibit 30
24
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time
(Case Study 4 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Circuit Current Arc Clearing Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.2031 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.3215 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.4398 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.5582 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.6765 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.7949 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 0.9132 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.0316 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.1499 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.2683 * * *
0.208 15 2 24.161 1.3866 * * *
Exhibit 31
Incident Energy as a Function of Arc Clearing Time for .208 kV*
(Case Study 4 Point 5)
60
50
40
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
IEEE Method
30
ARCPRO™ Method
20
10
0
0.2031 0.3215 0.4398 0.5582 0.6765 0.7949 0.9132 1.0316 1.1499 1.2683 1.3866
Clearing Time (sec.)
Exhibit 32
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
25
Arc Current
The fault current values were tested for sensitivity using a reasonable range of values that
can be found on a distribution system. Results show that the incident energy is nearly
linear for the increase in available fault current.
Several features are important to note. First, an increase in fault current generally will be
accompanied by a faster clearing time; however, for this sensitivity analysis, clearing
time was held constant. Second, the length and type of conductor used for the service
drop will result in changes to the available fault current. This is important to keep in
mind when trying to determine the arc energy at the meter base. For the purposes of this
analysis, we have assumed the worst case scenario, with a service length of zero, to be
conservative. While this results in a higher arc current, it will ensure that the adequate
level of PPE is selected for metering personnel who do live line meter work.
Exhibits 33-44 show the relationship between arc current and arc energy.
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 1 Point 4 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Clearing Circuit Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 15 2 0.0314 1.513 0.374 0.089 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 1.816 0.454 0.108 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 2.118 0.534 0.128 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 2.421 0.616 0.147 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 2.723 0.698 0.167 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.026 0.781 0.187 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.329 0.864 0.207 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.631 0.948 0.226 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.934 1.032 0.247 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 4.236 1.116 0.267 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 4.539 1.201 0.287 none
Exhibit 33
26
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 1 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Arc Clearing Circuit Current Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 15 2 0.0314 1.513 0.235 0.056 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 1.816 0.299 0.071 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 2.118 0.3689 0.08772 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 2.421 0.447 0.107 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 2.723 0.527 0.125 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.026 0.609 0.145 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.329 0.690 0.164 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.631 0.774 0.184 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 3.934 0.857 0.204 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 4.236 0.944 0.224 none
12.47 15 2 0.0314 4.539 1.032 0.247 none
Exhibit 34
Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current for 12.47kV
(Case Study 1 Point 4)
0.35
0.30
0.25
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.20
IEEE Method
ARCPRO™ Method
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
1.513 1.816 2.118 2.421 2.723 3.026 3.329 3.631 3.934 4.236 4.539
Bolted Fault Current (kA)
Exhibit 35
27
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 1 Point 5 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Arc Clearing Circuit Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 15 2 0.0962 2.437 1.572 0.376 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 2.9244 1.784 0.426 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 3.4118 1.985 0.474 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 3.8992 2.178 0.520 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 4.3866 2.363 0.565 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 4.874 2.542 0.608 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 5.3614 2.716 0.649 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 5.8488 2.885 0.690 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 6.3362 3.050 0.729 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 6.8236 3.211 0.767 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 7.311 3.368 0.805 none
Exhibit 36
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 1 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Arc Clearing Circuit Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 15 2 0.0962 2.437 1.367 0.326 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 2.9244 1.751 0.418 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 3.4118 2.159 0.5151 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 3.8992 2.567 0.612 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 4.3866 2.992 0.714 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 4.874 3.434 0.816 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 5.3614 3.893 0.928 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 5.8488 4.386 1.046 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 6.3362 4.896 1.166 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 6.8236 5.406 1.290 none
0.24 15 2 0.0962 7.311 5.950 1.416 none
Exhibit 37
28
Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current for .24kV
(Case Study 1 Point 5)
1.6
1.4
1.2
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
1.0
IEEE Method
0.8
ARCPRO™ Method
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
2.437 2.9244 3.4118 3.8992 4.3866 4.874 5.3614 5.8488 6.3362 6.8236 7.311
Bolted Fault Current (kA)
Exhibit 38
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 4 Point 4 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Arc Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Clearing Circuit Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.4215 7.573 1.810 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.5058 9.088 2.172 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.5901 10.602 2.534 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.6744 12.117 2.896 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.7587 13.632 3.258 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.843 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.9273 16.661 3.982 4-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.0116 18.176 4.344 8-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.0959 19.690 4.706 8-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.1802 21.205 5.068 8-cal System
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.2645 22.719 5.430 8-cal System
Exhibit 39
29
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 4 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Arc Clearing Circuit Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.4215 0.342 0.082 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.5058 0.438 0.104 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.5901 0.5559 0.1326 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.6744 0.673 0.160 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.7587 0.791 0.188 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.843 0.908 0.216 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 0.9273 1.025 0.244 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.0116 1.142 0.272 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.0959 1.290 0.307 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.1802 1.433 0.341 none
24.9 15 4 0.0489 1.2645 1.576 0.375 none
Exhibit 40
Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current for 25kV
(Case Study 4 Point 4)
4
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
IEEE Method
3
ARCPRO™ Method
0
0.4215 0.5058 0.5901 0.6744 0.7587 0.843 0.9273 1.0116 1.0959 1.1802 1.2645
Bolted Fault Current (kA)
Exhibit 41
30
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 4 Point 5 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Arc Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident
Line to Arc Point to Gap Clearing Circuit Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 15 2 0.2031 12.0805 18.891 4.515 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 14.4966 21.363 5.106 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 16.9127 23.703 5.665 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 19.3288 25.936 6.199 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 21.7449 28.080 6.711 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 24.161 30.148 7.206 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 26.5771 32.149 7.684 8-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 28.9932 34.092 8.148 12-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 31.4093 35.983 8.600 12-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 33.8254 37.826 9.041 12-cal System
0.208 15 2 0.2031 36.2415 39.628 9.471 12-cal System
Exhibit 42
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current
(Case Study 4 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Arc Arc Bolted Short Incident Incident Level of
Line to Arc Point to Gap Clearing Circuit Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Person (in) (in) Time (Sec) Current (kA) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 15 2 0.2031 12.0805 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 14.4966 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 16.9127 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 19.3288 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 21.7449 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 24.161 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 26.5771 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 28.9932 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 31.4093 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 33.8254 * * *
0.208 15 2 0.2031 36.2415 * * *
Exhibit 43
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
31
Incident Energy as a Function of Bolted Short Circuit Current for .208 kV*
(Case Study 4 Point 5 )
10
7
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2
5 IEEE Method
ARCPRO™
4 Method
0
12.0805 14.4966 16.9127 19.3288 21.7449 24.161 26.5771 28.9932 31.4093 33.8254 36.2415
Bolted Fault Current (kA)
Exhibit 44
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
In Box/Open Air
An arc in box fault results in more heat energy being reflected to the worker than from an
open air fault. The sensitivity of this variable is shown in Exhibits 45-48.
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Box or Open Air
(Case Study 1 Point 4 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy PPE
Box/Open Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
Open 15 3.026 0.0314 2 12.47 0.781 0.187 none
Box 15 3.026 0.0314 2 12.47 1.347 0.322 none
Exhibit 45
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Box or Open Air
(Case Study 1 Point 5 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy PPE
Box/Open Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
Open 15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.24 2.542 0.608 none
Box 15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.24 5.044 1.206 none
32
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Box or Open Air
(Case Study 3 Point 4 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident
Arc Point to Circuit Arc Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Box/Open Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
Open 15 0.843 0.0314 4 24.9 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
Box 15 0.843 0.0314 4 24.9 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
Exhibit 47
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Box or Open Air
(Case Study 4 Point 5 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident
Arc Point to Circuit Arc Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Box/Open Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
Open 15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.208 15.196 3.632 4-cal System
Box 15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.208 30.148 7.206 8-cal System
Exhibit 48
System Voltage
In the real world, the system voltage cannot be varied without affecting the available fault
current. However, a range of voltages was used to determine the sensitivity of the
equations to system voltage. This sensitivity analysis varied the voltage (+/- 10%) from
nominal voltage. The results shown in Exhibits 49-60 illustrate that varying the voltage
has very little effect on the arc energy.
Increasing the operating voltage from 12.5 kV to 25 kV will have a significant impact on
reducing available current fault, so it did not make sense to run a sensitivity analysis of
this magnitude.
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 1 Point 4 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy PPE
Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 3.026 0.0314 2 11.22 0.781 0.187 none
15 3.026 0.0314 2 12.47 0.781 0.187 none
15 3.026 0.0314 2 13.72 0.781 0.187 none
Exhibit 49
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 1 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident Level of
Arc Point to Circuit Current Arc Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy PPE
Person (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 3.026 0.0314 2 11.22 0.609 0.145 none
15 3.026 0.0314 2 12.47 0.609 0.145 none
15 3.026 0.0314 2 13.72 0.609 0.145 none
Exhibit 50
33
Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage for a 1ph 25 kVA
Polemounted Transformer
(Case Study 1 Point 4)
0.20
0.18
0.16
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.14
0.12
IEEE Method
0.10
ARCPRO™ Method
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
11.22 12.47 13.72
Line to Line Voltage (kV)
Exhibit 51
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 1 Point 5 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident Level of
Arc Point to Circuit Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy PPE
Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.216 2.470 0.590 none
15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.24 2.542 0.608 none
15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.264 2.616 0.625 none
Exhibit 52
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 1 Point 5 ARCPROTM Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Arc Incident Incident
Arc Point to Circuit Current Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Person (in) (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.216 3.434 0.816 none
15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.24 3.434 0.816 none
15 4.874 0.0962 2 0.264 3.434 0.816 none
Exhibit 53
34
Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage for a 1ph 25 kVA
Polemounted Transformer
(Case Study 1 Point 5)
0.9
0.8
0.7
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.6
0.5 IEEE Method
0.4 ARCPRO™ Method
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.216 0.24 0.264
Line to Line Voltage (kV)
Exhibit 54
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 4 Point 4 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Incident Incident
Arc Point to Circuit Arc Clearing Arc Gap Line to Line Energy Energy Level of PPE
Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 0.843 0.0489 4 22.41 13.632 3.258 4-cal System
15 0.843 0.0489 4 24.9 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
15 0.843 0.0489 4 27.39 16.661 3.982 4-cal System
Exhibit 55
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
TM
(Case Study 4 Point 4 ARCPRO Software)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Arc Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident
Point to Person Circuit Current Arc Clearing Gap Line to Line Energy Energy Level of PPE
(in) (kA) Time (Sec) (in) kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 0.843 0.0489 4 22.41 0.908 0.216 none
15 0.843 0.0489 4 24.9 0.908 0.216 none
15 0.843 0.0489 4 27.39 0.908 0.216 none
Exhibit 56
35
Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage for a 3ph 500 kVA
Padmounted Transformer
(Case Study 4 Point 4)
4.5
4.0
3.5
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
3.0
2.5
IEEE Method
ARCPRO™ Method
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
22.41 24.9 27.39
Line to Line Voltage (kV)
Exhibit 57
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 4 Point 5 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident
Arc Point to Circuit Arc Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.1872 28.821 6.888 8-cal System
15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.208 30.148 7.206 8-cal System
15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.2288 31.536 7.537 8-cal System
Exhibit 58
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage
(Case Study 4 Point 5 ARCPROTM Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Distance from Bolted Short Arc Incident Incident Level of
Arc Point to Circuit Arc Clearing Gap Line to Energy Energy PPE
Person (in) Current (kA) Time (Sec) (in) Line kV (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.1872 * * *
15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.208 * * *
15 24.161 0.2031 2 0.2288 * * *
Exhibit 59
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
36
Incident Energy as a Function of Voltage for a 3ph 500 kVA*
Padmounted Transformer
(Case Study 4 Point 5)
6
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
IEEE Method
4
ARCPRO™ Method
0
0.1872 0.208 0.2288
Line to Line Voltage (kV)
Exhibit 60
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
Distance
Distance from the arc has an impact on the level of heating of the worker’s clothes and
body. The value used by NESC Table 410-1 is 15 inches. This value represents the
location of the worker’s body and head relative to the arc. The worker’s hand will be
closer and subject to greater heat. For other workers who may be some distance away,
less of the incident heat energy will reach them. A safe approach distance can be
calculated using these formulas, which determine when a worker would need to don
his/her PPE.
A range of values used, from 3 to 61 inches, is shown in Exhibits 61-72.
37
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 1 Point 4 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Bolted Short Arc Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Gap Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Current (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 3 19.519 4.665 8-cal System
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 6 4.880 1.166 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 9 2.169 0.518 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 12 1.220 0.292 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 15 0.781 0.187 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 21 0.398 0.095 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 27 0.241 0.058 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 31 0.183 0.044 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 37 0.128 0.031 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 41 0.105 0.025 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 47 0.080 0.019 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 51 0.068 0.016 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 57 0.054 0.013 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 61 0.047 0.011 none
Exhibit 61
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 1 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Bolted Short Arc Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Current Gap Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 3 14.518 3.434 4-cal System
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 6 3.774 0.894 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 9 1.676 0.401 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 12 0.947 0.226 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 15 0.609 0.145 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 21 0.311 0.074 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 27 0.187 0.045 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 31 0.143 0.034 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 37 0.100 0.024 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 41 0.082 0.019 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 47 0.062 0.015 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 51 0.053 0.013 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 57 0.042 0.010 none
12.47 3.026 2 0.0314 61 0.037 0.009 none
Exhibit 62
38
Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance for 12.47 KV
(Case Study 1 Point 4 )
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2
3.0
IEEE Method
2.5
ARCPRO™
Method
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
3 6 9 12 15 21 27 31 37 41 47 51 57 61
Approach Distance (in.)
Exhibit 63
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 1 Point 5 IEEE Method)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Load Side - Line to Line Fault
Bolted Short Arc Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Gap Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Current (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 3 63.558 15.191 >12-cal System
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 6 15.889 3.798 4-cal System
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 9 7.062 1.688 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 12 3.972 0.949 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 15 2.542 0.608 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 21 1.297 0.310 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 27 0.785 0.188 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 31 0.595 0.142 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 37 0.418 0.100 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 41 0.340 0.081 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 47 0.259 0.062 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 51 0.220 0.053 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 57 0.176 0.042 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 61 0.154 0.037 none
Exhibit 64
39
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 1 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Bolted Short Arc Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Gap Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Current (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 3 81.940 19.380 >12-cal System
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 6 21.250 5.049 8-cal System
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 9 9.452 2.261 4-cal System
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 12 5.338 1.275 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 15 3.434 0.816 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 21 1.751 0.417 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 27 1.059 0.253 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 31 0.804 0.192 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 37 0.564 0.134 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 41 0.461 0.109 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 47 0.350 0.083 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 51 0.298 0.071 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 57 0.238 0.057 none
0.24 4.874 2 0.0962 61 0.207 0.049 none
Exhibit 65
Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance for .24kV
(Case Study 1 Point 5)
25
20
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
IEEE Method
15
ARCPRO™
10 Method
0
3 6 9 12 15 21 27 31 37 41 47 51 57 61
Approach Distance (in.)
Exhibit 66
40
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 4 Point 4 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Line Side - 3ph Fault
Bolted Short Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Current Gap Arc Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 3 378.656 90.501 >12-cal System
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 6 94.664 22.625 >12-cal System
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 9 42.073 10.056 12-cal System
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 12 23.666 5.656 8-cal System
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 15 15.146 3.620 4-cal System
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 21 7.728 1.847 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 27 4.675 1.117 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 31 3.546 0.848 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 37 2.489 0.595 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 41 2.027 0.485 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 47 1.543 0.369 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 51 1.310 0.313 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 57 1.049 0.251 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 61 0.916 0.219 none
Exhibit 67
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 4 Point 4 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Bolted Short Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Gap Arc Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Current (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 3 19.074 4.529 8-cal System
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 6 5.457 1.290 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 9 2.474 0.592 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 12 1.408 0.336 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 15 0.908 0.216 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 21 0.465 0.111 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 27 0.282 0.067 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 31 0.214 0.051 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 37 0.150 0.036 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 41 0.122 0.029 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 47 0.093 0.022 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 51 0.079 0.019 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 57 0.063 0.015 none
24.9 0.843 4 0.0489 61 0.055 0.013 none
Exhibit 68
41
Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance for 25kV
(Case Study 4 Point 4)
100
90
80
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
70
60
IEEE Method
50
ARCPRO™
Method
40
30
20
10
0
3 6 9 12 15 21 27 31 37 41 47 51 57 61
Approach Distance (in.)
Exhibit 69
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 4 Point 5 IEEE Method)
3ph 500 kVA Padmounted Transformer - Load Side - 3ph Fault
Bolted Short Arc Distance from Incident Incident
Line to Circuit Gap Arc Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy Level of PPE
Line kV Current (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 3 753.698 180.138 >12-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 6 188.425 45.035 >12-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 9 83.744 20.015 >12-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 12 47.106 11.259 12-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 15 30.148 7.206 8-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 21 15.382 3.676 4-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 27 9.305 2.224 4-cal System
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 31 7.059 1.687 none
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 37 4.955 1.184 none
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 41 4.035 0.964 none
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 47 3.071 0.734 none
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 51 2.608 0.623 none
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 57 2.088 0.499 none
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 61 1.823 0.436 none
Exhibit 70
42
Sensitivity Analysis-Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance
(Case Study 4 Point 5 ARCPROTM Software)
1ph 25 kVA Polemounted Transformer - Line Side - Line to Ground Fault
Bolted Short Arc Distance from Incident Incident Level of
Line to Circuit Gap Arc Clearing Arc Point to Energy Energy PPE
Line kV Current (kA) (in) Time (Sec) Person (in) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Required
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 3 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 6 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 9 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 12 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 15 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 21 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 27 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 31 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 37 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 41 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 47 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 51 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 57 * * *
0.208 24.161 2 0.2031 61 * * *
Exhibit 71
Incident Energy as a Function of Approach Distance for .208kV *
(Case Study 4 Point 5)
200
180
160
140
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
120
IEEE Method
100
ARCPRO™
Method
80
60
40
20
0
3 6 9 12 15 21 27 31 37 41 47 51 57 61
Approach Distance (in.)
Exhibit 72
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for those points with no data.
43
Linear Relationship of Arc Energy to Current x Time
Hi-Line thoroughly evaluated the results calculated by IEEE 1584 and ARCPROTM,
looking for a correlation between the input variables and the calculated arc energy result.
One of the most interesting observations was the linear relationship between the incident
energy and the product of fault current and clearing time.
This linear relationship can be a useful tool for helping engineers to estimate the
minimum clearing time for the overcurrent devices so as to maintain a certain level of
PPE. It is important to note that this method provides only an estimate of what the
clearing time needs to be; it is up to the individual engineer to run the calculations for an
arc-flash assessment to determine the PPE level and appropriate overcurrent protection.
(Note that this relationship is not as evident at secondary voltages.) Graphs of our
findings are included in Exhibits 73-75 for reference.
Linear Relationship of Arc Energy to the Product of Fault Current
and Clearing Time In a Box
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
Arc Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Fault Current x Clearing Time
(Data Points use IEEE Method for Typical 12 KV Faults)
Exhibit 73
44
Linear Relationship of Arc Energy to the Product of Fault Current
and Clearing Time Not In a Box
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Arc Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Fault Current x Clearing Time
(Data Points use IEEE Method for Typical 12 KV Faults)
Exhibit 74
Linear Relationship of Arc Energy to the Product of Fault Current
and Clearing Time
25
20
Arc Energy (cal/cm^2)
15
10
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Fault Current x Clearing Time
(Data Points use IEEE Method for Typical 25 KV Faults)
Exhibit 75
45
About the Authors
Braxton Underwood, P.E., lead author for this project, is a Project Manager for Hi-Line
Engineering, 1850 Parkway Place, Suite 800, Marietta, GA 30067. Kevin Mara, P.E., co-
author for this project, is a Vice President of the firm. Hi-Line Engineering specializes in
providing safe, reliable, and efficient planning and design services for electric
cooperatives.
46
Appendix A – Case Study 1
47
Case Study 1
The first case study selected is a substation in a mostly residential area with some mixed
commercial load. The power transformer for this substation is a Delta-Wye Grounded 67
kV-12.47 kV 10 MVA 3ph unit. The feeder is primarily composed of 4/0 AL UG and
1/0 ACSR overhead conductor. The smaller taps are constructed with 4 ACSR overhead
or 1/0 AL underground conductors in subdivisions and radial riser pole taps to
padmounted transformers.
All distribution transformers chosen as selection points for arc-flash calculation points
are connected Wye-Wye Grounded unless otherwise noted.
The first selection point is the substation transformer. This point simulates a fault on the
load side of the transformer just beyond the feeder breaker. The transformer information
is as follows:
Case Study 1: Selection Point 1
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 10000 kVA Power XFMR
Transformer Voltage (kV) 67 - 12.47/7.2
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 7.60
X/R Ratio 5
Miles from Source 0.01
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,317
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0661
Clearing Time (Cycles) 3.966
Exhibit A-1
The second and third selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 150 kVA padmounted transformer served by a 1/0 AL underground 3ph line. This
transformer serves residential and small commercial loads. The transformer information
is as follows:
Case Study 1: Selection Point 2
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 150 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.208
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.08
X/R Ratio 4.3
Miles from Source 0.187
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,168
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0261
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.566
48
Case Study 1: Selection Point 3
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 150 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.208
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.08
X/R Ratio 4.3
Miles from Source 0.187
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 12,933
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1967
Clearing Time (Cycles) 11.802
Exhibits A-2 & A-3
The fourth and fifth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 25 kVA polemounted transformer served by a single-phase 4 ACSR tap off a three-
phase 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves residential loads. The transformer
information is as follows:
Case Study 1: Selection Point 4
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 25 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.08
X/R Ratio 1.43
Miles from Source 0.360
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 3,026
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0314
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.884
Exhibit A-4
Case Study 1: Selection Point 5
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 25 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.08
X/R Ratio 1.43
Miles from Source 0.389
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 4,874
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0962
Clearing Time (Cycles) 5.772
Exhibit A-5
The sixth and seventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 25 kVA padmounted transformer served by a single-phase 2 AL underground tap off
a three-phase 2 AL underground main line. This transformer serves residential loads.
The transformer information is as follows:
49
Case Study 1: Selection Point 6
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 25 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.08
X/R Ratio 1.43
Miles from Source 0.770
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 2,272
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0247
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.482
Case Study 1: Selection Point 7
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 25 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.08
X/R Ratio 1.43
Miles from Source 0.808
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 4,844
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0204
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.224
Exhibits A-6 & A-7
The eighth and ninth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 50 kVA padmounted transformer served by a single-phase 4 ACSR and 1/0 AL
underground tap off a three-phase 1/0 ACSR overhead main line. This transformer
serves residential loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 1: Selection Point 8
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 50 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 1.84
X/R Ratio 1.68
Miles from Source 1.127
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 1,480
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0223
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.338
50
Case Study 1: Selection Point 9
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 50 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 1.84
X/R Ratio 1.68
Miles from Source 1.622
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 10,637
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0782
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.692
Exhibits A-8 & A-9
The tenth and eleventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 1000 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 4/0 AL underground
main line. This transformer serves two large commercial loads. The transformer
information is as follows:
Case Study 1: Selection Point 10
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 1000 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.20
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 1.211
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 2,254
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0473
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.838
Case Study 1: Selection Point 11
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 1000 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.20
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 1.211
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 23,047
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.2085
Clearing Time (Cycles) 12.51
Exhibits A-10 & A-11
The twelfth and thirteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals
of a 1ph 15 kVA polemounted transformer served by a single-phase 8 CU tap off a three-
phase 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a residential load. The transformer
information is as follows:
51
Case Study 1: Selection Point 12
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 15 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.10
X/R Ratio 1.3
Miles from Source 1.158
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 1,956
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0305
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.83
Case Study 1: Selection Point 13
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 15 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.10
X/R Ratio 1.3
Miles from Source 1.168
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 2,927
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0692
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.152
Exhibits A-12 & A-13
The fourteenth and fifteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side
terminals of a 1ph 37.5 kVA polemounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 ACSR
main line. This transformer serves residential loads. The transformer information is as
follows:
Case Study 1: Selection Point 14
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 37.5 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.00
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 1.101
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 2,260
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0659
Clearing Time (Cycles) 3.954
52
Case Study 1: Selection Point 15
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 37.5 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.00
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 1.101
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 7,506
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0707
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.242
Exhibits A-14 & A-15
The table in Exhibit A-16 illustrates the arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 1:
Case Study 1 (12kV)
TM TM
Bolted Fault Arc Distance from Gap Between Incident Incident ARCPRO ARCPRO
Line to Circuit Clearing Arc Point to Conductors Fault Energy Energy Incident Incident Energy
Point Line kV Current (kA) Time (Sec) Person (in) (in) Type (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Energy (cal/cm^2) Notes
1 12.47 3.317 0.0661 15 2 3ph 1.812 0.433 1.433 0.342
2 12.47 3.168 0.0261 15 2 3ph 1.176 0.281 1.571 0.374 In a box
In a box,
ARCPRO
stated that
arc could
not be
3 0.208 12.933 0.1967 15 2 3ph 19.167 4.581 * * sustained
4 12.47 3.026 0.0314 15 2 LG 0.781 0.187 0.609 0.145
5 0.24 4.874 0.0962 15 2 LL 2.542 0.608 3.434 0.816
6 12.47 2.272 0.0247 15 2 LG 0.782 0.187 0.281 0.067 In a box
7 0.24 4.844 0.0204 15 2 LL 1.065 0.255 0.633 0.152 In a box
8 12.47 1.48 0.0223 15 2 LG 0.448 0.107 0.144 0.034 In a box
9 0.24 10.637 0.0782 15 2 LL 7.045 1.684 7.125 1.695 In a box
10 12.47 2.254 0.0473 15 2 3ph 1.484 0.355 1.816 0.432 In a box
11 0.48 23.047 0.2085 15 2 3ph 53.621 12.816 206.040 49.215 In a box
12 12.47 1.956 0.0305 15 2 LG 0.477 0.114 0.318 0.076
13 0.24 2.927 0.0692 15 2 LL 1.284 0.307 1.258 0.298
14 12.47 2.26 0.0659 15 2 3ph 1.202 0.287 0.765 0.201
15 0.24 7.506 0.0707 15 2 LL 2.521 0.602 4.522 1.078
Exhibit A-16
*The ARCPROTM analysis of Case Study 1, Point 3 showed that the input voltage could not sustain the arc;
therefore, there is no value for the incident energy.
53
Exhibits A-17 and A-18 show the graphical arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 1:
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 1)
Line Side (Primary)
0.500
0.450
0.400
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.350
0.300 IEEE M ethod
0.250 ARCPRO™
0.200 M ethod
0.150
0.100
0.050
0.000
1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Points
Exhibit A-
17
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 1)
Load Side (Secondary)*
50.000
45.000
40.000
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
35.000
30.000 IEEE M ethod
25.000 ARCPRO™
M ethod
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0.000
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Points
Exhibit A-18
*ARCPROTM stated that the arc could not be sustained for the point with no data.
54
Case Study 1 Feeder Topology:
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
Appendix B – Case Study 2
64
Case Study 2
The second case study selected is a substation located in a mostly residential area with
some mixed small and large commercial loads. The power transformer for this substation
is a Delta-Wye Grounded 67 kV-24.9 kV 7.5 MVA 3ph unit. The feeder is primarily
composed of 4/0 AL UG and 1/0 ACSR overhead conductor. The smaller taps are
constructed with 4 ACSR overhead or 1/0 AL underground conductors in subdivisions
and radial riser pole taps to padmounted transformers.
All distribution transformers chosen as selection points for arc-flash calculation points
are connected Wye-Wye Grounded unless otherwise noted.
The first selection point is the substation transformer. This point simulates a fault on the
load side of the transformer just beyond the feeder breaker. The transformer information
is as follows:
Case Study 2: Selection Point 1
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 7500 kVA Power XFMR
Transformer Voltage (kV) 67 - 24.9/14.4
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 7.60
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 0.015
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 1,417
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0658
Clearing Time (Cycles) 3.948
Arc Energy-IEEE 1584 (cal/cm^2) 8.188
Arc Energy-ARCPRO (cal/cm^2) 0.196
Exhibit B-1
The second and third selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 10 kVA polemounted transformer served by a single-phase 4 ACSR tap off a three-
phase 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves two residential loads. The
transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 2: Selection Point 2
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 10 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.26
X/R Ratio 0.55
Miles from Source 8.493
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 627
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0722
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.332
Exhibit B-2
65
Case Study 2: Selection Point 3
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 10 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.26
X/R Ratio 0.55
Miles from Source 8.641
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 1,818
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.3942
Clearing Time (Cycles) 23.652
Exhibit B-3
The fourth and fifth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 75 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground tap
off a 3ph 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a small commercial load. The
transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 2: Selection Point 4
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 75 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.50
X/R Ratio 2.39
Miles from Source 7.162
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 777
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0497
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.982
Case Study 2: Selection Point 5
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 75 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.50
X/R Ratio 2.39
Miles from Source 7.162
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,309
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0683
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.098
Exhibits B-4 & B-5
The sixth and seventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 500 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground tap
off a 3ph 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a large commercial load. The
transformer information is as follows:
66
Case Study 2: Selection Point 6
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 500 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.60
X/R Ratio 3.5
Miles from Source 4.600
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 983
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0824
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.944
Case Study 2: Selection Point 7
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 500 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.60
X/R Ratio 3.5
Miles from Source 4.600
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 15,810
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.2971
Clearing Time (Cycles) 17.826
Exhibits B-6 & B-7
The eighth and ninth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 100 kVA padmounted transformer served by a single-phase 4 ACSR and 1/0 AL
underground tap off a three-phase 4 and 1/0 ACSR overhead main line. This transformer
serves residential loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 2: Selection Point 8
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 100 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 1.50
X/R Ratio 2.48
Miles from Source 4.370
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 796
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0247
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.482
67
Case Study 2: Selection Point 9
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 100 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 1.50
X/R Ratio 2.48
Miles from Source 4.370
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 24,429
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0592
Clearing Time (Cycles) 3.552
Exhibits B-8 & B-9
The tenth and eleventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 50 kVA polemounted transformer served by a three-phase 4 ACSR overhead main
line. This transformer serves a small commercial load. The transformer information is as
follows:
Case Study 2: Selection Point 10
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 50 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 1.84
X/R Ratio 1.68
Miles from Source 2.161
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 1,149
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1419
Clearing Time (Cycles) 8.514
Case Study 2: Selection Point 11
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 50 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 1.84
X/R Ratio 1.68
Miles from Source 2.161
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 10,719
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0833
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.998
Exhibits B-10 & B-11
The twelfth and thirteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals
of a 3ph 1500 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground
tap off a three-phase 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves two large commercial
loads. The transformer information is as follows:
68
Case Study 2: Selection Point 12
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1500 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 5.75
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 0.455
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 1,374
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0299
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.794
Case Study 2: Selection Point 13
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1500 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 5.75
X/R Ratio 10
Miles from Source 0.455
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 20,588
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0303
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.818
Exhibits B-12 & B-13
The fourteenth and fifteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side
terminals of a 1ph 15 kVA padmounted transformer served by a single-phase 1/0 AL
underground tap off a three-phase 1/0 ACSR overhead main line. This transformer
serves residential loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 2: Selection Point 14
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 15 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.10
X/R Ratio 1.3
Miles from Source 5.251
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 836
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1071
Clearing Time (Cycles) 6.426
Case Study 2: Selection Point 15
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 15 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.10
X/R Ratio 1.3
Miles from Source 5.251
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 2,920
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1067
Clearing Time (Cycles) 6.402
69
Exhibits B-14 & B-15
Exhibit B-16 illustrates the arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 2:
Case Study 2 (25kV)
Bolted Fault Arc Distance from Gap Between IEEE Method IEEE Method ARCPROTM ARCPROTM
Line to Circuit Clearing Arc Point to Conductors Fault Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy
Point Line kV Current (kA) Time (Sec) Person (in) (in) Type (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Notes
1 24.9 1.417 0.0658 15 4 LL 34.258 8.188 0.819 0.196
2 24.9 0.627 0.0722 15 4 LG 16.633 3.975 0.298 0.021
3 0.24 1.818 0.3942 15 2 LL 5.256 1.256 3.689 0.881
4 24.9 0.777 0.0497 15 4 3ph 14.189 3.391 0.826 0.196 In a box
5 0.48 3.309 0.0683 15 2 3ph 3.449 0.824 4.386 1.046 In a box
6 24.9 0.983 0.0824 15 4 3ph 29.761 7.113 1.846 0.440 In a box
7 0.48 15.81 0.2971 15 2 3ph 55.700 13.313 164.730 39.270 In a box
8 24.9 0.796 0.0247 15 4 LG 7.224 1.727 0.125 0.030 In a box
In a box,
ARCPRO
stated that
arc could
not be
9 0.24 24.429 0.0592 15 2 LL 9.495 2.269 * * sustained
10 24.9 1.149 0.1419 15 4 3ph 59.906 14.318 0.132 0.316
11 0.24 10.719 0.0833 15 2 LL 3.803 0.909 8.721 2.074
12 24.9 1.374 0.0299 15 4 3ph 15.095 3.608 1.076 0.136 In a box
13 0.48 20.588 0.0303 15 2 3ph 7.089 1.694 25.245 3.137 In a box
14 24.9 0.836 0.1071 15 4 LG 32.898 7.863 0.576 0.137 In a box
15 0.24 2.92 0.1067 15 2 LL 3.921 0.937 1.725 0.410 In a box
Exhibit B-16
*The ARCPROTM analysis of Case Study 2 Point 9 showed that the input voltage could not sustain the arc;
therefore, there is no value for the incident energy.
70
Exhibits B-17 and B-18 show the graphical arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 2:
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 2)
Line Side (Primary)
15
12
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
9
IEEE M ethod
ARCPRO™
6 M ethod
0
1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Points
Exhibit B-17
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 2)
Load Side (Secondary)*
40
35
30
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
25
IEEE M ethod
20
ARCPRO™
M ethod
15
10
0
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Points
Exhibit B-18
TM
*ARCPRO stated that the arc could not be sustained for the point with no data.
71
Case Study 2 Feeder Topology:
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
Appendix C – Case Study 3
81
Case Study 3
The third case study selected is a substation in a primarily residential area with some
small commercial load. The power transformer for this substation is a Delta-Wye
Grounded 115 kV-12.47 kV 15/20/25 MVA 3ph unit. The feeder is primarily composed
of 336, 477, 2, and 4 ACSR overhead conductors. The main underground conductor used
in subdivisions and riser pole taps to padmounted transformers is 1/0 AL underground.
All distribution transformers chosen as selection points for arc-flash calculation points
are connected Wye-Wye Grounded unless otherwise noted.
The first selection point is the substation transformer. This point simulates a fault on the
load side of the transformer just beyond the feeder breaker. The transformer information
is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 1
15000/20000/25000 kVA Power
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type Transformer
Transformer Voltage (kV) 115 - 12.47/7.2
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 9.15
X/R Ratio
Miles from Source 0.289
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 6,905
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0578
Clearing Time (Cycles) 3.468
Exhibit C-1
The second and third selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 25 kVA polemounted transformer served by a 477 ACSR 3ph main line. This
transformer serves residential loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 2
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 25 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.40
X/R Ratio 1.1
Miles from Source 3.258
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 2,200
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0779
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.674
82
Case Study 3: Selection Point 3
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 25 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.40
X/R Ratio 1.1
Miles from Source 3.258
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 4,219
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.6087
Clearing Time (Cycles) 36.522
Exhibits C-2 & C-3
The fourth and fifth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 10 kVA polemounted transformer served by a single-phase 4 ACSR tap off a three-
phase 477 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a residential load. The transformer
information is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 4
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 10 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.60
X/R Ratio 0.72
Miles from Source 2.627
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 1,660
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0323
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.938
Case Study 3: Selection Point 5
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 10 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.60
X/R Ratio 0.72
Miles from Source 2.750
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 1,590
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.868
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.629
Exhibits C-4 & C-5
The sixth and seventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 50 kVA polemounted transformer served by a single-phase 2 ACSR tap off a three-
phase 477 ACSR main line. This transformer serves residential loads. The transformer
information is as follows:
83
Case Study 3: Selection Point 6
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 50 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.30
X/R Ratio 1.6
Miles from Source 2.745
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 2,418
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0287
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.722
Case Study 3: Selection Point 7
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 50 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.30
X/R Ratio 1.6
Miles from Source 2.745
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 8,563
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0779
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.674
Exhibits C-6 & C-7
The eighth and ninth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 37.5 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground tap
off a three-phase 336 ACSR overhead main line. This transformer serves residential
loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 8
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 37.5 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.30
X/R Ratio 1.03
Miles from Source 1.543
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,387
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0185
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.11
Case Study 3: Selection Point 9
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 37.5 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.30
X/R Ratio 1.03
Miles from Source 1.543
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 4,648
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.4289
Clearing Time (Cycles) 25.734
84
Exhibits C-8 & C-9
The tenth and eleventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 112.5 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground
and 4 ACSR tap off a 336 ACSR main line. This transformer serves small commercial
loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 10
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 112.5 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.208
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.80
X/R Ratio 2.16
Miles from Source 0.750
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 4,571
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0163
Clearing Time (Cycles) 0.978
Case Study 3: Selection Point 11
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 112.5 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.208
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.80
X/R Ratio 2.16
Miles from Source 0.750
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 10,716
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.3022
Clearing Time (Cycles) 18.132
Exhibits C-10 & C-11
The twelfth and thirteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals
of a 1ph 75 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground
tap off a three-phase 336 ACSR main line. This transformer serves several residential
loads. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 12
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 75 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.16
X/R Ratio 1.58
Miles from Source 1.279
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,742
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0233
Clearing Time (Cycles) 1.398
85
Case Study 3: Selection Point 13
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 75 kVA 1ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.16
X/R Ratio 1.58
Miles from Source 1.279
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 13,731
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1193
Clearing Time (Cycles) 7.158
Exhibits C-12 & C-13
The fourteenth and fifteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side
terminals of a 3ph 300 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL
underground and 336 ACSR tap off a 477 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a
small commercial load. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 3: Selection Point 14
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 300 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 4.20
X/R Ratio 4.8
Miles from Source 1.757
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,156
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0408
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.448
Case Study 3: Selection Point 15
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 300 kVA 3ph Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 12.47/7.2 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 4.20
X/R Ratio 4.8
Miles from Source 1.757
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 7,777
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.7894
Clearing Time (Cycles) 47.364
Exhibits C-14 & C-15
Exhibit C-16 illustrates the arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 3:
86
Case Study 3 (12kV)
Bolted Fault Distance from Gap Between IEEE Method IEEE Method ARCPROTM ARCPROTM
Line to Circuit Arc Clearing Arc Point to Conductors Fault Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy
Point Line kV Current (kA) Time (Sec) Person (in) (in) Type (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Notes
1 12.47 6.905 0.0578 15 2 3ph 3.453 0.825 3.315 0.789
2 12.47 2.2 0.0779 15 2 3ph 1.380 0.330 0.950 0.226
3 0.24 4.219 0.6087 15 2 LL 14.554 3.478 18.020 4.284
4 12.47 1.66 0.0323 15 2 LG 0.424 0.101 0.272 0.065
5 0.24 1.59 0.868 15 2 LL 10.547 2.521 6.834 1.629
6 12.47 2.418 0.0287 15 2 3ph 0.562 0.134 0.401 0.096
7 0.24 8.563 0.0779 15 2 LL 3.043 0.727 0.595 1.418
8 12.47 3.387 0.0185 15 2 3ph 0.895 0.214 0.356 0.085 In a box
9 0.24 4.648 0.4289 15 2 LL 21.759 5.201 12.675 3.015 In a box
10 12.47 4.571 0.0163 15 2 3ph 1.084 0.259 1.617 0.385 In a box
11 0.208 10.716 0.3022 15 2 3ph 25.940 6.200 94.860 22.593 In a box
12 12.47 3.742 0.0233 15 2 3ph 1.253 0.299 0.528 0.126 In a box
13 0.24 13.731 0.1193 15 2 LL 12.831 3.067 15.750 3.750 In a box
14 12.47 3.156 0.0408 15 2 3ph 1.831 0.438 2.494 0.592 In a box
15 0.48 7.777 0.7894 15 2 3ph 81.631 19.510 159.120 37.893 In a box
Exhibit C-16
87
Exhibits C-17 and C-18 show the graphical arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 3:
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 3)
Line Side (Primary)
0.9
0.8
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
0.7
0.6 IEEE M ethod
0.5
0.4 ARCPRO™
0.3 M ethod
0.2
0.1
0.0
1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Points
Exhibit C-17
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 3)
Load Side (Secondary)
40
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
35
30
25 IEEE M ethod
20 ARCPRO™
15 M ethod
10
5
0
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Points
Exhibit C-18
88
Case Study 3 Feeder Topology:
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
Appendix D – Case Study 4
98
Case Study 4
The fourth case study selected is a substation that is a mixed residential area with small
and large commercial loads, as well as some motor and industrial loads. The power
transformer for this substation is a Delta-Wye Grounded 115 kV-24.9 kV 12/16/20/22.4
MVA 3ph unit. The feeder is primarily composed of 4/0, 1/0, 2, and 4 ACSR overhead
conductors. The smaller taps are constructed with 4 ACSR overhead with some 1/0 AL
underground conductors serving radial riser pole taps to padmounted transformers.
All distribution transformers chosen as selection points for arc-flash calculation points
are connected Wye-Wye Grounded unless otherwise noted.
The first selection point is the substation transformer. This point simulates a fault on the
load side of the transformer just beyond the feeder breaker. The transformer information
is as follows:
Case Study 4: Selection Point 1
12000/16000/20000//22400 Power
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type Transformer
Transformer Voltage (kV) 115 - 24.9/14.4
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 7.53
X/R Ratio 4.8
Miles from Source 0.000
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 3,410
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0637
Clearing Time (Cycles) 12.786
Exhibit D-1
The second and third selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of 3-
1ph 50 kVA polemounted transformers served by a 2 ACSR tap off a 3ph 1/0 ACSR
main line. This transformer serves a motor load. The transformer information is as
follows:
Case Study 4: Selection Point 2
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3-1ph 50 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.30
X/R Ratio 1.6
Miles from Source 9.093
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 948
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0674
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.044
99
Case Study 4: Selection Point 3
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3-1ph 50 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.30
X/R Ratio 1.6
Miles from Source 9.093
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 6,770
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.7346
Clearing Time (Cycles) 44.076
Exhibits D-2 & D-3
The fourth and fifth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 500 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground tap
off a three-phase 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a large commercial load.
The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 4: Selection Point 4
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 500 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.208
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 4.50
X/R Ratio 5.8
Miles from Source 11.231
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 843
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0489
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.934
Case Study 4: Selection Point 5
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 500 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.208
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 4.50
X/R Ratio 5.8
Miles from Source 11.231
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 24,161
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.2031
Clearing Time (Cycles) 12.186
Exhibits D-4 & D-5
The sixth and seventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 100 kVA polemounted transformer served by a single-phase 4 ACSR overhead tap
off a three-phase 4 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a small commercial load.
The transformer information is as follows:
100
Case Study 4: Selection Point 6
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 100 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.60
X/R Ratio 2
Miles from Source 12.834
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 478
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0687
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.122
Case Study 4: Selection Point 7
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 100 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.60
X/R Ratio 2
Miles from Source 14.083
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 13,729
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1537
Clearing Time (Cycles) 9.222
Exhibits D-6 & D-7
The eighth and ninth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
3ph 225 kVA padmounted transformer served by a three-phase 1/0 AL underground tap
off a three-phase 2 ACSR overhead main line. This transformer serves a motor load. The
transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 4: Selection Point 8
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 225 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 4.00
X/R Ratio 3.7
Miles from Source 19.450
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 455
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0447
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.682
101
Case Study 4: Selection Point 9
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3ph 225 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 4.00
X/R Ratio 3.7
Miles from Source 19.450
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 5,425
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.1653
Clearing Time (Cycles) 9.918
Exhibits D-8 & D-9
The tenth and eleventh selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals of a
1ph 15 kVA polemounted transformer served by a three-phase 4/0 ACSR main line. This
transformer serves a residential load. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 4: Selection Point 10
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 15 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.25
X/R Ratio 1.03
Miles from Source 2.128
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 2,400
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0791
Clearing Time (Cycles) 4.746
Case Study 4: Selection Point 11
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 15 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.25
X/R Ratio 1.03
Miles from Source 2.128
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 2,760
Clearing Time (Sec) 1.6488
Clearing Time (Cycles) 98.928
Exhibits D-10 & D-11
The twelfth and thirteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side terminals
of 3-1ph 25 kVA polemounted transformers served by a three-phase 1/0 and 4/0 ACSR
main line. This transformer serves a motor load. The transformer information is as
follows:
102
Case Study 4: Selection Point 12
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3-1ph 25 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.40
X/R Ratio 1.1
Miles from Source 6.095
Fault Type 3ph
Fault Current (Amps) 1,525
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0378
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.268
Case Study 4: Selection Point 13
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 3-1ph 25 kVA Polemounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .277/.480
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 2.40
X/R Ratio 1.1
Miles from Source 6.101
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 3,601
Clearing Time (Sec) 1.24
Clearing Time (Cycles) 74.4
Exhibits D-12 & D-13
The fourteenth and fifteenth selection points were taken on the load and line side
terminals of a 1ph 25 kVA padmounted transformer served by a single-phase 1/0
underground tap off a 2 and 1/0 ACSR main line. This transformer serves a residential
load. The transformer information is as follows:
Case Study 4: Selection Point 14
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 25 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Line
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.30
X/R Ratio 1.03
Miles from Source 13.967
Fault Type LG
Fault Current (Amps) 461
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0442
Clearing Time (Cycles) 2.652
103
Case Study 4: Selection Point 15
Transformer Size (kVA) and Type 1ph 25 kVA Padmounted
Transformer Voltage (kV) 24.9/14.4 - .120/.240
Fault Location (Line/Load) Load
Transformer Impedance %Z 3.30
X/R Ratio 1.03
Miles from Source 14.062
Fault Type LL
Fault Current (Amps) 3,041
Clearing Time (Sec) 0.0995
Clearing Time (Cycles) 5.97
Exhibits D-14 & D-15
The table in Exhibit D-16 illustrates the arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 4:
Case Study 4 (25kV)
Bolted Fault Distance from Gap Between IEEE Method IEEE Method ARCPROTM ARCPROTM
Line to Circuit Arc Clearing Arc Point to Conductors Fault Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy
Point Line kV Current (kA) Time (Sec) Person (in) (in) Type (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) (J/cm^2) (cal/cm^2) Notes
1 24.9 3.41 0.0637 15 4 3ph 79.811 19.075 2.465 0.588
2 24.9 0.948 0.0674 15 4 3ph 23.477 5.611 0.478 0.114
3 0.48 6.77 0.7346 15 2 3ph 34.085 8.147 40.800 9.724
4 24.9 0.843 0.0489 15 4 3ph 15.146 3.620 0.908 0.216 In a box
In a box,
ARCPRO
stated that
arc could
not be
5 0.208 24.161 0.2031 15 2 3ph 30.163 7.209 * * sustained
6 24.9 0.478 0.0687 15 4 LG 12.066 2.884 0.187 0.044
7 0.24 13.729 0.1537 15 2 LL 8.331 1.991 22.950 5.491
8 24.9 0.455 0.0447 15 4 3ph 7.473 1.786 0.341 0.081 In a box
9 0.48 5.425 0.1653 15 2 3ph 12.637 3.020 20.451 4.871 In a box
10 24.9 2.4 0.0791 15 4 3ph 69.752 16.671 1.938 0.464
11 0.24 2.76 1.6488 15 2 LL 29.370 7.020 27.880 6.630
12 24.9 1.525 0.0378 15 4 3ph 21.180 5.062 0.517 0.123
13 0.48 3.601 1.24 15 2 LL 33.886 8.099 29.920 7.106
14 24.9 0.461 0.0442 15 4 LG 7.487 1.789 0.100 0.024 In a box
15 0.24 3.041 0.0995 15 2 LL 3.761 0.899 1.695 0.404 In a box
Exhibit D-16
*The ARCPROTM analysis of Case Study 4 Point 5 showed that the input voltage could not sustain the arc;
therefore, there is no value for the incident energy.
104
Exhibits D-17 and D-18 show the graphical arc-flash calculation results for Case Study 4:
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 4)
Line Side (Primary)
20
16
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
IEEE M ethod
12
ARCPRO™
8 M ethod
0
1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Points
Exhibit D-17
TM
IEEE & ARCPRO Incident Energy (Case Study 4)
Load Side (Secondary)*
10
8
Incident Energy (cal/cm^2)
6 IEEE M ethod
ARCPRO™
4 M ethod
0
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Points
Exhibit D-18
TM
*ARCPRO stated that the arc could not be sustained for the point with no data.
105
Case Study 4 Feeder Topology:
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
Taking the Flash Out of Electrical Safety
October 3, 2017
Arc Flash Study
E
Prepared for:
L
ABC
P
City, State
A M Prepared by:
John D. Aeiker, PE, CSP
S
Consultant
CONTENTS
Arc Flash Study Overview
Incident Energy Summary Report
Equipment Evaluation Report
PPE Poster
Arc Flash Model Drawing
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 2
October 3, 2017
ABC – City, State – Arc Flash Study
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this Arc Flash Study of the electrical distribution
system for the XYZ in city, state.
The current version (v7.0) of SKM Power Tools Arc Flash modeling, equipment evaluation, short
circuit current analysis and over current device coordination software programs were used to determine
E
Arc Flash incident energy levels for this project. IEEE Standard 1584 modeling software and NFPA 70E
2015 edition was used for verification.
L
The results of the calculations and models have been documented on four (4) drawings based on
the facility distribution system. The calculations have been based on data collected during my on-site visit
on October 1-3, 2017. Having the assistance of Bryan Johnson and Jason Bateman facilitated the data
collection greatly.
P
The results contained in this report are based on the design and information available at the time
this report was completed. Any changes made to equipment settings or system configuration will
invalidate the results contained in this report and may result in a more hazardous condition thus,
M
necessitating a follow-up review of this arc flash study.
The Incident Energy Summary Report and Equipment Evaluation Report provide the detailed
A
results however; the six (6) highlights of this Arc Flash Study are summarized as follows:
S
1) Utility Fault Current Contribution
The short circuit fault current available at the primary incoming bus for the incoming utility service to
the xyz in city was made available.
2) 13.8kV and 480V Switchgear, and Generator Buses @ DANGEROUS Level
Operation of the disconnect devices on the 13.8kV Switchgear in all four units is indicated as
DANGEROUS (>40 calories/cm2). This is not unusual for a protective device fed from a large generator,
or protective devices located on the secondary of transformers fed from a utility, or at the incoming
main lugs of a power distribution center as the transformer significantly increases the response time of
the upstream protective device.
Operation of all the protective devices connected to the 480V Switchgear in three of the four units is
indicated as DANGEROUS (>40 calories/cm2). Operation of protective devices connected to SWGR 412
is indicated as 37 calories/cm2 or PPE Level 4. This is due to different, faster response relay settings on
SWGR 412 Relay than the other 480V switchgear relays.
Operation of the Generator Circuit Breakers on all four units is indicated as DANGEROUS (>40
calories/cm2).
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 3
These DANGEROUS levels may be mitigated by increasing the working distance to enable the use of AF
PPE Level 4. See the notes on the arc flash model drawing for details. Handle extensions may be
available to achieve this increased working distance. Remote operation of the switches or circuit
breakers may also be an option to consider.
3) System Mis-coordination
The Incident Energy Summary Report indicates a few areas of over current device mis-coordination,
see the (*N5) notations in the arc flash summary report. In a few cases, subpanel branch breakers are
coordinated to the bus duct fused disconnects bypassing the subpanel main breakers.
E
In an industrial power system, mis-coordination is not an uncommon situation to find and it typically
works in your favor relative to arc flash as the speed of the upstream protective device reduces the
L
incident energy exposure. These upstream protective devices function in this manner only in an
overload condition. As we understand the system is reliable and functions well, our recommendation
is to leave these devices and their settings in their current state. While a detailed system analysis
P
could be considered, it should be noted that this power system device coordination analysis could
consume significant engineering and field monitoring cost.
4) Equipment Evaluation Report
M
The Equipment Evaluation Report indicates a few failures or marginal ratings. These are primarily in
two areas of over current device ratings in the Device Evaluation Summary Reports. One area is the
Short Circuit Current Available ratings for a device > 80% SCCA ratings and the other is related to
connected load to the device > 80% for continuous load ratings.
A
a. In the case of the available short circuit current ratings, these devices are continuous
duty rated and thus they are suitable for the service as designed and intended. This is
a software default value based on the NEC and in this case is not applicable to your
S
system.
b. The second area is relative to connected load greater than 80% and 100%. The
software cannot determine the real horsepower of a particular motor and assumes it
to be 100%loaded. It cannot determine true loading of multiple motors operated in a
lead / lag configuration. It calculates to 100% load on every device connected. It
cannot calculate diversity of loads per the NEC. This is the only reason you will find a
marginal rating on a device due to loading > 80% or a failure rating on a device due to
loading > 100%.
5) Equipment Labeling
The switchboard and motor control center (MCC) sections will be labeled to the actual incident energy
levels per the requirements of IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E for testing, troubleshooting and interacting
with the device with exposed energized parts. All disconnects that could require maintenance, testing
or troubleshooting will be labeled to the requirements of NFPA 70E 130.5(D); extracted text from
provided next.
NFPA 70E, 2015 Edition (Pg. 28)
130.5 (D) Equipment Labeling. Electrical equipment such as switchboards, panel boards, industrial control
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 4
panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers that are in other than dwelling units and that
are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized shall be field-
marked with a label containing all the following information:
(1) Nominal system voltage
(2) Arc flash boundary
(3) At least one of the following:
a. Available incident energy and the corresponding working distance, or the arc flash PPE
category in Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(b) or Table 130.7(C)(15)(B)for the equipment, but not
both
b. Minimum arc rating of clothing
c. Site-specific level of PPE
E
Exception: Labels applied prior to September 30, 2011 are acceptable if they contain the available
incident energy or required level of PPE.
L
The method of calculating and the data to support the information for the label shall be documented.
Where the review of the arc flash hazard risk assessment identifies a change that renders the label
P
inaccurate, the label shall be updated.
The owner of the electrical equipment shall be responsible for the documentation, installation, and
maintenance of the field-marked label.
M
6. Operation of Electrical Equipment
The motor control centers and distribution panels are typical lockout points. The calculated energy
levels as indicated on the drawings are often in excess of 1.2 calories/cm2 and as such would require
A
some level of arc rated PPE. The extracted text from NFPA 70E 2015 edition regarding this situation is
provided next.
S
NFPA 70E, 2015 Edition (Pg. 24)
130.2 Electrically Safe Working Conditions
(A) Energized Work
(4) Normal Operation. Normal operation of electric equipment shall be permitted where all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The equipment is properly installed.
(2) The equipment is properly maintained.
(3) The equipment doors are closed and secured.
(4) All equipment covers are in place and secured.
(5) There is no evidence of impending failure.
Informational Note: The phrase properly installed means that the equipment is installed in accordance
with applicable industry codes and standards and the manufacturer’s recommendations. The phrase
properly maintained means that the equipment has been maintained in accordance with the
manufacturer’s recommendations and applicable industry codes and standards. The phrase evidence of
impending failure means that there is evidence such as arcing, overheating, loose or bound equipment
parts, visible damage, or deterioration.
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 5
Arc Flash
Task Equipment Condition*
PPE Required
…
Voltage testing on individual All of the following:
battery cells or individual multi-
cell units The equipment is properly installed
The equipment is properly maintained
No
or All equipment covers are in place and secured
There is no evidence of impending failure
Removal of battery inter-cell
E
connector covers
One or more of the following:
L
The equipment is not properly installed the
equipment is not properly maintained
P
Equipment doors are open or not secured Yes
Equipment covers are off or not secured
There is evidence of impending failure
M
NFPA 70E makes it very clear the determination of this condition can only be made by the responsible
person in charge of the facility. If the facility has evidence and documentation as per the requirements
of NFPA 70E 205.3, 205.4 and 210.5 that all five conditions are met, then no arc rated PPE would be
A
required to operate disconnects with the doors properly closed and latched. "In our experience, it is
very rare that equipment is maintained to the exact specifications of the manufacturer”. For
reference see NFPA extracts listed below.
S
A safer approach could be taken. Other facilities with similar situations provide an appropriate Arc
Rated switchers coat, face shield and leather gloves in each of the MCC rooms and then instruct the
task qualified workers when performing the lock out procedure to wear the coat, hard hat, face shield
and gloves to interact with the disconnect in question. If this approach is taken, the under-layer
clothing shall be 100% natural fiber non-melting clothing per NFPA 70E. After the disconnect switch is
operated to the “off” position, then lock out procedures can be performed without any arc rated PPE.
NFPA 70E, 2015 Edition (Pg. 44 & 45)
205.3 General Maintenance Requirements. Electrical equipment shall be maintained in accordance
with manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards to reduce the risk associated with
failure. The equipment owner or the owner’s designated representative shall be responsible for
maintenance of the electrical equipment and documentation.
Informational Note: Common industry practice is to apply test or calibration decals to equipment to
indicate the test or calibration date and overall condition of equipment that has been tested and
maintained in the field. These decals provide the employee immediate indication of last maintenance
date and if the tested device or system was found acceptable on the date of test. This local information
can assist the employee in the assessment of overall electrical equipment maintenance status.
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 6
205.4 Overcurrent Protective Devices. Overcurrent protective devices shall be maintained in accordance
with the manufacturers’ instructions or industry consensus standards. Maintenance, tests, and inspections
shall be documented.
210.5 Protective Devices. Protective devices shall be maintained to adequately withstand or interrupt
available fault current.
Informational Note: Improper or inadequate maintenance can result in increased opening time of the
overcurrent protective device, thus increasing the incident energy.
The calculations in this study and resultant incident energy levels are based upon the overcurrent devices
E
(overcurrent relays, circuit breakers, and fused disconnects) operating as designed and being properly
maintained. Maintenance intervals should be based on the manufacturer’s recommendations or industry
consensus testing standards. This is typically a 3 to 5-year interval based on the conditions of the equipment.
L
The InterNational Electrical Testing Association (NETA) provides guidance documents for adjusting these
intervals based on location conditions.
P
It is important to note that in many cases, changing the trip settings of the equipment in place in the facility is
relatively simple to do. Full-function circuit breakers and time overcurrent relay devices often have adjustable
long-time, short-time and instantaneous (LSI) trip units that provide the unique ability to modify or change the
trip settings with a small screwdriver. As any changes to the equipment settings may have a significant impact
M
on the incident energy levels found in the electrical system, the facility should have a change management
process in place to maintain the settings as found for this Arc Flash Study. Any change to the site distribution
system or a change by the utility relative to your incoming service fault current could necessitate a review of
A
this arc flash study.
Annex H of NFPA 70E provides guidance for a clothing system to 12 calories/cm2 and as such on all the model
drawings anytime there is a PPE Category 3 situation it will be indicated as such with the specific calories/cm2
S
exposure. This can help you if your clothing supplier is providing 12 calories/cm2 clothing. This needs to be
verified to what level of protection your PPE uniform clothing provides. This can be your decision after
verification of the ATPV of the clothing supplied, documented and communicated to the affected personnel.
Layering of Arc rated clothing is allowed as long as it has been tested as a system. This information is available
on the clothing manufacturers’ websites as well as on ArcWear.com. As an example, Westex has tested their
Indura Ultrasoft shirt with their T-shirt (typical rental company provided material) and the combination
achieves 20 calories/cm2. Tyndale’s 9 calories/cm2 shirt has been tested with various other 4 calories/cm2 T-
shirts achieving slightly higher overall results when used together.
Any exposures greater than PPE Category 1 (> 4 calories/cm2) requires the use of an arc rated
face shield and balaclava or an arc rated face shield hood assembly.
NFPA 70E requires the arc flash study to be reviewed every five years. If the utility contacts you for a service
interruption, ask the question for what purpose. If they are upgrading the transmission line or transmission /
distribution transformers, this is your indication to find out what the change will be to your incoming fault
current and relay clearing times which can affect the arc flash calculations.
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 7
If the utility has not changed anything relative to your incoming service fault current and you have not changed
anything in your distribution system on site, then the review can be a very simple process of noting this fact
every 5 years. A verification from the utility of the utility information found on the arc flash study document
and also contained on the USB drive is all that would be required.
Equipment Evaluation Report. All of the relative files in PDF, native Microsoft Office format and native SKM
format are provided on an USB drive for file retention. It is recommended that these files be retained in a
secure location within your organization. e-Hazard also retains the files backed up to a
“secured cloud service”.
E
I keep an exact duplicate of the documentation binder in my office so if there is ever a question, we can both
look at the exact same piece of information at any time in the future. If I should be traveling, I have all the files
L
on my laptop with me.
Please call John Aeiker, 251-581-1492 for any additional clarification relative to this report.
Thank you,
M P
S A
(502) 716-7073 Office 3018 Eastpoint Parkway www.e-hazard.com
(502) 371-6300 Fax Louisville, KY 40223 [email protected]
October 3, 2017 xyz e-Hazard
Incident Energy Summary Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Prot Dev Prot Dev Trip/ Breaker Ground Equip Gap Arc Working Incident PPE Level
2 Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Flash Distance Energy
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time/Tol Boundary (in) (cal/cm2)
E
3
4 (kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.) (in)
13.8kV Bus - SWGR 11 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 26.20 25.01 24.82 23.72 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 2299 36 68 Dangerous! (*N2)
5 (*N9)
13.8kV Bus - SWGR 21 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 25.72 24.56 25.32 24.18 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 2252 36 67 Dangerous! (*N2)
L
6 (*N9)
13.8kV Bus - SWGR 31 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 26.12 24.94 24.74 23.64 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 2292 36 68 Dangerous! (*N2)
7 (*N9)
13.8kV Bus - SWGR 41 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 25.72 24.56 25.32 24.18 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 2252 36 67 Dangerous! (*N2)
8 (*N9)
Black Start Gen SWGR 312 - MCC 3121 0.48 67.57 33.54 31.25 15.51 0.3 0.000 Yes PNL 25 138 18 34 Level 4 (*N21)
P
9 Connection Pt CB
Black Start Generator MaxTripTime @2.0s 0.48 6.68 4.65 6.68 4.65 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 126 18 29 Level 4 (*N2) (*N9)
10 Bus
Chiller Heater 1 Cabinet XFMR - Chiller Heater 1 0.48 17.04 10.34 17.04 10.34 1 0.083 Yes PNL 25 145 18 37 Level 4
11 Relay
Chiller Heater 2 Cabinet XFMR - Chiller Heater 2 0.48 17.23 10.44 17.23 10.44 1 0.083 Yes PNL 25 146 18 37 Level 4
Relay
M
12
Chiller Heater 3 Cabinet XFMR - Chiller Heater 3 0.48 17.05 10.34 17.05 10.34 1 0.083 Yes PNL 25 145 18 37 Level 4
13 Relay
Chiller Heater 4 Cabinet XFMR - Chiller Heater 4 0.48 16.90 10.27 16.90 10.27 1 0.083 Yes PNL 25 144 18 36 Level 4
14 Relay
CT Pump 1 Bus SWGR 111 52-CT 4.16 10.54 10.22 10.39 10.07 0.004 0.000 Yes SWG 104 1 36 0.05 Level 0
15
A
CT Pump 2 Bus SWGR 211 52-CT 4.16 10.50 10.18 10.34 10.03 0.004 0.000 Yes SWG 104 1 36 0.05 Level 0
16
CT Pump 3 Bus SWGR 311 52-CT 4.16 10.57 10.25 10.41 10.09 0.004 0.000 Yes SWG 104 1 36 0.05 Level 0
17
CT Pump 4 Bus SWGR 411 52-CT 4.16 10.46 10.15 10.31 10.00 0.004 0.000 Yes SWG 104 1 36 0.05 Level 0
18
Generator Bus Unit 1 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 19.30 18.53 19.30 18.53 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 1674 36 50 Dangerous! (*N2)
19 (*N9)
S
Generator Bus Unit 2 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 19.30 18.53 19.30 18.53 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 1674 36 50 Dangerous! (*N2)
20 (*N9)
Generator Bus Unit 3 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 19.30 18.53 19.30 18.53 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 1674 36 50 Dangerous! (*N2)
21 (*N9)
Generator Bus Unit 4 MaxTripTime @2.0s 13.80 19.30 18.53 19.30 18.53 2 0.000 Yes SWG 153 1674 36 50 Dangerous! (*N2)
22 (*N9)
LP1121 Main MCC 1121 LP1121 CB 0.208 2.60 1.69 2.60 1.69 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
23
LP2121 Main MCC 2121 LP2121 CB 0.208 2.55 1.67 2.55 1.67 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
24
LP3121 Main MCC 3121 LP3121 CB 0.208 2.60 1.69 2.60 1.69 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
25
LP4121 Main MCC 4121 LP4121 CB 0.208 2.55 1.67 2.55 1.67 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
26
MCC 1121 Bus SWGR 312 - MCC 3121 0.48 48.63 25.33 22.16 11.54 0.3 0.000 Yes PNL 25 115 18 25 Level 4 (*N21)
27 CB
MCC 1121 Typ 100A MCC 1121 Typ 100A CB 0.48 11.39 7.33 11.27 7.25 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 12 18 0.59 Level 0
28 Load
MCC 1121 Typ 200A MCC 1121 Typ 200A CB 0.48 21.66 12.69 20.90 12.25 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 17 18 1.1 Level 0
29 Load
Page 1 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Incident Energy Summary Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Prot Dev Prot Dev Trip/ Breaker Ground Equip Gap Arc Working Incident PPE Level
2 Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Flash Distance Energy
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time/Tol Boundary (in) (cal/cm2)
E
3
4 (kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.) (in)
MCC 1121 Typ 400A MCC 1121 Typ 400A CB 0.48 30.58 17.04 29.29 16.32 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 20 18 1.5 Level 1
30 Load
MCC 1121A Bus MCC 1121A Main CB 0.48 13.13 8.27 13.13 8.27 0.011 0.000 Yes PNL 25 8 18 0.31 Level 0
31
L
MCC 1121A Main @ MCC 1121 - MCC 1121A 0.48 13.25 8.34 13.25 8.34 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 13 18 0.68 Level 0
32 Demin H2O CB
MCC 1122 Bus MCC 1122 Main CB 0.48 17.27 10.46 16.55 10.02 0.053 0.000 Yes PNL 25 23 18 1.8 Level 1
33
MCC 1122 LPCT Main MCC 1122 LPCT CB 0.208 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.73 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
34
P
MCC 1122 Main @ CT SWGR 112 - MCC 1122 0.48 17.42 10.54 16.70 10.10 0.172 0.000 Yes PNL 25 47 18 5.8 Level 2 (*N21)
35 Bldg CB
MCC 1122 Typ CT MCC 1122 Typ CT Drive 0.48 3.07 2.39 3.05 2.37 0.015 0.000 Yes PNL 25 4 18 0.11 Level 0
36 Drive CB
MCC 1122 Typ CT Fan MCC 1122 Typ CT Fan 0.48 10.88 7.05 10.30 6.67 0.015 0.000 Yes PNL 25 8 18 0.34 Level 0
37 CB
MCC 1223 LP 12A & MCC 1223 LP12A & 12S 0.208 1.97 1.39 1.97 1.39 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
M
38 12S Mains CB
MCC 1223 LP12A & MCC 1223 LP12A & 12S 0.48 37.97 20.50 37.97 20.50 0.01 0.000 Yes PNL 25 13 18 0.72 Level 0
39 12S XFR SW CB
MCC 1223 MLO Bus SWGR 112 - MCC 1223 0.48 41.71 22.21 40.78 21.72 0.05 0.000 Yes PNL 25 37 18 3.9 Level 1 (*N21)
40 CB
MCC 1223 Typ CW MCC 1223 Typ CW 0.48 22.81 13.26 22.10 12.85 0.01 0.000 Yes PNL 25 10 18 0.47 Level 0
A
41 Pump Pump CB
MCC 1223 Typ MCC 1223 Typ Drive CB 0.48 3.30 2.55 3.28 2.53 0.015 0.000 Yes PNL 25 4 18 0.11 Level 0
42 Drive/Heater
MCC 2121 Bus SWGR 212 - MCC 2121 0.48 27.32 15.47 24.85 14.08 0.172 0.000 Yes PNL 25 61 18 8.8 Level 3
43 CB
MCC 2121 Typ 100A MCC 2121 Typ 100A CB 0.48 10.20 6.67 10.06 6.58 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 11 18 0.54 Level 0
S
44 Load
MCC 2121 Typ 200A MCC 2121 Typ 200A CB 0.48 16.59 10.11 15.78 9.61 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 15 18 0.84 Level 0
45 Load
MCC 2121 Typ 400A MCC 2121 Typ 400A CB 0.48 21.02 12.37 19.67 11.57 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 17 18 1.0 Level 0
46 Load
MCC 3121 Bus SWGR 312 - MCC 3121 0.48 56.58 28.82 25.97 13.23 0.3 0.000 Yes PNL 25 125 18 29 Level 4 (*N21)
47 CB
MCC 3121 Typ 100A MCC 3121 Typ 100A CB 0.48 11.72 7.51 11.60 7.44 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 12 18 0.61 Level 0
48 Load
MCC 3121 Typ 200A MCC 3121 Typ 200A CB 0.48 23.10 13.41 22.34 12.97 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 17 18 1.1 Level 0
49 Load
MCC 3121 Typ 400A MCC 3121 Typ 400A CB 0.48 33.57 18.45 32.29 17.75 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 22 18 1.6 Level 1
50 Load
MCC 3121A Bus MCC 3121A Main CB 0.48 7.50 5.13 7.50 5.13 0.014 0.000 Yes PNL 25 7 18 0.23 Level 0
51
MCC 3121A Main @ MCC 3121 - MCC 3121A 0.48 7.54 5.15 7.54 5.15 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 9 18 0.41 Level 0
52 Demin H2O CB
MCC 3122 Bus MCC 3122 Main CB 0.48 50.35 26.09 49.59 25.69 0.05 0.000 Yes PNL 25 41 18 4.7 Level 2
53
MCC 3122 Chem Bldg MCC 3122 Chem Bldg 0.208 3.40 2.04 3.40 2.04 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
54 LP Main LP CB
Page 2 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Incident Energy Summary Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Prot Dev Prot Dev Trip/ Breaker Ground Equip Gap Arc Working Incident PPE Level
2 Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Flash Distance Energy
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time/Tol Boundary (in) (cal/cm2)
E
3
4 (kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.) (in)
MCC 3122 Main @ CT SWGR 312 - MCC 3122 0.48 51.58 26.63 50.82 26.24 0.05 0.000 Yes PNL 25 42 18 4.8 Level 2 (*N21)
55 Bldg CB
MCC 3122 Typ CT MCC 3122 Typ CT Drive 0.48 3.33 2.56 3.31 2.55 0.015 0.000 Yes PNL 25 4 18 0.11 Level 0
L
56 Drive CB
MCC 3122 Typ CT Fan MCC 3122 Typ CT Fan 0.48 17.94 10.80 17.41 10.48 0.015 0.000 Yes PNL 25 11 18 0.54 Level 0
57 CB
MCC 3423 LP34A & MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S 0.208 1.97 1.39 1.97 1.39 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
58 34S Mains CB
MCC 3423 LP34A & MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S 0.48 37.97 20.50 37.97 20.50 0.01 0.000 Yes PNL 25 13 18 0.72 Level 0
P
59 34S XFR SW CB
MCC 3423 MLO Bus SWGR 312 - MCC 3423 0.48 41.70 22.21 40.78 21.72 0.05 0.000 Yes PNL 25 37 18 3.9 Level 1 (*N21)
60 CB
MCC 3423 Typ CW MCC 3423 Typ CW 0.48 22.81 13.26 22.10 12.85 0.01 0.000 Yes PNL 25 10 18 0.47 Level 0
61 Pump Pump CB
MCC 3423 Typ MCC 3423 Typ Drive CB 0.48 3.30 2.55 3.28 2.53 0.015 0.000 Yes PNL 25 4 18 0.11 Level 0
62 Drive/Heater
M
MCC 4121 Bus SWGR 412 - MCC 4121 0.48 27.56 15.59 25.09 14.19 0.172 0.000 Yes PNL 25 61 18 8.8 Level 3
63 CB
MCC 4121 Typ 100A MCC 4121 Typ 100A CB 0.48 10.22 6.68 10.08 6.59 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 11 18 0.54 Level 0
64 Load
MCC 4121 Typ 200A MCC 4121 Typ 200A CB 0.48 16.67 10.15 15.86 9.66 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 15 18 0.84 Level 0
65 Load
A
MCC 4121 Typ 400A MCC 4121 Typ 400A CB 0.48 21.15 12.44 19.80 11.64 0.025 0.000 Yes PNL 25 17 18 1.1 Level 0
66 Load
SWGR 11 52-M Bus SWGR 311 Relay 4.16 12.05 11.66 10.89 10.54 1.917 0.083 Yes SWG 104 792 36 24 Level 3 (*N9)
67
SWGR 111 52-M Bus SWGR 111 Relay 4.16 12.02 11.63 10.86 10.51 1.917 0.083 Yes SWG 104 790 36 24 Level 3 (*N9)
68
SWGR 111 Bus SWGR 111 52-M Relay 4.16 11.95 11.57 10.80 10.45 1.893 0.083 Yes SWG 104 775 36 24 Level 3
S
69
SWGR 112 Bus SWGR 112 Relay 0.48 67.55 33.53 29.83 14.81 1.917 0.083 Yes PNL 25 316 18 132 Dangerous! (*N9)
70 (*N21)
SWGR 211 52-M Bus SWGR 211 Relay 4.16 11.96 11.57 10.80 10.45 1.917 0.083 Yes SWG 104 785 36 24 Level 3 (*N9)
71
SWGR 211 Bus SWGR 211 52-M Relay 4.16 11.90 11.51 10.74 10.39 1.899 0.083 Yes SWG 104 773 36 24 Level 3
72
SWGR 212 - MCC 1223 SWGR 112 - MCC 1223 0.48 29.65 16.59 28.99 16.23 0.05 0.000 Yes PNL 25 31 18 2.9 Level 1 (*N21)
73 CB Bus CB
SWGR 212 Bus SWGR 212 Relay 0.48 31.85 17.64 29.41 16.29 1.917 0.083 Yes PNL 25 290 18 114 Dangerous! (*N9)
74
SWGR 311 Bus SWGR 311 52-M Relay 4.16 11.98 11.60 10.83 10.48 1.891 0.083 Yes SWG 104 776 36 24 Level 3
75
SWGR 312 Bus SWGR 312 Relay 0.48 67.54 33.53 29.63 14.71 1.917 0.083 Yes PNL 25 315 18 131 Dangerous! (*N9)
76 (*N21)
SWGR 411 52-M Bus SWGR 411 Relay 4.16 11.91 11.53 10.75 10.41 1.377 0.083 Yes SWG 104 566 36 17 Level 3
77
SWGR 411 Bus SWGR 411 Relay 4.16 11.85 11.46 10.69 10.34 1.382 0.083 Yes SWG 104 564 36 17 Level 3 (*N5)
78
SWGR 412 - MCC 3423 SWGR 312 - MCC 3423 0.48 29.65 16.59 28.99 16.23 0.05 0.000 Yes PNL 25 31 18 2.9 Level 1 (*N21)
79 CB Bus CB
SWGR 412 Bus SWGR 412 Relay 0.48 32.19 17.80 29.75 16.45 0.546 0.083 Yes PNL 25 145 18 37 Level 4
80
XYZ Energy Grid MaxTripTime @2.0s 138 42.17 42.17 42.00 42.00 2 0.000 No AIR 153 2774 18 28376 Dangerous! (*N1)
81 138kV Bus (*N2) (*N9)
Unit 2 Refrig Air SWGR 211 52-CH 4.16 11.43 9.41 10.43 8.59 0.011 0.000 Yes SWG 104 3 36 0.12 Level 0 (*N3)
82 Compressors
Page 3 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Incident Energy Summary Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Prot Dev Prot Dev Trip/ Breaker Ground Equip Gap Arc Working Incident PPE Level
2 Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Flash Distance Energy
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time/Tol Boundary (in) (cal/cm2)
E
3
4 (kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.) (in)
Unit 3 Refrig Air SWGR 311 52-CH 4.16 11.51 9.47 10.51 8.65 0.011 0.000 Yes SWG 104 3 36 0.11 Level 0 (*N3)
83 Compressors
Unit 4 Refrig Air SWGR 411 52-CH 4.16 11.39 9.37 10.39 8.55 0.011 0.000 Yes SWG 104 3 36 0.12 Level 0 (*N3)
L
84 Compressors
Unit 1 & 2 - TIC Panel MCC 1121 LP1121 CB 0.208 2.60 1.69 2.60 1.69 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
85 Main
Unit 1 Refrig Air SWGR 111 52-CH 4.16 11.48 9.45 10.49 8.63 0.011 0.000 Yes SWG 104 3 36 0.11 Level 0 (*N3)
86 Compressors
Unit 3 & 4 - TIC Panel MCC 3121 LP3121 CB 0.208 2.60 1.69 2.60 1.69 2 0.000 Yes PNL 25 18 18 1.2 Level 0 (*N9) (*N15)
P
87 Main
Level 0: Nonmelting or 0.0 - 1.2 cal/cm^2 #Level 0 = 42 (*N1) - Out of IEEE
Untreated Fiber with 1584 Range, Lee
Weight >= 4.5 oz/sq yd Equation Used.
88
Level 1: Arc-rated shirt 1.2 - 4.0 cal/cm^2 #Level 1 = 7 (*N2) < 80% Cleared
& pants or arc-rated Fault Threshold
M
89 coverall
Level 2: Arc-rated shirt 4.0 - 8.0 cal/cm^2 #Level 2 = 3 (*N3) - Arcing Current
& pants or arc-rated Low Tolerances Used
90 coverall
Level 3: Arc-rated shirt 8.0 - 25.0 cal/cm^2 #Level 3 = 10 (*N5) -
& pants + arc-rated Miscoordinated,
A
coverall + arc-rated arc Upstream Device
flash suit Tripped
91
Level 4: Arc-rated shirt 25.0 - 40.0 cal/cm^2 #Level 4 = 9 (*N9) - Max Arcing
& pants + arc-rated Duration Reached
coverall + arc-rated arc
flash suit
S
92
Level Dangerous!: DO 40.0 - 999.0 cal/cm^2 #Danger = 12 (*N15) - Report as
NOT WORK ON LIVE! category 0 if fed by
one transformer size
93 < 125 kVA
#Equip Eval
(*N21) - Equipment
Failed = 11
Evaluation Failed,
OVERDUTIED
EQUIPMENT
FOUND -
Inappropriate to
94 provide arc-flash
For additional information refer to NFPA 70 E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the hazard
NFPA 70E 2012 Annex D.7 - IEEE 1584 Bus Report ( - 80% Cleared Fault results.include
Threshold,
Workplace. Ind. Motors for 5.0 Cycles), mis-coordination checked
95
Level 0: Nonmelting or Untreated Fiber with Weight >= 4.5 oz/sq yd, Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Leather Gloves, Safety glasses, Non-melting or untreated natural fiber (cotton/wool/rayon/silk > 4.5 oz/sq
yd), shirt (long-sleeve), pants (long)., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0 (minimum) gloves, Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
96
Level 1: Arc-rated shirt & pants or arc-rated coverall , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Leather Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses, electrically rated hard hat with
hood and face shield., 4 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long), or Arc-rated coverall, plus arc-rated face shield or arc flash suit hood, Arc-rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools +
Class 0 (minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash) as needed., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
97
Page 4 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Incident Energy Summary Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Bus Name Protective Bus Bus Bus Prot Dev Prot Dev Trip/ Breaker Ground Equip Gap Arc Working Incident PPE Level
2 Device kV Bolted Arcing Bolted Arcing Delay Opening Type (mm) Flash Distance Energy
Name Fault Fault Fault Fault Time Time/Tol Boundary (in) (cal/cm2)
E
3
4 (kA) (kA) (kA) (kA) (sec.) (sec.) (in)
Level 2: Arc-rated shirt & pants or arc-rated coverall , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Leather Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses, electrically rated hard hat with
hood and face shield. Hearing protection., 8 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long), or Arc-rated coverall, plus arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated face shield and arc rated balaclava, Arc-rated
rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0 (minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash)., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
L
98
Level 3: Arc-rated shirt & pants + arc-rated coverall + arc-rated arc flash suit , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Arc-rated Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses,
electrically rated hard hat with hood and face shield. Hearing protection., 25 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long) plus Arc-rated coverall, plus arc rated arc flash suit jacket, pants, & hood, Arc-
rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0 (minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash)., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
99
Level 4: Arc-rated shirt & pants + arc-rated coverall + arc-rated arc flash suit , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Arc-rated Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses,
P
electrically rated hard hat with hood and face shield. Hearing protection., 40 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long) plus Arc-rated coverall, plus arc rated arc flash suit jacket, pants, & hood, Arc-
rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0 (minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash)., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
100
Level Dangerous!: DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, No FR Category Found
101
AM
S
Page 5 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
DC Incident Energy Summary Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 Bus Name Protective Bus DC Bolted DC Arcing Bus DC Bolted DC Arcing Trip/ Breaker Duration Multiplier Working Arc Incident PPE Level
2 Device kV Bus Bus Equivalent Prot Dev Prot Dev Delay Opening of Arc Distance Flash Energy
3 Name Fault (kA) Fault (kA) Resistance Fault (kA) Fault (kA) Time Time/Tol (sec.) (in) Boundary (cal/cm2)
E
4 (Ohms) (sec.) (sec.) (in)
Typical DC Bus @ MaxTripTime @2.0s 0.125 0.600 0.300 0.2082 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.000 2.000 1.0 18 10 0.36 Level 0 (*N2)
5 1min (*N9)
Typical DC Bus @ MaxTripTime @2.0s 0.125 0.480 0.240 0.2602 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.000 2.000 1.0 18 9 0.29 Level 0 (*N2)
6 8hr (*N9)
L
Typical DC Bus @ MaxTripTime @2.0s 0.125 0.864 0.432 0.1446 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.000 2.000 1.0 18 12 0.52 Level 0 (*N2)
7 Max (*N9)
(*N2) < 80% Cleared Fault
Threshold
8
DC Arc Flash (ANSI) For additional information refer to NFPA 70 E, Standard for (*N9) - Max Arcing Duration
Bus Report Electrical Safety in the Workplace. Reached
9
P
Level 0: Nonmelting or Untreated Fiber with Weight >= 4.5 oz/sq yd, Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Leather Gloves, Safety glasses, Non-melting or untreated natural fiber (cotton/wool/rayon/silk > 4.5 oz/sq yd), shirt (long-sleeve), pants
10 (long)., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0 (minimum) gloves, Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
Level 1: Arc-rated shirt & pants or arc-rated coverall , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Leather Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses, electrically rated hard hat with hood and face shield., 4 cal/sq
cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long), or Arc-rated coverall, plus arc-rated face shield or arc flash suit hood, Arc-rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0 (minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash) as
needed., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
11
Level 2: Arc-rated shirt & pants or arc-rated coverall , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Leather Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses, electrically rated hard hat with hood and face shield. Hearing
M
protection., 8 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long), or Arc-rated coverall, plus arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated face shield and arc rated balaclava, Arc-rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0
(minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash)., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
12
Level 3: Arc-rated shirt & pants + arc-rated coverall + arc-rated arc flash suit , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Arc-rated Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses, electrically rated hard hat with hood
and face shield. Hearing protection., 25 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long) plus Arc-rated coverall, plus arc rated arc flash suit jacket, pants, & hood, Arc-rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0
(minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash)., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
A
13
Level 4: Arc-rated shirt & pants + arc-rated coverall + arc-rated arc flash suit , Hardhat + Arc-rated hard hat liner + Safety Glasses or Goggles + Ear Canal Inserts, Arc-rated Gloves, Leather work shoes, Safety glasses, electrically rated hard hat with hood
and face shield. Hearing protection., 40 cal/sq cm, Arc-rated shirt (long-sleeve) plus Arc-rated pants (long) plus Arc-rated coverall, plus arc rated arc flash suit jacket, pants, & hood, Arc-rated rainwear as needed., > 50V voltage rated tools + Class 0
(minimum) gloves and leather protectors (flash)., Leather shoes (flash) as needed. Dielectric shoes or insulating mat (step and touch potential).
14
Level Dangerous!: DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!, No FR Category Found
15
S
Page 1 of 1
XYZ
xyz
E
Typical SBM Battery Set @ 1min Typical SBM Battery Set @ 8hr Typical SBM Battery Set @ Max
Battery Rating 83.900 A Battery Rating 6.700 A Battery Rating 840.000 A
Rated Voltage 125.000 V Rated Voltage 125.000 V Rated Voltage 125.000 V
L
Battery Size Type ONE_MINUTE Battery Size Type EIGHT_HOURS Battery Size Type MAX_SC
Number of Positive Plates 15 Number of Positive Plates 15 Number of Positive Plates 15
Battery Type NICKEL_CADMIUM Battery Type NICKEL_CADMIUM Battery Type NICKEL_CADMIUM
Number of Cells 90 Number of Cells 90 Number of Cells 90
P
dcCBL-0001 dcCBL-0003 dcCBL-0004
Length 10.00 ft Length 10.00 ft Length 10.00 ft
M
Typical DC Bus @ 1min Typical DC Bus @ 8hr Typical DC Bus @ Max
System Nominal DC Voltage 125.0 V System Nominal DC Voltage 125.0 V System Nominal DC Voltage 125.0 V
A
AF_BoltedFault 0.600 kA AF_BoltedFault 0.480 kA AF_BoltedFault 0.864 kA
AF_TripTime 2.000 s AF_TripTime 2.000 s AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.36 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.29 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.52 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0
AF_Boundary 9.85 inches AF_Boundary 8.81 inches AF_Boundary 11.81 inches
S
AF_ArcingFault 0.300 kA AF_ArcingFault 0.240 kA AF_ArcingFault 0.432 kA
XYZ
Arc Flash Study - Typical DC Model Drawing
e-Hazard - Louisville, KY
J. D. Aeiker May 3, 2017 Rev. 0
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Equipment Evaluation Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G
1 Device/Bus Status Description Voltage (V) Continuous Amps INT kA Rating%
2 Manufacturer Bus/Device LF/Dev/Rating% Calc/Dev/Series Volt/INT/C-L
3 MCC 1121 - MCC 1121A CB Pass SFLA, Spectra RMS 480 0.00 48.63 100.00
4 MCC 1121 Bus 70-250A 480 200.00 65.00 74.82
5 GE SFLA 0.00
6
7 MCC 1121 LP1121 CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 0.00 48.63 100.00
8 MCC 1121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 74.82
9 GE SELA 0.00
10
11 MCC 1121 Typ 100A CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 37.14 48.63 100.00
12 MCC 1121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 74.82
13 GE SELA 37.14
E
14
15 MCC 1121 Typ 200A CB Pass SFLA, Spectra RMS 480 155.07 48.63 100.00
16 MCC 1121 Bus 70-250A 480 200.00 65.00 74.82
L
17 GE SFLA 77.53
18
19 MCC 1121 Typ 400A CB Pass SGLA, Spectra RMS 480 247.87 48.63 100.00
20 MCC 1121 Bus 125-600A 480 600.00 65.00 74.82
P
21 GE SGLA 41.31
22
23 MCC 1121A Main CB Pass HKD 480 0.00 13.25 100.00
24 MCC 1121A Main @ Demin H2O 100-400A 480 250.00 65.00 20.39
25 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 0.00
M
26
27 MCC 1122 LPCT CB Pass HKD 480 0.00 17.27 100.00
28 MCC 1122 Bus 100-400A 480 250.00 65.00 26.57
29 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 0.00
A
30
31 MCC 1122 Main CB Pass HND, RMS 310 480 136.96 17.42 100.00
32 MCC 1122 Main @ CT Bldg LSI, 400-800A Adj Plug 480 800.00 65.00 26.81
S
33 CUTLER-HAMMER HND 17.12
34
35 MCC 1122 Typ CT Drive CB Pass HMCP 480 12.43 17.27 100.00
36 MCC 1122 Bus 30A (90-300A Inst) 480 30.00 65.00 26.57
37 CUTLER-HAMMER HMCP 41.42
38
39 MCC 1122 Typ CT Fan CB Pass HMCP 480 124.53 17.27 100.00
40 MCC 1122 Bus 150A (750-2500A Inst) 480 150.00 65.00 26.57
41 CUTLER-HAMMER HMCP 83.02
42
43 MCC 1223 LP12A & 12S CB Pass HKD 480 0.00 41.71 100.00
44 MCC 1223 MLO Bus 100-400A 480 100.00 65.00 64.16
45 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 0.00
46
47 MCC 1223 Typ CW Pump CB Pass HKD 480 154.75 41.71 100.00
48 MCC 1223 MLO Bus 100-400A 480 300.00 65.00 64.16
49 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 51.58
50
51 MCC 1223 Typ Drive CB Pass HMCP 480 12.37 41.71 100.00
52 MCC 1223 MLO Bus 30A (90-300A Inst) 480 30.00 65.00 64.16
53 CUTLER-HAMMER HMCP 41.24
54
55 MCC 2121 LP2121 CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 0.00 27.32 100.00
56 MCC 2121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 42.02
57 GE SELA 0.00
58
Page 1 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Equipment Evaluation Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G
1 Device/Bus Status Description Voltage (V) Continuous Amps INT kA Rating%
2 Manufacturer Bus/Device LF/Dev/Rating% Calc/Dev/Series Volt/INT/C-L
59 MCC 2121 Typ 100A CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 36.85 27.32 100.00
60 MCC 2121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 42.02
61 GE SELA 36.85
62
63 MCC 2121 Typ 200A CB Pass SFLA, Spectra RMS 480 153.86 27.32 100.00
64 MCC 2121 Bus 70-250A 480 200.00 65.00 42.02
65 GE SFLA 76.93
66
67 MCC 2121 Typ 400A CB Pass SGLA, Spectra RMS 480 245.94 27.32 100.00
68 MCC 2121 Bus 125-600A 480 600.00 65.00 42.02
69 GE SGLA 40.99
E
70
71 MCC 3121 - MCC 3121A CB Pass SFLA, Spectra RMS 480 0.00 56.58 100.00
72 MCC 3121 Bus 70-250A 480 250.00 65.00 87.05
L
73 GE SFLA 0.00
74
75 MCC 3121 LP3121 CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 0.00 56.58 100.00
76 MCC 3121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 87.05
P
77 GE SELA 0.00
78
79 MCC 3121 Typ 100A CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 37.09 56.58 100.00
80 MCC 3121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 87.05
81 GE SELA 37.09
M
82
83 MCC 3121 Typ 200A CB Pass SFLA, Spectra RMS 480 154.85 56.58 100.00
84 MCC 3121 Bus 70-250A 480 200.00 65.00 87.05
85 GE SFLA 77.42
A
86
87 MCC 3121 Typ 400A CB Pass SGLA, Spectra RMS 480 247.52 56.58 100.00
88 MCC 3121 Bus 125-600A 480 600.00 65.00 87.05
S
89 GE SGLA 41.25
90
91 MCC 3121A Main CB Pass HKD 480 0.00 7.54 100.00
92 MCC 3121A Main @ Demin H2O 100-400A 480 250.00 65.00 11.60
93 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 0.00
94
95 MCC 3122 Chem Bldg LP CB Pass HKD 480 0.00 50.35 100.00
96 MCC 3122 Bus 100-400A 480 100.00 65.00 77.47
97 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 0.00
98
99 MCC 3122 Main CB Pass SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 136.22 51.58 100.00
100 MCC 3122 Main @ CT Bldg LSI, 200-2000AS 480 800.00 65.00 79.36
101 GE SS 17.03
102
103 MCC 3122 Typ CT Drive CB Pass HMCP 480 12.36 50.35 100.00
104 MCC 3122 Bus 30A (90-300A Inst) 480 100.00 65.00 77.47
105 CUTLER-HAMMER HMCP 12.36
106
107 MCC 3122 Typ CT Fan CB Pass HMCP 480 123.86 50.35 100.00
108 MCC 3122 Bus 150A (750-2500A Inst) 480 150.00 65.00 77.47
109 CUTLER-HAMMER HMCP 82.57
110
111 MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S CB Pass HKD 480 0.00 41.70 100.00
112 MCC 3423 MLO Bus 100-400A 480 100.00 65.00 64.16
113 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 0.00
114
Page 2 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Equipment Evaluation Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G
1 Device/Bus Status Description Voltage (V) Continuous Amps INT kA Rating%
2 Manufacturer Bus/Device LF/Dev/Rating% Calc/Dev/Series Volt/INT/C-L
115 MCC 3423 Typ CW Pump CB Pass HKD 480 154.75 41.70 100.00
116 MCC 3423 MLO Bus 100-400A 480 300.00 65.00 64.16
117 CUTLER-HAMMER HKD 51.58
118
119 MCC 3423 Typ Drive CB Pass HMCP 480 12.37 41.70 100.00
120 MCC 3423 MLO Bus 30A (90-300A Inst) 480 100.00 65.00 64.16
121 CUTLER-HAMMER HMCP 12.37
122
123 MCC 4121 LP4121 CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 0.00 27.56 100.00
124 MCC 4121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 42.39
125 GE SELA 0.00
E
126
127 MCC 4121 Typ 100A CB Pass SELA, Spectra RMS 480 36.85 27.56 100.00
128 MCC 4121 Bus 15-150A 480 100.00 65.00 42.39
L
129 GE SELA 36.85
130
131 MCC 4121 Typ 200A CB Pass SFLA, Spectra RMS 480 153.84 27.56 100.00
132 MCC 4121 Bus 70-250A 480 200.00 65.00 42.39
P
133 GE SFLA 76.92
134
135 MCC 4121 Typ 400A CB Pass SGLA, Spectra RMS 480 245.91 27.56 100.00
136 MCC 4121 Bus 125-600A 480 600.00 65.00 42.39
137 GE SGLA 40.99
M
138
139 SWGR 111 52-CH Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 172.23 12.03 81.89
140 SWGR 111 Bus 2R-26R 5080 200.00 50.00 24.05
141 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 9R 86.12 22.23
A
142
143 SWGR 111 52-CT Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 28.23 12.03 81.89
144 SWGR 111 Bus 2R-26R 5080 100.00 50.00 24.05
S
145 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 3R 28.23 22.23
146
147 SWGR 111 52-M Pass VB1 4160 200.47 11.58 87.39
148 SWGR 111 52-M Bus 1200-4000A 4760 1200.00 33.18 (*N2) 34.90
149 GE VB1-4.16-250 16.71 31.22
150
151 SWGR 111 CB - 991A Pass PVDB1 13800 60.43 28.84 89.03
152 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 11 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 72.10
153 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 5.04 66.64
154
155 SWGR 111 Chiller Heater 1 XFMR Pass HLE & CLE, 5.5kV E-Rated 4160 0.00 12.03 75.64
156 SWGR 111 Bus 30E-450E 5500 200.00 63.00 19.09
157 CUTLER-HAMMER HLE, 200E 0.00 17.79
158
159 SWGR 112 - MCC 1121 CB Fail SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 442.01 *69.38 (*N1) 100.00
160 SWGR 112 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 1200.00 65.00 *106.73
161 GE SS 36.83
162
163 SWGR 112 - MCC 1122 CB Fail SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 136.96 *69.38 (*N1) 100.00
164 SWGR 112 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 800.00 65.00 *106.73
165 GE SS 17.12
166
167 SWGR 112 - MCC 1223 CB Fail SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 167.12 *69.38 (*N1) 100.00
168 SWGR 112 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 800.00 65.00 *106.73
169 GE SS 20.89
170
Page 3 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Equipment Evaluation Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G
1 Device/Bus Status Description Voltage (V) Continuous Amps INT kA Rating%
2 Manufacturer Bus/Device LF/Dev/Rating% Calc/Dev/Series Volt/INT/C-L
171 SWGR 112 CB - 991B Pass PVDB1 13800 25.95 28.84 89.03
172 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 11 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 72.10
173 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 2.16 66.64
174
175 SWGR 211 52-CH Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 172.19 11.97 81.89
176 SWGR 211 Bus 2R-26R 5080 200.00 50.00 23.94
177 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 9R 86.10 22.14
178
179 SWGR 211 52-CT Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 28.23 11.97 81.89
180 SWGR 211 Bus 2R-26R 5080 100.00 50.00 23.94
181 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 3R 28.23 22.14
E
182
183 SWGR 211 52-M Pass VB1 4160 200.42 11.52 87.39
184 SWGR 211 52-M Bus 1200-4000A 4760 1200.00 33.18 (*N2) 34.72
L
185 GE VB1-4.16-250 16.70 31.08
186
187 SWGR 211 CB - 992A Pass PVDB1 13800 60.42 28.40 89.03
188 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 21 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 70.99
P
189 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 5.03 65.83
190
191 SWGR 211 Chiller Heater 2 XFMR Pass HLE & CLE, 5.5kV E-Rated 4160 0.00 11.97 75.64
192 SWGR 211 Bus 30E-450E 5500 200.00 63.00 19.00
193 CUTLER-HAMMER HLE, 200E 0.00 17.71
M
194
195 SWGR 212 - MCC 2121 CB Pass SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 436.65 32.72 (*N1) 100.00
196 SWGR 212 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 1200.00 65.00 50.33
197 GE SS 36.39
A
198
199 SWGR 212 CB - 992B Pass PVDB1 13800 15.19 28.40 89.03
200 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 21 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 70.99
S
201 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 1.27 65.83
202
203 SWGR 311 52-CH Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 172.23 12.06 81.89
204 SWGR 311 Bus 2R-26R 5080 200.00 50.00 24.12
205 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 9R 86.11 22.30
206
207 SWGR 311 52-CT Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 28.23 12.06 81.89
208 SWGR 311 Bus 2R-26R 5080 100.00 50.00 24.12
209 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 3R 28.23 22.30
210
211 SWGR 311 52-M Pass VB1 4160 200.46 11.61 87.39
212 SWGR 11 52-M Bus 1200-4000A 4760 1200.00 33.18 (*N2) 34.99
213 GE VB1-4.16-250 16.70 31.31
214
215 SWGR 311 CB - 993A Pass PVDB1 13800 60.43 28.76 89.03
216 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 31 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 71.89
217 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 5.04 66.44
218
219 SWGR 311 Chiller Heater 3 XFMR Pass HLE & CLE, 5.5kV E-Rated 4160 0.00 12.06 75.64
220 SWGR 311 Bus 30E-450E 5500 200.00 63.00 19.14
221 CUTLER-HAMMER HLE, 200E 0.00 17.84
222
223 SWGR 312 - MCC 3121 CB Fail SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 437.54 *69.37 (*N1) 100.00
224 SWGR 312 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 1200.00 65.00 *106.73
225 GE SS 36.46
226
Page 4 of 5
October 3, 2017 XYZ e-Hazard
Equipment Evaluation Report J.D. Aeiker
A B C D E F G
1 Device/Bus Status Description Voltage (V) Continuous Amps INT kA Rating%
2 Manufacturer Bus/Device LF/Dev/Rating% Calc/Dev/Series Volt/INT/C-L
227 SWGR 312 - MCC 3122 CB Fail SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 136.22 *69.37 (*N1) 100.00
228 SWGR 312 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 800.00 65.00 *106.73
229 GE SS 17.03
230
231 SWGR 312 - MCC 3423 CB Fail SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 167.12 *69.37 (*N1) 100.00
232 SWGR 312 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 800.00 65.00 *106.73
233 GE SS 20.89
234
235 SWGR 312 CB - 993B Pass PVDB1 13800 25.77 28.76 89.03
236 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 31 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 71.89
237 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 2.15 66.44
E
238
239 SWGR 411 52-CH Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 172.20 11.92 81.89
240 SWGR 411 Bus 2R-26R 5080 200.00 50.00 23.84
L
241 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 9R 86.10 22.04
242
243 SWGR 411 52-CT Pass CLS-1, -2, -22, 2.8-5.08kV R-Rated 4160 28.23 11.92 81.89
244 SWGR 411 Bus 2R-26R 5080 100.00 50.00 23.84
P
245 CUTLER-HAMMER CLS, 3R 28.23 22.04
246
247 SWGR 411 52-M Pass VB1 4160 200.43 11.47 87.39
248 SWGR 411 52-M Bus 1200-4000A 4760 1200.00 33.18 (*N2) 34.57
249 GE VB1-4.16-250 16.70 30.94
M
250
251 SWGR 411 CB - 994A Pass PVDB1 13800 60.42 28.40 89.03
252 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 41 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 70.99
253 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 5.04 65.83
A
254
255 SWGR 411 Chiller Heater 4 XFMR Pass HLE & CLE, 5.5kV E-Rated 4160 0.00 11.92 75.64
256 SWGR 411 Bus 30E-450E 5500 200.00 63.00 18.92
S
257 CUTLER-HAMMER HLE, 200E 0.00 17.63
258
259 SWGR 412 - MCC 4121 CB Pass SS, SH PowerBreak II, MVT Plus/PM 480 436.60 33.05 (*N1) 100.00
260 SWGR 412 Bus LSI, 200-2000AS 480 1200.00 65.00 50.84
261 GE SS 36.38
262
263 SWGR 412 CB - 994B Pass PVDB1 13800 15.19 28.40 89.03
264 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 41 600-3000A 15500 1200.00 40.00 70.99
265 GE PVDB1-15.5-40000 (5 Cycle) 1.27 65.83
266
267
268 (*N1) System X/R higher than Test X/R, Calc INT kA modified based on low voltage factor.
269 ISIMISIMISIMSKM ISIM
270 (*Calc INT kA) Device did not pass. Device is either Marginal (90%) or Failed (100%) of the device library interrupting rating.
Page 5 of 5
Best Practices
40 cal/cm2 25 cal/cm2 8 cal/cm2 4 cal/cm2
PPE Min. Arc Rating PPE Min. Arc Rating PPE Min. Arc Rating PPE Min. Arc Rating for
Exposure
up to:
1cal/cm
.2 2
Rated Face Shield Rated Face Shield
with Rated Balaclava or
or
E
Rated Flash Hood
Head
Hard Hat Eye and Hearing
Protection
L
Safety Glasses/Goggles
Hearing Protection
Long sleeve Shirt
P
Rated long sleeve Shirt
2
& Rated Pants 2 Long Pants
40Rating
cal/cm
25Rating
cal/cm
Undergarments
Body
Arc or Arc
Rated Coverall ALL Clothing Made
of Nonmelting or
or Untreated Natural
M
Rated Arc Flash Suit Fiber
Heavy Duty Heavy Duty
Leather Gloves Leather Gloves
Hands
Rated Gloves
or or
A
Rubber Insulating Gloves
with Leather Protectors
EH Leather Work
Feet
S
Leather Work Shoes Shoes
e st ices Rated Undergarments
B ct DI/EH Work Shoes Dielectric Shoes
a
Pr Rated Hard Hat Liner • Working under powerlines
• High step-potential risk
Rated Jacket, Parka, or Rainwear • Wet conditions
P ersonal
Required by NFPA 70E
sure correct
d
be
e
Required, Choices Available
As Needed
Check to
you h
ave
-R at
Recommended Best Practice
Arc P rotective Taking the Flash Out of Electrical Safety
Are You Protected? E quipment for the task (502) 716-7073
e-Hazard.com
v1501 | © 2015 e-Hazard Management, LLC.
XYZ Grid 138kV Input
XYZ Grid 138kV Bus
Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 42166.22 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
Generator Unit 1 AF_IncidentEnergy 28376.45 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
AF_Boundary 2773.72 inches
AF_ArcingFault 42.166 kA
Utility Grid Disconnect SW 1
Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
Generator Bus Unit 1
Current Capability 1200.0 A
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
InitSymRMS 3P 19302.90 A Settings
XYZ
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 50.09 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
NOTE #2: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY AF_Boundary 1673.64 inches
Operation of the Generator CB is Dangerous; >40 calories/cm2. AF_ArcingFault 18.526 kA
CBL-0030
(1) 300 AWG 30.0 ft
2 Labels
The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
working distance from 36" to 48". This increase in working distance Open Generator CB Unit 1
would reduce the Incident Energy from 50 cal/cm2 to 38 cal/cm2 and Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of the Generator CB. Current Capability 3000.0 A Generator CB Unit 1 is shown
The AFB remains the same in either case.
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A de-energized (open) as the
Settings P
IE is higher on the SWGR 11 S
Transformer 1
bus when on the Utility Grid Nominal kVA 60000.0 kVA
E
Pri RatedVoltage 138000 V
Sec RatedVoltage 13800 V
Z% 9.3100 %
CBL-0001
(6) 750 AWG 110.0 ft
SWGR 11 - 13.8kV SWGR 11 - 13.8kV 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 11
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 26197.87 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
SWGR 112 CB - 991B AF_IncidentEnergy 68.22 Cal/cm^2
SWGR 111 CB - 991A Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V NOTE: Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 2299.19 inches
Current Capability 100.0 A
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
Black Start Generator is Out of Service Sensor/Trip 0.0 A AF_ArcingFault 25.014 kA
Settings
Settings and scheduled to be removed. Shown
here for completeness of the study. 4 Labels
SWGR 112 Relay
L
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
Current Capability 0.0 A
SWGR 111 Relay Settings NOTE #1: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 3.75 (75A) Operation of all the protective devices on the 13.8kV Bus is Dangerous;
Current Capability 0.0 A Inverse LT (0.5-10) 2 >40 calories/cm2.
Settings PU IOC (1-31 x TOC) 14 (1050A)
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.875 (472.5A) Black Start Generator IOC Delay (0-1.55 Sec.) 0.05
Inverse (0.5-10) 6.5 The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
PU IOC (1-31 x TOC) 8 (3780A) working distance from 36" to 63". This increase in working distance
IOC Delay (0-1.55 Sec.) 0.05
CBL-0002 would reduce the Incident Energy from 67 cal/cm2 to 39 cal/cm2 and
(1) 4/0 AWG 50.0 ft enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all the protective
CBL-0003
devices on the 13.8kV Bus. The AFB remains the same in either case.
(1) 4/0 AWG 70.0 ft
CBL-0036 P
(5) 500 AWG 80.0 ft XFMR 112 NOTE #3: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
S
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V Operation of all protective devices on SWGR 112 is Dangerous;
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V >40 calories/cm2.
P Z% 5.2600 %
S
XFMR 111
Nominal kVA 5000.0 kVA The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
P
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V Black Start Generator Bus
Sec RatedVoltage 4160 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V working distance from 18" to 36". This increase in working distance
Z% 5.5700 % InitSymRMS 3P 6681.00 A CBL-0053 would reduce the Incident Energy from 116 cal/cm2 to 37 cal/cm2 and
AF_TripTime 2.000 s (5) 500 AWG 80.0 ft enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all protective
AF_IncidentEnergy 28.99 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 4 devices on SWGR 112. The AFB remains the same in either case.
AF_Boundary 125.66 inches
AF_ArcingFault 4.646 kA
SWGR 111 52-M Bu s SWGR 112 - 480V SWGR 112 - 480V
SWGR 112 Bus
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V 4 Labels
InitSymRMS 3P 12021.32 A Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
AF_TripTime 1.917 s InitSymRMS 3P 67545.57 A
AF_IncidentEnergy 24.12 Cal/cm^2 AF_TripTime 1.917 s
Open
Black Start BS1 or BS2 CB SWGR 112 - MCC 1121 CB SWGR 112 - MCC 1122 CB SWGR 112 - MCC 1223 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 131.85 Cal/cm^2 See Unit 2 Model Drawing
AF_PPE Category 3
AF_Boundary 789.93 inches
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V SWGR 112 - MCC 1223 CB Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous! for Continuation
Current Capability 1600.0 A Current Capability 1600.0 A Current Capability 800.0 A is interlocked with Current Capability 800.0 A AF_Boundary 316.27 inches
AF_ArcingFault 11.631 kA
Sensor/Trip 1600.0 A Sensor/Trip 1600.0 A Sensor/Trip 800.0 A Sensor/Trip 800.0 A AF_ArcingFault 33.528 kA
Settings Settings Settings SWGR 212 - MCC 1223 CB Settings SWGR 212 - MCC 1223 CB Bus
2 Labels LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 1 (1600A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.65 (780A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.9 (720A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.8 (640A) Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 4 Labels
See Unit 3 Model Drawing See Unit 3 Model Drawing Only ONE closed at a time InitSymRMS 3P 29650.88 A
STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3.5 (5600A) STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 5 (3900A) STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 2.5 (1800A) for Continuation STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3 (1920A) AF_TripTime 0.050 s
for Continuation
SWGR 111 52-M STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t Off) STD (Min-Max) Int (I^2t On) STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On) STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On) AF_IncidentEnergy 2.87 Cal/cm^2
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V INST (1.5-15 x P) 14.5 (23200A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (18000A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (12000A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (12000A)
Current Capability 1200.0 A
IE at MCC 1223 is the same AF_PPE Category 1
MCC 3121A Bu s MCC 3122 Bus AF_Boundary 30.7 inches
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A from either source. AF_ArcingFault 16.595 kA
Settings Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 7497.02 A InitSymRMS 3P 50352.39 A
AF_TripTime 0.014 s AF_TripTime 0.050 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.23 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 4.68 Cal/cm^2
M
CBL-0008 CBL-0012
CBL-0034 CBL-0032 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 2
(2) 500 AWG 460.0 ft (2) 500 AWG 100.0 ft
(5) 500 AWG 5.0 ft (1) 2000 AWG 5.0 ft AF_Boundary 6.61 inches AF_Boundary 41.35 inches
SWGR 111 52-M Relay AF_ArcingFault 5.127 kA AF_ArcingFault 26.087 kA CBL-0028
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V (2) 500 AWG 100.0 ft
Current Capability 0.0 A
Settings
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 5.625 (1350A) Units 1 & 2 Common MCC
Inverse (0.5-10) 6
MCC 1223
MCC 1122 Main @ CT Bldg MCC 1223 MLO Bus
Black Start Gen Connection Pt
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V InitSymRMS 3P 17423.74 A InitSymRMS 3P 41705.92 A
CBL-0013 Black Start Gen Connection Point InitSymRMS 3P 67570.30 A AF_TripTime 0.172 s AF_TripTime 0.050 s
(2) 500 AWG 70.0 ft AF_TripTime 0.300 s AF_IncidentEnergy 5.84 Cal/cm^2 MCC 1223 Typ CW Pump CB MCC 1223 Typ Drive CB MCC 1223 LP12A & 12S CB AF_IncidentEnergy 3.93 Cal/cm^2
AF_IncidentEnergy 33.8 Cal/cm^2 AF_PPE Category 2 Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 1
AF_PPE Category 4 CBL-0011 AF_Boundary 47.33 inches CBL-0014 Current Capability 300.0 A Current Capability 30.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 37.19 inches
NOTE: AF_Boundary 137.99 inches (1) 600 AWG 8.0 ft AF_ArcingFault 10.537 kA (1) 800 AWG 8.0 ft Sensor/Trip 300.0 A Settings Sensor/Trip 100.0 A AF_ArcingFault 22.209 kA
Black Start Generator is Out of Service and AF_ArcingFault 33.538 kA Settings INST (90-300A) H (300A) Settings
schedule for removal at the time of this AF SWGR 112 - MCC 1122A Main CB 2 Labels
Thermal Curve (Fixed) Thermal Curve (Fixed)
6 Labels
study. It is included here for completeness. is interlocked with SWGR 112 - MCC 1122 Main CB INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (3000A) INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (1000A)
SWGR 111 - 4160V SWGR 312 - MCC 3122A Main CB is interlocked with
SWGR 111 Bus
If ever used, the IE at the BSGenerator SWGR 312 - MCC 3122 Main CB
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V connection point increases to 29 calories/cm2 and MCC 1122 Main CB
InitSymRMS 3P 11954.97 A and
and thus, requires PPE Level 4 for operation CB 1321A Tie Breaker Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
CBL-0022 CBL-0023
AF_TripTime 1.893 s CB 1322 Tie Breaker
A
SWGR 111 52-CT SWGR 111 52-CH SWGR 111 Chiller Heater 1 XFMR of devices on MCC 1121 and MCC 3121. Current Capability 800.0 A
AF_IncidentEnergy 23.68 Cal/cm^2 (2) 1/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 8 AWG 100.0 ft
Sensor/Trip 800.0 A CBL-0026
Open
Open
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
Current Capability 100.0 A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
Current Capability 200.0 A
AF_PPE Category 3
Labeling reflects the use of normal utility power. Only ONE Main CB closed at a time Settings (1) 2 AWG 5.0 ft
Current Capability 200.0 A AF_Boundary 775.14 inches CB 1321A Tie Breaker
Plug Adj (400-800A) 800A (800A) Only ONE Main CB closed at a time CB 1322 Tie Breaker
Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A AF_ArcingFault 11.568 kA
Settings Settings Nominal Voltage 480.0 V LTD (Fixed) Fixed Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Settings Current Capability 250.0 A STPU (2-8 x LTPU) 8 (6400A) Current Capability 800.0 A
100.0 Amps 200.0 Amps 200.0 Amps
5 Labels Sensor/Trip 250.0 A STD (Inst-300 ms) Inst (I^2t Off) Sensor/Trip 800.0 A
Settings INST (14000A) Fixed (14000A) Settings
MCC 1223 Typ CW Pump MCC 1223 Typ Drive/Heater
Thermal Curve (Fixed) Plug Adj (400-800A) 800A (800A) MCC 1223 LP12A & 12S XFR SW
CBL-0004 INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (2500A) LTD (Fixed) Fixed Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
STPU (2-8 x LTPU) 8 (6400A) InitSymRMS 3P 22805.71 A InitSymRMS 3P 3303.08 A Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
(3) 500 AWG 100.0 ft
SWGR 111 52-CT Relay SWGR 111 52-CH Relay XFMR - Chiller Heater 1 Relay STD (Inst-300 ms) Inst (I^2t Off) AF_TripTime 0.010 s AF_TripTime 0.015 s InitSymRMS 3P 37970.45 A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V INST (14000A) Fixed (14000A) AF_IncidentEnergy 0.47 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.11 Cal/cm^2 AF_TripTime 0.010 s
Current Capability 0.0 A Current Capability 0.0 A Current Capability 0.0 A AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.72 Cal/cm^2
Settings Settings Settings CBL-0019 AF_Boundary 10.21 inches AF_Boundary 4.29 inches AF_PPE Category 0
O/L PU 1.15 (115A) PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.5 (900A) LDPU 0.9 (180A) (1) 800 AWG 8.0 ft AF_ArcingFault 13.261 kA AF_ArcingFault 2.546 kA AF_Boundary 13.23 inches
O/L Curve 3 Inverse (0.5-10) 4 ANSI MOD 1 AF_ArcingFault 20.498 kA
SDPU 1.5 (300A) 4 Labels 16 Labels
SDT 1.0 2 Labels
INST 8 (1600A)
CBL-0016 CBL-0015
(1) 4 AWG 220.0 ft (1) 500 AWG 250.0 ft Cooling Tower MCC 1122 Typ Unit 1 CW Pump Drive Typ Unit 1 Drive
P MCC 1122 Bus Rated HP 125.0 hp Rated HP 10.0 hp CBL-0073
S
XFMR - Chiller Heater 1 MCC 1121 MCC 1121 RatedAmps 150.8 A RatedAmps 12.1 A (1) 2 AWG 50.0 ft
S
MCC 1121 Bus Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Nominal kVA 1000.0 kVA
InitSymRMS 3P 17272.02 A
Pri RatedVoltage 4160 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_TripTime 0.053 s
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V InitSymRMS 3P 48634.92 A
CT Pump 1 Bus Unit 1 Refrig Air Co mp ressors AF_IncidentEnergy 1.85 Cal/cm^2
Z% 5.9000 % AF_TripTime 0.300 s Typical for Unit 1 CW
MCC 1121 Typ 400A CB MCC 1121 Typ 200A CB MCC 1121 Typ 100A CB MCC 1121 LP1121 CB MCC 1122 LPCT CB MCC 1122 Typ CT Drive CB MCC 1122 Typ CT Fan CB AF_PPE Category 1 Typical for Unit 1 Drives & Heaters
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V AF_IncidentEnergy 25.14 Cal/cm^2 AF_Boundary 23.47 inches Pump Drives 1, 2, & 12
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 4 Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V and Air Comp resso r 12B
P
InitSymRMS 3P 10543.83 A InitSymRMS 3P 11484.11 A AF_ArcingFault 10.459 kA XFMR - MCC 1223 LP12A & 12S
Current Capability 600.0 A Current Capability 250.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 115.21 inches Current Capability 250.0 A Current Capability 30.0 A Current Capability 150.0 A S
AF_TripTime 0.004 s AF_TripTime 0.011 s Nominal kVA 45.0 kVA
Sensor/Trip 600.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 100.0 A AF_ArcingFault 25.325 kA Sensor/Trip 250.0 A Settings Settings
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.05 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.11 Cal/cm^2 Pri RatedVoltage 480 V
Settings Settings Settings Settings Settings INST (90-300A) H (300A) INST (750-2500A) H (2500A) 5 Labels
AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 Sec RatedVoltage 208 V
MAX MAX MAX MAX Thermal Curve (Fixed)
AF_Boundary 1.34 inches AF_Boundary 3.24 inches 10 Labels Z% 4.9800 %
AF_ArcingFault 10.224 kA AF_ArcingFault 9.452 kA Chiller Heater 1 Cabinet INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (2500A)
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
2 Labels 4 Labels InitSymRMS 3P 17044.52 A
AF_TripTime 1.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 36.73 Cal/cm^2
P CBL-0021 CBL-0020 CBL-0072
Cooling Tower Pump 1 Air Compressor 1A AF_PPE Category 4 CBL-0005 CBL-0006 CBL-0007 XFMR - LP1121 (1) 8 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 2/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 1/0 AWG 100.0 ft
Rated HP 200.0 hp Rated HP 1220.0 hp AF_Boundary 145.14 inches (2) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 2 AWG 100.0 ft
S
Nominal kVA 45.0 kVA MCC 1121 - MCC 1121A CB
RatedAmps 27.8 A RatedAmps 169.8 A AF_ArcingFault 10.341 kA Pri RatedVoltage 480 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V P
Current Capability 250.0 A XFMR - MCC 1122 LPCT
Sec RatedVoltage 208 V S
Nominal kVA 15.0 kVA
2 Labels Z% 4.7000 % Sensor/Trip 200.0 A
Settings Pri RatedVoltage 480 V MCC 1223 LP 12A & 12S Mains
Typical for both air MAX Sec RatedVoltage 208 V
Z% 5.2000 % Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
compressors
MCC 1122 Typ CT Drive MCC 1122 Typ CT Fan InitSymRMS 3P 1972.80 A
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_TripTime 2.000 s
LP1121 Main InitSymRMS 3P 3071.77 A InitSymRMS 3P 10884.30 A AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
MCC 1121 Typ 400A Load MCC 1121 Typ 200A Load MCC 1121 Typ 100A Load
AF_TripTime 0.015 s AF_TripTime 0.015 s AF_PPE Category 0
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 208.0 V AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
InitSymRMS 3P 30575.20 A InitSymRMS 3P 21659.38 A InitSymRMS 3P 11385.36 A InitSymRMS 3P 2596.19 A AF_IncidentEnergy 0.11 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.34 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_ArcingFault 1.391 kA
AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 2.000 s CBL-0009 MCC 1122 LPCT Main
AF_IncidentEnergy 1.48 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 1.07 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.59 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2 (1) 350 AWG 250.0 ft AF_Boundary 4.12 inches AF_Boundary 8.39 inches
Nominal Voltage 208.0 V AF_ArcingFault 2.393 kA AF_ArcingFault 7.050 kA 6 Labels
AF_PPE Category 1 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 InitSymRMS 3P 784.96 A
AF_Boundary 20.47 inches AF_Boundary 16.86 inches AF_Boundary 11.74 inches AF_Boundary 18.04 inches AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_ArcingFault 17.036 kA AF_ArcingFault 12.690 kA AF_ArcingFault 7.326 kA AF_ArcingFault 1.687 kA AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2 6 Labels 2 Labels Typical for LP 12A & 12S CBs
AF_PPE Category 0
8 Labels 8 Labels 8 Labels 4 Labels AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
AF_ArcingFault 0.728 kA
MCC 1121A Main @ Demin H2O Typ Unit 1 CT Drive Typ Unit 1 CT Fan Drive
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Rated HP 10.0 hp Rated HP 100.0 hp
4 Labels RatedAmps 12.1 A RatedAmps 120.6 A
Typical for SGLA type CB Typical for SFLA type CB Typical for SELA type CB Unit 1 & 2 - DT Manual XFR SW InitSymRMS 3P 13254.85 A
250A - 600A 150A - 250A 20A - 150A LP112 1 LP2121
AF_TripTime 0.025 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.68 Cal/cm^2 Typical for LPCT CBs
See Unit 2 Model Drawing
AF_PPE Category 0 Typical for Unit 1 CT Drives Typical for Unit 1 CT
for Continuation AF_Boundary 12.79 inches Fan Drives 1 & 2
MCC 1121 Typ 200hp Motor MCC 1121 Typ 100hp Motor MCC 1121 Typ 30hp Motor AF_ArcingFault 8.342 kA
Rated HP 200.0 hp Rated HP 125.0 hp Rated HP 30.0 hp
RatedAmps 241.2 A RatedAmps 150.8 A RatedAmps 36.2 A 6 Labels
Unit 1 & 2 - TIC Panel Main
Nominal Voltage 208.0 V MCC 1121A Main CB
InitSymRMS 3P 2596.19 A Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
AF_TripTime 2.000 s Current Capability 250.0 A
AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2 Sensor/Trip 250.0 A
AF_PPE Category 0 Settings
AF_Boundary 18.04 inches Thermal Curve (Fixed)
AF_ArcingFault 1.687 kA INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (2500A)
4 Labels
Supplies power to UPS Battery Charger
CBL-0010
4 Labels - 125VDC
PPE Level 0
(1) 600 AWG 8.0 ft
XYZ
Arc Flash Study - Unit 1 Model Drawing
Demin Water Building MCC 1121A MCC 1121A Bus
e-Hazard - Louisville, KY
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 13128.62 A J. D. Aeiker October 3, 2017 Rev. 0
AF_TripTime 0.011 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.31 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 0
AF_Boundary 7.92 inches
AF_ArcingFault 8.274 kA
10 480V Labels
4 208V Labels
Typical for Demin H2O MCC 1121A CBs
20A - 150A
XYZ
Generator Unit 2
XYZ Grid 138kV Bus
Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 42166.22 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 28376.45 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
AF_Boundary 2773.72 inches
AF_ArcingFault 42.166 kA
Generator Bus Unit 2
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 0.00 A Utility Grid Disconnect SW 2
AF_TripTime 2.000 s Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
AF_IncidentEnergy 50.09 Cal/cm^2 Current Capability 1200.0 A
AF_PPE Category Dangerous! Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
NOTE #2: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY AF_Boundary 1673.64 inches Settings
AF_ArcingFault 18.526 kA
Operation of the Generator CB is Dangerous; >40 calories/cm2.
2 Labels
The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the CBL-0029
working distance from 36" to 48". This increase in working distance (1) 300 AWG 30.0 ft
would reduce the Incident Energy from 50 cal/cm2 to 38 cal/cm2 and Open Generator CB Unit 2
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of the Generator CB. Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V Generator CB Unit 2 is shown
Current Capability 3000.0 A
The AFB remains the same in either case. Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
de-energized (open) as the
Settings IE is higher on the SWGR 21
E
P
bus when on the Utility Grid S
Transformer 2
Nominal kVA 60000.0 kVA
Pri RatedVoltage 138000 V
Sec RatedVoltage 13800 V
Z% 9.3200 %
CBL-0024
(6) 750 AWG 110.0 ft
SWGR 21 - 13.8kV SWGR 21 - 13.8kV 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 21
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 25716.73 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
SWGR 212 CB - 992B AF_IncidentEnergy 66.86 Cal/cm^2
L
SWGR 211 CB - 992A Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 2252.07 inches
Current Capability 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 0.0 A AF_ArcingFault 24.562 kA
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Settings
Settings
4 Labels
SWGR 212 Relay
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
Current Capability 0.0 A
SWGR 211 Relay Settings NOTE #1: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 3.75 (75A) Operation of all the protective devices on the 13.8kV Bus is Dangerous;
Current Capability 0.0 A Inverse LT (0.5-10) 2 >40 calories/cm2.
Settings PU IOC (1-31 x TOC) 14 (1050A)
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.875 (472.5A) IOC Delay (0-1.55 Sec.) 0.05
Inverse (0.5-10) 6.5 The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
P
PU IOC (1-31 x TOC) 8 (3780A) working distance from 36" to 63". This increase in working distance
IOC Delay (0-1.55 Sec.) 0.05 CBL-0018
(1) 4/0 AWG 50.0 ft would reduce the Incident Energy from 67 cal/cm2 to 39 cal/cm2 and
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all the protective
CBL-0017
devices on the 13.8kV Bus. The AFB remains the same in either case.
(1) 4/0 AWG 70.0 ft
P
XFMR 212
NOTE #3: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
S
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA Operation of all protective devices on SWGR 212 is Dangerous;
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V >40 calories/cm2.
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V
P Z% 5.3600 %
S
XFMR 211 The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
Nominal kVA 5000.0 kVA
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V working distance from 18" to 36". This increase in working distance
Sec RatedVoltage 4160 V would reduce the Incident Energy from 114 cal/cm2 to 37 cal/cm2 and
Z% 5.5900 % CBL-0054
(5) 500 AWG 80.0 ft
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all protective
devices on SWGR 212. The AFB remains the same in either case.
M
SWGR 212 - 480V SWGR 212 Bus
SWGR 211 52-M Bus Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 31850.09 A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V AF_TripTime 1.917 s
InitSymRMS 3P 11961.81 A SWGR 212 - MCC 2121 CB Open SWGR 212 - MCC 1223 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 114.23 Cal/cm^2
AF_TripTime 1.917 s Nominal Voltage 480.0 V SWGR 112 - MCC 1223 CB Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
AF_IncidentEnergy 23.98 Cal/cm^2 Current Capability 1600.0 A Current Capability 800.0 A
AF_PPE Category 3 Sensor/Trip 1600.0 A
is interlocked with Sensor/Trip 800. 0 A
AF_Boundary 289.8 inches
AF_ArcingFault 17.641 kA
AF_Boundary 785.2 inches Settings SWGR 212 - MCC 1223 CB Settings
AF_ArcingFault 11.574 kA LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.65 (780A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.8 (640A)
LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 4 Labels
STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3.5 (2730A) Only ONE closed at a time STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3 (1920A)
STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On) STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On)
INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (18000A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (12000A)
IE at MCC 1223 is the same
SWGR 211 52-M from either source.
A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
Current Capability 1200.0 A
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
Settings
CBL-0035 CBL-0033
(3) 500 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 800 AWG 5.0 ft
SWGR 211 52-M Relay
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
Current Capability 0.0 A
Settings
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 5.625 (1350A) SWGR 212 - MCC 1223 CB Bus
Inverse (0.5-10) 6 Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
MCC 2121 MCC 2121 MCC 2121 Bus InitSymRMS 3P 29650.88 A
S
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_TripTime 0.050 s
InitSymRMS 3P 27315.17 A AF_IncidentEnergy 2.87 Cal/cm^2
CBL-0031 AF_TripTime 0.172 s AF_PPE Category 1
(2) 500 AWG 70.0 ft MCC 2121 Typ 400A CB MCC 2121 Typ 200A CB MCC 2121 Typ 100A CB MCC 2121 LP2121 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 8.76 Cal/cm^2 AF_Boundary 30.7 inches
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 3 AF_ArcingFault 16.595 kA
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 60.58 inches
Sensor/Trip 600. 0 A Sensor/Trip 200. 0 A Sensor/Trip 100. 0 A Sensor/Trip 100. 0 A AF_ArcingFault 15.471 kA
Settings Settings Settings Settings See Unit 1 Model Drawing
MAX MAX MAX MAX for Continuation
8 Labels
SWGR 211 - 4160V SWGR 211 Bus
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 11896.21 A P
AF_TripTime 1.899 s CBL-0041 CBL-0040 CBL-0039 XFMR - LP2121
S
SWGR 211 52-CT SWGR 211 52-CH SWGR 211 Chiller Heater 2 XFMR AF_IncidentEnergy 23.61 Cal/cm^2 (2) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 2 AWG 100.0 ft Nominal kVA 45.0 kVA
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V AF_PPE Category 3 Pri RatedVoltage 480 V
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 200.0 A AF_Boundary 772.58 inches Sec RatedVoltage 208 V
Sensor/Trip 100. 0 A Sensor/Trip 200. 0 A Sensor/Trip 200. 0 A AF_ArcingFault 11.512 kA Z% 4.7000 %
Settings Settings Settings
100.0 Amps 200.0 Amps 200.0 Amps
6 Labels
MCC 2121 Typ 400A Load MCC 2121 Typ 200A Load MCC 2121 Typ 100A Load LP2121 Main
XFMR - Chiller Heater 2 Relay Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
SWGR 211 52-CT Relay SWGR 211 52-CH Relay Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V InitSymRMS 3P 21018.92 A InitSymRMS 3P 16594.98 A InitSymRMS 3P 10197.37 A InitSymRMS 3P 2550.57 A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Current Capability 0.0 A AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 2.000 s
Current Capability 0.0 A Current Capability 0.0 A Settings AF_IncidentEnergy 1.04 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.84 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.54 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
Settings Settings LDPU 0.9 (180A) AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0
O/L PU 1.15 (115A) PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.5 (900A) ANSI MOD 1 AF_Boundary 16.58 inches AF_Boundary 14.52 inches AF_Boundary 11.04 inches AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
O/L Curve 3 Inverse (0.5-10) 5 SDPU 1.5 (300A) AF_ArcingFault 12.369 kA AF_ArcingFault 10.108 kA AF_ArcingFault 6.668 kA AF_ArcingFault 1.666 kA
SDT 1.0
INST 8 (1600A) 8 Labels 8 Labels 8 Labels 4 Labels
CBL-0025 CBL-0027
(1) 4 AWG 220.0 ft (1) 500 AWG 250.0 ft LP1121 LP2121
Typical for SGLA type CB Typical for SFLA type CB Typical for SELA type CB
P 250A - 600A 150A - 250A 20A - 150A
XFMR - Chiller Heater 2 Unit 1 & 2 - DT Manual XFR SW
S
Nominal kVA 1000.0 kVA
CT Pump 2 Bus Unit 2 Refrig Air Compressors Pri RatedVoltage 4160 V See Unit 1 Model Drawing
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V MCC 2121 Typ 200hp Motor MCC 2121 Typ 100hp Motor MCC 2121 Typ 30hp Motor
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V for Continuation
Z% 5.8200 % Rated HP 200.0 hp Rated HP 125.0 hp
InitSymRMS 3P 10501.54 A InitSymRMS 3P 11430.48 A Rated HP 30.0 hp
RatedAmps 241.2 A RatedAmps 150.8 A RatedAmps 36.2 A
AF_TripTime 0.004 s AF_TripTime 0.011 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.05 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.12 Cal/cm^2
XYZ
AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 Unit 1 & 2 - TIC Panel Main
AF_Boundary 1.33 inches AF_Boundary 3.27 inches
AF_ArcingFault 10.184 kA AF_ArcingFault 9.408 kA Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 2596.19 A
2 Labels 4 Labels
Chiller Heater 2 Cabinet
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
Arc Flash Study - Unit 2 Model
AF_PPE Category 0
Cooling Tower Pump 2 Air Compressor 2A
InitSymRMS 3P 17225.91 A
AF_TripTime 1.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 37.07 Cal/cm^2
AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
AF_ArcingFault 1.687 kA
Drawing e-Hazard - Louisville, KY
Rated HP 200.0 hp
RatedAmps 27.8 A
Rated HP 1220.0 hp
RatedAmps 169.8 A
AF_PPE Category 4
AF_Boundary 145.98 inches
AF_ArcingFault 10.435 kA
Supplies power to UPS Battery Charger J. D. Aeiker October 3, 2017 Rev. 0
4 Labels - 125VDC
Typical for both air 2 Labels PPE Level 0
compressors
XYZ Grid 138kV Bus
Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 42166.22 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 28376.45 Cal/cm^2
Generator Unit 3 AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
XYZ
AF_Boundary 2773.72 inches
AF_ArcingFault 42.166 kA
Utility Grid Disconnect SW 3
Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
Current Capability 100.0 A
Generator Bus Unit 3 Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
Settings
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 0.00 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 50.09 Cal/cm^2
NOTE #2: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
Operation of the Generator CB is Dangerous; >40 calories/cm2. AF_Boundary 1673.64 inches
AF_ArcingFault 18.526 kA CBL-0058
(1) 300 AWG 30.0 ft
The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the 2 Labels
working distance from 36" to 48". This increase in working distance
would reduce the Incident Energy from 50 cal/cm2 to 38 cal/cm2 and Open Generator CB Unit 3
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of the Generator CB. Current Capability 3000.0 A Generator CB Unit 3 is shown
The AFB remains the same in either case. Sensor/Trip 0. 0 A de-energized (open) as the P
Settings Transformer 3
IE is higher on the SWGR 31 S
Nominal kVA 60000.0 kVA
bus when on the Utility Grid Pri RatedVoltage 138000 V
Sec RatedVoltage 13800 V
Z% 9.3400 %
CBL-0057
E
(1) 3000 AWG 10.0 ft
SWGR 31 - 13.8kV SWGR 31 - 13.8kV 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 31
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 26120.71 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
SWGR 312 CB - 993B AF_IncidentEnergy 68.01 Cal/cm^2
SWGR 311 CB - 993A Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 2291.77 inches
Current Capability 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 0.0 A AF_ArcingFault 24.941 kA
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Settings
Settings
4 Labels
SWGR 312 Relay NOTE #1: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
SWGR 311 Relay
L
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V Current Capability 0.0 A Operation of all the protective devices on the 13.8kV Bus is Dangerous;
Current Capability 0.0 A Settings >40 calories/cm2.
Settings PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 3.75 (75A)
PU TOC (1. 5-13.125A) 7. 875 (472. 5A ) Inverse LT (0.5-10) 2
Inverse (0.5-10) 6.5 The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
PU IOC (1-31 x TOC ) 8 (3780A) working distance from 36" to 63". This increase in working distance
Def. Time, 8 Sec. 8
would reduce the Incident Energy from 67 cal/cm2 to 39 cal/cm2 and
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all the protective
CBL-0056 devices on the 13.8kV Bus. The AFB remains the same in either case.
CBL-0055 (1) 4/0 AWG 50.0 ft
(1) 4/0 AWG 70.0 ft
P XFMR 312
S
XFMR 311 S
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA NOTE #3: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
Nominal kVA 5000.0 kVA Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V Operation of all protective devices on SWGR 312 is Dangerous;
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V
Sec RatedVoltage 4160 V >40 calories/cm2.
P
Z% 5.3000 %
Z% 5.5500 %
The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
working distance from 18" to 38". This increase in working distance
CBL-0066 would reduce the Incident Energy from 126 cal/cm2 to 37 cal/cm2 and
(5) 500 AWG 80.0 ft enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all protective
SWGR 11 52-M Bus devices on SWGR 312. The AFB remains the same in either case.
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 12051.42 A
AF_TripTime 1.917 s SWGR 312 - 480V SWGR 312 - 480V SWGR 312 Bus
AF_IncidentEnergy 24.19 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 3 Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
AF_Boundary 792.31 inches InitSymRMS 3P 67543.27 A
AF_ArcingFault 11.660 kA AF_TripTime 1.917 s
SWGR 312 - MCC 3121 CB SWGR 312 - MCC 3122 CB SWGR 312 - MCC 3423 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 131.24 Cal/cm^2
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V SWGR 312 - MCC 3423 CB Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
Current Capability 1600.0 A Current Capability 800.0 A Current Capability 800.0 A
Sensor/Trip 1600.0 A Sensor/Trip 800.0 A
is interlocked with Sensor/Trip 800.0 A
AF_Boundary 315.38 inches See Unit 4 Model Drawing
AF_ArcingFault 33.527 kA for Continuation
Settings Settings SWGR 412 - MCC 3423 CB Settings
SWGR 311 52-M LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.65 (780A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.9 (720A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.8 (640A)
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 4 Labels
Only ONE closed at a time SWGR 412 - MCC 3423 CB Bus
Current Capability 1200.0 A STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 5 (3900A) STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 9 (6480A) STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3 (1920A)
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A STD (Min-Max) Int (I^2t On) STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On) STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On) Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Settings INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (18000A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 14 (11200A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (12000A) InitSymRMS 3P 29650.35 A
IE at MCC 3423 is the same AF_TripTime 0.050 s
from either source. AF_IncidentEnergy 2.87 Cal/cm^2
M
AF_PPE Category 1
AF_Boundary 30.7 inches
AF_ArcingFault 16.594 kA
SWGR 311 52-M Relay
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V CBL-0064 CBL-0063
Current Capability 0.0 A (2) 500 AWG 50.0 ft (2) 500 AWG 100.0 ft
CBL-0083
Settings (1) 2000 AWG 5.0 ft CBL-0062
PU TOC (1. 5-13.125A) 5. 625 (1350A) (2) 500 AWG 100.0 ft
Inverse (0.5-10) 6
NOTE: Black Start Generator Connection Point; Units 3 & 4 Common MCC
(See Unit 1 Model Drawing for Generator)
MCC 3423
CBL-0059 MCC 3122 Main @ CT Bldg MCC 3423 MLO Bus
(2) 500 AWG 70.0 ft Black Start Gen Connection Pt Black Start Generator is Out of Service and
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
schedule for removal at the time of this AF
InitSymRMS 3P 67570.30 A InitSymRMS 3P 51582.86 A InitSymRMS 3P 41704.94 A
study. It is included here for completeness. AF_TripTime 0.050 s AF_TripTime 0.050 s
AF_TripTime 0.300 s MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S CB
AF_IncidentEnergy 4.78 Cal/cm^2 MCC 3423 Typ CW Pump CB MCC 3423 Typ Drive CB AF_IncidentEnergy 3.93 Cal/cm^2
AF_IncidentEnergy 33.8 Cal/cm^2
If ever used, the IE at the BSGenerator AF_PPE Category 2 Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 1
AF_PPE Category 4
connection point increases to 29 calories/cm2 AF_Boundary 41.92 inches Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 37.19 inches
AF_Boundary 137.99 inches
and thus, requires PPE Level 4 for operation AF_ArcingFault 26.631 kA Sensor/Trip 300.0 A Settings Sensor/Trip 100.0 A AF_ArcingFault 22.209 kA
AF_ArcingFault 33.538 kA
of devices on MCC 1121 and MCC 3121. Settings INST (90-300A) H (300A) Settings
SWGR 311 - 4160V SWGR 311 Bus Thermal Curve (Fixed) Thermal Curve (Fixed)
INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (3000A) 6 Labels
INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (1000A)
A
Labeling reflects the use of normal utility power.
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 11984.69 A MCC 3122 Main CB
AF_TripTime 1.891 s Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
SWGR 311 52-CT SWGR 311 52-CH SWGR 311 Chiller Heater 3 XFMR AF_IncidentEnergy 23.72 Cal/cm^2 Current Capability 800.0 A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V AF_PPE Category 3 Sensor/Trip 800.0 A
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 200.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 776.41 inches Settings
Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A AF_ArcingFault 11.596 kA CBL-0065 CBL-0069 CBL-0068
LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.9 (720A)
Settings Settings Settings (3) 500 AWG 50.0 ft (2) 1/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 8 AWG 100.0 ft
LTD (1-4) 1 CBL-0067
100.0 Amps 200.0 Amps 200.0 Amps
6 Labels STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 9 (6480A) (1) 2 AWG 5.0 ft
STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On)
INST (1.5-15 x P) 14 (11200A)
SWGR 311 52-CT Relay SWGR 311 52-CH Relay XFMR - Chiller Heater 3 Relay MCC 3423 Typ CW Pump MCC 3423 Typ Drive/Heater
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S XFR SW
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Current Capability 0.0 A Current Capability 0.0 A Current Capability 0.0 A InitSymRMS 3P 22805.35 A InitSymRMS 3P 3303.07 A Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Settings Settings Settings MCC 3121 MCC 3121 MCC 3121 Bus CBL-0081 InitSymRMS 3P 37969.57 A
AF_TripTime 0.010 s AF_TripTime 0.015 s
O/L PU 1.15 (115A) PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.5 (900A) LDPU 0.9 (180A) (1) 800 AWG 8.0 ft AF_IncidentEnergy 0.47 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.11 Cal/cm^2 AF_TripTime 0.010 s
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
O/L Curv e 3 Inverse (0.5-10) 4.5 ANSI MOD 1 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.72 Cal/cm^2
InitSymRMS 3P 56582.68 A
SDPU 1.5 (300A) AF_TripTime 0.300 s AF_Boundary 10.21 inches AF_Boundary 4.29 inches AF_PPE Category 0
S
SDT 1.0 MCC 3121 Typ 400A CB MCC 3121 Typ 200A CB MCC 3121 Typ 100A CB MCC 3121 LP3121 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 28.84 Cal/cm^2 AF_ArcingFault 13.261 kA AF_ArcingFault 2.546 kA AF_Boundary 13.23 inches
INST 8 (1600A) Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V See Unit 1 Model Drawing AF_ArcingFault 20.498 kA
AF_PPE Category 4
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A for Continuation to CB 1322
CBL-0061 CBL-0060 AF_Boundary 125.26 inches 4 Labels 16 Labels
Sensor/Trip 600.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Tie Breaker 2 Labels
(1) 4 AWG 220.0 ft (1) 500 AWG 250.0 ft
Settings Settings Settings Settings
AF_ArcingFault 28.821 kA Cooling Tower MCC 3122 MCC 3122 Bus
P MAX MAX MAX MAX Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
XFMR - Chiller Heater 3 10 Labels
S
Nominal kVA 1000.0 kVA InitSymRMS 3P 50352.39 A Typ Unit 3 CW Pump Drive Typ Unit 3 Drive
Pri RatedVoltage 4160 V AF_TripTime 0.050 s Rated HP 125.0 hp Rated HP 10.0 hp CBL-0070
CT Pump 3 Bus Unit 3 Refrig Air Compressors AF_IncidentEnergy 4.68 Cal/cm^2 (1) 2 AWG 50.0 ft
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V RatedAmps 150.8 A RatedAmps 12.1 A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Z% 5.9000 % MCC 3122 Chem Bldg LP CB MCC 3122 Typ CT Drive CB MCC 3122 Typ CT Fan CB AF_PPE Category 2
InitSymRMS 3P 10565.85 A InitSymRMS 3P 11511.30 A Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_Boundary 41.35 inches
AF_TripTime 0.004 s AF_TripTime 0.011 s P
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_ArcingFault 26.087 kA
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.05 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.11 Cal/cm^2 CBL-0078 CBL-0077 CBL-0076 XFMR - LP3121 Typical for Unit 1 CW
S
MCC 3121 - MCC 3121A CB Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Settings Settings Typical for Unit 3 Drives & Heaters
AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 (2) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 2 AWG 100.0 ft Nominal kVA 45.0 kVA Pump Drives 3, 4, & 34
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Settings INST (90-300A) H (300A) INST (750-2500A) H (2500A) 5 Labels
AF_Boundary 1.34 inches AF_Boundary 3.23 inches Pri RatedVoltage 480 V and Air Compressor 34B
Sec RatedVoltage 208 V Current Capability 250.0 A Thermal Curve (Fixed) P
AF_ArcingFault 10.245 kA AF_ArcingFault 9.474 kA XFMR - MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S
Z% 4.7000 % Sensor/Trip 250.0 A INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (1000A) S
Nominal kVA 45.0 kVA
Chiller Heater 3 Cabinet Settings
2 Labels 4 Labels Pri RatedVoltage 480 V
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V MAX Sec RatedVoltage 208 V
InitSymRMS 3P 17051.46 A Z% 4.9800 %
AF_TripTime 1.000 s
Cooling Tower Pump 3 Air Compressor 3A AF_IncidentEnergy 36.74 Cal/cm^2 CBL-0079 CBL-0080
Rated HP 200.0 hp Rated HP 1220.0 hp MCC 3121 Typ 400A Load MCC 3121 Typ 200A Load MCC 3121 Typ 100A Load LP3121 Main (1) 8 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 2/0 AWG 100.0 ft
AF_PPE Category 4
RatedAmps 27.8 A RatedAmps 169.8 A AF_Boundary 145.18 inches Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
AF_ArcingFault 10.345 kA InitSymRMS 3P 33574.09 A InitSymRMS 3P 23099.21 A InitSymRMS 3P 11719.51 A InitSymRMS 3P 2604.80 A CBL-0082 CBL-0071
AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 2.000 s CBL-0075 (1) 6 AWG 60.0 ft (1) 1/0 AWG 100.0 ft
AF_IncidentEnergy 1.61 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 1.14 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.61 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2 (1) 350 AWG 520.0 ft
2 Labels
Typical for both air AF_PPE Category 1 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0
compressors AF_Boundary 21.58 inches AF_Boundary 17.48 inches AF_Boundary 11.93 inches AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
AF_ArcingFault 18.453 kA AF_ArcingFault 13.407 kA AF_ArcingFault 7.509 kA AF_ArcingFault 1.691 kA MCC 3122 Typ CT Drive MCC 3122 Typ CT Fan
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
8 Labels 8 Labels 8 Labels 4 Labels InitSymRMS 3P 3330.56 A InitSymRMS 3P 17938.22 A MCC 3423 LP34A & 34S Mains
P AF_TripTime 0.015 s AF_TripTime 0.015 s Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
MCC 3121A Main @ Demin H2O XFMR - MCC 3122 Chem Bldg AF_IncidentEnergy 0.11 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.54 Cal/cm^2
S
Nominal kVA 25.0 kVA InitSymRMS 3P 1972.80 A
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_TripTime 2.000 s
Typical for SGLA type CB Typical for SFLA type C B Typical for SELA type CB InitSymRMS 3P 7538.56 A Pri RatedVoltage 480 V AF_Boundary 4.31 inches AF_Boundary 11.11 inches
Sec RatedVoltage 208 V AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
250A - 600A 150A - 250A 20A - 150A AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_ArcingFault 2.564 kA AF_ArcingFault 10.803 kA AF_PPE Category 0
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.41 Cal/cm^2 Z% 1.8000 %
AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
LP3121 LP4121 AF_PPE Category 0 6 Labels 2 Labels AF_ArcingFault 1.391 kA
AF_Boundary 9.31 inches
MCC 3121 Typ 200hp Motor MCC 3121 Typ 100hp Motor MCC 3121 Typ 30hp Motor Unit 3 & 4 - DT Manual XFR SW AF_ArcingFault 5.151 kA
Rated HP 200.0 hp Rated HP 125.0 hp 6 Labels
Rated HP 30.0 hp
RatedAmps 241.2 A RatedAmps 150.8 A RatedAmps 36.2 A See Unit 4 Model Drawing 6 Labels Typ Unit 3 CT Drive Typ Unit 3 CT Fan Drive
for Continuation MCC 3122 Chem Bldg LP Main Rated HP 10.0 hp Rated HP 100.0 hp Typical for LP 34A & 34S CBs
Nominal Voltage 208.0 V RatedAmps 12.1 A RatedAmps 120.6 A
InitSymRMS 3P 3402.86 A
MCC 3121A Main CB AF_TripTime 2.000 s
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
Unit 3 & 4 - TIC Panel Main Typical for Unit 3 CT Drives Typical for Unit 3 CT
Current Capability 100.0 A AF_PPE Category 0
Nominal Voltage 208.0 V Sensor/Trip 250.0 A AF_Boundary 18.04 inches Fan Drives 3, 4, & 5
InitSymRMS 3P 2604.80 A Settings AF_ArcingFault 2.040 kA
AF_TripTime 2.000 s Thermal Curve (Fixed)
AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2 INST (5-10 x Trip) 10 (2500A) 4 Labels
AF_PPE Category 0
AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
AF_ArcingFault 1.691 kA Typical for Chem Bldg LP CBs
Supplies power to UPS Battery Charger
CBL-0074
4 Labels - 125VDC (1) 600 AWG 8.0 ft
PPE Level 0
Demin Water Building MCC 3121A MCC 3121A Bus
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
See Unit 1 Model Drawing InitSymRMS 3P 7497.02 A
for Continuation to CB 1321A AF_TripTime 0.014 s
XYZ
Tie Breaker AF_IncidentEnergy 0.23 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 0
AF_Boundary 6.61 inches
AF_ArcingFault 5.127 kA
10 480V Labels
Arc Flash Study - Unit 3 Model Drawing
4 208V Labels
e-Hazard - Louisville, KY
Typical for Demin H2O MCC 3121A CBs
20A - 150A
J. D. Aeiker October 3, 2017 Rev. 0
Generator Unit 4
XYZ Grid 138kV Bus
Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
XYZ
InitSymRMS 3P 42166.22 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 28376.45 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
AF_Boundary 2773.72 inches
AF_ArcingFault 42.166 kA
Generator Bus Unit 4
city, state
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 0.00 A Utility Grid Disconnect SW 4
AF_TripTime 2.000 s Nominal Voltage 138000.0 V
AF_IncidentEnergy 50.09 Cal/cm^2 Current Capability 100.0 A
AF_PPE Category Dangerous! Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
NOTE #2: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY AF_Boundary 1673.64 inches Settings
AF_ArcingFault 18.526 kA
Operation of the Generator CB is Dangerous; >40 calories/cm2.
2 Labels
The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the CBL-0037
working distance from 36" to 48". This increase in working distance (1) 300 AWG 30.0 ft
would reduce the Incident Energy from 50 cal/cm2 to 38 cal/cm2 and Open Generator CB Unit 4 Generator CB Unit 4 is shown
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of the Generator CB. Current Capability 3000.0 A de-energized (open) as the
The AFB remains the same in either case. Sensor/Trip 0.0 A IE is higher on the SWGR 41
Settings
bus when on the Utility Grid P
E
S
Transformer 4
Nominal kVA 60000.0 kVA
Pri RatedVoltage 138000 V
Sec RatedVoltage 13800 V
Z% 9.3200 %
CBL-0038
(6) 750 AWG 110.0 ft
SWGR 41 - 13.8kV SWGR 41 - 13.8kV 13.8kV Bus - SWGR 41
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 25716.65 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
SWGR 412 CB - 994B AF_IncidentEnergy 66.86 Cal/cm^2
L
SWGR 411 CB - 994A Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V AF_PPE Category Dangerous!
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V Current Capability 1200.0 A AF_Boundary 2252.07 inches
Current Capability 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 0.0 A AF_ArcingFault 24.562 kA
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A Settings
Settings
4 Labels
SWGR 412 Relay
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
SWGR 411 Relay NOTE #1: DANGEROUS!! VERY HIGH INCIDENT ENERGY
Current Capability 0.0 A
Nominal Voltage 13800.0 V
Current Capability 0.0 A
Settings Operation of all the protective devices on the 13.8kV Bus is Dangerous;
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 2.625 (52.5A)
Settings Inverse (0.5-10) 2 >40 calories/cm2.
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.875 (472.5A)
Inverse (0.5-10) 4
PU IOC (1-31 x TOC) 20 (9450A) The DANGEROUS Level may be mitigated by increasing the
P
IOC Delay (0-1.55 Sec.) 0.45 CBL-0051 working distance from 36" to 63". This increase in working distance
(1) 4/0 AWG 50.0 ft would reduce the Incident Energy from 67 cal/cm2 to 39 cal/cm2 and
enable the use of AF PPE Level 4 for operation of all the protective
CBL-0045 devices on the 13.8kV Bus. The AFB remains the same in either case.
(1) 4/0 AWG 70.0 ft
P
XFMR 412
S
Nominal kVA 1500.0 kVA
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V
Sec RatedVoltage 480 V
P Z% 5.2900 %
S
XFMR 411
Nominal kVA 5000.0 kVA
Pri RatedVoltage 13800 V
Sec RatedVoltage 4160 V
Z% 5.6200 %
CBL-0052
(5) 500 AWG 80.0 ft
M
SWGR 412 - 480V SWGR 412 Bus
SWGR 411 52-M Bus
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V InitSymRMS 3P 32189.22 A
InitSymRMS 3P 11911.59 A AF_TripTime 0.546 s
AF_TripTime 1.377 s SWGR 412 - MCC 4121 CB Open SWGR 412 - MCC 3423 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 36.54 Cal/cm^2
AF_IncidentEnergy 17.45 Cal/cm^2 Nominal Voltage 480.0 V SWGR 312 - MCC 3423 CB Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 4
AF_PPE Category 3 Current Capability 1600.0 A Current Capability 800.0 A
AF_Boundary 566.29 inches Sensor/Trip 1600.0 A
is interlocked with Sensor/Trip 800.0 A
AF_Boundary 144.7 inches
AF_ArcingFault 17.801 kA
AF_ArcingFault 11.527 kA Settings SWGR 412 - MCC 3423 CB Settings
LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.65 (780A) LTPU (0.5-1.0 x P) 0.8 (640A)
LTD (1-4) 1 LTD (1-4) 1 4 Labels
STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3.5 (2730A) Only ONE closed at a time STPU (1.5-9 x LTPU) 3 (1920A)
STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On) STD (Min-Max) Min (I^2t On)
INST (1.5-15 x P) 14 (16800A) INST (1.5-15 x P) 15 (12000A)
SWGR 411 52-M IE at MCC 3423 is the same
A
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V from either source.
Current Capability 1200.0 A
Sensor/Trip 0.0 A
Settings
CBL-0049 CBL-0050
(3) 500 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 800 AWG 5.0 ft
SWGR 411 52-M Relay
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
Current Capability 0.0 A
Settings
PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 5.625 (1350A)
Inverse (0.5-10) 6 SWGR 412 - MCC 3423 CB Bus
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
MCC 4121 MCC 4121 MCC 4121 Bus InitSymRMS 3P 29650.35 A
S
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_TripTime 0.050 s
InitSymRMS 3P 27555.71 A AF_IncidentEnergy 2.87 Cal/cm^2
CBL-0042
AF_TripTime 0.172 s AF_PPE Category 1
(2) 500 AWG 70.0 ft AF_Boundary 30.7 inches
MCC 4121 Typ 400A CB MCC 4121 Typ 200A CB MCC 4121 Typ 100A CB MCC 4121 LP4121 CB AF_IncidentEnergy 8.83 Cal/cm^2
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V AF_PPE Category 3 AF_ArcingFault 16.594 kA
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 60.89 inches
Sensor/Trip 600.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 100.0 A AF_ArcingFault 15.588 kA
Settings Settings Settings Settings See Unit 3 Model Drawing
MAX MAX MAX MAX for Continuation
8 Labels
SWGR 411 - 4160V SWGR 411 Bus
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 11846.60 A
AF_TripTime 1.382 s P
SWGR 411 52-CT SWGR 411 52-CH SWGR 411 Chiller Heater 4 XFMR AF_IncidentEnergy 17.4 Cal/cm^2 CBL-0046 CBL-0047 CBL-0048 XFMR - LP4121
S
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V AF_PPE Category 3 (2) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 4/0 AWG 100.0 ft (1) 2 AWG 100.0 ft Nominal kVA 45.0 kVA
Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A Current Capability 100.0 A AF_Boundary 564.49 inches Pri RatedVoltage 480 V
Sensor/Trip 100.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A Sensor/Trip 200.0 A AF_ArcingFault 11.465 kA Sec RatedVoltage 208 V
Settings Settings Settings Z% 4.7000 %
100.0 Amps 200.0 Amps 200.0 Amps
6 Labels
MCC 4121 Typ 400A L oad MCC 4121 Typ 200A L oad MCC 4121 Typ 100A L oad LP4121 Main
SWGR 411 52-CT Relay SWGR 411 52-CH Relay Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 480.0 V Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V XFMR - Chiller Heater 4 Relay InitSymRMS 3P 21151.49 A InitSymRMS 3P 16673.40 A InitSymRMS 3P 10219.24 A InitSymRMS 3P 2551.46 A
Current Capability 0.0 A Current Capability 0.0 A Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 0.025 s AF_TripTime 2.000 s
Settings Settings Current Capability 0.0 A AF_IncidentEnergy 1.05 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.84 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.54 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
O/L PU 1.15 (115A) PU TOC (1.5-13.125A) 7.5 (900A) Settings AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0
O/L Curve 3 Inverse (0.5-10) 4.5 LDPU 0.9 (180A) AF_Boundary 16.64 inches AF_Boundary 14.55 inches AF_Boundary 11.05 inches AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
ANSI MOD 1 AF_ArcingFault 12.435 kA AF_ArcingFault 10.148 kA AF_ArcingFault 6.680 kA AF_ArcingFault 1.667 kA
SDPU 1.5 (300A)
SDT 1.0 8 Labels 8 Labels 8 Labels 4 Labels
INST 8 (1600A)
CBL-0044 CBL-0043
(1) 4 AWG 220.0 ft (1) 500 AWG 250.0 ft LP3121 LP4121
Typical for SGLA type CB Typical for SFLA type CB Typical for SELA type CB
P 250A - 600A 150A - 250A 20A - 150A Unit 3 & 4 - DT Manual XFR SW
S
XFMR - Chiller Heater 4
Nominal kVA 1000.0 kVA
CT Pump 4 Bus Unit 4 Refrig Air Compressors See Unit 3 Model Drawing
Pri RatedVoltage 4160 V
Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Nominal Voltage 4160.0 V Sec RatedVoltage 480 V for Continuation
MCC 4121 Typ 200hp Motor MCC 4121 Typ 100hp Motor MCC 4121 Typ 30hp Motor
InitSymRMS 3P 10464.73 A InitSymRMS 3P 11385.06 A Z% 5.9500 % Rated HP 200.0 hp Rated HP 125.0 hp
AF_TripTime 0.004 s AF_TripTime 0.011 s Rated HP 30.0 hp
RatedAmps 241.2 A RatedAmps 150.8 A RatedAmps 36.2 A
AF_IncidentEnergy 0.05 Cal/cm^2 AF_IncidentEnergy 0.12 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 0 AF_PPE Category 0 Unit 3 & 4 - TIC Panel Main
XYZ
AF_Boundary 1.33 inches AF_Boundary 3.29 inches
AF_ArcingFault 10.149 kA AF_ArcingFault 9.372 kA Nominal Voltage 208.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 2604.80 A
AF_TripTime 2.000 s
2 Labels 4 Labels Chiller Heater 4 Cabinet
Nominal Voltage 480.0 V
InitSymRMS 3P 16899.66 A
AF_IncidentEnergy 1.2 Cal/cm^2
AF_PPE Category 0
AF_Boundary 18.04 inches
Arc Flash Study - Unit 4 Model Drawing
Cooling Tower Pump 4
Rated HP 200.0 hp
Air Compressor 4A
Rated HP 1220.0 hp
AF_TripTime 1.000 s
AF_IncidentEnergy 36.43 Cal/cm^2
AF_ArcingFault 1.691 kA
e-Hazard - Louisville, KY
October 3, 2017 Rev. 0
RatedAmps 27.8 A RatedAmps 169.8 A AF_PPE Category 4
AF_Boundary 144.43 inches
AF_ArcingFault 10.266 kA
Supplies power to UPS Battery Charger
J. D. Aeiker
4 Labels - 125VDC
Typical for both air
PPE Level 0
compressors 2 Labels
Engineering
Technical Standard
TS 0371 - Arc Flash Hazard
Assessment and Design
Aspects
Version: 1.0
Date: 24 September 2020
Status: FINAL
Document ID: SAWS-ENG-0371
© 2020 SA Water Corporation. All rights reserved. This document may contain
confidential information of SA Water Corporation. Disclosure or dissemination to
unauthorised individuals is strictly prohibited. Uncontrolled when printed or
downloaded.
TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
Copyright
This Technical Standard remains intellectual property of the South Australian Water
Corporation. It is copyright and all rights are reserved by SA Water. No part may be
reproduced, copied or transmitted in any form or by any means without the express written
permission of SA Water.
The information contained in this Standard is strictly for the private use of the intended
recipient in relation to works or projects of SA Water.
This Standard has been prepared for SA Water’s own internal use and SA Water makes no
representation as to the quality, accuracy or suitability of the information for any other
purpose.
Application and Interpretation of this Document
It is the responsibility of the users of this Standard to ensure that the application of information
is appropriate and that any designs based on this Standard are fit for SA Water’s purposes
and comply with all relevant Australian Standards, Acts and Regulations.
Users of this Standard accept sole responsibility for interpretation and use of the information
contained in this Standard. Users should independently verify the accuracy, fitness for
purpose and application of information contained in this Standard.
Only the current revision of this Standard should be used which is available for download from
the SA Water website.
Significant/Major Changes Incorporated in This Edition
Nil.
This is the first issue of this Technical Standard.
Revision 1.0 - 24 September 2020 Document ID: SAWS-ENG-0371 Page 2 of 42
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
Document Controls
Revision History
Revision Date Author Comments
0.1 28/05/2019 J. Hamra DRAFT - New issue of Technical Standard
1.0 24/09/2020 J. Hamra First Issue
Template: Technical Standard Version 6.00, 10/05/2016
Approvers
Role Signature and Date
Principal Electrical Engineer 1 5 /1 0 /2 0 2 0
Justin Hamra
X
S ig n e r 's N a m e
S ig n e d b y : H A 0 0 3 6 2 7
Manager Engineering Quality and Innovation 1 5 /1 0 /2 0 2 0
Matthew Davis
X
S ig n e r's N a m e
S ig n e d b y: D A 0 0 3 6 8 1
Senior Manager Engineering 1 6 /1 0 /2 0 2 0
Richard Gray
X
S ig n e r 's N a m e
S ig n e d b y : G R 0 0 1 9 6 4
Reviewers
Role Name Revision Review Date
Senior Electrical Engineer Jonathan Nicholls 0.1 17/07/2020
Senior Electrical Engineer Stephen Dadswell 0.1 15/07/2020
Revision 1.0 - 24 September 2020 Document ID: SAWS-ENG-0371 Page 3 of 42
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7
1.1 Purpose .......................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions ................................................... 7
1.3 References .................................................................................................... 8
1.3.1 Australian and International Standards .................................................. 8
1.3.2 SA Water and External Documents ........................................................ 9
2 Scope ............................................................................................................... 10
2.1 Approval to Deviate from This Standard................................................... 10
3 Design Criteria ................................................................................................. 11
3.1 Arc Fault Verification Requirement ........................................................... 11
3.2 Design Expectations ................................................................................... 12
4 Methodology ................................................................................................... 13
4.1 General ........................................................................................................ 13
4.2 Calculation Method ................................................................................... 13
4.3 Collection of Power System Data .............................................................. 15
4.3.1 Generators .............................................................................................. 15
4.3.2 Transformers ............................................................................................ 15
4.3.3 Cables ..................................................................................................... 15
4.3.4 Protective Devices ................................................................................. 15
4.3.5 Switching Points ...................................................................................... 15
4.3.6 Loads ....................................................................................................... 16
4.4 Prepare Software Model of the Power System ......................................... 16
4.4.1 Determine the Power System Switching Scenarios.............................. 16
4.5 Calculate Maximum and Minimum Bolted Fault Currents ...................... 17
4.6 Calculate Arcing Current Using IEEE 1584................................................. 18
4.7 Determine the Arcing Duration ................................................................. 18
4.7.1 Forms of Segregation ............................................................................. 20
4.8 Calculate the Incident Energy and Arc Flash Boundary ......................... 22
4.9 Determine the Arc Flash Classification...................................................... 23
4.9.1 Arc Classification Modifiers .................................................................... 23
5 Task-Specific PPE Selection ............................................................................ 25
5.1 Methodology .............................................................................................. 25
5.2 Activity Definitions and Explanations ........................................................ 26
5.2.1 Operating Controls Definition................................................................ 26
5.2.2 Operating Controls Explanation............................................................ 27
5.2.3 Visual Inspection Definition .................................................................... 27
5.2.4 Visual Inspection Explanation ................................................................ 27
5.2.5 Electrical Work Definition ....................................................................... 28
5.2.6 Electrical Work Explanation ................................................................... 28
5.2.7 Switching Definition ................................................................................ 28
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
5.2.8 Switching Explanation ............................................................................ 28
5.2.9 Racking Definition .................................................................................. 28
5.2.10 Racking Explanation .............................................................................. 28
6 Arc Flash Cautionary Labels ........................................................................... 30
7 Assessment Outcome and Control ................................................................ 34
8 Switchboard Design and Configuration Principles ....................................... 35
8.1 LV Power Reticulation Philosophy .............................................................. 35
8.2 General Design Requirements for Switchboards ..................................... 36
8.3 Main Switchboards ..................................................................................... 36
8.4 Distribution Switchboards ........................................................................... 37
8.5 Motor Control Centres ................................................................................ 37
8.6 Distribution Boards or Sections Rated ≤ 250A ........................................... 37
8.7 Arc Detection Systems................................................................................ 38
Appendix A – Excerpts from NFPA 70E .................................................................. 39
A1 Table 130.5 (C) ............................................................................................ 39
A2 Table 130.7 (C) ............................................................................................ 41
List of figures
Figure 4-1 - High-level flowchart for completing an Arc Flash Study .................... 14
Figure 4-2 - Typical LV Fuse Curve ........................................................................... 17
Figure 4-3 - Typical LV Circuit Breaker Curve .......................................................... 17
Figure 4-4 - Arc Fault Locations vs. Protection Device Selection .......................... 19
Figure 4-5 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 1 Switchboards ................................. 20
Figure 4-6 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 2a (left) and Form 2b (right) Switchboards
...................................................................................................................... 20
Figure 4-7 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 3a (left) and Form 3b (right) Switchboards
...................................................................................................................... 21
Figure 4-8 - Arc fault propagation for Form 3a (left) and Form 3b (right) switchboards
...................................................................................................................... 21
Figure 4-9 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 4a (left) and Form 4b (right) Switchboards
...................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 6-1 - Arc Flash ‘Warning’ Label Example ..................................................... 31
Figure 6-2 - Arc Flash ‘Danger’ Label Example ...................................................... 31
Figure 6-3 - General PPE Information Label Example ............................................ 32
Figure 6-4 - Example Label to be Used Where Space is Limited ........................... 33
Figure 8-1 - LV Power Reticulation Philosophy ........................................................ 35
Revision 1.0 - 24 September 2020 Document ID: SAWS-ENG-0371 Page 5 of 42
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
List of tables
Table 1-1 - Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions .............................................. 7
Table 1-2 - Australian and International Standards ................................................. 8
Table 1-3 - SA Water and External Documents ........................................................ 9
Table 4-1 - SA Water Arc Flash Classifications ........................................................ 23
Table 5-1 - NFPA 70(E) Table 130.5(C) summary .................................................... 25
Table 5-2 – Task-Specific Basis of PPE ...................................................................... 26
Table 5-3 – Task Specific PPE Category Groups ..................................................... 26
Table 6-1 - Arc Flash Cautionary Label Information............................................... 30
Table 8-1 - Switchboard Configuration Approach ................................................ 35
Table 8-2 - NFPA 70E Table 130.7 (C)....................................................................... 41
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
1 Introduction
Arc Flash is a destructive and potentially life-threatening type of electrical fault, caused by
unintended or accidental connection of energized conductors and /or earth. The result is an
explosive release of energy, which is sufficient to melt conductors and change the
surrounding air from gas to conductive plasma.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this Technical Standard is to:
• Detail a basic understanding of arc flash terminology;
• Provide an effective arc flash classification process;
• Recommend industrial practices to minimize the risk of arc flash hazards;
• Provide a guide for the appropriate selection of personal protective equipment against
the activity being undertaken;
• Outline arc flash cautionary label specifications and application;
• Provide principles on switchboard design and configuration; and
• Detail arc flash assessment study report requirements.
1.2 Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions
The following acronyms, abbreviations and definitions in Table 1-1 are used in this document:
Table 1-1 - Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions
Term Description
AC Alternating Current
The arc flash boundary is the distance from live parts outside of which a person
without Arc Rated PPE cannot receive anything greater than a second-degree
Arc Flash Boundary
burn. Outside of the boundary the assessed energy levels are below 1.2
cal/cm2. Within the boundary the energy levels are 1.2 cal/cm2 or above.
Arc Thermal Performance Value is the maximum incident energy on a fabric or
material that will result in sufficient heat transfer through the fabric or material to
ATPV
cause the onset of anything more than a second degree burn that occurs for
energy levels 1.2 cal/cm2 or above.
Clothing specified with an ATPV (Arc Thermal Performance Value) expressed in
Arc Rated (AR) PPE calories per centimetre squared. AR PPE with an ATPV has been specifically
tested to provide protection against electrical arcing faults.
A fault current flowing through an electrical arc plasma. Also referred to as arc
Arcing Fault Current
fault current or arc current.
A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy caused
Arc Flash Hazard
by an electric arc.
AREP Auxiliary Winding Regulation Excitation Principle (Generator type)
Should primary protection fail to operate, backup protection is the next
protection relay and circuit breaker combination to detect and clear an
Backup Protection
electrical fault. For an arcing fault occurring on a switchboard’s main incomer,
this is typically the first upstream feeder protection.
An expected fault current flowing where there is close to zero resistance or
Bolted Fault Current
impedance in the fault path.
A connection to the switchboard through which a portion of the total arcing
Contributing Branch
fault current originates.
Revision 1.0 - 24 September 2020 Document ID: SAWS-ENG-0371 Page 7 of 42
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
Term Description
Physical stimulation that occurs when electrical current passes through the
Electrical Shock
body.
The theoretical amount of current delivered at a point on the system during a
Fault Current
short-circuit condition.
An approach limit at a distance from live parts that are uninsulated or exposed
Flash-protection outside of which a person cannot receive anything greater than a second
Boundary degree burn during an electrical arc event. Also referred to as ‘closest
approach distance’.
A rating category number used by NFPA 70E to classify the expected incident
Hazard Risk Category energy that may exist within the specified working distance, due to an arcing
fault.
HV High Voltage
The amount of energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from the
source, during an electrical arc event. Incident energy is measured in either
Incident Energy
calories per centimetre squared (cal/cm2) or joules per centimetre squared
(J/cm2).
One who has demonstrated skills and knowledge related to the construction
Qualified Person and operation of electrical equipment and installations and has received safety
training to identify the hazards and reduce the associated risk.
PPE Personal protective equipment.
The fastest protection relay and/or circuit breaker combination to detect and
Primary Protection
clear an electrical fault.
The dimension between the potential arc point and the head and body of the
Working Distance worker positioned to perform the assigned task. (455mm – 18 inches)
1.3 References
1.3.1 Australian and International Standards
Any Standard referred to in this Technical Standard shall be of the latest edition (including
amendments) of that Standard at the date of calling of tenders.
Table 1-2 identifies Australian and International standards and other similar documents
referenced in this document:
Table 1-2 - Australian and International Standards
Number Title
AS 2067:2016 Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1kVac
AS/NZS 3000:2018 Wiring Rules
AS/NZS 3008.1.1 Electrical Installations – Selection of cables Part 1.1: Cables for alternating
voltages up to and including 0.6/1 kV – Typical Australian installation
conditions
AS/NZS 3439.1:2002 Low Voltage Switchgear and Control gear Assemblies – Part 1: Type- tested
and partially type-tested assemblies
AS/NZS 60076.5 Power Transformers Part5: Ability to withstand short circuit
AS/NZS 61439.1:2016 Low Voltage Switchgear and Controlgear Assemblies – General Rules
AS/NZS 61439.2:2016 Low Voltage Switchgear and Controlgear Assemblies – Power switchgear
and controlgear assemblies
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Number Title
High Voltage Switchgear and Control gear – AC Metal-enclosed
AS 62271.200:2005 Switchgear and Control gear for Rated Voltages Above 1kV and up to and
Including 52kV
IEC 60909-0:2016 Short-circuit currents in three-phase AC systems – Part 0: Calculation of
currents
IEC TR 61641:2014 Enclosed low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies - Guide for
testing under conditions of arcing due to internal fault
IEEE 242:2001 Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power systems
IEEE 551 – 2006 Recommended Practise for calculating AC Short circuit currents in Industrial
and Commercial Power Systems
IEEE 141:1993 IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution in Industrial
Plants
IEEE 1584 - 2013 Guide for Performing Arc-flash Hazard Calculations
1.3.2 SA Water and External Documents
Table 1-3 identifies the SA Water standards and other similar documents referenced in this
document:
Table 1-3 - SA Water and External Documents
Number Title
- Australian Electrical Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline- March 2019
ENA NENS 09 – 2014 Energy Networks Australia – National Guideline for the Selection, Use and
Maintenance of Personal Protective Equipment for Electrical Arc Hazards
NFPA 70E – 2018 Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
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2 Scope
This Technical Standard covers aspects of the general requirements for the design, review
and maintenance of SA Water’s state-wide electrical power assets.
It defines the accepted SA Water practises to perform arc flash hazard calculations and
assessment for HV and LV switchgear assemblies in AC power systems with faults involving
three phases. This includes:
• HV and LV switchboards;
• Power equipment switchgear;
• Power factor correction equipment;
• Motor starters and variable speed drives;
• Harmonic filters; and
• Any other cubicle containing HV or LV power equipment.
The arc flash hazard assessment methodology detailed in this document shall be undertaken
during both the engineering design stage and for evaluation of existing equipment. This
Technical Standard applies to both new installations and for any changes to an installation
that affect the arc flash incident energy levels of existing switchboards or electrical power
equipment, or for the review of such equipment.
The main aim of this Technical Standard is to provide electrical systems that exhibit safe levels
of arc flash through reasonable application of these principles.
Control, instrumentation and SCADA cubicles do not require arc flash analysis or
categorisation.
This Technical Standard has been developed to assist in the design, maintenance, installation,
and management of this infrastructure. It should be read in conjunction with the associated
project specification, drawings and any documents annexed to the project specification. The
provisions of this Technical Standard shall apply unless they are specifically deleted or
amended in the project specification or drawings, which shall then take precedence.
The currency of this document should be checked prior to use.
2.1 Approval to Deviate from This Standard
Approval may ultimately be granted by the SA Water Principal Electrical Engineer, to deviate
from the requirements as stipulated in this Standard, if the functional requirements (e.g. asset
life, ease of use, maintainability, etc.) for the asset differs from those stated in the Standard,
but is assessed as still being acceptable. Any approval to deviate from the stated
requirements of this Standard shall not be seen as creating a precedent for future like
projects. Any request to deviate from this Standard must be carried out on a project by
project basis, where each alternative proposal will be individually assessed on its own merit.
No action should be taken until a written reply to such a request has been received.
SA Water encourages and welcomes suggestions as to the improvement of this standard for
future releases. These suggestions should be passed through to the SA Water Principal
Electrical Engineer.
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3 Design Criteria
The design criteria must be ascertained and agreed with SA Water or its representative during
all stages of investigation, concept design and detailed design in order to achieve a value-
for-money installation that is fit for purpose and with minimum or negligible risks to SA Water.
The design criteria should consider the following aspects:
1. Safety Considerations
The installations are to be designed with the safety and welfare of construction, operation
and maintenance personnel and the general public in mind, complying with statutory
regulations. Wherever possible, electrical equipment and wiring should not be located in
areas classified as hazardous.
2. Life Cycle Costs
Designs should be innovative and incorporate the appropriate techniques and technology,
in conjunction with the selection of appropriate equipment, to minimise the life cycle costs,
while satisfying operational functionality and process risk management and maintenance
requirements. Energy consumption must be given particular attention in this respect.
3. Security of Operation
Designs should take into account the failure of a single item of equipment or a fault in a
particular area of an installation is confined to the associated part of the installation and
does not affect the continuous operation of the remaining parts of the installation, where
possible.
4. Reliability
The installations are to be designed to minimise the likelihood of a failure, taking into
consideration the electricity supply characteristics, ambient conditions, load characteristics
and operation and maintenance requirements.
5. Upgradability
The installations are to be designed to facilitate future upgrades, where applicable.
6. Interchangeability
The installations are to be designed to maximise the interchangeability of components and
assemblies as far as practical to improve flexibility and reduce the spare parts inventory.
7. Operation, Maintenance and Fault-Finding Facilities
The installations are to be provided with suitable and adequate facilities to allow ease of
operation, maintenance and fault finding.
8. Environmental Considerations
The installations are to be designed and suitable equipment selected to avoid or minimise
unacceptable impact on the environment, as far as possible.
3.1 Arc Fault Verification Requirement
All low voltage switchboards shall be designed to provide personal protection in the event of
an internal arcing fault.
The assembly shall limit the damage of the switchboard to the section affected by the fault,
thus allowing the unaffected part to be put back into service.
With regards to safety of personnel, assemblies rated above 250A per phase shall be verified
with respect to their ability to withstand internal arcing. The manufacturer shall confirm the
successful assessment in accordance with either Appendix ZD of AS 61439.1: 2016 or as per
the criteria specified in IEC TR 61641, Criteria 1 to 7. Test reports or certificates issued by
certified independent testing laboratories should be made available in the predesign stage.
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The prospective fault currents shall be used for designs and are to be based on the worst-
case operating scenarios, with a contribution that can be expected from any connected
load.
3.2 Design Expectations
As part of a detailed design, the Designer is expected to undertake the following design
activities as a minimum:
1. Site investigations to gather all required information and data to develop a site power
systems model in order to undertake arc flash assessment studies.
a. Where existing model data exists, it will be provided by SA Water, however, it is the
responsibility of the Designer to confirm the accuracy of the model prior to use.
b. Where model data does not exist, the Designer shall seek all data and develop a
new model.
2. Perform and submit an arc flash assessment report in accordance with this Technical
Standard, including calculations, arc flash category ratings, and any required
protection setting changes (i.e. upstream) to reduce the arc flash risk to as low as is
reasonably practicable.
3. Submit native data files of the power systems model developed and arc flash
calculations carried out for future use (e.g. SKM PowerTools, PowerCAD, etc.) to SA
Water as part of the project completion documentation. This may include data files in
Excel or CAD file format. Drawings of single line diagrams should include data such as
cable sizes and lengths, protection relay model numbers, circuit breaker
models/types/basic settings and basic transformer and generator parameters. Cable
schedules, protection relay settings and protection reports should be provided in an
easily editable format, such as Excel.
4. For brownfield sites, if it is found during the detailed design stage that the arc flash or
reticulation philosophy requirements cannot be achieved, the Designer shall engage
with the Superintendent’s Representative (SA Water’s Representative) to discuss the
options available and agree on an approach (i.e. to reduce the arc flash risk), within
the scope of the upgrade project.
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4 Methodology
This section outlines the preferred methodology for the calculation of arc flash parameters for
SA Water existing and proposed assets.
4.1 General
Although consideration of arc faults is a requirement of AS/NZ 3000, there is currently no clear
regulatory framework for the calculation and assessment of arc fault hazards in Australia,
other than the recommended guidelines provided by Energy Networks Australia – NENS 09 -
2014 National Guideline for the Selection, Use and Maintenance of Personal Protective
Equipment for Electrical Arc Hazards.
Current accepted practice in Australia is to apply the internationally accepted calculation
methods provided in IEEE-1584 (Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations) to
determine arc flash incident energy levels.
Once the incident energy levels are established, equipment can be given an arc flash
hazard classification. Classifications have been derived from standards such as the American
National Fire Protection Association standard NFPA 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace.
It is important to note that incident energy calculations and the resultant arc flash
classification represents the worst-case situation. It represents the hazard present with
equipment doors or panels open, and busbars or conductors exposed to personnel. It does
not consider the reduction of risk when panel doors/panels are securely closed, nor of arc-
rated switchgear or switchboards where the arc blast is either contained or safely re-
directed. The impact of these, and other arc mitigation measures, on equipment classification
should be carefully assessed on an individual basis.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements in relation to arc flash have been
determined from both NFPA 70E and NENS 09 standards and have been considered as
industry norms in the development of this Technical Standard.
4.2 Calculation Method
Calculation of the arc flash incident energy at each location in an electrical network requires
detailed analysis and calculation of short-circuit fault levels throughout the network. Although
this may be determined by hand for simple systems, for more complex systems it is common
practice to calculate through electrical modelling software. For complex systems with
multiple operating scenarios, many electrical modelling software packages allow the IEEE-
1584 calculations to be performed in software. There are a number of modelling software
packages that are used to create power system models and perform arc flash hazard
assessments. (e.g. SKM Power Tools for Windows (PTW), Electrical Transient and Analysis
Program (ETAP), DIgSILENT, PowerCAD and EasyPower.)
A high-level flowchart outlining the steps to be completed when performing an arc flash
study is provided in Figure 4-1.
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Collect Power System Data
Prepare a software model
of the power system
Determine the system
modes of operation
Calculate the maximum and
minimum bolted fault levels for
various network operating
scenarios using IEC-60909
Convert bolted fault current to
the arcing fault current using
IEEE-1584
Optimization of Study protective device
protection devices and characteristics and
engineering controls determine arc duration
Calculate incident energy
and arc flash boundary
distance
Yes No
(Additional) Arc Flash Determine PPE
Mitigation Required? requirements and Arc
Flash cautionary labels
Figure 4-1 - High-level flowchart for completing an Arc Flash Study
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4.3 Collection of Power System Data
The available fault currents at different locations in the electrical network are dependent on
the capability of the main power supply to provide and sustain a short circuit. The fault
current contribution should be confirmed with the power supply utility under the following
conditions:
1. Maximum three phase symmetrical fault level and corresponding X/R ratio; and
2. Minimum three phase symmetrical fault level and corresponding X/R ratio.
4.3.1 Generators
For power systems fed via local generation permanently installed at a site, the following data
should be collected:
1. Alternator kVA rating and power factor values from the nameplate;
2. Alternator impedance characteristics; and
3. Details of excitation system and field forcing; if applicable (e.g. AREP).
4.3.2 Transformers
The following information should be collected for transformers:
1. Primary and secondary voltage ratings;
2. Vector group;
3. kVA rating;
4. Tap position; and
5. Transformer impedance (%Z) and X/R ratio.
In the absence of impedance details, typical values per AS/NZS 60076.5 may be used.
4.3.3 Cables
In general, the data for the following cables should be collected:
1. Main cable from the utility connection up to site’s main switchboard;
2. Cables used to provide alternate supply sources; e.g. generator cables; and
3. Cables supplying sub-distribution boards feeding significant motor loads.
Once the data for the power cables has been collected, the relevant electrical parameters
(cable impedance) should be obtained from the cable manufacturer’s catalogue or
standard cable parameters listed under AS/NZS 3008.1.1.
4.3.4 Protective Devices
The time taken by the protective device to interrupt an arcing fault on the downstream
circuit is a critical factor in incident energy calculations. The protection settings and trip
characteristics of the primary, backup and largest outgoing feeder protection overcurrent
device should be obtained from design documents for new installations and for existing
installations, data from site and protection relay datasheets.
4.3.5 Switching Points
All switching points in the electrical system which could affect the fault current levels should
be identified by investigating the switchboard configuration and single line drawings. This
includes HV and LV switching points such as:
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1. Secondary selective changeover arrangements;
2. Ring main switches; and
3. Contingency and backup supply arrangements; etc.
4.3.6 Loads
Data related to all regenerative power system loads should be collected. This includes:
1. Large (>37kW rated) direct on-line and bypass soft-starter connected induction motors;
and
2. Large motors connected through four quadrant (regenerative type) variable speed
drives.
It is noted that although the sub-transient fault contribution from motors generally decays
quite rapidly (over a few electrical cycles), the resulting fault contribution may have a
significant impact on the available incident energy at the electrical switchboard.
The following information should be collected for the motors:
1. Motor kW rating;
2. Motor power factor; and
3. Starting (locked rotor) current.
4.4 Prepare Software Model of the Power System
The power system simulation model should be prepared using an industry-wide accepted
power system simulation software (such as ETAP, SKM PTW, DIgSILENT, EasyPower, PowerCAD,
etc). The electrical power system simulation software should be compliant with the latest
applicable standards for short circuit and incident energy calculations.
The model should include sufficient detail to allow for simulations under maximum and
minimum fault current scenarios.
As a minimum, the power system simulation model should include the components of the
electrical system from the utility point of supply to the busbars of the switchboards under
assessment. Any additional sources of fault current (large induction motors, supplementary /
backup generation) should also be included in the simulation model. Any assumptions for the
modelling data should be clearly documented and justified in the arc flash assessment
report.
4.4.1 Determine the Power System Switching Scenarios
The switching scenarios (operating modes) of the switchboard may significantly impact the
results of the arc flash calculations. For radial (single feed) switchboards only one switching
scenario needs to be considered, however, for complicated supply arrangements, several
operating modes may be possible; this includes:
1. Sites with more than one electrical utility supply;
2. Secondary selective switchboards (Main-tie-main arrangements);
3. Embedded generation that may be operated islanded from the electrical utility;
4. Switchboards with supplementary / emergency generation; etc.
The operating modes relevant to the power system or switchboard under assessment should
be mutually agreed between the asset owner and Power Systems Engineer at the outset of
the study.
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4.5 Calculate Maximum and Minimum Bolted Fault Currents
In order to identify the worst-case incident energy level at the electrical equipment,
calculations for fault currents under both maximum and minimum fault currents are
necessary, according to IEC 60909. This is because the overcurrent protection devices
employ inverse time protection characteristics, which can result in a disproportionate
increase in the fault clearing times (and hence the arcing duration) with a relatively small
decrease in the fault current.
Some situations where this can occur are shown in the figures below:
Figure 4-2 - Typical LV Fuse Curve
The fuse curve is so steep that an 800 A fault current takes ten times longer to clear, as
compared to a 1,600A fault current.
Figure 4-3 - Typical LV Circuit Breaker Curve
A small reduction in fault current causes fault to be cleared on LTPU in 5 s rather than STPU in
250ms.
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The fault current calculations should therefore consider:
1. All possible operating scenarios of the system;
2. Maximum and minimum pre-fault voltage factors (c-factors) as per IEC 60909; and
3. Fault current levels with and without motor contributions.
4.6 Calculate Arcing Current Using IEEE 1584
Currents associated with electrical arcing faults are always less than the prospective three
phase bolted fault current level of the system due to the arcing resistance.
For electrical installations between 0.208kV and 15kV, IEEE 1584 provides equations to
estimate the arcing current, depending upon several factors, including:
1. The prospective three phase bolted fault current.
2. The nominal voltage of the equipment.
3. The bus-gap (i.e. the gap between adjacent phases at a possible arcing point).
4. An adjustment factor “K”, which depends upon the location of arcing (enclosed vs.
unenclosed space).
For accurate arcing current calculations, the bus gap should be obtained from the
switchboard manufacturer, however, in the absence of manufacturer’s information, typical
bus gaps based on IEEE 1584 may be employed.
4.7 Determine the Arcing Duration
The duration of the arcing current used for incident energy calculations will depend on a
number of factors, including:
1. The tripping characteristics of the protective device that would interrupt the fault.
2. The location of the fault. In general, there are three possible locations on a switchboard
at which an arcing fault could occur, as shown in Figure 4-4 - Arc Fault Locations vs.
Protection Device Selection.
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Figure 4-4 - Arc Fault Locations vs. Protection Device Selection
It can be seen from the above figure that faults at the three locations will have different
arcing times associated with them. For faults at location C (downstream of a feeder circuit),
the associated trip device would be the outgoing feeder circuit breaker. Assuming that the
protection system is well-coordinated, it is expected that the protection settings of the
outgoing feeder circuit breaker will be set to more sensitive levels compared to the incoming
and upstream (remote) breaker settings. The incident energy associated with a fault at
location C would generally be less than locations B and A.
Similarly, the incident energy at location A is the most severe, as the expected tripping time
of the remote upstream protection is expected to be the highest. In most cases, the upstream
circuit breaker will be on the primary (HV) side of the distribution transformer feeding the
switchboard under assessment.
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4.7.1 Forms of Segregation
The form of segregation of the switchboard under assessment - AS/NZS 3439.1 and AS/NZS
61439.2 outline the forms of segregation for switchgear assemblies. Primarily, these forms
describe the varying configurations of physical barriers used in the separation of functional
units of switchgear from each other.
For existing switchgear assemblies, the identification of arc-fault clearing location is tied to
the issue of arc propagation. Although the physical barriers used for segregation in
switchgear assemblies are not guaranteed to impede arc propagation through the different
functional units (unless proven by verification tests), it is reasonable to assume that
segregation assemblies would have some impact on the selection of the protective device
for determining the arcing duration.
The figures given below illustrate the possible impact of the switchboard’s form of segregation
on the arc flash propagation through the functional units.
Figure 4-5 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 1 Switchboards
Figure 4-6 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 2a (left) and Form 2b (right) Switchboards
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Figure 4-7 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 3a (left) and Form 3b (right) Switchboards
Figure 4-8 - Arc fault propagation for Form 3a (left) and Form 3b (right) switchboards
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Figure 4-9 - Arc Fault Propagation for Form 4a (left) and Form 4b (right) Switchboards
Based on the above basic principles, if the switchgear enclosure being assessed contains a
protective device with the line side terminals that are not fully segregated, then an arcing
fault can only be cleared by the next upstream device.
In general, SA Water utilizes low voltage switchboards of form 3b segregation; therefore, the
arcing times should be based on the protection characteristics of the device upstream of the
switchboard.
4.8 Calculate the Incident Energy and Arc Flash Boundary
The first step in the calculation of incident energy is the determination of working distance. As
defined by IEEE 1584, the working distance is the separation distance between the closest
possible arcing point and the body of the person conducting work. Generalized working
distances based on the voltage class of the equipment are provided in IEEE 1584 and should
be used for the assessment, where physical inspection is not possible.
Once the working distance associated with the switchboard under investigation has been
identified, empirical equations provided in IEEE 1584 should be used to estimate incident
energy levels. The basic inputs to the calculation are as follows:
1. The equipment operating voltage;
2. Working distance associated with the operating voltage;
3. Calculated arcing current (maximum and minimum); and
4. Arcing time (i.e. action time of the associated protective device).
IEEE 1584 also provides the empirical formulae to determine the distance from the
switchboard at which the incident energy is not considered as a major hazard to
unprotected personnel. This distance is termed the ‘Arc Flash Boundary’. Based on IEEE 1584,
the incident energy at the arc-flash boundary equals 1.2 Cal/cm2, which relates to the
threshold for a second-degree burn.
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4.9 Determine the Arc Flash Classification
When the worst-case arc flash incident energy has been determined, each piece of
equipment can be given the appropriate arc flash classification.
The arc flash classification adopted by SA Water closely relates to table 130.7(C) of NFPA 70E
(2018) reproduced in Appendix A.
Table 4-1 - SA Water Arc Flash Classifications
Category Incident Energy
CATEGORY 0 Incident Energy below 1.2 cal/cm2
CATEGORY 1 Incident Energy 1.2 to < 4 cal/cm2
CATEGORY 2 Incident Energy 4 to < 8 cal/cm2
CATEGORY 3 Incident Energy 8 to < 25 cal/cm2
CATEGORY 4 Incident Energy 25 to < 40 cal/cm2
UNACCEPTABLE DANGER Incident Energy above 40 cal/cm2
It is noted that the arc flash classification levels listed in Table 4-1, and the associated PPE
requirements, assume that the working personnel will be directly exposed to an arcing fault
i.e. switchboard panel doors open at the time of fault or incorrectly fastened or forced open
by the internal pressure developed by the arc.
4.9.1 Arc Classification Modifiers
Arc flash classification based on incident energy calculations does not consider the risk
reduction introduced through various mitigation measures.
4.9.1.1 Arc-rated switchgear
Modern HV and LV switchboards can be designed to withstand an internal arc fault blast. This
equipment is specially verified and certified so that any escaping arc fault energy is
contained or redirected, and injury to personnel is limited to less than second degree burns.
Switchboards intended to provide increased security against the occurrence or the effects of
internal arcing faults have been designed and tested according to the methods outlined in
AS/NZS 3439.1 Appendix ZC and ZD or AS/NZS 61439.1 Appendix ZC and ZD. This is an optional
switchboard specification, and AS/NZS 3439.1 or AS/NZS 61439.1 type-test certification does
not automatically infer that the equipment has been tested to contain and limit exposure to
an arc fault. It must be specifically requested from the switchboard manufacturer before
design and construction.
According to NFPA 70E guidelines, arc-rated and tested equipment is equivalent to “Below
Category 1” arc flash classification. Note that this applies only when all doors and panels are
closed. With doors/panels open, the classification reverts to the IEEE incident energy derived
classification.
4.9.1.2 Optimized protection settings
Arc fault incident energy can be greatly reduced by selecting appropriate protection
devices and protection settings. Setting optimization is achieved by reducing the protection
settings as much as possible, while maintaining time and current discrimination between
protective devices in the electrical system.
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4.9.1.3 Task specific classification
Further to the above, the arc fault exposure risk may vary depending on the particular task
performed. For example, circuit breaker switching is considered a lower risk task than racking
out a circuit breaker. NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C) (15) (A) (a) provides guidance with examples
of electrical operation and maintenance activities and the impact on PPE requirements.
4.9.1.4 Maintenance and condition
The risk of arc fault occurrence and effectiveness of any mitigation measures is highly
dependent on equipment maintenance and condition.
Existing equipment will require a physical inspection and assessment of condition when
considering its arc fault classification.
4.9.1.5 Arc flash detection
Optical arc fault detection devices help to detect and assist in the speed of operation of
protective devices under arc fault conditions. Optical arc fault detection devices can be
used to detect the flash of light emitted early in the arc flash event and trigger the operation
of circuit breakers well in advance of the normal trip caused by arc fault current.
The operating times of arc-detection devices can be used as part of the incident energy
calculation, or the presence of the device can be applied as a modifier to the arc flash
classification.
4.9.1.6 Arc quenching
Devices can be used in conjunction with an arc flash detection system to clear an arcing
fault within a few milliseconds. An arc flash quenching device extinguishes an arc much
faster than a circuit breaker by applying a rapid bolted short circuit between phases or
between phases and earth close to the arcing fault location. This causes a collapse in the arc
voltage, rapidly extinguishing the arc. The bolted short circuit current flows through the
quenching device until it is interrupted by the primary protection device.
4.9.1.7 Other mitigation measures
Various other technologies are available, such as zone selective interlocking and bus
differential protection schemes, which can be applied to reduce the incident energy levels.
Zone selective interlocking provides protection between backup, primary and outgoing
feeder protection that uses blocking signals between the devices, allowing protection to trip
more quickly without a protection grading trade-off. A bus differential protection scheme,
when implemented, provides a faster tripping time during a fault condition, within a given
zone of protection.
Where the mitigation methods described above do not reduce incident energy levels to
Category 1 or below, then remote switching of HV and LV circuit breakers and feeders shall
be implemented as an additional feature. This reduces exposure levels by allowing workers to
undertake switching operation (remote tripping, closing or spring charging) at a safe
distance from the switchboard. A label shall be installed adjacent to the device to indicate
remote switching is available.
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5 Task-Specific PPE Selection
5.1 Methodology
Given that most of the switchboards currently installed at SA Water facilities do not include
special means for detection and interruption of arcing faults, and that the switchboards are
not of form 4b construction, it is expected that the worst-case incident energy levels on the
switchboards will be high.
The equivalence of arc-rated equipment and ‘Below Category 1’ arc fault classification
should be negotiated with the Client and/or Operator, and an agreed operational
philosophy must be applied consistently.
For SA Water sites, a task- and condition-based PPE selection criteria has been selected that is
consistent with NFPA 70(E) Article 100 – Information Note 1, which states:
“The likelihood of occurrence of an arc flash increases when energized electrical conductors
or parts are exposed or when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition,
provided a person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an
electric arc. An arc flash incident is not likely to occur under normal operating conditions
when enclosed energized equipment has been properly installed and maintained”.
The standard further refers to Table 130.5(C) for examples of tasks that increase the likelihood
of an arc flash incident occurring. Excerpts from NFPA 70(E) Table 130.5(C) are provided in
Appendix A of this document. A high-level summary of the task breakdowns and likelihood of
arc-flash occurrence as per NFPA 70(E) is provided in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1 - NFPA 70(E) Table 130.5(C) summary
High Level Task Description Equipment Condition Likelihood of Arc Flash
Visual inspections, reading of
panel meters, examination of
insulated cables without Any No
manipulation
Electrical (energized) work,
racking of circuit breakers,
examination and manipulation
of insulated cables, opening Any Yes
compartments which include
bare live electrical circuits
Normal operation of circuit
breakers (switching), opening of
hinged doors on panel boards to Any No
access escutcheon mounted
devices on switchboards
Based on the likelihood of arc flash occurrence as indicated in the above table and
Appendix A, lower PPE categories may be assigned for tasks requiring minimal interaction
with live electrical equipment. SA Water will follow a risk-based approach to determine the
PPE requirements for each activity separately.
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The following basis for PPE requirements shall be applied for SA Water assets:
Table 5-2 – Task-Specific Basis of PPE
Switchboard is internally Arc Rated Switchboard is not internally Arc Rated
Activity Descriptor
Doors Closed Doors Open Doors Closed Doors Open
Based on Location Based on Location
Operating non- Minimum PPE B or Location A Minimum PPE for B or Location A
switching Controls for site incident energy site incident energy
Visual Inspection Minimum PPE Minimum PPE for
for site Based on site Based on
Location A and B Location A and B
incident energy incident energy
Electrical Work N/A N/A
Based on Location Based on Based on Location
Switching Minimum PPE B or Location A Location B or A incident
for site incident energy Location A energy
incident energy
Based on Location Based on Based on Location
Racking Minimum PPE B or Location A Location B or A incident
for site incident energy Location A energy
incident energy
Note: Locations (A,B) relate to Figure 4-4 - Arc Fault Locations vs. Protection Device Selection
5.2 Activity Definitions and Explanations
The following sections define and explain the activities around and in switchboards that
relate to the category of PPE that shall be used for both Incomer and Non-Incomer circuits.
Table 5-3 – Task Specific PPE Category Groups
Task Specific PPE Category
ACTIVITY Doors Closed Doors Open
Incomer and Non-
Incomer circuits
Operating controls Cat x or blank Cat x or blank
Visual inspection Cat x or blank
Cat x or blank
Electrical Work Cat x or blank
Switching Cat x or blank Cat x or blank
Racking Cat x or blank Cat x or blank
5.2.1 Operating Controls Definition
Operating Controls is the activity undertaken by trades and non-trades personnel during
routine operation of a switchboard’s control switch and pushbutton facilities. This activity
descriptor applies to:
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1. Personnel (Operators and Tradespeople) interacting with control or monitoring devices
mounted on the front panel or escutcheon of a switchboard or control panel.
2. Only locations on a switchboard or control panel that are designed to be accessed by
non-electrically qualified personnel.
3. Opening hinged doors to access escutcheon devices.
4. Does not apply to the operation of large load circuit breakers that may be in the
immediate vicinity.
The underlying assumption for applying a reduced PPE requirement for operating controls is
that since access to these controls is not compromising the arc flash category that deems it
safe to conduct this task, the likelihood of occurrence of an arc fault impacting on the
Operator is remote.
Where access to these controls does compromise the arc flash category, the higher arc flash
category must be adhered to and the appropriate PPE used or access should not be gained.
5.2.2 Operating Controls Explanation
The operation of controls on doors or escutcheons designed for this purpose is deemed a low
risk activity. However, depending upon the condition of the switchboard under assessment, a
higher category PPE may be applied. The switchboard must be inspected for the integrity of
fastening devices and covers and there should be no vents or louvres facing towards the
inspecting personnel. Consideration shall always be given to the impact of the operation,
which may result in the switching of heavy current devices in the vicinity of the Operator.
5.2.3 Visual Inspection Definition
Visual inspection is the activity undertaken during routine physical and visual examinations of
the switchboards. This activity descriptor also applies to:
1. Personnel reading panel meters (provided that all doors are closed).
2. Personnel present in the vicinity of, or passing near live switchboards, provided no work
(such as switching) is being carried out on the switchboard by others.
3. Opening hinged doors to access escutcheon devices.
The underlying assumption for applying a reduced PPE requirement for visual inspections is
that since the state of the electrical equipment is not being changed, the likelihood of
occurrence of an arc fault is remote.
5.2.4 Visual Inspection Explanation
1. Visual inspection with doors closed is always deemed a low risk activity. However,
depending upon the condition of the switchboard under assessment, a higher
category PPE may be applied. The switchboard must be inspected for the integrity of
fastening devices and covers and there should be no vents or louvres facing towards
the inspecting personnel.
2. Visual inspections with doors open pose a higher risk of arc flash. The following should
be considered for selecting the PPE for open door visual inspections:
a. If the line side busbars and terminals are fully insulated or phase barriered, select PPE
category based on Location B (busbar) incident energy assessment.
b. If the line side busbars and terminals are not fully insulated or phase barriered, select
PPE based on Location A (line side) incident energy assessment.
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5.2.5 Electrical Work Definition
Electrical work refers to:
1. Connecting / disconnecting electricity supply to electrical equipment or installation;
2. Installing, removing, adding, testing, replacing, altering electrical equipment or an
electrical installation, including testing for dead circuit; and/or
3. Cover removal or opening hinged doors on equipment that could contain exposed
energized equipment for the purpose of inspection or maintenance.
5.2.6 Electrical Work Explanation
Live electrical work on switchboards should generally be avoided unless the hazard
associated with powering off is deemed significant. If energised or ‘live’ electrical work is
unavoidable, a risk assessment must be undertaken before the work starts and it must be
carried out by competent persons. The PPE selection for live electrical work should be based
on the worst-case incident energy results (Location A).
5.2.7 Switching Definition
Switching refers to changing the state of a functional unit i.e.:
1. Test for dead circuit.
2. Lock/unlock cubicle using interlock key.
3. Operation of an isolator, fuse switch, contactor or circuit breaker.
4. Fuse removal / insertion.
5. Manual spring charging.
6. Operating earthing mechanisms.
7. Install/remove equipment service tags.
5.2.8 Switching Explanation
Although switching is considered as a low risk activity by NFPA 70(E), a conservative
approach to selection of the switching PPE is recommended.
1. For switchboards which have been verified for internal arc containment, switching
activities with the doors closed require minimum level “standard” PPE.
2. For non-internal arc rated boards, recognizing that there is little probability of an arc
flash occurrence on the line side terminals during switching, appropriate PPE should be
selected based on the following criteria:
a. If the line side busbars and terminals are fully insulated or phase barriered – select
PPE Category based on Location B (busbar) incident energy assessment.
b. If the line side busbars and terminals are not fully insulated or phase barriered - select
PPE category based on Location A (line side) incident energy assessment.
5.2.9 Racking Definition
Racking is the process of connecting or disconnecting the functional unit from a bus via an
integrated mechanism.
5.2.10 Racking Explanation
1. For switchboards which have been verified for internal arc containment, racking in/out
of the functional units do not require special PPE. The selection of PPE to be used during
racking with doors open should be based on the following criteria:
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a. If the line side busbars and terminals are fully insulated or phase barriered, and the
racking device is a moulded case circuit breaker, supported and guided by a frame
assembly – select PPE category based on Location B (busbar) incident energy
assessment.
b. If the line side busbars and terminals are not fully insulated or phase barriered, or the
racking device is not a moulded case circuit breaker supported and guided by a
frame assembly – select PPE category based on Location A (line side) incident
energy assessment.
c. If the line side busbars and terminals are fully insulated or phase barriered, and the
racking device is an air circuit breaker supported and guided by a rigid frame
assembly, fitted with fail safe mechanical trip interlocks (cannot be withdrawn or
inserted into the busbar when the circuit breaker is closed) and fitted with busbar
shutters – select PPE category based on Location B (busbar) incident energy
assessment.
2. For switchboards which have not been verified for internal arc containment, PPE
selection for racking with doors open is a high-risk activity and the PPE should be
selected based on the worst-case incident energy result (Location A).
If racking is being carried out with the doors closed, the following criteria are
recommended:
a. If the line side busbars and terminals are fully insulated or phase barriered, and the
racking device is a moulded case circuit breaker supported and guided by a frame
assembly – select PPE category based on Location B (busbar) incident energy
assessment.
b. If the line side busbars and terminals are not fully insulated or phase barriered, or the
racking device is not a moulded case circuit breaker supported and guided by a
frame assembly – select PPE category based on Location A (line side) incident
energy assessment.
c. If the line side busbars and terminals are fully insulated or phase barriered, and the
racking device is an air circuit breaker supported and guided by a rigid frame
assembly, fitted with fail safe mechanical trip interlocks (cannot be withdrawn or
inserted into the busbar when the circuit breaker is closed) and fitted with busbar
shutters – select PPE category based on Location B (busbar) incident energy
assessment.
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6 Arc Flash Cautionary Labels
An adhesive arc flash cautionary label shall be produced for each switchboard or
equipment item requiring such labelling to inform personnel of potential arc flash
consequences and the required levels of arc rated PPE required for different activities. The
labels shall be logically located in relevant positions on the equipment so that they are easily
seen and read.
All the information required for the arc flash cautionary label shall be captured in tabular
format and shown on the Engineering Design Protection Grading drawings (Design Summary
or Primary Design).
The following information shall be included on the arc flash cautionary label:
Table 6-1 - Arc Flash Cautionary Label Information
Information Example
1 Site - main information Hallett Cove WWTP
2 Site - sub-information Pump Station No. 2
3 Equipment - main description PP-01 VSD Panel
4 Equipment - sub-description Incoming cables and busbar
5 Arc Fault Level 8.49 kA for 0.4 sec
6 Arc Fault Certification Status Certificate reference or “Unknown”
7 Date 12/08/2019
8 Company performing assessment Norfolk Engineering
9 Voltage (kV) 0.4
10 Incident Energy at Working Distance 0.84
(cal/cm2)
11 Arc Flash Boundary (closest approach 0.36
distance) (m)
12 Report details Arch flash performed by Norfolk
Engineering per document 13937-04
13 Validity Valid until 1/8/2024 (Validity will be void if
any changes are made to this electrical
installation.)
14 Notes Common label applies to each VSD on
this panel. If energy levels exceed 40
cal/cm2 - follow risk assessment
15 A table of minimum arc rated PPE (Refer Figure 6-1and Figure 6-2 for
requirements against operational activities examples)
with doors open and doors closed.
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It is important that the arc flash labels are posted in appropriate locations and be visible,
securely attached, and maintained in legible condition. The bottom of the label should be
placed 1.5m from ground level. A ‘warning’ label shall be applied for arc flash ratings that do
not exceed Category 1. A ‘danger’ label will apply for ratings Category 2 and above.
Typical arc flash cautionary labels are provided in Figure 6-1and Figure 6-2 for reference. Visio
copies of these examples are available on request from SA Water.
WARNING
ARC FLASH AND SHOCK HAZARD
PPE REQUIREMENTS ARE MANDATORY
INCIDENT ENERGY AT WORKING
VOLTAGE (kV) ARC FLASH BOUNDARY (m)
Aldinga Waste Water DISTANCE (Cal/cm2 )
Treatment Plant
0.415 kV 2.99 Cal/cm2 0.80 m
Position A02MCC10 bus and
outgoing circuits TASK SPECIFIC PPE CATEGORIES FOR OUTGOING CIRCUITS
Equipment A02MCC10
ACTIVITY DOORS CLOSED DOORS OPEN
Location Aldinga Main MCC
RACKING Not Applicable Not Applicable
Arc Fault Level 7.62kA for 0.12s
SWITCHING CATEGORY 1 (SEE NOTE 1) CATEGORY 1 (SEE NOTE 1)
Arc Fault Certified Unknown ELECTRICAL WORK Not Applicable
CATEGORY 1 (SEE NOTE 1)
Date 12/03/2020 VISUAL INSPECTION CATEGORY 0 (SEE NOTE 2)
ABC Engineering
Company (for SA Water) OPERATING CONTROLS CATEGORY 0 (SEE NOTE 2) Not Applicable
CATEGORY 0 (up to 1.2 Cal/cm2) Arc flash assessment performed by ABC Engineering refer to document 102-REP-020_Rev A.
CATEGORY 1 (1.2 to 4 Cal/cm2) Valid until:12/03/2025 (Validity will be void if any changes are made to the electrical installation)
CATEGORY 2 (4 to 8 Cal/cm2)
CATEGORY 3 (8 to 25 Cal/cm2) Notes:
CATEGORY 4 (25 to 40 Cal/cm2)
DANGER (>40 Cal/cm2) 1.Outgoing circuits that are within the arc flash boundary (0.130m) of the incomer circuit,
PPE category 2 is applicable.
2.Reduced arc hazard levels are applied based on NFPA70E, Table 130.5 (C).
Figure 6-1 - Arc Flash ‘Warning’ Label Example
DANGER
ARC FLASH AND SHOCK HAZARD
PPE REQUIREMENTS ARE MANDATORY
INCIDENT ENERGY AT WORKING
VOLTAGE (kV) ARC FLASH BOUNDARY (m)
Bolivar WWTP- DISTANCE (Cal/cm2 )
DAFF Plant
0.415 kV 5.95 Cal/cm2 1.21 m
Position MCC01-Incomer and
Outgoing circuits TASK SPECIFIC PPE CATEGORIES FOR INCOMER AND OUTGOING CIRCUITS
Equipment MCC01
ACTIVITY DOORS CLOSED DOORS OPEN
Location DAFF MCC
RACKING Not Applicable Not Applicable
Arc Fault Level 15.27kA for 2s
SWITCHING CATEGORY 2 CATEGORY 2
Arc Fault Certified Unknown ELECTRICAL WORK Not Applicable
CATEGORY 2
Date 12/03/2020 VISUAL INSPECTION CATEGORY 0 (SEE NOTE)
ABC Engineering
Company (for SA Water) OPERATING CONTROLS CATEGORY 0 (SEE NOTE) Not Applicable
CATEGORY 0 (up to 1.2 Cal/cm2)
CATEGORY 1 (1.2 to 4 Cal/cm2) Arc flash assessment performed by ABC Engineering refer to document 188-REP-022_Rev A.
CATEGORY 2 (4 to 8 Cal/cm2)
CATEGORY 3 (8 to 25 Cal/cm2) Valid until: 12/03/2025 (Validity will be void if any changes are made to the electrical installation)
CATEGORY 4 (25 to 40 Cal/cm2)
DANGER (>40 Cal/cm2) Note: Reduced hazard level is applied based on NFPA70E, Table 130.5(c)
Figure 6-2 - Arc Flash ‘Danger’ Label Example
In addition to the above warning/danger labels, a general PPE label similar to that of Figure
6-3, which contains protective clothing details that needs to be worn for the various incident
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energy levels, shall be posted at the entrances to areas and/or on the protective enclosures
on which the arc flash assessment has been undertaken. SA Water representatives may be
sought for guidance on suitable locations.
This general information is to be provided on a suitably formatted sign made using fit-for-
purpose material, separate to the Arc Flash rating signs, and located in a prominent and
relevant position.
ARC FLASH CATEGORIES - PPE REQUIREMENTS
APPLY PPE CATEGORIES LISTED BELOW
AS SPECIFIED BY INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT SIGNS ON THIS SITE
Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy Incident Energy
below 1.2 cal/cm2 1.2 to < 4 cal/cm2 4 to < 8 cal/cm2 8 to < 25 cal/cm2 25 to < 40 cal/cm2
MINIMUM PPE Arc-Rated Clothing - Arc-Rated Clothing - Arc-Rated Clothing - Arc-Rated Clothing -
FOR SITE Minimum Arc Rating Minimum Arc Rating Minimum Arc Rating Minimum Arc Rating of
of 4 cal/cm2 (16.75 of 8 cal/cm2 (33.5 of 25 cal/cm2 (104.7 40 cal/cm2 (167.5 J/cm2
(Specified on a per- J/cm2 ): J/cm2 ): J/cm2 ): ):
site basis.) Arc-rated long- Arc-rated long- Appropriate clothing Appropriate clothing
sleeve shirt and sleeve shirt and system to meet the system to meet the
pants or arc-rated pants or arc-rated minimum arc rating minimum arc rating
coverall coverall
Arc-rated face Arc-rated arc flash Arc-rated arc flash Arc-rated arc flash suit
shield suit hood or suit hood hood
This is a suggested arc-rated face shield
minimum: and arc-rated
balaclava
Sturdy covered Industrial work Industrial work Industrial work boots Industrial work boots
footware boots boots
Long sleeve shirt Safety glasses or Safety glasses or Safety glasses or Safety glasses or safety
and pants safety goggles safety goggles safety goggles goggles
Safety glasses or Hearing protection Hearing protection Hearing protection Hearing protection (ear
safety goggles – if (ear plugs) (ear plugs) (ear plugs) plugs)
specified. Heavy duty leather Heavy duty leather Arc Rated Gloves Arc Rated Gloves
gloves gloves
Hard Hat Hard Hat Hard Hat Hard Hat
Figure 6-3 - General PPE Information Label Example
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Figure 6-4 - Example Label to be Used Where Space is Limited
All equipment rated Category 3 and above shall have the arc flash boundary suitably
identified on the ground.
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7 Assessment Outcome and Control
The arc flash assessment study and calculation report shall be documented, covering the
following as a minimum:
1. Different operational scenarios considered in the study,
2. Worst-case scenario calculation results, including arc flash boundary, incident energy
category at the working distance, the arc flash safety in design approach and
outcomes,
3. A summary of arc flash PPE categories,
4. All applicable arc flash cautionary labels,
5. Arc flash mitigation measures and recommendations as applicable, and
6. Software model shall be included as a deliverable with any associated data and
reference files.
Changes to the electrical equipment, protection devices and settings (except for changes
recommended as part of the arc flash assessment study) will affect the arc flash incident
energy levels. If these changes occur after the final arc flash assessment study, the arc flash
energy levels shall be re-assessed in accordance with the requirements of this document.
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8 Switchboard Design and Configuration Principles
The power reticulation strategy that SA Water intends to implement is based around the
following power reticulation configuration and switchboard design principles outlined in this
section.
8.1 LV Power Reticulation Philosophy
SAPN LV
Generator Supply
Supply/Supplies
MAIN SWITCHBOARD
(Generally external to a building and contains metering equipment)
DISTRIBUTION SWITCHBOARD
(Generally inside a building)
GENERAL LIGHT AND POWER
MOTOR CONTROL CENTRE PLC/RTU/COMMS CABINET
DISTRIBUTION BOARD
(Generally inside a building) (Generally inside a building)
(Generally inside a building)
Figure 8-1 - LV Power Reticulation Philosophy
Table 8-1 - Switchboard Configuration Approach
Maximum Permitted Arc Maximum Permitted Arc
Arc Fault Containment
Flash Category Rating Flash Category Rating
Description Required to AS61439
(with Doors Open) – (with Doors Closed) –
(Appendix ZD(1))
refer to Note 2 refer to Note 2
Main Switchboard Yes 2(2b) 0
Dependent on arc flash
Distribution Switchboard 1(2c) 0
assessment
Dependent on arc flash
Motor Control Centre 1 0
assessment
General Light and Power
No 0 0
Distribution Board
PLC/RTU/Comms N/A (Arc flash free N/A (Arc flash free
No
Cabinet zones) zones)
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Notes:
1. Applicable to incomer, main busbar and outgoing connections
2. Maximum Arc Flash Category Rating:
a. In general, the desired category rating of any new switchboard is Category 0,
however, it is acknowledged that this is not always possible.
b. Main Switchboard – Category 2
The Designer should set out to achieve a Category rating of no more than ‘2’, but SA
Water will accept up to a Category ‘4’ rating if complexity, cost and timing factors
provide suitable justification.
c. Distribution Switchboard – Category 1
The Designer should set out to achieve a Category rating of no more than ‘1’, but SA
Water will accept up to a Category ‘2’ rating if complexity, cost and timing factors
provide suitable justification.
8.2 General Design Requirements for Switchboards
All switchboards rated above 250 Amps shall be verified to provide arc flash energy
containment. The arc flash energy containment shall be valid for any arc flash event
occurring at any point within the switchboard.
a. Where an arc flash event is controlled using specific blast chutes and vents external to the
switchboard, signage shall be provided clearly stating the area around the switchboard
with restricted access. Arc chutes and vents shall be configured such that arcing exhaust
gases are evacuated to the exterior of the switchboard/building in such a way that does
not present a hazard to personnel.
b. If a switchboard has been designed with different sections of the switchboard having
different Arc Flash Category ratings and these sections have been verified to provide arc
flash containment to other sections, cable ways between the sections shall not
compromise the arc fault containment of either section.
c. Incoming and outgoing feeds from any module within the switchboard shall be protected
such that accidental live contact when working in the module is not possible, e.g.
accidental dropping of small items such as bolts, screws and washers which could create
a short circuit or an arc flash event.
d. Segregation between vertically arranged modules shall be a minimum of IP4X to prevent
small items falling vertically between modules.
e. Segregation between modules and busbar sections shall be a minimum of IP4X.
f. Segregation between modules and cable zones shall be a minimum of IP2X.
8.3 Main Switchboards
Main Switchboards shall typically be designed as standalone switchboards, which may
contain a main circuit breaker(s), emergency generator circuit breaker, solar supply input,
manual or automatic transfer switch, supply authority metering and CTs, and the site MEN link.
All new Main Switchboards shall be arc fault contained, with an absolute maximum arc flash
energy rating of less than 40 cal/cm2 (i.e. maximum of Category 4), but preferably an arc
flash energy rating of less than 8 cal/cm2 (Category 2 or below).
Where a Category 4 arc flash energy rating or less cannot be achieved due to limitations of
the existing upstream protective device, the Contractor shall liaise with the relevant electrical
utility provider in an effort to modify/replace the upstream protective device, to reduce the
associated risks.
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8.4 Distribution Switchboards
Distribution Switchboards shall typically be designed as standalone switchboards, containing
a main incoming circuit breaker, power metering and distribution circuit breakers to supply
power to various plant areas and equipment.
The need for arc fault containment of any new Distribution switchboard shall be determined
by the arc flash assessment conducted on each site, restricting arc flash energy to a rating of
< 4 cal/cm2 (Category 1).
A Distribution Switchboard will typically supply the following loads:
1. Other local power distribution switchboards
2. Local motor control centres
3. Local control panels
4. General light and small power distribution boards
5. Proprietary standalone process equipment packages
6. Power conditioning equipment
7. UPS systems, etc.
8.5 Motor Control Centres
Motor Control Centres shall typically be designed as standalone switchboards, containing a
main incoming circuit breaker, power metering, motor starting and control equipment (i.e.
circuit breakers, contactors, relays, overloads, soft starters, etc.) and suitable interfaces to the
wider control system i.e. segregated PLC/RTU section or facilities to interface to a separate
PLC/RTU panel.
The need for arc fault containment of any new Motor Control Centre shall be determined by
the arc flash assessment conducted on each site, restricting arc flash energy to a rating of < 4
cal/cm2 (Category 1).
Consideration should also be given to the location of any Variable Speed Drives. Where
space and installation environment/methodology allow, VSDs shall be IP54, mounted external
to the switchboard i.e. mounted on the switchroom building internal wall.
Multiple Motor Control Centres shall be considered for areas where:
1. Category 1 arc flash energy ratings cannot be achieved through the use of one
switchboard.
2. The required maximum demand is greater than 800 Amps.
3. The board length introduces supply, transportation, construction or installation issues.
4. There are benefits in providing electrical redundancy in the system.
5. There are benefits when carrying out future board replacement programs.
8.6 Distribution Boards or Sections Rated ≤ 250A
Low voltage distribution boards and control panels incorporating low voltage distribution
sections pose a potential risk to personnel, as typically these boards are not designed with
specific arc fault containment measures and are often accessed by non-electrically qualified
workers i.e. operations or maintenance personnel.
All low voltage distribution boards and control panels for this purpose shall have a maximum
current rating of ≤ 250A. Multiple distribution boards/control panels shall be installed if a
current rating above 250A is required.
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These boards typically contain a main incoming circuit breaker, power metering, distribution
circuit breakers, lighting and emergency control circuits, RCD testing facilities, surge
protection, etc.
These boards shall typically be designed as follows:
1. Maximum rating of 250 Amps and protected by a maximum 250 Amp adjustable circuit
breaker located within the upstream switchboard (i.e. within the Distribution
Switchboard or Motor Control Centre).
2. Arc flash energy rating of < 1.2 Cals/cm2 (i.e. Category 0). This will allow acceptable
safe access to Operators in appropriate standard PPE (i.e. clothing with typically > 80%
natural fibre and standard safety glasses).
3. Where attainment of Category 0 cannot be achieved, the capacity of the distribution
switchboard and associated protective devices shall be reduced to a level, lower than
250 Amps, which achieves a Category 0 rating. e.g. installation of multiple, lower-rated
distribution boards.
4. If it is not possible to demonstrate Category 0 attainment through calculation, providing
distribution boards with upstream protection limited to 63A or less, will be an
acceptable mitigation outcome.
5. For boards or sections which are accessible to personnel without an electrical license
(e.g. PLC cabinet, telemetry section, etc.), a minimum degree of protection of IPXXC
(i.e. 2.5mm diameter holes at least 100mm distant from live parts) shall be provided in
addition to ensuring that at the position of operation or inspection, arc flash energy
exposure is Category 0. Also, all cabling exposed to touch must be double insulated in
line with AS/NZS3000 requirements.
To minimise the size of these types of boards, all three-phase outlet circuit breakers shall be
supplied directly from the Distribution Switchboard or respective local Motor Control Centre.
Low Voltage Distribution Boards shall not be contained within other switchboards unless it can
be demonstrated that they are fully isolated (in an arc flash perspective) from the rest of the
switchboard, and achieve a Category 0 arc flash rating themselves.
8.7 Arc Detection Systems
Arc fault detection devices using optical technology, in combination with current
measurement sensors, or similar mitigation devices, are recommended for LV switchboards
rated 800A or more. The arc detection system can be used to trigger the operation of circuit
breakers well in advance of the normal trip caused by arc fault current alone.
Arc fault detectors shall be located in order to detect arc faults which occur:
• At the point of switchboard connection to the incoming supply;
• In the incoming circuit breaker compartment;
• Along the main busbar, (unless this is fully insulated);
• Along the distribution busbar, (unless this is fully insulated);
• In outgoing circuit breaker compartments; and
• In motor starter compartments, except where protected by HRC fuses which limits the
peak cut-off current to less than 17 kA, and the line side, of which is fully insulated.
The switchboard manufacturer shall perform tests to verify the performance and safety of arc
detection systems and provide certified test reports to SA Water. Where optical arc flash
detection protection is installed, warning labels are to be attached to the switchboard and in
a prominent position on each switchroom personnel access door. The mounting height of the
warning labels must be at least 1500mm from floor level.
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
Appendix A – Excerpts from NFPA 70E
A1 Table 130.5 (C)
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
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For Official Use Only Uncontrolled when printed or downloaded
TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
A2 Table 130.7 (C)
Table 8-2 - NFPA 70E Table 130.7 (C)
Arc-Flash PPE PPE
Category
1 Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 4 cal/cm2 (16.75 J/cm2)a Arc-rated
long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall Arc-rated face shieldb or arc
flash suit hood
Arc-rated jacket, parka, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN)
Protective Equipment
Hard hat
Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection (ear canal inserts)c
Heavy-duty leather glovesd Leather footwear (AN)
2 Arc-Rated Clothing, Minimum Arc Rating of 8 cal/cm2 (33.5 J/cm2)a Arc-rated
long-sleeve shirt and pants or arc-rated coverall
Arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated face shieldb and arc-rated balaclava Arc-
rated jacket, parka, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN) Protective Equipment
Hard hat
Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection (ear canal inserts) c
Heavy-duty leather glovesd Leather footwear
3 Arc-Rated Clothing Selected so that the System Arc Rating Meets the required
Minimum Arc Rating of 25 cal/cm2 (104.7 J/cm2)a
Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (AR) Arc-rated pants (AR) Arc-rated coverall (AR)Arc-
rated arc flash suit jacket (AR) Arc-rated arc flash suit pants (AR) Arc-rated arc
flash suit hood
Arc-rated glovesd
Arc-rated jacket, parka, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN)
Protective Equipment
Hard hat
Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection (ear canal inserts) c
Leather footwear
4 Arc-Rated Clothing Selected so that the System Arc Rating meets the required
Minimum Arc Rating of 40 cal/cm2 (167.5 J/cm2)a
Arc-rated long-sleeve shirt (AR) Arc-rated pants (AR) Arc-rated coverall (AR)
Arc-rated arc flash suit jacket (AR) Arc-rated arc flash suit pants (AR) Arc-rated
arc flash suit hood
Arc-rated glovesc
Arc-rated jacket, parka, rainwear, or hard hat liner (AN)
Protective Equipment
Hard hat
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TS 0371 Arc Flash Hazard Assessment and Design Aspects SA Water - Technical Standard
Arc-Flash PPE PPE
Category
Safety glasses or safety goggles (SR) Hearing protection (ear canal inserts) c
Leather footwear
AN: As needed (optional). AR: As required. SR: Selection required.
a Arc rating is defined in Article 100.
b Face shields are to have wrap-around guarding to protect not only the face but also the
forehead, ears, and neck, or, alternatively, an arc-rated arc flash suit hood is required to be
worn.
cOther types of hearing protection are permitted to be used in lieu of or in addition to ear
canal inserts provided they are worn under an arc-rated arc flash suit hood.
dIf rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors are used, additional leather or arc-rated
gloves are not required. The combination of rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors
satisfies the arc flash protection requirement.
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ELECTRICAL
ARC FLASH
HAZARD
MANAGEMENT
GUIDELINE
March 2019
This publication is supported by AGL
pursuant to an enforceable undertaking
Intellectual property licence
AEC grants SafeWork NSW a permanent,
CONTENTS
between AGL Macquarie ACN 167 859 494
irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, non-
and SafeWork NSW, dated 16 April 2018. 1.0 PREFACE 4
exclusive license to use, reproduce, distribute,
This document has been prepared by a cross electronically transmit, electronically 2.0 OBJECTIVES 6
section of Electricity generation industry distribute, adapt, and modify any materials
practitioners and professionals and is developed as a result of this enforceable 3.0 SCOPE 8
endorsed by the Australian Energy Council undertaking. 4.0 CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN FACTORS 10
(AEC). The contribution of AGL Macquarie,
Alinta Energy, Synergy, Delta Electricity, 5.0 ELECTRICAL ARC FLASH HAZARD MANAGEMENT 12
Stanwell, CS Energy, Hydro Tasmania, Snowy A commitment regarding linking the strategy 5.1 Overview of Hazard Management Process 12
Hydro, Thomson Bridge, Origin Energy, and promotion of benefits to the enforceable
ENGIE, HIESN and Palisade Asset Management undertaking 5.2 What is an Arc Flash? 13
is appreciated. AEC is committed to ensuring that any 5.3 What is Arc Plasma? 15
This document was published by the promotion of a benefit arising from this 5.4 Other products of an Arc Fault 15
Australia Energy Council (AEC) Level 14, enforceable undertaking will clearly link
the benefit to the undertaking and that the 5.5 When and where do electrical faults occur? 16
50 Market Street, Melbourne, VIC, 3000.
undertaking was entered into as a result of the Table 1: Increasing arc flash risks with work activity 19
alleged contravention.
5.6 Incident Energy / Heat Flux 19
Disclaimer
5.8 Effective implementation of arc flash controls 20
This document refers to various standards,
guidelines, calculations, legal requirements, 5.8.1 Labelling 20
technical details and other information.
Table 2: Typical electrical worker activities and suggested risk controls 23
Over time, changes in Australian Standards,
6.0 DEMONSTRATION OF INDEPENDENT COMPETENCY IN PERFORMING
industry standards and legislative
THE FOLLOWING TASKS 29
requirements, as well as technological
advances and other factors relevant to the 7.0 ADDRESSING THE HUMAN FACTORS 34
information contained in this document, Table 3: Typical human factor activities and suggested risk controls 36
may affect the accuracy of the information
contained in this document. Accordingly, 8.0 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 38
caution should be exercised in relation to 9.0 ANNEXES 39
the use of the information contained in this
document. Annex A: Arc Flash Risk Assessment and Control 40
Correspondence should be addressed to the Annex B: Arc-Rated Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment 47
GM Policy and Research, Australian Energy Annex C: Do’s and DON’T’s of Arc Flash Labelling 50
Council (AEC), Level 14, 50 Market Street,
Annex D: Arc Flash Incident Energy Calculation Methods (‘Theory’) 52
Melbourne, VIC, 3000.
Annex E: Calculating Incident Energy or Heat Flux (‘Practice’) 56
Annex F: Electrical Arc Flash Hazards Management Guideline Checklist 61
COPYRIGHT
Annex G: References 62
© 2019 Australian Energy Council
Annex H: Definitions 64
1.0 PREFACE
2
0 cal/cm
2
4 cal/cm
2
8 cal/cm
2
25 cal/cm
2
40 cal/cm
Electric arc flash is a serious hazard which has This Guideline recommends minimum industry PPE PPE PPE PPE PPE
CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY
the potential for personnel injury, equipment standards, is advisory only and does not
damage and loss of business objectives. In
Australia, it has been found that there is a
need for increased awareness and greater
substitute for, or override, any legislation,
regulation or safety rules implemented by
jurisdictional regulators or Energy Industry
0 1 2 3 4
education within the Energy Industry to operators.
eliminate or minimise the risk of injury to
Supporting and detailed technical information Icons in this guideline. Refer to Diagram 18 in Annex B for a more detailed description of correct PPE categories.
persons from an arc flash.
has been provided in several annexes to
The guidance material on the elimination assist the development and implementation
or minimisation of arc flash hazards across of Energy Industry organisations’ specific arc
Australian workplaces is not available in flash hazard management systems. They have
an accessible or practical form and is not been provided for the purpose of information
available free of charge. Currently there are and guidance only.
several national and international standards
and a large volume of technical material
published by standards organisations, industry
associations and equipment manufacturers on Time to arc flash — 5 mS
electric arc flash. There is a need however for
Temperature of arc flash plasma — 5000°С
a consolidated guideline that incorporates the
collective electric arc flash hazard knowledge
and experience and the presentation in an
Metal Vapor
easy-to-read guideline that can be easily
accessed and shared by in the Australian
Energy Industry.
Further, there is a need for consideration of
the general effect of human factors and of the
specific requirements of young workers and
workers deemed ‘vulnerable’ (such as workers
with an inadequate amount of training or
competency in arc flash risk controls) in the
Energy Industry in managing electric arc flash
hazards.
Intense Light
Sound Waves > 140 db
Pressure Waves > 13.7 MPa
Shrapnel
Molten Metal Droplets
Diagram 1. Arc flash effects
4 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 5
2.0 OBJECTIVES Supporting and detailed technical information
has been provided in several annexes, namely:
The objectives of this Guideline are to: This Guideline supports the objectives of >> Annex A: Arc Flash Risk Assessment
the This Guideline supports the objectives >> Annex B: Arc-Rated Clothing and Personal
>> Provide an effective hazard management
of the National Electricity Network Safety Protective Equipment
process and set of recommended
Code (ESAA NENS 09) to promote nationally
practices appropriate to the Australian >> Annex C: Do’s and DON’T’s of Arc Flash
consistent practices within the Energy
context, for application where electrical Labelling
Industry for arc-rated clothing and Personal
arc flash hazards may be encountered >> Annex D: Arc Flash Incident Energy
Protective Equipment (PPE) for all work on
across the construction, operation, and Calculation Methods (‘Theory’)
or near electrical equipment where there is
maintenance of electrical apparatus within
a possibility of exposure to residual arc flash >> Annex E: Calculating Incident Energy or
the Energy Industry.
incident energy above 5J/cm2 (1.2cal/cm2). Heat Flux (‘Practice’)
>> Progressively eliminate or minimise
the risk of arc flash hazards through >> Annex F: Electrical Arc Flash Hazards
improving understanding and application Management Guideline Checklist
of arc flash hazards, their assessment and >> Annex G: References
their control. >> Annex H: Definitions
>> Provides an explanation as to how human
factors (that being the interaction of
individuals with each other, in teams, It is not the intent of this guideline to set out
with equipment and with management a detailed procedure, and as such, procedures
systems) and workplace safety culture should be developed by each Energy Industry
and attitudes contribute and can be organisation in accordance with the principles
influenced to eliminate or minimise the contained in this Guideline.
risk associated with arc flash. This guideline is supported by an online video
>> Advance the current arc flash literature on electrical arc flash hazards and potential
with the specific requirements of people control measures to reduce or eliminate the
deemed ‘vulnerable’ working within the risk of arc flash occurring. Like this Guideline,
Energy Industry. the online video is published by the Australia
Energy Council (AEC) Level 14, 50 Market
>> Provide education on arc flash hazards
and their assessment (through the Street, Melbourne, VIC, 3000.
calculation of incident energy or heat
flux and other technical information that
is considered beneficial to the Energy
Industry).
6 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 7
3.0 SCOPE
These Guidelines apply when Energy Industry This guide does not cover specific live line
workers are required to perform any activity work techniques, such as glove and barrier
on or near electrical equipment where arc or bare hand live line techniques.
flash and electric shock hazards exist [and
Other workplace hazards and associated
as a guide relates to minimum work on or
controls required for effective hazard
near energized equipment above Extra Low
identification and risk management not
Voltage (ELV) limits, i.e. 50 V ac (rms) or
covered within these Guidelines are to be
120V dc (ripple free)].
identified and effectively implemented by
Recommendations within these Guidelines risk assessment and subsequent application
relate to core electrical arc flash hazard of the hierarchy of control, and as referenced
management as well as electrical hazards in respective to applicable Acts, Regulations,
(e.g. electrocution) and other workplace Codes of Practice, Standards and Guideline.
hazards (e.g. working at height) where relevant.
This guideline includes high voltage and low
voltage. Arc flash risk is often incorrectly
only associated with high voltage equipment.
Whilst the probability of initiating an arc flash
is greater the higher the voltage (due to the
greater ability to breakdown insulation), arcs
Operating/
can initiate at low voltage. Low voltage arc Racking
flash often results in higher incident energy
at the working position, due to the increased
fault currents and a range of other factors.
Other
work
Electrical Test
work voltage
H
Cleaning
V
7
×
LV
Diagram 2. Low Voltage is far more dangerious than High Voltage Diagram 3. Exposure to arc flash
8 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 9
4.0 CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN FACTORS
Across Australia, the risk of arc flash incidents The types of human factors that can interfere
or incidents involving electrical hazards with safe and effective electrical arc flash
(such as working on energised equipment risk controls being implemented by electrical Vulnerable
when permitted by law) are affected by any workers can include (but are not limited to): EXPERIENCE
or ‘at risk’
range of human factors in people who perform
1. Training and competency: where electrical
tasks as electrical workers.
workers are not educated and competent
On occasion, electrical work is performed by in the arc flash hazard, they are unaware Apprenticeship (under 25 yr old) Electrical worker’s working lifespan Retirement (65 yr old)
people who are young (such as apprentices of the potential for an arc flash incident to
who are largely less than 25 years of age) or cause harm ;
who are deemed ‘vulnerable’ – perhaps as a 2. Errors, mistakes and lapses: where people
result of their age, experience or length of Diagram 4. Vulnerable or ‘at risk’ worker
make errors in process (across a very
service, their level of skill and competence wide range of reasons) that results in
or as a result of relevant and potentially compromising the effectiveness of an arc
multiplied ‘human factors’ that are present flash risk control;
across the Energy Industry. As these human
factors may contribute to electrical incident 3. Complacency: both with the risks and
WORKPLACE CULTURE TRAINING AND COMPETENCY
and accidents the management of (and with the process of arc flash risk controls; Peoples whose actions are affected by the where people are not aware of arc flash
interaction of (actual or perceived) workplace incidents or are unaware of the potential for
training in) human factors is an important 4. Time pressure: where the ability to culture, being bullied or facing peer pressure an arc flash incident to cause significant harm
issue for all electrical workers occurring in the properly implement an administration from team-members and/or their Supervisors /
Team Leaders and a lack of accountability
Energy Industry. control (such as a permit to work) is across all aspects of electrical works. ERRORS, MISTAKES AND
LAPSES
compromised;
By definition, human factors are the wide where people make errors in
process (across a very wide
range of issues that affect how people 5. Violations: where people deliberately range of reasons) that results in
perform tasks in their work (and non-work and willingly work ‘outside’ known MENTAL HEALTH compromising the effectiveness
ISSUES AND CONCERNS of an arc flash risk control
environments); how they interact with risk controls and expected skills and
each other across teams, equipment and competencies.
workplaces and how they interact with
management systems and technology. Human
6. Information overload: where the HUMAN
information is unclear, overwhelming or
factors are the social and personal skills which duplicated to people leading to confusion FACTORS COMPLACENCY
can complement (but also distract from) and errors (this often affects a contracted DISTRACTIONS
that can interfere with
both with the risks
and with the process
technical skills and they are important for safe workforce who are commonly assigned
that are both work and
non-work related and all
the effectiveness of of arc flash risk
and effective electrical work. higher risk work); lead to a ‘breaking’ or a risk controls across controls
person’s concentration the electrical
Electrical workers in the Energy Industry are 7. Distractions: that are both work and non- resulting in error (such as industry/Generation
non-work related Sector
deemed ‘vulnerable’ workers as they are a work related and all lead to a ‘breaking’ or distractions resulting from
type of worker that has a greater exposure a person’s concentration resulting in error mobile phones)
and are at increased risk of fatality or injury (such as non-work related distractions
/ incident than most - due to both the types resulting from mobile phones); TIME PRESSURE
INFORMATION where the ability to properly
of electrical work that they perform and
8. Mental health issues and concerns; OVERLOAD implement an administration
in recognition of the many ‘human factors’ where the information is control (such as a permit to
that interact with their safe and effective 9. Peoples whose actions are affected by unclear, overwhelming or work) is compromised
duplicated to people
performance of technical work in the Energy the interaction of (actual or perceived) leading to confusion and
Industry. workplace culture, being bullied or facing errors (this often affects a VIOLATIONS
contracted workforce who where people deliberately and willingly
peer pressure from team-members and/ are commonly assigned work ‘outside’ known risk controls and
or their Supervisors / Team Leaders and a higher risk work) expected skills and competencies
lack of accountability across all aspects of
electrical works.
Diagram 5. Human factors
10 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 11
5.0 ELECTRICAL ARC FLASH HAZARD MANAGEMENT 5.2 WHAT IS AN ARC FLASH? The term Arc Flash comes from an earlier
understanding that the burns from an arc
An electrical arc fault is often referred to
fault were similar to the flash burns from a
5.1 OVERVIEW OF HAZARD To achieve this, the following steps should to as an Arc Flash.
welding arc. That is, the heat was transferred
MANAGEMENT PROCESS be undertaken: Arc faults arise when current flows through to the individual by the radiant heat and light
a. Understand the hazard the air between phase conductors or between (infrared – ultraviolet) from the arc.
When workers are required to work on or
phase conductors and neutral or ground. Put
near electrical equipment, all reasonably b. Identify assets or asset groups with arc Recent research has shown that, although
simply, an arc fault could be described as an
practicable measures should be taken to flash hazard potential the radiant energy from an electrical arc
unexpected, violent, electrical short circuit in
protect workers from the harmful effects of c. Quantify the hazard (calculate the arc contributes to the energy received, the major
the air that produces an arc and associated
electric arc flash hazards through hazard flash incident energy on each asset or hazard to an individual comes from the plasma
by-products.
elimination and risk reduction. asset group) ejected by an arc.
When arc faults occur, the resulting energy
d. Assess the risk (using your organisation’s released may be enough to seriously burn
risk management framework) or otherwise injure nearby persons, ignite
e. Develop and implement risk treatments flammable materials (including clothing),
using the hierarchy of controls and cause significant damage to plant and
f. Validate control effectiveness equipment.
g. Monitor and review.
1.
Understand the HAZARD
Air Plasma Cloud of Plasma Molten
jets with hot gas “dust” droplets
O¯, N¯, Cu+ (CuO smoke) shower
2. HAZARD RISK
Identify assets or asset groups
with arc flash HAZARD potential
RD
3. HA
ZA RI
SK
Quantify the HAZARD (calculate
the arc flash incident energy on
each asset or asset group)
4.
Assess the RISK (using your
organisation’s risk management HAZARD RISK
A HAZARD is something that has the
framework) potential to harm you.
RISK is the likelihood of a hazard
causing harm.
Driven away 20,000°C Pressure
5. 6. 7. from source shock waves
of supply by and defening
Develop and implement RISK Validate control Monitor and magnetic sound
treatments using the hierarchy effectiveness review. forces
of controls
Diagram 6. Hazard management process Diagram 7. What is an Arc-flash?
12 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 13
5.3 WHAT IS ARC PLASMA? 5.4 OTHER PRODUCTS OF
Arc Plasma is the fourth (4th) state of matter AN ARC FAULT
(solid, liquid, gas, plasma) and is probably Along with the thermal effects of plasma
Copper Vapor 35,000 F
best described as ‘super-heated ionised gas’. and radiated heat/light, an arc fault may also
Molten Metal >1,800 F produce the following:
The arc plasma ejected by an electrical arc
Intense Light fault may be at temperatures more than >> Molten metal droplet spray and metal
Hot Air > 500 F 5000 degrees (C) and has sometimes been vapour;
Pressure Waves > 2000 lb/psf described as a “fireball or plasma ball” coming
>> Ejected debris;
Sound Waves > 140 db from an arcing fault.
>> Pressure wave;
Shrapnel > 740 mph Contact with this 5000-degree (C) plasma
“fireball” may lead to serious burns. >> Noise.
Importantly though, such contact may also The arc flash will melt and vaporise
ignite non-arc rated clothing and other conductors and other material, which the
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) with sudden transition from solid to vapour results
burning clothing and PPE known as significant in a pressure wave from the rapid expansion
contributors to the seriousness of injury (for example copper expands 67,000 times in
outcomes. volume transitioning from solid to vapour).
Clothing and PPE often continue to burn and The high pressures can easily exceed hundreds
subsequently continue to impact even after or even thousands of kilos per square meter
the arc fault and contact with plasma have and can result in knocking workers off
ceased. ladders, rupturing eardrums and collapsing
a person’s lung. Material and molten metal
are expelled away from the arc at speeds
exceeding 1120 km/hr (700 mph) and are fast
enough for shrapnel to completely penetrate
the human body. The vaporised and molten
metal presents a hazard from both contact
and from the inhalation of hot and hazardous
compounds.
Arcs that occur in enclosures can be focused,
resulting in a higher-pressure rise directed
towards an enclosure opening (such as is
often the case when a panel door is open
and at the point where a person is likely to
be positioned).
Diagram 8. Other components of an Arc-flash
14 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 15
5.5 WHEN AND WHERE DO Any activity in the vicinity of energised
ELECTRICAL FAULTS OCCUR? conductors has the potential for arc flash,
but arc flash most commonly happens when
Unintended and uncontrolled electrical a person is working on an energised circuit
arc faults may occur in several workplace or equipment (knowing it is energised or
locations and circumstances, and during believing it is not). The risk increases by the
a range of activities. degree of interaction with the energised
equipment.
The diagram below indicates the increase in
risk in the performance of tasks:
Work on the Vicinity of Inspection Operating Inspection Testing voltage, Work on the Racking Restoration Commissioning Racking Restoration
equipment equipment (panel closed) equipment (panel open) including proving equipment (panels closed) (panel open) after a fault or
ACTIVITY
(isolated, proven (panels closed) de-energised (isolated but operation of
de-energised and not proven de- equipment with
earthed) energised) possible defect
RISK
Work on plant, Person standing Person standing in Person operating Person inspecting Person testing Person removing Person racking Person switching Person switching Person racking Person switching
with isolations near electrcial front of electrical equipment with open panel, using open panel, using component from circuit breaker, electrical electrical circuit breaker, electrical
locked and equipment panel, reading a operating handle IR thermometer multimete open panel, panel closed, with equipment on equipment on for panel open with equipment on
tagged, earths meter on the front using insulated racking handle the first time racking handle after a fault
applied, barriers panel screwdriver
and signs
AFTER
FIRST TIME FAULT
PLANT
ISOLATIONS
ON ON ON
EARTH
Workers in Workers in Workers in Workers in Workers in live Workers in live Workers in live Workers in Workers in Workers in Workers in Workers in
standard PPE standard PPE standard PPE operating PPE work PPE (helmet work PPE (helmet work PPE (helmet operating PPE operating PPE operating PPE operating PPE operating PPE
(helmet, safety (helmet, safety (helmet, safety (helmet and face and face shield, and face shield, and face shield, (helmet and face (arc flash suit) (helmet and face (helmet and face (helmet and face
glasses, ankle to glasses, ankle to glasses, ankle to shield, safety safety glasses, safety glasses, safety glasses, shield, safety shield, safety shield, safety shield, safety
wrist hi visibility wrist hi visibility wrist hi visibility glasses, balaclava, balaclava, ankle to balaclava, ankle to balaclava, ankle to glasses, balaclava, glasses, balaclava, glasses, balaclava, glasses, balaclava,
clothes, safety clothes, safety clothes, safety ankle to wrist hi wrist hi visibility wrist hi visibility wrist hi visibility ankle to wrist hi ankle to wrist high ankle to wrist hi ankle to wrist hi
boots) boots) boots) visibility clothes, clothes, insulated clothes, insulated clothes, insulated visibility clothes, visibility clothes, visibility clothes, visibility clothes,
insulated gloves gloves, safety gloves, safety gloves, safety insulated gloves insulated gloves insulated gloves insulated gloves
with leather over boots) boots) boots) with leather over with leather over with leather over with leather over
gloves, safety gloves, safety gloves, safety gloves, safety gloves, safety
Safety observer Safety observer Safety observer
boots) boots) boots) boots) boots)
with LV rescue kit with LV rescue kit with LV rescue kit
16 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 17
TABLE 1: INCREASING ARC FLASH RISKS WITH WORK ACTIVITY
5.6 INCIDENT ENERGY / HEAT FLUX Second-degree burns (also called
‘Partial Thickness Burns’) are possible
The amount of energy that strikes an on unprotected skin from exposure to arc
individual during an arc fault is termed fault incident energies. The onset of a second-
incident energy (sometimes referred to as degree burn on unprotected skin is likely to
Epidermis heat flux) and is usually measured in Joules/ occur at an exposure of 1.2 cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2)
cm2 (or calories/cm2). for one second.
Dermis
Hypoermis The arc energy is the energy in the arc, but Therefore, 5J/cm2 (1.2cal/cm2) is an important
(fat) the incident energy is the energy that reaches incident energy level threshold for arc fault
Muscle an individual or surface at a distance from hazard management.
the arc during an arc fault. The duration of an
Bone
arc fault is usually quite short and is primarily 5.7 RISK MITIGATION –
determined by the time it takes for over HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS
current protective devices to operate (i.e.
open the circuit). The model Work Health & Safety (WHS)
Regulations require duty holders to work
In general, the higher the fault current through the Hierarchy of Controls when
and/or the longer the protection clearing time, managing health and safety risks.
and/or and the shorter the distance from
the arc, the greater the incident energy. The ways of controlling risks are ranked from
Calculation of arc flash incident energy is the highest level of protection and reliability
2.5 cm = 5 J/cm2/second
covered in Annex D: Arc Flash Incident to the lowest – details of arc flash risk control
Second degree burns occur at 6 J/cm2 Energy Calculation Methods. measures are included in Annex A: Arc Flash
(1.2 cal/cm2) Risk Assessment.
Second degree burns equates to damage
through the epidermis, into the dermis
layer of the skin
Results in redness, blistering and pain.
Blistering may lead to permanent scars.
1 HIGHEST ELIMINATE MOST 1
Incident energy is the temperature
2 SUBSTITUTE 2
produced (in cal/cm2) at the distance
(usually eighteen inches) from the arc
3 Level of ISOLATE Reliability 3
flash.
health and of control
safety measures.
4 protection.
ENGINEER 4
5 ADMINISTRATE 5
6 LOWEST PPE LEAST 6
Hand 1 inch over It takes 1.2 cal/cm 2
flame for 1 second to create a second
equals 1 cal/cm2. degree burn. 1. Eliminate the hazard 4. Reduce the risk through engineering controls
2. Replace the hazard with something safer 5. Change/control the way people work
3. Separate the hazard from people 6. Protect the worker
Diagram 11. Arc flash control measures
Diagram 10. Second degree burns
18 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 19
5.8 EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION >> Administration – such as permits to work,
signs, barriers and similar processes which Label example
OF ARC FLASH CONTROLS HEADER stays constant
ensure consistent work methods that
With arc flash, where the hazard cannot be
eliminated, it is often a combination of control
minimise risk; DANGER
measures used to mitigate the hazard. Whilst >> Administration – such as labelling; DANGER ARC FLASH HAZARD
As per OCE, ENG, G01, 01
greater details are outlined in Annex A: Arc >> Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) ARC FLASH HAZARD
As per OCE, ENG, G01, 01
Equipment
Coal Handling Plant 415V SWBD A Pass LS
Flash Risk Assessment, this is typically: and Clothing.
Name:
Voltage Level, Fault Current,
5.8.1 LABELLING
415 45.35
>> Elimination – elimination, where possible, INTERNAL AREA
Volts: kA:
is the most effective risk control /
Door OPEN
To clearly communicate the arc flash risk on may change Incident Energy
Cal/cmˆ²
12.4 Arc Flash Boundary, m: 1.90
mitigation method.
>> This means working on energised
electrical equipment, it is recommended that
3 WARNING
3
electrical equipment is properly labelled.
equipment when: WARNING Arc Flash Hazard | Wear Category 3 PPE
It is recommended that the Energy Industry Arc Flash Hazard | Wear Category 3 PPE
(a) it is necessary in the interests of health considers all labels as needing to meet the • Bus name or equipment name
and safety that the electrical work is • Bus voltage level
requirements of Danger Signage (Danger FOOTER stays constant • Activity to be performend
carried out on the equipment while the signs communicate a hazard, condition or • Incident energy level
equipment is energised, or situation that is likely to be life threatening). • Arc flash boundary
• PPE
Example: It may be necessary that life- It is recommended that the Energy Industry
saving equipment remain energised and considers all labels provide the critical risk
operating while electrical work is carried information clearly, concisely and consistently. Diagram 12. Arc flash label design
out on the equipment. Whilst minimum size of labels cannot be
(b) it is necessary that the electrical recommended, it is a recommendation of this
equipment to be worked on is energised Guideline that labels are located so they are
in order for the work to be carried out clearly visible, well placed and include all the
properly, or information required in international arc flash Effective Risk HAZARD
documents and in a format consistent with
(c) it is necessary for the purposes of Australian requirements. The details included
Control Measures
testing required under clause 155, or in the labels are shown in the illustration below
(d) there is no reasonable alternative however as a minimum, it is recomended
means of carrying out the work that all Arc Flash Hazard labels across the
Australian Energy Industry include
>> Substitution –Replacing the higher risk (as a minimum):
activity with a lower risk. Replacing a
standard switchboard with one that has >> Bus Name or Equipment Name;
been designed and tested for arc-resistant >> Bus Voltage Level; 1 Energised
Electrical
Equipment
construction
>> Activity to be performed; (HAZARD)
>> Isolate – isolation of hazard which can
>> Incident Energy Level;
be achieved by working on de-energised
(and earthed) electrical equipment or >> Arc Flash Boundaries; and 2 Arc Flash Prevention Measures
- Elimination (For maintenance personnel)
using techniques like remote switching/ >> PPE Level Required for varying activity
• Isolation
• Prove deenergised
racking and switchboard status (for example door • Earthing (HV conductors)
• Isolation and earthing check and confirmation
open / door closed).
>> Engineering – such as arc resistant
3 Electrical Equipment • Barriers and signs
Arc Flash (INCIDENT) • Permit issue
switchboards designed to contain >> PPE – which protect people from the - Remote operation
• Arc flash mitigation - Prevention of inadvertent energisation - LOTO
and redirect the arc flash. Alternately, incident energy if all other controls fail measures - Arc flash protection
incorporating faster protection settings and an arc flash occurs. OUTCOME - Arc resistant panels - Optimised protection settings
- Arc flash incident energy reduction
4
Person Injured by - Arc flash boundaries
during maintenance work using remote Arc Flash - PPE - Insulated tools and test equipment
Whilst the effective implementation of
rackable circuit breakers. (OUTCOME)
arc flash controls in aged plants can be
>5J/cm2 arc flash
incredibly troublesome, some practical incident energy
recommendations have been provided in
Annex A: Arc Flash Risk Assessment.
Diagram 13. Layering of controls
20 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 21
22
that stage.
this Guideline.
Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline
the de-energisation, isolation and prove
It is not the intent of this guideline to set
The table demonstrates that the preferred
out detailed risk controls, and as such, risk
and what control measures are effective at
elimination of hazards is only possible after
Energy Industry organisation in accordance
controls should be developed, implemented
This table provides an example where typical
operators of the equipment. The table should
be considered as a guide and is advisory only.
steps required for electrical work (LV and HV)
with the principles or risk control contained in
and monitored and regularly reviewed by each
deenergised, which still results in hazard to the
TABLE 2: TYPICAL ELECTRICAL WORKER ACTIVITIES AND SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS
CONDITION LEVEL OF RISK*
OF BOARD *REFER TO DIAGRAM 11 -
WHAT TO
TASK
ENERGISED ARC-FLASH CONTROL LOOK OUT FOR
PANELS MEASURES
STATE
Work scoped Energised Closed Correct understanding of the work
3
Work identified to be done Confirmation bias may exist
Work inspection Energised Open Plant is energised and is at risk of arc flash.
Plant may require inspection to The inspection must not place the persons inspecting at
fully determine the scope and 4 5 6 risk. If it does, it should be treated
work instructions, or to correctly
design the isolations.
Risk Assessment and Work Energised Closed Work instructions and risk assessments can be limited by
instructions prepared the knowledge and experience of the persons creating
3 5 them. Check and challenge to ensure all the work and
Work instructions and risk
risks are identified.
assessments completed
Isolations designed Energised Closed The design of the isolations determines the effectiveness
of the Elimination control. Inaccuracy or lapses have a
Isolations and earthing required
potential major impact.
making the work area safe need to
be designed. 3 Should be checked by another person to ensure accuracy
Checking drawings for accurate information
Identifying all possible energised supplies
Approval of the work, risk Energised Closed The approval process is to ensure the work scope, risk
assessment and isolation design 3 assessment and isolation design process have been
as per company procedures completed correctly and thoroughly.
De-energisation (remote) Unknown Closed Ensure other personnel are not in the vicinity and at risk;
Switching of plant by means that 3 5 Ensure remotely operated plant is confirmed to have
does not require the operator to operated correctly.
stand in the arc flash boundary
De-energisation (local) Unknown Closed Ensure only load breaking rated plant is used to break load
currents;
Switching of plant that require the
4 5 6
Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines
operator to stand in the arc flash Operator should position themselves to stand to the side
boundary of plant where possible, to reduce the direct incident
energy from and arc flash.
23
Isolations applied Unknown Open Locks and Tags best practice;
Application of isolations as per Ensure 3 phase devices all phases operated correctly;
company procedures.
4 5 6
Ensure correct isolations devices identified, operated
correctly and confirmed in the correct state.
Prove circuits deenergised Deenergised Open Include all circuits that workers may be exposed to.
Prove the tester, before and after testing.
4 5 6
If the isolations are not correct, the prove deenergised test
may cause an arc flash.
Earths applied to HV conductors Deenergised Open If the conductor is energised, the earthing will cause an
and where required
4 5 6 arc flash.
Permit issued/job briefed Deenergised/ Open Permit issue is the formal acknowledgement by the work
earthed party that they correctly understand the permit conditions
Work party correctly briefed on
and will adhere to all safety instructions.
the safety precautions required
for the work to be undertaken. If 1 5 6 Last chance to confirm the safety precautions are correct
under a permit, the correct permit and the work can be completed safely.
issue is adhered to.
Complacency and inattention at this step place the work
party at risk.
Work party undertakes the work Deenergised/ Open Ensure work party is either competent to perform the
as per the work scope. earthed work, or adequately supervised.
1 5 6
Beware of scope creep, which may result in work beyond
what the risk assessment and isolation design allowed for.
Permit relinquished and cancelled Deenergised/ Open Permit holder and operator should check and confirm the
earthed state of the plant, to ensure it is safe to reenergise.
Work party relinquishes permit 1 5 6
and the operator cancels Left tools, earths or incorrectly replaced covers or fittings
can result in arc flash upon reenergisation
Earths removed Deenergised Open As soon as earths are removed, HV conductors are unsafe.
Removal of earths from 1 5 6 All earths must be removed, as reenergisation on an earth
conductors will result in a short circuit and potential arc flash risk.
Isolations restored to allow plant Unknown Open Ensure restoration of isolation will not inadvertently
to be energised 4 5 6 energise the plant as this can result in the isolation failing.
Reenergisation (remote) - Energised Closed Ensure other personnel are not in the vicinity and at risk;
Switching of plant by means that 3 5 Ensure remotely operated plant is confirmed to have
does not require the operator to operated correctly.
stand in the arc flash boundary
Reenergisation (local) Energised Closed Ensure only load breaking rated plant is used to break load
currents;
Switching of plant that require the
operator to stand in the arc flash 4 5 6 Operator should position themselves to stand to the side
boundary of plant where possible, to reduce the direct incident
energy from and arc flash.
Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines
Operational testing Energised Open Plant is energised.
Plant may require checking 4 5 6
and testing to ensure operating
24
correctly
6.0 DEMONSTRATION OF INDEPENDENT COMPETENCY
IN PERFORMING THE FOLLOWING TASKS
Supporting information has been provided in
several ‘informative’ annexes to assist with the Whilst definitions of electrical work (and electrical workers) differ across all Australian States
minimum competency requirements of Energy and Territories, it is the intent of this guideline to recommend the minimum competency
Industry organisations’ as they progress their requirements for workers who are (or have the potential to be) exposed to the harmful effects of
specific arc flash hazard management system. electric arc flash hazards.
The annexes provided are for information and It is recommended that the Energy Industry considers, as a minimum, the following:
guidance only.
TYPE OF MINIMUM COMPETENCY MINIMUM EDUCATIONAL TYPE OF MINIMUM COMPETENCY MINIMUM EDUCATIONAL
WORKER REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT WORKER REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT
Electrical Engineers >> Arc Flash Risk Assessment >> Registered and / or Operators >> Arc Flash Risk Assessment >> Registered and / or
>> Arc Rated Clothing and Australian recognised >> Arc Rated Clothing and Australian recognised
Personal Protective Equipment qualification in Electrical Personal Protective Equipment Operator Qualification
(including the limitations of Engineering (including the limitations of >> Electrical Plant Specific
arc flash PPE and incorrect Arc >> Instruction, Supervision, arc flash PPE and incorrect Arc Operator Training
Flash PPE) Information or Training in Flash PPE) >> Instruction, Supervision,
>> Arc Flash Labelling Human Factors >> Arc Flash Labelling Information or Training in
>> Arc Flash Incident Energy Human Factors
Calculation Methods (‘Theory’) Electrical >> Arc Flash Risk Assessment >> Registered and / or
>> Calculating Incident Energy or Contractors >> Arc Rated Clothing and Australian recognised Trade
Heat Flux (‘Practice’) Personal Protective Equipment based Qualification
>> References (including the limitations of >> Instruction, Supervision,
arc flash PPE and incorrect Arc Information or Training in
>> Definitions
Flash PPE) Human Factors
Electricians >> Arc Flash Risk Assessment >> Registered and / or
>> Arc Flash Labelling
>> Arc Rated Clothing and Australian recognised Trade
based Qualification >> References
Personal Protective Equipment
(including the limitations of >> Instruction, Supervision, >> Definitions
arc flash PPE and incorrect Arc Information or Training in
Flash PPE) Human Factors
>> Arc Flash Labelling Health & Safety >> Electrical Arc Flash Hazards >> Registered and / or
>> References Practitioners / Management Guideline Australian recognised
>> Definitions Professionals Checklist qualification in WHS (or
related discipline)
>> Instruction, Supervision,
Information or Training in
Maintenance >> Arc Flash Risk Assessment >> Registered and / or Human Factors
>> Arc Rated Clothing and Australian recognised
Maintenance Qualification Technical Trainers >> Arc Rated Clothing and >> Registered and / or
Personal Protective Equipment Personal Protective Equipment Australian recognised
(including the limitations of >> Specific and / or directly (including the limitations of qualification in WHS (or
arc flash PPE and incorrect Arc related industry experience arc flash PPE and incorrect Arc related discipline)
Flash PPE) >> Instruction, Supervision, Flash PPE) >> Instruction, Supervision,
>> Arc Flash Labelling Information or Training in >> Arc Flash Labelling Information or Training in
Human Factors Human Factors
>> References
>> Definitions
28 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 29 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 30
7.0 ADDRESSING THE HUMAN FACTORS
WORKPLACE CULTURE TRAINING AND COMPETENCY
Human factors play a significant role in how The recommended actions for organisations Peoples whose actions are affected by the where people are not aware of arc flash
interaction of (actual or perceived) workplace incidents or are unaware of the potential for
people organise, manage and conduct various to consider if human factors are or have the culture, being bullied or facing peer pressure an arc flash incident to cause significant harm
activities and how they respond to various potential to interfere with the effectiveness of from team-members and/or their Supervisors /
Team Leaders and a lack of accountability
situations. In the context of electric arc flash, risk controls are outlined below. All suggested across all aspects of electrical works. ERRORS, MISTAKES AND
these human factors and consideration of Human Factor risk controls have been LAPSES
where people make errors in
‘vulnerable’ people has gained considerable provided are for information and guidance process (across a very wide
attention. only and are still subject to a risk assessment range of reasons) that results in
MENTAL HEALTH compromising the effectiveness
per team, site or workplace.
Increasingly there is growing awareness for ISSUES AND CONCERNS of an arc flash risk control
consideration of the general effect of human
factors and of the specific requirements of
people deemed ‘vulnerable’ and currently HUMAN
working in the Energy Industry. The human
factors involved in incidents / accidents
FACTORS COMPLACENCY
DISTRACTIONS both with the risks
around electrical arc flash incidents in the that are both work and
that can interfere with and with the process
the effectiveness of
Energy Industry are: non-work related and all
risk controls across
of arc flash risk
lead to a ‘breaking’ or a controls
the electrical
>> Workers being inexperienced or having person’s concentration
resulting in error (such as industry/Generation
never received formal training (or been non-work related Sector
deemed competent) in electrical arc flash distractions resulting from
mobile phones)
hazards and the expected risk controls;
>> Workers making unintentional errors TIME PRESSURE
because of performing familiar tasks INFORMATION where the ability to properly
OVERLOAD implement an administration
out of habit or whilst on ‘auto-pilot’ or where the information is control (such as a permit to
perhaps because they are complacent or unclear, overwhelming or work) is compromised
duplicated to people
have made a mistake; leading to confusion and
errors (this often affects a VIOLATIONS
>> Workers making intentional errors or contracted workforce who where people deliberately and willingly
violating the procedures of safe work; are commonly assigned work ‘outside’ known risk controls and
higher risk work) expected skills and competencies
>> The self-imposed or actual pressure and
stress of insufficient time, high workloads
and interruptions / distractions;
>> Technical / other information overload
Diagram 14. Human factors
(this includes when safe work procedures
are ambiguous or confusing);
>> When personal stress or mental health
factors (such as relationship breakdown,
death of a family member etc) are
involved or are involved to a level that
workers are not used to dealing with; and
>> When the workplace contributes to an
unsafe workplace culture.
34 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 35
TABLE 3: TYPICAL HUMAN FACTOR ACTIVITIES
AND SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS
HUMAN FACTOR CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN FACTOR RISK CONTROL HUMAN FACTOR CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN FACTOR RISK CONTROL
Training and >> Commit to an implementation of the minimum competency Information >> Simple english documentation and signage
Competency requirements when working on / around electrical arc flash hazards Overload >> Local signage
>> Instruction, Supervision, Information or Training in Human Factors >> Removal of detail not required by person undertaking activity
>> Appropriate worker selection and monitoring to the ongoing >> Diligence towards the creation of simple software systems and
suitability of workers selected to perform relevant works processes toward Permit to Work Systems and other isolation tasks
Errors, Mistakes >> Verification activities. Isolation, plant ID and activity required Distractions >> Ensure levels and type of supervision matches the actual (or
and lapses >> Appropriate worker selection and monitoring to the ongoing potential) of arc flash hazards and risk
suitability of workers selected to perform relevant works >> Stop and think processess (Take 5)
>> Stop and think processess (Take 5) >> Ongoing safety observation process (Behavioural based)
>> Ongoing safety observation process (Behavioural based) >> Management, Team Leader and Supervisor and Peer walkdowns
>> Management, Team Leader and Supervisor and Peer walkdowns
Mental Health issues >> Ensure levels and type of supervision matches the actual (or
Effective QA documentation – Switching or job instruction
and concerns potential) of arc flash hazards and risk
>> Interlock and control – error tolerent equipment
>> Stop and think processess (Take 5)
>> Ongoing safety observation process (Behavioural based)
Complacency >> Ensure levels and type of supervision matches the actual (or
potential) of arc flash hazards and risk >> Management, Team Leader and Supervisor and Peer walkdowns
>> Commit to arc flash awareness activities by way of alerts, training, >> Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) and other Mental Health
refreshers, tool box talks, and lessons learned (post industry First Aid assistance in the event of worker disclosure of mental
incidents and accidents). health issues and concerns
Time Pressure >> Executive and Senior Management oversight Workplace >> Cultural audit
>> Proper planning and resourcing for activities Culture and other >> Accountability process implement for all levels of business
organisational /
>> Higher risk activities emphasised in risk assessment team factors >> Ensure levels and type of supervision matches the actual (or
>> Management, Team Leader and Supervisor and Peer walkdowns potential) of arc flash hazards and risk
>> Stop and think processess (Take 5)
Violations >> Ensure levels and type of supervision matches the actual (or
>> Ongoing safety observation process (Behavioural based)
potential) of arc flash hazards and risk
>> Management, Team Leader and Supervisor and Peer walkdowns
>> Accountability process implement for all levels of business
>> Executive oversight of competing business drivers
36 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 37
8.0 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 9.0 ANNEXES
The effective management of change is Annex A: Arc Flash Risk Assessment
especially important within the Energy
Annex B: Arc-Rated Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment
Industry because it supports communication,
teamwork and the effective coordination of Annex C: Do’s and DON’T’s of Arc Flash Labelling
activity toward the elimination or minimisation Annex D: Arc Flash Incident Energy Calculation Methods (‘Theory’)
of risk of injury to persons from an electrical
arc flash hazard. Annex E: Calculating Incident Energy or Heat Flux (‘Practice’)
Any organisations management of change Annex F: Electrical Arc Flash Hazards Management Guideline Checklist
method should be applied to any electrical Annex G: References
arc flash hazard management program and in
conjunction with Annex F: Electrical Arc Flash Annex H: Definitions
Management Guideline Checklist.
38 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines 39
ANNEX A: ARC FLASH RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL WHS RISK MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR
REQUIREMENTS ENERGISED WORK:
ASSESSING THE RISK OF ARC FLASH TO ASSESS THE RISK, CONSIDER: For work on or near energised electrical 1. A documented risk assessment;
equipment (including the isolation, testing for 2. Area clear of obstructions to allow for
The WHS Act and Regulations require persons >> What is the potential impact of the deenergised, and restoration of the equipment
who have a duty of care to ensure health and hazard? easy access and exit;
required for safe access), works must be
safety to ‘manage risks.’ This eliminates or >> Severity of the electrical hazard assessed for risk. 3. Point of supply clearly marked, labelled
minimises health and safety risks so far as is such as direct contact causing and capable of being operated quickly
reasonably practicable. As per Work Health & Safety Regulation 34 (with exceptions);
electrocution, fire or explosion
Duty to Identify Hazards requires a duty
Risk assessment involves considering what causing serious burns or death. 4. Following consultation with a person with
holder to identify of reasonably foreseeable
could happen if someone is exposed to a >> Number of persons exposed to management control of the workplace;
hazards (including arc flash hazards).
hazard and the likelihood of it happening. the hazard 5. Inadvertent contact prevented;
WHS regulation 35 requires risk management
As per Model Code of Practice - Managing >> Likelihood of the hazard causing harm 6. Carried out by a competent person;
to eliminate, and if not possible, to minimise
Electrical Risks in the Workplace (published >> Likely, unlikely, possible or would it be risks “so far as is reasonably practicable”. 7. With tools, testing equipment and PPE
as approved code of practice under Section a rare event
As per Work Health & Safety Act Division suitable for the work, properly tested and
274 of WHS Act), a risk assessment is to be
>> Frequency of exposure 4 Section 157 electrical work on energised maintained in good working order;
prepared. Control/mitigation measures are to
be put in place to reduce the level of risk so OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT electrical equipment – when permitted, is not 8. In accordance with a SWMS; and
far as is reasonably practicable. CONSEQUENCES & LIKELIHOOD ARE: carried unless: 9. With a safety observer, competent
RISKS CAN ARISE FROM THE >> Equipment working conditions a. It is necessary to do carry out the work in to implement control measures and
(wet condition, outdoors, confined space) the interests of health and safety. rescue the worker if necessary (with
FOLLOWING: the exception that not required if work
For example, it may be necessary that
>> Work practices (isolations, permits)
>> The properties of electricity (in the form life-saving equipment remain energised identified there is no serious risk and
and availability of work procedures to
of a hidden risk) as electrical currents and operating while electrical work is consisting only of testing
carry out electrical maintenance
are mostly invisible, have no smell or carried out; Until the arc flash hazard has been eliminated
sound (noting that some equipment does >> Experience, skill and capability of relevant
b. It is necessary that the electrical or isolated, personnel inside the arc flash
emit a sound when energised such as workers.
equipment is energised in order for the limit should be using PPE appropriate for the
Transformers and HV lines); energy level (cal/cm2).
work to be carried out properly;
>> Work environment such as wet weather,
c. It is necessary for the purposes of testing Electrical equipment shall be treated as
confined spaces and hazardous
required under clause 155; energised until it is isolated and proven
atmospheres;
d. There is no reasonable alternative means deenergised.
>> Competency of the individual carrying out
of carrying out the work. CONTROLS FOR ARC FLASH
the electrical work.
Work should be carried out in accordance of TYPICALLY RELY TO THE FOLLOWING
the requirements for energised work. PRINCIPLES:
>> Reduction of arc flash energy;
>> Reduce the exposure of personnel to the
arc flash;
>> Protect people from the arc flash though
application of the Hierarchy of Controls;
>> Increase the commitment to experience,
skills and capabilities of relevant workers.
40 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex A Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex A 41
HIERARCHY OF CONTROL RISK MITIGATION – ISOLATION ARC FLASH BOUNDARIES
Isolation of arc flash risk involves the Arc Flash Boundaries are the distances
separation of personnel from the energised from energised equipment that should be
electrical equipment and conductors. maintained to manage arc flash risk.
1 HIGHEST ELIMINATE MOST 1 Isolation is most effective for personnel
The boundaries are set around two key
who do not need to operate or work on the
criteria:
2 SUBSTITUTE 2 electrical equipment.
>> The distance for the standard levels of
Level of Reliability Some controls that may isolate the arc flash
3 ISOLATE 3 PPE to protect the person;
health and of control risk are:
safety measures. >> The amount of energy a person in the
4 ENGINEER 4 >> Restrict proximity to energised electrical working position will be exposed to
protection.
plant; during an arc flash.
5 ADMINISTRATE 5 >> Restrict switch rooms and substations to The determination of the appropriate
authorised personnel only; boundaries is by the reviewing Annex D – Arc
6 LOWEST PPE LEAST 6
>> Use Arc Flash boundaries; Flash Incident Energy Calculation Methods.
1. Eliminate the hazard >> Restrict access when switching or live The boundaries are defined as:
4. Reduce the risk through engineering controls
2. Replace the hazard with something safer 5. Change/control the way people work work is undertaken;
>> Arc Flash boundary (outer boundary):
3. Separate the hazard from people 6. Protect the worker >> Use remote switching and racking The flash boundary is the farthest
equipment; established boundary from the energy
>> Follow permit to work system and source. If an arc flash occurred, this
Diagram 15. Hierarchy of controls diagram to re-draw in new style electrical safety procedures; boundary is where an employee would be
exposed to a curable second-degree burn
>> Keep away from the arc flash boundary.
(1.2 cal/cm2).
RISK CONTROL / MITIGATION – RISK MITIGATION – SUBSTITUTION
ELIMINATION Substitution requires a hazard to be replaced
Elimination is the most effective risk control/ with a less dangerous hazard. With electrical
mitigation method. The elimination of arc equipment, there is little opportunity to
flash risk requires that there is no exposure of substitute.
personnel to energised electrical equipment,
either by the physical separation for the
energised equipment, or by the effective
isolation (and earthed if high voltage)
and proof that electrical conductors are 0
deenergised.
Whilst the isolation and earthing of
conductors eliminates the risk, the process
to isolate, prove deenergised and earth
conductors still has arc flash risk.
4
CONTROLS THAT MAY ELIMINATE THE
ARC FLASH RISK ARE: 2
1.
0
7m
>> Eliminate the need to be near energised
electrical conductors – relocate the work. 3
.4
>> Isolate and earth conductors, so they are
no longer energised.
3m
Diagram 16. 3D/Isometric to show boundary and people with PPE
42 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex A Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex A 43
RISK MITIGATION – Other recommended arc flash controls: RISK MITIGATION – Minimum PPE standards for access near
ENGINEERING CONTROLS ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS energised electrical equipment are:
>> New Plant (tips and pointers for
Engineering Controls for reducing the risk manufacturers or suppliers): Administrative controls minimise the risk from >> Safety glasses;
from arc flash are: >> Passive arc resistant design arc flash by ensuring appropriate procedures >> Safety boots;
(segregated bus compartments, are adhered to.
>> Availability of accurate and updated >> Ankle to wrist non-flammable clothing;
arc flash register and plant single line arc containment/diversion etc.) Examples of administrative controls used for >> Arc flash rated PPE;
diagrams; >> Equipment not initially designed arc flash are:
for arc resistance cannot be >> Insulated gloves for exposure to live low
>> Plant identification as per electrical >> Work/access permit system; voltage;
readily modified to be arc
drawings;
resistant. Essentially, arc resistant >> Permit system for live and energised low >> Insulated tools for exposure to live low
>> Reduce the energy released in an arc equipment must be designed, voltage work; voltage;
flash, by reducing arc energy built and installed to be arc >> Risk assessments; >> In addition to the reduction of the
(fault current): resistant;
>> Job Briefings; arc flash energy, a risk that must be
>> Configuration of boards (open bus-tie >> Arc flash detection system; considered is the flammability of the PPE.
during maintenance) >> Arc flash labels.
>> IP2X compliant panels. A significant amount of injury from arc
>> Employ High Resistance Grounding
>> Old Plant (tips and pointers for operations RISK MITIGATION – PERSONAL flash incidents occurs from the ignition of
for three phase circuits PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) the clothing, which can occur with PPE
and maintenance personnel):
>> Use current limiting reactors that is not appropriately fire retardant.
>> Inspect and make panels IP2X PPE controls reduce the arc flash energy
>> Reduce the energy released in an arc compliant; reaching the skin, in the event of an arc flash.
flash, by reducing arc duration (trip time): The purpose of arc flash PPE is to reduce the
>> Routine inspection, maintenance and
>> Reduce protection settings testing; energy reaching the skin below the 1.2 cal/cm2
(if practicable); limit.
>> Thermography (Infra-red scanning) of
>> Reliable and faster switchgear/ panels, thermal stickers;
protection devices;
>> Check integrity of panel fasteners/
>> Use Zone Selective Interlocking; locks;
>> Implement a Bus Differential Scheme >> Noise / PD monitoring;
(Faster than ZSI);
>> Dust ingress protection (pressurised
>> Deploy Arc Flash Reduction or air-conditioned switch rooms).
Maintenance System;
Engineering controls provide permanent
>> Easy Egress. reduction in arc flash risk, but these controls
>> Reduce the probability of an arc flash must be monitored and reviewed from time to
occurring by: time.
>> Use of insulating tools; The arc flash register must be controlled,
>> Use of calibrated and tested test and any changes updated immediately.
equipment. Drawings must be updated for plant changes
>> Contain or redirect the arc flash energy and management of change process strictly
away from personnel by using: followed.
>> arc resistant enclosures; Insulating tools degrade over time and must
be replaced.
>> arc blast ducts;
>> remote operation of breakers and Testing gear must be within date while being
switches, including remote tracking used for electrical testing.
devices. Remotely operating in the safe zone
Diagram 17. Engineering controls
44 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex A Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex A 45
ANNEX B: ARC-RATED CLOTHING AND PERSONAL
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
ARC FLASH PERSONAL PROTECTIVE Some of the main considerations of PPE inside
EQUIPMENT arc flash boundaries are:
In the case of arc flash hazard, the main >> All employees within the arc flash
purpose of Personal Protective Equipment boundary to wear arc flash PPE
is to reduce burn injury to worker to a level appropriate for the incident energy
of curable burn. exposure (Note: this time is dependent
on the task being performed so should
Personal protective equipment may, or may be specific to the risk assessment
not, provide adequate protection in the case requirements);
of arc flash exposure.
>> PPE should cover all other clothing that
It is important that workers understand the can be ignited;
use, care, and limitations. Workers must not
>> PPE should not restrict visibility and
treat PPE as a substitute for common sense
movement;
and safe work practices.
>> Non-conductive protective head wear is
The most common and industry accepted required when in contact with live parts
Arc flash overcurrent
PPE that protects the body from arc flash or when there is a possibility of electrical
is arc-rated clothing. Arc-rated clothing is explosion. The face, neck and chin must
tested for performance under exposure to be protected;
electric arc. This is different from flame-
resistant clothing, though arc-rated clothing >> Eye protection is required;
is also flame-resistant. >> Hearing protection is required;
>> Body protection is required using arc-
Fault current rated clothing when the estimated incident
energy at the body may cause a second
degree (curable) burn (1.2 cal/cm2);
>> Heavy-duty leather or arc-rated gloves are
required to protect the hand;
Bare fibre sensors
>> If incident energy exceeds 4 cal/cm2,
detect light from heavy-duty boots are required to protect
the arc flash over
the entire length of
the feet.
the fibre loop. This
type of sensor is
used for large
Arc flash areas, such as
bushbars.
Arc flash light
sensors (up to four)
Easily
mounted point
sensors detect
light from arc
flash in
confined
spaces
Diagram 17. Engineering controls
46 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex A Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex B 47
0 cal/cm
2
4 cal/cm
2
8 cal/cm
2
25 cal/cm
2
40 cal/cm
2
INCORRECT ARC FLASH PPE
PPE PPE PPE PPE PPE Incorrect use of arc flash PPE will compromise >> Metal fasteners and jewellery heat up
CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY
0 1 2 3 4
its ability to reduce the incident energy that and continue to burn under the extreme
reaches the skin of the wearer. Common temperatures;
issues include exposure of skin, typically the >> Safety glasses (clear or tinted as
hands, forearms and neck, and the wearing of appropriate) worn, even under face
HAZARD - Be aware of heat stress
when wearing Cat 4 clothing
fasteners or jewellery that will absorb heat in shields to protect the eyes. Face shields
an arc flash, resulting in continuing burns. without side and chin protection can act
Why? as a scoop, directing the arc flash around
the face;
>> Exposed skin is not protected and will
burn under arc flash; >> Hearing protection (with in ear canal
inserts) to minimise hearing loss from the
>> Synthetics and non-arc flash rated
arc blast.
material at risk of melting and/or
igniting under the extreme temperature,
increasing the burn injuries;
• No protection • Arc-rated long sleeve shirt • Arc-rated long sleeve shirt • Arc-rated long sleeve jacket • Arc-rated long sleeve jacket
• Arc-rated pants or overalls • Arc-rated pants or overalls • Arc-rated pants • Arc-rated pants
• Arc-rated face shield with • Arc-rated face shield & • Arc-rated flash hood with • Arc-rated flash hood with
hard hat balaclava or Arc flash suit hard hat hard hat
• Safety glasses with hard hat • Safety glasses • Safety glasses
• Hearing protection • Safety glasses • Hearing protection • Hearing protection
• Leather & voltage rated • Hearing protection • Leather & voltage rated • Leather & voltage rated
gloves (as needed) • Leather & voltage rated gloves (as needed) gloves (as needed)
• Leather work shoes gloves (as needed) • Leather work shoes • Leather work shoes
• Leather work shoes
Diagram 18. PPE icons and their PPE levels
• Exposed jewellery (including watches)
• Exposed undergarments (synthetics worn under arc flash PPE)
• Short sleeves/sleeves rolled up
• Metal fasteners (zips and buttons)
• Synthetics worn over arc flash PPE
• Exposed face
• No safety glasses (even with face shield)
• Face shields directing
• No ATPV rating
Diagram 19. Incorrect PPE
48 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex B Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex B 49
ANNEX C: DO’S AND DON’T’S OF ARC FLASH LABELLING RECOMMEND PLACEMENT OF ARC It is recommended to place a label every 3-5
FLASH LABELS meters, and at incomers, bus ties
(if applicable) or where there is significant
DO DON’T Switchboards and switchgear labelling are change in incident energy and PPE
consolidated into 1-2 larger labels. This requirement.
>> Label “worst” case energy or PPE >> Label each MCC bucket, breaker fuse reduces the clutter and sign blindness on the
category based on system configuration; cubicle or plug-in (busway); switchboard and simplifies the information for To be easily identified and read, it is
>> Consider all possible modes of operation; >> Use ‘common sense’ in your hazard the workers. recommended the bottom of the labels
labelling; to be placed 1.5m from the ground.
>> Provide clear information on labels for Worst case arc flash should be used for
people to use PPE and clothing; >> Proceed with work if instructions and or a switchboard, rather than labelling for
>> Label using only one colour PPE are unclear or unsuitable. each circuit.
(Red for Danger);
>> Replace label based upon equipment
nominal voltage. The working distance is
455mm for LV switchboards and 910mm
for HV switchboards;
>> Manage PPE categories or incident energy
analysis using Permit to Work processes,
stating increased distances based on work
tasks and safety procedures;
DANGER
>> Label to warn of potential danger, not for HAMILTON HILL RESERVOIR -
MAIN SB
* Energy Level Exceeds CAT 4 - Follow Risk Assesment
ARC FLASH HAZARD
415VAC Shock Hazard
the purpose of working on the equipment;
Minimum PPE Category
ACTIVITY
Door Open Door Closed
INCOMER INCOMER ENERGY
Racking *CAT 4+ N/A Incident energy @ 455 mm 54.2 cal/cm²
Switching CAT 1 CAT 1 Arc Flash Boundary
Whilst Switching 5.1 m Clear Space
NON-INCOMER CIRCUITS Incoming Insulated - Risk Assessed
DANGER
Switching or Racking CAT 1 CAT 1 BUSBAR ENERGY ER
NG ARD
Live Electrical Testing
DA SH HAZ G01,
01
CAT 1 N/A Incident energy @ 455 mm 2.8 cal/cm² ENG, LS
>> Implement NFPA 70E Article 130.2
FLA
(Power Circuits)
OCE, SWBD PPE
per
ARCAs im 415V
20.87 0
Operating Controls CAT 0 CAT 0 Arc Flash Boundary
rn
ReclaStation kA
4
Power 0
Easte ter Fault Current,
Whilst Switching 0.84 m Clear Space
Bayswa Flash m
ent ry,
415 Arc
Equipm 3.43
Visual Inspection (Live Parts)
Namen Bounda
CAT 1 CAT 0 Locatio Volts
Level,
0
Arc
Flash
ry,
m
2 PPE
m
| 1.07
ARC FLASH HAZARD
Bounda Category
Voltage
ER
CLOSED
Energy,m
for
Door
@450m 32.9 Boundary
Incident Flash 4 PPE
NG
Cal/cm³ Arc ry
OPEN m Open
Door Energy, Door Catego
DA
@450m
Incident | Wear
Cal/cm³
Hazard
As per OCE, ENG, G01, 01
Flash
4
Arc
Equipment
Name Eastern Reclaim 415V SWBD LS
Work Permit requirements for all
Location Bayswater Power Station
Voltage Level, Volts 415 Fault Current, kA 20.87 PPE
DANGER Door CLOSED
Incident Energy,
Cal/cm³ @450mm
0 Arc Flash
Boundary, m 0
0
energised work even if a label is present. 4
ARC FLASH HAZARD Door OPEN
Incident Energy, 32.9 Arc Flash
3.43
As per OCE, ENG, G01, 01 Cal/cm³ @450mm Boundary, m
Equipment
Name Eastern Reclaim 415V SWBD Door Open Arc Flash Boundary for Category 2 PPE m | 1.07
4 DANGER
Location Bayswater Power Station
Voltage Level, Volts 415 Fault Current, kA 21.09 PPE
0
Door CLOSED Arc Flash Hazard | Wear Category 4 PPE
Arc Flash
Incident Energy, 0 Boundary, m 0
Cal/cm³ @450mm
2
Door OPEN
Arc Flash
Incident Energy, 4.39 1.01 R
Cal/cm³ @450mm Boundary, m
N GE D
DA
HAZAR
Hazard
FLASH
Shock
ARC
415VAC
Door Open Arc Flash Boundary for Category 2 PPE m | N/A
cal/cm²
54.2
RVOIR Space
2
Clear
ENERGY mm m
RESE 455 5.1
WARNING
@
Category INCOMER
HILL Risk Assesment PPE
Door
Closed energy
Assessed
Incident Boundary- Risk
TON 4-
Follow Minimum
Flash 2.8
cal/cm²
CAT Open Arc Switching
Insulated Space
HAMILSB Exceeds
Door
N/A
1
Whilst
Incoming ENERGY455
mm
0.84
m
Clear
MAINLevel
CAT @
4+ BUSBAR
energy
* Energy *CAT
Y 1 1 Incident Boundary
CAT CAT
Flash
Arc Switching
ACTIVIT N/A Whilst
1 0
CAT CAT
INCOMER
1 0
1.5 m
CAT CAT
Racking
CIRCUITS 0
ER CAT
Switching
1
Racking CAT
NON-INCOM or
Testing
Switching
Electrical
Circuits) Parts)
Live Controls
(Power (Live
Operating
Inspection
Visual
Arc Flash Hazard | Wear Category 2 PPE
INCOMER
DANGER
ER
NG ARD
DA SH HAZ ENG,
G01,
01
FLA OCE, SWBD PPE
ARC FLASH HAZARD
per
ARCAs im 415V
rn
ReclaStation kA
21.09 0
2
Power 0
Easte ter Fault Current,
Bayswa Flash m
ent ry,
415 Arc
Equipm
Namen Bounda 1.01
Locatio Volts 0 Flash m m
| N/A
ry, 2 PPE
Level, Arc
Bounda Category
Voltage
NG
CLOSED
Energy,m
for
Door
@450m 4.39
NI
Boundary
Incident Flash 2 PPE
ry
HV Switch
Cal/cm³ Arc
OPEN m Open
AR
Door Energy, Door
Catego
@450m
| Wear
W
Incident
Cal/cm³
Hazard
Flash
2
Arc
HAMILTON HILL RESERVOIR -
MAIN SB ARC FLASH HAZARD
* Energy Level Exceeds CAT 4 - Follow Risk Assesment
415VAC Shock Hazard
Minimum PPE Category
ACTIVITY
Door Open Door Closed
INCOMER INCOMER ENERGY
Racking
LV Sec Main and Xfmr
*CAT 4+ N/A Incident energy @ 455 mm 54.2 cal/cm²
Switching CAT 1 CAT 1 Arc Flash Boundary
Whilst Switching 5.1 m Clear Space
NON-INCOMER CIRCUITS Incoming Insulated - Risk Assessed
Switching or Racking CAT 1 CAT 1 BUSBAR ENERGY
Live Electrical Testing
(Power Circuits)
CAT 1 N/A Incident energy @ 455 mm 2.8 cal/cm²
Refer to Main Label for Switching or
Operating Controls
Racking (Incomer)
CAT 0 CAT 0 Arc Flash Boundary
Whilst Switching 0.84 m Clear Space
Visual Inspection (Live Parts) CAT 1 CAT 0
LV Bus and Feeder Breakers
DANGER DANGER
ARC FLASH HAZARD ARC FLASH HAZARD
As per OCE, ENG, G01, 01 As per OCE, ENG, G01, 01
Equipment Equipment
Name Eastern Reclaim 415V SWBD Name Eastern Reclaim 415V SWBD LS
Location Bayswater Power Station Location Bayswater Power Station
Voltage Level, Volts 415 Fault Current, kA 21.09 PPE Voltage Level, Volts 415 Fault Current, kA 20.87 PPE
Diagram 20. Placement of arc flash labels
0 0
Door CLOSED Door CLOSED
Arc Flash Arc Flash
Incident Energy, 0 Boundary, m 0 Incident Energy, 0 Boundary, m 0
Cal/cm³ @450mm Cal/cm³ @450mm
2 4
Door OPEN Door OPEN
Arc Flash Arc Flash
Incident Energy, 4.39 Boundary, m 1.01 Incident Energy, 32.9 Boundary, m 3.43
Cal/cm³ @450mm Cal/cm³ @450mm
Door Open Arc Flash Boundary for Category 2 PPE m | N/A Door Open Arc Flash Boundary for Category 2 PPE m | 1.07
2 WARNING
Arc Flash Hazard | Wear Category 2 PPE 4 DANGER
Arc Flash Hazard | Wear Category 4 PPE
50 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex C Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex C 51
ANNEX D: ARC FLASH INCIDENT ENERGY CALCULATION When using any calculation, the assumptions Refer to IEEE 1584 for the calculation
behind the tool must be understood, including: methodology and input data/information
METHODS (‘THEORY’) >> Whether it is calculating for ‘open air’ or
required.
‘arc in a box’; A fault study and protection grading study
Currently, there are several industry standards QUANTIFYING ARC FAULT HAZARD is required to provide short circuit current
>> Single phase or multi-phase fault;
and guidelines and technical papers for INCIDENT ENERGY and protection clearing times besides many
the calculation of arc flash incident energy. >> Type of equipment and protection; other parameters about system/equipment
However, IEEE 1584 Guide for Performing The purpose of an Arc Fault Hazard
>> Voltage limitations. configuration.
Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations (IEEE 1584) Assessment is to quantify the potential
incident energy per unit area that an individual All calculations must cater for Australian Suggested steps that may be taken in Arc
has been widely adopted by the industry
may be exposed to during an arc fault. electricity supply parameters and switchgear Flash Calculations are:
as a “defacto” standard.
type, and all calculation methodologies must
IEEE 1584-2018 has undergone major revision The arc fault hazard analysis should include a 1. Ensure the single line diagram is correct;
be used only under technically competent
and incorporates research work done by calculation of the estimated arc fault incident supervision. 2. Obtain the impedance and rating data
major organisations and captures learning energy based on the available fault current, necessary to perform fault studies;
the duration of the arc (cycles), the voltage, Arc fault hazard assessments should be
and feedback. 3. Review the protection. Confirm settings
and the distance from the arc to the worker reviewed periodically, and as a minimum,
It is recommended that IEEE 1584 be used by and the nature of the enclosure. when design changes intended to be and check that the grading is correct;
sector organisation for calculation incident permanent occur to electrical system 4. Perform fault studies;
energy at working distance. In the absence of a calculated arc flash parameters that affect the assessment
incident energy, NFPA 70E includes the 5. Perform the calculations according to
Other papers and standards that address this (e.g. when changing protection settings,
Arc Flash PPE Category Method. However, IEEE 1584.
topic are: changing power transformer size, or power
the PPE category method of NFPA 70E source configuration, etc.).
>> EESA Electrical Arcing Hazards - A should be used with caution as it defines
paper by Dr. David Sweeting (Sweeting PPE categories based on equipment types,
Consulting) and Professor Tony Stokes protection devices and clearing times, etc.
(Electrical Engineering University These may not be directly applicable to the
of Sydney) presented at the EESA installation in Australia and hence incident
Conference in Sydney on 12 August 2004; energy calculation method is considered more
appropriate.
>> Arc Flash Hazard Standards – The Burning
Question, Sesha Prasad paper to IDC Incident energy is inversely proportional to
Electrical Arc Flash Forum, Melbourne, the working distance squared (double the
April 2010; distance equals one-quarter the incident
>> NFPA 70E Annex D1; energy). It is directly proportional to the time
duration of the arc and to the available bolted
>> CAN/ULC-S801-10 Standard on Electric fault current (double the arc duration or fault
Utility Workplace Electrical Safety for current equals double the incident energy).
Generation, Transmission and Distribution; It should be noted that time generally has a
>> Canadian Standards Association Z462-08. greater effect on the incident energy than the
available bolted fault current.
When performing arc fault hazard
assessments, consideration should be given
to very low fault energy areas as well as very
high. Low fault currents can result in very
long clearing times and may give higher total
incident energies than high fault currents with
very fast clearing times.
The arc fault hazard analysis should also
consider all possible network configurations,
including temporary configurations.
52 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex D Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex D 53
Boundary
Boundary
PPE (mm
PPE (mm
per Cat 2
per Cat 2
AF_FB@
AF_FB@
at 8 Cal/
at 8 Cal/
IE2 Arc
IE2 Arc
Flash
Flash
cm2)
5894
cm2)
1376
N/A
N/A
LV SWITCHBOARDS RECOMMENDED METHODOLOGY
In a single 11kV Switchboard, the arc flash The recommended methodology based on the
DANGER-
DANGER-
PPE Level
PPE Level
level can range from Cat 2 level (7.29 Cal/ work of Dr. David Sweeting provides the best
Level 2
Level 2
OUS!
OUS!
cm2) to Dangerous level (49.2 Cal/cm2). current assessment of the nature of electrical
Understanding of information written on arc hazard behaviour in Australia for arc faults
the arc flash level and its placement is very between parallel conductors.
important.
If this methodology is not utilised, at least one
(cal/cm2)
(cal/cm2)
Incident
Incident
415V switchboards can have different incident of the following methodologies or recognised
Energy
Energy
7.4
7.3
49
49
energy levels (49.1 Cal/cm2 & 7.4 Cal/cm2) equivalents should be carefully used with due
as per above examples. Identification of respect to their limitations:
BAYSWATER POWER STATION - High Voltage Switchboards
BAYSWATER POWER STATION - Low Voltage Switchboards
switchboards and arc flash labels accuracy
>> Calculations based on IEEE 1584
plays a very important role.
(i.e. in either the Spread sheet option
Distance
Distance
Working
Working
The calculations in the previous examples are or Software program option);
455
455
910
910
based on IEEE 1584. If we consider line of >> Activity Tables in USA Standards NFPA
fire calculation according to NENS 09, the 70E 2012 or NESC:2012.
incident energy levels can be as high as 3
times as those calculated under IEEE 1584. Note: IEEE 1584 based methodology has
Boundary
Boundary
Arc Flash
Arc Flash
If the switchboard door is open, the plasma consistently and significantly underestimated
41593
(mm)
(mm)
5843
4383
1382
jet/fireball is highly likely to be directed to the incident energies recorded for arc faults
personnel standing in front of the panel. between parallel conductors during Australian
This risk must be considered. testing due to arguably flawed assumptions
underpinning the methodology.
Time/Tol
Time/Tol
Opening
Opening
Breaker
Breaker
The preferred NENS09 methodology best
0.080
0.080
0.080
0.080
(sec)
(sec) predicted actual Australian test outcomes
that were consistently in the order of three
times the IEEE 1584 predicted values. The
IEEE 1584 based methodology, however,
Trip/Delay
Trip/Delay
does reasonably predict radiant energy for
0.957
(sec)
(sec)
Time
Time
0.02
0.2
opposing conductors as also demonstrated by
1.2
the Ausgrid testing outcomes.
This discrepancy has been corrected in 2018
edition of IEEE 1584 as the required data
Bus Arcing
Bus Arcing
involved enclosure design, bus configuration
39.09
20.85
37.93
15.94
Fault
Fault
(KA)
(KA)
and various other parameters that were
missing in 2002 edition.
Bus Bolted
Bus Bolted
40.02
40.75
46.37
Fault
Fault
41.25
(KA)
(KA)
Diagram 21. HV switchboard table
Diagram 22. LV switchboard table
HV SWITCHBOARDS
LV SWITCHBOARDS
Bus (KV)
Bus (KV)
0.415
0.415
11.00
11.00
Switchboard
Switchboard
SWBD B LS
2 Unit 415V
1 Unit 11KV
Bus Name
Bus Name
1/2 Station
1 Unit 11KV
Section B
Section C
Switch-
board
415V
LS
54 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex D Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex D 55
ANNEX E: CALCULATING INCIDENT ENERGY
OR HEAT FLUX (‘PRACTICE’) Conductor Conductors
IEEE 1584 According to the IEEE 1584 model, in the
event of an arc fault, the arc emits energy
One of the most common methods of (light in all spectrums – infrared, visible,
estimating incident energy (or heat flux) ultraviolet, x-ray) that is transferred to an
is using the standard of the Institute of individual by radiation.
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
1584 – 2002 Guide for Performing Arc-Flash It is believed that the same incident energy is
Hazard Calculations. received at a given radius from the arc, in all Radiation Arc Arc
directions. Radiation
The incident energy/heat flux calculation
formulae within IEEE 1584 have been The incident energy per unit area is
developed using the data from a large understood to be a product of current,
number of laboratory tests. time and distance.
However, the IEEE 1584 tests and calculations
are based upon a radiant heat transfer model
that may not accurately estimate incident
energy in some situations.
11
IEEE 1584 1phase model IEEE 1584 3phase model
Radiation
Diagram 23. IEEE 1584 1 and 3 phase models.
IEEE 1584 CALCULATIONS SUMMARY NENS 09-2014
1. Calculate the fault current Arc Plasma
Incoming
Supply
5000°C 2. Calculate the arc current Another common methods of estimating
Plasma Plasma incident energy (or heat flux) is the use of the
Jets Flow Plasma Cloud 3. Calculate the normalised incident energy
or ‘fireball’ standard of the Energy Networks Association
4. Calculate the incident energy
(ENA) National Guideline for the Selection,
Conductors (in Joules/cm2)
Use and Maintenance of Personal Protection
5. Calculate the boundary Equipment for Electrical Arc Hazards 09 -
201412Recent Australian research has shown
that, although the radiant energy from an
Radiation arc contributes to the energy received, the
major hazard to an individual comes from the
plasma* ejected by an arc.
*Plasma is the fourth (4th) state of matter
(solid, liquid, gas, plasma) and is probably
best described as “super-heated ionised gas”.
Diagram 24. NENS09 Model, ENA NENS 09 – 2014 National Guideline for the Selection, Use and Maintenance of
Personal Protective Equipment for Electrical Arc Hazard
56 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex E Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex E 57
ARC BEHAVIOUR – IEEE 1584 / NENS09-2014 Therefore, with an arc on parallel electrodes,
PARALLEL ELECTRODES COMPARISON the incident energy / heat flux is a product of
current, time, distance and direction.
NENS 09-2014 formulae are based on a There is a dramatic difference between the
parallel electrode model, as most conductors incident energy levels associated with plasma Unless you can be sure of the position of the
in real-world situations are in parallel cloud interface (e.g. as generated at the end individual in relation to the electrodes and the
formation. of the electrodes) compared to the incident arc, the formulae at A5 below should be used
energy levels associated only with radiant to cover the “worst case” scenario.
An arc between parallel electrodes will travel
exposure (e.g. to the side of the electrodes) AUSGRID FY14 LANE COVE TEST
along the electrodes, moving away from the
as for Ausgrid actual testing outcomes in FY14
source, by motor effect. STATION ARC FAULT TESTING
(see section A4 below).
At some conductor termination, the arc will OUTCOMES
For example, in the diagram below, in the
develop into plasma jets emitted from the end This following graph compares the measured
event of an arc, Person ‘A’ will be subject to
of the electrodes. These plasma jets will create and calculated incident energy for tests
the plasma cloud and will receive three (3)
a cloud of plasma that will be at temperatures conducted under Test Series 8940 at the Lane
times the energy received by Person ‘B,
of at least 5000 deg C. (See diagram below). Cove Test Station. Calorimeters measured the
who will be predominantly subjected to
It is contact with this plasma cloud that has radiant energy. energy at the positions for Persons A and B in
the greatest potential to cause severe burns. the diagram.
The energy received by Person ‘A’ will be
To the sides of the electrodes, radiant energy approximately the value calculated by the RECOMMENDED FORMULAE FOR
is emitted, like the IEEE 1584 model. NENS09-2014 formulae at A5 below. This will DETERMINING INCIDENT ENERGIES
Figure 3 – NENS09 Model, ENA NENS 09 – be approximately three (3) times the IEEE FOR DIFFERENT FAULT CURRENTS
2014 National Guideline for the Selection, 1584 calculated values. AND / OR FAULT DURATIONS
Use and Maintenance of Personal Protective The energy received by Person ‘B’ will be The following formulae are based on a 50Hz
Equipment for Electrical Arc Hazard approximately 1/3 of the energy calculated by ac supply.
the formulae below. This will be approximately
equal to the IEEE 1584 calculated values. Where:
t = fault duration (seconds)
IE(cal/cm2) = incident energy / heat flux
Measured v calculated Person ‘B’
(cal/cm2)
Irms = prospective symmetrical RMS
three phase fault current (Amps)
r = distance from the arc
(metres)3
Person ‘A’
cal/cm2
450mm
Incoming
Supply 450mm
Conductors
Diagram 25. Energy comparison by position.
NENS 09 Calculation Person A IEEE Calculation Person B
Diagram 26. Comparison of measured results against calculated values.
58 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex E Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex E 59
Copper Electrodes ANNEX F: ELECTRICAL ARC FLASH
a. The formula used to calculate the single-phase incident energy (IE) values for copper
electrodes is:
HAZARDS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINE CHECKLIST
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) = 1.2667 x 10 -4 x t x Irms 1.12 / r2 The following Checklist has been provided to
b. This can be rearranged to calculate distance: support Professionals and Practitioners that
are developing or completing their system of
r = 0.011258 x t 0.5 x Irms 0.56 / IE 0.5
work around the hazard of Electrical Arc Flash.
c. The formula used to calculate the three-phase incident energy values (IE) for copper
The Checklist is provided are for information
electrodes is:
and guidance only and all results should be
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) = 3.8 x 10 -4 x t x Irms 1.12 / r2 reviewed / approved and subject to audit
by qualified and competent Subject Matter
d. This can be rearranged to calculate distance:
Experts.
r = 0.0195 x t 0.5 x Irms 0.56 / IE 0.5
Aluminium Electrodes
Arc Flash Guideline Requirement Is it in Is it Actions
For aluminium electrodes the above formulae become: place? working
e. Single phase faults: well?
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) = 1.4667 x 10 -4 x t x Irms 1.12 / r2 Procedures for Electrical Arc Flash Hazard
Management have been developed
r = 0.0121 x t 0.5 x Irms 0.56 / IE 0.5 (or integrated into Electrical Safety) into the
f. Three phase faults: Organisations Management System.
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) = 4.4 x 10 -4 x t x Irms 1.12 / r2 A program for managing change has been
applied to Electrical Arc Flash Hazard
r = 0.021 x t 0.5 x Irms 0.56 / IE 0.5 Management procedures.
Training in Electrical Arc Flash Hazard
Management procedures (including Human
Factors) have been implemented and workers
Application Variations required to perform electrical work have been
The above formulae can be used for deemed competent to perform all electrical
circumstances where different fault work.
currents and/or different fault durations Electrical Arc Flash Subject Matter Experts have
are anticipated. effectively completed their Arc Flash Incident
The formulae for two-phase (only) faults Energy Calculation Method and all risk control
can be determined by doubling the RHS of methods (including labelling) are implemented
equations for single-phase incident energy in Electrical Arc Flash Subject Matter Experts and
Paragraphs A4.1 and A4.2. These formulae can OHS Professionals (where available) collaborate
then be manipulated to derive the equations and complete electrical safety risk assessments
for distance. and all risk control methods are implemented
Calories to Joules Electrical Arc Flash Subject Matter Experts and
OHS Professionals (where available) review Arc
Given arc-rated protective clothing / Flash PPE & Clothing and have registers in place
PPE globally is classified by ATPV in cal/cm2, for repair / replacement
the formulae above have been provided in
calories rather than Joules. Electrical Arc Flash Hazard Management
practices are subject to audit at scheduled
>> To convert from calories to Joules, regular intervals
multiply by 4.184.
Electrical Arc Flash Hazard Management
>> Joules = calories x 4.184 Procedures are reviewed on an annual basis
by the Organisations Management System
Professionals
60 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex E Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex F 61
ANNEX G: REFERENCES IEC 61482-1 Live working - Protective clothing against the thermal hazards of an
electric arc - Part 1-1: Test methods - Method 1: Determination of the arc
The documents below are referred to in these Guidelines and / or associated annexes: rating (ATPV or EBT50) of flame resistant materials for clothing
IEC 61482-2 Live working - Protective clothing against the thermal hazards of an
AS/NZS 1336 Recommended practices for occupational eye protection electric arc - Part 2: Requirements
AS/NZS 1800 Selection, care and use of occupational safety helmets IEEE 1584 Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations
AS/NZS 1906 Retro-reflective materials and devices for road traffic control purposes NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace (2018)
AS/NZS 2210 Occupational protective footwear NESC:2012 National Electrical Safety Code
AS/NZS 2210-1 Guide to selection, care and use CAN/ULC-S801-10 Canadian Standards Association CAN/ULC-S801-10 Standard on
AS/NZS 2919 Industrial clothing Electric Utility Workplace Electrical Safety for Generation, Transmission
and Distribution
AS/NZS 4602 High visibility safety garments
CAN Z462-08 Canadian Standards Association Z462-08 Workplace electrical safety,
AS 1319 Safety signs for the occupational environment
Annex D
AS 4501-2 Occupational protective clothing – General requirements
Electricity Engineers’ Association of New Zealand (EEA) Guide for the
AS 4501-1 Guidelines on the selection, use, care and maintenance of protective Management of Arc Flash Hazards, October 2011
clothing
Arc Flash Hazard Standards – The Burning Question, Sesha Prasad
AS 1957 Textiles—Care labelling paper to IDC Electrical Arc Flash Forum, Melbourne, April 2010.
AS 2001 Methods of test for textiles (Available at www.arcflash.com.au/documents/Arc_Flash_Hazard_
AS 2001.5.4 Dimensional change—Domestic washing and drying procedures for Standards_The_Burning_Question_Sesha.pdf)
textile testing (ISO 6330:2000, MOD) EESA Electrical Arcing Hazards, A paper by Dr. David Sweeting
AS 2225 Insulating gloves for electrical purposes (Sweeting Consulting) and Professor Tony Stokes (Electrical
Engineering University of Sydney) presented at the EESA Conference in
AS/NZS 4836:2011 Safe working on or near low-voltage electrical installations and Sydney on 12 August 2004
equipment
Arc-Flash PPE Research Update, Hugh Hoagland, pages 1179-1187; IEEE
Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011. Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 49, No. 3, May / June 2013
ISO 139 Textiles - Standard atmospheres for conditioning and testing Practical approaches to mitigating arc flash exposure in Europe,
ISO 6330 Textiles - Domestic washing and drying procedures for textile testing Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers — May 28, 2013, Paper
ISO 3175-1 Textiles - Professional care, dry cleaning and wet cleaning of fabrics No. IS-20 presented at the 10th Petroleum and Chemical Industry
and garments - Part 1: Assessment of performance after cleaning and Conference Europe Electrical and Instrumentation Applications
finishing ISSA Guideline for the selection of personal protective equipment when
ISO 15025 Protective Clothing – Protection against heat and flame – Method of exposed to the thermal effects of an electric fault arc, 2nd Edition 2011
test for limited flame spread Australian Safety Behaviours: Human Factors – Resource Guide for Engineers
ISO 6941 Burning behaviour – Measurement of flame spread properties of Government Civil (2013). [email protected].
vertically orientated specimens Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA)
ISO 10047 Textiles - Determination of surface burning time of fabrics
ISO 14116 Protective clothing – Protection against heat and flame – limited flame
spread materials, material assemblies and clothing
ASTM F1959 / Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc Rating of Materials for
F1959M - 06ae1 Clothing
ASTM F1506-08 Standard Performance Specification for Flame Resistant Textile
Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to
Momentary Electric Arc and Related Thermal Hazards
ASTM D6413-08 Standard Test Method for Flame Resistance of Textiles (Vertical Test)
ASTM F496 - 08 Standard Specification for In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and
Sleeves
62 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex G Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex G 63
ANNEX H: DEFINITIONS EBT (Break-open Threshold Energy) Hazard Risk Category (HRC)
The incident energy on a material or material Previous versions of the NFPA 70E categories
Approved Break-open system that results in a 50% probability of defining levels of arc-rated protection required
break-open when performing tasks with estimated
Having appropriate organisation endorsement In electrical arc fault testing, material response incident energy exposures within an escalating
for a specific function. evidenced by the formation of one or more Electrical Arc Fault
set of incident energy ranges. This has been
openings in the material which may allow An unplanned or unexpected explosion replaced with the Incident energy analysis
Arc Fault Protection Boundary
flame to pass through the material caused by the short circuiting or grounding of method 130.5(G) or the
The arc fault protection boundary (within (see also EBT). one or more energised electrical conductors.
which arc-rated PPE is required) for systems Arc flash PPE category method 130.7(C) (15).
The specimen is considered to exhibit break- Electrical apparatus
50 volts and greater shall be the distance at Heat Flux
open when any opening is at least 300 mm2
which the potential incident energy equals Any electrical equipment, including overhead
in area or at least 25 mm in any dimension. The thermal intensity of the arc that is incident
5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2). lines and underground cables, the conductors
A single thread across the opening does not by the amount of energy transmitted per unit
Arc Flash PPE category method reduce the size of the hole for the purposes of of which are live or can be made live.
area and per unit of time, measured in Joules
NFPA 70E categories defining levels of the tests methods ASTM 1959 or IEC 61482. Electrical operating work per square centimetres per second (J/cm2/s)
arc-rated protection required when A multi-layer specimen is considered to exhibit Work involving the operation of switching or calories per square centimetres per second
performing tasks based on the arc flash break-open when all layers show formation of devices, links, fuses or other connections (cal/cm2/s).
PPE category method, in lieu of the incident one or more openings. intended for ready removal or replacement, Hierarchy of controls
energy analysis, with estimated incident proving electrical conductors de-energised,
Calorie Measures taken to minimise risks to the lowest
energy exposures within an escalating set of earthing and/or short-circuiting, locking and/
incident energy ranges, as for the example The energy required to raise one gram level reasonably practicable in the descending
or tagging of electrical apparatus and erection
table below (where IE = Incident Energy): of water by one degree Celsius at one order of: Elimination, Substitution, Engineering
of barriers and/or signs.
atmosphere pressure. Second-degree burns Controls, Administrative Controls, and PPE.
Arc flash PPE category Electrode
occur at 1.2 calories per centimetre squared High voltage (HV)
Min. Protective [cal/cm2] per second (cal/cm2/s). Any conductive material which forms the
A nominal voltage exceeding 1,000V
Clothing Rating Composite anode or cathode of an electric arc.
alternating current (ac) or exceeding 1,500V
0 AR not required The layer or layers that provide protection Energised direct current (dc).
(Non-melting or required (i.e. outer shell, thermal barrier and/ Connected to a source of electrical supply. High voltage live work
untreated natural fibre or moisture barrier).
Exposed conductor Work performed on or near components
specified) Conductor
An electrical conductor, approach to which is of a line capable of being energised to
1 4 high voltage without implementing the full
A wire, cable, form of metal or any other not prevented by a barrier of rigid material or
2 8 material designed for carrying electric current. by insulation that is adequate under a relevant protective practice of isolating, proving
3 25 Australian Standard specification or other for de-energised and earthing.
Component assembly
4 40 the voltage concerned. Heat attenuation factor (HAF)
The material combination found in a multi-
Arc Thermal Performance Value (ATPV) layer garment arranged in the order of the Flame retardant In electric arc fault testing is the percent of the
finished garment construction and including Having properties that suppress or delay the incident energy which is blocked by a material
In arc testing, the incident energy on a at an incident energy level equal to ATPV.
material or a multi-layer system of materials any inner liner. combustion or propagation of flame.
that results in a 50% probability that enough Coverall / Overall Garment
heat transfer through the tested specimen
Protective garment designed and configured A single item of clothing which may consist of
is predicted to cause the onset of a second-
to provide protection to the torso, arms, and single or multiple layers.
degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll
legs, excluding the head, hands, and feet.
curve, without break-open. Hardware
De-energised
Note: ATPV is expressed in kW.s/m2 Non-fabric components of protective clothing
or Cal/cm2. Not connected to any source of electrical including those made of metal or plastic
supply, but not necessarily isolated. material, e.g. fasteners, company logos, name
Base Garment
badges, buttons.
A garment which is considered as outer wear
but may be worn in direct contact with the
skin, e.g. shirts, trousers or coveralls, etc.
64 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex H Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex H 65
Incident Energy Isolated Multi-layer clothing assembly Reasonably practicable
The term incident energy (IE) is used to A conductor which is disconnected from A series of layers of garments arranged in the That which is, or was at a particular time,
describe the thermal energy to which a all possible sources of electricity supply by order as worn. reasonably able to be done to ensure health
worker is exposed in an arc fault incident. means which will prevent the unintentional and safety, considering and weighing up all
It may contain multi-layer materials, material
energising of the apparatus and which is relevant matters including:
It can be defined as the thermal energy combinations or separate layers of clothing
assessed as a suitable step in the process of
generated during an electrical arc fault materials in single layers. 1. The likelihood of the hazard or the risk
making safe for access purposes.
incident that is impressed on a surface at concerned occurring;
Near / In Proximity / Close to
some specified distance from the source of an Live
2. The degree of harm that might result from
arc fault, usually measured in joules per square A situation where there is a reasonable
A conductor which is energised or subject to the hazard or the risk;
centimetre (J/cm2) or calories per square possibility of a person either directly or
hazardous induced or capacitive voltages.
centimetre (cal/cm2). through a conductor, coming within the 3. What the person concerned knows, or
Low voltage (LV) relevant assessed electric arc hazard. ought reasonably to know, about the
Incident energy estimates for specific
hazard or risk, and ways of eliminating or
workplace exposures assume that the A nominal voltage exceeding 50 V ac or 120 V Outer material
minimising the risk;
applicable overcurrent protective device ripple free dc but not exceeding 1,000V ac or
The outermost material of which the
has sensed, responded to, and ultimately 1,500 V dc. 4. The availability and suitability of ways to
protective clothing is made.
cleared the arc fault within its published eliminate or minimise the risk; and
Joule
time-current curve. Outer shell
5. After assessing the extent of the risk
The energy required to raise 0.239 grams
Incident energy analysis method The outside facing portion of the composite and the available ways of eliminating or
of water by one degree Celsius at one
with the exception of trim, hardware, minimising the risk, the cost associated
The NFPA 70E details the Incident energy atmosphere pressure, or the energy expended
reinforcing material, and wristlet material. with available ways of eliminating or
analysis method for the determination of PPE in one second by one ampere current against
Overlap minimising the risk, including whether the
requirements. The incident energy exposure a resistance of one ohm.
cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk.
level is based on the working distance of 1 Joule equals 0.239 calories, or, 1 calorie Interface area which should be maintained, for
the employee’s face and chest areas from a example whilst performing stooping, reaching Removable inner liner
equals 4.184 Joules.
prospective arc source for a specific task to be or turning movements. An inner garment designed to be attached or
performed. Arc-rated clothing and other PPE Manufacturer
Overhead line to be worn separately under an outer garment
shall be used by the employee based on the The entity that assumes the liability and in order to provide thermal insulation.
incident energy exposure associated with the provides the warranty for the compliant Any aerial conductor or conductors with
specific task. associated supports, insulators and other Safe approach distance
product.
Innermost lining apparatus erected, or in the course of The minimum separation in air from an
Material combination
erection, for the purpose of conveyance of exposed conductor that shall be maintained
The lining found on the innermost face of a A material produced from a series of electrical energy. by a person, or any object (other than
component assembly. separate layers, intimately combined prior insulated objects designed for contact with
Protective clothing
Interface area to the garment manufacturing stage, live conductors) held by or in contact with
e.g. a quilted fabric. Protective garments, configured as a shirt and that person. These are detailed in ENA NENS
An area of the body not protected by a trousers or as a coverall which may or may not
Melt 04 National Guidelines for Safe Approach
protective garment, helmet, gloves, footwear, include a jacket, coat, hood, and / or gloves Distances to Electrical Apparatus.
or any other PPE; the area where the To change from solid to liquid form, (etc.), and interface components that are
protective garments and the helmet, gloves, or become consumed by action of heat. designed to provide protection to the worker’s Second Degree Burns (may also referred to
footwear, meet, i.e. the protective coat/ body. For garments that are arc-rated, they as Partial Thickness Burns)
helmet/SCBA face piece area, the protective Moisture barrier
shall be tested and marked with a ATPV value. A burn that affects the epidermis and the
coat/glove area, and the protective trouser/ A fabric or membrane used in a component dermis, classified as superficial or deep
footwear area. Protective garment
assembly to enable the properties of the according to the depth of injury.
Interface component assembly to comply with the manufacturer’s A single item of clothing which may consist of
claims concerning hydrostatic pressure and single or multiple layers (e.g. protective jacket The superficial type involves the epidermis
Item or items designed to provide limited water vapour permeability. / coat; protective shirt; protective trousers; and the papillary dermis and is characterized
protection to interface areas. or protective coverall / overall). by pain, oedema, and the formation of blisters;
it heals without scarring.
Protective trouser
The deep type extends into the reticular
A protective garment designed and dermis, is pale and anaesthetic, and results
configured to provide protection to lower in scarring.
torso and legs, excluding the feet.
66 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex H Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guidelines - Annex H 67
Substation
A switchyard, terminal station or a place where
high-voltage is converted or transformed to a
different voltage.
Switching / Protective Jacket
A protective garment (jacket) designed and
configured to provide protection to upper
torso and arms, excluding the hands and head.
Thermal barrier
That portion of the composite designed to
provide thermal protection.
Thermal hazard
A hazard having sufficient heat energy to
cause the onset of partial thickness burns.
Trim
Retro-reflective and fluorescent material
attached to the outer shell for visibility
enhancement retro-reflective materials
enhance night-time visibility, and fluorescent
materials improve daytime visibility.
Under garment
A garment which is worn under a basic
garment.
Work
Any activity or process including installing
maintaining, inspecting, operating and
supervision, carried out on energised
equipment or equipment which is capable
of being energised.
Working Distance
The dimension between the possible arc
point and the head of the body of the worker
positioned in place to perform the assigned
task.
Worker
Persons who may be exposed to electric
hazards.
68 Electric Arc Flash Hazard Management Guideline - Annex H
Sample
Arc Flash Risk Study
Using IEEE 1584-2018
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Purpose 3
1.2 Method 3
2 Study Results 5
2.1 Fault currents 5
2.2 Coordination 5
2.3 Arc Flash Hazard 6
2.4 Arc Flash Risk 6
3 Power System Model 7
3.1 Sources 7
3.2 Scenarios 7
3.3 Assumptions & Approximations 7
A Calculation Results 8
A.1 Single Line Diagram 8
A.2 Input Data 9
A.3 Fault currents 10
A.4 Coordination 11
A.5 Time-current Diagrams 13
A.6 IEEE 1584-2018 Calculation Results 15
A.7 Arc Flash Risk 17
This report has been prepared by:
Vrielink Electrical Services
De Spinde 170
8102 LG Raalte
The Netherlands
www.vrielink-es.com
Author:
Joost Vrielink
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a sample arc flash risk study based on a fictional industrial power system. For more
information about this sample report or arc flash hazard calculation studies please contact:
Vrielink Electrical Services
Email: [email protected]
Phone: +316 4641 4084
Or visit www.vrielink-es.com
1.2 Method
To determine arc hazard level the IEEE Standard 1584 can be used to calculate the incident
energy and arc flash boundary. The standard provides the following method for calculation:
1. Gather data for a short-circuit and protective device coordination study
2. Calculate short-circuit current
3. Calculate the arcing current
4. Determine the trip time for the arcing current
5. Calculate the incident energy in cal/cm²
The equations for calculating arcing current and incident energy are empirically derived from
measurements performed on electrical arcs. These equations have a limited range of validity for
current and voltage although for most industrial systems these limits are not reached.
1.2.1 Data Collection
Details about the electrical distribution system are required to accurately calculate the hazard
level. The following lists the information typically required:
• Utility data; fault contribution and protection settings
• One Line Diagrams showing the main electrical equipment
• When one-line diagrams do not show complete distribution, an additional list
should be obtained of all three-phase electrical distribution panels. These are the
locations that are going to be labeled (and calculated). Loads and single-phase
distribution are not applicable.
• Cable List with Sizes & Lengths. If estimated, the lengths that are at least accurate
to within about 5m.
• Relay and circuit breaker setting schedule.
Typically, an onsite data collection effort is required to verify drawings are accurate. This is
especially a concern for older installations.
1.2.2 Scenarios
When the electrical distribution system is operated in different modes, scenarios can be
created that simulate the entire range of operating parameters. This ensures that the worst-
case hazard is found. As an example, the following scenarios may be created:
3 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
• Maximum Utility – full contribution of all sources, including motors
• Minimum Utility – minimum contribution of utility and all rotating equipment out
of service
• Emergency – with emergency generators supplying part of the system
A calculation needs to be performed for all applicable scenarios, evaluation should be based on
the worst-case result. Which scenario yields the worst-case result is determined for each location
separately.
1.2.3 Short-circuit Evaluation
The results of the short-circuit evaluation can be used for checking if switchgear and
protective devices are adequately rated against short-circuit currents.
During data collection the short-circuit withstand of all switchgear and protective devices is
gathered and compared to the maximum calculated short-circuit current. When current-limiting
devices are present (such as fuses or molded-case circuit breakers) their limiting effect will be
included as far as documentation is available.
The following parameters are evaluated:
• The symmetrical (RMS) withstand current for thermal withstand
• The peak current for mechanical withstand
Any issues with inadequate rating of equipment are immediately reported, as they can create
unsafe working conditions.
1.2.4 Protective Device Evaluation
Overcurrent devices that are modelled should be checked for miscoordination for overload and
short-circuit currents. When during an overcurrent more than one device trips, these devices are
said to not provide full coordination, and this may present operational issues (although not
necessarily safety related). In this case alternative protection settings can be explored that do
provide improved or full coordination.
A report should include a list of locations where full coordination is not available. Alternative
protection settings can be presented with their limits, as this is usually a compromise between
operational stability, safety and cost. A setting evaluation will consider the following information:
• Connected loads and system stability
• System coordination
• Arc flash hazard levels
1.2.5 Arc Flash Hazard Calculation
Using the result of the short-circuit evaluation and the protection device coordination studies,
the arc flash incident energy and the associated boundary can be calculated according to the
equations in IEEE Standard 1584. A report should provide the calculation results, source data
and any approximations or analytical variables used.
4 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
2 Study Results
2.1 Fault currents
For evaluating equipment, the results of fault calculation according to IEC 60909 are compared
to withstand values of switchgear and protective devices. Equipment that is not rated high
enough against short-circuit currents could fail when a fault occurs and lead to injury.
symmetrical IEC 60909 assymetrical IEC 60909
withstand current I’’k peak current Ip
swgLV 50 28 110 62
swgLV - pd-T 42 28 88 62
swgLV - pd-G 42 28 88 62
swgLV - pd-1 36 28 76 62
swgLV - pd-2 80 28 176 62
pnl1 36 13 76 22
pnl2 36 7 76 12
In this sample report no issues were found with equipment fault withstand capabilities. In case
there are this typically means equipment must be replaced or protected with fault limiting
protective devices such as fuses.
2.2 Coordination
A Protective Device Coordination Study is required for the arc flash hazard calculation to
determine the time it takes for arc flash currents to be interrupted. The study will also show
how protective devices (relays, circuit breakers and fuses) react when a fault occurs. If they are
not properly coordinated, a larger part of the electrical system might be shut down to isolate a
fault. The study will identify these problems and provide recommendations to improve
coordination and reliability of the total electrical system.
In this sample study some issues with coordination are found for the main incoming
protection breakers (pd-T and pd-G) with outgoing feeder protection pd-1:
pd-tx pd-T pd-G
pd-T full - -
pd-G - - -
pd-1 - 9 kA 9 kA
pd-2 - full full
2.2.1 Solutions for improved coordination
Coordination can be improved by using settings as recommended in Table A.4.3:
pd-tx pd-T pd-G
pd-T full - -
pd-G - - -
pd-1 - full full
pd-2 - full full
5 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
2.3 Arc Flash Hazard
With the results of the short-circuit fault and coordination study the arc flash hazard can be
calculated. The IEEE 1584-2018 Guide results in a hazard calculation expressed in cal/cm²
based on the arcing fault and duration.
2.3.1 Overview of results for this sample system. For more details see annex A.6 on page 15.
Label Bus name / PD name (side) Ia t Energy Remarks
#
#001 swgLV (BUS) 18.3 kA 2.00 s 43.6 cal/cm² Long delay for generator protection pd-G.
#001.1 swgLV / pd-G (LINE) 21.0 kA 2.00 s 22.1 cal/cm² No protection between generator and swgLV.
#001.2 swgLV / pd-T (LINE) 18.4 kA 2.00 s 97.1 cal/cm² Long delay for medium voltage protection pd-tx.
#002 pnl1 (BUS) 8.3 kA 0.05 s 1.0 cal/cm²
#003 pnl2 (BUS) 4.2 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm²
With the results of this study, control measures can be identified to reduce overall arc flash
risk. As an example, in this study recommended settings have been identified that reduce
hazard. This is a low-cost measure that can yield massive reduction in hazard and often
improves the system coordination.
2.3.2 Results with recommended settings with reduced arc flash risk
Label Bus name / PD name (side) Ia t Energy Remarks
#
#001 swgLV (BUS) 18.3 kA 0.10 s 6.5 cal/cm² Shorter delay for generator protection pd-G.
#001.1 swgLV / pd-G (LINE) 21.0 kA 2.00 s 22.1 cal/cm² No protection between generator and swgLV.
#001.2 swgLV / pd-T (LINE) 18.4 kA 0.20 s 10.1 cal/cm² Shorter delay for medium voltage protection pd-tx.
#002 pnl1 (BUS) 8.3 kA 0.05 s 1.0 cal/cm²
#003 pnl2 (BUS) 4.2 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm²
2.4 Arc Flash Risk
Annex A.7 on page 17 shows an example how risk assessment for arc flash can be performed.
When using this method control measures should be implemented in the following cases:
- Tasks with a remote or improbable likelihood and a calculated hazard > 1.2 cal/cm².
- Special consideration for remote likelihood and calculated hazard > 12 cal/cm².
Conversely, additional control measures, including PPE, are not required for:
- Tasks with a calculated hazard < 1.2 cal/cm².
- Tasks with an incredible likelihood.
Risk assessment is usually adapted to be in line with a company’s established risk assessment
method, including for example the use of a risk matrix.
6 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
3 Power System Model
The hazard calculation requires an accurate representation of the electrical system to get
reliable results. Information sources are typically a combination of existing site documentation
and a site visit where information is verified or completed.
3.1 Sources
• Data collection site visit
• Site electrical single line diagram (outline of electrical configuration, basic
information)
• Relay and circuit breaker setting schedule (breaker types, settings)
• Cable schedule (cable sizes, lengths)
3.2 Scenarios
If PPE are used to mitigate arc flash hazard, the worst-case occurring incident energy should
be considered. Because of this, the hazard calculation will consist of multiple calculations of
the electrical distribution system in different switching configurations or scenarios. Some of
the reasons to use multiple scenarios are emergency generators, paralleling of transformers
and a difference between the minimum and maximum utility contribution.
In the sample study three scenarios are calculated, depending on the use of utility and
generator contribution to faults.
Scenario Utility Generator
utility yes no
parallel yes yes
generator no yes
3.3 Assumptions & Approximations
If information is not available in the provided site documentation and these cannot be
completed during a site visit, assumptions are made where they are not expected to make a
large impact on arc flash hazard. In rare cases these assumptions are not possible and a range
of values are used in different scenarios to make sure the worst-case is covered.
• All cable lengths are estimates rounded to the closest 5 meters.
• Thermal motor protection for motor m2 has not been modelled, as it does not
affect arc flash
• Utility R/X ratio assumed at 0.1.
• Transformer X/R ratio assumed at typical values.
3.3.1 Maximum arcing time
The maximum arcing time has been limited to 2 seconds, based on IEEE 1584 6.9.1:
"If the time is longer than two seconds, consider how long a person is likely to remain in the
location of the arc flash. It is likely that the person exposed to arc flash will move away quickly if
it is physically possible and two seconds is a reasonable maximum time for calculations. A
person in a bucket truck or a person who has crawled into equipment will need more time to
move away."
7 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A Calculation Results
A.1 Single Line Diagram
UTILITY
Isc 3P 250.0 MVA
Isc SLG 0.0 MVA
pd-tx
I>, I>>
transformer generator
10000/400V 630 kVA
S 1000kVA X"d 0.15 pu
6.00%
3// 240 cu 2// 240 cu
10m 10m
pd-T pd-G
ACB ACB
swgLV 1600 B 1000 B
400V 1600AF/1600AT 1000AF/1000AT
pd-1 pd-2
MCCB NV/NH
250H gG 63A
250AF/250AT 63AF/63AT
1// 95 cu 1// 25 cu
60m 40m
pnl1 pnl2
400V 400V
8 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.2 Input Data
A.2.1 Distribution equipment
Label # Bus name Voltage Dimensions Configuration Withstand
#001 swgLV 400 V 508x508x250 cm HCB 50 kA
#001.1 swgLV 400 V 750x750x250 cm VCCB 50 kA
#001.2 swgLV 400 V 750x750x250 cm VCCB 50 kA
#002 pnl1 400 V 508x508x250 cm VCCB 36 kA
#003 pnl2 400 V 508x508x250 cm VCCB 36 kA
A.2.2 Utility
Connection 3P Contribution Z+ (pu)
Utility
Service SLG Contribution Z0 pu
Wye-Ground 250.0 MVA 0.0496 + j0.3969
UTILITY
In 0.0 MVA ∞ + j∞
A.2.3 Generators
Size Voltage Z+ (pu)
Generator
X’’d Ampacity Z0 pu
630 kVA 400V 1.58 + j23.81
Generator
0.15 909 A 1.58 + j23.81
A.2.4 Transformers
Size Voltage Z+ (pu)
Transformer
Vector / Z% Ampacity Z0 pu
1000 kVA 10000/400V 1.03 + j5.91
Transformer
Dyn1 / 6.00% 58/1443 A 1.03 + j5.91
A.2.5 Cables
From Size Z+ pu
Cable
To Length Z0 pu
BUS-0013 3//240 mm² cu 0.20 + j0.16
c-tx
swgLV 10.0 m 0.32 + j0.42
BUS-0015 2//240 mm² cu 0.30 + j0.25
c-gen
swgLV 10.0 m 0.48 + j0.62
swgLV 1//95 mm² cu 9.23 + j3.18
c-pnl1
pnl1 60.0 m 14.67 + j8.09
swgLV 1//25 mm² cu 23.18 + j2.29
c-pnl2
pnl2 40.0 m 36.84 + j5.81
9 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.3 Fault currents
A.3.1 IEC 60909 Results
Label # Bus name Voltage Scenario Ik'' Ip Ik Ik''(SLG) Ip(SLG)
utility 21.91 kA 48.68 kA 21.91 kA 22.06 kA 48.83 kA
#001 swgLV 400 V parallel 28.25 kA 63.28 kA 22.99 kA 28.36 kA 64.14 kA
generator 6.52 kA 15.00 kA 1.75 kA 6.48 kA 15.89 kA
utility 11.25 kA 17.36 kA 11.25 kA 9.64 kA 14.87 kA
#002 pnl1 400 V parallel 12.55 kA 21.84 kA 11.20 kA 10.57 kA 16.05 kA
generator 5.39 kA 9.86 kA 1.72 kA 4.99 kA 9.24 kA
utility 6.80 kA 9.82 kA 6.80 kA 5.78 kA 8.35 kA
#003 pnl2 400 V parallel 7.11 kA 11.80 kA 6.82 kA 6.00 kA 8.66 kA
generator 4.60 kA 7.08 kA 1.68 kA 4.15 kA 6.34 kA
A.3.2 Comparison of Fault Study Results with equipment ratings
symmetrical IEC 60909 assymetrical IEC 60909
withstand current I’’k peak current Ip
swgLV 50 28 110 62
swgLV - pd-T 42 28 88 62
swgLV - pd-G 42 28 88 62
swgLV - pd-1 36 28 76 62
swgLV - pd-2 80 28 176 62
pnl1 36 13 76 22
pnl2 36 7 76 12
A.3.3 Table: reference for equipment evaluation with IEC 60909 results
symmetrical symmetrical asymmetrical
breaking current withstand current peak current
Study Results (IEC 60909) I’’k, Ib (1) Ik Ip
LV Switchgear (IEC 61439) - ICW Ipk
LV Circuit Breakers (IEC 60947) ICU, ICS (2) ICW ICM
MV Switchgear (IEC 62271) - Ik Ima
MV Circuit Breakers (IEC 62271) ISC Ik Ima
(1): I’’k is the initial symmetrical current, with a maximum possible AC component. Ib is the breaking current at a certain time delay,
which may be lower than I’’k due to the AC decrement of rotating equipment.
(2): ICU is the ultimate breaking capacity, I CS is the service breaking capacity.
10 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.4 Coordination
A.4.1 Table: current protective device settings
Model Type
Name Scenario Settings
Rating Withstand
Relay
I> 1 (75A)
t> 60 (sec)
pd-tx - 75 / 5 I>, I>>
I>> 8 (600A)
t>> 0.3 (sec)
LV Breakers
Ir 250 (250A)
250N MCCB
pd-1 - tr Fixed
250.0A/250.0A 36 kA
Ii 6 (1500A)
L Ir 0.9 (900A)
L tr 4
1000 B ACB
pd-G - S Isd 4 (3600A)
1000.0A/1000.0A 42 kA
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 10 (10000A)
L Ir 0.9 (1440A)
L tr 4
1600 B ACB
pd-T - S Isd 4 (5760A)
1600.0A/1600.0A 42 kA
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 10 (16000A)
LV Fuses
gG 63A NV/NH
pd-2 -
80 kA
A.4.2 Table: coordination with current settings
pd-tx pd-T pd-G
pd-T full - -
pd-G - - -
pd-1 - 9 kA 9 kA
pd-2 - full full
11 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.4.3 Table: recommended protective device settings
Model Type
Name Scenario Settings
Rating Withstand
Relay
I> 1 (75A)
t> 60 (sec)
pd-tx - 75 / 5 I>, I>>
I>> 5 (375A)
t>> 0.1 (sec)
LV Breakers
Ir 250 (250A)
250H MCCB
pd-1 - tr Fixed
250.0A/250.0A 65.0 kA
Ii 6 (1500A)
L Ir 0.9 (900A)
L tr 4
1000 B ACB
pd-G - S Isd 3 (2700A)
1000.0A/1000.0A 42.0 kA
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 5 (5000A)
L Ir 0.9 (1440A)
L tr 4
1600 B ACB
pd-T - S Isd 4 (5760A)
1600.0A/1600.0A 42.0 kA
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 5 (8000A)
LV Fuses
gG 63A NV/NH
pd-2 -
120.0 kA
A.4.4 Table: coordination with recommended settings
pd-tx pd-T pd-G
pd-T full - -
pd-G - - -
pd-1 - full full
pd-2 - full full
12 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.5 Time-current Diagrams
A.5.1 TCC: swgLV fed from transformer – with current settings
1000
pd-tx
pd-tx
100
UTILITY
pd-T
pd-tx
, 75 / 5 A
I> 1 (75A)
t> 60 (sec)
I>> 8 (600A)
t>> 0.3 (sec) pd-1
transformer
10000/400V 10
1000kVA S
Z% 6.00%
TIME IN SECONDS
3// 240 cu
10m
pd-T
1600 B, 1600 A
L Ir 0.9 (1440A)
L tr 4
S Isd 4 (5760A)
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 10 (16000A) 1
swgLV
400 V pd-1
Isc 27.8kA 250H, 250 A
Ia 18.3kA Ir 250 (250A)
tr Fixed
Ii 6 (1500A)
1// 95 cu
60m
pnl1 0.10
400 V
Isc 11.0kA
Ia 8.3kA
0.01
100K
10K
100
1K
1M
CURRENT IN AMPERES
transformer @400 V x 1 A, Bus Fault Current (InitSym 3P)
A.5.2 TCC: swgLV fed from transformer – with recommended settings
1000
pd-tx
pd-tx
100
UTILITY
pd-T
pd-tx
, 75 / 5 A
I> 1 (75A)
t> 60 (sec)
I>> 5 (375A)
t>> 0.1 (sec)
pd-1
transformer
10
10000/400V
1000kVA S
Z% 6.00%
TIME IN SECONDS
3// 240 cu
10m
pd-T
1600 B, 1600 A
L Ir 0.9 (1440A)
L tr 4
S Isd 4 (5760A)
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
1
I Ii 5 (8000A)
swgLV
400 V pd-1
Isc 27.8kA 250H, 250 A
Ia 18.3kA Ir 250 (250A)
tr Fixed
Ii 6 (1500A)
1// 95 cu
60m
pnl1 0.10
400 V
Isc 11.0kA
Ia 8.3kA
0.01
100K
10K
100
1K
1M
CURRENT IN AMPERES
transformer @400 V x 1 A, Bus Fault Current (InitSym 3P)
13 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.5.3 TCC: swgLV fed from generator – with current settings
1000
pd-G
100
pd-1
generator
2// 240 cu 10
10m
TIME IN SECONDS
pd-G
1000 B, 1000 A
L Ir 0.9 (900A)
L tr 4
S Isd 4 (3600A)
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 10 (10000A)
swgLV
400 V pd-1
Isc 27.8kA 250H, 250 A
Ia 18.3kA Ir 250 (250A) 1
tr Fixed
1// 95 cu Ii 6 (1500A)
60m
pnl1
400 V
Isc 11.0kA
Ia 8.3kA
0.10
0.01
100K
10K
100
1K
1M
CURRENT IN AMPERES
generator @400 V x 1 A, Bus Fault Current (InitSym 3P)
A.5.4 TCC: swgLV fed from generator – with recommended settings
1000
pd-G
100
pd-1
generator
2// 240 cu 10
10m
TIME IN SECONDS
pd-G
1000 B, 1000 A
L Ir 0.9 (900A)
L tr 4
S Isd 3 (2700A)
S tsd 0.1 (I^s T Off)
I Ii 10 (10000A)
swgLV
400 V pd-1
Isc 27.8kA 250H, 250 A
Ia 18.3kA Ir 250 (250A) 1
tr Fixed
1// 95 cu Ii 6 (1500A)
60m
pnl1
400 V
Isc 11.0kA
Ia 8.3kA
0.10
0.01
100K
10K
100
1K
1M
CURRENT IN AMPERES
generator @400 V x 1 A, Bus Fault Current (InitSym 3P)
14 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.6 IEEE 1584-2018 Calculation Results
A.6.1 Results with current settings
Label # Bus name / PD name (side) Volt Gap Config Dimensions Work D
Scenario Prot Dev Isc Ia t Energy Boundary
swgLV (BUS) 400 V 25 mm HCB 508x508x250 cm 46 cm
#001
pd-G 27.8 kA 18.3 kA 2.00 s 43.6 cal/cm² 2.7 m
utility pd-T 21.9 kA 14.7 kA 0.10 s 7.2 cal/cm² 1.1 m
parallel pd-G 27.8 kA 18.3 kA 2.00 s 43.6 cal/cm² 2.7 m
generator pd-G 6.0 kA 3.9 kA 2.00 s 36.3 cal/cm² 2.5 m
swgLV / pd-G (LINE) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 750x750x250 cm 46 cm
#001.1
MaxTripTime @2.0s 27.8 kA 21.0 kA 2.00 s 22.1 cal/cm² 2.3 m
parallel MaxTripTime @2.0s 27.8 kA 21.0 kA 2.00 s 22.1 cal/cm² 2.3 m
generator MaxTripTime @2.0s 6.0 kA 4.4 kA 2.00 s 19.1 cal/cm² 2.1 m
swgLV / pd-T (LINE) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 750x750x250 cm 46 cm
#001.2
pd-tx 27.8 kA 18.4 kA 2.00 s 97.1 cal/cm² 5.2 m
utility pd-tx 21.9 kA 14.7 kA 2.00 s 75.2 cal/cm² 4.5 m
parallel pd-tx 27.8 kA 18.4 kA 2.00 s 97.1 cal/cm² 5.2 m
pnl1 (BUS) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 508x508x250 cm 46 cm
#002
pd-1 11.0 kA 8.3 kA 0.05 s 1.0 cal/cm² 0.4 m
utility pd-1 10.1 kA 7.6 kA 0.05 s 0.9 cal/cm² 0.4 m
parallel pd-1 11.0 kA 8.3 kA 0.05 s 1.0 cal/cm² 0.4 m
generator pd-1 4.9 kA 3.5 kA 0.05 s 0.4 cal/cm² 0.2 m
pnl2 (BUS) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 508x508x250 cm 46 cm
#003
pd-2 5.7 kA 4.2 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
utility pd-2 5.6 kA 4.0 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
parallel pd-2 5.7 kA 4.2 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
generator pd-2 4.0 kA 2.9 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
A.6.2 Results with recommended settings
Label # Bus name / PD name (side) Volt Gap Config Dimensions Work D
Scenario Prot Dev Isc Ia t Energy Boundary
swgLV (BUS) 400 V 25 mm HCB 508x508x250cm 46 cm
#001
pd-G 27.8 kA 18.3 kA 0.10 s 6.5 cal/cm² 1.1 m
utility pd-T 21.9 kA 14.7 kA 0.07 s 4.7 cal/cm² 0.9 m
parallel pd-G 27.8 kA 18.3 kA 0.10 s 6.5 cal/cm² 1.1 m
generator pd-G 6.0 kA 3.9 kA 0.10 s 1.8 cal/cm² 0.6 m
swgLV / pd-G (LINE) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 750x750x250cm 46 cm
#001.1
MaxTripTime @2.0s 27.8 kA 21.0 kA 2.00 s 22.1 cal/cm² 2.3 m
parallel MaxTripTime @2.0s 27.8 kA 21.0 kA 2.00 s 22.1 cal/cm² 2.3 m
generator MaxTripTime @2.0s 6.0 kA 4.4 kA 2.00 s 19.1 cal/cm² 2.1 m
swgLV / pd-T (LINE) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 750x750x250cm 46 cm
#001.2
pd-tx 27.8 kA 21.0 kA 0.20 s 10.1 cal/cm² 1.5 m
utility pd-tx 21.9 kA 16.8 kA 0.20 s 8.8 cal/cm² 1.4 m
parallel pd-tx 27.8 kA 21.0 kA 0.20 s 10.1 cal/cm² 1.5 m
pnl1 (BUS) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 508x508x250cm 46 cm
#002
pd-1 11.0 kA 8.3 kA 0.05 s 1.0 cal/cm² 0.4 m
utility pd-1 10.1 kA 7.6 kA 0.05 s 0.9 cal/cm² 0.4 m
parallel pd-1 11.0 kA 8.3 kA 0.05 s 1.0 cal/cm² 0.4 m
generator pd-1 4.9 kA 3.5 kA 0.05 s 0.4 cal/cm² 0.2 m
pnl2 (BUS) 400 V 25 mm VCBB 508x508x250cm 46 cm
#003
pd-2 5.7 kA 4.2 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
utility pd-2 5.6 kA 4.0 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
parallel pd-2 5.7 kA 4.2 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
generator pd-2 4.0 kA 2.9 kA 0.00 s 0.0 cal/cm² 0.1 m
15 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.6.3 IEEE Std 1584 Table Header Descriptions
Header Description
Label # Label identification number
Bus name /PD name (side) Location of the arc flash.
Volt Bus voltage at the fault location (in Volts)
Gap The spacing between bus bars or conductors at the arc location.
Electrode configuration:
VCB: vertical conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure
VCBB: vertical conductors/electrodes terminated in an insulating barrier inside a metal box/enclosure
Config
HCB: horizontal conductors/electrodes inside a metal box/enclosure
VOA: vertical conductors/electrodes in open air
HOA: horizontal conductors/electrodes in open air
Dimensions Dimensions of the box enclosing the arc: height, width, depth.
Work D The working distance between the arc source and the worker’s face or chest.
Scenario Switching setup used for calculation.
Prot Dev Protective device that interrupts the arcing current.
Isc The current flowing to a bus fault.
Ia The calculated arcing current [kA] on the faulted bus
t The time [s] required for the protective device to operate for the given arcing fault condition.
Energy The amount of energy released at the working distance.
Boundary The distance from the arc where exposure is reduced to 1.2 cal/cm².
16 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
A.7 Arc Flash Risk
The goal of risk assessment is to determine when additional measures should be taken to reduce arc
flash risk. Because a risk assessment method is not specified in the standards, the approach offered here
is based on IEC 61508: Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related
Systems. Using this standard, the frequency and event consequence severity of the activity are
determined that result in a risk classification. The frequency is estimated based on the task performed
and the equipment condition. The consequence severity is calculated using the IEEE Standard 1584:
Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. This risk assessment method fulfils all the
requirements of NFPA 70E.
For every activity the likelihood of occurrence needs to be determined, meaning an estimate must be
determined as to how often a failure leading to an arc flash may occur based on the specific activity.
A.7.1 Likelihood of occurrence A.7.2 Consequence categories.
Category Definition Range Category Definition
Frequent Many times in system lifetime > 10−3 Catastrophic Multiple loss of life
Probable Several times in system lifetime 10−3 to 10−4 Critical Loss of a single life
Occasional Once in system lifetime 10−4 to 10−5 Marginal Major injuries to one or more persons
Remote Unlikely in system lifetime 10−5 to 10−6 Negligible Minor injuries at worst
Improbable Very unlikely to occur 10−6 to 10−7
Incredible Cannot believe that it could occur < 10−7
Because arc flash is a rare phenomenon, it is unlikely that any work activity performed by electrically
qualified personnel would fall within the frequent, probable or occasional categories. The consequence
of an arc flash will depend on the energy released during the event, which can range from negligible all
the way up to catastrophic for extremely high energy levels.
With both the likelihood of occurrence and the consequence known, a risk class can be derived to
evaluate if additional control measures are required.
A.7.3 Risk class based on likelihood of occurrence and consequence categories
Consequence
Likelihood Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
Frequent I I I II
Probable I I II III
Occasional I II III III
Remote II III III IV
Improbable III III IV IV
Incredible IV IV IV IV
Class I: Unacceptable in any circumstance;
Class II: Undesirable: tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if the costs are grossly
disproportionate to the improvement gained;
Class III: Tolerable if the cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement;
Class IV: Acceptable as it stands, though it may need to be monitored.
17 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study www.vrielink-es.com
For arc flash incident energy, the consequence category will be divided as follows:
A.7.4 Arc flash incident energy and consequence categories
Table Error! Reference source not found..1: Arc flash incident energy and consequence categories
Incident Energy Category Consequence
Below 1.2 cal/cm² Negligible Minor injuries at worst
1.2 – 12 cal/cm² Critical Loss of a single life
Over 12 cal/cm² Catastrophic Multiple loss of life
The likelihood of occurrence for electrical arcs depends on the task performed and the
condition of the equipment. The table below is based on NFPA 70E table 130.5(C), but
adjusted to only show the likelihood, not risk assessment results.
A.7.5 Likelihood of occurrence for tasks with possible exposure to electrical arcs.
Task Likelihood
Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch. Incredible
Examination of insulated cable with no manipulation of cable. Incredible
Operation of a CB, switch, contactor, or starter. Normal equipment condition. Incredible
Removal or installation of covers for equipment such as wireways, junction boxes, and cable trays that does not
Incredible
expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts. Normal equipment condition.
Opening a panelboard hinged door or cover to access dead front overcurrent devices. Normal equipment
Incredible
condition.
Performing infrared thermography and other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary.
Improbable
This activity does not include opening of doors or covers.
Working on control circuits with exposed energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, nominal 125 volts ac or
dc, or below without any other exposed energized equipment over nominal 125 volts ac or dc, including opening of Improbable
hinged covers to gain access.
For dc systems, insertion or removal of individual cells or multi-cell units of a battery system in an open rack. Improbable
For dc systems, maintenance on a single cell of a battery system or multi-cell units in an open rack. Improbable
Removal of battery nonconductive intercell connector covers. Normal equipment condition. Improbable
Voltage testing on individual battery cells or individual multi-cell units. Normal equipment condition. Improbable
For ac systems, work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing. Remote
For dc systems, working on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of series-connected battery cells,
Remote
including voltage testing.
Removal or installation of CBs or switches. Remote
Opening hinged door(s) or cover(s) or removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors
Remote
and circuit parts). For dc systems, this includes bolted covers, such as battery terminal covers.
Application of temporary protective grounding equipment, after voltage test. Remote
Working on control circuits with exposed energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, greater than 120 volts. Remote
Insertion or removal of individual starter buckets from motor control center (MCC). Remote
Insertion or removal (racking) of circuit breakers (CBs) or starters from cubicles, doors open or closed. Remote
Examination of insulated cable with manipulation of cable. Remote
Working on exposed energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of equipment directly supplied by a
Remote
panelboard or motor control center.
Insertion or removal of revenue meters (kW-hour, at primary voltage and current). Remote
Removal of battery conductive intercell connector covers. Remote
Opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments. Remote
Operation of outdoor disconnect switch (hookstick operated) at 1 kV through 15 kV. Remote
Operation of outdoor disconnect switch (gang-operated, from grade) at 1 kV through 15 kV. Remote
Maintenance and testing on individual battery cells or individual multi-cell units in an open rack. Abnormal
Remote
equipment condition.
Insertion or removal of individual cells or multi-cell units of a battery system in an open rack. Abnormal equipment
Remote
condition.
Arc-resistant switchgear Type 1 or 2 (for clearing times of less than 0.5 sec with a prospective fault current not to
exceed the arc-resistant rating of the equipment) and metal enclosed interrupter switchgear, fused or unfused of Remote
arc resistant type construction, 1 kV through 15 kV. Abnormal equipment condition.
Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles; Insertion or removal (racking) of ground and test device; or
Remote
Insertion or removal (racking) of voltage transformers on or off the bus. Abnormal equipment condition.
18 of 19 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study – www.vrielink-es.com
Normal equipment condition is defined as:
• The equipment is properly installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and applicable industry codes
and standards.
• The equipment is properly maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations and applicable industry
codes and standards.
• The equipment is used in accordance with instructions included in the listing and labeling and in accordance with
manufacturer’s instructions.
• Equipment doors are closed and secured.
• Equipment covers are in place and secured.
• There is no evidence of impending failure such as arcing, overheating, loose or bound equipment parts, visible damage, or
deterioration.
Using the tables above we obtain the following risk classes for electrical arcs:
A.7.6 Risk class for electrical arcs
Hazard Likelihood Consequence Risk Class
Remote Catastrophic Class II
Over 12 cal/cm² Improbable Catastrophic Class III
Incredible Catastrophic Class IV
Remote Critical Class III
1,2-12 cal/cm² Improbable Critical Class III
Incredible Critical Class IV
Remote Negligible Class IV
Under 1,2 cal/cm² Improbable Negligible Class IV
Incredible Negligible Class IV
These results show that control measures should be implemented in the following cases:
• Tasks with a remote or improbable likelihood and a calculated hazard > 1.2
cal/cm².
• Special consideration for remote likelihood and calculated hazard > 12 cal/cm².
Conversely, additional control measures, including PPE, are not required for:
• Tasks with a calculated hazard < 1.2 cal/cm².
• Tasks with an incredible likelihood.
19 of 19 Sample Arc Flash Hazard Calculation Study – www.vrielink-es.com
B R A N D O N A N D C L A R K I N C . / / S C O T T W. C L A R K , P. E .
ELECTRICAL
C O N T I N U I N G E D U C AT I O N
A R C F L A S H - N F PA 7 0 E
• Training is not a substitute for following corporate safety
guidelines.
• Always refer to the latest safety standards when selecting
PPE or evaluating hazards.
• “What is an electrical arc flash?”
• “How do I calculate the danger posed by an arc flash?”
• “How do I protect myself and others from an arc flash?”
TYPES OF
ELECTRICAL
F A U LT S
Bolted Fault:
Bolted faults are characterized by
a solidly connected fault path
causing high levels of current to
flow through this solid
connection.
Arcing Fault:
Arcing faults differ in the fact that
the current actually flows through
ionized air causing an arc.
ELECTRICAL
ARC FLASH
• Flash Temperature:
up to 35000 [ºF]
• Blast Pressure:
500 to 600 [psi]
• Pressure Wave Velocity:
5500 to 6000 [ft/s]
ELECTRICAL
ARC FLASH
• Injuries
• 2nd Degree Burn:
176[ºF] @ 0.1[s]
• 3rd Degree Burn:
205[ºF] @ 0.1[s]
• Threshold for 2nd Degree
Burn: 1.2 [cal/cm2]
ELECTRICAL
ARC FLASH
Causes of arcing faults:
• Accidents caused by touching a test
probe to the wrong surface.
• Accidental tool slippage.
• Sparks due to breaks or gaps in
insulation system.
• Equipment failure due to use of
substandard parts, improper installation,
or even normal wear and tear.
• Dust, corrosion or other impurities on
the surface of the conductor insulation
systems.
ELECTRICAL
ARC FLASH
• 5 to 10 arc flash explosions
occur in electric equipment
every day in the United
States.
• This number does not include
cases in which the victim is
sent to an ordinary hospital.
• These incidents are so severe
the victims require treatment
from a special burn center.
ELECTRICAL ARC
FLASH HAZARD
• NFPA 70E
• Arch Flash Hazard: A dangerous
condition associated with the
possible release of energy
caused by an electric arc
• FPN No.1: “…may exist when
energized electrical conductors
are exposed… a person
interacting with equipment in
such a manner that could cause
an electric arc.”
• “What is an electrical arc flash?”
• “How do I calculate the danger posed by an arc flash?”
• “How do I protect myself and others from an arc flash?”
ELECTRICAL ARC
FLASH HAZARD
• Arc Flash Hazard Analysis: A
study investigating a worker’s
potential exposure to arc flash
energy, conducted for the
purpose of injury prevention
and the determination of safe
work practices, arc flash
protection boundary, and
appropriate levels of PPE.
• Calculations based on NFPA
Annex D
ELECTRICAL ARC
FLASH HAZARD
• Arc Flash Hazard Analysis
Results:
• PPE Selection
• Arc Flash Boundary
ELECTRICAL ARC
FLASH HAZARD
Arc Flash Boundary:
• Designed to prevent 2nd
degree burns when
unprotected during an arc
flash.
• The higher the arc flash energy
the greater the boundary.
• If inside the boundary PPE
protection is needed to
prevent injury.
STOLL
EXPERIMENT
Stoll A.M., Greene L.C.,
“Relationship Between Pain and
Tissue Damage Due to Thermal
Radiation”, Journal of Applied
Physiology 14: 373-382, 1959
• Based on experiments on humans.
• Used a flame source with varying
times of exposure
• The time and energy was varied to
determine a second degree burn
threshold relationship.
ELECTRICAL ARC FLASH BOUNDARIES
Important Factors:
NFPA Annex D:
• Available fault current
Multiple Methods
• Transformer kVA
• Lee Method
• Transformer Impedance
• IEEE 1584 Method
• Motor Contribution
• Software Solutions
• Fuse or Breaker Curves and Settings
Requires a complete protection
coordination study
• Conduit Type
B RBreaker
E A K E R / FSettings
U S E C U R Comparison
VES
CURRENT IN AMPERES CURRENT IN AMPERES
1000 1000
2000 KVA 2000 KVA
2 sets: 500 Fault clears in 8 2 sets: 500
2000 KVA seconds 2000 KVA
100 125E
Incident energy 100 125E
= 718 cal/cm2
3000A MAIN 3000A MAIN
10
800A1
No FR class for IE 10
800A1
TIME IN SECONDS
values this high
TIME IN SECONDS
IA = 6K IA = 6K
1
IB = 9K 1
IB = 9K
2 sets: 500 2 sets: 500
TX Inrush
Fault clears in 0.1 TX Inrush
0.10 0.10
second
Incident energy
0.01
1 10 100 1K 10K = .97 cal/cm2 0.01
1 10 100 1K 10K
Case 3.tcc Ref. Voltage: 480 Current Scale x10^2 Ford Sharonville.drw Case 3.tcc Ref. Voltage: 480 Current Scale x10^2 Ford Sharonville.drw
FR class 0
31 Engineering Services
ELECTRICAL ARC
FLASH HAZARD
• Arc Flash Hazard Analysis
Results:
• PPE Selection
• Arc Flash Boundary
• “What is an electrical arc flash?”
• “How do I calculate the danger posed by an arc flash?”
• “How do I protect myself and others from an arc flash?”
ELECTRICAL
SHOCK HAZARD
• Shock Hazard Analysis: A
shock hazard analysis shall
determine the voltage to
which personnel will be
exposed, boundary
requirements, and personal
protective equipment
necessary in order to minimize
the possibility of electrical
shock.
• Calculations based on NFPA
130.2
ELECTRICAL
SHOCK HAZARD
• Shock Hazard Analysis
Results:
• PPE Selection
• Approach Boundary
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• PPE Selection:
• Based on Arc Flash and Shock
Hazard
• FR, Fire Retardant clothing or Arc
Flash Suit
• Arc Flash Suit:
• A complete FR clothing and
equipment that covers the entire
body, except for the hands and feet.
This includes pants, jacket, and a
beekeeper-type hood fitted with a
face shield
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• Arc Rating: The value
attributed to materials that
describes their performance
to exposure to an electrical
arc discharge. The arc rating
is expressed in [cal/cm2] and
is derived from the
determined value of the arc
thermal performance value
(ATPV) or energy breakopen
threshold.
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• 130.7(C)(10): Category 0
2
• Incident Energy: {0-1.2} [cal/cm ]
• Shirt (Long Sleeve) *1
• Pants (Long) *1
• Safety Glasses or Goggles
• Hearing Protection
• Gloves (As needed)
• *1: Non-melting (according to ASTM
F 1506-00) or Untreated Natural Fiber
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• 130.7(C)(10): Category 1
2
• Incident Energy: {1.2-4} [cal/cm ]
• Arc-rated long sleeve shirt
• Arc-rated pants
• Arc-rated coverall
• Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear
• Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing
Protection
• Leather Gloves
• Leather work shoes
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• 130.7(C)(10): Category 2
2
• Incident Energy: {4-8} [cal/cm ]
• Arc-rated long sleeve shirt
• Arc-rated pants
• Arc-rated coverall
• Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear
• Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing
Protection
• Leather Gloves
• Leather work shoes
• Arc-rated flash suit hood, for Cat 2*
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• 130.7(C)(10): Category 3
2
• Incident Energy: {8-25} [cal/cm ]
• Arc-rated long sleeve shirt
• Arc-rated pants
• Arc-rated coverall
• Arc-rated flash suit jacket, pants, hood
• Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear
• Hardhat with FR lines, Safety Glasses,
Hearing Protection
• Arc-rated Gloves
• Leather work shoes
ELECTRICAL
PPE
• 130.7(C)(10): Category 4
2
• Incident Energy: {25-40} [cal/cm ]
• Arc-rated long sleeve shirt
• Arc-rated pants
• Arc-rated coverall
• Arc-rated flash suit jacket, pants, hood
• Arc-rated jacket, parka, or rainwear
• Hardhat with FR lines, Safety Glasses,
Hearing Protection
• Arc-rated Gloves
• Leather work shoes
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• Approach Boundaries
• Shock
• From Shock Hazard
Analysis
• Arc Flash
• From Arc Flash Hazard
Analysis
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• Arc Flash Protection
Boundary: When an arc
flash hazard exists, an
approach limit at a
distance from a
prospective arc source
within which a person
could receive a second
degree burn if an electrical
arc flash were to occur.
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• 130.7(C)(1) When and
employee is working within
the Arc Flash Protection
Boundary he or she shall
wear protective clothing
and other personal
protective equipment in
accordance with 130.3.
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• NFPA 70E defines an unqualified person
as simply "a person who is not a
qualified person." There are two kinds of
unqualified persons:
• An unqualified electrician who does not
know the equipment or has not received
safety training on the potential hazards
involved.
• A non-electrician, such as a general
maintenance worker or painter, who is
not expected to work on live electrical
equipment.
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• Shock Hazard Boundary:
• Limited Approach
Boundary: An approach
limit at a distance from
and exposed energized
electrical conductor or
circuit part within which a
shock hazard exists.
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• Shock Hazard Boundary:
• Restricted Approach Boundary:
An approach limit at a distance
from and exposed energized
electrical conductor or circuit
part within which there is an
increased risk of shock, due to
electrical arc over combined
with inadvertent movement, for
personnel working in close
proximity to the energized
electrical conductor or circuit
part.
ELECTRICAL
H A Z A R D A N A LY S I S
• Shock Hazard Boundary:
• Prohibited Approach
Boundary: An approach limit
at a distance form and
exposed energized
electrical conductor or
circuit part within which
work is considered the same
as making contact with the
electrical conductor or
circuit part.
ELECTRICAL SHOCK BOUNDARIES
NFPA 70E 70E
NFPA Table 130.4
Table (C)
130.4 (C)(a)
(a)
Approach Boundaries
Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Partsfor
to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts forShock Protectionforfor
Shock Protection Alternating
Alternating Current
Current
Systems (all dimensions
Systems are distances
(all dimensions fromfrom
are distances energized electrical
energized electricalconductor
conductor or circuitparts
or circuit partsto to employee)
employee)
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) b (4)
(4) (5) (5)
LimitedLimited Approach
Approach Boundary
Boundary b
Nominal System Voltage Exposed Exposed Fixed Restricted Approach Prohibited Approach
Nominal System
Range,Voltage
Phase4 to Phase4 Exposed Movable Exposed Fixed
Circuit Part Restricted
BoundarybbApproach
; Includes Prohibited
BoundarybApproach
b
Range, Phase to Phase Movable
Conductor Circuit Part Boundary ; Includes
Inadvertent Movement Adder Boundary
50 V Conductor
Not Specified Not Specified Inadvertent
Not Movement
Specified Adder Not Specified
50 V 50 V – 300 V Not Specified
3.0 m (10 ft. 0 Not
in.) Specified
1.0 m (3 ft. 6 in.) Not Specified
Avoid Contact NotContact
Avoid Specified
50 V – 300 301
V V – 750 V 3.0ft.m0(10
3.0 m (10 ft. 01.0
in.) in.)m1.0
(3 m
ft.(36 ft. 6 in.)
in.) 0.3 m Contact
Avoid (1 ft. 0 in.) 25 Avoid
mm (0 ft. 1 in.)
Contact
301 V – 750 V 3.0 m (10 ft. 0 in.) 1.0 m (3 ft. 6 in.) 0.3 m (1 ft. 0 in.) 25 mm (0 ft. 1 in.)
751 V – 15 kV 3.0 m (10 ft. 0 in.) 1.5 m (5 ft. 0 in) 0.7 m (2 ft. 2 in.) 0.2 m (0 ft.7 in.)
15.1 kV – 36 kV 3.0 m (10 ft. 0 in.) 1.8 m (6 ft. 0 in.) 0.8 m (2 ft. 7 in.) 0.3 m (0 ft. 10 in.)
751 V – 15 36.1
kV kV – 46 kV 3.0 m (10
3.0ft.m0(10
in.)
ft. 0 1.5
in.) m2.5
(5 m
ft.(80 ft.
in)0 in.) 0.7
0.8mm(2
(2ft.
ft. 29 in.)
in.) 0.40.2
m (1mft.(05 ft.7
in.) in.)
15.1 kV – 36 kV 3.0 m (10 ft. 0 in.) 1.8 m (6 ft. 0 in.) 0.8 m (2 ft. 7 in.) 0.3 m (0 ft. 10 in.)
36.1 kV – 46 kVkV – 72.5 kV 3.0 m (10
46.1 3.0ft.m0(10
in.)
ft. 0 2.5
in.) m2.5
(8 m
ft.(80 ft.
in.)
0 in.) 0.8
1.0mm(2
(3ft.
ft. 93 in.)
in.) 0.10.4
m (2mft.(12 ft.
in.)5 in.)
72.6 kV – 121 kV 3.3 m (10 ft. 8 in.) 2.5 m (8 ft. 0 in.) 1.0 m (3 ft. 4 in.) 0.8 m (2 ft. 9 in.)
138 kV
46.1 kV – 72.5 kV – 145 kV 3.0 m (10
3.4ft.m0(11 ft. 0 2.5
in.) in.) m3.0
(8 m
ft.(10 ft. 0 in.)
0 in.) 1.2mm(3
1.0 (3ft.
ft. 310in.)
in.) 1.00.1
m (3mft.(24 ft.
in.)2 in.)
72.6 kV – 121 kV 3.3 m (10 ft. 8 in.) 2.5 m (8 ft. 0 in.) 1.0 m (3 ft. 4 in.) 0.8 m (2 ft. 9 in.)
161 kV – 169 kV 3.6 m (11 ft. 8 in.) 3.6 m (11 ft. 8 in.) 1.3 m (4 ft. 3 in.) 1.1 m (3 ft. 9 in.)
138 kV – 145 kV
230 kV – 242 kV
3.4 m (11 ft. 0 in.) 3.0 m (10 ft. 0 in.)
4.0 m (13 ft. 0 in.) 4.0 m (13 ft. 0 in.)
1.2 m (3 ft. 10 in.)
1.3 m (4 ft. 3 in.)
1.0 m (3 ft. 4 in.)
1.6 m (5 ft. 2 in.)
345 kV – 363 kV 4.7 m (15 ft. 4 in.) 4.7 m (15 ft. 4 in.) 2.8 m (9 ft. 2 in.) 2.6 m (8 ft. 8 in.)
161 kV – 169 kV 3.6 m (11 ft. 8 in.) 3.6 m (11 ft. 8 in.) 1.3 m (4 ft. 3 in.) 1.1 m (3 ft. 9 in.)
230 kV – 242
500kV
kV – 550 kV 4.0 m (13
5.8ft.m0(19
in.)
ft. 0 4.0
in.) m5.8
(13mft.
(190ft.
in.)
0 in.) 1.3
3.6mm(4(11ft.ft.310
in.)in.) 3.51.6 m ft.
m (11 (5 4ft.in.)
2 in.)
345 kV – 363
765kV
kV - 800 kV 4.7 m (15
7.2ft.
m4 (23in.) 4.7 m7.2
ft. 9 in.) (15mft.
(234 ft.
in.)
9 in.) 2.84.9mm(9(15
ft.ft.2 11
in.)in.) 4.72.6 m (8
m (15 ft. 5ft.in.)
8 in.)
500 kV – 550 kV 5.8 m (19 ft. 0 in.) 5.8 m (19 ft. 0 in.) 3.6 m (11 ft. 10 in.) 3.5 m (11 ft. 4 in.)
765 kV - 800 kV NFPA
7.2 m (23 ft. 9 in.) 7.2 m (2370E
ft. 9Table
in.) 130.4 (C)4.9
(a)m (15 ft. 11 in.) 4.7 m (15 ft. 5 in.)
Approach Boundaries to Energized Electrical Conductors or Circuit Parts for Shock Protection for
Direct Current Voltage Systems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ELECTRICAL
HAZARD
BOUNDARIES
• Approach Boundaries
• Shock
• From Shock Hazard Analysis
• Calculations based on NFPA
130.2
• Arc Flash
• From Arc Flash Hazard Analysis
• Calculations based on NFPA
Annex D
ELECTRICAL
HAZARD
BOUNDARIES
• 130.2(D)(1) Working at or close
to the limited approach
boundary: Where one or more
unqualified persons are
working at or close to the
limited approach boundary, the
designated person in charge of
the work space where the
electrical hazard exists shall
advise the unqualified person(s)
of the electrical hazard and
warn them to stay outside of
the limited approach boundary.
ELECTRICAL
HAZARD
BOUNDARIES
• 130.2(D)(2) Entering the limited
approach boundary: Where there
is a need for an unqualified
person(s) to cross the limited
approach boundary, a qualified
person shall advise them of the
possible hazards and
continuously escort the
unqualified person(s) while inside
the limited approach boundary.
Under no circumstances should
the unqualified person(s) be
allowed to cross the restricted
approach boundary.
• “What is an electrical arc flash?”
• “How do I calculate the danger posed by an arc flash?”
• “How do I protect myself and others from an arc flash?”
HAZARD RISK
C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
• What if the hazard analysis
process has not been
completed?
• You can use the Hazard
Risk Category
Classifications 130.7(C)(9)
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
Panelboards or Other Equipment Rated 240 V and Below- Note 1
Perform infrared thermography & other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 0 N N
Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers on 0 N N
Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers off 0 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 1 Y Y
Remove/Install CBs of fused switches 1 Y Y
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 0 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the 1 Y Y
panelboard
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
Panelboards or Switchboards Rated.240 V and up to 600 V (with molded case or insulated case circuit breakers)
- Note 1
Perform infrared thermography & other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 1 N N
Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers on 0 N N
Circuit breaker (CB) or fused switch operation with covers off 1 Y Y
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2 Y Y
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the 2 Y Y
panelboard
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9): Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
600 V Class Motor Control Center (MCCs) - Note 2
Perform infrared thermography & other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 1 N N
CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors closed 0 N N
Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N N
CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors open 1 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 0 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V or below, exposed 2 Y Y
Insertion or removal of individual starter “buckets” from MCC- Note 3 4 Y N
Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2 Y N
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts)- Note 3 4 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) - Note 3 1 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts of utilization equipment fed directly by a branch circuit of the 2 Y Y
motor control center
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
600V Class Switchgear (with power circuit breakers or fused switches) - Note 4
Perform infrared thermography & other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 2 N N
CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors closed 0 N N
Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N N
CB or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors open 1 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 0 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V or below, exposed 2 Y Y
Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 N N
Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2 Y N
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 4 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 2 N N
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
Other 600 V Class (277 V through 600, nominal) Equipment - Note 2 (except as indicated) Lighting or small power
transformers (600 V Maximum)
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 2 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 1 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2 Y Y
Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2 Y N
Revenue Meters (kW-hour at primary voltage and current) insertion or removal 2 Y N
Cable trough or tray cover removal or installation 1 N N
Misc Equipment Cover removal or installation 1 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 2 Y Y
Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 2 Y N
Insertion or removal of plug in devices into or from busways 2 Y N
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
NEMA E2 (Fused contractor) Motor Starters, 2.3 kV through 7.2 kV
Perform infrared thermography & other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 3 N N
Contractor operation with enclosure 0 N N
Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N N
Contractor operation with enclosure door open 2 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 4 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 0 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V, exposed 3 Y Y
Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 N N
Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 3 Y N
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 4 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 3 N N
Insertion or removal (racking) of starters from cubicles of arc-resistant construction, tested in accordance with IEEE C37 0 N N
20.7 doors closed only
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
Metal Clad Switchgear, 1 kV through 38 kV
Perform infrared thermography & other non-contact inspections outside the restricted approach boundary 3 N N
CB Operation with enclosure doors closed 2 N N
Reading a panel meter while operating a meter switch 0 N N
CB Or fused switch or starter operation with enclosure doors open 4 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 4 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 2 Y Y
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts >120 V or below, exposed Insertion or 4 Y Y
removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed
Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 4 N N
Application of safety grounds, after voltage test 4 Y N
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 4 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 3 N N
Opening voltage transformer or control power transformer compartments 4 N N
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
ARC Resistant Switchgear Type 1 or 2 (for clearing times of <.05 with a perspective fault current not to exceed the Arc
resistant rating of the equipment)
CB operation with enclosure doors closed 0 N N
Insertion or removal (racking) of CBs from cubicles, doors open or closed 0 N N
Insertion or removal of CBs from cubicles with door open 4 N N
Work on control circuits with energized electrical conductors and circuit parts 120 V or below, exposed 2 Y Y
Insertion or removal (racking) of ground and test device with door closed 0 N N
Insertion or removal (racking) of voltage transformers on or off the bus door closed 0 N N
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9):
Table 1
Hazard/Risk Rubber Insulating Insulated and
Tasks Performed on Energized Equipment Category Gloves Insulating Hand
Tools
Other Equipment 1kV Through 38 kV Metal-enclosed interupter switch gear, fused or unfused
Switch operation of arc-resistant-type construction, tested in accordance with IEEE C37.20.7, doors closed only Switch 0 N N
operation, doors closed
Switch operation, doors closed 2 N N
Work on energized electrical conductors and circuit parts, including voltage testing 4 Y Y
Removal of bolted covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 4 N N
Opening hinged covers (to expose bare, energized electrical conductors and circuit parts) 3 N N
Outdoor disconnect switch operation (hook stick operated) 3 Y Y
Outdoor disconnect switch operation (gang-operated, from grade) 2 Y N
Insulated cable examination, in man hole or other confined spaces 4 Y N
Insulated cable examination, in open area 2 Y N
H A Z A R D R I S K C AT E G O R Y
C L A S S I F I C AT I O N S
Table130.7(C)(9): Table 1
Notes
a) Rubber insulating gloves rated for the maximum line-to-line voltage upon which work will be done.
(b) Insulated and insulating hand tools are tools rated and tested for the maximum line-to-line voltage upon which work will be done, and are
manufactured and tested in accordance with ASTM zg 1505. Standard Specification for Insulated Hand Tools.
(c) Y = yes (required), N = no (not required)
(d) For systems rated less than 1000 volts, the fault currents and upstream protective device clearing times are based on an 18 in. working distance.
(e) For systems rated 1 kV and greater, the Hazard/Risk Categories are based on a 36 in. working distance.
(f) For equipment protected by upstream current limiting fuses with arcing fault current in their current limiting range (1/2 cycle fault clearing time or less), the hazard/risk
category required may be reduced by one number.
Specific Notes (as referenced in the table):
1. Maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available ; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time.
2. Maximum of 65 kA short circuit current available ; maximum of 0.33 sec (2 cycle) fault clearing time.
3. Maximum of 42 kA short circuit current available ; maximum of 0.33 sec (20 cycle) fault clearing time.
4. Maximum of 25 kA short circuit current available ; maximum of up to 0.5 sec (30 cycle) fault clearing time.
BRANDON AND CLARK INC.
ELECTRICAL
C O N T I N U I N G E D U C AT I O N
An Eaton Arc Flash Handbook
Introduction...................................................................................03 Arc flash labels, boundaries and PPE.....................................18
Arc flash labels.................................................................19
Arc flash boundary...........................................................20
Electrical safety.............................................................................04
Table of
Personal protective equipment (PPE)...............................21
Electrical safety program..................................................05 Test your knowledge........................................................22
Hierarchy of risk controls..................................................06
contents
NFPA 70E definitions........................................................23
Laws, regulations and standards......................................07
What’s new in NFPA 70E.................................................08
NFPA 70E definitions........................................................09 Arc flash safety training...............................................................24
Training to enhance arc flash safety.................................25
NFPA 70E definitions........................................................26
Arc flash hazards...........................................................................10
What is an arc flash?........................................................11
The power of an arc flash.................................................12 Arc flash mitigation solutions....................................................27
NFPA 70E definitions........................................................13
You’ve had an arc flash study. Now what?.......................28
Safety and reliability: no compromise necessary.............29
NFPA 70E definitions........................................................30
Arc flash studies............................................................................14
What’s in a study?............................................................15
Scaling a study in large facilities or campuses.................16 An effective arc flash program..................................................31
NFPA 70E definitions........................................................17
How to reset safety in your facility..........................................32
2 EATON | Arc Flash Handbook
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Introduction
Protect what matters most
Nothing is more important than worker safety, but if you haven’t
taken the proper steps to mitigate the risks of arc flash, you’re
jeopardizing what matters most, and you could be breaking the
law.
This handbook will help you begin your journey to reset arc flash safety
in your facility, including how to do the following:
• Become familiar with the laws, regulations and standards: OSHA, NFPA 70,
NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584
• Understand the risks: an arc flash study is the first step
• Protect workers: use the results of the study to label equipment, set arc flash
boundaries and identify the proper personal protective equipment (PPE)
• Train workers: ensure that workers understand results of the study, safe work
practices, labels, boundaries and PPE
• Mitigate arc flash hazards: modify your work practices, electrical equipment
or electrical system, or install arc resistant replacement gear
At Eaton, we want to see that every person who operates, maintains or
works around electrical equipment goes home safe and sound every day, so
we’re providing this reference handbook to help improve arc flash safety. If you
don’t have the expertise you need on staff, Eaton has the breadth, depth and
experience to help you protect what matters most.
Get answers at Eaton.com/ArcFlashAnswers
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Electrical safety
I Choose ZERO
At Eaton, safety comes first.
“I Choose Zero” is the name of Eaton’s safety program
designed to achieve the goal of zero lost time due to
injuries and enhance overall personnel safety.
Our commitment extends well beyond Eaton employees;
we want to see zero lost time across all industries and all
businesses. That’s why our Electrical Engineering Services
and Systems team, one of the largest and most experienced
teams of power system engineers and field service
specialists in the industry, offers a complete, turnkey arc
flash safety solution to help you reset safety in your facility.
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Electrical safety
Electrical safety program
An effective workplace safety culture starts with a solid electrical safety program. The National Fire
Protection Association’s (NFPA) Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace handbook (NFPA 70E)
provides a framework for developing such a program, including principles, controls and procedures.
• Principles of an electrical safety program may include things such as proper maintenance of equipment; de-energizing equipment
where possible; identifying, reducing and protecting employees from electrical hazards; and using the proper tools.
• Electrical safety program controls may include development of procedures, training employees to be qualified to do the assigned
work, identification of tasks within the arc flash boundary and more.
• Procedures may consist of determining and assessing employee qualifications, hazards, personal protective equipment (PPE),
tools and one-line diagrams.
While this isn’t meant to be a comprehensive look at the information NFPA 70E provides about electrical safety programs, it does
seek to convey the scope and magnitude of developing one. This handbook covers many of the elements addressed in the NFPA 70E
standard and can help you get started on your journey to reset safety.
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Electrical safety
Hierarchy of risk controls
The 2018 edition of NFPA 70E places an enhanced emphasis on the hierarchy of risk controls, moving it out of the informative annex and
making it a requirement in article 110.1(H).
Eaton has extensive expertise providing services and solutions to help you improve arc flash safety in accordance with the hierarchy of
risk controls.
Elimination: Physically remove the hazard
All hazards are identified and eliminated. OSHA 3885 defines Elimination as “A change in process or workplace condition
that removes the hazard or ensures that no worker can be exposed to a hazard under any foreseeable circumstances.”
Substitution: Replace the hazard
Replace hazard with equipment that reduces frequency, probability or potential severity of exposure to a lesser
extent.
Engineering controls: Isolate people from the hazard
Reduce the frequency or the consequence of exposure to a potential hazard by incorporating designs
that provide that function automatically, without any action by personnel.
Awareness: Increase visibility of the hazard
Incorporate signs, labels or audible warnings alerting personnel of the potential presence
of hazards that could not be eliminated or reduced.
Administrative controls: Change the way people work
Administrative controls refer to policies and procedures which workers must
follow in order to reduce risk of injury.
Personal protective equipment: Protect the worker
Require personnel to wear PPE to protect against remaining risks due
to electric shock and arc flash, among others. While important, PPE is
still considered to be the least effective control measure because of the
opportunity for human error. Source: NIOSH
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Electrical safety
Laws, regulations and standards
The following play a key role in keeping electrical environments safe through continual research,
communications and enforcement.
OSHA NFPA 70E
Occupational Safety and Health Administration National Fire Protection Association,
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
Establishes safe and healthful working conditions for
workers by setting and enforcing standards and by providing Provides a practical standard that addresses the electrical
training,outreach, education and compliance assistance safety-related practices in the workplace
NFPA 70 IEEE 1584
National Electric Code Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations
Regionally adoptable standard for the safe installation of
electrical wiring and equipment Presents methods for the calculation of arc-flash incident
energy and arc-flash boundaries
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Electrical safety
What’s new in NFPA 70E?
The NFPA 70E standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace is updated every three years. Here is a summary of
the key changes you’ll see in the 2018 edition.
Changes to NFPA 70E 2018 Edition Section
Added a new general requirement for hazard elimination to be the first priority in the implementation of
105.4
safety-related work practices
Added a requirement to inspect newly installed or modified equipment 110.1(B)
Moved the hierarchy of risk control methods from an informational note to a requirement; risk assessment
110.1(H)
has been revised to include human error
Revised to require a job safety plan before work tasks begin 110.1(I)
Added an electrical safety program requirement to investigate electrical incidents 110.1(I)
Table 130.5(C) (previously Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(a)) has been revised and relocated from the arc flash PPE
Table 130.5(C)
category method to the arc flash risk assessment in Article 130.5
Table 130.5(G) (previously Table H.3(b)) has been revised and relocated from the arc flash risk assessment in
Table 130.5(G)
Article 130.5
Rewritten to provide clarity for conducting a risk assessment and applying risk controls Informative Annex F
Revised with updated information and data for electrical shock and arc flash injuries Informative Annex K
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Electrical safety
Definitions from NFPA 70E 2018:
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
De-energized
Free from any electrical connection to a source of potential Did you know?
difference and from electrical charge; not having a potential
different from that of the earth. OSHA enforces workplace safety under the law, but the OSHA electrical
safety standards are not prescriptive. The requirements of NFPA 70E are
prescriptive, but are not mandated by law; however, they are considered
Electrical safety program to be the minimum consensus requirements for safe electrical work
A documented system consisting of electrical safety principles, procedures, and OSHA may use them as the basis for issuing citations.
policies, procedures and processes that directs activities In 2014, OSHA published the Electric Power Generation, Transmission,
appropriate for the risk associated with electrical hazards. and Distribution and Electrical Equipment Final Rule that requires
employers to do the following to protect workers from flames and
Electrically safe work condition electric arc hazards:
A state in which an electrical conductor or circuit part has been • The employer must assess the workplace to identify workers exposed
disconnected from energized parts, locked/tagged in accordance to flame or electric-arc hazards.
with established standards, tested to verify the absence of • No later than January 1, 2015, employers must estimate the
voltage, and, if necessary, temporarily grounded for personnel incident heat energy of any electric-arc hazard to which a worker
protection. would be exposed.
• No later than April 1, 2015, employers generally must provide
Energized workers exposed to hazards from electric arcs with protective clothing
and other protective equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal
Electrically connected to, or is, a source of voltage. to the estimated heat energy.
Is it time to reset safety?
Are you familiar with the laws, standards and tools to help
you enhance arc flash safety in your facility?
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Arc flash hazards
Arc flash threatens personnel safety, and companies face
lawsuits, fines, equipment damage, facility downtime and
lost production.
What arc flash events really mean to you are problems.
Safety problems. Legal problems. Financial problems.
Are you prepared?
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Arc flash hazards
What is an arc flash?
An arc flash event releases a tremendous amount of energy in
the form of thermal heat, toxic fumes, pressure waves, blinding
light, sound waves and explosions that can result in serious
injury including critical burns, collapsed lungs, loss of vision,
ruptured eardrums, puncture wounds and even death.
According to the National Fire Protection Association, an arc
flash occurs “when an electric current passes through air
between ungrounded conductors or between ungrounded
conductors and grounded conductors.” Temperatures can reach
35,000°F – more than three times hotter than the temperature
of the sun! These excessive temperatures cause the air and
metal in the path of the arc to expand and explode, creating an
arc blast.
Common causes of arc flash include:
Human error
• Accidental contact (people, animals, tools)
• Incorrect wiring, labeling or installation The threat is real: what you should know about arc flash and what you can do to protect your
people and equipment from dangerous arc flash events.
• Improper use of tools
• Failure to notice signs of impending failure
• Insufficiently trained employees
Equipment failure
• Insulation breakdown
• Utility transients and lightning
• Poor maintenance (dust, corrosion, condensation)
• Loose connections
• Interaction with equipment that has not been properly maintained
• Improperly rated equipment
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Arc flash hazards
The power of an arc flash
The inverse square law and incident energy
As the distance from energized equipment decreases by half, the incident energy increases by approximately a factor of four.
The significance of 1.2 cal/cm2
If you hold your fingertip over a lit candle for one second, you will experience thermal energy of 1.2 cal/cm2.
A worker who experiences this amount of thermal energy may experience a second-degree burn, which causes pain, swelling and blistering but
doesn’t impact the tissue and blood vessels as a third-degree burn would.
The 1.2 cal/cm2 threshold is used for setting arc flash boundaries and selecting PPE. By following proper procedures, the thermal energy on a
workers skin will be limited to 1.2 cal/cm2 in the event of an arc flash incident.
Heat intensity Physical dangers
35,000 Fo
Solid to vapor
dependent upon expands by
67,000 times
• Power of the arc • Heat
Distance from the arc Shrapnel Intense Intense
• • Temperature
expansion light
• Duration of the arc • Pressure
• Sound
• Intense UV and IR light
Risks to personnel Hot air, rapid Molten High decibel
expansion metal levels
• Burns • Lung injuries
• Wounds • Chronic pain
• Broken bones • Scarring
• Hearing loss • Death
• Vision loss
Electrical Percussive
Shrapnel explosion force
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Arc flash hazards
Definitions from NFPA 70E 2018:
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
Arc flash hazard
A source of possible injury or damage to health associated with Did you know?
the release of energy caused by an electric arc.
An arc blast is comparable to the blast from a stick of dynamite.
Informational Note No. 1: The likelihood of occurrence of an arc flash incident
increases when energized electrical conductors or circuit parts are exposed or
when they are within equipment in a guarded or enclosed condition, provided a
person is interacting with the equipment in such a manner that could cause an
electric arc. An arc flash incident is not likely to occur under normal operating
conditions when enclosed energized equipment has been properly installed and
maintained. Is it time to reset safety?
Are your employees exposed to arc flash hazards in their daily
Electrical hazard work?
A dangerous condition such that contact or equipment failure
can result in electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn or arc
blast injury.
Exposed
Capable of being inadvertently touched or approached nearer
than a safe distance by a person. It is applied to electrical
conductors or circuit parts that are not suitably guarded,
isolated or insulated.
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Arc flash studies
To reset safety, start with a study.
Employers must “furnish a workplace that is free from
recognized hazards causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm,” per Section 5(a)(1) of OSHA’s
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act.
Employers must “estimate the incident heat energy of any
electric-arc hazard to which a worker would be exposed”
per OSHA 29 CFR parts 1910 and 1926.
The first and perhaps most important step in understanding,
and then addressing the hazards in the workplace is an arc
flash study.
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Arc flash studies
What’s in a study?
The threat of arc flash is real, and the consequences of an 7 things to look for in an arc flash study report
event can be devastating. The initial step in addressing this
risk is to have an arc flash study performed, but beware - not Not all studies are equal, and an inferior study unnecessarily endangers
all studies are equal, and an inferior study unnecessarily your employees and business. Does your existing or proposed report
endangers your employees and your business. provide comprehensive and actionable
information?
To gauge the quality of a study, first, verify that the study will
be performed by experienced engineers. Inquire about their Use this checklist to find out.
education, licenses and experience. Executive summary
Then, ask about their ability to offer a turnkey solution after the One-line diagram
study.
Short circuit analysis
Q: Can they train employees on how to interpret the study,
read warning labels, choose the correct PPE and properly Protective device coordination study
maintain electrical equipment?
Protective device settings table
Q: Do they have the ability to help you develop an effective
electrical safety program? Arc flash incident energy analysis
Q: Can they provide products and services to help reduce Input data used in the analysis
high incident energy identified in the study? Get the complete worksheet here.
Finally, ask for a sample of the final report.
Q: What information will be included, and will it provide
recommendations to improve safety in your facility?
Compare the sample report against the following checklist to
ensure you’ll get comprehensive and actionable information.
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Arc flash studies
Scaling a study in large facilities or campuses
Sometimes, it’s not practical to commission a study for
an entire facility or campus, especially when faced with
personnel and budget constraints. Yet, postponing can leave
employees exposed to a greater risk of being injured by an
arc flash event.
You can get started now while working within the
constraints of your available resources. These key questions
will help you pinpoint where to start. Once you address arc
flash safety in the identified areas, you will have the know-
how and experience to then schedule arc flash studies in
other parts of your business, while ensuring that you’ve
taken the proper steps to minimize the risk of arc flash in
the areas most critical to your business.
Q: Which equipment is critical to your operations?
Q: Which equipment needs to stay energized for
maintenance and troubleshooting?
Q: Which building is most critical if an outage occurs? Understanding maximum and minimum fault levels
Q: What is the age of your equipment?
Q: What resources do you have for supporting an arc
flash study?
Get the complete worksheet here.
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Arc flash studies
Definitions from NFPA 70E 2018:
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
Incident energy Single-line diagram
The amount of thermal energy impressed on a surface, a Diagram that shows, by means of single lines and graphic symbols, the course of
certain distance from the source, generated during an electrical an electric circuit or system of circuits and the component devices or parts used
arc event. Measured in calories per square centimeter (cal/cm2). in the circuit or system.
Electrical safety
Identifying hazards associated with the use of electrical energy Did you know?
and taking precautions to reduce the risk associated with those
hazards. When calculating incident energy for especially complex electrical
systems, the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) may require
Authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) specialized training, licensure or registration.
An organization, office, or individual responsible for enforcing An arc flash study must be reviewed for accuracy at least every
requirements of a code or standard, or for approving equipment, five years, or when there are changes to the facility power
materials, an installation or a procedure. distribution system or the incoming utility power.
Interrupting rating
The highest current at rated voltage that a device is identified to
interrupt under standard test conditions.
Service point Is it time to reset safety?
Do you have an up-to-date arc flash study?
The point of connection between the facilities of the serving
utility and the premises wiring. Does your study report provide comprehensive and actionable
information?
Short circuit current rating
The prospective symmetrical fault current at a nominal voltage
to which an apparatus or system is able to be connected
without sustaining damage exceeding defined acceptance
criteria.
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Arc flash labels,
boundaries and PPE
Per NFPA 70E, section 130.5(H), electrical equipment such
as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels,
meter socket enclosures and motor control centers that are
in other than dwelling units and that are likely to require
examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance while
energized shall be marked with a label.
The label must show the nominal system voltage, the arc
flash boundary and information to select the proper PPE.
This may include the available incident energy and
corresponding working distance, minimum arc rating of
clothing or site-specific level of PPE.
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Arc flash labels, boundaries and PPE
Arc flash labels:
How to interpret label content
WARNING
The owner of the electrical equipment is responsible for providing arc flash
A warning labels which are required on electrical equipment over 50V that could
be accessed while energized. A
An arc flash boundary is the distance at which the incident energy equals
B 1.2 cal/cm2, and arc-rated PPE is required for any employee within the arc
flash boundary.
SHOCK & ARC FLASH HAZARD
The working distance is the distance from a person’s face and chest to the
C prospective arc source. Typical working distances, primarily based on equipment
type, are published in IEEE standard 1584 and used in studies to perform the
incident energy calculations.
Location: MAIN SWGR G
Report#: TQS12345.1 Rev.0 Issued: JULY-2018
13’ 6” B ARC FLASH BOUNDARY
LINE SIDE of MAIN
While performing two sets of calculations for the load side and the line side of
D the main breaker on specific equipment is not specified in NFPA 70E, Eaton
recommends making this a standard practice to enhance productivity and safety
CALCULATED INCIDENT ENERGY
for equipment that has adequate isolation of the main protective device.
• If the calculation is performed on the line side only, the entire switchgear lineup
32 cal/cm AT 36” WORKING DISTANCE
2
C
may be incorrectly thought to have incident energy above 40 cal/cm2 and not
able to be worked on while energized.
D
3’ 10” ARC FLASH BOUNDARY
LOAD SIDE of MAIN
• If the calculation is performed on the load side only, the calculated incident
energy value will be relatively low, putting workers on the line side in danger.
CALCULATED INCIDENT ENERGY
Calculated incident energy is the amount of thermal energy (cal/cm2) E 6 cal/cm AT 36” WORKING DISTANCE
2
E at a distance from an electrical arc event and indicates the level of PPE
required to protect workers.
480V Shock Hazard Limited Approach Boundary: 3’ - 6”
F Min. Glove Class: 00 Restricted Approach Boundary: 1’ - 0”
F Nominal voltage, limited and restricted approach boundaries, and PPE glove
rating are also displayed on the label to help protect workers from electric shock.
G Eaton’s labels display the arc flash study report number for reference.
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Arc flash labels, boundaries and PPE
Arc flash boundary
The arc flash boundary is calculated based on Electrical equipment type Working distance
the arcing current and clearing time. It is the
distance at which the incident energy equals Low-voltage panelboards and switchboards 18 in
1.2 cal/cm2. At this distance, a person would Low-voltage switchgear 24 in
be expected to receive a just curable burn on Medium-voltage switchgear 36 in
exposed skin if a worst-case arc fault occurs.
The arc flash boundary is independent of the
shock protection boundaries, which are fixed Arc flash boundary Typical working distance
Zero Distance
based on voltage. The arc flash boundary may
be inside or outside the shock boundaries
depending on the system configuration.
The arc flash boundary is Only persons with
The working distance is the distance from a typically outside of the appropriate PPE
person’s face and chest to the prospective arc working distance, but in permitted inside
source. Typical working distances, primarily
instances where the arc this boundary
based on equipment type, are published in
flash incident energy is
IEEE standard 1584 and used in studies to Exposed,
perform the incident energy calculations. At very low (<1.2 cal/cm2),
the arc flash boundary
energized
this distance and with the proper PPE, it is conductor
expected that a person’s head and torso would may be inside the
or circuit
be protected. Additional PPE is necessary for working distance. part
any body parts, such as arms and hands, that
are inside the working distance.
Low-voltage does not imply a low arc flash
hazard and high-voltage does not necessarily
imply a significant arc flash hazard.
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Arc flash labels, boundaries and PPE
Personal protective equipment (PPE)
NFPA 70E arc flash PPE category method tables vs. incident energy analysis method
Two methods can be used in an arc flash risk assessment to determine appropriate arc flash PPE. One is the incident energy analysis method
using IEEE standard 1584 calculations, which results in an incident energy value expressed as cal/cm2 at a typical working distance. The second
is the arc flash PPE category method, which results in appropriate arc flash PPE selected directly from the NFPA 70E tables.
Do you know which is superior for PPE identification?
Example of an IEEE standard 1584 calculation
Device Bkr. Incident
Bus Bolted Arcing Trip AF Working
Bus Name Device Name Bus kV Fault kA Bolted Fault kA Time (s.) Opening Ground Equip Gap mm Boundary Distance Energy
Fault kA (s.) (cal/cm2)
485 mm
PANEL-A PANEL-A FDR
(19 in)
12.57 12.57 6.56 2 0 yes PNL 25 6’ 2” 1’ 6” 13.4
Example of an NFPA 70E arc flash PPE category method
Arc flash Arc flash
Equipment type PPE boundary
category
Panelboards or other equipment rated 240V and below 485 mm
1
Parameters: Maximum of 25kA available fault current; maximum of 0.03 sec (2 cycles) fault clearing time; minimum working distance 455 mm (18 in.) (19 in)
On the surface, it would appear that the NFPA 70E arc flash PPE category method is a simple lookup; however, in order to use these tables
correctly, the assumptions must be verified by doing some level of calculations.
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Arc flash labels, boundaries and PPE
Test your knowledge
Using the NFPA 70E arc flash PPE Category Method, can you
confidently answer these questions? If not, what would you
have to do in order to verify the assumptions on the table?
1. Does your panel operate under the 25kA short circuit current?
2. Does your panel meet the 0.03 sec (2 cycles) fault clearing time?
3. What is the working distance?
In most systems, the answers to these questions are not easily
determined without performing additional analysis. The incident
energy analysis method is the preferred industry standard to
calculate the exact hazard to provide your workers with the
most accurate arc flash data.
Arc flash labels and personal protective equipment
Answers
1. The short circuit current is dependent on the system, not the equipment type,
so calculations to verify the following are required: available fault current from
the utility, upstream transformer impedance and kVA rating, and upstream cable
type, size and length.
2. A coordination study is required to validate this time because most protec-
tive devices do not operate at this fault clearing time unless the available fault
current is quite high. It’s also necessary to know the available fault current to
determine clearing time.
3. The working distance for most panelboards is 18 inches. Making assumptions
without validating them will result in inaccurate data which puts employees in
danger, either by specifying insufficient PPE, or by specifying excessive PPE,
which results in reduced dexterity, visibility and comfort.
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Arc flash labels, boundaries and PPE
Definitions from NFPA 70E 2018:
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
Arc flash boundary Working distance
When an arc flash hazard exists, an approach limit from an arc The distance between a person’s face and chest area and a prospective arc source.
source at which incident energy equals 1.2 cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2). Informational note: Incident energy increases as the distance from the arc source decreases.
Informational Note: According to the Stoll skin burn injury model, the onset of a
second degree burn on unprotected skin is likely to occur at an exposure of 1.2
cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2) for one second.
Did you know?
Arc flash suit The maximum available fault current is not a good approximation of the
A complete arc-rated clothing and equipment system that fault current that would be sustained in an arc flash event; typically, it’s
covers the entire body, except for hands and feet. much lower because arcing faults have a higher impedance.
When using the incident energy analysis method, Table 130.5(G) provides
Arc rating guidance on selection of PPE with two levels of exposure:
The value attributed to materials that describes their 1. Incident energy exposures equal to 1.2 cal/cm2 up to 12 cal/cm2
performance to exposure to an electrical arc discharge. The
arc rating is expressed in cal/cm2 and is derived from the 2. Incident energy exposures greater than 12 cal/cm2
determined value of the arc thermal performance value (ATPV) For both levels, appropriate PPE must have an arc rating equal to or
or energy break open threshold. greater than the estimated incident energy
Balaclava (sock hood)
An arc-rated hood that protects the neck and head except for
the facial area of the eyes and nose.
Is it time to reset safety?
Limited approach boundary Do employees know how to read a label? Do they know what PPE is
An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized required? Are they wearing the correct PPE?
electrical conductor or circuit part within which a shock hazard exists. Are subcontractors exposed and are they wearing the proper PPE?
Restricted approach boundary
An approach limit at a distance from an exposed energized
electrical conductor or circuit part within which there is an
increased likelihood of electric shock, due to electrical arc-over
combined with inadvertent movement.
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Arc flash safety
training
A top-notch safety culture incorporates comprehensive
training for employees focusing on the specific hazards
associated with electrical energy.
Per NFPA 70E, Article 110, employees shall be trained in
safety-related work practices and procedural requirements,
as necessary, to provide protection from the electrical
hazards associated with their respective job or task
assignments.
It is the employer’s responsibility to see that this training
occurs and is documented, and it may be conducted
in the classroom, on-the-job or a combination of both,
determined by the risk to the employee.
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Arc flash safety training
Training to enhance arc flash safety
Why training is critical What to look for in training
Ensure that your employees are able to: A trainer who:
• Recognize hazards • Has experience with equipment from various manufacturers
• Interpret arc flash labels • Is familiar with electrical standards and regulations
• Understand arc flash boundaries • Has helped companies develop safe work practices
• Understand PPE requirements • Is knowledgeable with up-to-date tools and equipment used
in electrical work
• Interpret arc flash study results
• Train others in work flow
A training curriculum that includes:
Retrain when: • Understanding standards and regulations
• Identifying hazards
• Retraining has not occurred within three years
• Establishing safe work practices
• New equipment, including PPE, or new technology is
introduced into the work environment • Interpreting an arc flash study
• New or revised procedures are to be used • Reading an arc flash label and selecting the proper PPE
• Inspection indicates employees are not properly complying • Using tools, including insulated hand tools, live-line tools, grounding cables,
with safety related work practices voltage detectors, etc.
• Operating and maintaining electrical equipment
Training records:
• Verify employee training annually
• Document what training the employee has received
• Document when an employee has demonstrated proficiency
• Retain the documentation throughout the employee’s
employment
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Arc flash safety training
Definitions from NFPA 70E 2018:
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
Qualified person
One who has demonstrated skills and knowledge related to Did you know?
the construction and operation of electrical equipment and
installations and has received safety training to identify the Arc flash is just one training aspect of an electrical safety program. Be
sure to train employees on lockout/tagout (LOTO), workspace and barriers,
hazards and reduce the associated risk. and shock hazard. For expert training, turn to Eaton’s trainers, the same
electrical engineers who not only perform arc flash analyses, but also
install, commission, troubleshoot and maintain electrical equipment every
day.
If you’re not properly maintaining your electrical equipment, incident
energy may be higher than expected, increasing safety risk. A
maintenance training program covers:
• Preventative maintenance schedules
• Proper operation and maintenance of equipment
• Use of interlocks
• Required tools
• How to recognize signs of impending equipment failure
Is it time to reset safety?
Are employees qualified to perform the work they’re doing?
Are unqualified employees required to receive any electrical related safety
training?
Are your employees trained to identify the arc flash hazard and reduce the
associated risk?
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Arc flash mitigation
solutions
After the incident energy has been calculated throughout
your facility and workers have been provided with the
proper PPE and training, continue to enhance arc flash
safety with products and solutions that can help mitigate
the magnitude, duration and even the likelihood of an arc
flash event.
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Arc flash mitigation solutions
You’ve had an arc flash study. Now what?
Mitigating the hazards and risks of arc flash
Your arc flash study report from Eaton provides recommendations to reset safety in your facility. The short circuit analysis identifies overdutied
equipment, the protective device coordination study indicates the degree of selectivity in your system, and the arc flash incident energy analysis
calculates available fault current, clearing time and incident energy at the working distance.
Chances are, you will discover that your facility is deficient in one or more of these categories, and the following are opportunities for improving
safety and mitigating arc flash hazards.
Work practice modifications Equipment or system modifications Arc resistant replacement gear
• Work on gear only when it is de-energized • Arcflash Reduction Maintenance Switch • Flashgard motor control centers (MCC)
• Limit source power (utility power, • Zone Selective Interlocking (ZSI) • Low-voltage and medium-voltage arc
generator power, de-energizing part of resistant switchgear type 2B
system) • Current limiting devices
Operating scenarios include normal utility Type 2 : Arc resistance provided from
» • Differential relay schemes
operation and alternative sources of power the front, sides and rear
such as diesel standby generators • Arc flash relay
Type 2B : Arc resistance is maintained
• Modify standard work documents/ • High-resistant grounding even while opening designated low
practices
• Power Xpert dashboard (HMI) voltage compartments
» Lockout/tagout (LOTO)
» Sequence of operation • Breaker setting adjustments • Medium-voltage metal-clad switchgear
» Remote racking type 2B
• Bypass isolation Automatic Transfer Switch
• Safely interact with equipment to perform (ATS) • Variable frequency drives type 2B
preventative maintenance or electrical
High and low impedance transformers • Arc quenching Magnum DS switchgear
inspection of the gear •
» Infrared (IR) windows • Fused switch to breaker retrofills
» Visible blade viewing windows
» Double-door line isolation switch
» Insulgard
• Kirk Key Interlock Systems
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Arc flash mitigation solutions
Safety and reliability:
no compromise necessary
The easiest way to lower arc flash incident energy is to reduce the fault clearing time. However, lowering the pickup and time delays of protective
devices to make them trip faster may compromise coordination and system reliability. It is important to have a balance between system selectivity
and protection. The following solutions help to improve arc flash safety and reduce incident energy levels, but not compromise protective device
coordination.
Selectivity is the practice of optimizing and coordinating the settings on adjustable protective devices (breakers, protective relays, etc.) so that the
device immediately upstream of a given fault is the device to trip and effectively clear the fault. Achieving selectivity ensures that under a given
fault condition, the loss of load to other, non-affected branches of the system are minimized. A simple example is if there’s a fault in your kitchen
stove, you want only the breaker on that circuit in your home to trip, not the device that feeds the whole neighborhood!
Pre-Arcing Arcing
Arc prevention Arc containment
• Training Arc resistant/explosion proof enclosures
• Safe work practices • Panelboards, switchboards, motor control centers and switchgear
Passive • Maintenance • Personal protective equipment (PPE)
• Good design
• Remote racking
• High resistance grounding
Arc prediction monitoring Arc detection Arc elimination
• Partial discharge • Current/voltage signal analysis • Arc quenching switchgear - arc mitigator
• Smoke • Ground fault • Create a parallel arc
• Temperature • Light sensing • Light sensing
Active • Acoustic
Arc flash reduction
• Differential protection
• Zone selective interlocking
• Maintenance switch
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Arc flash mitigation solutions
Definitions from NFPA 70E 2018:
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
Circuit breaker
Device designed to open and close a circuit by nonautomatic Did you know?
means and to open the circuit automatically on a predetermined
overcurrent without damage to itself when properly applied Eaton’s arc quenching switchgear detects and contains an arc
within its rating. fault in less than 4 milliseconds, drastically reducing the incident
energy.
Current limiting overcurrent protective device Per NEC section 240.87, arc energy reduction (ARMS, ZSI,
A device that, when interrupting currents in its current-limiting differential relay schemes or arc quenching switchgear) is required
range, reduces the current flowing in the faulted circuit to a for any circuit breaker that can be adjusted to 1200A or above,
magnitude substantially less than that obtainable in the same regardless of settings.
circuit if the device were replaced with a solid conductor having
comparable impedance.
Fuse Is it time to reset safety?
What methods do you use to mitigate arc flash hazards?
An overcurrent protective device with a circuit-opening fusible
part that is heated and severed by the passage of overcurrent
through it.
Arc resistant switchgear
Equipment designed to withstand the effects of an internal
arcing fault and that directs the internally released energy away
from the employee.
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An effective arc flash safety program
Are you prepared?
The threat of arc flash is real, and the consequences of an event can be devastating: lawsuits, fines, equipment damage, operations downtime,
lost production and most significant, personnel injury or death. An effective arc flash safety program incorporates the elements shown below.
Single-line diagram Protective device Incident energy analysis Short-circuit study
Shows how electrical distribution equipment is coordination study Calculates the arc flash boundary, Calculates available fault current, compares
connected and how power flows, from the incoming Ensures that only the affected working distance and incident it to the equipment ratings, and identifies
power source through each individual load, and is portion of the system is taken energy per NFPA 70E overdutied equipment that needs to be
necessary to understand the system as a whole offline if there is a fault replaced
Safety training
Educates employees about how to interpret
the study, the one-line diagram, the arc flash
warning labels and choosing appropriate PPE
Arc flash warning labels Documented electrical safety program
Affixed to electrical equipment to indicate the incident Mitigation solutions A documented system consisting of electrical
energy, working distance and arc flash boundary for Helps to lower incident energy at locations safety principles, policies, procedures, and
that piece of equipment, and is used to select the of concern, typically those with high incident processes that directs activities appropriate for
proper personal protective equipment (PPE) energy over 40 cal/cm2 the risk associated with electrical hazards
Personal protective equipment (PPE) Electrical maintenance Arc flash study update
Protects a qualified worker in the event of an arc flash Helps to ensure that protective devices such Required when changes occur in the electrical
event, and is meant to be used only after recognizing the as breakers, relays and trip units will clear a system that could affect the results of the
hazards and taking steps to minimize or eliminate them potential arcing fault analysis, or every five years, and ensures that
the study results and labels are accurate
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How to reset safety in your facility
Assess your Ask an Learn
preparedness expert more
ArcFlash.Eaton.com Eaton.com/ArcFlashAnswers Eaton.com/ResetSafety
© 2018 Eaton Eaton Follow us on social media to get the
All Rights Reserved 1000 Eaton Boulevard Eaton is a registered trademark. latest product and support information.
Printed in USA Cleveland, OH 44122
Publication No. SA083118EN United States All other trademarks are property
October 2018 Eaton.com of their respective owners.
ELECTRICAL SAFETY HAZARDS HANDBOOK
The World’s Leading Provider of
Circuit Protection Solutions
Littelfuse is the global leader in circuit protection A comprehensive approach to circuit protection
Companies around the world have come to rely on Littelfuse goes well beyond efficient and comprehensive
Littelfuse’s commitment to providing the most advanced product delivery. We offer an integrated approach to circuit
circuit protection solutions and technical expertise. It’s this protection that includes:
focus that has enabled Littelfuse to become the world’s
• A very broad, yet deep selection of products
leading provider of circuit protection solutions. and technologies from a single source, so you
benefit from a greater range of solutions and
make fewer compromises.
For over 75 years, Littelfuse has maintained its focus on
circuit protection. As we expand in global reach and technical • Products that comply with applicable industry
and government standards, as well as our own
sophistication, you can continue to count on us for solid circuit
uncompromising quality and reliability criteria.
protection solutions, innovative technologies, and industry
leading technical expertise. It is a commitment that only a • Forward thinking, application-specific solutions
world class leader with staying power can support. that provide the assurance your most demanding
requirements will be met.
• Dedicated global, customer-focused and
application-specific technical support services.
Littelfuse Electrical Safety HAZARDS Handbook
Littelfuse is Committed to Safety
Littelfuse has a continuing commitment to improved
electrical safety and system protection. As the leader in
circuit protection, Littelfuse offers a variety of products and
services designed to help you increase safety in your facility.
For assistance with Arc-Flash, products and services, or
application information, call 1-800-TEC-FUSE (832-3873).
Electrical Safety is a Serious Issue
Electrical Safety in the workplace is the most important
job of an electrical worker. No matter how much training
one has received or how much employers try to safeguard
their workers, Electrical Safety is ultimately the responsibil-
ity of the electrical worker. The human factor associated
with electrical accidents can be immeasurable. No one can
replace a worker or loved one that has died or suffered the
irreparable consequences of an electrical accident.
This Electrical Safety Hazards Handbook was developed for general education purposes only and is not intended
to replace an electrical safety-training program or to serve as a sole source of reference. The information herein is
also not intended to serve as recommendations or advice for specific situations. It is the responsibility of the user to
comply with all applicable safety standards, including the requirements of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and other appropriate governmental and
industry accepted guidelines, codes, and standards. Use the information within this Handbook at your own risk.
Table of Contents
Introduction 6 Who is Qualified? 24
Energized Electrical Work Permit 24
Why is Electrical Safety so Important? 6 Employer and Employee Responsibilities 26
Electricity Basics 8 Arc-Flash and Other Electrical Safety Hazards 27
Ohm’s Law 8 Electrical Safety Hazards 27
Types of Electrical Faults 9 Electric Shock 27
Overloads 9 Arc-Flash and Arc Blasts 28
Short Circuits 9 Arc-Flash Metrics 29
Overcurrent Protective Devices 9 Arc-Blast Effect 31
Interrupting Rating 10 Light and Sound Effects 31
Current Limitation 11
Fuses 12
Circuit Breakers 12 Electrical Hazard Analysis 32
Circuit Protection Checklist 15
Shock Hazard Analysis 32
Approach Boundaries 32
History of Electrical Safety 16 Flash Hazard Analysis 34
Arc-Flash Calculations 35
Electrical Safety Organizations 19 Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation Examples 36
OSHA 19 IEEE 1584 Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation 38
The General Duty Clause 19 NFPA 70E Table Method 40
OSHA Regulations 19 Steps Required to Use the
NFPA 20 NFPA 70E Table Method 40
IEEE 20
NRTL 20
NEMA 21 Minimizing Arc-Flash and Other
ANSI 21 Electrical Hazards 42
ASTM 21
NECA 21 1. Design a Safer System 42
2. Use and Upgrade to Current-limiting
Overcurrent Protective Devices 43
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards 22 3. Implement an Electrical Safety Program 45
4. Observe Safe Work Practices 45
Working on Deenergized Equipment 22 5. Use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 47
Establish a Safe Work Condition 22 6. Use Warning Labels 49
Working on Energized Equipment 23 7. Use an Energized Electrical Work Permit 49
8. Avoid Hazards of Improperly Selected or
Maintained Overcurrent Protective Devices 50
9. Achieve or Increase Selective Coordination 51
Electrical Safety Summary 53
Annex A 54
Electrical Safety Terms and Definitions 54
Annex B 61
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards 61
Annex C 63
Energized Electrical Work Permit 63
Annex D 65
Arc-Flash Calculation Steps 65
Annex E 67
Arc Flash Calculator Tables 67
Annex F 71
Resources for Electrical Safety 71
Annex G 73
References 73
Annex H 74
Electrical Safety Quiz 74
Introduction
Electrical Safety Hazards Overview
97% Safety in the workplace is job number one for
employer and employee alike. It is especially
important for those who install and service
meet the standards and reduce the hazards.
While parts of the standards, regulations,
and codes especially relating to electrical
of all electrical systems. Nothing can replace a safety are quoted or summarized herein, it is
electricians worker or loved one that has died or suffered the responsibility of the user to comply with
the irreparable consequences of an electrical all applicable standards in their entirety.
have been accident. No matter how much an employer
shocked or tries to safeguard its workers or how much
safety training is provided; the ultimate Why is Electrical Safety so Important?
injured responsibility lies with the worker. The human
on the job. factor is part of every accident or injury. Electrical hazards have always been recognized,
yet serious injuries, deaths, and property
damage occur daily. Organizations like the US
The purpose of this handbook is to identify Department of Labor and the National Safety
electrical safety hazards and present ways Council compile statistics and facts on a
to minimize or avoid their consequences. It regular basis. The following table demonstrates
is a guide for improving electrical safety and the importance of electrical safety.
contains information about governmental
regulations, industry-accepted standards
and work practices. It presents ways to
FACTS...
• 97% of all electricians have been shocked or injured on the job.
• Approximately 30,000 workers receive electrical shocks yearly.
• Over 3600 disabling electrical contact injuries occur annually.
• Electrocutions are the 4th leading cause of traumatic occupational fatalities.
• Over 2000 workers are sent to burn centers each year with severe Arc-Flash burns.
• Estimates show that 10 Arc-Flash incidents occur every day in the US.
• 60% of workplace accident deaths are caused by burn injuries.
• Over 1000 electrical workers die each year from workplace accidents.
For more information: • Medical costs per person can exceed $4 million for severe electrical burns.
• Total costs per electrical incident can exceed $15 million.
800-TEC-FUSE • In the year 2002, work injuries cost Americans $14.6 billion.
www.littelfuse.com
Information derived from Industry Surveys, the NFPA, The National Safety Council, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CapSchell, Inc.
The moral obligation to protect workers
who may be exposed to electrical hazards is
fundamental, but there are legal and other
factors that require every facility to establish
a comprehensive Electrical Safety Program.
Meeting OSHA regulations, reducing insurance
costs, and minimizing downtime and repair
costs are additional benefits of Electrical Safety
programs. When electrical faults occur, the
electrical system is subjected to both thermal
and magnetic forces. These forces can severely
damage equipment and are accompanied
by fires, explosions and severe arcing. Such
violent damage often causes death or severe
injury to personnel. Costs of repairs, equipment Littelfuse offers a variety
replacements, and medical treatment can run of products and services
into millions of dollars. Loss of production designed to help you
and damaged goods are also important increase safety in your
considerations. Other major factors include facility, such as:
the cost of OSHA fines and litigation. Severe
electrical faults may shut down a complete
• Current-Limiting Fuses
process or assembly plant, sending hundreds
or thousands of workers home for weeks while • Fuse Holders and
repairs are being made. It is also possible that Accessories
one tragic event could close a plant permanently.
• Training Seminars
& Presentations
Implementing and following a well designed
Electrical Safety Program will protect employees • Arc-Flash Calculators
and employers against:
• Electrical Safety
Literature
• Injury to personnel • Electrical Safety Video
• OSHA citations and fines • Warning Labels
• Increased costs for insurance
• Electrical Designers
and workman compensation
Reference (EDR) Software
• Lost or unusable materials
• Technical Papers
• Unplanned equipment
repair or replacement costs • MROplus Fuse
Inventory Analysis
• Multi-million dollar lawsuits
• Technical Support &
• Possible bankruptcy Engineering Services
Electrical Safety is not an option — it is absolutely
necessary for workers and employers alike.
Electricity Basics
Ohm’s Law: Even the simplest electrical system can Ohm’s Law
become dangerous. Unless proper procedures
The Current (I) in Amperes
are instituted, personnel installing or servicing In 1827, George Simon Ohm discovered that the
is equal to the electromotive
these systems are frequently exposed flow of electric current was directly proportional
force, or Voltage (V) divided
to the hazards of shock, arc flash and arc to the applied voltage and inversely proportional
by the Resistance (R)
blast. Eliminating and/or reducing these to the “resistance” of the wires or cables
in “ohms.”
hazards require a basic knowledge of electric (conductors) and the load. This discovery became
circuits. The following is a brief overview. known as Ohm’s Law.
Current (I) = Voltage (V) Ohm’s Law:
Resistance (R)
Electricity can be defined as the flow of electrons The Current in Amperes (I) is equal to the
through a conductor. This is similar to the
å CURRENT FLOW
electromotive force, or Voltage (V) divided
I= V flow of water through a pipe. Electromotive by the Resistance (R) in “ohms”.
R force, measured in volts, causes the current
to flow similar to a pump moving water. The
higher the water pressure and the larger the Current (I) = Voltage (V)
LOAD
pipes, the greater the water flow. In electrical
Resistance (R)
GEN.
circuits the rate of current flow is measured
I= V
in amperes, similar to gallons of water per
second. Figure 1 illustrates a simple circuit. R
System voltage and load resistance
determine the flow of current.
å CURRENT FLOW ç SHORT CIRCUIT
Accidental
LOAD
Connection
LOAD
GEN.
GEN. Creates Fault
(red lines indicate increased current)
For more information: System voltage and load resistance
During a short circuit, only the resistance of
determine the flow of current.
the fault path limits current. Current may
800-TEC-FUSE increase to many times the load current.
www.littelfuse.com Figure 1
ç SHORT CIRCUIT
Accidental
AD
Connection
When two of the variables are known, the third An Overload is defined as an overcurrent that is
can be easily determined using mathematical confined to the normal current path. Excessive
equations as shown above. Current seeks connected loads, stalled motors, overloaded
the path of least resistance; whether it is a machine tools, etc. can overload a circuit. Most
conductor, the ground, or a human body. For conductors can carry a moderate overload for a
example, at a given voltage, the higher the short duration without damage. In fact, transient
resistance is the lower the current will be. The moderate overloads are part of normal operation.
lower the resistance is, the higher the current Startup or temporary surge currents for motors,
will be. Materials that have very low resistance pumps, or transformers are common examples.
such as metals like copper and aluminum Overcurrent protection must be selected that will
are termed conductors, while non-metallic carry these currents. However, if the overload
materials like rubber, plastics, or ceramics persists for too long, excessive heat will be
that have very high resistance are termed generated ultimately causing insulation failure.
insulators. Conductors are usually insulated to This may result in fires or lead to a short circuit.
confine current to its intended path and to help
prevent electrical shock and fires. Conductor
cross-section and material determine its Short Circuits
resistance. Current produces heat as a function
of current squared X resistance (I2R). The NEC®
publishes tables that show the rated current
Current
carrying capacity of various sizes and types of
conductors (wire and cables). Currents that
exceed the rating of the conductor increase
temperature and decrease insulation life.
Time
Types of Electrical Faults
Current flow during a short circuit condition. Figure 3
Types of
Together, current and voltage supply the A Short Circuit is any current not confined to
power we use every day. Any electric current the normal path. The term comes from the Electrical
that exceeds the rating of the circuit is an fact that such currents bypass the normal load Faults:
Overcurrent. When the current exceeds (i.e., it finds a “short” path around the load).
the rated current carrying capacity of the Usually, when a current is greater than 6 times
conductor, it generates excess heat that can (600%) the normal current, it should be removed • Overloads
damage insulation. If insulation becomes as quickly as possible from the circuit. Short
damaged, personnel may be severely injured Circuits are usually caused by accidental contact • Short Circuits
and equipment or property compromised or or worn insulation and are more serious than
destroyed. Overcurrents can be divided into overloads. Damage occurs almost instantly.
two categories: Overloads and Short Circuits. Examples of Short Circuits include two or more
conductors accidentally touching, someone
touching or dropping tools across energized
Overloads conductors or accidental connection between
energized conductors and ground. Such ground
faults may vary from a few amperes to the
Current
maximum available short circuit fault current.
Time Overcurrent Protective Devices
Overcurrent protective devices (fuses and
Current flow during an overload condition. Figure 2 circuit breakers) are used to protect circuits
and equipment against overloads and
ELECTRICITY BASICS
Always use short circuits (faults). These devices vary in Interrupting Rating
overcurrent characteristic, design and function. Fuses
protective and circuit breakers are designed to sense Interrupting Rating (sometimes called
devices that abnormal overloads and short circuits and Interrupting Capacity) is the highest available
have interrupting open the circuit before catastrophic events symmetrical rms alternating current (for DC
ratings greater occur. Each device, however, has different fuses the highest DC current) at which the
than the maximum time characteristics and must be used and protective device has been tested, and which it
available fault applied according to the appropriate standards has interrupted safely under standardized test
current of your and manufacturer’s recommendations conditions. Fuses and circuit breakers often
electrical system. for the individual application. have very different interrupting ratings. Current-
limiting fuses have interrupting ratings up to
300,000 Amperes. UL Class H fuses and most
Fuses and circuit breakers must be able common molded case circuit breakers have
to discern the difference between normal interrupting ratings of only 10,000 Amperes. If
current variations that pose no threat to an overcurrent protective device with 10,000
equipment, and dangerous overloads or short AIR (Amperes Interrupting Rating) is used in
circuits that can cause extensive damage to a circuit that is capable of delivering a short
equipment and compromise safety. Not all circuit over 10,000 amperes, a violent explosion
devices are designed to protect against both or flash fire can occur. Always use overcurrent
overloads and short circuits. Most motor protective devices that have interrupting
starters provide only overload protection, ratings greater than the maximum available
while some circuit breakers provide only fault current of your electrical system.
short-circuit protection. Overcurrent protective
devices should be selected carefully to make
sure they will open the circuit safely under any
abnormal overcurrent condition. Interrupting
ratings and opening times, especially
under short-circuit conditions, must also
be carefully observed. Failure to select the
properly rated overcurrent protective device
can result in fires, explosions, and death.
For more information:
UL CLASS RK 1
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
10
Current Limitation with a Current-limiting Fuse
Available Peak Current
Current
NOTE:
Total Clearing I2t =
Melting I2t + Arcing I2t
Current Limitation:
Fault Occurs Peak Let-Thru / Current (lpeak)
Fuse Elements Melt
A current-limiting
device is one that
Arcing Energy (l2t)
opens and clears
Melting Energy (l2t) a fault within the
first half cycle.
Time One half cycle of
standard 60 hz cur-
Melting Arcing
Time rent is equivalent
Time
Arc is Extinguished to .00833 seconds.
Fuse Total Clearing Time Article 240.2 of the
(less than ½ cycle) National Electrical
Code (NEC) further
Figure 4 states that a
current-limiting
Current Limitation device will reduce
of standard 60 Hz current (8.33 milliseconds).
What exactly is “Current Limitation” and why Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the the peak let-thru
is it important? Article 240.2 of the National effect of current limitation on a faulted circuit. current to a value
Electrical Code® (NEC®) defines a Current-
substantially less
Limiting Overcurrent Protective Device as: “A
device that, when interrupting currents in its As seen above, the total clearing time “t” occurs than the potential
interrupting range, reduces the current flowing before the first zero. The I2t energy is the area peak which would
in the faulted circuit to a magnitude substantially under the curves. It is clear that I2t through
occur if the
less than that obtainable in the same circuit if the fuse is much less than would otherwise
the device were replaced with a solid conductor occur. Heating is a direct function of current current-limiting
having comparable impedance.” What this really squared x time (I2t). Reducing current in half device were not in
means is that a current-limiting device is one that reduces heat by 75%. Generally, the lower the
the circuit.
opens and clears a fault before the first current peak instantaneous current is, the lower the
zero after the fault occurs, and limits the peak I2t energy will be. The square of peak current
fault current. In most cases the current-limiting determines the amount of magnetic stress.
device will clear a fault in less than one half cycle For a given circuit, cutting the peak current
in half reduces magnetic stress by 75%.
. National Electrical Code® and NEC® are registered trademarks of the
National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA.
11
ELECTRICITY BASICS
Low Voltage Fuses a silica sand “filler” material that safely
UL Fuse Classes: quenches the arc and stops the current flow.
A fuse is an intentional weak link in a
circuit. It is a thermally responsive device
• Class R
designed to provide overcurrent protection. Figure 5 illustrates the components of a
• Class J The main function of a fuse is to protect Littelfuse LLSRK_ID current-limiting dual
conductors and equipment from damaging element time-delay fuse with blown fuse
• Class CC overcurrents and quickly deenergize faulted indication. It consists of two current sensing
• Class CD circuits minimizing hazards to personnel. elements in series with each other. The
first element is made with a very precise
• Class L elastomeric silicone overload section that
Fuses may be classified as fast-acting or time- protects against sustained overloads. The
• Class T
delay and as current-limiting or non-current- second element opens quickly under short
• Class G limiting. Fast-acting fuses are designed to circuit conditions, limiting the damaging heat
respond quickly to overload currents, while time- energy during short circuits and Arc-Flash
• Class H delay fuses are required to carry an overload events. Finally and perhaps just as important,
• Class K current for a predetermined amount of time. This the blown fuse indication makes trouble-
permits time-delay fuses to carry starting current shooting and replacement safe, fast, and easy.
• Plug and other temporary overloads. Fuses that limit
the maximum peak current (Ip) that could flow
Refer to UL 248 for during a short circuit are classified as current- A fuse is designed to safely open the circuit
more information. limiting fuses. Whether the fuse is classified as only once. Therefore, it must be carefully
fast-acting or time-delay, current-limiting fuses selected to keep the equipment operating unless
will open quickly during short-circuit conditions. there is danger of severe overheating or if a
short circuit or arcing fault occurs. Selecting
the right fuse for the application is critical to
Standard electrical fuses are available in overall safety and reliability. At the same time,
current ratings from 1/10 to 6000 Amperes fuses are fail-safe. Unlike mechanical devices,
and for voltages up to 600 Volts. Underwriters nothing can happen to a fuse that will prevent
Laboratories (UL) and CANENA (Council it from opening or increase its opening time.
for the Harmonization of Electrotechnical
Standards of the Americas) classify low
voltage fuses (600VAC and less) into several Circuit Breakers
main classes such as R, J, CC, CD, L, T, G,
H, K and Plug, as well as Semiconductor or Like fuses, circuit breakers are designed to
Supplemental fuses. Each class is defined protect circuits from overload and short circuit
by its performance characteristics, size, and conditions when applied within their ratings.
function. Low voltage cartridge fuses are Most circuit breakers utilize a mechanical
further classified as either current-limiting or latching, spring assisted switching mechanism
non-current-limiting types. Cartridge fuses and a thermal, thermal-magnetic, hydraulic-
have ferrules, blades, or screw type methods magnetic, or electronic current sensing circuit
of installation. They are generally intended that causes the switching mechanism to
for and suitable for branch circuit, feeder, and unlatch and open the circuit. Typical circuit
service entrance overcurrent protection in breakers are not current-limiting. However,
accordance with ANSI/NFPA 70, commonly current-limiting circuit breakers are available
known as the National Electrical Code®. in some ratings, but at a higher cost.
For more information: Inside a typical fuse, the current flows through Standard circuit breakers are available with
the fuse elements, or “links”. When enough current ratings up to 6300A and voltage ratings
800-TEC-FUSE heat is generated, the fuse element will melt
and open (blow). Most power fuses incorporate
up to 1000V. As current levels increase, the
type of circuit breaker may vary from Molded
www.littelfuse.com
12
Plated
End Caps
Precision Formed
Short Circuit Element
Blown Fuse
Elastomeric Silicone Indicator Assembly
Overload Section
Granular
Quartz Filling
BEFORE OPENING (blowing) AFTER OPENING (blowing)
Current-limiting
Figure 5 fuses usually have
much higher inter-
rupting ratings and
react much faster
Case Circuit Breakers (MCCB) to Insulated- Common Molded Case Circuit Breakers
Case Circuit Breakers (ICCB) to Low-Voltage (MCCB’s) such as the one shown in Figure 6 to short circuits and
Power Circuit Breakers (LVPCB) types. Some usually have “Thermal-Magnetic” trip units. Arc-Flash events,
circuit breakers have magnetic only trip units This means they have two sensing circuits in making them safer
or electronic trip sensors that can be adjusted series with a spring assisted latching switch.
for long, short, or instantaneous delays. The first sensing circuit uses a “thermal” and more reliable
In all cases, the sensing circuit causes the sensing element that reacts to overloads. to use than most
switching circuit within the circuit breaker The second sensing circuit is a “magnetic” circuit breakers.
to operate (open). Due to the mass of the coil that reacts to short circuits. Either the
contacts and mechanical switching components thermal sensing circuit or the magnetic sensing
and other factors, opening times of non- circuit can cause the mechanically latched
current-limiting circuit breakers under short switching circuit to open the circuit. This
circuit conditions can vary from ¾ cycles (13 provides time-current characteristics similar
msec.) to 8 cycles (130 msec.) or more. to dual-element fuses. However, most fuses
have much higher interrupting ratings and
react much faster to short circuits and Arc-
Flash events, making them safer and more
reliable to use than most circuit breakers.
13
ELECTRICITY BASICS
Failure to follow Whether you use fuses or circuit breakers,
NFPA and all both types of overcurrent protective devices
must be tested and approved by a nationally
applicable standards recognized safety agency, such as Underwriters
and guidelines along Laboratories. The device must also be applied
with the the manu- in accordance with the National Electrical Code®
or other codes and standards required by the
facturers’ recommen- Authority Having Jurisdiction over the facility. It
dations can result in a is also important to remember that even if a fuse
catastrophy. or circuit breaker is approved by a recognized
safety agency like UL, it must be installed
and used in accordance with any instructions
included with its labeling or listing. There are
Figure 6 differences, for example, in UL standards used
(Drawing courtesy of AVO Training Institute, Dallas, TX) to qualify fuses and circuit breakers such as UL
248, UL489, and UL1077. Always check the
Circuit breaker manufacturers typically applicable standards and the manufacturer to
recommend that their circuit breakers be cycled determine if their devices meet the required
ON and OFF at least once each year to keep interrupting ratings, voltage ratings, current
the tripping mechanism from seizing under limitation, etc. for each application. Failure to
certain environmental conditions. Most apply overcurrent protective devices within their
manufacturers of industrial and commercial ratings can result in fires, explosions, and deaths.
circuit breakers publish field-testing and
maintenance instructions. This often includes
annual testing and recalibration that requires Short Circuit Current Rating (SCCR)
special equipment and qualified personnel.
Instructions for thermal-magnetic breakers With all of the advances in engineering and
require many of these tests to be performed at safety, why is it that every day 1 maintenance
room temperature that can take breakers out of person is either killed or injured in electricity
service for several hours. After a circuit breaker related accidents? Is it possible the majority
has opened, it is very important to examine the of effort that has gone into engineering and
circuit to determine if the cause was a short inspecting for safe electrical systems has
circuit or an overload. Article 225.3 of NFPA 70E ended when the electricity reaches the line
requires that if a circuit breaker interrupts a side terminals of the equipment? The 2005
fault at or near its interrupting rating, it must be National Electrical Code addresses this
inspected by a trained technician and tested, situation with the advent of required labels on
repaired or replaced in accordance with the equipment that clearly state the equipment’s
manufacturer’s specifications. Short Circuit Current Rating (SCCR). The NEC
specifically addresses this for industrial control
panels [Article 409], industrial machinery
Circuit breakers must be carefully selected electrical panels [670], multiple motor HVAC
according to the application and NEC® equipment [440], meter disconnect switches
requirements. Current ratings that are too low [230] and multiple motor controllers [430].
will cause nuisance tripping and excessive
downtime. Current ratings that are too
high can cause excessive overheating or The most dangerous and common
higher arc-flash hazards. Failure to follow misconception of SCCR by equipment
NFPA standards and guidelines and the manufacturers is that the interrupting capacity
For more information: manufacturers’ recommendations can or rating of a circuit protection device is also
result in catastrophic consequences. the SCCR of the end use equipment in which
800-TEC-FUSE it is installed. Meaning, the manufacturer
www.littelfuse.com
14
that labels the equipment with a 22kA SCCR, What kind of environmental
solely because the main circuit breaker or extremes are possible? Dust,
fuse has an interrupting capacity of 22kA, humidity, temperature extremes
is mislabeling its equipment and creating a and other factors need to be
potentially dangerous condition in your plant. considered.
What is the maximum available
In order to build and label a safe piece of fault current the protective device
equipment, the manufacturer must determine may have to interrupt?
the component in the primary electrical path
with the lowest SCCR or withstand rating. Is the overcurrent protective device
The SCCR of the equipment then must match rated for the system voltage?
the rating of that component with the lowest
SCCR. Just as every device within the electrical Will the overcurrent protective
distribution system of your facility must be device provide the safest and most
rated to handle a worst-case scenario in order reliable protection for the specific
to completely protect the people and equipment equipment?
within your facility, every component within your
equipment must be designed to handle a worst- Under short-circuit conditions, will
case scenario for exactly the same reason. the overcurrent protective device
minimize the possibility of a fire or
explosion?
The NEC® recognizes and specifically requires
equipment to have accurate SCCR labels. Does the overcurrent protective
These labels will allow you and inspectors to device meet all the applicable
compare fault current studies to the SCCR and safety standards and installation
minimize potential hazards in your facilities. requirements?
Answers to these questions and other criteria will Unlike fuses,
Circuit Protection Checklist help to determine the type of overcurrent protective circuit breakers
device to use for optimum safety and reliability.
require annual
Before a system is designed or when maintenance to
unexpected events may occur, circuit designers meet manufacturer’s
should ask themselves the following questions:
specifications.
What is the normal or average
current expected?
What is the maximum continuous (three
hours or more) current expected?
What inrush or temporary surge
currents can be expected?
Are the overcurrent protective
devices able to distinguish
between expected inrush and surge
currents and open under sustained
overloads and fault conditions?
15
History of Electrical Safety
Thomas Edison Contrary to popular belief, Benjamin Franklin did Westinghouse confronted each other on the
is said to have not “discover” or “invent” electricity. The flow relative benefits and dangers of Direct Current
of electricity and its effects have been known (DC) vs. Alternating Current (AC). Concerned
developed the first for centuries, especially when traveling through with electrical safety, Thomas Edison tried to
“fuse” by using a air in the form of lightning. It wasn’t until the establish DC current as the standard in the US.
wire between two late 18th and early 19th centuries, however, He argued that DC current was not as dangerous
that scientists began to discover and analyze as AC, which George Westinghouse was
terminals that what electricity really is and how to harness promoting. In 1889, the state of New York
would melt if too it for man’s benefit. Thus began the need to commissioned the development of the electric
much current regulate electrical installations to protect people chair for their capital punishment program. Even
and equipment from its unintended effects. though Edison was not a proponent of capital
flowed through it. punishment, he was asked to design the electric
chair and assumed Westinghouse would be
With the advent of the electric light bulb and approached if he refused. Edison viewed this as
electric motors in the late 19th Century, it was an opportunity to prove that AC was more
soon discovered that electricity could also cause dangerous than DC and designed the “chair”
fires and kill people. Thomas Edison is said to using AC. In 1893, George Westinghouse
have developed the first “fuse” by using a wire received the contract to design the “Palace of
1860s 1889 1897 1913 1970
First fuses Electric chair First NEC 1 Edition
st
developed Electrician’s Handbook OSHA is formed
was developed released
1880s 1890s 1897 1940s 1979
AC/DC Electrical systems Circuit breakers Current-limiting fuses NFPA 70E is
were expanded developed UL is formed were developed Released
between two terminals that would melt if too Electricity” at the World’s Columbian Exposition
much current flowed through it. In 1882, Edison in Chicago. AC was used and shown to be
opened the world’s first central electric light safely applied. Obviously, Edison was proven
power station in New York City. It produced wrong regarding the safe application of AC.
enough DC current to power 7200 electric Westinghouse also had a better plan for
For more information: lamps. In 1887, Edison was issued the first generating and distributing electrical energy
fuse patent. Ever since, controlling electricity over long distances at higher voltages and then
800-TEC-FUSE and protecting wires from fire has become
more and more complex. In an effort to increase
transforming it to lower useable voltages. Thus
began the need for increased electrical
www.littelfuse.com electrical safety, Thomas Edison and George construction and safety standards.
16
Because insurance companies were concerned not exceed 250 and is often convenient to
about fire safety and electricity, the Underwriters locating a blown-out fuse or for ascertaining
Electrical Bureau (later to become UL) was whether or not a circuit is alive. Some men
established in 1894 to review various electrical can endure the electric shock that results
safety standards and building codes that were without discomfort whereas others cannot.
quickly being developed. In the 1890’s, the first Therefore, the method is not feasible in
crude circuit breakers were also developed. In some cases. Which are the outside wires
1896, the National Fire Protection Association and which is the neutral of a 115/230-volt,
was formed in New York City. Because electricity three-wire system can be determined in
was viewed as a fire hazard, the National Board this way by noting the intensity of the shock
of Fire Underwriters unanimously approved the that results by touching different pairs of
first “National Electrical Code” in June of 1897. wires with the fingers. Use the method with
Thus, the “NEC” was born. caution and be certain the voltage of the
circuit does not exceed 250 before touching
the conductors.
Many electric generating plants and transmission
lines were built and installed in the US in the
early 20th Century. Construction and safety
standards were quickly developed. In 1904
159. The presence of low voltages
can be determined by tasting.
The method is feasible only where the
Underwriters Laboratories published the first pressure is but a few volts and hence is
fuse standard. In 1913, the first edition of the used only in bell and signal work. Where the
“American Electricians’ Handbook” was issued. In voltage is very low, the bared ends of the
the 1930’s, the Wiggington Voltage Tester conductors constituting the circuit are held a
(a.k.a. the “Wiggie”) was developed for testing short distance apart on the tongue. If voltage
the presence of voltage, etc. In June of 1940, is present a peculiar mildly burning sensation
UL published the first circuit breaker standard, results, which will never be forgotten after
UL489, entitled “Branch-Circuit and Service one has experienced it. The taste is due to
Circuit-Breakers.” It was later in the 1940’s when the electrolytic decomposition of the liquids
the first current-limiting fuses were developed. on the tongue, which produces a salt having
1980 1990 1995 2002 2005
First burn OSHA Subpart S Arc-Resistant NEC requires NEC is updated with
centers opened updated switchgear introduced warning labels new safety definitions
1982 1995 2000 2004
Ralph Lee’s NFPA 70E recognizes NFPA 70E expands NFPA 70E is expanded
Arc-Flash paper Arc-Flash on Arc-Flash and revised
Despite advances in technology and as a taste. With voltages of 4 or 5 volts, due to
hard as it may be to believe, the American as many cells of a battery, it is best to test
Electricians Handbook of 1942 had the for the presence of voltages by holding one
following to say about Electrical Safety: of the bared conductors in the hand and
touching the other to the tongue. Where a
terminal of a battery is grounded, often a
“158. Electricians often test for
the presence of voltage by
touching the conductors with the fingers.
taste can be detected by standing on moist
ground and touching a conductor from the
other battery terminal to the tongue. Care
This method is safe where the voltage does should be exercised to prevent the two
17
HISTORY OF ELECTRICAL SAFETY
At OSHA’s request, conductor ends from touching each other at most comprehensive dissertations on the
the National Fire the tongue, for if they do a spark can result causes and effects of Arc-Flash hazards. It
that may burn.“ was also the first notable publication that
Protection Associa- attempted to analyze and quantify the potential
tion was asked to energy released during an Arc-Flash event.
research and pro- After World War II, the demand for electric
power increased for new construction and
vide guidelines for advances in productivity created the need for In 1990, OSHA updated subpart S of the Code
electrical safety in circuit protection devices with higher current of Federal Regulations, CFR 29 Section 1910,
the workplace. ratings and interrupting capacities. Electrical which deals specifically with the practical
safety standards and practices needed to safeguarding of electrical workers at their
keep pace with the ever-increasing growth workplaces. In 1995, NFPA 70E was revised
As a result the of electrical power use and generation. to include formulas to establish shock and
NFPA 70E “Standard flash protection boundaries. Also in the mid
1990’s, equipment makers began to design their
for Electrical Safety In 1970, when the Williams-Steiger Act was equipment to be more arc resistant. In the year
in the Workplace.” signed into law, the Occupational Safety and 2000, NFPA 70E was again revised to include
was issued. Health Administration (OSHA) was created. It an expanded section on Arc-Flash hazards. In
took OSHA several years before they issued 2002, the National Electrical Code (NEC)® was
comprehensive regulations that governed updated to include the requirement of shock
aspects of all workers safety. At OSHA’s request, and Arc-Flash hazard warning labels on all
the National Fire Protection Association, which equipment that is likely to be worked on while
issues the National Electrical Code®, (NFPA 70), energized. Also in 2002, the IEEE (Institute of
was asked to research and provide guidelines for Electronic and Electrical Engineers) published
electrical safety in the workplace. In 1979, the IEEE 1584 “Guide for Performing Arc‑Flash
NFPA issued the first edition of NFPA 70E, Hazard Calculation”. The latest edition of
entitled “Standard for Electrical Safety NFPA 70E recognizes IEEE 1584 as a preferred
Requirements for Employee Workplaces” (since method of calculating Arc-Flash hazards.
renamed the “Standard for Electrical Safety in
the Workplace.”) This was the first nationally
accepted standard that addressed electrical In addition to OSHA, NFPA, and the IEEE, there
safety requirements for employee workplaces. are several other safety organizations and
standards such as American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), American Society of Testing
In the 1970’s, in addition to the known shock and Materials (ASTM) and the International
hazards associated with electricity, researchers Electrotechincal Commission (IEC) that have
began to address the phenomena of arcing developed practices and have set standards
faults that released large amounts of heat and for materials and the testing of products to
light energy as well as pressure and sound protect workers from electrical hazards.
energy. In 1980, Dr. Raphael Lee opened
the first burn center in Chicago dedicated to
the care and treatment of electrical burns.
In 1982, Mr. Ralph Lee (no relation) wrote
an IEEE technical paper entitled “The Other
Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast Burns.”
This paper introduced methods to determine
and calculate the severity of electrical arc-
flash hazards. It remains today as one of the
For more information:
. Croft, Terrell, American Electricians’ Handbook, 5th edition,
800-TEC-FUSE McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1942
www.littelfuse.com
18
Electrical Safety Organizations The General Duty Clause
Several organizations have developed and Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational
continue to revise standards to address the Safety and Health Act of 1970 reads,
numerous concerns involving electrical power.
Standards and safety organizations include:
“ 5. Duties
• OSHA
Occupational Safety & (a) Each Employer
Health Administration
(1) Shall furnish to each of his
• NFPA employees employment and a
National Fire place of employment which are
Protection Association free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely
• IEEE to cause death or serious
Institute of Electrical and physical harm to his employees;”
Electronic Engineers
The “General Duty Clause” is essentially the
• UL mission that OSHA strives to enforce. It is
Underwriters Laboratories also often cited when OSHA investigates a
workplace accident. Many OSHA regulations
• NEMA are prescriptive in nature like the “General
National Electrical Duty Clause”. In other words, OSHA is
Manufacturers Association the “shall” or the reason for addressing an
issue. In some cases, OSHA will also provide
• ANSI detailed information on how to meet the
American National requirements. In other instances, OSHA
Standards Institute refers to national safety organizations such as The primary goal
NFPA to provide the required level of detail to of OSHA is “to
• ASTM meet the regulations. In either case, OSHA
American Society for covers all employees and all employers. ensure safe and
Testing and Materials healthful condi-
• NECA tions for every
OSHA Regulations
National Electrical American worker.”
Contractors Association Published by the U.S. Federal Register,
OSHA regulations can be found in the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) under Title
OSHA
29. More specifically, and legally enforced
by OSHA, Subpart S (Parts 1910.301 to
The primary goal of the Occupational Safety
1910.399) addresses “Electrical” safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) is “to ensure
standards and covers the practical
safe and healthful conditions for every American
safeguarding of electrical workers. Subpart
worker.” OSHA currently has thousands of rules
S is divided into four major divisions:
and regulations that cover workplace safety.
Federal and state OSHA programs enforce • Design safety standards
regulations through workplace inspections,
voluntary assistance programs, and training • Safety-related work practices
activities. Citations and fines are also levied
• Safety-related maintenance
for violations found during inspections.
requirements
• Safety requirements for special
equipment
19
HISTORY OF ELECTRICAL SAFETY
OSHA and NFPA Other OSHA standards outline some of In order to help meet the required OSHA
have worked with the general requirements for electrical regulations for electrical safety and training,
installations and general safe work practices: OSHA refers to NFPA 70E as a national
each other to estab- consensus standard for electrical safety in
lish standards and the workplace. NFPA also publishes NFPA 70,
codes that ensure 29 CFR 1910.132 otherwise known as the National Electrical
Personal Protective Equipment Code®, and other standards that address
employee safety in General Requirements public safety and practices. Together, OSHA
the workplace. and the NFPA continue to work to improve
29 CFR 1910.335 workplace safety. To ensure the safety of
Electrical Personal Protective Clothing your plant and personnel, OSHA and NFPA
standards should always be followed.
29 CFR 1910.147
Control of Hazardous Energy
(Lockout / tagout) IEEE
29 CFR 1910.269 The Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Power Generation, Transmission, Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) is an association of
& Distribution electrical and electronic engineers established
to advance the theory and application of
OSHA and NFPA have worked with each other electro-technology and allied sciences. The
to establish standards and codes that ensure Industry Application Society (IAS) of the IEEE
employee safety in the workplace. One of is the group that addresses power distribution
their objectives is to minimize the hazards of in industrial and similar facilities. There are
electricity through standards that specify safe numerous sub-committees that meet regularly
design characteristics and work practices for to research, publish, and update standards
electrical equipment and systems. Many of the and guidelines for the testing, evaluation,
standards and codes are not only accepted in and application of their particular industry
the United States, but throughout the world. or specialty. In 2002, the Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Committee IAS published
IEEE1584, entitled, IEEE Guide for Performing
NFPA Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. Although there
are other methods of determining Arc-Flash
The primary organization in the U.S. for fire and hazards, IEEE 1584 has quickly become
electrical safety standards is the NFPA. Their the de facto standard for determining the
document, NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical extent of potential Arc-Flash Hazards.
Safety in the Workplace, has been adopted by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
as an American National Standard. This standard NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TESTING
covers safety related work practices, defines LABORATORIES (NRTL)
qualified and unqualified workers and provides
guidance to establish an electrical safety The best-known NRTL is Underwriters Labora-
program. It also requires an electrical hazard tories, Inc. (UL). UL is an independent, not-for-
analysis for shock and flash, discusses energized profit product safety testing and certification
work permits, and proper Lockout/tagout organization that lists and labels products for
procedures. NFPA 70E defines and establishes conformance to accepted standards. Work-
shock and Arc-Flash approach boundaries to ing with industry associations, manufacturers,
energized equipment and addresses how to experts, insurance companies, and government
For more information: select appropriate PPE (personal protective agencies, UL publishes various standards and
equipment) and protective clothing. minimum test requirements for all types of
800-TEC-FUSE electrical equipment. Manufacturers submit
www.littelfuse.com
20
their products to be evaluated for conformance ANSI
to one or more of these standards. If the
product meets or exceeds the standards, UL The American National Standards Institute
lists the product in their guides and permits (ANSI) is a private, non-profit organization
manufacturers to display the UL label on the that administers and coordinates the U.S.
product. Protective devices such as fuses and voluntary standardization and conformity
circuit breakers must meet rigid standards such assessment system. Working in conjunction
as UL248, UL489, or UL1077. There are other with organizations such as NFPA, IEEE, NEMA,
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories ASME (American Society of Mechanical
such as Canadian Standards Association (CSA), Engineers), ASCE (American Society of Civil
Electrical Testing Laboratories (ETL) that test Engineers), AIMME (American Institute of
and evaluate products to UL or other industry Mining and Metallurgical Engineers), and
standards. Equipment that has been modified ASTM (American Society of Testing and
may require new evaluation and manufacturers Materials), ANSI coordinates and adopts
routinely submit their products to UL for re- these various industry consensus standards
evaluation to maintain their listing. and publishes standards to promote US and
Global conformity. ANSI has adopted many
NFPA, NEMA, and ASTM standards for
NEMA procedures, materials, and personal protective
equipment used by electrical workers.
The National Electrical Manufacturers
Association (NEMA) has over 400 member
companies including large, medium, and small ASTM
businesses that manufacture products used in
the generation, transmission and distribution, ASTM International, formerly known as the
control, and end-use of electricity. NEMA has American Society for Testing and Materials, is a
developed and published hundreds of standards voluntary standards development organization
jointly developed by its member companies. primarily involved with establishing standards
The standards have been established in the for the testing and analysis of materials. OSHA commonly
best interests of the industry and users The ASTM has published several standards is referred to as the
of its products. NEMA works closely with accepted by ANSI and other organizations that
the American National Standards Institute govern the manufacturing, testing methods, “Shall” and NFPA
(ANSI) and the International Electrotechnical and ratings of personal protective equipment 70E as the “How
Commission (IEC) to be an advocacy group to used by electrical and other workers. to” with regards to
UL and governmental agencies. Many NEMA
publications have been adopted by ANSI as electrical safety.
American National Standards. Some address the NECA
use and application of overcurrent protective
devices including AB3-2001 Molded Case NECA, the National Electrical Contractors
Circuit Breakers and their Application; AB4- Association, is in the process of developing
2003 Guidelines for Inspection and Preventive installation standards for electrical
Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers construction work. They have also developed
Used in Commercial and Industrial Applications; electrical safety standards with emphasis
and FU1-2002 Low-voltage Cartridge Fuses, on their members. In many cases, these
while others address safety issues such standards are being adopted by ANSI.
as safety signs, tags, and barricades.
21
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards
Over 20,000 standards have been developed “Justification
. for Work.
20,000 + to reduce the risk of electrical hazards. Except
for OSHA regulations most standards do not
Live parts to which an employee
might be exposed shall be put into an
standards have automatically become law. However, they are often electrically safe work condition before
adopted by governmental bodies and become law; an employee works on or near them,
been developed to
enforced by the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). unless the employer can demonstrate
reduce the risk of Other standards are written into manufacturing that deenergizating introduces
electrical hazards. and construction specifications. Whether law or additional or increased hazards or is
not, applicable standards should be followed to infeasible due to equipment design
improve safety and reduce potential hazards. or operational limitations. Energized
parts that operate at less than 50
volts to ground shall not be required
Working on deenergized equipment to be deenergized if there will be no
increased exposure to electrical burns
OSHA 29 Part 1910.333 covers selection and or to explosion due to electric arcs...”
use of (electrical) work practices. It defines and
regulates such things as working on or near When electrical equipment has been
energized or deenergized parts, Lockout / tagout deenergized, OSHA Part 1910.147 (c) and
procedures, who is or is not considered qualified 1910.333 (b)(2) requires Lockout/tagout
to work on live circuits, approach distances, use procedures be followed. Failure to follow
of personal protective equipment, and other Lockout/tagout procedures is also consistently
requirements. Paragraph 1910.333 (a)(1) reads: listed as one of the top ten OSHA violations.
“Deenergized parts. How to establish an electrically safe
Live parts to which an employee may work condition
be exposed shall be deenergized before
the employee works on or near them, Equipment that has been deenergized and
unless the employer can demonstrate verified as such is said to be in an electrically
that deenergizing introduces additional safe work condition. Article 120.1 of NFPA
or increased hazards or is infeasible 70E outlines 6 steps that must be followed
due to equipment design or operational to insure that employees are working in an
limitations. Live parts that operate electrically safe work condition. They are:
at less than 50 volts to ground need
not be deenergized if there will be no
increased exposure to electrical burns
or to explosion due to electric arcs.”
For more information:
To demonstrate the close relationship between . Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire
800-TEC-FUSE OSHA and NFPA 70E, here is what NFPA
70E Article 130.1 has to say regarding the
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
www.littelfuse.com need for equipment to be deenergized: which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.
22
1. “Determine all possible sources Working on energized equipment
of electrical supply to the specific
equipment. Check applicable Although the best practice is to always
up-to-date drawings, diagrams, work on deenergized equipment, OSHA
and identification tags. and NFPA do recognize that in some
circumstances it may create an additional
2. After properly interrupting the load hazard or be infeasible to deenergize.
current, open the disconnecting OSHA 29 CFR 1910.333 (a)(2) states:
device(s) for each source.
3. Wherever possible, visually verify “Energized parts.
that all blades of the disconnecting If the exposed live parts are not
devices are fully open or that deenergized (i.e., for reasons of
drawout-type circuit breakers increased or additional hazards or
are withdrawn to the fully infeasibility), other safety-related work
disconnected position. practices shall be used to protect
employees who may be exposed to
4. Apply Lockout / tagout devices in the electrical hazards involved. Such
accordance with a documented work practices shall protect employees
and established policy. against contact with energized
circuit parts directly with any part
5. Use an adequately rated voltage of their body or indirectly through
detector to test each phase some other conductive object….”
conductor or circuit part to verify
they are deenergized. Test each Electrical tasks such as troubleshooting and
phase conductor or circuit part testing for the presence of voltage, current,
both phase-to-phase and phase- etc., can only be done while equipment
to-ground. Before and after each is energized. In these instances, work on
test, determine that the voltage energized equipment is allowed, but workers Establish a “safe
detector is operating satisfactorily. must follow safe work practices and use the work condition”
appropriate PPE. Other exceptions that allow
6. Where the possibility of induced work on energized equipment include: and work on
voltages or stored electrical system components
energy exists, ground the phase • Life-support equipment deenergized
conductors or circuit parts before
touching them. Where it could be • Emergency alarm systems when possible.
reasonably anticipated that the
• Hazardous area ventilation
conductors or circuit parts being
equipment
deenergized could contact other
exposed energized or circuit parts,
apply ground connecting devices Deenergizing these types of equipment
rated for the available fault duty.” could increase or create additional hazards. A
mistake often made is confusing infeasibility
It is important to note that a safe work with inconvenience. For example, meeting
condition does not exist until all 6 steps are a manufacturing production schedule does
complete. During the process of creating not qualify as infeasible. It may be very
the electrically safe work condition, the inconvenient but it still does not authorize
appropriate PPE must also be utilized. working on energized equipment. OSHA 29
CFR 1910.331-335 outlines the conditions
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for for working on energized circuits in much
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire
greater detail. When work is to be performed
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, on energized equipment, extra care must
which is represented only by the standard in its entirety be used and all applicable OSHA and NFPA
23
ELECTRICAL SAFETY CODES AND STANDARDS
As a worker, you codes and standards followed. Electrical NFPA 70E Article 110.6 (D) Employee Training
may be qualified for workers must also be trained and specially covers the requirements for “Qualified” persons
“qualified” to work on energized equipment, in more detail. In addition to being trained
some tasks and un- and the specific equipment to be serviced. and knowledgeable, qualified persons must
qualified for other. also be familiar with emergency procedures,
special precautionary techniques, personal
Who is Qualified? protective equipment, Arc-Flash, insulating
Knowing the materials and tools, and testing equipment. In
difference between The definition of a “Qualified” person continues some instances, employees receiving on-the-
to change and evolve. As a worker, you may job training may be considered “Qualified”
the two can save be qualified for some tasks and unqualified for for specific duties under supervision.
your life. others. Knowing the difference may even save
your life. It is no longer sufficient for those who
will install and/or maintain electrical systems and Ultimately, a person can be considered
equipment to be just “familiar” with the hazards qualified with respect to certain equipment and
involved. Training is the key in determining who methods but still be considered unqualified
is considered a qualified worker. All personnel for others. Unqualified persons must also
who may be exposed to electrical hazards MUST be trained in the risks they are exposed to
receive documented training in order to become and the procedures that are necessary to
qualified. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.333 (c)(2) states; ensure their safety, however, they may not
be considered “qualified” to work on specific
equipment. It is vital that Unqualified workers
“Work on energized equipment. have an understanding of what tasks can
Only qualified persons may work on only be performed by Qualified workers.
electric circuit parts or equipment
that have not been deenergized under
the procedures of paragraph (b) of Energized Electrical Work Permit
this section. Such persons shall be
capable of working safely on energized Before work is performed on energized
circuits and shall be familiar with the equipment, NFPA 70E states:
proper use of special precautionary
techniques, personal protective
equipment, insulating and shielding Article 130 (A)(1)
materials, and insulated tools.” “If live parts are not placed in an
electrically safe work condition (i.e., for
Article 100 of the National Electrical Code® and the reasons of increased or additional
NFPA 70E also defines a Qualified Person as: hazards or infeasibility per 130.1), work
to be performed shall be considered
energized electrical work and shall be
“Qualified Person performed by written permit only.”
One who has skills and knowledge
related to the construction and operation The intent of an Energized Electrical Work
of the electrical equipment and Permit is to discourage the practice of working
installations and has received safety on energized equipment. The objective is to
training on the hazards involved.” get the supervisor or manager to recognize
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National Electrical . Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for
Code ® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection Association, Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire
Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete and official Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
For more information: position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is represented complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
only by the standard in its entirety. which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
24
and fully understand the additional risks 1. The location and description of
involved so they will be less likely to approve equipment to be serviced
work on energized components. In essence, 2. Justification why circuit
this shifts the decision to work on energized cannot be deenergized
equipment from the worker to management.
3. Description of safe work
practices employed
According to the NFPA 70E Handbook, work
4. Results of the shock hazard analysis
permits can also be written to cover a certain
length of time for routine tasks provided the 5. Determination of the shock
worker is trained and qualified. Other tasks that protection boundaries
are not routine should generate a work permit
as needed to insure the worker is trained and 6. Results of the flash hazard analysis
qualified for the task. Exceptions to the written 7. The Flash Protection Boundary
work permit include testing, troubleshooting,
and voltage measuring by qualified workers. 8. Description of PPE to be used
9. Description of barriers used
to restrict access
NFPA 70E does not require a specific format for
an Energized Electrical Work Permit. However, 10. Evidence of job briefing
it should contain the following 11 elements:
11. Signature of responsible management
XYZ CompanY EnErgiZEd ElECtriCal Work pErmit HOW WILL ACCESS TO THE WORK AREA BE RESTRICTED FROM UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL?
Section 1 - Work request
(to be completed by person requesting the permit)
HAS A JOB BRIEFING BEEN COMPLETED?
Work ordEr no:
loCation: EQUipmEnt:
WHAT EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE?
Start datE: timE: timE rEQUirEd: timE rEQUirEd: The intent of
dESCription oF taSk:
WERE THERE ANY JOB SPECIFIC HAZARDS? an Energized
LE LE
dESCription oF EQUipmEnt:
IN YOUR OPINION, CAN THIS JOB BE COMPLETED SAFELY? YES NO
Electrical Work
SYStEm VoltagE:
Permit is to
P P
aVailaBlE FaUlt CUrrEnt: Signature of Qualified Person Date
discourage
M M
Section 2 - Justification of Work
(to be completed by Qualified person performing the work)
Signature of Qualified Person Date
the practice
A A
WHY iS taSk BEing pErFormEd in EnErgiZEd Condition?
Section 3 - Approval to Perform Work on Energized Equipment
of working
S S
on energized
WHat Work praCtiCES Will BE UtiliZEd to inSUrE SaFEtY? (To be completed by Management)
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE SHoCk analYSiS? IS WORK ON ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT APPROVED? equipment.
limitEd: rEStriCtEd: proHiBitEd: Signature of Manufacturing Manager Date
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE FlaSH HaZard analYSiS?
Signature of Plant Manager Date
HaZard riSk inCidEnt FlaSH protECtion
CatEgorY: EnErgY: BoUndarY: Signature of Safety Manager Date
WHat iS tHE rEQUirEd pErSonnEl protECtiVE EQUipmEnt (ppE) For tHiS taSk ?
Signature of Electrical Maintenance Manager Date
HARD HAT EAR PROTECTION VOLTAGE RATED GLOVES FR PANTS
SAFETY GLASSES T-SHIRT LEATHER GLOVES FR COVERALL
SAFETY GOGGLES LONG SLEEVE SHIRT COTTON UNDERWEAR FLASH SUIT
Signature of Qualified Person Date
FACE SHIELD FR SHIRT LONG PANTS LEATHER SHOES
FLASH HOOD
Figure 7
See Appendix C for Sample Work Permit Energized Electrical Work Permit
25
ELECTRICAL SAFETY CODES AND STANDARDS
Safety is the The implementation and proper use of Energized Employees are expected to:
responsibility of both Work Permits has forced employers and
employees to perform hazard risk assessments • Be trained and “qualified”
the employer and and justify working on potentially hazardous
employee. Together energized equipment. At this time, OSHA • Use the PPE provided
does not specifically require the written by their employer
they must develop
Energized Electrical Work Permit. However, it • Inform their employers of the
and implement is implied within current OSHA regulations and need to repair or replace PPE
safe work practices will most likely be enforced in future OSHA
and procedures revisions. For an example of an Energized At the end of the day, safety is the
Electrical Work Permit refer to Annex C of responsibility of both the employer and
and an Electrical this handbook or Annex J of NFPA 70E. employee. Together they must develop
Safety Program. and implement safe work practices and
procedures and an Electrical Safety Program.
Employer and Employee Responsibilities
According to OSHA and NFPA 70E, if work
is planned or performed on energized
equipment, employers must:
• Justify why work must be per-
formed on energized equipment.
• Perform an electrical hazard
assessment.
• Inform and train employees
of the potential hazards
and how to avoid them.
• Test and verify that employees
are “qualified” to work on
specific equipment.
• Select and provide proper personal
protective equipment for employees.
• Train employees how to
use and care for PPE.
• Provide their employees with a job
briefing and written Energized Work
Permit signed by management.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
26
Arc-Flash and Other Electrical Safety Hazards
Electrical Safety Hazards Electric Shock
When electrical systems break down When personnel come in contact with energized
what are the primary hazards and what conductors they receive a shock with current
are the consequences to personnel? flowing through their skin, muscles and vital
organs. The severity of the shock depends on
• Electric shock the current’s path through the body, the current
intensity, and the duration of the contact.
• Exposure to Arc-Flash They may only experience a mild tingling
• Exposure to Arc-Blast sensation or it could result in serious injury or
death. As voltage levels increase, the effects
• Exposure to excessive light of electric shock escalate. Current may also
and sound energies cause an erratic heartbeat known as ventricular
fibrillation. If fibrillation occurs even briefly and
Secondary hazards may include burns, the goes untreated, the effects are usually fatal.
release of toxic gases, molten metal, airborne
debris and shrapnel. Unexpected events can When personnel
cause startled workers to lose their balance A clear understanding of how electric current come in contact
and fall from ladders or jerk their muscles travels through the body can help minimize
possibly causing whiplash or other injuries. injury if such contact occurs. The table below with energized
outlines the effects that various values of conductors they
electrical current have on the human body. receive a shock
with current
CONDITION EFFECTS flowing through
their skin, muscles
1-3mA of current Mild sensation
and vital organs.
10mA of current Muscles contract, releasing grip may be difficult
30mA of current Breathing difficult, possible loss of consciousness
The shock may
30-75mA of current Respiratory paralysis result in a serious
100-200mA of current Ventricular fibrillation and sometimes
fatal injury.
50-300mA of current Shock (potentially fatal)
Over 1500mA of current Tissue and organ burn
150˚ F Cell destruction
200˚ F Skin experiences “third degree” burns
27
ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL SAFETY HAZARDS
There are three basic pathways electric 3) In a touch/step potential contact, cur-
current travels through the body; rent travels from one hand, through the
As little heart, down the leg, and out of the foot.
as 50 mA 1) Touch Potential (hand/hand path)
The heart and lungs are in the direct
path of current so ventricular fibrilla-
of current tion, difficulty in breathing, collapse,
can be fatal. 2) Step Potential (foot/foot path) unconsciousness, or death may occur.
3) Touch/Step Potential (hand/foot path) Even though there may be no external signs
from the electrical shock, internal tissue or organ
Figure 8 illustrates these groups and the path of damage may have occurred. Signs of internal
current through the body. damage may not surface immediately; and
when it does, it may be too late. Any person
1) In a touch potential contact, current experiencing any kind of electrical shock should
travels from one hand through the seek immediate medical attention. Using
heart and out through the other hand. the correct personal protective equipment
Because the heart and lungs are in (PPE) and following safe work practices will
the path of current, ventricular fibril- minimize risk of electrical shock hazards.
lation, difficulty in breathing, uncon-
sciousness, or death may occur.
Arc-Flash and Arc Blasts
2) In a step potential contact, current travels
from one foot through the legs, and out An Arc-Flash is an unexpected sudden release
of the other foot. The heart is not in the of heat and light energy produced by electricity
direct path of current but the leg muscles traveling through air, usually caused by
may contract, causing the victim to col- accidental contact between live conductors.
lapse or be momentarily paralyzed. Temperatures at the arc terminals can reach or
exceed 35,000 degrees Fahrenheit (F), or four
Figure 8
Source Ground Source
Source Ground Ground
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE TOUCH POTENTIAL
(hand/hand path)
STEP POTENTIAL
(foot/foot path)
TOUCH/STEP POTENTIAL
(hand/foot path)
www.littelfuse.com
28
times the temperature of the sun’s surface. The Since energy equals power multiplied by time,
air and gases surrounding the arc are instantly and power (wattage) is volts X amps, we can
heated and the conductors are vaporized see that calories are directly related to amperes,
causing a pressure wave called an Arc Blast. voltage, and time. The higher the current,
voltage and time, the more calories produced.
Personnel directly exposed to an Arc-Flash
and Arc-Blast events are subject to third To define the magnitude of an Arc-Flash and
degree burns, possible blindness, shock, blast the associated hazards, some basic terms have
effects and hearing loss. Even relatively small been established: The amount of instantaneous
arcs can cause severe injury. The secondary heat energy released by an Arc-Flash is generally
effect of arcs includes toxic gases, airborne called incident energy. It is usually expressed
debris, and potential damage to electrical in calories per square centimeter (cal/cm2) and
equipment, enclosures and raceways. The high defined as the heat energy impressed on an
temperatures of the arc and the molten and area measuring one square centimeter (cm2).
vaporized metals quickly ignite any flammable However, some calculation methods express
materials. While these fires may cause extensive the heat energy in Joules/cm2 and can be
property damage and loss of production, the converted to calories/cm2 by dividing by 4.1868.
hazards to personnel are even greater.
If we place instruments that measure incident
Any energized electrical conductor that makes energy at varying distances from a controlled
accidental contact with another conductor or Arc-Flash, we would learn that the amount
with ground will produce an Arc-Flash. The arcing of incident energy varies with the distance
current will continue to flow until the overcurrent from the arc. It decreases approximately as Incident energy is
protective device used upstream opens the the square of the distance in feet. Just like the instantaneous
circuit or until something else causes the current walking into a room with a fireplace, the
to stop flowing. The arc current can vary up to closer we are, the greater the heat energy. energy released by
the maximum available bolted fault current. Tests have indicated that an incident energy an Arc-Flash and is
of only 1.2 cal/cm2 will cause a second-degree usually expressed
burn to unprotected skin. A second-degree
Arc-Flash Metrics burn can be defined as “just” curable. in calories per
square centimeter
In order to determine the potential effects of an (cal/cm2).
Arc-Flash, we need to understand some basic For the purpose of understanding the potential
terms. An Arc-Flash produces intense heat at effects of an Arc-Flash, you must determine
the point of the arc. Heat energy is measured the working distance from an exposed “live”
in units such as BTU’s, joules, and calories. The part. Most measurements or calculations are
following data provides a basis for measuring made at a working distance of 18 inches. This
heat energy: distance is used because it is the approximate
distance a worker’s face or upper body torso
A Calorie is the amount of heat energy may be away from an arc, should one occur.
needed to raise the temperature of one Some parts of a worker may be less than 18
gram of water by one degree Celsius. inches away, but other work may be performed
at greater distances. The working distance
arc-flash metrics is used to determine the degree of risk and
the type of personal protection equipment
Energy (E) = Power (P) × Time (t) necessary to protect against the hazard.
Power (P) = Volts (V) × Amps (I)
Calories (E) = Volts (V) × Amps (I) × Time (t)
1 Calorie = 4.1868 watt-seconds NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace categorizes Arc-Flash Hazards into
1 Joule = 1 watt-second
five Hazard Risk Categories (HRC 0 through 4)
29
ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL SAFETY HAZARDS
The amount of incident energy
results/example
incident energy a (cal/cm2)
worker may be 0.0033 Amount of energy the sun produces in 0.1sec. on the ground’s surface at the equator.
exposed to during
1 Equivalent to a finger tip exposed to a cigarette lighter flame for one second
an Arc-Flash is
directly proportional 1.2 Amount of energy that will instantly cause 2nd degree burns to bare skin
to the clearing time
4 Amount of energy that will instantly ignite a cotton shirt
of the overcurrent
8 Amount of energy that will instantly cause incurable 3rd degree burns to bare skin
protective device.
based on the amount of energy that can be When a severe enough Arc-Flash occurs, the
In general, a released at a certain working distance during an overcurrent protective device (fuse or circuit
current-limiting Arc-Flash event. They are: breaker) upstream of the fault interrupts the
current. The amount of incident energy a worker
fuse will clear a incident energy may be exposed to during an Arc-Flash is directly
hazard risk category
fault much quicker (cal/cm2)
proportional to the total clearing ampere-squared
than a standard 0 to 1.2 0 seconds (I²t) of the overcurrent protective
device during the fault. High current and longer
circuit breaker. 1.21 to 4 1
exposure time produces greater incident energy.
4 .1 to 8 2 The only variable that can be positively and
effectively controlled is the time it takes for the
8.1 to 25 3
overcurrent protective device to extinguish the
25.1 to 40 4 arc. A practical and significant way to reduce the
duration of an Arc-Flash and thereby the incident
Studies show that many industrial Arc-Flash energy is to use the most current-limiting
events produce 8 cal/cm2 (HRC 2) or less, but OCPD’s throughout the electrical system.
other accidents can produce 100 cal/cm2 or more
(exceeding all HRC). It is important to remember
that it only takes 1.2 cal/cm2 (HRC 0) to cause a Current-limiting devices such as Littelfuse type
second degree burn to unprotected skin. LLSRK_ID or JTD_ID fuses will open in ½ AC
cycle (8.33 milliseconds) or less under short
circuit conditions. Studies have shown that many
What determines the severity of existing molded case circuit breakers take up
an Arc Flash? to 6 AC cycles (100 milliseconds) or longer to
open under short circuit conditions. Refer to the
Several groups and organizations have table on page 31 showing the typical opening
developed formulas to determine the times for various overcurrent protective devices.
incident energy available at various working
distances from an Arc-Flash. In all cases,
the severity of the Arc-Flash depends on Arc Blast Effect
one or more of the following criteria:
• Available short circuit current During an Arc-Flash, the rapidly expanding
• System voltage gases and heated air may cause blasts, pressure
waves, or explosions rivaling that of TNT.
For more information: • Arc gap The gases expelled from the blast also carry
the products of the arc with them including
• Distance from the arc
800-TEC-FUSE • Opening time of overcurrent
droplets of molten metal similar to buckshot. For
example, the high temperatures will vaporize
www.littelfuse.com protective device (OCPD) copper, which expands at the rate of 67,000
30
times its mass when it changes from solid to drop a tool or make contact between energized
vapor. Even large objects such as switchboard conductors. Faulty electrical equipment can
doors, bus bars, or other components can also produce a hazard while being operated.
be propelled several feet at extremely high Electrical safety hazards such as exposure to
velocities. In some cases, bus bars have shock and Arc-Flash can also be caused by:
been expelled from switchboard enclosures
entirely through walls. Blast pressures may • Worn or broken conductor insulation
exceed 2000 pounds per square foot, knocking
workers off ladders or collapsing workers’ • Exposed live parts
lungs. These events occur very rapidly with • Loose wire connections
speeds exceeding 700 miles per hour making it
impossible for a worker to get out of the way. • Improperly maintained switches
and circuit breakers
• Obstructed disconnect panels
Light and Sound Effects
• Water or liquid near electrical
The intense light generated by the Arc-Flash equipment
emits dangerous ultraviolet frequencies, which
may cause temporary or permanent blindness • High voltage cables
unless proper protection is provided. The • Static electricity
sound energy from blasts and pressure waves
can reach 160 dB, exceeding the sound of an • Damaged tools and equipment
airplane taking off, easily rupturing eardrums
and causing permanent hearing loss. For The severity and causes of electrical hazards are
comparison, OSHA states that decibel levels varied, but the best protection is to deenergize Circuit breakers
exceeding 85 dB require hearing protection. equipment before working on it. No one has can take up to
ever been killed or injured from an Arc-Flash
while working on deenergized equipment. If 12 times longer
Common Causes equipment cannot be deenergized, electrical
to open under
workers must be “qualified”, trained, wear
The most common cause of Arc-Flash and other appropriate personal protective equipment short circuit
electrical accidents is carelessness. No matter (PPE), and follow all applicable OSHA and conditions
how well a person may be trained, distractions, NFPA standards. It is important to remember
than current-
weariness, pressure to restore power, or over- that proper selection and application of
confidence can cause an electrical worker to overcurrent protective devices (OCPD) will limiting fuses.
bypass safety procedures, work unprotected, also substantially reduce the hazards.
typ. opening time typICAL opening time
overcurrent protective device at 8 × rating at 20 × rating
Current-limiting fuses or
0.1 to 1 second < ½ cycle = 8.3 milliseconds
current-limiting circuit breakers
Molded case circuit breakers without adj. trip 5 to 8 seconds 1.5 cycles = 25 milliseconds
Molded case circuit breakers with adj. trip 1 to 20 seconds 1.5 cycles = 25 milliseconds
Large air power breakers with electronic trip 5 to 20 seconds 3 cycles = 50 milliseconds
Medium voltage breakers with electronic trip 5 to 20 seconds 5 to 6 cycles = 100 milliseconds
31
Electrical Hazard Analysis
Electric Hazard Both OSHA and NFPA 70E require an Electrical Limited Approach Boundary
Analysis is required Hazard Analysis prior to beginning work on The Limited Approach Boundary is an
or near electrical conductors that are or may approach boundary to protect personnel
for all areas of the become energized. The analysis must include all from shock. A boundary distance is
electrical system electrical hazards: shock, Arc-Flash, Arc-Blast, established from an energized part
that operate at 50 and burns. NFPA 70E Article 110.8(B)(1) based on system voltage. To enter this
specifically requires Electrical Hazard Analysis boundary, unqualified persons must be
volts or higher. within all areas of the electrical system that accompanied by a qualified person and
operate at 50 volts or greater. The results of the use PPE.
Electrical Hazard Analysis will determine the
work practices, protection boundaries, personal
protective equipment, and other procedures Restricted Approach Boundary
required to protect employees from Arc-Flash The Restricted Approach Boundary is an
or contact with energized conductors. approach boundary to protect personnel
from shock. A boundary distance is
established from an energized part
Shock Hazard Analysis based on system voltage. Only qualified
persons are allowed in this boundary
NFPA 70E Articles 110.8(B)(1) and 130.2(A) and they must use PPE.
require a Shock Hazard Analysis. The Shock
Hazard Analysis determines the system
voltage to which personnel can be exposed, Prohibited Approach Boundary
the protection boundary requirements as The Prohibited Approach Boundary is an
established in NFPA 70E Table 130.2(C), and approach boundary to protect personnel
identifies personal protective equipment from shock. Work in this boundary is
(PPE) required to minimize shock hazards. considered the same as making direct
contact with an energized part. Only
qualified persons are allowed to enter
Approach Boundaries this boundary and they must use PPE.
NFPA 70E has established three
shock protection boundaries:
1) Limited Approach Boundary
For more information: 2) Restricted Approach Boundary
3) Prohibited Approach Boundary
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
32
Shock protection boundaries are based on In summary, a Shock Hazard Analysis is
system voltage and whether the exposed performed to reduce the potential for direct
energized components are fixed or movable. shock. It will establish shock protection
NFPA 70E Table 130.2(C) defines these boundaries and determine PPE required for
boundary distances for nominal phase-to- protecting workers against shock hazards.
phase system voltages from 50 Volts to 800kV.
Approach Boundary distances may range from
an inch to several feet. Please refer to NFPA
70E Table 130.2(C) for more information.
ry
da
un
Bo
tion
Flash Protec
1 2 3 A
Completing a shock
hazard analysis
establishes the
system voltage,
shock protection
boundaries and type
of personal protec-
tion equipment
required to protect
workers against
shock hazards.
1 Limited Approach Boundary
2 Restricted Approach Boundary
3 Prohibited Approach Boundary
A Energized Part
Figure 9
Shock Protection Boundaries
33
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
In part, Arc-Flash Flash Hazard Analysis at every point where service on energized
hazard calcula- equipment, devices, or conductors may be
A complete electrical hazard analysis must also required. The discussion and examples that
tions are based on contain a Flash Hazard Analysis. NFPA 70E Article follow are intended to introduce readers to the
the available fault 130.3 requires this analysis to be performed: required data and some of the methods for
current and the performing an electrical flash hazard analysis at
600 volts and below. Readers are cautioned that
opening time of “A Flash Hazard Analysis calculations for systems with different voltages,
overcurrent protec- shall be done in order to protect equipment, devices, and a wider range of fault
tive devices. personnel from the possibility of being currents require the more complete methods
injured by an Arc-Flash. The analysis contained in NFPA 70E Article 130 and Annex D.
shall determine the Flash Protection
Boundary and the personal protective
equipment that people within the Flash According to NFPA 70E, the default Flash
Protection Boundary shall use.” Protection Boundary is four feet (48”) based
on an OCPD clearing time of 6 cycles (0.1
sec) and an available fault current of 50 kA
The analysis requires the available fault current or other combinations not exceeding 5,000-
to be calculated and documented at every ampere seconds. For other conditions or
point in the electrical system. This includes all under engineering supervision, calculations
components contained in the electrical system. are permitted to determine the Flash
The end result of this research will be an accurate, Protection Boundary. Complete formulas
documented one-line diagram, which will provide for varying conditions are given in NFPA
the data for a short circuit analysis, and the other 70E Article 130 and NFPA 70E Annex D.
calculations that determine the Flash Protection
Boundary and required level of PPE. In part,
Arc-Flash hazard calculations are based on the The following data is required to
available fault current and the opening time of complete the Flash Hazards Analysis:
overcurrent protective devices. NFPA 70E has also
assigned Hazard Risk Categories based on the • Up-to-date one-line circuit diagram
estimated incident energy (typically expressed in of the electrical distribution system
cal/cm²), from an Arc-Flash.
• Available fault current from
the utility or generator
• Maximum available bolted fault
The Flash Protection Boundary (FPB)
currents at each location
The Flash Protection Boundary is the
distance in feet (DC ) from a given arc • Minimum self-sustaining
source that will produce a second- arcing current at each location
degree burn on exposed bare skin.
• Clearing times of all
overcurrent protective devices
Unlike the Shock Hazard Protection Boundaries
that are based solely on system voltage, the As power is distributed throughout your facility, it
Flash Protection Boundary is not fixed. In order is important to remember that although voltage
to determine the potential Arc-Flash hazard, levels may be higher at the service entrance,
Flash Protection Boundaries must be calculated secondary power distribution transformers can
produce much higher current levels and Arc-
For more information: . Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for Flash energy levels. Power utilities should be
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, Copyright ® 2004, National Fire consulted regularly to establish the maximum
Protection Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the
800-TEC-FUSE complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject,
which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.
available fault current at the service entrance
location of your building. Hand calculations or
www.littelfuse.com
34
commercial software can be used to estimate the Multiple methods are also provided in NFPA
maximum available short circuit current at every 70E Annex D for estimating incident energy
access point in your electrical system. under varying conditions. The results can vary
drastically depending on the specific system
parameters. An arcing fault will also produce very
Arc-Flash Calculations different incident energy levels depending on if
the arc is in open air or confined in a cubic box.
If the maximum available fault current at a The formula in Table B estimates the incident
particular location is known, then an analysis of the energy for a fault occurring in a 20 inch cubic
upstream overcurrent protective device (OCPD) box with one side open. This estimate simulates
will determine how fast the device will clear the the potential effect of an arc-flash while working
circuit at the fault current. If these two factors in equipment and switchgear enclosures.
are known, the amount of incident energy and
the Flash Protection Boundary can be calculated.
During arcing faults the arc impedance
(resistance) reduces arc current. Because
The Flash Protection Boundary (Dc) measured the opening times of OCPD increase as the
in feet is based on the bolted fault mega volt- short-circuit current (Isc) decreases, lower
amperes (MVAbf) and the clearing time (t) of arc fault currents may greatly increase the
the OCPD. If the bolted fault current (Isc) is not total arc energy. Studies have shown that
known, it can be calculated based on the MVA the minimum self-sustainable arc in 480 volt
rating and impedance of the source transformer. systems is 38% of the available bolted fault
An alternate method of determining the Flash current. Because of the increased time at this
Protection Boundary based on the MVA rating of reduced fault level, the incident energy may be
a source transformer with an impedance of 5% higher than under bolted fault conditions. Each
and the clearing time (t) of the OCPD is supplied point in the system needs to be evaluated for
in NFPA 70E. Table A provides a basic formula both maximum and minimum fault currents.
for calculating the Flash Protection Boundary.
NFPA 70E refers
to three methods
Table A to determine
Dc = [2.65 x MVA bf x t]½ OR Dc = [53 x MVA x t]½ the incident
DC = FPB distance in ft. from the Arc energy or Hazard
MVAbf = Available bolted fault MVA in mega volt-amps at point of fault Risk Category.
MVA = Transformer capacity in mega volt-amps
t = Clearing time of overcurrent protective device in seconds
Table B
-1.4738 2 2
E = 1038.7 D t [0.0093F -0.3453F + 5.9675] cal/cm
MB B A
EMB = Maximum 20 in. cubic box incident energy
DB = Distance from arc electrodes, (usually 18 in.)
tA = Arc duration, seconds
F = Bolted fault current in kA
Note: The formula in Table B only applies to systems where the available
short circuit current is in the range of 16kA to 50kA.
35
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
The following Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation Examples
example illustrates
the difference in The following examples break down the
incident energy calculations and compare the Hazard Risk
between a current- Category (HRC), Incident Energy (cal/cm²), Flash
Protection Boundary (FPB) and PPE (Personal
limiting fuse and a Protective Equipment) required to work on an
circuit breaker. energized 480V system protected by either
2500 Amp Class L fuses or a 2500 Amp low
voltage power circuit breaker.
Example 1 Example 2
Calculation for energized work in the Calculation for energized work in the
transformer metering section of a 2000 kVA transformer metering section of a 2000 kVA
substation. Transformer secondary substation. Transformer secondary
protected with current-limiting fuses. protected with a circuit breaker.
2000 kVA 2000 kVA
4160V/480V 4160V/480V
5.5%Z 5.5%Z
FUSE: CIRCUIT BREAKER
V A Littelfuse KLPC2500 V A
CLEARING TIME: CLEARING TIME:
0.01 sec @ 43.7kA 0.083 sec @ 43.7 kA
Refer to Annex D for Step by step instructions of this example.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
36
Example 1 (continued) Example 2 (continued)
NFPA 70E Article 130.3 (A) NFPA 70E Article 130.3 (A)
Flash Protection Boundary Distance Flash Protection Boundary Distance
Calculate MVAbf : Calculate MVAbf :
Note: 2000 kVA = 2 MVA Note: 2000 kVA = 2 MVA
MVA bf = 100 × MVA = 100 × 2 MVA bf = 100 × MVA = 100 × 2
%Z 5.5 %Z 5.5
MVA bf = 36.4 MVA MVA bf = 36.4 MVA
Calculate DC : Calculate DC :
t = 0.01 sec t = 0.083 sec
DC = (2.65 × MVAbf × t) DC = (2.65 × MVAbf × t)
DC = (2.65 × 36.4 × 0.01) = 0.98 ft ≅ 12 inches DC = (2.65 × 36.4 × 0.083) = 2.83 ft ≅ 34 inches
NFPA 70E Annex D.6.2(a) NFPA 70E Annex D.6.2(a)
Incident Energy Exposure Incident Energy Exposure
Calculate Isc: Calculate Isc:
Isc = MVA × 10 × 100 Isc = MVA × 10 × 100
6 6
3 × VAC %Z 3 × VAC %Z In this example,
the incident en-
Isc = 2 × 106 × 100 = 43,738 Amps Isc = 2 × 106 × 100 = 43,738 Amps
3 × 480 5.5 3 × 480 5.5 ergy for a current-
limiting fuse is
Calculate F:
Isc 43,738 A
Calculate F:
Isc 43,738 A
eight
F=
1000
=
1000
= 43.7 kA F=
=
1000 1000
= 43.7 kA
times
Calculate EMB: Calculate EMB: lower
For this calculation, DB = 18 inches For this calculation, DB = 18 inches than the incident
energy for a
EMB = 1038.7 × DB-1.4738 × ta × (0.0093 F 2 – 0.3453 F + 5.9675) EMB = 1038.7 × DB-1.4738 × ta × (0.0093 F 2 – 0.3453 F + 5.9675)
circuit breaker.
EMB = 1038.7 × (18) –1.4738 × (.01) × [0.0093 (43.7)2 – 0.3453 (43.7) EMB = 1038.7 × (18)–1.4738 × (.083) × [0.0093 (43.7)2 – 0.3453 (43.7)
+5.9675] + 5.9675]
EMB = 1.27 cal/cm2 EMB = 10.54 cal/cm2
In this example the incident energy is much less when
a current-limiting fuse is used to provide protection.
37
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
According to the
Data Ex. 1 - Fuse Ex. 2 - circuit breaker
previous example
the required level
of PPE needed
while working
on the equipment
protected by
the circuit breaker
would be much
greater than the Example Results Comparison NFPA 70E are based on IEEE 1584 but do
level of PPE needed not contain all the data or descriptions of
As the examples show, the Flash Protection how these methods were developed. IEEE
while working on Boundary, Incident Energy, and Hazard Risk 1584 outlines 9 steps necessary to properly
the equipment pro- Category can vary greatly depending on the perform an Arc-Flash hazard calculation.
tected by the fuse. overcurrent protective device being used. In
this particular comparison, the required level of
PPE would also be quite different between the Step 1
fuse and circuit breaker. The above calculations
can also be performed using commercially Collect the system and installation data
available software programs. Refer to Annex D
of this handbook for more details on the steps Depending on whether you are doing a
required to complete the hand calculations. complete site analysis or looking at one
individual portion, this step can take a few
minutes or several weeks to perform. Begin
IEEE 1584 Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation by reviewing the latest up-to-date single line
diagram(s) of the equipment or system you
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic are analyzing. If single line diagrams are not
Engineers (IEEE) publishes the IEEE 1584 available, you must create them. The utility
“Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard can provide you with the available fault MVA
Calculations.” It contains detailed methods and and X/R ratio at the entrance to your facility.
data that can be used to calculate Arc-Flash If you generate your own electricity, or if you
Hazards for the simplest to the most complex have emergency or standby generators and
systems. The Petroleum and Chemical Industry large motors, a more detailed analysis must be
committee of the IEEE spent many years performed. In order to calculate the bolted fault
developing these methods. They are based on current available at the point of your application,
empirical testing of Class RK1 and Class L fuses, you must record on your one line diagram all
Low Voltage Molded Case Circuit Breakers, transformers and their ratings, circuit breakers
Insulated Case Circuit Breakers and Low Voltage or fusible distribution circuits and their ratings,
Power Circuit Breakers as well as theoretical MCC’s, and all other equipment between the
modeling. Included in 1584 are spreadsheet power source and the area you are concerned
programs that simplify the calculation of with. Next, you must record the size, type,
incident energy and flash-protection boundaries. length, and number of cables or busbars, etc.
used between the utility and the distribution and
control equipment being analyzed. The type of
IEEE 1584 does not address the Safety- conduit or raceway must also be recorded. All
For more information: related Work Pratices in the same manner as transformer data must be recorded including
NFPA 70E. IEEE 1584 concerns itself primarily MVA ratings and impedance, and all overcurrent
800-TEC-FUSE with performing the calculations that may
be necessary to determine safe practices.
protective devices must be identified with their
specific characteristics or trip ratings recorded.
www.littelfuse.com The calculation methods in Annex D of
38
Step 2 immediately on the LINE side of the equipment
you are analyzing. If the fuse manufacturer
Determine the system modes of operation or circuit breaker manufacturer publishes
maximum and minimum clearing times, it is
Most installations have only one mode of important to use the maximum clearing time
operation with one utility connection. However, possible for the predicted arc fault current.
larger industrial or commercial buildings or
manufacturing plants may have two or more
utility feeders with tie switching of two or NOTE: This step can be omitted if the
more transformers, or co-generators running overcurrent protective devices are those
in parallel. Each mode can be very complex already tested and listed in the IEEE 1584
and require a detailed hazard analysis. document. See Section 4.6 of IEEE 1584.
Step 3 Step 6
Determine the bolted fault currents Document the system voltages and classes
of equipment
You can perform hand calculations or use
commercially available software programs such Make sure you document the system voltages
as the Littelfuse EDR software to calculate the and class of equipment such as 15kV switchgear,
bolted fault currents at all points between the 5kV switchgear, low-voltage switchgear, low-
utility and the distribution or control equipment voltage MCCs and panelboards, or cable runs.
you are analyzing. It will be necessary to plug
in all of the data you have recorded about the
transformers, cable sizes and lengths, and Step 7
type of conduit, etc. used in each installation
to determine the bolted fault currents. Select the working distances
IEEE 1584 is
IEEE 1584 has established three typical working one method
Step 4 distances for different classes of equipment.
As previously discussed, incident energy of determining
Determine the arc fault currents calculations and Hazard Risk Categories will incident energy
depend on the working distances selected. and Flash Protection
After determining the bolted fault currents, IEEE
1584 provides a formula to calculate the predicted Boundaries (FPB).
arc fault current due to typical arc impedance Step 8 Another method
and other factors. The predicted arc fault current will be to use NFPA
for system voltages under 1kV depends on the Determine the incident energy for
bolted fault current, system voltage, arc gap, all equipment 70E equations and
and whether the arc would most likely occur in calculations.
the open air or in an enclosed box configuration. You can use formulas included in the IEEE 1584
document or commercially available software
to calculate the incident energy possible in
Step 5 cal/cm2 at the working distance selected.
Find the protective device characteristics and
the duration of the arcs Step 9
From the data collected in Step 1 and the Determine the flash protection boundary
predicted arc fault current determined in Step for all equipment
4, the next step is to establish the total clearing
time of the overcurrent protective device The formulas given within IEEE 1584 can
39
ELECTRICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS
The Table Method be used to determine the distance from Steps Required to Use the NFPA 70E
may be used in the arc at which the onset of a second- Table Method
degree burn will occur to unprotected
lieu of a complete skin. This distance must be established Step 1
Flash Hazard and will vary based on system parameters.
Analysis. However, Software programs automatically calculate Once the equipment is identified where work
the distance based on the arc fault current, is to be performed, review the up-to-date one
a complete analysis system voltage, arc gap, and arc duration. line drawing for information about the available
will provide more short circuit current and other details about
accurate results. the location of the equipment. If the one line
If the overcurrent protective devices (OCPD) drawing is not up to date or the available short
are something other than those covered circuit is not known, it must be determined.
by IEEE 1584, or if the voltage levels and
short circuit currents exceed the IEEE 1584 Step 2
limitations, then the opening times of
the overcurrent protective devices must Consult NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) and find
be analyzed and the corresponding Flash the task to be performed. If the desired task to
Protection Boundary and incident energy be performed is not listed, the Table Method
must be calculated by another method. cannot be used and a complete Flash Hazard
Analysis is required.
NFPA 70E Table Method Step 3
Although NFPA 70E (Article 130.3) requires Once you find your task in the table, identify the
a Flash Hazard Analysis, it also provides an Hazard Risk Category and determine if voltage
alternate method for determining Hazard rated gloves or tools are required.
Risk Categories and required PPE. This is
commonly called the “Table Method” and Step 4
is based on various tasks to be performed
on energized equipment (see NFPA 70E Verify that the conditions stated in the footnotes
Table 130.(C)(9)(a)). The Table Method may for NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), and any
be used in lieu of a complete Flash Hazard Tentative Interim Amendments such as those
Analysis in some cases. However, a complete stated in NFPA 70E, are applicable to the task.
analysis provides more accurate results.
Step 5
Caution is advised when using the Table Using NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(10-11) and
Method. All footnotes listed at the end of the corresponding notes in Table 130.7(C)(9)(a),
NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) and in any identify the required PPE for the task.
applicable Tentative Interim Amendments
must be observed and all prescribed conditions Step 6
verified. If a task is not listed in NFPA 70E
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) or cannot be verified, The NFPA 70E Table Method does not provide
then NFPA 70E leaves no other alternative the Flash Protection Boundary, but it must be
but to do a complete hazard risk assessment determined. For systems 600V and below,
using one of the other calculation methods. NFPA 70E defines the FPB as 4 feet. See NFPA
70E for more information on calculating the FPB.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
40
Whether calculations are made or NFPA 70E
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is used, the results of an
Electrical Hazard Analysis (Shock and Flash
Hazard Analysis) will determine the following:
• The Limited Approach Boundary
• The Restricted Approach Boundary
• The Prohibited Approach Boundary
• Incident Energy possible at
each location
• Flash Protection Boundary
• Hazard Risk Category
• PPE required to work on
energized equipment
OSHA regulations
must be followed
to perform a hazard
assessment, and
to determine the
PPE required for
properly protecting
electrical workers.
41
Minimizing Arc-Flash and Other Electrical Hazards
Estimates show that NFPA 70E guidelines and practices are generally 1. Design a safer system.
10 Arc-Flash considered the “How to” of conforming to the
OSHA regulations when performing a hazard Goals
incidents assessment, and determining the required PPE. When designing a safer system the following
occur every day There are many practices that will help reduce goals and factors should be considered:
in the U.S. Arc-Flash and other electrical hazards while
• Provide maximum protection to
conforming to OSHA and NFPA 70E regulations
personnel, equipment, and property.
and guidelines. Circuit designers and electrical
maintenance engineers should carefully consider • Meet all applicable code require-
each of the following recommendations: ments (OSHA, NFPA, Building
and Insurance codes, etc.)
1. Design a safer system. • Utilize current-limiting overcurrent
protective devices to minimize
2. Use and upgrade to current-limiting Arc-Flash hazards.
overcurrent protective devices. • Utilize “touch-safe” components
to minimize exposure to energized
3. Implement an Electrical Safety Program. components
4. Observe safe work practices. • Utilize fuses with blown fuse
indication to minimize exposure
5. Use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). to energized components while
trouble-shooting the circuit.
6. Use Warning Labels.
• Provide selective coordination
(only the area where the
7. Use an Energized Electrical Work Permit.
fault occurs is shut-off)
8. Avoid hazards of improperly selected or • Provide a system that is safe to
maintained overcurrent protective devices. service and maintain.
9. Achieve or Increase Selective Coordination.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
42
System Requirements • Current-limitation
Current-limiting OCPDs reduce
Once the goals for your system are established, damage from major faults. Often
the selection of the overcurrent protective devices or equipment can be easily
devices that best meet those goals can be repaired rather than face time-con-
determined. What is the best choice for your suming and costly replacement.
application; fuses or circuit breakers? Fuses offer
many safety and performance advantages over • Are your sensitive control devices such as
circuit breakers. Factors to consider include: motor starters truly protected?
After a fault, will the units be usable or will
they require replacement? Only current-
• System voltage limiting fuses can provide Type 2 Protec-
Voltage ratings for fuses are stan- tion. That means you are up and running
dardized at 250, 300, and 600 once the cause of the fault is removed.
volts. In comparison, some circuit
breakers are rated for dual volt- 2. Use and upgrade to current-limiting
ages and are often mis-applied. overcurrent protective devices.
• Interrupting rating The incident energy from an Arc-Flash depends
Most fuses have standard ratings of on the magnitude of the current and the time it
200kA at full rated voltage. Circuit is allowed to flow. Within their current-limiting
breaker interrupting ratings may range range, current-limiting devices reduce the peak
from 10kA to 100kA, but the interrupt- fault current. Current-limiting fuses have much
ing ratings of many breakers vary with faster clearing times when operating within
system voltage and type of trip unit. their current-limiting range than standard circuit
breakers. The faster the overcurrent protective
• System changes resulting in increased device clears the fault, the lower the I²t and
available fault current incident energy will be. If current-limiting fuses
If your facility grows or the utility makes are used, the incident energy and the Hazard Upgrading to
changes, fault currents have been Risk Category may be reduced significantly. Class RK1 or Class J
known to more than double. Interrupting
ratings of overcurrent protective devices current- limiting
must be regularly reviewed to insure Upgrade to Class RK1 or Class J current- fuses is the
the device will still protect the system. limiting fuses easiest way to:
• Load current characteristics One of the quickest and easiest ways to reduce
Inductive loads such as motors and potential incident energy, lower the Hazard Risk • Reduce potential
transformers and even large incandes- Categories and reduce the required PPE, is to Arc-Flash hazards
cent lamps have large inrush currents replace UL Class H, K5 or Class RK5 fuses with
that require circuit breakers to be current-limiting UL Class RK1 or Class J fuses.
oversized so that overload protection is Upgrading to time-delay Class J fuses affords the • Reduce Hazard
sacrificed. Properly selected time-delay best solution by providing the best current limitation Risk Categories
fuses can be sized close to load currents while assuring non-interchangeability with non-
and will offer better overload protection. current-limiting fuses. If an equipment manufacturer
• Reduce the
amount of
required PPE
43
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
Current-limiting fuses has specified a non-time delay fuse, standard Class circuit and maximizes safety by minimizing
that also offer blown J fuses are available. If your equipment already has exposure to energized components when
UL Class H fuse clips, it is very easy to replace the trouble-shooting. Replacing non-current-
fuse indication such Class H or K5 fuses being used with Class RK1 limiting fuses with Littelfuse current-limiting
as the Littelfuse Class fuses. For a given current and voltage rating, UL Indicator® fuses can significantly reduce the:
RK1 LLSRK_ID series Class H, K5, RK5, and RK1 fuses are the same
physical size, therefore, it is easy and strongly • Incident energy from an Arc-Flash
can help: recommended to upgrade to better fuse protection.
To assure that only current-limiting fuses are used, • The Hazard Risk Category
• reduce exposure to consider changing to Class J clips or to rejection • The level and type of PPE necessary
electrical hazards type clips that will accept only Class R fuses.
• Trouble-shooting and downtime.
• decrease downtime Current-limiting fuses that also offer blown
fuse indication such as the Littelfuse Class
J JTD_ID and Class RK1 LLSRK_ID can help
• maximize safety
reduce exposure to electrical hazards. The
unique blown fuse indicator decreases
downtime by immediately indicating the opened
Use the table below to consolidate your
fuse inventory and eliminate unsafe or
unnecessary fuses.
You Should Use This Fuse.... If You Have This Fuse....
Class L KLPC KLPC KRPC A4BQ LCL
KLLU KLU A4BY LCU
KTU A4BT
Class RK1 LLSRK_ID FLSR FRSR TRS GF6B
(600 Volts) FLSR_ID NOS* OTS* ECSR
NLS* RES* RFS* LESRK
RLS* LPSRK A6DR KOS*
LLSRK KTSR* A6KR* ERS*
KLSR*
Class RK1 LLNRK FLNR FRNR TR GF6A
(250 Volts) NLN* NON* OT* ECNR
RLN* REN* RF* LENRK*
KLNR* LPNRK A2DR KON*
KTNR* A2KR* ERN*
Class J JTD_ID JTD LPJ AJT JDL
JLS* JHC A4J* JFL*
JKS*
Class CC CCMR FLM LPCC ATDR EDCC
FLQ FNM TRM MEN
KLDR FNQ ATQ MEQ
KLK FNQR ATQR HCTR
BLS KTKR ATMR HCLR
For more information: BLF KTK SBS MCL
BLN BBS OTM EBS
KLKR BAF ATM MOL
800-TEC-FUSE * Consult Article 430 of the NEC® when substituting for loads with motors, or call 800-TEC-FUSE
BAN
www.littelfuse.com
44
3. Implement an Electrical Safety Program. as well as hand tools are often overlooked and
must be insulated and rated for the voltage
Electrical Safety Programs protect both of the circuits where they will be used. All
employees and employers and provide goals, tools and equipment used for maintenance
procedures and work practices to insure safety. must also be periodically inspected to ensure
NFPA 70E Article 110.7 requires employers they are not damaged (i.e. torn insulation)
to establish an Electrical Safety Program that and are still in good working condition.
must be documented and include the minimum
following components:
Disconnect Operation
• Scope of the Program
Operating a damaged disconnect switch,
• Company Philosophy whether it’s a fusible switch or circuit breaker,
• Responsibilities can be dangerous. Serious injury could occur if
someone is standing in front of a faulty switch
• Establishment of a Safety or circuit breaker while opening or closing
Team or Committee the device. If the handle is on the right hand
side of the device, stand to the right, use
• Written Procedures
your left hand to grasp the handle, turn your
• Work Instructions face away and then operate it. If the handle
is on the left side, reverse the procedure.
• Identification of Industry Codes Use special caution while operating circuit
& Standards to be adhered to breakers. If closed into a fault, circuit breakers
• Establishment of a Documented will trip, drawing an internal arc. The gases
Training Program from the arc are very hot, and vent through
openings in the breaker. These hot gases often
• Establishment of Assessment vent around the handle and can cause burns
and Audit Requirements unless proper protective equipment is used.
The implementation
• Company Policies and Enforcement
and enforcement
Proper Service or Repair of All
Increased safety will be possible with the Equipment or Devices of a well-designed
implementation and vigorous enforcement of Electrical Safety
a well-designed and documented Electrical a) Locate the equipment where work is to be Program in accor-
Safety Program. These programs should performed. If equipment is running, follow
be in accordance with all OSHA regulations manufacturer’s shutdown procedures being dance with OSHA
and nationally recognized safety standards sure that all unit switches are off. Do not and NFPA 70E will
such as NFPA 70E and NEC®. For more open any enclosures. Determine if there is increase safety in
information on establishing an Electrical adequate working space and that it is clear
Safety Program, refer to NFPA 70E Annex E of obstructions. your facility.
or NFPA’s Electrical Safety Program Book.
b) Locate all disconnecting means providing
power to the equipment, including all
4. Observe safe work practices sources of emergency, alternate, and control
power. This must include discharging
Maintenance capacitors and other sources of stored
energy. Turn all disconnecting devices to the
Safe maintenance practices and procedures OFF position and apply lockout/tagout
include properly training employees in the devices as required by OSHA and the
knowledge of the equipment and tools company’s Electrical Safety Program.
necessary for maintenance and repair. NFPA
70E states that employees “shall be trained c) While wearing proper personal protective
in and familiar with the specific maintenance equipment, open the enclosure door or
procedures and tests required.” Test equipment access panels. Test the voltage meter to be
45
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
It is estimated that used on a known energized source to be Equipment containing circuit breakers
Lockout/Tagout sure it is working properly. Test all exposed
wires, contacts and other components likely i) After following steps 1 through 3 above,
prevents about to be energized insuring that the equipment look for circuit breakers and examine to
120 fatalities and is in an electrically safe work condition. see if any are tripped. Examine the circuit
breaker(s) to see if the case or surround-
50,000 workday Equipment containing fuses ing area shows signs of severe venting
injuries annually. indicating a serious fault.
d) If it is suspected there is one or more
Source:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration opened fuses, remove fuses from the circuit j) Investigate the circuit for the causes of
using the proper size fuse puller. circuit breaker tripping. Correct the problem.
Note: The use of Littelfuse Indicator® If breaker is protecting motor starters,
Fuses will minimize time required to especially IEC or single-purpose type, test
locate opened fuses, and help avoid the motor starters to be sure they are still
mixing them with good fuses. functional. If the motor starters have
heaters (resistance coils) in the overloads,
e) Place fuses on a non-conductive surface and test the resistance across the heaters to
measure fuse resistance across the ends insure they are still functional.
(endcaps/blades) of the fuse with a meter. If
the fuses have knife blades be sure to test k) Test resistance across the poles of the
from blade to blade since some types of open circuit breaker to be sure all poles are
fuses have insulated end caps and will give a open and there are no shorts between
false reading. High resistance indicates that poles. Close the circuit breaker and
the fuse may be open. measure resistance across the closed
poles to insure resistances are within
f) Investigate the circuit to identify the cause of tolerances and are equal from pole to pole.
any blown fuses. Look for loose connections
or signs of overheating. Correct the problem. Placing equipment in service
g) Verify the proper fuse class, voltage, ampere, l) Following manufacturer’s instructions, close
and interrupting ratings before installing all internal switches and circuit breakers and
replacement fuses. (Caution: because fuse other procedures necessary for start-up.
characteristics may vary between manufac-
turers and fuse classes, fuses should be of m) Close enclosure door(s) and access panels
the same manufacturer and class for each and check the area for other personnel.
application.) Remove lockout/tagout devices following
OSHA and safety program procedures.
h) Examine fuse clips or mountings for signs of
corrosion, overheating, or loss of tension. n) Restore power standing to the side of the
Service if necessary. Install the replacement switch enclosures.
fuse with the proper size fuse puller.
o) Restart equipment following manufacturer’s
instructions and exercising caution until
satisfactory operation is insured.
Lockout/tagout Procedures
OSHA requires that energy sources to
For more information: machines or equipment must be turned off and
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
46
disconnected isolating them from the energy positioned or removed.
source. The isolating or disconnecting means
must be either locked or tagged with a warning c) Make sure that only the employees who
label. While lockout is the more reliable and attached the locks or tags are the ones
preferred method, OSHA accepts tagout to that are removing them.
be a suitable replacement in limited situations.
It is estimated that Lockout/tagout prevents d) After removing locks or tags, notify
about 120 fatalities and 50,000 workday injuries affected employees before starting
annually. Approximately 39 million workers are equipment or machines.
protected by Lockout/tagout practices. Failure to
comply with Lockout/tagout safety regulations 5. Use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
is frequently one of the top five OSHA violations.
In 2004 alone, there were over 4,300 violations The proper selection and use of Personal
cited by OSHA. NFPA 70E Article 120 contains Protective Equipment will significantly reduce
detailed instructions for lockout/tagout and placing the risk of Arc-Flash and other electrical
equipment in an Electrically Safe Work Condition. hazards to personnel working on energized
equipment. OSHA Part 1910.335 (a) states:
Application of Lockout/tagout Devices
“…Employees working in areas where
a) Make necessary preparations there are potential electrical hazards
for shutdown shall be provided with, and shall
use, electrical protective equipment
b) Shut down the machine or equipment that is appropriate for the specific
parts of the body to be protected
c) Turn OFF (open) the energy- and for the work to be performed.”
isolating device (fuse/circuit breaker)
A variety of PPE is available from numerous
d) Apply the lockout or tagout device manufacturers. The most common The proper
types of protective gear include: selection and use
e) Render safe all stored or
of PPE will greatly
residual energy • Nonconductive flame-resis-
tant head, face, and chin pro- reduce the risk
f) Verify the isolation and deenergiza- tection (hard hats, full face of Arc-Flash and
tion of the machine or equipment shields, switching hoods, etc.)
other electrical
• Eye protection (face shields, hazards.
Removal of Lockout/tagout Devices safety glasses, goggles)
• Body protection resistant to
a) Inspect the work area to ensure that non- flash flame (shirts, pants,
essential items have been removed and jackets, coveralls)
that machine or equipment components
are intact and capable of operating • Hand and arms protection
properly. Especially look for tools or (insulating gloves and sleeves
pieces of conductors that may not have with leather protectors)
been removed.
• Foot and leg protection (insulated
leg and footwear)
b) Check the area around the machine
or equipment to ensure that all • Insulating blankets or mats
employees have been safely
47
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
PPE that is selected Selection of PPE is dependant on the task to be V-rated
should be rated for, performed. NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(9), (10), Tools and gloves rated and tested
and (11) provide guidance for the selection of for the line-to-line voltage at the area
or greater than, the personal protective equipment to be used for where the work is to be performed.
minimum Arc-Flash specific tasks and hazard levels. The Table of PPE
rating required for requirements below provides typical clothing Flame Resistant (FR)
requirements for Hazard Risk Categories from “The property of a material whereby combustion
each Hazard 0 through 4. Note: Hazard Risk Category 0 still is prevented, terminated, or inhibited
Risk Category. requires some level of protective clothing or following the application of a flaming or non-
equipment. Manufacturers have also developed flaming source of ignition, with or without
tables and selection guides based on NFPA 70E susequent removal of the ignition source.”
recommendations. It is important to note that
the level of PPE recommended by NFPA 70E is: Breakopen Threshold Energy (EBT)
“intended to protect a person from arc-flash and The incident energy level which does not
shock hazards”. Even with PPE, some arc-flash cause flame resistant (FR) fabric breakopen
conditions may result in burns to the skin or include and does not exceed second-degree burn
arc blast pressures, toxic vapors, and propelled criteria, as defined in ASTM F 1959.
particles and materials. PPE that is selected should
be rated for, or greater than, the minimum Arc-Flash Standards such as OSHA 1910.137 also specify
rating required for each Hazard Risk Category. that protective gear must be maintained and
periodically inspected to ensure that it remains in
a safe and reliable condition. NFPA also supports
Common Personal Protective this in NFPA 70E Articles 130.7(B), 130.7(C)(8) and
Equipment Terms and Definitions 130.7(F). NFPA requirements state that PPE should
be inspected before and after each use, and be
Arc Thermal Performance repaired, cleaned or laundered according to the
Exposure Value (ATPV) manufacturer’s instructions prior to use. It is also
The incident energy level (in cal/cm²) that can extremely important to avoid contamination of
cause the onset of a second-degree burn PPE material. Contact with grease, solvents, and
as defined in ASTM F 1959 Standard Test flammable liquids may destroy the protection.
Method for Determining the Arc Thermal
Performance Value of Materials for Clothing.
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical
Personal Protective Equipment will be labeled
Safety in the Workplace, Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection
with a calorie rating (Example: 11 cal/cm²). Association, 2004. This reprinted material is not the complete and
official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is
represented only by the standard in its entirety.
PPE Requirements
Minimum
Required
Flash
Hazard Risk Minimum Typical Protective Clothing Systems
Protection
Category Arc Rating of Clothing Description
Boundary
PPE (cal/cm2)
(in.)
0 N/A 1 layer of non-melting, flammable fabric with weight of at least 4.5 oz/yd2 6
1 4 1 layer of a FR shirt and FR pants or FR coverall 15
2 8 1 or 2 layers of FR shirt and FR pants with conventional cotton underwear 45
For more information: 3 25 2 or 3 layers of FR shirt, FR pants plus FR coverall cotton underwear 60
800-TEC-FUSE 4 40 3 or more layers of FR shirt, FR pants plus multi-layer flash suit ~120
www.littelfuse.com Derived from NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(11)
48
6. Use Warning Labels. Preferred Label Approach
The National Electrical Code® recently recognized
Arc-Flash hazards and developed a warning
label requirement. NEC® Article 110.16 states:
“110.16 Flash Protection: 32 inches 35 kA
1 480 VAC
Switchboards, panelboards, industrial 2.77 cal/cm2
control panels, meter socket enclosures,
and motor control centers that are
in other than dwelling occupancies
and are likely to require examination,
adjustment, servicing, or maintenance 42 inches 12 inches 1 inch
while energized shall be field marked Bus: SERVICE4 05/12/05
to warn qualified persons of potential
electric Arc-Flash hazards. The marking
shall be located so as to be clearly
visible to qualified persons before
Figure 11
examination, adjustment, servicing, or
maintenance of the equipment.”
The use of detailed warning labels not only
While the overall requirement is very increases safety, but also minimizes the time
comprehensive, the required label format required to identify minimum levels of PPE.
can be very generic. However, if a complete Other types of warning labels should also be
electrical hazard analysis is performed, the used to include information about proper fuse
preferred approach would be to include replacements, location of disconnects and
the Hazard Risk Category, Flash Protection other sources of power, etc. Warning labels
Boundary, Incident Energy available, level can be applied directly to pieces of equipment The use of detailed
of PPE required, system voltage, and shock or on enclosure doors. Computer programs warning labels will
protection boundaries on labels. See Figures 10 and adhesive blank labels make it easy to
and 11 for examples of typical warning labels: create labels for almost every purpose. increase safety as
well as minimize
the time required to
Minimum Label Requirements 7. Use an Energized Electrical Work Permit.
identify minimum
NFPA 70E requires that a detailed written levels of PPE.
Energized Electrical Work Permit must
be used and signed by responsible
management whenever work is performed
on live energized equipment.
35 kA
480 VAC
Figure 10
See Annex C of this handbook for an
example of an Energized Electrical
. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National Electrical Work Permit. For additional information
Code ® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection Association, on Energized Electrical Work Permits,
1 inch Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete and official refer to NFPA 70E Article 130.1(A).
position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is represented
05/12/05
only by the standard in its entirety.
49
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
Circuit breakers trip- 8. Avoid Hazards of Improperly Selected or closed on the short circuit before it is corrected.
ping mechanisms Maintained Overcurrent Protective Devices. This is especially important for circuit breakers
and switches because short circuit currents can
could seize up and Whether in the design or maintenance of permanently damage the equipment to the point
not operate properly an electrical system, hazards exist if the that it will not operate safely when reenergized.
if not maintained proper overcurrent device is not selected and
applied. Circuit breakers and other electrical
to manufacturer’s equipment must be maintained and serviced Circuit Breakers
specifications. regularly to ensure that they will operate
properly when needed. Unfortunately, in many Circuit breakers, like fuses, are rated to safely
industries and especially during economic interrupt their maximum interrupting current
turndowns, the tendency is to limit or eliminate only once. Molded Case Circuit Breakers
regularly scheduled maintenance on circuit (commonly referred to as MCCB’s) must meet
breakers and other electrical equipment. the requirements of UL489, “Standard for
However, the potential costs associated with Safety,” Molded-Case Circuit Breakers, Molded
OSHA violations, liability lawsuits, workers Case Switches and Circuit Breaker Enclosures.
compensation, equipment replacement, and This standard allows manufacturers to list their
lost production far exceeds the costs of circuit breakers at varying degrees of available
regular testing and maintenance of circuit fault currents, current-limiting ability and other
breakers and other electrical equipment. characteristics. They must be applied within
the maximum limitations of their ratings.
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.334(b)(2)
“Reclosing circuits after protective Circuit breaker manufacturers typically
device operation. After a circuit is recommend that their circuit breakers be cycled
deenergized by a circuit protective ON and OFF at least once each year to keep
device, the circuit may NOT be the tripping mechanism from seizing under
manually reenergized until it has been certain environmental conditions. Cycling circuit
determined that the equipment and breakers ON and OFF manually may help keep the
circuit can be safely reenergized. The switching mechanism from seizing, but may not
repetitive manual reclosing of circuit guarantee that the tripping mechanism will operate
breakers or reenergizing circuits properly. Some manufacturers also recommend
through replaced fuses is prohibited. that their circuit breakers be periodically tested and
recalibrated under carefully controlled conditions.
NOTE: When testing time-current characteristics,
When it can be determined from the recommendations state the circuit breaker
design of the circuit and the overcurrent being tested must be at room temperature. This
devices involved that the automatic practice would increase equipment downtime
operation of a device was caused while the circuit breaker to be tested cools
by an overload rather than a fault down after it is removed from service.
condition, no examination of the circuit
or connected equipment is needed
before the circuit is reenergized.” The National Electrical Manufacturers Association
(NEMA) has published standard AB 4-2003
In this section of the regulations, OSHA entitled, “Guidelines for Inspection and Preventive
recognizes the importance of knowing why Maintenance of Molded Case Circuit Breakers
the overcurrent protective device has opened. Used in Commercial and Industrial Applications.”
If the fuse or circuit breaker opened due to It deals exclusively with the maintenance and
For more information: an overload, no examination of the circuit or care of Molded Case Circuit Breakers to provide
connected equipment is necessary. However, if reliable protection. The expected lifetime of a
800-TEC-FUSE the overcurrent protective device opened due
to a short circuit fault, catastrophic results can
circuit breaker, however, depends on circuit
conditions and its’ environment. Standard AB
www.littelfuse.com occur if the fuse or circuit breaker is replaced or 4-2003 emphasizes that safe work practices
50
include regular periodic maintenance, and fuses (200,000 AIR). The circuit breaker’s
investigating what caused the circuit breakers to low interrupting rating may not be an initial
operate prior to reenergizing the circuit — similar hazard, but as available fault currents rise from
to OSHA 29 CFR 1910.334(b)(2). There are other the utility, a dangerous situation is created.
published industry standards for maintenance During service upgrades, circuit breakers with
of large Air Power Circuit Breakers. Preventive low interrupting capacities may have to be
maintenance of these circuit breakers should be replaced by higher rated devices or protected
performed at least annually, and after interruption by fuses in order to lower fault currents.
of a fault some 20 or more steps are required
before placing the circuit breaker back in service.
Non-current-limiting fuses
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Another potential electrical hazard is the
Engineers (IEEE) has also published Standard use of non-current-limiting fuses including
493-1997, otherwise known as the “Gold Book,” “renewable” fuses. Although fuse standards
entitled, Recommended Practice For the Design and fuse technology have changed greatly,
Of Reliable Industrial And Commercial Power many older machines and equipment may
Systems. The IEEE studied failure statistics of contain Class H (one-time or renewable) or
typical industrial and commercial electrical K5 one-time fuses. The continued use of
distribution systems and components over these fuses especially where available fault
several years prior to 1974 and more recently in currents exceed their interrupting ratings
1996. The results of the 1996 study concluded can be catastrophic. In addition to being
nearly 1/3 of all circuit breakers that failed while in non-current-limiting, Class H and K5 fuses
service could have been avoided if proper have lower interrupting ratings than the Class
maintenance and testing was performed. R or J fuses. Just like non-current-limiting
circuit breakers, the Class H and K5 fuses
may permit much higher current to flow for a
Article 225.3 of NFPA 70E much longer time, increasing risk to workers
requires that if a circuit breaker and the equipment. The incident energy of an
interrupts a fault at or near its Arc-Flash could be deadly to an unsuspecting
interrupting rating, it must be inspected worker who is not properly protected.
by a trained technician and tested,
repaired or replaced in accordance with
the manufacturer’s specifications. 9. Achieve or Increase Selective Coordination.
If proper maintenance and repair is neglected, When an overcurrent occurs in a system only
circuit breakers may fail to open or open more the overcurrent protective device immediately
slowly than when first calibrated. The IEEE on the line side of the overcurrent should
study noted that circuit breaker failures caused open. This reduces unnecessary shutdown
excessive equipment damage, blackouts, of other equipment and simplifies locating
unexpected repair and replacement costs, lost the problem. Such systems are defined as
production, scrap production, and most “selectively coordinated.” Refer to Figure 12.
importantly, severe blast and burn injuries to
personnel. Proper care and maintenance of
circuit breakers must be part of any Electrical If a system is not selectively coordinated, a fault
Safety Program. at point A can cause the fuses or circuit breakers
at points B, C, and D to open, needlessly
shutting off power to two or more unaffected
Other common safety hazards involve using areas. In a selectively coordinated system, a
overcurrent protective devices with improper fault at point A will cause only the fuse or circuit
interrupting ratings. Standard circuit breakers breaker immediately before the fault to open,
have relatively low interrupting ratings (typically keeping power supplied to the rest of the feeder
10,000 to 100,000 AIC) when compared to and branch circuits throughout the facility.
51
MINIMIZING ARC-FLASH AND OTHER ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
Achieving a selec- Feeder circuit breakers or fuses are typically It is also unsafe to replace blown fuses with
tively coordinated rated at least twice that of the downstream slightly higher ampere ratings in order to
devices. An Arc-Flash that opens the upstream compensate for nuisance openings. Doing
system not only devices means that the total I2t heat energy and so will defeat selective coordination and can
reduces downtime consequently, incident energy, is determined by dramatically increase the amount of risk to
and the risk of the largest upstream device. In this situation, the workers if an Arc-Flash occurs. In order to
electrical system is not selectively coordinated, decrease downtime and reduce the risk of
Arc-Flash exposure, and the incident energy increases as a result Arc‑Flash exposure to unsuspecting workers,
but the National of the time elapsed before the upstream it is best to replace non-current-limiting fuses
Electrical Code® overcurrent protective device clears the fault. and circuit breakers with more accurately
rated time-delay current-limiting fuses such as
requires it. the Littelfuse Class RK1 LLSRK_ID series.
Achieving a selectively coordinated system
not only reduces downtime and the risk of
Arc-Flash exposure, but Articles 240.12, 700.27, Electrical safety is important for everyone.
701.18 and 620.62 of the National Electrical Employees working on electrical systems
Code require it. These code specifications refer are at risk every day, but with the
to emergency circuits or potential life saving properly designed overcurrent protection
circuits such as alarm circuits, emergency system, the implementation of safe
lighting, and elevator circuits. For example, work practices and the utilization of the
during an emergency or in a building with an appropriate PPE, risk can be minimized.
elevator, an overcurrent on one elevator motor
must not cause the feeder circuit to open all
other elevator circuits, or alarm systems.
Figure 12
Selective Coordination
Without Selective With Selective
Coordination Coordination
D D
C C
Legend:
Fuse Opens
B B
Fuse Not Opened
Circuit Breaker Opens
A A
Unnecessary
For more information: Power Outage
FAULT FAULT
800-TEC-FUSE Examples of loads
include: motors, LOAD LOAD LOAD LOAD
www.littelfuse.com elevators, lighting, etc. #1 #2 #1 #2
52
Electrical Safety Summary
Here is a brief review of some basic 7) When working on or approaching
electrical safety concepts. energized circuits, proper protective
clothing must be worn. The minimum
1) Unless there is a compelling safety flame retardant clothing, safety
issue such as life-support equipment, glasses, and protective gloves and
alarm systems, hazardous location equipment must meet OSHA and
ventilation, or lighting required for NFPA 70E guidelines. Protective
safety, OSHA requires that circuits be insulating blankets and mats are
deenergized and the system be placed also used to minimize exposure.
in an Electrically Safe Work Condition
before any work is performed. 8) Be certain there is adequate lighting
for the tasks to be performed. Por-
2) When placing equipment in an table lighting must be fully insulated
Electrically Safe Work Condition, so that it will not accidentally cause
always follow proper Lockout/tagout short circuits when used near
procedures. energized components.
3) An Electrical Hazard Analysis must 9) Use barricades or barriers to warn Employees working
be performed on all circuits 50 volts unqualified individuals from entering on electrical systems
and higher that may be worked on the area.
while energized. are at risk every day,
10) Be prepared for the unexpected. Make but with the properly
4) The Hazards must be identified and sure emergency communications and designed overcurrent
warning labels must be applied to all trained medical personnel are avail-
equipment that may be worked on able if something goes wrong. protection system,
while energized. the implementation
11) Use current-limiting overcurrent of safe work practices
5) Workers must be trained on the protective devices wherever possible
equipment, hazards and safety to reduce the potential electrical and the utilization
precautions, and be certified as hazards. of the appropriate
“qualified” to work on energized PPE, risk can be
equipment. Training and certification Electrical Safety in the workplace can only be
must be documented. attained when workers and employers diligently minimized.
follow OSHA and industry accepted standards
6) All work performed on energized and regulations. It is our sincere hope and desire
equipment must be preceded by a that this handbook has been helpful in informing
job briefing and a signed Energized the reader of the importance of Electrical Safety
Electrical Work Permit. while providing methods and information on how
to effectively and safely reduce electrical hazards.
53
Annex A
Electrical Safety Terms and Definitions
A.I.C. or A.I.R.: fuse after the fuse link has melted
See Interrupting Capacity. and until the circuit is interrupted.
Ambient Temperature:
The air temperature surrounding a device.
Current
Peak Current which would occur
For fuses or circuit breakers in an enclosure, without current limitation
the air temperature within the enclosure.
Ampacity:
The current in amperes that a conductor can
carry continuously under the conditions
of use without exceeding its temperature Peak Let-through Current
rating. It is sometimes informally applied to Arcing Energy (l2t)
Melting Energy (l2t)
switches or other devices. These are more
Time
properly referred to by their ampere rating.
Melting Arcing
Ampere Rating: Time Time
The current rating, in amperes, that is
Figure 13
marked on fuses, circuit breakers, or other
Current Limitation
equipment. It is not to be inferred that
equipment or devices can continuously carry
rated amperes. Various derating factors may Arcing-fault:
apply. Refer to NEC® for further information. A short circuit that arcs at the point of fault.
The arc impedance (resistance) tends to
Ampere-Squared-Seconds (I²t): reduce the short-circuit current. Arcing
The heat energy passed by a fuse or circuit faults may turn into bolted faults by welding
breaker from the instant the fuse links melt of the faulted components. Arcing faults
or circuit breaker contacts part (arcing may be phase-to phase or phase-to-ground.
time). It is equal to the rms arcing current
squared multiplied by the arcing time. Arc-Blast:
A pressure wave created by the
Approach Boundaries: heating, melting, vaporization, and
Protection boundaries established expansion of conducting material
to protect personnel from shock. and surrounding gases or air.
Arcing I²t: Arc-Flash:
For more information: The heat energy passed by a fuse during The sudden release of heat energy and
its arcing time. It is equal to the rms arcing intense light at the point of an arc. Can
800-TEC-FUSE current squared multiplied by the arcing time. be considered a short circuit through
the air, usually created by accidental
www.littelfuse.com Arcing Current (See Figure 13): contact between live conductors.
The current that flows through the
54
Arc Gap: two bare bus bars, or a crossed-phase
The distance between energized conductors condition due to incorrect wiring.
or between energized conductors and
ground. Shorter arc gaps result in Boundaries of Approach:
less energy being expended in the Protection boundaries established to protect
arc, while longer gaps reduce arc personnel from shock and Arc-Flash hazards.
current. For 600 volts and below, arc
gaps of 1.25 inches (32 mm) typically Calorie:
produce the maximum incident energy. The amount of heat needed to raise the
temperature of one gram of water by one
Arc Rating: degree Celsius. 1 cal/ cm² is equivalent
A rating assigned to material(s) that relates to the exposure on the tip of a finger
to the maximum incident energy the material by a cigarette lighter for one second.
can resist before breakopen of the material
or onset of a second-degree burn. The Clearing I²t (Also Total Clearing I²t):
arc rating is typically shown in cal/cm². The ampere-squared seconds (I²t) through an
overcurrent device from the inception of the
Arcing Time: overcurrent until the current is completely
(See Figure 13): The time between interrupted. Clearing I²t is the sum of the
the melting of a fuse link or parting Melting I²t and the Arcing I²t.
of circuit breaker contacts, until
the overcurrent is interrupted. Coordination or Coordinated System:
See Selective Coordination.
Arc Voltage:
A transient voltage that occurs across Current-Limiting Fuse (Figure 14):
an overcurrent protection device during A fuse which, when interrupting currents
the arcing time. It is usually expressed within its current-limiting range, reduces the
as peak instantaneous voltage (Vpeak or current in the faulted circuit to a magnitude
Epeak), but sometimes as rms voltage. substantially less than that obtainable in the
same circuit if the device was replaced with
Asymmetrical Current: a solid conductor having comparable
AC current that is not symmetrical around impedance. To be labeled “current-limiting,”
the zero axis. Usually caused by a fault a fuse must mate with a fuse block or fuse
in circuits with low power factors. (See holder that has either a rejection feature or
Power Factor and Symmetrical Current). dimensions that will reject non-current-
limiting fuses.
Available Short Circuit Current:
(also Available or Prospective Fault Current):
The maximum rms Symmetrical Current
Current
that would flow at a given point in a system
Current which
under bolted-fault conditions. Short-circuit would flow if
not interrupted
current is maximum during the first half-
cycle after the fault occurs. (See definitions
of Bolted Fault and Symmetrical Current.)
Current before fault
Bolted Fault:
A short circuit that has no electrical
resistance at the point of the fault. It
results from a firm mechanical connection Time
Fault occurs
between two conductors, or a conductor
Fuse opens and
and ground. Bolted faults are characterized clears short circuit
in less than ½ cycle Arc is extinguished
by a lack of arcing. Examples of bolted
Figure 14
faults are a heavy wrench lying across
Current Limiting Fuse
55
ANNEX A
Current-Limiting Range: Fault Current:
For an individual overcurrent protective Same as Short-Circuit Current.
device, the current-limiting range begins at
the lowest value of rms symmetrical current Flash Hazard Analysis:
at which the device becomes current-limiting A study that analyzes potential exposure
(the Threshold Current) and extends to the to Arc-Flash hazards. The outcome of
maximum interrupting capacity of the device. the study establishes Incident Energy
levels, Hazard Risk Categories, Flash
Current Rating: Protection Boundaries, and required PPE.
See Ampere Rating. It also helps define safe work practices.
Deenergized: Flash Protection Boundary:
Equipment or components that have A protection boundary established to protect
had all energy sources removed. personnel from Arc-Flash hazards. The
Flash Protection Boundary is the distance
Device Rating: at which an unprotected worker can receive
Refers to the standard ampere rating a second-degree burn to bare skin.
of a device as defined by NEC ® Article
240.6. Standard ampere ratings Fuse:
ranges from 1 to 6000 amperes. An overcurrent protective device consisting
of one or more current-carrying elements
Distance to Arc: enclosed in a body fitted with contacts
Refers to the distance from the receiving so that the fuse may be readily inserted
surface to the arc center. The value used into or removed from an electrical
for most calculations is typically 18 inches. circuit. The elements are heated by the
current passing through them, thus
Electrical Hazard: interrupting current flow by melting
A dangerous condition caused by during specified overcurrent conditions.
equipment failure or contact with an
energized conductor. Hazards include Ground-fault:
shock, Arc-Flash, burns and arc blasts. A short circuit caused by insulation
breakdown between a phase conductor
Electrical Hazard Analysis: and a grounded object or conductor.
A study to identify the potential electrical
hazards that may be exposed to Hazard Risk Category:
personnel. The analysis should address A classification of risks (from 0 to 4) defined
both shock and Arc-Flash hazards. by NFPA 70E. Each category requires PPE
and is related to incident energy levels.
Electrically Safe Work Condition:
Condition where the equipment and Incident Energy:
or circuit components have been The amount of thermal energy impressed
disconnected from electrical energy on a surface generated during an
sources, locked/tagged out, and tested to electrical arc at a certain distance from
verify all sources of power are removed. the arc. Typically measured in cal/cm2.
Energized: I²t:
Refers to components within a system Symbol for Ampere-Squared-Seconds. A means
being connected to a “live” voltage source. of describing the thermal energy generated by
For more information: current flow. When a fuse or current-limiting
Fault: circuit breaker are interrupting currents
800-TEC-FUSE Same as Short-Circuit and
used interchangeably.
within their current-limiting range, the term is
expressed as melting, arcing, or total clearing
www.littelfuse.com I²t. (See Melting I²t, Arcing I²t, and Clearing I²t)
56
Instantaneous Peak Current Peak Let-through Current
(Ip or Ipeak): (See Figure 15):
The maximum instantaneous current The maximum instantaneous current
value developed during the first half- that passes through an overcurrent
cycle (180 electrical degrees) after fault protective device during its total clearing
inception. The peak current determines time when the available current is
magnetic stress within the circuit. within its current-limiting range.
Interrupting Capacity (AIC):
Current
The highest available symmetrical rms Peak Current which would occur
without current limitation
alternating current (for DC the highest direct
current) at which the protective device has
been tested, and which it has interrupted
safely under standardized test conditions.
The device must interrupt all available
overcurrents up to its interrupting capacity. Peak Let-through Current
Also commonly called Interrupting Rating.
Arcing Energy (l2t)
Melting Energy (l2t)
Interrupting Rating (IR, I.R., AIR or Time
A.I.R.): Figure 15
The highest rms symmetrical current, Melting Arcing Peak let-through
Time Time
at specified test conditions, which
the device is rated to interrupt. The Power Factor (X/R):
difference between Interrupting Capacity As used in overcurrent protection, power
and Interrupting Rating is in the test factor is the relationship between the inductive
circuits used to establish the ratings. reactance (X) and the resistance (R) in the
system during a fault. Under normal conditions
Limited Approach Boundary: a system may be operating at a 0.85 power
An approach boundary to protect personnel factor (85%). When a fault occurs, much of the
from shock. A boundary distance is system resistance is shorted out and the power
established from an energized part based factor may drop to 25% or less. This may cause
on system voltage. To enter this boundary, the current to become asymmetrical. See
unqualified persons must be accompanied definition of Symmetrical Current.
with a qualified person and use PPE.
PPE:
Melting I²t: An acronym for Personnel Protective
The heat energy created by an overcurrent Equipment. It can include clothing,
required to melt the fuse link(s). It equals tools, and equipment.
the rms current (or DC current) squared,
multiplied by the melting time in seconds. Prohibited Approach Boundary:
For times less than 0.004 seconds, melting I²t An approach boundary to protect personnel
approaches a constant value for a given fuse. from shock. Work in this boundary is
considered the same as making direct
Overcurrent: contact with an energized part. Only
Any current larger than the equipment, qualified persons are allowed to enter
conductor, or devices are rated to this boundary and they must use PPE.
carry under specified conditions.
Protection Boundaries:
Overload: Boundaries established to protect
An overcurrent that is confined to the personnel from electrical hazards.
normal current path (e.g., not a short
circuit), which, if allowed to persist, will Qualified Person:
cause damage to equipment and/or wiring. A person who is trained and knowledgeable
57
ANNEX A
on the construction and operation of the
equipment and can recognize and avoid
electrical hazards that may be encountered. A
Rating:
A designated limit of operating
characteristics based on definite
conditions, such as current rating,
voltage rating and interrupting rating. B C D E
Renewable Fuse:
X
A fuse that may be readily restored
to service by replacing the renewable
element after operation.
Restricted Approach Boundary: F G H J
An approach boundary to protect
personnel from shock. A boundary Y
distance is established from an energized
part based on system voltage. Only In a selective system:
qualified persons are allowed in the
For a fault at "X" only fuse "C" will open.
boundary and they must use PPE. For a fault at "Y" only fuse "F" will open.
Selective Coordination Figure 16
(See Figure 16):
In a selectively coordinated system, only
the protective device immediately on the
line side of an overcurrent opens. Upstream Short Circuit (See Figure 17):
protective devices remain closed. All other A current flowing outside its normal path.
equipment remains in service, which It is caused by a breakdown of insulation
simplifies the identification and location of or by faulty equipment connections. In a
overloaded equipment or short circuits. short circuit, current bypasses the normal
load. The amount of current is determined
Shock: by the system impedance (AC resistance)
A trauma subjected to the body by electrical rather than the load impedance. Short-circuit
current. When personnel come in contact currents may vary from fractions of an
with energized conductors, it can result ampere to 200,000 amperes or more.
in current flowing through their body
often causing serious injury or death.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
58
ratings (also called withstand ratings) apply to
equipment that will be subjected to fault
å CURRENT FLOW currents, but which are not required to interrupt
them. This includes switches, busway (bus
duct), switchgear and switchboard structures,
motor control centers and transformers. Most
short-circuit ratings are based on tests which
LOAD
last three complete electrical cycles (0.05
GEN. seconds). Some equipment may have reduced
short-circuit rating for times longer than 3
cycles. Refer to manufacturers literature. If the
equipment is protected during the test by fuses
System voltage and load resistance or by a circuit breaker with instantaneous trips,
the test duration is the time required for the
determine the flow of current.
overcurrent protective device to open the circuit.
When so protected during testing, the
ç SHORT CIRCUIT equipment instructions and labels must
indicate that the equipment shall be
protected by a given fuse class and rating, or
by a specific make, type, and rating of circuit
Accidental breaker. Certain circuit breakers equipped
LOAD
Connection with short-delay trip elements instead of
GEN.
Creates Fault instantaneous trip elements may have
withstand (short-circuit) ratings in addition to
their interrupting rating. The withstand rating
is the fault current the breaker must be able to
(red lines indicate increased current) withstand for a specified time or if it is
protected by a fuse or another circuit breaker
During a short circuit, only the resistance of
in series with it. They may also have reduced
the fault path limits current. Current may interrupting ratings.
increase to many times the load current.
Figure 17 Symmetrical Current:
The terms “Symmetrical Current” and
Short-Circuit Rating: “Asymmetrical Current” describe an
The maximum rms symmetrical short-circuit AC wave’s symmetry around the zero
current (for DC equipment DC current) at which axis. The current is symmetrical when
a given piece of equipment has been tested the peak currents above and below the
under specified conditions, and which at the zero axis are equal in value, as shown
end of the test, is in essentially the same in Figure 18. If the peak currents are not
condition as prior to the test. Short-circuit equal, as shown in Figure 19, the current
Symmertrical Current Asymmertrical Current
Zero Axis
Zero Axis
Equal Unequal
Peaks Peaks
Figure 18 Figure 19
59
ANNEX A
is asymmetrical. The degree of asymmetry Threshold Ratio:
during a fault is determined by the change The threshold current divided by the
in power factor (X/R) and the point in the ampere rating of a specific type or class
voltage wave when the fault occurs. of overcurrent device. A fuse with a
threshold ratio of 15 becomes current-
System Voltage: limiting at 15 times its current rating.
The phase-to-phase or three-phase
voltage(s) at the point being evaluated. Unqualified Person:
A person that does not possess all
Threshold Current: the skills and knowledge or has not
The minimum current for a given fuse size been trained for a particular task.
and type at which the fuse becomes current-
limiting. It is the lowest value of available Voltage Rating:
rms symmetrical current that will cause the The maximum rms AC voltage and/or the
device to begin opening within the first 1/4 maximum DC voltage at which the device
cycle (90 electrical degrees) and completely is designed to operate. For example,
clear the circuit within 1/2 cycle (180 electrical fuses rated 600 volts may be applied at
degrees). The approximate threshold any system voltage less than or equal to
current can be determined from the fuse’s their rating. [There are no specific rules
peak let-through charts. See Figure 20. for applying AC fuses in DC circuits.]
Fuses used on DC circuits must have
proper DC voltage ratings. Circuit breaker
B
ratings are more complex since some
breakers may have dual voltage ratings.
Withstand Rating:
Peak Let-Through in Amperes
See Short-Circuit Rating.
Peak let-through current
8000 Fuse approximate
threshold current = 3500
A
3500
Available Fault Current Symmetrical RMS Amperes
Figure 20
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
60
Annex B
Electrical Safety Codes and Standards
National Electrical Code® (NEC®) NEC Articles
In 1896 members of the industry met in New The following NEC paragraphs are important
York City to develop a single electrical installation when designing and servicing electrical systems:
code from the five then in use. After review
by over 1200 individuals, it was published in
1897 and has become known as the National “110.4 Voltages.
Electrical Code. In 1911 the NFPA became the Throughout this Code, the voltage
sponsor of the NEC and continues the tradition considered shall be that at which the
of wide spread consensus. The purpose of circuit operates. The voltage rating of
the National Electrical Code “is the practical the electrical equipment shall not be
safeguarding of persons and property from less than the nominal voltage of the
hazards arising from the use of electricity. The circuit to which it is connected.”
NEC contains provisions considered necessary
for safety.” The NEC is updated and revised “110.9 Interrupting Rating:
every three years. The NEC, also known as Equipment intended to interrupt
NFPA 70, is the nationally accepted standard for current at fault levels shall have an
safe electrical installation methods and practices. interrupting rating sufficient for the
Although the NEC is regarded as the “Bible” nominal circuit voltage and the current
for electrical construction practices, it does not that is available at the line terminals of
provide comprehensive details for workplace the equipment. Equipment intended
safety when servicing electrical systems. to interrupt current at other than fault
levels shall have an interrupting rating
at nominal circuit voltage sufficient for
While the NEC is not a design manual, following the current that must be interrupted.”
its provisions help ensure that electrical
systems are reasonably safe. Some of the NEC
provisions specifically addressing application
1, 2. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National
of overcurrent protective devices are listed
Electrical Code® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection
herein, however users are cautioned the Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete
NEC must be considered in its entirety. and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is
represented only by the standard in its entirety.
61
ANNEX B
“110.10 Circuit Impedance and “240.12 Electrical
Other Characteristics: System Coordination:
The overcurrent protective devices, Where an orderly shutdown is
the total impedance, the component required to minimize the hazard(s) to
short-circuit current ratings, and personnel and equipment, a system of
other characteristics of the circuit to coordination based on the following
be protected shall be selected and two conditions shall be permitted:
coordinated to permit the circuit-
protective devices used to clear a fault 1. Coordinated short-circuit protection
to do so without extensive damage
to the electrical components of the 2. Overload indication based on
circuit. This fault shall be assumed monitoring systems or devices.
to be either between two or more of
the circuit conductors or between any FPN:
circuit conductor and the grounding The monitoring system may cause
conductor or enclosing metal raceway. the conditions to go to alarm, allowing
Listed products applied in accordance corrective action or an orderly shutdown,
with their listing shall be considered to thereby minimizing personnel hazard
meet the requirements of this section.” and equipment damage.”
“110.16 Other related articles:
Flash Protection: Switchboards,
panelboards, industrial control panels, 430.32 Continuous-Duty Motors
meter socket enclosures, and motor and 430.52 Rating Or Setting for
control centers that are in other than Individual Motor Circuit.
dwelling occupancies and are likely These code articles outline sizing
to require examination, adjustment, requirements for overcurrent devices
servicing, or maintenance while when used for the protection of motor
energized shall be field marked to circuits. For more information, consult
warn qualified persons of potential NFPA 70: The National Electrical Code.
electric Arc-Flash hazards. The marking
shall be located so as to be clearly 620.62, 700.12, and 701.18
visible to qualified persons before Refer to selective coordination of
examination, adjustment, servicing, systems that provide emergency
or maintenance of the equipment.” power, signaling systems or elevator
circuits. For more information, consult
“240.2 Definition: Current-Limiting NFPA 70: National Electrical Code (NEC).
Overcurrent Protective Device:
A device that when interrupting
currents in its current-limiting
range, reduces the current flowing
in the faulted circuit to a magnitude
substantially less than that obtainable
in the same circuit if the device were
replaced with a solid conductor
having comparable impedance.”
1-. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 70-2005, National
Electrical Code® Copyright © 2004, National Fire Protection
For more information:
Association, Quincy, MA. This reprinted material is not the complete
and official position of the NFPA on the referenced subject, which is
represented only by the standard in its entirety.
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
62
Annex C
Energized Electrical Work Permit
XYZ CompanY EnErgiZEd ElECtriCal Work pErmit
Section 1 - Work request
(to be completed by person requesting the permit)
Work ordEr no:
loCation: EQUipmEnt:
Start datE: timE: timE rEQUirEd: timE rEQUirEd:
E
dESCription oF taSk:
L
dESCription oF EQUipmEnt:
SYStEm VoltagE:
P
aVailaBlE FaUlt CUrrEnt:
M
Section 2 - Justification of Work
(to be completed by Qualified person performing the work)
A
WHY iS taSk BEing pErFormEd in EnErgiZEd Condition?
S
WHat Work praCtiCES Will BE UtiliZEd to inSUrE SaFEtY?
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE SHoCk analYSiS?
limitEd: rEStriCtEd: proHiBitEd:
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE FlaSH HaZard analYSiS?
HaZard riSk inCidEnt FlaSH protECtion
CatEgorY: EnErgY: BoUndarY:
WHat iS tHE rEQUirEd pErSonnEl protECtiVE EQUipmEnt (ppE) For tHiS taSk ?
HARD HAT EAR PROTECTION VOLTAGE RATED GLOVES FR PANTS
SAFETY GLASSES T-SHIRT LEATHER GLOVES FR COVERALL
SAFETY GOGGLES LONG SLEEVE SHIRT COTTON UNDERWEAR FLASH SUIT
FACE SHIELD FR SHIRT LONG PANTS LEATHER SHOES 63
FLASH HOOD
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE SHoCk analYSiS?
limitEd: rEStriCtEd: proHiBitEd:
ANNEX C
WHat WErE tHE rESUltS oF tHE FlaSH HaZard analYSiS?
HaZard riSk inCidEnt FlaSH protECtion
CatEgorY: EnErgY: BoUndarY:
WHat iS tHE rEQUirEd pErSonnEl protECtiVE EQUipmEnt (ppE) For tHiS taSk ?
HARD HAT EAR PROTECTION VOLTAGE RATED GLOVES FR PANTS
SAFETY GLASSES T-SHIRT LEATHER GLOVES FR COVERALL
SAFETY GOGGLES LONG SLEEVE SHIRT COTTON UNDERWEAR FLASH SUIT
FACE SHIELD FR SHIRT LONG PANTS LEATHER SHOES
FLASH HOOD
E
HOW WILL ACCESS TO THE WORK AREA BE RESTRICTED FROM UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL?
L
HAS A JOB BRIEFING BEEN COMPLETED?
P
WHAT EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE?
M
WERE THERE ANY JOB SPECIFIC HAZARDS?
A
IN YOUR OPINION, CAN THIS JOB BE COMPLETED SAFELY? YES NO
S
Signature of Qualified Person Date
Signature of Qualified Person Date
Section 3 - Approval to Perform Work on Energized Equipment
(To be completed by Management)
IS WORK ON ENERGIZED EQUIPMENT APPROVED?
Signature of Manufacturing Manager Date
Signature of Plant Manager Date
Signature of Safety Manager Date
Signature of Electrical Maintenance Manager Date
Signature of Qualified Person Date
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
64
Annex D
Arc-Flash Calculation Steps
For Example on Page 36
Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations: Step 6:
Calculate the Incident Energy at 18 inches
Example 1 working distance using the NFPA 70E
With Littelfuse Class L 2500 Amp fuses formula for “Arc-in-a-box” [ref. NFPA 70E
Annex D 6.2(a)], where DB =18; ta = 0.01; and
Step 1: F = 43.7
Review the up-to-date one line drawing EMB = 1038.7 DB-1.4738 ta[0.0093F 2 -0.3453F+5.9675]
for information about the available EMB = 1038.7 x (18)-1.4738 x (.01) x [0.0093(43.7)2 –
short circuit current and other details – 0.3453(43.7) +5.9675]
about the location of the equipment. EMB = 1.27 cal/cm2
Step 2: Step 7:
The one line drawing states that the 2000 Determine the Hazard Risk Category
kVA transformer has a 4160V primary and with Littelfuse 2500 Amp Class L fuse.
480V secondary with 5.5% impedance. Since the Incident Energy is 1.27 cal/cm2
at 18 inches, NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(11)
Step 3: defines the minimum Arc Rating of PPE up
Determine the MVAbf of the transformer. to 4 cal/cm2 as Hazard Risk Category 1.
Since 2000kVA is 2 MVA, the
MVAbf = MVA x 100 / %Z =
= 2 x 100 / 5.5 = 36.4 MVA. Example 2
With 2500 Amp Low Voltage Power
Step 4: Circuit Breaker
Determine the clearing time of the
2500 Amp Class L fuse at the fault current. Step 1:
The maximum three phase bolted fault Determine the clearing time of the circuit
current at the transformer secondary is breaker at the fault level.
given by the formula, I sc = (MVA x 10 6 x 100) Since the Isc = 43,738 Amps, consulting
/ 3 x 480 x 5.5 = 43,738 Amps = 43.7 kA. the time current curve for the Circuit
Referring to the time current curve for the Breaker shows the clearing time
Littelfuse 2500 Amp Class L fuse, the clearing “t” is 5 cycles = 0.083 second.
time at 43,738 Amps is 0.01 second = ta.
Step 2:
Step 5: Determine the Flash Protection Boundary
Determine the Flash Protection Boundary (FPB) using the formula in NFPA 70E
(FPB) using the formula in NFPA 70E Article Article 130.3(A).
130.3(A). Since MVAbf = 36.4 and t = 0.083 sec.,
Since MVAbf = 36.4 and t = 0.01 sec., Dc = [2.65 x MVAbf x t] ½
Dc = [2.65 x MVAbf x t]½ D c = [2.65 x 36.4 x .083]½ = 2.83 ft. (34 inches)
Dc = [2.65 x 36.4 x 0.01]½ = 0.98 ft. (~12 inches)
65
ANNEX D
Step 3:
Determine the Incident Energy at 18 inches
working distance with the Circuit Breaker.
Since ta = 0.083 and Isc = 43,738 = 43.7 kA = F,
EMB = 1038.7 DB-1.4738 ta[0.0093F 2-0.3453F+5.9675]
EMB = 1038.7 x (18)-1.4738 x (0.083) x [0.0093(43.7)2 –
– 0.3453(43.7) + 5.9675]
EMB = 10.54 cal/cm2
Step 4:
Determine the Hazard Risk Category. Since
the Incident Energy is 10.54 cal/cm2 at 18
inches and NFPA Table 130.7(C)(11) defines the
minimum Arc Rating of PPE up to 25
cal/cm2 as Hazard Risk Category 3.
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
66
Annex E
Arc Flash Calculator Tables
The following Arc-Flash Calculator tables 3) Consult the table and determine the
are based on published data in IEEE 1584 Incident Energy, Hazard Risk Category,
“Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard and Flash Protection Boundary.
Calculations”. It is meant to serve as a guide
only for determining the incident energy level 4) Select the appropriate PPE outlined in
at specific points of an electrical system. The NFPA 70E that meets the determined
purpose of a Flash Hazard Analysis is to Hazard Risk Category and Incident Energy.
determine a worker’s potential exposure to
Arc-Flash energy in order to minimize injury and Arc-Flash Calculator Table Notes
determine safe work practices and appropriate
• Even when the Hazard Risk Category
levels of PPE. Prior to using these tables,
is zero, workers should wear FR cloth-
users must know and understand the steps
ing to protect against unrecognized
required to perform a Flash Hazard Analysis.
hazards. NFPA 70E Annex H provides a
simplified approach to everyday clothing
for workers in diverse environments.
The Arc-Flash Calculator tables may be used
for systems rated 600 volts and below. The
incident energy calculations are based on
• PPE may have higher ratings than required
for the Hazard Risk Category.
data and equations in IEEE 1584 for 600V
Class RK1 and Class L fuses and 600V
circuit breakers. Incident energy for 600V • The standards and regulations establish mini-
Class J, Class T, and Class CC fuses may mum requirements for improving safety. The
also be determined by using these tables. incident energy levels used in these tables
were determined under specified test condi-
tions used in IEEE 1584. The recommended
How to use the Arc-Flash Calculator Tables: level of PPE is the minimum recommended
to reduce injury from burns that could occur
1) Calculate the available 3-phase bolted from an arcing fault. These minimums may
fault current available at every point in not be adequate, and it may be necessary to
the electrical system where workers may use PPE with higher ratings than calculated.
be exposed to energized components.
• Refer to NFPA 70E Table 130.7 (C)(10)
2) Determine the ampere rating of the Protective Clothing and PPE Matrix to
overcurrent protective device (fuse or determine specific PPE requirements.
circuit breaker) to be used to protect the
equipment where work is to be performed. • For more information on performing a
If ratings are not shown in calculator Flash Hazard Analysis, refer to NFPA 70E
tables, select the next largest rating. or IEEE 1584.
67
ANNEX E
Fault 1-100 101-200 201-400 401-600 601-800 801-1200 1201-1600 1601-2000
Current kA Amperes Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse Fuse
Fuse Rating 1
I.E.
FPB
2.39
30
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
Amperes HRC
I.E.
1
0.25
X
5.19
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
X
>100
2 FPB 6 54 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
(Calories/cm² at HRC 0 2 X X X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 20.59 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
18” and Hazard 4 FPB
HRC
6
0
6
0
>120
3
>120
X
>120
X
>120
X
>120
X
>120
X
Risk Category) 6
I.E.
FPB
0.25
6
0.25
6
0.75
18
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
>100
>120
HRC 0 0 0 X X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.69 36.84 >100 >100 >100 >100
8 FPB 6 6 12 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 4 X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.63 12.81 75.42 >100 >100 >100
10 FPB 6 6 12 96 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 3 X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.57 6.71 49.64 73.57 >100 >100
12 FPB 6 6 12 60 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 2 X X X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.51 0.60 23.85 39.84 >100 >100
14 FPB 6 6 12 12 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 3 4 X X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.45 0.58 1.94 11.14 24.95 >100
16 FPB 6 6 12 12 30 84 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.39 0.48 1.82 10.75 24.56 >100
18 FPB 6 6 12 12 24 84 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.38 1.70 10.36 24.19 >100
20 FPB 6 6 12 12 24 78 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.28 1.58 9.98 23.82 >100
22 FPB 6 6 6 6 24 78 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 X
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.46 8.87 23.44 29.17
24 FPB 6 6 6 6 24 72 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.34 7.52 23.07 28.91
26 FPB 6 6 6 6 24 60 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.22 6.28 22.70 28.65
28 FPB 6 6 6 6 18 60 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.01 5.16 22.33 28.40
30 FPB 6 6 6 6 18 54 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.80 2.84 17.03 27.75
35 FPB 6 6 6 6 18 36 114 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.49 1.25 9.28 27.11
40 FPB 6 6 6 6 12 18 78 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 26.47
45 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 25.83
50 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 25.19
55 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 24.55
60 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
For more information: I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.94 23.90
65 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
800-TEC-FUSE
HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
I.E. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.39 2.67 21.67
70 FPB 6 6 6 6 6 12 36 >120
www.littelfuse.com HRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
I.E. = Incident Energy (cal/cm )
2
FPB = Flash Protection Boundary (in.)
68 HRC = Hazard Risk Category X = Exceeds NFPA 70E
Fault 1-100 101-200 201-400 401-600 601-800 801-1200 1201-1600 1601-2000
Current kA Amperes CB CB CB CB CB CB CB CB
I.E. >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
1 FPB >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC X X X X X X X X
I.E. 0.17 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
2 FPB 6 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 X X X X X X X
I.E. 0.33 0.33 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
4 FPB 6 6 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 X X X X X X
I.E. 0.50 0.50 0.50 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
6 FPB 12 12 12 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 X X X X X
I.E. 0.66 0.66 0.66 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
8 FPB 12 12 12 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 X X X X X
I.E. 0.82 0.82 0.82 >100 20.01 >100 >100 >100
10 FPB 18 18 18 >120 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 X 3 X X X
I.E. 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.67 24.00 >100 >100 >100
12 FPB 18 18 18 24 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 0 0 0 1 3 X X X
I.E. 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.94 27.45 >100 >100 >100
14 FPB 18 18 18 30 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC
I.E.
0
1.29
0
1.29
0
1.29
1
2.21
4
31.62
X
31.62
X
>100
X
>100
Circuit Breaker
16 FPB 24 24 24 30 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 4 4 X X Rating Amperes
I.E. 1.45 1.45 1.45 2.48 35.46 35.46 >100 >100
18 FPB 24 24 24 30 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC
I.E.
1
1.60
1
1.60
1
1.60
1
2.74
4
39.29
4
39.29
X
39.29
X
>100
(Calories/cm² at
20 FPB 24 24 24 36 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 X 18” and Hazard
I.E. 1.76 1.76 1.76 3.01 43.10 43.10 43.10 >100
22 FPB 24 24 24 36 >120 >120 >120 >120 Risk Category)
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 1.91 1.91 1.91 3.28 46.91 46.91 46.91 >100
24 FPB 30 30 30 36 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 2.07 2.07 2.07 3.54 50.71 50.71 50.71 50.71
26 FPB 30 30 30 42 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 2.22 2.22 2.22 3.81 54.50 54.50 54.50 54.50
28 FPB 30 30 30 42 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 2.38 2.38 2.38 4.07 58.28 58.28 58.29 58.29
30 FPB 30 30 30 42 18 54 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 2.76 2.76 2.76 4.73 67.72 67.72 67.72 67.72
35 FPB 36 36 36 48 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 1 X X X X
I.E. 3.14 3.14 3.14 5.39 77.11 77.11 77.11 77.11
40 FPB 36 36 36 54 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 3.53 3.53 3.53 6.04 86.47 86.47 86.47 86.47
45 FPB 42 42 42 54 >120 >120 >1 20 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 3.91 3.91 3.91 6.69 95.81 95.81 95.81 95.81
50 FPB 42 42 42 60 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 4.29 4.29 4.29 7.34 >100 >100 >100 >100
55 FPB 48 48 48 60 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 4.66 4.66 4.66 7.99 >100 >100 >100 >100
60 FPB 48 48 48 66 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 1 1 1 2 X X X X
I.E. 5.04 5.04 5.04 8.64 >100 >100 >100 >100
65 FPB 48 48 48 72 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 2 2 2 3 X X X X
I.E. 5.42 5.42 5.42 9.28 >100 >100 >100 >100
70 FPB 54 54 54 78 >120 >120 >120 >120
HRC 2 2 2 3 X X X X
I.E. = Incident Energy (cal/cm2) FPB = Flash Protection Boundary (in.)
HRC = Hazard Risk Category X = Exceeds NFPA 70E 69
ANNEX E
Arc-Flash Calculator Table Example Example #2:
Determine the Incident Energy (I.E.), Flash
Example #1: Protection Boundary (FPB), and Hazard Risk
Determine the Incident Energy (I.E.), Flash Category (HRC) for equipment supplied by a
Protection Boundary (FPB), and Hazard Risk 600V 400A main circuit breaker panelboard.
Category (HRC) for equipment supplied by a
600V 400A fusible safety switch. Step 1:
Review the up-to-date one line drawing
Step 1: for information about the available
Review the up-to-date one line drawing short circuit current and other details
for information about the available about the panelboard location.
short circuit current and other details
about the safety switch location. Step 2:
The one line diagram shows that
Step 2: 26 kA is available at the terminals
Assume the one line diagram shows that 26 kA of the panelboard and it has a 400 A
is available at the terminals of the switch and main molded case circuit breaker.
the switch has 400A Class RK1 fuses installed.
Step 3:
Step 3: Using the Circuit Breaker Calculator Table from a
Using the Fuse Calculator Table from a preceding preceding page, determine the incident energy
page, determine the incident energy of 0.25 of 2.07 cal/cm², Flash Protection Boundary of
cal/cm², Flash Protection Boundary of 6 inches, 30 inches, and a Hazard Risk Category of 1 for
and a Hazard Risk Category of 0 for a 400A Class a 400A circuit breaker when 26kA is available.
RK1 current-limiting fuse when 26kA is available.
Step 4:
Step 4: Using NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(10-11),
Using NFPA 70E Tables 130.7(C)(10-11), determine the required level of PPE needed
determine the required level of PPE needed for work in Hazard Risk Category 1.
for work in Hazard Risk Category 0.
Example Comparison
The table below illustrates the
difference between the fuse and
circuit breaker for this example:
DATA COMPARISON Class RK1 Fuse Circuit Breaker
Incident Energy (cal/cm2) 0.25 2.07
Flash Protection Boundary 6” 30”
Hazard Risk Category 0 1
For more information:
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com
70
Annex F
Resources for Electrical Safety
OSHA The federal OSHA program is operated under
Occupational Safety and Health Administration a multi-million dollar budget with a staff of
U.S. Department of Labor over 2200 people. Inspectors, which comprise
Washington D.C. 20210 more than 50 percent of OSHA’s workforce,
www.osha.gov conduct several thousand inspections every
year. Fines are often levied for violations
found during inspections. In addition to the
federal program, twenty-five states operate
their own OSHA programs that are supported
by a staff of 2600 people including over 1200
inspectors.
NFPA Founded in 1896, the National Fire Protection
National Fire Protection Association Association (NFPA) was originally formed to
1 Batterymarch Park, PO Box 9101 standardize the installation of fire sprinklers.
Quincy, MA 02269-9101 This nonprofit organization also operates on
Ph. 800-344-3555 a multi-million dollar budget and is support-
www.nfpa.org ed by a staff of several hundred people.
Although the NFPA has no power to enforce
its standards and codes, many governmental
agencies on the local and national level have
adopted the NFPA’s standards and codes and
in essence, have made them into law.
IEEE The Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) was officially named
445 Hoes Lane in 1963, but its predecessors, the AIEE
PO Box 1331 (American Institute of Electrical Engineers)
Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331 and the IRE (Institute of Radio Engineers),
Ph. 800-678-IEEE date back to 1884. Just as its name indicates,
www.ieee.org the IEEE is an association of electrical and
electronic engineers organized to advance the
theory and application of electro-technology
and allied sciences.
71
ANNEX F
UL Underwriters Laboratories (formerly the
Underwriters Laboratories Underwriters Electrical Bureau) originally was
333 Pfingsten Road founded in 1894. Underwriters Laboratories
Northbrook, IL 60062 Inc. (UL) is an independent, not-for-profit
Ph. 847-272-8400 product-safety testing and certification
www.ul.com organization that tests and certifies products
for public safety.
NEMA The National Electrical Manufacturers
National Electrical Manufacturers Association Association (NEMA) was formed in 1926.
15 Inverness Way East NEMA works closely with ANSI (American
Englewood, CO 80112-5776 National Standards Institute) and IEC
Ph. 800-854-7179 (International Electrotechnical Committee)
www.nema.org and is an advocacy group to UL and
governmental agencies.
ANSI The American National Standards Institute
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) was founded in 1918. ANSI is a pri-
11 W. 42nd Street vate, non-profit organization that administers
New York, NY 10036 and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standard-
Ph. 212-642-8908 ization and conformity assessment system.
www.ansi.org
ASTM ASTM International, formerly known as the
ASTM International American Society for Testing and Materials
100 Barr Harbor Drive (ASTM) is a voluntary standards development
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959 organization that was founded in 1898. ASTM
Ph. 610-832-9585 International is primarily involved with estab-
www.ASTM.org lishing standards for materials used in manu-
facturing and methods of testing and analysis.
NIOSH The Occupational Safety and Health Act of
National Institute for Occupational Safety 1970 created NIOSH along with OSHA. NIOSH
and Health is part of the U.S. Department of Health
Hubert H. Humphrey Bldg. and Human Services Agency and provides
200 Independence Ave., SW research, education, training, and information
Room 715H to insure safe and healthful workplaces.
Washington, DC 20201
Ph. 202-401-6997
www.cdc.gov/niosh
NSC The National Safety Council (NSC) was
National Safety Council founded in 1913. Their mission is essentially
For more information: 1121 Spring Lake Drive to educate and influence people to adopt
Itasca, IL 60143 safety policies and practices. It is a nonprofit,
800-TEC-FUSE Ph. 800-845-4NSC
www.nsc.org
nongovernmental organization.
www.littelfuse.com
72
Annex G
References
Cadick, John, Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, and Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Dennis Neitzel. Electrical Safety Handbook, Inc. New York, NY. September 2002
Second Edition. McGraw-Hill, Inc. 2000
Lee, R., The other electrical hazard: electrical arc
“George Westinghouse, Thomas Edison & blast burns, IEEE Transactions on
the Battle of the Currents” Electrical IndustryApplications, vol 1A-18. No. 3, May/
Apparatus, October 2003. June 1982.
Doughty, R. L., T.E.Neal, and H.L.Floyd, Mastrullo, Kenneth G., Jones, Ray A., Jones, Jane
Predicting Incident Energy to Better G., The Electrical Safety Program Book,
Manage The Electric Arc Hazard on National Fire Protection Association, Inc.,
600 V Power Distribution Systems. Quincy, MA., 2003.
Proc. of the IEEE Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Conference, pp. Modern Physics, Trinklein, Holt, Rinehart
329-346, September 28-30, 1998. and Winston 1990.
Doughty, R. L., et.al, The Use of Low-Voltage National Safety Council, 1121 Spring Lake
Current Limiting Fuses to Reduce Drive, Itasca, IL 60143-3201.
Arc-Flash Energy, IEEE Transactions
on Industry Applications, Vol.36, No. NEMA Standard AB 4-2003, Guidelines for
6, November/December 2000. Inspection and Preventive Maintenance
of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Used in
Essig, Mark, Edison & the Electric Chair, New Commercial and Industrial Applications,
York: Walker Publishing Company, 2003. National Electrical Manufacturers
Association, Rosslyn, VA. 2003.
Gregory, G. D., I. Lyttle, and C.M. Wellman,
Arc-Flash Energy Limitations Using Low- NFPA 70 – National Electrical Code®, Quincy, MA:
Voltage Circuit Breakers. Proc. of the National Fire Protection Association, 2005.
IEEE Petroleum and Chemical Industry
Conference, Industry Applications Society NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in
49th Annual, New Orleans, LA, Sept. 2002. the Workplace, Quincy, MA: National
Fire Protection Association, 2004.
IEEE Standard 493-1997, Recommended Practice
For The Design of Reliable Industrial OSHA Regulations 29 CFR 1910.300-399,
And Commercial Power Systems, The Subpart S, “Electrical” Washington,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics DC: Occupational Safety and Health
Engineers, Inc. New York, NY. 1997. Administration, US Department of Labor.
IEEE 1584, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash
Hazard Calculations, IEEE Industry
Applications Society, The Institute of
73
Annex H
Electrical Safety Quiz
1. OSHA requires employers to perform hazard assessments of their
T F
plants and facilities.
2. Unless it is justifiable, you should always deenergize equipment
T F
before working on it.
3. You must apply lockout/tagout devices in accordance with a
documented and established policy in order to establish an T F
electrically safe work condition.
4. According to NFPA 70E, all circuits must be analyzed for safety. T F
5. Only qualified electricians are allowed to work on energized circuits. T F
6. 1.2 cal/cm² will cause 2nd degree burns to bare skin. T F
7. Only qualified workers are allowed within the Limited
T F
Approach Boundary.
8. Unqualified workers are never allowed within the Restricted
T F
Approach Boundary.
9. Decreasing the opening time of the overcurrent protective device will
T F
decrease Arc-Flash hazards.
10. An Energized Electrical Work Permit is always required when
T F
working on any energized equipment.
11. The NEC® requires Arc-Flash warning labels on all equipment that
T F
may be worked on while energized.
12. NFPA 70E is often thought of as the ‘How-to’ Source for
T F
OSHA compliance.
13. Qualified and unqualified workers can work on or near exposed
T F
energized electrical components.
For more information:
14. Failure to perform regular maintenance on circuit breakers may
T F
result in increased Incident Energy.
800-TEC-FUSE
www.littelfuse.com 15. The use of Current-Limiting fuses can reduce Arc-Flash hazards. T F
For Quiz Answers see page 75.
74
Electrical Safety
Quiz Answers
(from pg 74):
1-T; 2-T; 3-T; 4-F;
5-F; 6-T; 7-F; 8-T;
9-T; 10-F; 11-T; 12-T;
13-F; 14-T; 15-T
This Electrical Safety Handbook was developed for general education herein. Littelfuse will not be liable for any damages of any kind arising from
purposes only and is not intended to replace an electrical safety-training the use of this handbook, including but not limited to direct, indirect, incidental
program or to serve as a sole source of reference. These materials are punitive, and consequential damages. THE MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED
offered as is, Littelfuse, Inc. does not warrant, guarantee or make any “AS IS” WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR
representations regarding the use of these materials or their correctness, IMPLIED. LITTELFUSE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
accuracy, reliability, or applicability. It is the responsibility of the user to comply IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES
with all applicable safety standards, including the requirements of the U.S. OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Fire The information herein is not intended to serve as recommendations or
Protection Association (NFPA), and other appropriate governmental and advice for specific situations. Littelfuse assumes no responsibilities for
industry accepted guidelines, codes, and standards. Littelfuse accepts no errors or omissions, including any errors or omissions such as technical or
legal responsibility for any injury and/or damage to persons or property from other inaccuracies, or typographical errors. Use the information within this
any of the statements, methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained handbook at your own risk. Information is subject to change without notice.
75
Call 800-TEC-FUSE today for assistance with Arc-Flash!
Littelfuse is comitted to your safety. We offer innovative products
and technical expertise to help you make the right choices.
Littelfuse offers a variety of products and services designed to help you increase safety
in your facility, such as:
Current-Limiting Fuses Technical Papers Electrical Designers
Reference (EDR) Software
Fuse Holders and Electrical Safety Literature
Accessories MROplus Fuse Inventory
Electrical Safety Video Analysis
Arc-Flash Calculators
Training Seminars Technical Support &
Warning Labels & Presentations Engineering Services
800 E. Northwest Highway
Des Plaines, IL 60016, USA Specifications, descriptions and illustrative material in
this literature are as accurate as known at the time of
800 TEC-FUSE publication, but are subject to change without notice.
www.littelfuse.com FORM NO. PF339 © 2005, Littelfuse Inc. Printed in U.S.A.
ETAP Arc Flash Analysis
The purpose of this tutorial is to introduce the Arc Flash Analysis module of ETAP and provide
instructions on how to setup Arc Flash (AF) calculations. For this section of the tutorial, you
should select the “Example Project (ANSI)” option when starting the ETAP Demo.
There are two options to perform AF calculations:
• Using the Quick Incident Energy Calculator for a single bus (location)
• Running a Global AF calculation for all Buses (global AF calc)
Using the Quick Incident Energy Calculator at any Bus
This is the simplest way to get some quick AF results and make labels. The following steps show
how to accomplish this:
ETAP Arc Flash has typical equipment gap and X-factors built into the rating page of the
bus. You can take advantage of these typical values to perform a quick Arc Flash
calculation. Open the editor for Bus1 and go to the rating page of the bus and select the
type of equipment that is represented by that bus. This can be enclosed equipment such as
MCC, switchgear, or open-air equipment, i.e., not enclosed in a box. Once you have
selected the equipment type, select typical gap and boundary values by clicking on the
“Typical Data” button. This will bring all the required gap and x-factor information as
well as approach boundaries as defined by NFPA 70E. To change the Arc Flash Analysis
Data and Shock Hazard Analysis Data press the “Data Options” button.
Getting Started - ETAP Arc Flash Analysis 1
© 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Go to the Arc Flash page and select the working distance. This distance is automatically
populated based on the voltage level and type of equipment. The working distance is
defined as the distance from the person’s torso and face to the energized equipment
(typically 18 inches for low voltage equipment). You may also define the system
grounding configuration of the equipment feeder, i.e., transformer grounding / source
grounding like solidly grounded or delta. If you do not know the system grounding,
assuming the system is ungrounded will yield conservative results (default). You can
change the default user-defined system grounding by selecting it from the dropdown list.
ETAP can also be configured to automatically determine the system grounding.
Enter the available User-Defined Bolted Fault Current. If you know how long it will take
the protective device to clear the arc, enter this information in the User-Defined Arc Fault
Clearing Time (FCT).
Select the User-Defined Arc Flash calculation by selecting the User-Defined radio button
and you will get the incident energy, flash protection boundary, and the hazard/risk level
according to NFPA 70E with the version selected previously.
Select the arc flash label template that you want and click on the Print button. A Crystal
Reports viewer window will open with a label that is ready for printing. The bus Arc
Flash page allows you to get Arc Flash results instantly.
Getting Started - ETAP Arc Flash Analysis 2
© 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Setting Up and Running a Global Arc Flash Analysis
The previous section described a simple way to generate quick AF results. However, the bus calculator is
simplified and it is not efficient when you need to run an analysis on hundreds of fault locations. For this
you need to setup the global AF calculation.
The same input data is required if you use the quick incident energy calculator at the bus or if the global
AF calculation is used; however, in ETAP there are quicker and easier ways to define the input data
required by the calculation.
Open the Arc Flash calculation study case and go to the AF Data page. In this page you
can globally define the equipment’s gaps between conductors, working distance, and
other AF parameters to be used by the global AF calculation. This will save you a lot of
time since you would be only required to define the type of equipment represented by
each bus. The following image shows the recommended settings for a global AF
calculation:
The global definitions for each set of input data parameters can be modified or reviewed
by accessing the Project \ Settings \ Arc Flash \ menus as shown below:
Getting Started - ETAP Arc Flash Analysis 3
© 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
It is recommended that you use the options shown in the AF Data page image since they allow the
use of the latest standards with typical values.
On the Info page of the Short Circuit Study Case editor, select the buses to be faulted
through the Info as shown in the Short Circuit leaflet. You can also right-click on the bus
and select Fault or Don’t Fault.
Next select the analysis method from the Short Circuit Study Case Arc Flash page. This
can be either NFPA 70E 2009 or IEEE 1584. The IEEE method is a more accurate model
and is set as default.
The next step requires the selection of the arc fault clearing time (FCT). The default is set
to the automatic determination of the FCT from the Star protective device time current
characteristics (TCC) of the protective devices (PD). In most cases, the most conservative
solution is reached by selecting a TCC only for the main feeder PD since they take a
longer time to operate. If you do not select a TCC for the bus, ETAP will use the user-
defined FCT from the bus Arc Flash page.
The remaining options to be selected can be left as default and are self explanatory. For
example, you can choose to update the global calculation results back to the Arc Flash
page of the bus.
Once this information has been selected from the bus and Short Circuit Arc Fash pages,
all you need to do is to click on the Arc Flash icon on the Short Circuit toolbar to launch
the calculation. The program will provide a full set of reports for all the faulted buses as
well as all the labels for every protective device location and for the faulted buses.
Getting Started - ETAP Arc Flash Analysis 4
© 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Run AF
Calculation
AF Result
Analyzer
The AF calculations can be repeated for all the different configurations in ETAP.
The Scenario and Study Wizards can be used to keep track and repeat the
different calculations as shown in the images below where two different AF
calculations were performed and recorded:
System
Toolbar Scenario Wizard
Study Wizard
Getting Started - ETAP Arc Flash Analysis 5
© 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
The AF calculation results can be viewed using the AF Result Analyzer. This new tool in
ETAP can be launched from the Short Circuit toolbar by clicking on the AF Result
Analyzer icon. The AF Result Analyzer allows you to review results from several studies
for comparison, finding potential problems in the system with ease, and determining
worst case conditions. At the same time labels, work permits, and data sheets can be
generated and printed from here.
Getting Started - ETAP Arc Flash Analysis 6
© 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Part 1 – System Modeling & Studies for Existing Systems
Operation Technology, Inc.
Copyright 2009
Result of rapid release of energy due to
an arcing fault between two conductors.
Bus voltages > 208V
Temperatures as high as 36,000 oF
Thermal Damage(I2t)
Cal/cm2
Current
Time
Current
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Intense Heat
Thermo-acoustic shock wave
Molten metal
Shrapnel
Blinding light
Toxic smoke
Contact with energized components
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Arc Flash prevention is at the forefront:
Greater understanding of arc flash hazards
and the risks they pose to personnel
Increased enforcement on the part of OSHA to
judge whether the employer “acted
reasonably” in protecting its workers from arc
flash hazards
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
IEEE 1584-2002
IEEE 1584a-2004
IEEE 1584b-2009(?) – In Ballot
IEEE 1584.1 – In Progress
IEEE 3002.5 – In Progress
NFPA 70E-2009
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
OSHA regulations were developed to
mandate that employers provide a safe
workplace for their employees
CFR Part 1910 promotes the safety of
employees working on or near electrical
equipment and clearly defines employer
responsibilities
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Equipment must be de-energized before
work is performed unless demonstrated:
De-energizing introduces additional or
increased hazards
Infeasible due to equipment design or
operational limits
Lockout / Tag out (LOTO) procedures
must be used
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
If equipment cannot be de-energized prior
to work:
Employees must be properly protected
Employers are responsible for performing a
hazard assessment
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Arc Flash information needs to be
determined and documented
Protection boundaries established and
appropriate PPE must be provided
Panels and electrical equipment must be
labeled:
Labels are the end product but a number of
prerequisite steps must be followed
Arc flash calculations is one of the steps of the
entire arc flash assessment
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Arc flash calculations should be
performed by or under the direction of a
qualified person with experience in
performing power system studies
including arc flash calculations
Have familiarity with the industry for which
the study is being performed
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Utilize IEEE 1584 – Guide for Performing
Arc Flash Calculations
NFPA 70E table approach is not needed.
Avoid using quick calculators except for
approximate calculations
3-Phase equations can be used for 1-
Phase system with conservative results.
Empirical equations can be used where
IEEE equations do not apply. (>15 kV or <
208 V)
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Scope of study
Field verification and audit
Update one-line diagrams
Software modeling and design
Short-circuit analysis
Protective device coordination
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Scope and level of detail depend upon
complexity of the system:
Simple System – Begin at point of electrical
service. e.g. office buildings, commercial
facilities, small industrial and institutional
systems
Intermediate System – Customer owned
service transformer and/or secondary
selective substation. e.g. mid sized industrial,
institutional and large commercial facilities
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Scope and level of detail depend upon
complexity of the system:
Complex System – System includes nominal
voltage > 600 V, protective relaying, network
systems, customer owned primary substation,
customer owned generation for prime power.
e.g. large industrial complexes, campus type
systems with multiple modes of operations
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Encompass all equipment from customer
owned service entrance down through
major equipment rated 208V nominal
Equipment rated < 240 V served by
transformer rated <= 125 kVA may be
excluded
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Most critical step for all system studies
Become familiar with plant layout, equipment and
maintenance procedures
Walk-downs to validate drawings and access
equipment condition
Start with most recent / accurate one-line diagram.
Highlight or mark-off each piece of equipment on the
one-line:
▪ Connectivity
▪ Cable/Line lengths
▪ Nameplate ratings
▪ Protective device locations and settings
Work with electricians to gather and document data
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Take pictures during field verification
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Generate / update worksheets with
protective device information & settings.
What is missing in this settings sheet?
50/51 CO SUB 8 TIME O.C. TAP:6 T.D.:9 INST 180 A. ABB 1200/5
50/51 CO SUB 8 TIME O.C. TAP:6 T.D.:9 INST: 180 A. ABB 1200/5
50/51 CO SUB 8 TIME O.C. TAP:6 T.D.:9 INST: 180 A. ABB 1200/5
Curve Type
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Validate main feeder lengths
Issue mark-ups to update CAD drawings as
needed
Wear PPE based on NFPA tables when
collecting data for equipment with no labels
At higher voltages rely on HV qualified
electricians to collect data
Equipment ID’s in the electrical model must
match the system device ID / tag number
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Equipment Count (From Client) Count (After Field Verification)
Bus 337 339
Cable 608 1292
HVCB 76 84
LVCB 451 1205
Contactor 485 1169
Fuse 219 220
Induction Motor 461 1143
OCR 466 474
CT 413 424
Above example shows missing equipment added to existing
model after field verification such as LV motors > 50 HP and
load equipment feeders
Data collection must have high precision for arc flash studies
for higher accuracy
Other studies like short circuit may not need high precision
data collection since they tend to be on the conservative side
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Utility Normal, Max and Min SC Rating
Contact utility for most recent values
Max and Min SC rating for Coordination
Working Distances
IEEE 1584 –Table 3, however alternate working
distances to be used as applicable.
Equipment Type and Condition
MCC, Switchgear, etc. (Isolated / Not Isolated)
Evaluate age, condition and maintenance history
Poorly maintained equipment may not operate
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
BREAKER BREAKER FRAME TRIP TRIP SENSOR LONG SHORT
PLUG # In RATING
LTPU STPU INST. NOTES & REMARKS LAST CAL
IDENTIFICATION TYPE SIZE UNIT UNIT# DELAY DELAY
CH DSII- DIGITRIP
MAIN 480V SWGR 3200 3000A 3200A 3200A 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 DIS
632 RMS 510
10/12/2006
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
When relay, circuit breaker and fuse data not
available – no assumption should be made to
their type, style, setting or clearing time.
Arc Flash analysis should not be performed
on downstream devices with assumed data.
If you must provide result, select the further
upstream device that has known data and
calculate results based on that device.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Fuse considered to clear
the fault since CB22
information unavailable.
In this case, arc fault
clearing PD is user-
defined as fuse
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Short circuit model provides accurate
representation of system Z.
Arc flash study should be based on up-to-
date short circuit study that reflects
existing conditions, system configurations
and operating scenarios.
Maximum fault levels calculated.
Identify device duty problems prior to
proceeding with arc flash calculations.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
System representation should include
accurate momentary, interrupting and
steady state fault currents.
Neglecting steady state currents may give
inaccurate picture of how devices will operate.
This becomes an important factor for systems
with generation.
Incident energy decay is directly proportional
to decay in short circuit current.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
½ Cycle Method
Fault Current Decay Method
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Existing device ratings and settings must be
field verified
Identify any mis-coordination based on
bolted fault
Include protection schemes utilized in the
system such as differential and directional
relays
Plot arcing current to compare against device
ST and INST settings
LV Arcing Fault ~ 38% of Bolted Fault
MV Arcing Fault ~ 90% of Bolted Fault
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Ensure that downstream device (breakers
/ fuses) clear the short circuit fault.
For selective coordination, sufficient time
separation between devices must be
maintained.
Consider relay calibration state and age
when determining operating time.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Latest relay test reports
Advanced Relay Test & Transient
Simulator Click here for more details
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Prefault Voltage = System Nominal kV
Faulted buses include SWGR, MCC,
Panelboards, etc.
Consider decaying and non-decaying fault
currents
Include motor equipment cables and
overload heaters
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Consider various utility MVAsc
Consider combinations of secondary
selective tie breaker open / close
Consider combinations of sources in and
out of service
Determine Arc Thermal Performance
Value (ATPV) / EBT rating for equipment
(cal/cm2)
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Panelboard / MCC / Switchboard
Typically main source PD may not be isolated
Evaluation of equipment must be made
More conservative results may be needed i.e.
use next upstream protective device to
determine results
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
MCC Main
Breaker not
isolated
Bolted Fault
Coordination Using
upstream PD
Fuse 4
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
IEEE 1584 tests showed one case of
sustained arc at 208 V (> 10 kA with 12.7
mm gap) in enclosure without barrier.
Phase conductors with open tips
Real-world equipment has insulating barriers
Effect of Insulating Barriers in Arc Flash
Testing (Sept 2008)
Self sustaining arcs possible at 208V with 12.7
mm gap with 4.5 kA
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Compare all cases to determine worst
case arc flash incident energy
Utilize ETAP arc flash result analyzer to
determine worst case.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Executive Summary
Scope and summary of major findings
Findings and recommendations
Short circuit analysis
Coordination study
Arc flash study
Tabulate results listing equipment arc flash energy
Bolted fault current, arcing fault current, identify
tripping device and clearing time, working distance,
arc flash protection boundary, incident energy,
hazard/risk category
Arc flash labels
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
De-energize whenever possible
Reduce total amp-cycles of the arcing fault (I2t)
Overcurrent device setting changes
Fuse size/type changes
Addition of new overcurrent protection for better
selectivity
Maintenance mode switch
Zone selective interlocking
Retrofitting breakers with new trip units
Arc flash light detecting circuit breakers / relays (fiber
optics)
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Increase working distance
Hot sticks
Robotic racking systems
Remote racking systems
Reduce arc flash exposure
Arc resistant gear
Infrared (IR) windows
Insulated buses
Partial discharge systems
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Custom arc flash label
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Next Southern California
User Group Meeting
March 23, 2010
Part 2
Arc Flash Mitigation & Safety Program
Copyright 2009 Operation Technology, Inc.
Arc Flash Hazard Risk Assessment
DYMAX Service, LLC
A RESA Power Company
250 Prairie Center Drive, Suite 300
Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Arc Flash Overview
An Arc Flash is an electrical explosion due to a fault condition or short circuit when either a
phase to ground or phase to phase conductor is connected and current flows through the air.
Arc Flashes cause electrical equipment to explode, resulting in an arc-plasma fireball.
Temperatures may exceed 35,000° F (the surface of the sun is 9,000° F). These high
temperatures cause rapid heating of surrounding air and extreme pressures, resulting in an arc
blast. The Arc Flash / Blast will likely vaporize all solid copper conductors which will expand
up to 67,000 times its original volume when it is vaporized. The Arc Flash / Blast produces fire,
intense light, pressure waves and flying shrapnel.
When an Arc Flash happens, it does so without warning and is lightning quick. The result of this
violent event is usually destruction of the equipment involved, fire, and severe injury or death to
any nearby people. Proper safety and protection measures must be taken to limit the damage
from an Arc Flash, which include; conducting an Arc Flash Incident Energy Analysis, Short
Circuit Study, Protective Device Coordination Study, Equipment Maintenance, and NFPA 70E
required Electrical Safety Training.
Why an Arc Flash Happens
There are a variety of reasons why an Arc Flash can occur, but most of them are human error and
preventable. Many Arc Flashes happen when maintenance workers are manipulating live
equipment for testing or repair and accidentally cause a fault or short circuit. Improper tools,
improper electrical equipment, corrosion of equipment, improper work techniques and lack of
electrical safety training are just some of the events that can lead to a devastating Arc Flash or
Arc Blast.
Arc faults are generally limited to systems where the bus voltage is in excess of 120 Volts.
Lower voltage levels normally will not sustain an arc. An arc fault is similar to the arc obtained
during electric welding and the fault has to be manually started by something creating the path of
conduction or a failure such as a breakdown in insulation
The arc fault current is usually much less than the available bolted fault current and below the
rating of circuit breakers. Unless these devices have been selected to handle the arc fault
condition, they will not trip and the full force of an Arc Flash will occur. The electrical equation
for energy is volts x current x time. The transition from arc fault to Arc Flash takes a finite time,
increasing in intensity as the pressure wave develops. The challenge is to sense the arc fault
current and shut off the voltage in a timely manner before it develops into a serious Arc Flash
condition.
2 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Arc Flash Compliance
OSHA mandates that employers identify electrical hazards, warn employees about the hazards
and provide them proper protection and training regarding the hazards. Compliance with OSHA
is mandatory for all US companies. While OSHA tells you "what to do" for Arc Flash, they don't
tell you “how to do it”. The role of NFPA 70E, IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70 (NEC) is to provide
guidance on "how" to properly implement the OSHA regulations.
The regulations that govern Arc Flash are:
1. OSHA Standards 29-CFR, Part 1910. Occupational Safety and Health Standards. 1910
sub part S (electrical) Standard number 1910.333 specifically addresses Standards for
Work Practices and references NFPA 70E. OSHA 29CFR 1910.335 (a) (1)(i) requires
the use of protective equipment when working where a potential electrical hazard exists
and 29CFR 1910.132(d)(1) which requires the employer assess the workplace for hazards
and the need for personal protective equipment.
2. NFPA 70E provides guidance on implementing appropriate work practices that are
required to safeguard workers from injury while working on or near exposed electrical
conductors or circuit parts that could become energized. Article 130.5 Arc Flash Risk
Assessment – requires an Arc Flash Risk Assessment be performed to determine if an Arc
Flash Hazard exists, determine the level of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) that a
worker must use, determine the Arc Flash Boundary, and determine the appropriate
safety-related work practices required. Each panel must be marked with an ANSI z535
approved Arc Flash Hazard Warning Label.
3. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 70 - “The National Electrical
Code” (NEC) contains requirements for warning labels, including ANSI compliance.
4. The Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers (IEEE) 1584 – Provides the Guide to
Performing Arc Flash Hazard Study Calculations.
Arc Flash Risk Assessment / Incident Energy Analysis
An Arc Flash Risk Assessment / Incident Energy Analysis is a calculation performed by a
Licensed Professional Engineer to determine the incident energy found at each location which
determines the Arc Flash Boundaries and what Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) must be
used by the employee. As part of the study, the engineer should also provide recommendations
to reduce the incident energy exposure. An Arc Flash Risk Assessment / Incident Energy
Analysis should only be performed by experienced and qualified licensed electrical engineers
familiar with power quality, short circuit studies, NFPA 70E, and IEEE 1584.
3 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
What are the Qualifications to Conduct Arc Flash Studies?
Let’s begin with state law. The practice of engineering is governed and regulated in all 50 states
and the District of Columbia. The language and specifics are somewhat different depending on
state law and board rules. It is unlawful to practice engineering or use the title of “Engineer”
unless an individual is authorized by the state board that governs the practice. In most states it is
also unlawful to practice engineering unless the “firm” offering these engineering services is also
registered with the state Engineering Licensing Board.
The “practice of engineering” is defined differently among states. In most states any engineering
analysis (…In order to safeguard life, health, and property, and to promote the public welfare,
any person in either public or private capacity practicing, or offering to practice, …,
professional engineering, …either as an individual, a copartner, or as agent of another, shall be
licensed.) must be performed by a Licensed Professional Engineer (PE). Arc Flash Hazard
Analysis, Fault Current Calculations, and Protective Device Coordination Studies are clearly
engineering analysis by any recognized standard or rule. It is also required by most states that the
PE be a full-time employee and Principal of the firm to be recognized as the “responsible
engineer in charge.”
It is not adequate for an engineer to only to be licensed in their state of residence. A Professional
Engineering License must be active in each state where a facility is located having an
engineering study or Arc Flash Hazard Risk Assessment performed.
Customers seeking an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis need to ensure the engineering services offered
will be performed by a Licensed Professional Engineer and that the engineering firm is registered
in the state where services are provided. Anyone offering engineering services without proper
licensing is violating engineering ethics and may be in violation of state law, subject to fines and
discipline by the state licensing board.
State professional licensing boards license individuals, not companies. Most states require
companies offering engineering services to have: 1) Individual(s) licensed as Professional
Engineer(s) in each state work is offered, or performed. And, 2) The Company offering or
performing engineering services must be registered with the state engineering board.
RESA Power (or DYMAX Services) currently has full-time individuals holding active
engineering licenses in the following (27) states (additional states will be added as needed):
Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
4 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Arc Flash Labeling
The NEC® and NFPA 70E require labeling of equipment to warn of potential Arc Flash
Hazards. Each panel must be marked with an ANSI approved Arc Flash Hazard Warning Label
to warn and instruct workers of the Arc Flash Hazard containing the following information:
(1) Nominal System Voltage
(2) Arc Flash Boundary
(3) At least one of the following:
a. Available incident energy and corresponding working distance, OR
b. The Arc Flash PPE category in Table 130.7(C)(15)(A)(b) or Table
130.7(C)(15)(B) fort the equipment, but not both.
c. Minimum arc rating of clothing
d. Site-specific level of PPE
Note: Where a review of the Arc Flash Hazard Assessment identifies a change that renders the label inaccurate,
the label shall be updated.
Examples of ANSI Z545 Compliant Arc Flash labels
5 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
6 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Arc Flash Awareness / Electrical Safety Training
Arc Flash Hazard & Electrical Safety Training are based on requirements by OSHA and NFPA
70E standards for worker protection. In addition to required core Electrical Safety Training and
emergency response training, the required employee Arc Flash Training teaches qualified and
unqualified persons subject to Arc Flash Hazards how to recognize the hazards, avoid accidents,
read the Arc Flash Hazard Labels and to use and care for Personal Protective Equipment and
other protection devices. There are also requirements for maintaining training documentation.
Although the NFPA standard only mentions employees as needing training, Arc Flash Safety
Training should be provided to anyone else who may be exposed to an Arc Flash Hazard,
including vendors, contractors, or anyone else who may come in contact or close proximity to
potentially hazardous electrical equipment.
Electrical Safety Awareness Training delivered by RESA Power (DYMAX Service)
professionals can make your facility a safer place to work. DYMAX training helps ensure that
you meet the 2015 NFPA 70E® Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, including the
requirements that employees are retrained every three years and that employers provide
confirmation of this training. We deliver training that improves employees' electrical safety
awareness and practices. All of our training content is augmented by our trainers' years of real-
world field experience.
Our classes are designed to give your qualified employees the knowledge they need about the
latest changes to safe work practices and other tasks related to prevention of Arc Flash Hazards
and mitigation of Arc Flash Incidents, including:
• Release of victims from exposed energized equipment
• Working within the Arc Flash Boundary and Limited Approach Boundary
• Audits of Electrical Safety Programs and implementation of corrective measures
• Determining Arc Flash Analysis needs for three-phase systems
• Employee responsibility for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
• Equipment labeling requirements
Our updated training covers all of the critical elements of the Standards, including sections 110,
130 and 340. RESA Power (DYMAX Service) Electrical Safety Training helps you to use and
understand NFPA 70E, 2015 edition and its relation to the NEC section 110.16 and OSHA
section 1910.269 (iii) (2) Training (ii) Qualified employees (C) & (D).
7 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Process For Completing Arc Flash Hazard Analysis
Step 1: Data Collection -
Qualified RESA personnel conduct a site survey to gather data from all applicable electrical
equipment including:
a. Utility Source; transformer size, impedance, voltages, utility available short circuit.
b. All Fuses and Circuit Breakers; manufacturer, model, type, size, settings.
c. Cables; size, length, conductor material, conduit type.
d. Motors; horsepower rating.
e. Transformers; pri/sec voltage, impedance, size, configuration.
Step 2: Power Systems Modeling -
Site specific information is developed into ‘active’ one-line diagrams using digital computer
software. These detailed models will be used for all analysis and calculations.
Step 3: Short Circuit Analysis -
Is required to determine the magnitude of current flowing throughout the power system at critical
points at various time intervals after a ‘fault’ occurs. These calculations are used to determine the
bolted fault current, which is essential for the calculation of incident energy and interrupting
ratings of equipment. Comparison of equipment ratings with calculated available fault current
and operating conditions will identify underrated equipment. We conduct these calculations in
accordance with ANSI Std. C37 and IEEE Std. 141-1993 (Red Book)
Step 4: Protective Device Coordination -
Is performed to ensure selection and arrangement of protective devices limits the effects of an
over-current situation to the smallest area. We perform this study in accordance with IEEE Std.
242-2001 (Buff Book)
Step 5: Arc Flash Calculations -
Are based on available short circuit current, protective device clearing time and distance from
the arc. Calculations of incident energy levels and flash protection boundaries are completed for
all relevant equipment locations. The magnitude of arc hazards are determined using the
‘Incident Energy Analysis Method’, per NFPA 70E-2015, IEEE Std. 1584 or NESC Tables.
Step 6: Reporting -
Upon completion of the calculations we prepare an Arc Flash Hazard Analysis Report and full
size one-line drawings. The report will be certified by our Licensed Engineer (PE).
Step 7: Label Installation -
Arc Flash Warning Labels are generated and installed by RESA personnel. Labels are compliant
with NFPA 70E, NFPA 70 (NEC), and ANSI Z535.
8 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Power System Engineering Studies
Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis Studies… (Requires PE Certification)
calculate arc-flash incident energy levels and flash protection boundary distances based on the
results of the short-circuit and coordination studies. The magnitude of arc hazards are
determined using the ‘Incident Energy Analysis Method’, per NFPA 70E-2015, IEEE Std.
1584 or NESC Tables.
Short Circuit (Available Fault Current) Studies… (Requires PE Certification)
calculate the magnitude of current flowing throughout the power system at critical points at
various time intervals after a ‘fault’ occurs. These calculations are used to determine the bolted
fault current, which is essential for the calculation of incident energy and interrupting ratings
of equipment. Comparison of equipment ratings with calculated available fault current and
operating conditions will identify underrated equipment. We conduct these calculations in
accordance with ANSI Std. C37 and IEEE Std. 141-1993 (Red Book)
Protective Device Coordination Studies… (Requires PE Certification)
determine selection, arrangement, and setting of protective devices to limit the effects of an
over-current situation to the smallest area. We perform this study in accordance with IEEE
Std. 242-2001 (Buff Book)
Load-Flow Studies…
determine active and reactive power, voltage, current, and power factor throughout the
electrical system. Provides an analysis of all possible operating scenarios which will be or
have been influenced by the proposed or completed additions or changes to the system
Power Quality Studies…
determine the fitness of electric power to consumer devices. Without the proper power, an
electrical device (or load) may malfunction, fail prematurely or not operate at all.
Infrared Electrical Inspections…
find hot spots caused by defects in connections and components. Infrared thermography is used
to find areas of excess heat (caused by increased resistance) so that problems can be corrected
before a component fails, causing damage to the component, creating safety hazards and
productivity loss.
9 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Engineering Studies
Proposals – Quotes – Questions
Contact Information
Ed Girzi, PE
Engineering Manager
(952) 563-4238 RESA Direct x4238
[email protected]
Biftu Rumicho, PE
Project Engineer
(952) 563-4241 RESA Direct x4241
[email protected]
Kevin Schmidt
Engineering Tech
(952) 563-4240 RESA Direct x4240
[email protected]
Nick Capra
Engineering Tech – Field Services
(952) 563-4237 RESA Direct x4237
[email protected]
10 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
Arc Flash & Safety Checklist
Description Yes No Not Sure
All persons who operate/maintain energized electrical equipment are
trained for the voltage-class equipment they operate/maintain.
All persons who operate/maintain energized electrical equipment
have been trained on both shock and arc flash hazards.
All persons who operate/maintain energized electrical equipment
have access to the proper personal protective equipment (PPE) to
protect them from both the shock and arc flash hazards.
One-line drawings exist, including current protective device settings,
and is legible and accurate.
All persons who operate the power system have access to the current
one-line drawings.
Equipment is labeled correctly and in accordance with existing safe
work practices, codes, and standards.
De-energized procedures and equipment exist and are used.
Written safety procedures and energized work permitting processes
exist and are followed.
Equipment is grounded and ground system is tested periodically.
Proper maintenance practices are followed, especially for fault
protection equipment.
Recent (less than five years old) relay/fuse coordination study exists,
and relays are calibrated to the settings recommended.
Arc Flash Analysis has been performed for this site (calculations,
labeling, and arc flash boundaries).
Complete this checklist for a high-level assessment of your risk. If you answer no or not sure to any of
the questions, you need to address your arc flash safety program immediately. Your business may be
non-compliant with industry safety standards and at risk for an arc flash incident.
RESA Power Representative:____________________________________________________________
12 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
RESA Power
250 Prairie Center Dr. Suite
300 Eden Prairie, MN 55347
(952) 942-5529
ENGINEERING STUDIES - INITIAL QUOTE INFORMATION
FACILITY/SITE INFORMATION CUSTOMER INFORMATION
Company: Company:
Address: Address:
City, ST, Zip: City, ST, Zip:
Phone/Fax: Phone/Fax:
Website: Website:
FACILITY/SITE CONTACT INFORMATION CUSTOMER CONTACT INFORMATION
Name: Name:
Title: Title:
Phone: Phone:
Email: Email:
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
Facility Type/Use? Facility Age:
Total square ft. under roof - to be included: Office SqFt?
Production SqFt? Warehouse SqFt?
Primary Utility Customer?: Voltages:
Site substations or Utility Transformers: Sizes:
Main Service(s) equipment Rating(s) (Amps):
How many feeders from service equipment (All services)?
Equipment operating at voltages above 480V? (Compressors, pumps, etc.)
Number/Length of Bus duct: Busplug drops to include:
Production Equipment / Machines / Control Panels to include (3 Phase):
Number of 480 volt stepdown transformers:
Number of Panelboards / Switchboards to include (3 phase):
Number of MCCs to include: Bucket Feeders to include?
On-site generation? How Much? What size(s)?
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Do you have an accurate one-line or riser of your facility? Please Attach.
Are panels and equipment accurately labeled?
Will you provide an electrician to accompany & assist with data collection?
Will you provide a man lift, with operator, if needed?
Has previous study been completed? What software? SKM? Available?
Notes:
Notes:
Please complete as much of the form as possible, return to RESA Power.
RESA Power - Sales Rep.
14 Revised 6-2-2016 HEG RESA-EP
Short-circuit, Protective Device
Coordination & Arc Flash
Analysis
By Albert Marroquin
Operation Technology, Inc.
Agenda
• Short-circuit Calculations for Arc Flash Analysis
• Protection and Coordination Principles
• Arc Flash Analysis and Mitigation
• Upcoming Arc Flash Analysis Standards/Guidelines
Changes
• DC Arc Flash Analysis
• Transient Arc Flash Analysis for Generators
Short-Circuit Analysis
Types of SC Faults
•Three-Phase Ungrounded Fault
•Three-Phase Grounded Fault
•Phase to Phase Ungrounded Fault
•Phase to Phase Grounded Fault
•Phase to Ground Fault
Fault Current
•IL-G can range in utility systems from a few percent to
possibly 115 % ( if Xo < X1 ) of I3-phase (85% of all
faults).
•In industrial systems the situation IL-G > I3-phase is rare.
Typically IL-G ≅ .87 * I3-phase
•In an industrial system, the three-phase fault condition
is frequently the only one considered, since this type of
fault generally results in Maximum current.
Purpose of Short-Circuit Studies
• A Short-Circuit Study can be used to determine any
or all of the following:
¾ Verify protective device close and latch capability
¾ Verify protective device Interrupting capability
¾ Protect equipment from large mechanical forces
(maximum fault kA)
¾ I2t protection for equipment (thermal stress)
¾ Selecting ratings or settings for relay coordination
System Components Involved in SC
Calculations
• Power Company Supply
• In-Plant Generators
• Transformers
• Reactors
• Feeder Cables / Cable Trays and Bus Duct Systems
System Components Involved in SC
Calculations
• Overhead Lines
• Synchronous Motors
• Induction Motors
• Protective Devices
• Y0 from Static Load and Line Cable
Short-Circuit Phenomenon
v(t) i(t)
v(t)= Vm∗ Sin(ωt +θ )
v(t)
i(t)
di
v(t) = Ri + L = Vm × Sin(ωt + θ ) (1)
dt
Solving equation 1 yields the following expression
e
RL
-
Vm Vm t
i(t) = × sin(ωt + θ - φ ) + × sin(θ - φ ) ×
Z Z
144424443 1444 424444 3
Steady State Transient
(DC Offset)
AC Current (Symmetrical)
with No AC Decay
DC Current
© 1996-2009 Operation Technology, Inc. – Workshop Notes: Short-Circuit ANSI Slide 9
AC Fault Current Including the
DC Offset (No AC Decay)
© 1996-2009 Operation Technology, Inc. – Workshop Notes: Short-Circuit ANSI Slide 10
Machine Reactance ( λ = L I )
AC Decay Current
Fault Current Including AC & DC Decay
Short-Circuit Study for Arc Flash
• A Short-Circuit Study can be used to determine any
or all of the following:
¾ Maximum and Minimum Short-circuit current levels
¾ Prefault voltage values should be considered
¾ Positive and Negative Impedance Tolerance Adjustments
¾ Actual fault current values should be used including
decaying contributions for medium voltage systems
¾ Operating Conditions and System Configurations which
may not be otherwise observed for regular SC studies
Reactance Representation for
Utility and Synchronous Machine for AF
½ Cycle 1 ½ to 4 Cycle 30 Cycle
X”d X”d X”d
Utility
X”d X’d Xd
Turbo Generator
Hydro-Gen with X”d X’d Xd
Amortisseur winding
α
X”d X’d
Condenser
X”d X’d α
Synchronous Motor
Fault Current Decay
Fault Current Recording
Overcurrent Protection and
Coordination Principles
Definition
• Overcurrent Coordination
¾ A systematic study of current responsive devices
in an electrical power system.
Objective
• To determine the ratings and settings of
fuses, breakers, relay, etc.
• To isolate the fault or overloads.
Coordination
• Limit the extent and duration of service
interruption
• Selective fault isolation
• Provide alternate circuits
Protection
• Prevent injury to personnel
• Minimize damage to components
¾ Quickly isolate the affected portion of the system
¾ Minimize the magnitude of available short-circuit
Spectrum Of Currents
• Load Current
¾ Up to 100% of full-load
¾ 115-125% (mild overload)
• Overcurrent
¾ Abnormal loading condition (Locked-Rotor)
• Fault Current
¾ Fault condition
¾ Ten times the full-load current and higher
• Arc Fault Currents
¾ Between 95 to 38% of bolted fault currents
Coordination
C D B A
t
C D B
I
Protection vs. Coordination
• Coordination is not an exact science
• Compromise between protection and coordination
¾ Reliability
¾ Speed
¾ Performance
¾ Economics
¾ Simplicity
Fixed Points
Points or curves which do not change regardless
of protective device settings:
• Cable damage curves
• Cable ampacities
• Transformer damage curves & inrush points
• Motor starting curves
• Generator damage curve / Decrement curve
• SC maximum and minimum fault points
Capability / Damage Curves
2
It I2t I2t
t
I22t
Motor
Xfmr Cable
Gen
I
Cable Protection
The actual temperature rise of a cable when exposed to
a short circuit current for a known time is calculated by:
Ι2 t
A=
⎡ T2 + 234 ⎤
0.0297log ⎢ ⎥
⎣ T1 + 234 ⎦
Where:
A= Conductor area in circular-mils
I = Short circuit current in amps
t = Time of short circuit in seconds
T1= Initial operation temperature (750C)
T2=Maximum short circuit temperature (1500C)
Cable Short-Circuit Heating Limits
Recommended
temperature rise:
B) CU 75-200C
Transformer Categories I, II
(49)
I2T
O/L
tLR MCP
(51)
ts
200 HP
Starting Curve
MCP (50)
LRAs LRAasym
Protective Devices
• Fuse
• Overload Heater
• Thermal Magnetic
• Low Voltage Solid State Trip
• Electro-Mechanical
• Motor Circuit Protector (MCP)
• Relay (50/51 P, N, G, SG, 51V, 67, 49, 46, 79, 21, …)
Fuse Types
• Expulsion Fuse (Non-CLF)
• Current Limiting Fuse (CLF)
• Electronic Fuse (S&C Fault Fiter)
Total Clearing
Time Curve
Minimum Melting
Time Curve
Molded Case CB
• Thermal-Magnetic Types
• Magnetic Only • Frame Size
• Motor Circuit Protector (MCP) • Poles
• Integrally Fused (Limiters) • Trip Rating
• Current Limiting
• Interrupting Capability
• High Interrupting Capacity
• Non-Interchangeable Parts • Voltage
• Insulated Case (Interchange
Parts)
Thermal Maximum
Thermal Minimum
Magnetic
(instantaneous)
Overcurrent Relay
• Time-Delay (51 – I>)
• Short-Time Instantaneous ( I>>)
• Instantaneous (50 – I>>>)
• Electromagnetic (induction Disc)
• Solid State (Multi Function / Multi Level)
• Application
© 1996-2009 Operation Technology, Inc. – Workshop Notes: Protective Device Coordination
Relay Coordination
• Time margins should be maintained between T/C
curves
• Adjustment should be made for CB opening time
• Shorter time intervals may be used for solid state
relays
• Upstream relay should have the same inverse T/C
characteristic as the downstream relay (CO-8 to
CO-8) or be less inverse (CO-8 upstream to CO-6
downstream)
• Extremely inverse relays coordinates very well with
CLFs
Arc Flash Analysis Methods and
Mitigation
Analysis Methods for Arc Flash Hazards
NFPA 70E 2009 “Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace”
IEEE 1584 2004a “Guide for Performing Arc Flash
Hazard Calculations”
Arc Flash Incident Video
Arc Flash Incident Video
Arc Flash Incident Video
AF Analysis Considerations
• Possible Arc Fault Locations
¾ Line side arc faults
¾ Load side arc faults
• Arc Flash Analysis Worst Case Scenarios
¾ Maximum bolted short-circuit fault current
¾ Minimum bolted short-circuit fault current
• Arcing Current Variation
¾ Incident Energy at 100% of arcing current
¾ Incident Energy at 85% of arcing current
Analysis of AF Results
• Arc Flash Analysis Scope
¾ 100s or 1000s of Buses
¾ High/Medium/Low Voltage Systems
¾ Multiple Operating Configurations
¾ Dozens of Multiple Scenarios to be considered
Analysis of AF Results
• Determine Which Protective Device Clears the Arc Fault
¾ Is it the first upstream device in all cases?
• Determine the Locations with Special Analysis
Conditions
¾ Ibf is less than 700 or higher than 106,000 Amps
¾ The bus nominal kV less than 0.208 kV
¾ The feeder source has capacity less than 125 kVA (may
not have enough energy to generate the arc)
Methods to Mitigate the
Incident Energy
• Methods to Reduce the Fault Clearing Time
¾ Improving coordination settings of OC PDs.
¾ Type 50 protective devices (Instantaneous)
¾ Arc Flash light sensors
¾ Maintenance mode (switch)
¾ Differential protection
¾ Zone selective interlocking protection (ZSIP)
• Methods to Increase the Working Distance
¾ Remote racking of breakers/Remote switching
¾ Use of Hot Sticks
Methods to Mitigate the
Incident Energy
• Methods to Reduce the Short-Circuit Current
¾ Current limiting fuses and circuit breakers
¾ Current limiting reactors, Isolating Transformers
¾ High resistance grounding
• Methods to Reduce the Energy Exposure
¾ Arc resistant switchgear
¾ Arc shields
¾ Infrared scanning, Partial Discharge and or Corona
Cameras
Improving Over-Current Device
Coordination Settings
• Purpose is to isolate the fault with the nearest
upstream over-current protective device
• Arc flash results are extremely dependent on
coordination settings
• Unnecessarily high time dial settings for type 51
over-current devices
• Selection of fuses with faster total clearing time
characteristic curves can reduce the energy significantly
Fault Clearing Time
is 37 cycles with
current time dial
settings
Incident Energy
released is greater
than 27 cal/cm² Arcing current
through A
50/51‐1
Category 4
Fault Clearing Time
= 10 cycles
with lower time dial
settings
Incident Energy
released is less than
Arcing current
8 cal/cm² through
50/51‐1
A
Category 2
Fuse Total Clearing Time based on 3.5 kA Arc Fault
Incident Energy Released for Each Fuse
Type 50 Protective Device
• Relays with instantaneous settings
• Molded case circuit breakers
• Insulated case breakers
• Power circuit breakers with instantaneous direct acting
trip elements
Type 50 PD Advantages
• Fast acting to reduce the fault clearing time since it can
operate within 3 to 6 cycles
• Commonly available for most MV and LV applications
• Cost effective and do not require special installations
• Already installed in electrical system and may only
require adjustments to reduce the incident energy
Type 50
Protective
Devices
Type 50 PD Drawbacks
• To achieve coordination with downstream elements,
upstream source Protective Devices have longer time
delays (do not have instantaneous protection)
• The arcing current magnitude passing through the Type 50
protective device must be higher than the device’s
instantaneous pickup setting
Type 50 PD Drawbacks
Selective
Coordination
introduces
time delays
Maintenance Mode
• Very fast acting trip device reduces the Fault Clearing Time
(FCT)
• Are designed to pickup under very low arcing current
values (instantaneous pickup setting is very low)
• Does not require complicated installation and will
effectively protect locations downstream from the trip unit
with maintenance mode
Maintenance
Mode
Normal
Operating
Mode
Normal Operating
Mode
Normal Operating
Mode
Maintenance Mode
Maintenance Mode
ON
Maintenance Mode Drawbacks
• System will not have coordination during the maintenance
period because of reduced instantaneous pickup settings
• Does not increase equipment protection unless the
maintenance mode is ON
• May not protect certain zones where energized equipment
tasks may be performed
Zone Selective Interlocking
Protection (ZSIP)
• Reduced arc fault clearing times
• Zone selection is accomplished by means of hard wired
communication between trip units
• Only the trip unit closest to the fault will operate within
instantaneous since upstream units are restrained by the
unit closest to the fault
• Equipment and personnel arc fault protection
Normal
Coordination
Settings
Arc Faults at
different bus levels
without ZSIP
ZSIP hard-wired
communication for
restraining upstream
trip units
Arc Flash at different
bus levels using
ZSIP (observe the
reduced energy)
ZSIP Drawbacks
• May take a bit longer to operate than type 50 devices
because of the inherent time delay required for the ZSI
logic operation
• If system is not coordinated, ZSIP does not necessarily
force coordination and other upstream devices may
operate before the device closest to the fault
• Arcing current must still be above short time pickup
Arc Flash Light Sensors
• Detect the light emitted by the arc
• Very fast operation (5 to 10 ms) after the light is detected
• Provide comprehensive zone or individual cubicle arc flash
protection (doors open or closed) when correctly applied
• Light sensor protection can be worn at time of task being
performed for additional safety
Light Sensors
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA - 500 ms Arc Fault Clearing Time
Arc Flash without Light Sensors
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA - 500 ms Arc Fault
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA Arc Fault with 50ms Fault Clearing Time
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA Arc Fault with 50ms Fault Clearing Time
Arc Flash Light Sensor Drawbacks
• Nuisance trips caused by light emitted from sources other
than electrical arcs (can be remedied by using a more
robust approach by combining over-current and light
sensors)
• Positioning of the light sensors poses a possible problem if
they are obstructed or blocked and cannot see the light
emitted by the arc
Light Sensor and
Over-Current Relay
Combination
Differential Protection
• Short Arc Fault Clearing Times
¾ Differential protection can operate (relay plus breaker)
within 4 to 6 cycles
¾ Relay can operate within ½ to 3 cycles
• Maintain coordination between protective devices upstream
and downstream from the Differential Protection Zone
• Differential protection provides continuous equipment arc
flash protection
Generator
Differential Relay
Bus Differential
Relay
Bus Diff Protection vs. OC Relay
Fault I = 51.2 kA
Diff Protection
FCT = 0.060 sec
Fault I = 13.83 kA
OC Protection
FCT = 0.643 sec
Differential Protection Drawbacks
• Nuisance trips caused by transformer inrush currents which
are seen by relay as internal faults - the magnetizing
current has particularly high second order harmonic content
which can be used to restrain or desensitize the relay
during energizing
• Higher equipment and installation costs - relatively higher
costs when compared to traditional over-current protective
devices
• Limited zone of protection for differential ct nodes
Current Limiting Methods
• Current Limiting Fuses
• Current Limiting Circuit Breakers
• Current Limiting Reactors
• Isolating transformers
• High Resistance Grounding
Current Limiting Fuses
• Current limiting fuses can operate in less than ½ cycle
• Current limiting action is achieved as long as the
magnitude of the arcing current is within the current
limiting range
• Current limitation curves (peak let-through curves) are
needed in order to check if the fuse can limit the current
• Can be very effective at reducing the incident energy if
properly used
Current Limiting Action
Ip
Current (peak amps)
ta = tc – tm
Ip’ ta = Arcing Time
tm = Melting Time
tc = Clearing Time
Ip = Peak Current
tm ta Time (cycles)
Ip’ = Peak Let-thru Current
tc
Current Limiting Action
Current Limiting Fuse Drawbacks
• Current limiting action is achieved as long as the
magnitude of the arcing current is within the current
limiting range
• Can be thermally damaged and have altered characteristics
• Needs spares (which may be expensive) and there is not
indication of the type of fault.
• Energization on pre-existing fault = another blown fuse
Current Limiting Reactors
Isolating Transformers
• Current limiting reactors can help to reduce the available
fault current and thus reduce the available energy
• Isolating transformers help to reduce high kA short-circuit
levels (down to less than 10 kA).
• Isolating transformers add impedance between the main
switchboard and the smaller panels fed from it. The short-
circuit available at the switchboard may be considerably
higher
Increasing the Working Distance
• Hot Sticks
• Remote Racking
• Remote Switching
Remote Racking/Remote
Switching
• Are used to increase the personal space between the
potential source of the arc and the electrician
• Can be combined with high strength plastic shields to
reduce the effects of the arc flash/blast
Remote Racking/Remote Switching
Remote Racking/Remote Switching
Remote Racking/Remote
Switching
Remote Racking/Remote
Switching
Mitigating/Avoiding the
Incident Energy
• Arc Resistant Switchgear
• Arc Flash Shields
Arc Resistant Switchgear
• Funneling or re-directing the incident energy away from
the personal space
• Special design and construction allows the front of the
equipment to experience low levels of energy
• Arc flash may still be very severe and equipment will
suffer considerable damage
Arc Resistant Switchgear
Upcoming Arc Flash Analysis
Standards/Guidelines Changes
Arc Flash Analysis
Standards/Guidelines Changes
• How will these standards affect your
AF Analysis Calculations?
¾IEEE 1584b -2010
¾IEEE 1584.1-2010
¾IEEE 1814
¾NFPA 70E -2011
¾NESC- Utility Models / Testing for utility
equipment
Arc Flash Analysis
Standards/Guidelines Changes
• Recent Papers on arc flash in Low
Voltage Equipment
• NFPA 70E and IEEE Collaboration
to develop / revise current Models
• DC Arc Flash Calculations
NFPA 70E & IEEE1584 Collaboration
Efforts “Phase I” Test Results
• Refined Equations for Incident Energy
Calculations ~ Vertical, Horizontal and
Vertical with Barrier Conductor arrangements
• Effect of Sound ~ 140 db @ 20 kA fault
• Effect of Light ~ 45,000,000 LUX from Arc
Fault – Bright day is about 20,000 LUX
• Arc Blast Pressure Wave Effects ~ 0.9 psi
120 to 200 lbs of force
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
Relay Operated Power Circuit Breaker Interrupting times
Circuit Breaker Rating and Type Interrupting Time at 60 Interrupting Time at 60 Hz
Hz (cycles) (seconds)
Low Voltage Molded Case CB 3.0 (used to be 1.5) 0.050 (used to be 0.025)
Low Voltage Insulated Case CB 3.0 0.050
Low Voltage Power CB 3.0 0.050
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
Main PD AF
Results
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
Results with Main
PD Isolation
Considered
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Impact of Arc Flash Events with Outward
Convective Flows on Worker Protection Strategies
ESW2010-11
Mike Lang, Member IEEE Ken Jones Member IEEE
Thomas Neal, PhD
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Arc Flash for LV Systems
IEEE 1584.1 Analysis Guidelines
• Define what are the requirements for
performing AF analysis
• Defines the complexity of Systems
and the experience required to
perform and AF study
• Educates the Engineering process
(how to make conservative
assumptions)
IEEE 1814 Safety by Design
• Reduce the Risk by designing safer
equipment
• Samples of better Disconnect
Switch Design
• Including Technology like ZSIP into
Unit Substation Design
NESC – ROP for 2012
200 Amp Meter Base
Shorting Wire in Meter Base
DC Arc Flash Analysis
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• DC SC and Arc Flash
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• DC Arc Flash Basic Concepts
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• DC Arc Power
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• Maximum Power Method (2007 IEEE Electrical
Safety Workshop)
I arc = 0.5 × I bf
Tarc
IE m = 0.01× Vsys × I arc × 2
D
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• Detailed Theoretical Calculation Method (2009
IEEE PCIC) (Testing has confirmed the theoretical
method)
0.12
Varc = (20 × 0.534 × Z g ) × I arc
(20 × 0.534 × Z g )
Rarc = 0.88
I arc
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• V-I Characteristic Curves
Methodology for DC AF
• Arc Energy Equations
Power = Vdc × I dc
2
Parc = Varc × I arc = I arc × Rarc
2
Earc ≈ I arc × Rarc × t arc
Methodology for DC AF
• DC Incident Energy Equations for Open Air and
Enclosed Configurations
Earc
Es =
4πd 2
Earc
E1 = k × 2
a +d 2
Methodology for DC AF
• Enclosed DC Arc Fault values a and k
Enclosure Width Height Depth a k
(mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
Panelboard 305 356 191 100 0.127
LV Switchgear 508 508 508 400 0.312
MV Switchgear 1143 762 762 950 0.416
Test System
• Example using the theoretical method
Diff Method Result Comparison
• Comparison of the Maximum Power Method vs.
Theoretical Method
DC Arc Ibf dc Iarc Rarc FCT I.E. (cal/cm2)
Flash (kA) dc (ohms (sec
Method (kA) ) )
Maximum 18.63 9.315 N/A 1.2 13.8
Power
Theoretical 18.63 11.80 0.008 1.2 12.5
Method 0
Transient Arc Flash Analysis for
Generators
Problem Description
• Arc Flash Incidents near or on Generator Auxiliary
Load
• No Generator Circuit Breaker
• Long Fault Clearing Time because of continuous
generator short-circuit current contribution
• Trying to determine a practical level of PPE to be
used for the task
• To determine a systematic method to determine
the incident energy for systems with high fault
current decay
System Description
System Description
Analysis Techniques and Assumptions
• IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E do not provide any
specific analysis method for such systems
• The classic IEEE 1584 method utilizes the Bolted
fault current to determine the arc fault current
• The guidelines do not consider any transients or
decay in the fault currents
Arc Flash Analysis
Utility Breaker Operates 6 cycles after Arc
Fault is detected
Arc Flash Analysis
Arc Flash Analysis
Scenario Arc Flash Method Arcing I.E. (cal/cm2) for 2.0
ID Current sec
(kA)
Case 1 Half Cycle (Ia”) 21.44 51.6
Case 2 Four Cycle (Ia’) 21.33 51
Case 3 Decay Method (Ia” ~ Ia) 21.4 ~ 35.7
11.5
Problems with Regular Arc Flash
Analysis Method
• The calculation results show very high incident
energy values
• Results in too much PPE requirements for the task
• Difficult to estimate the actual energy
Benefits from Transient Stability
Analysis
• Determine actual bolted fault current contributions
• Model actual generator time constants and exciter
field discharge strategies
• Accurate recalculation of the bolted fault current
levels for system separation
• Actual response of the Excitation and Generator
Controls
Methods of Reducing Generator Fault
Current
• Loss of Excitation
• Field Discharge Resistor / Crowbar bypass system
• Negative Field Forcing
Exciter Model Used for the Simulations
Field Discharge: Short-Circuit
Equivalent Circuit
Model for Field
Discharge Simulation
Field Discharge Resistor
A Field Discharge Resistor (FDR) is
added along with the generator Time
Constant (T’do)
Negative Field Forcing
For Negative Field Forcing.
The discharge rate is
dependent on the value of
the negative voltage
Transient Stability Scenarios
Scenario Field Discharge Simulation Bolted Fault
ID Scheme Method Current @ 2.0
sec
Case 1 None TS 17.7 kA
Case 2 Loss of Excitation TS 11.2 kA
Case 3 FDR to with RD = RF TS 6.2 kA
Case 4 Negative Field Forcing TS with UDM 0.54 kA
Fault Current Comparison
Incident Energy Determination from TS
Results
• Using Spreadsheet, MathCAD or Matlab to import
the bolted fault current values from the Transient
Fault Study
• The IEEE 1584 2002 Empirical Equations are used
• The energy is determined by integrating the
incident energy results from each time step up to
arbitrary time of exposure (i.e. 2.0 sec)
Incident Energy Comparison
Scenario Field Discharge I.E. (cal/cm2) for
ID Scheme 2.0 sec
Case 1 None 40.8
Case 2 Loss of Excitation 33.1
Case 3 FDR to with RD = RF 25.7
Case 4 Negative Field Forcing 19.8
Comparison Against Arc Flash
I.E. (cal/cm2) for 2.0 I.E. (cal/cm2) for
sec 2.0 sec
(Arc Flash with TS) (Regular Arc Flash)
Highest Results 40.8 51.6
Lowest Results 19.8 35.7
References
• Generator Field Discharge Methods – provided by
Wayne Eads of Southern Company Generation
• IEEE Standard 421.5 IEEE Recommended Practice
for Excitation System Models for Power System
Studies
• IEEE 1584 2002
• Power System Stability and Control, Prabha
Kundur
References
• DC Arc Flash and Shock NFPA 70E ROP –Memphis
Feb 18, 2010
• DC Arc Models and Incident Energy Calculations
Paper No. PCIC-2009-07 – Award Winning Paper
• DC Arc Hazard Assessment Phase II Copyright
Material Kenectrics Inc., Report No. K-012623-RA-
0002-R00
Questions?
• Questions?
Short-circuit, Protective Device
Coordination & Arc Flash
Analysis
By Albert Marroquin
Operation Technology, Inc.
Agenda
• Short-circuit Calculations for Arc Flash Analysis
• Protection and Coordination Principles
• Arc Flash Analysis and Mitigation
• Upcoming Arc Flash Analysis Standards/Guidelines
Changes
• DC Arc Flash Analysis
• Transient Arc Flash Analysis for Generators
Short-Circuit Analysis
Types of SC Faults
•Three-Phase Ungrounded Fault
•Three-Phase Grounded Fault
•Phase to Phase Ungrounded Fault
•Phase to Phase Grounded Fault
•Phase to Ground Fault
Fault Current
•IL-G can range in utility systems from a few percent to
possibly 115 % ( if Xo < X1 ) of I3-phase (85% of all
faults).
•In industrial systems the situation IL-G > I3-phase is rare.
Typically IL-G ≅ .87 * I3-phase
•In an industrial system, the three-phase fault condition
is frequently the only one considered, since this type of
fault generally results in Maximum current.
Purpose of Short-Circuit Studies
• A Short-Circuit Study can be used to determine any
or all of the following:
¾ Verify protective device close and latch capability
¾ Verify protective device Interrupting capability
¾ Protect equipment from large mechanical forces
(maximum fault kA)
¾ I2t protection for equipment (thermal stress)
¾ Selecting ratings or settings for relay coordination
System Components Involved in SC
Calculations
• Power Company Supply
• In-Plant Generators
• Transformers
• Reactors
• Feeder Cables / Cable Trays and Bus Duct Systems
System Components Involved in SC
Calculations
• Overhead Lines
• Synchronous Motors
• Induction Motors
• Protective Devices
• Y0 from Static Load and Line Cable
Short-Circuit Phenomenon
v(t) i(t)
v(t)= Vm∗ Sin(ωt +θ )
v(t)
i(t)
di
v(t) = Ri + L = Vm × Sin(ωt + θ ) (1)
dt
Solving equation 1 yields the following expression
e
RL
-
Vm Vm t
i(t) = × sin(ωt + θ - φ ) + × sin(θ - φ ) ×
Z Z
144424443 1444 424444 3
Steady State Transient
(DC Offset)
AC Current (Symmetrical)
with No AC Decay
DC Current
© 1996-2009 Operation Technology, Inc. – Workshop Notes: Short-Circuit ANSI Slide 9
AC Fault Current Including the
DC Offset (No AC Decay)
© 1996-2009 Operation Technology, Inc. – Workshop Notes: Short-Circuit ANSI Slide 10
Machine Reactance ( λ = L I )
AC Decay Current
Fault Current Including AC & DC Decay
Short-Circuit Study for Arc Flash
• A Short-Circuit Study can be used to determine any
or all of the following:
¾ Maximum and Minimum Short-circuit current levels
¾ Prefault voltage values should be considered
¾ Positive and Negative Impedance Tolerance Adjustments
¾ Actual fault current values should be used including
decaying contributions for medium voltage systems
¾ Operating Conditions and System Configurations which
may not be otherwise observed for regular SC studies
Reactance Representation for
Utility and Synchronous Machine for AF
½ Cycle 1 ½ to 4 Cycle 30 Cycle
X”d X”d X”d
Utility
X”d X’d Xd
Turbo Generator
Hydro-Gen with X”d X’d Xd
Amortisseur winding
α
X”d X’d
Condenser
X”d X’d α
Synchronous Motor
Fault Current Decay
Fault Current Recording
Overcurrent Protection and
Coordination Principles
Definition
• Overcurrent Coordination
¾ A systematic study of current responsive devices
in an electrical power system.
Objective
• To determine the ratings and settings of
fuses, breakers, relay, etc.
• To isolate the fault or overloads.
Coordination
• Limit the extent and duration of service
interruption
• Selective fault isolation
• Provide alternate circuits
Protection
• Prevent injury to personnel
• Minimize damage to components
¾ Quickly isolate the affected portion of the system
¾ Minimize the magnitude of available short-circuit
Spectrum Of Currents
• Load Current
¾ Up to 100% of full-load
¾ 115-125% (mild overload)
• Overcurrent
¾ Abnormal loading condition (Locked-Rotor)
• Fault Current
¾ Fault condition
¾ Ten times the full-load current and higher
• Arc Fault Currents
¾ Between 95 to 38% of bolted fault currents
Coordination
C D B A
t
C D B
I
Protection vs. Coordination
• Coordination is not an exact science
• Compromise between protection and coordination
¾ Reliability
¾ Speed
¾ Performance
¾ Economics
¾ Simplicity
Fixed Points
Points or curves which do not change regardless
of protective device settings:
• Cable damage curves
• Cable ampacities
• Transformer damage curves & inrush points
• Motor starting curves
• Generator damage curve / Decrement curve
• SC maximum and minimum fault points
Capability / Damage Curves
2
It I2t I2t
t
I22t
Motor
Xfmr Cable
Gen
I
Cable Protection
The actual temperature rise of a cable when exposed to
a short circuit current for a known time is calculated by:
Ι2 t
A=
⎡ T2 + 234 ⎤
0.0297log ⎢ ⎥
⎣ T1 + 234 ⎦
Where:
A= Conductor area in circular-mils
I = Short circuit current in amps
t = Time of short circuit in seconds
T1= Initial operation temperature (750C)
T2=Maximum short circuit temperature (1500C)
Cable Short-Circuit Heating Limits
Recommended
temperature rise:
B) CU 75-200C
Transformer Categories I, II
(49)
I2T
O/L
tLR MCP
(51)
ts
200 HP
Starting Curve
MCP (50)
LRAs LRAasym
Protective Devices
• Fuse
• Overload Heater
• Thermal Magnetic
• Low Voltage Solid State Trip
• Electro-Mechanical
• Motor Circuit Protector (MCP)
• Relay (50/51 P, N, G, SG, 51V, 67, 49, 46, 79, 21, …)
Fuse Types
• Expulsion Fuse (Non-CLF)
• Current Limiting Fuse (CLF)
• Electronic Fuse (S&C Fault Fiter)
Total Clearing
Time Curve
Minimum Melting
Time Curve
Molded Case CB
• Thermal-Magnetic Types
• Magnetic Only • Frame Size
• Motor Circuit Protector (MCP) • Poles
• Integrally Fused (Limiters) • Trip Rating
• Current Limiting
• Interrupting Capability
• High Interrupting Capacity
• Non-Interchangeable Parts • Voltage
• Insulated Case (Interchange
Parts)
Thermal Maximum
Thermal Minimum
Magnetic
(instantaneous)
Overcurrent Relay
• Time-Delay (51 – I>)
• Short-Time Instantaneous ( I>>)
• Instantaneous (50 – I>>>)
• Electromagnetic (induction Disc)
• Solid State (Multi Function / Multi Level)
• Application
© 1996-2009 Operation Technology, Inc. – Workshop Notes: Protective Device Coordination
Relay Coordination
• Time margins should be maintained between T/C
curves
• Adjustment should be made for CB opening time
• Shorter time intervals may be used for solid state
relays
• Upstream relay should have the same inverse T/C
characteristic as the downstream relay (CO-8 to
CO-8) or be less inverse (CO-8 upstream to CO-6
downstream)
• Extremely inverse relays coordinates very well with
CLFs
Arc Flash Analysis Methods and
Mitigation
Analysis Methods for Arc Flash Hazards
NFPA 70E 2009 “Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace”
IEEE 1584 2004a “Guide for Performing Arc Flash
Hazard Calculations”
Arc Flash Incident Video
Arc Flash Incident Video
Arc Flash Incident Video
AF Analysis Considerations
• Possible Arc Fault Locations
¾ Line side arc faults
¾ Load side arc faults
• Arc Flash Analysis Worst Case Scenarios
¾ Maximum bolted short-circuit fault current
¾ Minimum bolted short-circuit fault current
• Arcing Current Variation
¾ Incident Energy at 100% of arcing current
¾ Incident Energy at 85% of arcing current
Analysis of AF Results
• Arc Flash Analysis Scope
¾ 100s or 1000s of Buses
¾ High/Medium/Low Voltage Systems
¾ Multiple Operating Configurations
¾ Dozens of Multiple Scenarios to be considered
Analysis of AF Results
• Determine Which Protective Device Clears the Arc Fault
¾ Is it the first upstream device in all cases?
• Determine the Locations with Special Analysis
Conditions
¾ Ibf is less than 700 or higher than 106,000 Amps
¾ The bus nominal kV less than 0.208 kV
¾ The feeder source has capacity less than 125 kVA (may
not have enough energy to generate the arc)
Methods to Mitigate the
Incident Energy
• Methods to Reduce the Fault Clearing Time
¾ Improving coordination settings of OC PDs.
¾ Type 50 protective devices (Instantaneous)
¾ Arc Flash light sensors
¾ Maintenance mode (switch)
¾ Differential protection
¾ Zone selective interlocking protection (ZSIP)
• Methods to Increase the Working Distance
¾ Remote racking of breakers/Remote switching
¾ Use of Hot Sticks
Methods to Mitigate the
Incident Energy
• Methods to Reduce the Short-Circuit Current
¾ Current limiting fuses and circuit breakers
¾ Current limiting reactors, Isolating Transformers
¾ High resistance grounding
• Methods to Reduce the Energy Exposure
¾ Arc resistant switchgear
¾ Arc shields
¾ Infrared scanning, Partial Discharge and or Corona
Cameras
Improving Over-Current Device
Coordination Settings
• Purpose is to isolate the fault with the nearest
upstream over-current protective device
• Arc flash results are extremely dependent on
coordination settings
• Unnecessarily high time dial settings for type 51
over-current devices
• Selection of fuses with faster total clearing time
characteristic curves can reduce the energy significantly
Fault Clearing Time
is 37 cycles with
current time dial
settings
Incident Energy
released is greater
than 27 cal/cm² Arcing current
through A
50/51‐1
Category 4
Fault Clearing Time
= 10 cycles
with lower time dial
settings
Incident Energy
released is less than
Arcing current
8 cal/cm² through
50/51‐1
A
Category 2
Fuse Total Clearing Time based on 3.5 kA Arc Fault
Incident Energy Released for Each Fuse
Type 50 Protective Device
• Relays with instantaneous settings
• Molded case circuit breakers
• Insulated case breakers
• Power circuit breakers with instantaneous direct acting
trip elements
Type 50 PD Advantages
• Fast acting to reduce the fault clearing time since it can
operate within 3 to 6 cycles
• Commonly available for most MV and LV applications
• Cost effective and do not require special installations
• Already installed in electrical system and may only
require adjustments to reduce the incident energy
Type 50
Protective
Devices
Type 50 PD Drawbacks
• To achieve coordination with downstream elements,
upstream source Protective Devices have longer time
delays (do not have instantaneous protection)
• The arcing current magnitude passing through the Type 50
protective device must be higher than the device’s
instantaneous pickup setting
Type 50 PD Drawbacks
Selective
Coordination
introduces
time delays
Maintenance Mode
• Very fast acting trip device reduces the Fault Clearing Time
(FCT)
• Are designed to pickup under very low arcing current
values (instantaneous pickup setting is very low)
• Does not require complicated installation and will
effectively protect locations downstream from the trip unit
with maintenance mode
Maintenance
Mode
Normal
Operating
Mode
Normal Operating
Mode
Normal Operating
Mode
Maintenance Mode
Maintenance Mode
ON
Maintenance Mode Drawbacks
• System will not have coordination during the maintenance
period because of reduced instantaneous pickup settings
• Does not increase equipment protection unless the
maintenance mode is ON
• May not protect certain zones where energized equipment
tasks may be performed
Zone Selective Interlocking
Protection (ZSIP)
• Reduced arc fault clearing times
• Zone selection is accomplished by means of hard wired
communication between trip units
• Only the trip unit closest to the fault will operate within
instantaneous since upstream units are restrained by the
unit closest to the fault
• Equipment and personnel arc fault protection
Normal
Coordination
Settings
Arc Faults at
different bus levels
without ZSIP
ZSIP hard-wired
communication for
restraining upstream
trip units
Arc Flash at different
bus levels using
ZSIP (observe the
reduced energy)
ZSIP Drawbacks
• May take a bit longer to operate than type 50 devices
because of the inherent time delay required for the ZSI
logic operation
• If system is not coordinated, ZSIP does not necessarily
force coordination and other upstream devices may
operate before the device closest to the fault
• Arcing current must still be above short time pickup
Arc Flash Light Sensors
• Detect the light emitted by the arc
• Very fast operation (5 to 10 ms) after the light is detected
• Provide comprehensive zone or individual cubicle arc flash
protection (doors open or closed) when correctly applied
• Light sensor protection can be worn at time of task being
performed for additional safety
Light Sensors
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA - 500 ms Arc Fault Clearing Time
Arc Flash without Light Sensors
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA - 500 ms Arc Fault
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA Arc Fault with 50ms Fault Clearing Time
Kema-Laboratory Tests
50 kA Arc Fault with 50ms Fault Clearing Time
Arc Flash Light Sensor Drawbacks
• Nuisance trips caused by light emitted from sources other
than electrical arcs (can be remedied by using a more
robust approach by combining over-current and light
sensors)
• Positioning of the light sensors poses a possible problem if
they are obstructed or blocked and cannot see the light
emitted by the arc
Light Sensor and
Over-Current Relay
Combination
Differential Protection
• Short Arc Fault Clearing Times
¾ Differential protection can operate (relay plus breaker)
within 4 to 6 cycles
¾ Relay can operate within ½ to 3 cycles
• Maintain coordination between protective devices upstream
and downstream from the Differential Protection Zone
• Differential protection provides continuous equipment arc
flash protection
Generator
Differential Relay
Bus Differential
Relay
Bus Diff Protection vs. OC Relay
Fault I = 51.2 kA
Diff Protection
FCT = 0.060 sec
Fault I = 13.83 kA
OC Protection
FCT = 0.643 sec
Differential Protection Drawbacks
• Nuisance trips caused by transformer inrush currents which
are seen by relay as internal faults - the magnetizing
current has particularly high second order harmonic content
which can be used to restrain or desensitize the relay
during energizing
• Higher equipment and installation costs - relatively higher
costs when compared to traditional over-current protective
devices
• Limited zone of protection for differential ct nodes
Current Limiting Methods
• Current Limiting Fuses
• Current Limiting Circuit Breakers
• Current Limiting Reactors
• Isolating transformers
• High Resistance Grounding
Current Limiting Fuses
• Current limiting fuses can operate in less than ½ cycle
• Current limiting action is achieved as long as the
magnitude of the arcing current is within the current
limiting range
• Current limitation curves (peak let-through curves) are
needed in order to check if the fuse can limit the current
• Can be very effective at reducing the incident energy if
properly used
Current Limiting Action
Ip
Current (peak amps)
ta = tc – tm
Ip’ ta = Arcing Time
tm = Melting Time
tc = Clearing Time
Ip = Peak Current
tm ta Time (cycles)
Ip’ = Peak Let-thru Current
tc
Current Limiting Action
Current Limiting Fuse Drawbacks
• Current limiting action is achieved as long as the
magnitude of the arcing current is within the current
limiting range
• Can be thermally damaged and have altered characteristics
• Needs spares (which may be expensive) and there is not
indication of the type of fault.
• Energization on pre-existing fault = another blown fuse
Current Limiting Reactors
Isolating Transformers
• Current limiting reactors can help to reduce the available
fault current and thus reduce the available energy
• Isolating transformers help to reduce high kA short-circuit
levels (down to less than 10 kA).
• Isolating transformers add impedance between the main
switchboard and the smaller panels fed from it. The short-
circuit available at the switchboard may be considerably
higher
Increasing the Working Distance
• Hot Sticks
• Remote Racking
• Remote Switching
Remote Racking/Remote
Switching
• Are used to increase the personal space between the
potential source of the arc and the electrician
• Can be combined with high strength plastic shields to
reduce the effects of the arc flash/blast
Remote Racking/Remote Switching
Remote Racking/Remote Switching
Remote Racking/Remote
Switching
Remote Racking/Remote
Switching
Mitigating/Avoiding the
Incident Energy
• Arc Resistant Switchgear
• Arc Flash Shields
Arc Resistant Switchgear
• Funneling or re-directing the incident energy away from
the personal space
• Special design and construction allows the front of the
equipment to experience low levels of energy
• Arc flash may still be very severe and equipment will
suffer considerable damage
Arc Resistant Switchgear
Upcoming Arc Flash Analysis
Standards/Guidelines Changes
Arc Flash Analysis
Standards/Guidelines Changes
• How will these standards affect your
AF Analysis Calculations?
¾IEEE 1584b -2010
¾IEEE 1584.1-2010
¾IEEE 1814
¾NFPA 70E -2011
¾NESC- Utility Models / Testing for utility
equipment
Arc Flash Analysis
Standards/Guidelines Changes
• Recent Papers on arc flash in Low
Voltage Equipment
• NFPA 70E and IEEE Collaboration
to develop / revise current Models
• DC Arc Flash Calculations
NFPA 70E & IEEE1584 Collaboration
Efforts “Phase I” Test Results
• Refined Equations for Incident Energy
Calculations ~ Vertical, Horizontal and
Vertical with Barrier Conductor arrangements
• Effect of Sound ~ 140 db @ 20 kA fault
• Effect of Light ~ 45,000,000 LUX from Arc
Fault – Bright day is about 20,000 LUX
• Arc Blast Pressure Wave Effects ~ 0.9 psi
120 to 200 lbs of force
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
Relay Operated Power Circuit Breaker Interrupting times
Circuit Breaker Rating and Type Interrupting Time at 60 Interrupting Time at 60 Hz
Hz (cycles) (seconds)
Low Voltage Molded Case CB 3.0 (used to be 1.5) 0.050 (used to be 0.025)
Low Voltage Insulated Case CB 3.0 0.050
Low Voltage Power CB 3.0 0.050
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
Main PD AF
Results
IEEE 1584b - Amendments
Results with Main
PD Isolation
Considered
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Impact of Arc Flash Events with Outward
Convective Flows on Worker Protection Strategies
ESW2010-11
Mike Lang, Member IEEE Ken Jones Member IEEE
Thomas Neal, PhD
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Arc Flash for LV Systems
Arc Flash for LV Systems
IEEE 1584.1 Analysis Guidelines
• Define what are the requirements for
performing AF analysis
• Defines the complexity of Systems
and the experience required to
perform and AF study
• Educates the Engineering process
(how to make conservative
assumptions)
IEEE 1814 Safety by Design
• Reduce the Risk by designing safer
equipment
• Samples of better Disconnect
Switch Design
• Including Technology like ZSIP into
Unit Substation Design
NESC – ROP for 2012
200 Amp Meter Base
Shorting Wire in Meter Base
DC Arc Flash Analysis
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• DC SC and Arc Flash
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• DC Arc Flash Basic Concepts
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• DC Arc Power
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• Maximum Power Method (2007 IEEE Electrical
Safety Workshop)
I arc = 0.5 × I bf
Tarc
IE m = 0.01× Vsys × I arc × 2
D
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• Detailed Theoretical Calculation Method (2009
IEEE PCIC) (Testing has confirmed the theoretical
method)
0.12
Varc = (20 × 0.534 × Z g ) × I arc
(20 × 0.534 × Z g )
Rarc = 0.88
I arc
Methodology for DC Arc Flash
• V-I Characteristic Curves
Methodology for DC AF
• Arc Energy Equations
Power = Vdc × I dc
2
Parc = Varc × I arc = I arc × Rarc
2
Earc ≈ I arc × Rarc × t arc
Methodology for DC AF
• DC Incident Energy Equations for Open Air and
Enclosed Configurations
Earc
Es =
4πd 2
Earc
E1 = k × 2
a +d 2
Methodology for DC AF
• Enclosed DC Arc Fault values a and k
Enclosure Width Height Depth a k
(mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
Panelboard 305 356 191 100 0.127
LV Switchgear 508 508 508 400 0.312
MV Switchgear 1143 762 762 950 0.416
Test System
• Example using the theoretical method
Diff Method Result Comparison
• Comparison of the Maximum Power Method vs.
Theoretical Method
DC Arc Ibf dc Iarc Rarc FCT I.E. (cal/cm2)
Flash (kA) dc (ohms (sec
Method (kA) ) )
Maximum 18.63 9.315 N/A 1.2 13.8
Power
Theoretical 18.63 11.80 0.008 1.2 12.5
Method 0
Transient Arc Flash Analysis for
Generators
Problem Description
• Arc Flash Incidents near or on Generator Auxiliary
Load
• No Generator Circuit Breaker
• Long Fault Clearing Time because of continuous
generator short-circuit current contribution
• Trying to determine a practical level of PPE to be
used for the task
• To determine a systematic method to determine
the incident energy for systems with high fault
current decay
System Description
System Description
Analysis Techniques and Assumptions
• IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E do not provide any
specific analysis method for such systems
• The classic IEEE 1584 method utilizes the Bolted
fault current to determine the arc fault current
• The guidelines do not consider any transients or
decay in the fault currents
Arc Flash Analysis
Utility Breaker Operates 6 cycles after Arc
Fault is detected
Arc Flash Analysis
Arc Flash Analysis
Scenario Arc Flash Method Arcing I.E. (cal/cm2) for 2.0
ID Current sec
(kA)
Case 1 Half Cycle (Ia”) 21.44 51.6
Case 2 Four Cycle (Ia’) 21.33 51
Case 3 Decay Method (Ia” ~ Ia) 21.4 ~ 35.7
11.5
Problems with Regular Arc Flash
Analysis Method
• The calculation results show very high incident
energy values
• Results in too much PPE requirements for the task
• Difficult to estimate the actual energy
Benefits from Transient Stability
Analysis
• Determine actual bolted fault current contributions
• Model actual generator time constants and exciter
field discharge strategies
• Accurate recalculation of the bolted fault current
levels for system separation
• Actual response of the Excitation and Generator
Controls
Methods of Reducing Generator Fault
Current
• Loss of Excitation
• Field Discharge Resistor / Crowbar bypass system
• Negative Field Forcing
Exciter Model Used for the Simulations
Field Discharge: Short-Circuit
Equivalent Circuit
Model for Field
Discharge Simulation
Field Discharge Resistor
A Field Discharge Resistor (FDR) is
added along with the generator Time
Constant (T’do)
Negative Field Forcing
For Negative Field Forcing.
The discharge rate is
dependent on the value of
the negative voltage
Transient Stability Scenarios
Scenario Field Discharge Simulation Bolted Fault
ID Scheme Method Current @ 2.0
sec
Case 1 None TS 17.7 kA
Case 2 Loss of Excitation TS 11.2 kA
Case 3 FDR to with RD = RF TS 6.2 kA
Case 4 Negative Field Forcing TS with UDM 0.54 kA
Fault Current Comparison
Incident Energy Determination from TS
Results
• Using Spreadsheet, MathCAD or Matlab to import
the bolted fault current values from the Transient
Fault Study
• The IEEE 1584 2002 Empirical Equations are used
• The energy is determined by integrating the
incident energy results from each time step up to
arbitrary time of exposure (i.e. 2.0 sec)
Incident Energy Comparison
Scenario Field Discharge I.E. (cal/cm2) for
ID Scheme 2.0 sec
Case 1 None 40.8
Case 2 Loss of Excitation 33.1
Case 3 FDR to with RD = RF 25.7
Case 4 Negative Field Forcing 19.8
Comparison Against Arc Flash
I.E. (cal/cm2) for 2.0 I.E. (cal/cm2) for
sec 2.0 sec
(Arc Flash with TS) (Regular Arc Flash)
Highest Results 40.8 51.6
Lowest Results 19.8 35.7
References
• Generator Field Discharge Methods – provided by
Wayne Eads of Southern Company Generation
• IEEE Standard 421.5 IEEE Recommended Practice
for Excitation System Models for Power System
Studies
• IEEE 1584 2002
• Power System Stability and Control, Prabha
Kundur
References
• DC Arc Flash and Shock NFPA 70E ROP –Memphis
Feb 18, 2010
• DC Arc Models and Incident Energy Calculations
Paper No. PCIC-2009-07 – Award Winning Paper
• DC Arc Hazard Assessment Phase II Copyright
Material Kenectrics Inc., Report No. K-012623-RA-
0002-R00
Questions?
• Questions?
SECTION 26 05 73.19
SHORT-CIRCUIT/COORDINATION STUDY/ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS
PART 1 GENERAL
1.01 SCOPE
A. Contractor shall furnish and submit for approval to the Engineer of Record signed
and sealed short-circuit and protective device coordination studies, and Arc
Flash Risk Assessment study in accordance with the requirements of this
Section.
B. The scope of the studies shall include all new distribution equipment supplied by
the equipment Manufacturer under this contract.
1.02 RELATED WORK SPECIFIED ELSEWHERE
A. The work shall proceed in accordance with the following specifications sections,
bound herein:
1. Section 01 35 13 (01100) – “Special Project Procedures”
2. Section 01 35 26 (01016) – “Safety Requirements and Protection of
Property”
3. Section 01 35 53 (01140) – “Security”
4. Section 01 42 13 – “Abbreviations and Anacronyms”
5. Section 01 78 23 (01730) – “Operation and Maintenance Data”
6. Section 26 00 00 (16010) – “Basic Electrical Requirements”
1.03 REFERENCES
A. Below list is not all inclusive and it is the responsibility of the Contractor to comply
with all applicable requirements whether included in this list or not.
1. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE):
a. IEEE 141 – Recommended Practice for Electric Power
Distribution and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power
Systems
b. IEEE 242 – Recommended Practice for Protection and
Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems
c. IEEE 399 – Recommended Practice for Industrial and
Commercial Power System Analysis
d. IEEE 241 – Recommended Practice for Electric Power Systems
in Commercial Buildings
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e. IEEE 551 – Recommended Practice for Calculating Short Circuit
Currents in Industrial and Commercial Power Systems
f. IEEE 1015 – Recommended Practice for Applying Low-Voltage
Circuit Breakers Used in Industrial and Commercial Power
Systems.
g. IEEE 1584 - Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations
2. American National Standards Institute (ANSI):
a. ANSI C57.12.00 – Standard General Requirements for Liquid-
Immersed Distribution, Power, and Regulating Transformers
b. ANSI C37.13 – Standard for Low Voltage AC Power Circuit
Breakers Used in Enclosures
c. ANSI C37.010 – Standard Application Guide for AC High Voltage
Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis
d. ANSI C 37.41 – Standard Design Tests for High Voltage Fuses,
Distribution Enclosed Single-Pole Air Switches, Fuse
Disconnecting Switches and Accessories.
e. ANSI Z535.4 – Standard for Product Safety Signs and Labels.
3. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
a. NFPA 70 - National Electrical Code, latest edition
b. NFPA 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
1.04 SUBMITTALS
A. The Contractor shall furnish an Arc Flash Risk Assessment Study per the
requirements set forth in NFPA 70E - Standard for Electrical Safety in the
Workplace. The arc flash risk assessment shall be performed according to the
IEEE 1584 equations that are presented in NFPA70E, Article 130.5, Annex D.
B. The short-circuit and protective device coordination studies shall be as prepared
by the electrical equipment manufacturer or an approved engineering firm. It
shall include site specific arc flash warning labels.
C. Study reports shall be signed and sealed by the Registered/Licensed
Professional Electrical Engineer approving the studies.
D. For Review/Approval
1. The short-circuit and protective device coordination studies shall be
submitted to the Engineer of Record prior to receiving final approval of
the distribution equipment shop drawings and/or prior to release of
equipment drawings for manufacturing.
2. If formal completion of the studies may cause delay in equipment
manufacturing, approval from the engineer may be obtained for
preliminary submittal of sufficient study data to ensure that the selection
of device and characteristics will be satisfactory.
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E. For Construction
1. The results of the short-circuit, protective device coordination and arc
flash risk assessment studies shall be summarized in a final report. A
complete final report shall be provided in PDF format on CD/DVD, USB
drive and uploaded using the applicable Department’s system.
2. Following best practices, the Contractor is to provide the study project
files to the Owner in electronic format to allow the Owner to review all
aspects of the project input data and reprint arc flash labels, one-line
diagrams, reports etc. The electronic project files are critical for disaster
recovery and maintaining the power system. In addition, a copy the
Power*Tools for Windows (PTW) Viewer program is required to
accompany the electronic project files.
3. The report shall include the following sections:
a. Executive Summary.
b. Descriptions, purpose, basis, and scope of the study
c. Tabulations of circuit breaker, fuse, and other protective device
ratings versus calculated short circuit duties
d. Protective device time versus current coordination curves,
tabulations of relay and circuit breaker trip unit settings, fuse
selection
e. Specify PPE required for protection
f. Fault current calculations including a definition of terms and guide
for interpretation of the computer printout
g. Details of the incident energy and flash protection boundary
calculations
h. Recommendations for system improvements, where needed
i. One-line diagram
4. Arc flash labels for all applicable components, as herein specified, shall
also be provided in hard copy.
1.05 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS AND EXPERIENCE
A. License Requirements
1. The short-circuit protective device coordination and arc flash risk
assessment studies shall be conducted under the supervision and
approval of a Registered/Licensed Professional Electrical Engineer
skilled in performing and interpreting the power system studies.
2. The Registered/Licensed Professional Electrical Engineer shall be a full-
time employee of the equipment manufacturer or an approved
engineering firm.
B. Experience
1. The Registered/Licensed Professional Electrical Engineer shall have a
WASD 11/2021 26 05 73.19 - 3 ER No.
minimum of 5 years of experience in performing power system studies.
2. The equipment manufacturer or approved engineering firm shall
demonstrate experience with Arc Flash Risk Assessment by submitting
names of at least 10 actual arc flash risk assessment it has performed in
the past year.
3. The reference for each Arc Flash Risk Assessment reference provided
shall include:
a. Name of the Engineering firm and the Registered/Licensed
Professional Electrical Engineer for each reference.
b. The client’s name and address including a contact person and
phone number for each reference.
PART 2 PRODUCTS
2.01 COMPUTER ANALYSIS SOFTWARE
A. The studies shall be performed using the latest revision of the SKM Systems
Analysis Power*Tools for Windows (PTW) software program.
2.02 ARC FLASH WARNING LABELS
A. The Contractor of the Arc Flash Risk Assessment shall provide for each work
location analyzed a 4 in. x 6 in. thermal transfer type label of high adhesion
polyester in compliance with the following:
1. Label background shall be white color
2. Label lettering shall be black color
3. “DANGER” word shall be white color with red background.
PART 3 EXECUTION
3.01 DATA COLLECTION
A. Contractor shall furnish all data as required by the power system studies. The
Engineer performing the short-circuit, protective device coordination and arc
flash risk assessment studies shall furnish the Contractor with a listing of
required data immediately after award of the contract. The Contractor shall
expedite collection of the data to assure completion of the studies as required
for final approval of the distribution equipment shop drawings and/or prior to the
release of the equipment for manufacturing.
B. Source combination may include present and future motors and generators.
C. Load data utilized may include existing and proposed loads obtained from
Contract Documents provided by the Owner or Contractor.
D. If applicable, include fault contribution of existing motors in the study. The
Contractor shall obtain required existing equipment data, if necessary, to satisfy
WASD 11/2021 26 05 73.19 - 4 ER No.
the study requirements.
3.02 SHORT-CIRCUIT AND PROTECTIVE DEVICE EVALUATION STUDY
A. Use actual conductor impedances if known. If unknown, use typical conductor
impedances based on IEEE Standard 141-1993.
B. Transformer design impedances shall be used when test impedances are not
available.
C. Provide the following:
1. Calculation methods and assumptions
2. Selected base per unit quantities
3. One-line diagram of the system being evaluated
4. Source impedance data, including electric utility system and motor fault
contribution characteristics
5. Tabulations of calculated quantities
6. Results, conclusions, and recommendations
D. Calculate short-circuit momentary and interrupting duties for a three-phase
bolted fault at each:
1. Electric utility’s supply termination point
2. Incoming switchgear
3. Unit substation primary and secondary terminals
4. Low voltage switchgear
5. Motor control centers
6. Standby generators and automatic transfer switches
7. Branch circuit panelboards
8. Other significant locations throughout the system
E. For grounded systems, provide a bolted line-to-ground fault current study for
areas as defined for the three-phase bolted fault short-circuit study.
F. Protective Device Evaluation
1. Evaluate equipment and protective devices and compare to short circuit
ratings.
2. Adequacy of switchgear, motor control centers, and panelboard bus bars
to withstand short-circuit stresses.
3. Notify the Department in writing, of existing, circuit protective devices
improperly rated for the calculated available fault current.
WASD 11/2021 26 05 73.19 - 5 ER No.
3.03 PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY
A. Proposed protective device coordination time-current curves (TCC) shall be
displayed on log-log scale graphs.
B. Include on each TCC graph, a complete title and one-line diagram with legend
identifying the specific portion of the system covered.
C. Terminate device characteristic curves at a point reflecting maximum
symmetrical or asymmetrical fault current to which the device is exposed.
D. Identify the device associated with each curve by manufacturer type, function,
and, if applicable, tap, time delay, and instantaneous settings recommended.
E. Plot the following characteristics on the TCC graphs, where applicable:
1. Electric utility’s overcurrent protective device
2. Medium voltage equipment overcurrent relays
3. Medium and low voltage fuses including manufacturer’s minimum melt,
total clearing, tolerance, and damage bands
4. Low voltage equipment circuit breaker trip devices, including
manufacturer’s tolerance bands
5. Transformer full-load current, magnetizing inrush current, and ANSI
through-fault protection curves
6. Conductor damage curves
7. Ground fault protective devices, as applicable
8. Pertinent motor starting characteristics and motor damage points, where
applicable
9. Pertinent generators short-circuit decrement curve and generator
damage point
10. The largest feeder circuit breaker in each motor control center and
applicable panelboard
F. Provide adequate time margins between device characteristics such that
selective operation is provided, while providing proper protection.
3.04 ARC FLASH RISK ASSESSMENT
A. The arc flash risk assessment shall be performed according to the IEEE 1584
equations that are presented in NFPA70E, Annex D.
B. The flash protection boundary and the incident energy shall be calculated at all
significant locations in the electrical distribution system (switchboards,
switchgear, motor-control centers, transfer switches, panelboards, busway,
splitters, meter sockets, disconnect switches, control panels, transformers, etc)
where work could be performed on energized parts.
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C. The Arc Flash Risk Assessment shall include all significant locations in 240 volt
and 208-volt systems fed from transformers equal to or greater than 125 kVA
where work could be performed on energized parts.
D. Safe working distances shall be based upon the calculated arc flash boundary
considering an incident energy of 1.2 cal/cm2.
E. When appropriate, the short circuit calculations and the clearing times of the
phase overcurrent devices will be retrieved from the short-circuit and
coordination study model. Ground overcurrent relays should not be taken into
consideration when determining the clearing time when performing incident
energy calculations
F. The short-circuit calculations and the corresponding incident energy calculations
for multiple system scenarios must be compared and the greatest incident
energy must be uniquely reported for each equipment location. Calculations
must be performed to represent the maximum and minimum contributions of fault
current magnitude for all normal and emergency operating conditions. The
minimum calculation will assume that the utility contribution is at a minimum and
will assume a minimum motor contribution (all motors off). Conversely, the
maximum calculation will assume a maximum contribution from the utility and
will assume the maximum number of motors to be operating. Calculations shall
take into consideration the parallel operation of synchronous generators with the
electric utility, where applicable.
G. The incident energy calculations must consider the accumulation of energy over
time when performing arc flash calculations on buses with multiple sources.
Iterative calculations must consider the changing current contributions, as the
sources are interrupted or decremented with time. Fault contribution from
motors and generators should be decremented as follows:
1. Fault contribution from induction motors should not be considered
beyond 3-5 cycles.
2. Fault contribution from synchronous motors and generators should be
decayed to match the actual decrement of each as closely as possible
(e.g., contributions from permanent magnet generators will typically
decay from 10 per unit to 3 per unit after 10 cycles).
H. For each equipment location with a separately enclosed main device (where
there is adequate separation between the line side terminals of the main
protective device and the work location), calculations for incident energy and
flash protection boundary shall include both the line and load side of the main
breaker.
I. When performing incident energy calculations on the line side of a main breaker
(as required per above), the line side and load side contributions must be
included in the fault calculation.
J. Miscoordination should be checked amongst all devices within the branch
containing the immediate protective device upstream of the calculation location
WASD 11/2021 26 05 73.19 - 7 ER No.
and the calculation should utilize the fastest device to compute the incident
energy for the corresponding location.
K. Arc flash calculations shall be based on actual overcurrent protective device
clearing time. Maximum clearing time will be capped at 2 seconds based on IEEE
1584 section B.1.2. Where it is not physically possible to move outside of the
flash protection boundary in less than 2 seconds during an arc flash event, a
maximum clearing time based on the specific location shall be utilized.
3.05 REPORT SECTIONS
A. Input data shall include, but not be limited to the following:
1. Feeder input data including feeder type (cable or bus), size, length,
number per phase, conduit type (magnetic or non-magnetic) and
conductor material (copper or aluminum).
2. Transformer input data, including winding connections, secondary
neutral-ground connection, primary and secondary voltage ratings, kVA
rating, impedance, % taps and phase shift.
3. Reactor data, including voltage rating, and impedance.
4. Generation contribution data, (synchronous generators and Utility),
including short-circuit reactance (X”d), rated MVA, rated voltage, three-
phase and single line-ground contribution (for Utility sources) and X/R
ratio.
5. Motor contribution data (induction motors and synchronous motors),
including short-circuit reactance, rated horsepower or kVA, rated voltage,
and X/R ratio.
B. Short-Circuit Output Data shall include, but not be limited to the following reports:
1. Low Voltage Fault Report shall include a section for three-phase and
unbalanced fault calculations and shall show the following information for
each applicable location:
a. Voltage
b. Calculated fault current magnitude and angle
c. Fault point X/R ratio
d. Equivalent impedance
2. Momentary Duty Report shall include a section for three-phase and
unbalanced fault calculations and shall show the following information for
each applicable location:
a. Voltage
b. Calculated symmetrical fault current magnitude and angle
c. Fault point X/R ratio
d. Calculated asymmetrical fault currents
1) Based on fault point X/R ratio
WASD 11/2021 26 05 73.19 - 8 ER No.
2) Based on calculated symmetrical value multiplied by 1.6
3) Based on calculated symmetrical value multiplied by 2.7
e. Equivalent impedance
3. Interrupting Duty Report shall include a section for three-phase and
unbalanced fault calculations and shall show the following information for
each applicable location:
a. Voltage
b. Calculated symmetrical fault current magnitude and angle
c. Fault point X/R ratio
d. No AC Decrement (NACD) Ratio
e. Equivalent impedance
f. Multiplying factors for 2, 3, 5 and 8 cycle circuit breakers rated on
a symmetrical basis
g. Multiplying factors for 2, 3, 5 and 8 cycle circuit breakers rated on
a total basis
C. Recommended Protective Device Settings:
1. Phase and Ground Relays:
a. Current transformer ratio
b. Current setting
c. Time setting
d. Instantaneous setting
e. Recommendations on improved relaying systems, if applicable
2. Circuit Breakers:
a. Adjustable pickups and time delays (long time, short time, ground)
b. Adjustable time-current characteristic
c. Adjustable instantaneous pickup
d. Recommendations on improved trip systems, if applicable.
D. Incident energy and flash protection boundary calculations
1. Arcing fault magnitude
2. Protective device clearing time
3. Duration of arc
4. Arc flash boundary
5. Working distance
6. Incident energy
7. Hazard Risk Category*
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8. Recommendations for arc flash energy reduction
9. PPE required
*Applicable only when using the arc flash Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE) category method.
3.06 FIELD ADJUSTMENT
A. Adjust relay and protective device settings according to the recommended
settings table provided by the coordination study. Field adjustments to be
completed by the engineering service division of the equipment manufacturer
under the Startup and Acceptance Testing contract portion.
B. Make minor modifications to equipment as required to accomplish conformance
with short circuit and protective device coordination studies.
C. Notify the Department in writing of any required major equipment modifications.
3.07 ARC FLASH WARNING LABELS
A. The contractor of the Arc Flash Risk Assessment shall provide a 4 in. x 6 in.
thermal transfer type label of high adhesion polyester for each work location
analyzed.
B. All labels will be based on recommended overcurrent device settings and will be
provided after the results of the analysis have been presented to the Owner and
after any system changes, upgrades or modifications have been incorporated in
the system.
C. The label shall include the following information, at a minimum:
1. Location designation
2. Nominal voltage
3. Flash protection boundary
4. Hazard risk category*
5. Incident energy
6. Working distance
7. Company name performing the study
8. Company File number
9. Date study performed
10. PPE rating
11. Engineering report number, revision number and issue date
*Applicable only when using the arc flash PPE category method.
D. Labels shall be machine printed, with no field markings.
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E. Arc flash labels shall be provided in the following manner and all labels shall be
based on recommended overcurrent device settings:
1. For each 600, 480 and applicable 208-volt panelboard, one arc flash label
shall be provided
2. For each motor control center, one arc flash label shall be provided
3. For each low voltage switchboard, one arc flash label shall be provided
4. For each switchgear, one arc flash label shall be provided
5. For medium voltage switches one arc flash label shall be provided
6. For each industrial control panel, one arc flash label shall be provided
F. Labels shall be field installed by the engineering service division of the
equipment manufacturer under the Startup and Acceptance Testing contract
portion.
END OF SECTION
WASD 11/2021 26 05 73.19 - 11 ER No.
Arc Flash Analysis and Documentation
SOP
I. Purpose. ................................................................................................................................... 2
II. Roles & Responsibilities. ..................................................................................................... 2
A. Facilities Maintenance (FM). ........................................................................................... 2
B. Zone Supervisors/ Shop Foremen .................................................................................... 2
C. PMCS & CPC .................................................................................................................. 2
III. Procedures ............................................................................................................................ 3
A. Conducting Analysis ........................................................................................................ 3
B. When the Arc Flash Analysis should be reviewed ........................................................... 5
C. Document Storage and Distribution ................................................................................. 5
D. Hard Copies ...................................................................................................................... 6
IV. Training Requirements......................................................................................................... 6
V. Appendix A: Project Management Arc-Flash Analysis Flow Chart ................................... 7
VI. Appendix B: Incident energy calculations energy ............................................................... 7
VII. Appendix C - Definitions ................................................................................................... 10
I. Purpose
These procedures are intended to provide guidance for the implementation and the continuing
compliance of the University of Texas at Austin Arc Flash Analysis Program. The guidelines for
work involving electrical hazards and the selection of arc flash protective equipment are
provided by the 2012 National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) standard 70E. The standard
for calculating the arc flash energy levels at different points in the electrical power system is that
of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 1584.
II. Roles & Responsibilities
A. Facilities Maintenance (FM)
1. Implement arc flash analysis on existing buildings at the Main Campus
and Pickle Research Campus without a current arc flash analysis.
2. Maintain documents and electronic files for site studies. This includes
short-circuit coordination studies, arc flash studies, single-line diagrams,
as well as documentation on later electrical system changes.
3. Implement five year electrical single-line review and arc flash analysis
review.
4. Provide or coordinate general training for electrical work.
5. Alex Hershey and Darnell Mack are the electrical arc flash analysis
engineers.
a) Primary: Alex Hershey [email protected]
b) Secondary: Darnell Mack [email protected]
B. Zone Supervisors/ Shop Foremen
1. Ensure employees comply with all provisions of the Electrical & Arc
Flash Safety Program.
2. Assist arc flash team in 5 year review and update of arc flash analysis.
3. Report any discrepancies between SKM single-line and field conditions to
Facilities Arc Flash Engineer.
C. PMCS & CPC
Project Management & Construction Services (PMCS) & Capital Planning and
Construction (CPC)
1. Work with Facilities Maintenance Arc Flash Engineer to maintain up-to-
date single-line diagrams, panel schedules and SKM models.
2. Include a review of the arc flash study in any major modification or
renovation to the electrical system of a building.
3. Deliver reviewed and completed SKM files and other electrical power
system documentation to Facilities Arc Flash Engineer at the completion
of a project as a part of the project signoff.
III. Procedures
A. Conducting Analysis
1. Data Collection
a) Gather facility documentations: single-line diagrams, power floor
plans showing locations of electrical equipment, overcurrent protective
device information, component impedances for cable, transformers and
bus-way, minimum and maximum fault current at the electrical service
entrance to the facility, etc.
(1) Field verify existing documentation to ensure arc flash
analysis will be performed using accurate settings and field
conditions.
2. Generation/update of SKM single-line diagram
(1) Update existing SKM system single-line or create a new
single-line of the facility on the SKM software.
(2) The system single-line diagram shall clearly include
conductor lengths, number of conductors per phase, conductor
impedance values, protective device settings, transformer
impedances and X/R ratios, motor size, and other circuit
information.
3. Short Circuit Study
a) Calculate the available short circuit current at each point in the
electrical system using the SKM software.
b) The computer calculated values shall represent the highest short-
circuit current that the equipment could be subjected to under fault
conditions.
c) A tabular printout shall be produced which lists the calculated
maximum available short-circuit currents, X/R ratios, equipment short-
circuit interrupting or withstand current ratings, and notes regarding the
adequacy or inadequacy of the equipment. Identify in report any
inadequacies of the equipment and make recommendations for appropriate
improvements.
4. Time-Current Coordination Study
a) A time-current coordination analysis shall be performed with the
aid of the SKM software and shall include the determination of settings,
ratings, or types for the overcurrent protective devices supplied.
b) Log-log plots which indicate the degree of system protection and
coordination by displaying the time-current characteristics of series
connected overcurrent devices and other pertinent system parameters shall
be generated.
c) A tabular printout shall be produced which lists existing settings as
well as the recommended settings of all adjustable overcurrent protective
devices, the equipment designation where the device is located, and the
device number corresponding to the device on the system single-line
diagram.
d) Identify in report any significant deficiencies in protection and/or
coordination and recommendations as required for addressing system
protection or device coordination deficiencies
5. Arc Flash Hazard Analysis
a) Perform the arc flash analysis using the SKM software to obtain
Arc Flash Incident Energy (AFIE) levels and arc flash protection boundary
distances.
b) Arc flash hazard analysis shall be submitted in tabular form, and
shall include device or bus name, bolted fault and arcing fault current
levels, flash protection boundary distances, personal-protective equipment
classes and AFIE levels.
c) Arc Flash Hazard Analysis shall be performed in compliance with
IEEE Standard 1584-2002, the IEEE Guide for Performing Arc Flash
Calculations.
6. Equipment Labeling
a) Switchboards, panel boards, industrial control panels, motor
control centers or other electrical equipment which require regular
examination, adjustment, servicing or maintenance shall be have a visible
arc flash label.
b) Labels shall comply with relevant NEC and NFPA 70 E standards
and must include the following information:
(1) Equipment Name
(2) AFIE value (cal/cm2)
(3) System voltage
(4) PPE Required
(5) Arc Flash Hazard Boundary
(6) Hazard Risk Category
(7) Limited Approach Boundary
c) Updates to existing and missing panel schedule will be done as
electrical panels are field inspected.
B. When the Arc Flash Analysis should be reviewed
1. Arc flash analysis shall be updated when a major electrical modification or
renovation takes place. These are projects which lead to significant
changes to the utilities short-circuit current and arc flash analysis results.
Such projects include but are not limited to the following:
a) The addition or reduction of three phase ac transmission and
distribution lines, substations and similar equipment to accommodate load
changes.
b) Changes or additions involving: motors 50 HP or above, and over-
current protective devices.
2. Changes to equipment rated 240 V and below that does not involve at least
one 125 kVA or larger low impedance transformer in its immediate power
supply and changes to single-phase ac and dc systems do not require an
Arc Flash Analysis review but they should be documented properly on
panel schedules and the system single-line diagrams. Generic arc flash
hazard labels (1.2 cal/cm2) should be applied to appropriate equipment.
Such projects include but are not limited to the following:
a) Addition of receptacle circuits and lighting circuits.
b) The addition or reduction of panel boards under 240 V supplied
from transformers less than 125 kVA.
3. Arc flash hazard analysis shall be reviewed periodically every 5 years.
Each building will have a FAMIS EQ ID associated with its arc flash
analysis and a review cycle of 5 years for that EQ ID.
C. Document Storage and Distribution
1. SKM Project File
a) All SKM project files will be delivered to Facilities Maintenance
arc flash analysis engineers at the end of each project for review. FM will
store and maintain copies of the SKM files in the Archive Projects
directory.
2. Document Control
a) Copies of completed arc flash analysis will be stored in the archive
project directory and on meridian.
b) Copies of existing electrical single line or arc-flash files can be
checked out from the arc flash engineer and from meridian file database.
c) Finalized SKM project files must be transferred back to
responsible arc flash analysis engineer for review and work order close
out.
3. Code compliance issues should be noted and reported to zone supervisors.
The arc flash analysis group will review system changes and update the
folder as necessary.
D. Hard Copies
1. A printed copy of the completed electrical power system studies and
single-line diagrams shall be provided upon request only.
2. A clear folder with copies of the as built single-line will be stored in the
building main electrical room for qualified UT employees.
IV. Training Requirements
Employees of this program shall be trained and knowledgeable of the operation of electrical
equipment and safe work methods. They shall be trained to recognize and to avoid the electrical
hazards that might be present with respect to that equipment or work method.
Such persons shall receive all training required for a qualified electrical person as listed in NFPA
70E Article 110 (D).
Power system data collection shall be performed by or under the direction of a professional
engineer.
Calculations must be performed by an engineer with working knowledge of Power*Tools for
Windows the SKM arc flash and equipment evaluation software.
V. Appendix A: Project Management Arc-Flash Analysis Flow Chart
Does project include
addition or changes to the
electrical 3 phase ac Does the 3 phase ac
Project scope must system? equipment operate above
include the update of
240 volts or involves at
electrical panel schedules.
N Y least one 125 kVA or
No special arc flash
o e larger transformer in the
consideration needed.
immediate power supply?
Y
e
Query for existing
Contact FM Arc Flash
building electrical arc
Engineer to check out a Y
flash analysis files.
copy of these files for the e
project.
Does it exist?
N
o
Project scope must
Project scope must
include the creation of the
include the update and
necessary SKM electrical
review of the arc flash
system model and arc
analysis.
flash analysis.
Collect data for any 3
All finalized project files phase AC equipment Generic arc flash
must be transferred to the operating from 208 V to hazard labels may be
FM Electrical Engineers 15 kV. Create updated used (1.2 cal/cm2)
for review and work order panel schedules & for any added N
close out. electrical single-line equipment. o
drawings. Apply arc flash
hazard labels
VI. Appendix B: Incident energy calculations energy
lg En = K1 + K2 + 1.081 * lgIa + 0.0011 * G (1)
En - incident energy J/cm2 normalized for time and distance. The equation above is based on data
normalized for a distance from the possible arc point to the person of 610 mm. and an arcing
time of 0.2 sec.
K1 = -0.792 for open configurations, and is -0.555 for box configurations / enclosed equipment.
K2 = 0 for ungrounded and high resistance grounded systems, and equals -0.113 for grounded
systems.
G - gap between conductors in millimeters.
Ia - predicted three phase arcing current in kA. It is found by using formula 2 a) or b) so the
operating time for protective devices can be determined.
For 1000V and lower systems:
lgIa = K + 0.662 * lg Ibf + 0.0966 * V + 0.000526 * G + 0.5588 * V * lgIbf - 0.00304 * G * lgIbf
(2a)
lg - is logarithm base 10 (log10).
Ia - arcing current in kA.
En - normalized incident energy in J/cm2 as calculated by (1).
K - equals -0.153 for open configurations. and -0.097 for box configurations.
Ibf - bolted fault current for three phase faults in kA symmetrical rms.
V - system voltage in kV.
G - gap between condactors in millimeters.
E = 4.184 * Cf * En * (t / 0.2) * (610x/Dx) (3)
E - incident energy exposure in J/cm2.
Cf - calculation factor equal to 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV, and 1.5 for voltages below 1 kV.
En - normalized incident energy in J/cm2 as calculated by (1) above.
t - arcing time in seconds.
D - distance from possible arcing point to the person in millimeters.
x - distance exponent.
Flash Protection Boundary is found using the equation below:
DB = [4.184 * Cf * En * (t / 0.2) * (610x/EB)]1/x (4)
DB - distance of the boundary from the arc point in millimeters.
Cf - calculation factor equal to 1.0 for voltages above 1 kV, and 1.5 for voltages below 1 kV.
En - normalized incident energy in J/cm2 as calculated by (1).
EB - incident energy in J/cm2 at the boundary distance.
Ibf - bolted fault current for three phase faults in kA symmetrical rms.
t - arcing time in seconds.
x - distance exponent.
EB is usually set at 5 J/cm2 (1.2 cal/cm2 ) for bare skin, or at the rating of proposed personal
protection equipment.
For protective devices operating in the steep portion of their time-current curves, a small change
in current causes a big change in operating time. Incident energy is linear with time, so arc
current variation may have a big effect on incident energy. The solution is to make two arc
current and energy calculations: one using the calculated expected arc current and one using a
reduced arc current that is 15% lower.
The calculator makes possible both calculations for each case considered. The IEEE 1584
procedure requires that an operating time be determined for both the expected arc current and
the reduced arc current. Incident energy is calculated for both sets of arc currents and
operating times and the larger incident energy is taken as the model result. This solution was
developed by comparing the results of arc current calculations using the best available arc
current equation with actual measured arc current in the test database. The calculator predicts
arcing fault current for a given configuration and bolted fault short circuit current. It also
predicts bolted fault current required to cause 15% reduction of the predicted arcing current
for the given configuration. Arc duration should be adjusted for the predicted and 15%
reduced arc fault values.
Incident Energy Exposure
This is the amount of thermal incident energy to which the worker's face and chest could be
exposed at working distance during an electrical arc event. Incident energy is measured in
joules per centimetre squared (J/cm2) or in calories/cm2 (5 J/cm2 = 1.2 cal/cm2 ) . Incident
energy is calculated using variables such as available fault current, system voltage, expected
arcing fault duration and the worker's distance from the arc. The data obtained from the
calculations is used to select the appropriate flame resistant (FR) PPE.
VII. Appendix C - Definitions
• Arc flash hazard. A dangerous condition associated with the possible release of energy
caused by an electric arc.
• Arc flash hazard analysis. A study investigating a worker’s potential exposure to arc flash
energy, conducted for the purpose of injury prevention and the determination of safe
work practices, arc flash boundary, and the appropriate levels of personal protective
equipment (PPE).
• Arc rating. The value attributed to materials that describe their performance to exposure
to an electrical arc discharge. The arc rating is expressed in cal/cm2 and is derived from
the determined value of the arc thermal performance value (ATPV) or energy of break
open threshold (EBT) whichever is the lower value.
• Boundary
o Arc flash boundary. The approach limit at a distance from a prospective arc
source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an electrical
arc flash were to occur.
o Limited approach boundary. The approach limit at a distance from an exposed
energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which a shock hazard exists.
o Prohibited approach boundary. The approach limit at a distance from an exposed
energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which work is considered the
same as making contact with the electrical conductor or circuit part.
o Restricted approach boundary. The approach limit at a distance from an exposed
energized electrical conductor or circuit part within which there is an increased
risk of shock, due to electrical arc-over combined with inadvertent movement, for
personnel working in close proximity to the energized electrical conductor or
circuit part.
• Electrical hazard. A dangerous condition such that contact or equipment failure can result
in electric shock, arc flash burn, thermal burn, or blast.
• Energized. Electrically connected to, or is, a source of voltage.
• Incident Energy. The amount of energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from
the source, generated during an electrical arc event.
• Qualified person. One who has skills and knowledge related to the construction and
operation of the electrical equipment and installation and has received safety training to
recognize and avoid the hazards involved.
• Single-line Diagram. A diagram that shows, by means of single lines and graphic
symbols, the course of an electric circuit or system of circuits and the component devices
or parts used in the circuit or system.
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ARC FLASH STUDIES
An Internship with Fortescue Metals Group
Limited
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
CHRISTIAN BARABONA
BACHELOR OF ENGINEERING
(ELECTRICAL POWER AND INDUSTRIAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS)
JANUARY 2016
Disclaimer
I declare the following work to be my own, unless otherwise referenced, as defined by Murdoch
University’s Plagiarism and Collusion Assessment Policy.
Abstract
A significant safety risk to electrical personnel working on an energised switchboard is the hazard
of exposure to arc flash, which has gained increasing attention over the past decade. Although
reported arc flash injuries are infrequent compared to other electrical injuries, especially electric
shock, the very high costs associated with these arc flash injuries make them one of the most
important categories to avoid in an industrial workplace.
The main objective of this project is to conduct arc flash studies for switchboards installed at
Fortescue’s Solomon Hub to quantify the existing arc flash hazard posed by this type of equipment.
The aim of the study is to find feasible solutions to reduce arc flash incident energy to less than 8
cal/cm2 and to provide appropriate arc flash PPE recommendations.
Switchboards with voltage levels of 0.4kV, 0.69kV, 6.6kV, 11kV and 33kV were investigated. The
arc flash calculations were conducted using the IEEE 1584-2002 Standard, IEEE Guide for
Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. The study found that many switchboards have dangerous
incident energy levels that must be reduced, in order to allow energised work on the equipment. To
mitigate the hazard, three simple solutions were proposed: optimise protection settings, install
maintenance switches and remote operation.
Firstly, optimising protection settings is the least expensive solution to reduce the operating time of
protection devices, and hence limit arc flash incident energy exposure. Secondly, where a permanent
setting will violate the grading requirement of the system, then installing maintenance switches is
proposed. Thirdly, where the first two strategies cannot be implemented because they will violate
the grading requirement of the system, then remote operation is proposed. This will eliminate the arc
flash hazard because personnel will operate the equipment outside the arc flash boundary.
iii
If the recommendations of this study are implemented, the arc flash incident energy of the
switchboards will significantly reduce to not greater than 8 cal/cm2. The implications are improved
safety for personnel, given that energy levels on many switchboards currently pose a significantly
higher arc flash hazard.
iv
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank FMG’s engineering team especially my industry supervisors; Lead
Electrical Engineer Brad Mcleod and Principal Electrical Engineer Cobus Strauss for giving me the
opportunity to undertake an engineering internship as part of their team. The support and guidance
that you have provided is much appreciated and the knowledge I have gained from all of you is
invaluable.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my academic supervisors; Dr Sujeewa Hettiwatte and
Dr Gregory Crebbin for their academic assistance, not only for the internship project but also for the
support they have provided throughout my degree at Murdoch University. I would also like to
acknowledge the rest of the staff at the School of Engineering for facilitating our learning and guiding
us throughout our university studies.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my fellow students for making my time at university enjoyable
and for contributing to my academic and professional development.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and encouragement.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. viii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................... ix
Definitions, Acronyms and Terms Used in this Thesis Report .......................................................... xi
List of symbols ................................................................................................................................. xii
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
2 Background .............................................................................................................................. 3
2.1 Engineering Internship ..................................................................................................... 3
2.2 Fortescue Metals Group ................................................................................................... 3
2.2.1 Solomon Hub ............................................................................................................ 4
2.3 Project Background .......................................................................................................... 5
2.4 Arc flash ............................................................................................................................ 7
2.5 Arc flash reported incidents and statistics ........................................................................ 9
2.5.1 Standards and WHS Requirements ......................................................................... 10
2.6 Arc Flash Studies............................................................................................................. 13
2.6.1 NFPA 70E ................................................................................................................ 14
2.6.2 IEEE Std 1584 – 2002 .............................................................................................. 15
2.7 Assumptions and Clarifications ...................................................................................... 16
2.8 PowerFactory ................................................................................................................. 16
3 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 17
3.1 System audit, data collection and power system modelling .......................................... 17
3.2 Short-Circuit Study ......................................................................................................... 18
3.2.1 Effect of motor contributions in the calculations ................................................... 19
3.3 Arc current calculations .................................................................................................. 21
3.4 Coordination studies ...................................................................................................... 23
3.5 Incident energy and arc flash boundary calculations ..................................................... 24
3.6 PPE selection .................................................................................................................. 26
3.7 Process flowchart ........................................................................................................... 27
4 Results .................................................................................................................................... 28
4.1 Stockyard ........................................................................................................................ 28
4.2 Firetail ............................................................................................................................ 29
4.3 Kings Valley..................................................................................................................... 30
vi
4.4 RMUs + other attached switchboards ............................................................................ 31
5 Discussion............................................................................................................................... 32
5.1 Elimination ..................................................................................................................... 36
5.2 Substitution .................................................................................................................... 36
5.3 Engineering Controls ...................................................................................................... 37
5.3.1 Optimise protection settings .................................................................................. 37
5.3.2 Installing a maintenance switch ............................................................................. 37
5.3.3 Zone Selective Interlocking Scheme ....................................................................... 38
5.3.4 Remote Operation .................................................................................................. 39
5.4 Administrative control .................................................................................................... 40
5.5 PPE ................................................................................................................................. 40
6 Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 41
7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 44
8 References.............................................................................................................................. 46
9 Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 49
9.1 Appendix A – Solomon Interconnection diagram ........................................................... 49
9.2 Appendix B – LV incomers Settings................................................................................. 50
9.3 Appendix C – Arc flash study results for the Stockyard .................................................. 53
9.4 Appendix D – Arc flash study results for Firetail OPF...................................................... 54
9.5 Appendix E – Arc flash study results for Kings Valley OPF .............................................. 56
9.6 Appendix F – Arc flash study results for RMUs and switchboards downstream ............. 59
9.7 Appendix G – GE LV circuit breaker curve ...................................................................... 61
9.8 Appendix H – Maintenance mode protection settings ................................................... 62
9.9 Appendix I – Arc flash study results for Stockyard based on the proposed solutions ..... 63
9.10 Appendix J – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the proposed solutions
65
9.11 Appendix K – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the proposed
solutions ..................................................................................................................................... 67
9.12 Appendix L – Arc flash study results for RMUs based on proposed solutions ................ 69
9.13 Appendix M – Proposed protection settings to resolve grading problems found .......... 71
vii
List of Figures
Figure 1: Fortescue Metals Group Limited Operations Map [1]....................................................... 4
Figure 2: Switchboard installed in Substation 2 ............................................................................... 6
Figure 3: Locations within a switchboard where arc faults can occur: a) outgoing terminal of the
feeder, b) feeder, c) distribution bus, d) main busbar and e) incomer or incoming cable termination.
(Redrawn from [23]) ...................................................................................................................... 12
Figure 4: Fault simulation showing motor contributions ................................................................ 21
Figure 5: TCC illustrating the significant increase in incident energy for a 10% arc current
reduction ........................................................................................................................................ 22
Figure 6: TCC illustrating the effect of the clearing characteristics of a protection relay on the
incident energy ............................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 7: Flow chart which illustrate the steps conducted to achieve the goals of the arc flash
studies ............................................................................................................................................ 27
Figure 8: Fault simulation showing the faulted switchboard .......................................................... 32
Figure 9: Hierarchy of controls (redrawn from [40]) ...................................................................... 36
Figure 10: Zone selective interlocking ........................................................................................... 39
Figure 11: GE LV circuit breaker curve (approval pending [39] .................................................... 61
viii
List of Tables
Table 1: Definitions, acronyms and terms used in this report ........................................................... xi
Table 2: Limitations of equations from IEEE 1584 ........................................................................ 15
Table 3: Distance factors and typical conductor gaps used for the arc flash calculations [30] ....... 22
Table 4: PPE requirements based on incident energy exposure [26] .............................................. 26
Table 5: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at the Stockyard .................................. 28
Table 6: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Firetail OPF .................................... 29
Table 7: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Kings Valley OPF........................... 30
Table 8: Arc flash study results for RMUs and loads fed from the RMUs ..................................... 31
Table 9: Existing Stockyard .4 kV MCC protection settings .......................................................... 50
Table 10: Existing Firetail .4 kV MCC protection settings............................................................. 50
Table 11: Existing KV .4 kV MCC protection settings .................................................................. 51
Table 12: 0.4kV MCCs fed from RMUs ........................................................................................ 51
Table 13: Exising incomer protection settings for VSDs................................................................ 52
Table 14: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 53
Table 15: Arc flash study results for 11kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 53
Table 16: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 54
Table 17: Arc flash study results for 6.6kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 54
Table 18: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 55
Table 19: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 56
Table 20: Arc flash study results for the 6.6kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 57
Table 21: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 58
Table 22: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the existing settings .............................. 59
Table 23: Arc flash study results for the sizer drives switchboards based on the existing protection
settings ........................................................................................................................................... 59
Table 24: Arc flash study results for the VSDs based on the existing protection settings .............. 59
Table 25: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the existing protection settings
....................................................................................................................................................... 60
Table 26: Settings and location of the three maintenance switches ................................................ 62
Table 27: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the
proposed protection settings ........................................................................................................... 63
Table 28: Proposed protection settings for the Stockyard 0.4kV switchboards incomers ............... 63
Table 29: Arc flash study results for the Stockyard 11kV switchboards based on the proposed
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 63
Table 30: Proposed protection settings for Stockpile 11kV switchboards incomers....................... 64
Table 31: Arc flash study results for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection
settings ........................................................................................................................................... 65
ix
Table 32: Proposed protection settings for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards incomers ......................... 65
Table 33: Arc flash study results for Firetail 33kV switchboards based on the proposed
maintenance mode protection settings ............................................................................................ 66
Table 34: Arc flash study results for KV 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection
settings ........................................................................................................................................... 67
Table 35: Proposed protection settings for KV 0.4kV incomer ...................................................... 68
Table 36: Arc flash study results for KV 33kV switchboards based on the proposed maintenance
mode protection settings................................................................................................................. 68
Table 37: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the proposed maintenance mode
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 69
Table 38: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
....................................................................................................................................................... 69
Table 39: Proposed protection settings for LV incomers ................................................................ 70
Table 40: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main Firetail 33kV switchboard (2000-
SR001) ........................................................................................................................................... 71
Table 41: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main KV 33kV switchboard (2000-
SR001) ........................................................................................................................................... 71
Table 42: Proposed settings for feeders to RMUs for correct coordination between protection
devices ........................................................................................................................................... 71
x
Definitions, Acronyms and Terms Used in this Thesis Report
Table 1: Definitions, acronyms and terms used in this report
A Amperes
AC Alternating Current
Arc fault
A fault current flowing through ionized air during an arc flash event
current
Bolted fault A short-circuit or electrical contact between conductors at different voltages in
current which the impedance between the conductors is close to zero
Cal Calories
CB Circuit Breaker
cm Centimetre
DOL Direct On Line
Feeder The first downstream protection device relative to the main busbar
FLA Full Load Amps
Grading Correct coordination between protection devices
HV High Voltage (greater than or equal 1kV)
IAC Internal Arc Classification
Instantaneous
Protection element of low voltage circuit breakers that has no intentional delay
function
Incomer First upstream protection device relative to the main busbar
kA Kilo Amperes
kV Kilo Volts
KV Kings Valley
Long time
Inverse-time overcurrent element of low voltage circuit breakers
function
LV Low Voltage (less than 1kV)
MCC Motor Control Centre
MS Maintenance Switch
MPU Mobile Power Unit
Total time taken by a protection device to initiate trips or alarms exclusive of any time
Operating time
delays inherent in the tripping circuit after a trip is initiated
OPF Ore Processing Facility
PIMS Project Information Management System
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
Racking Process of disconnecting a circuit breaker from the bus
RMU Ring Main Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Short time
Protection element of low voltage circuit breakers that has intentional delay
function
SLD Single Line Diagram
TCC Time-Current Curve
Total Clearing
Sum of the protection device operating time and the opening time of the circuit breaker
Time
Upstream
protection Feeder from the first upstream switchboard
device
V Voltage
WHS Workplace Health and Safety
Working
Distance between the worker and the potential arc source inside the equipment
distance
50P Protection element of protection relays that has no intentional delay
51P Inverse-time overcurrent element of protection relays
xi
List of symbols
𝐶𝑓 Calculation factor
𝐷 distance from the possible arc point to person (mm)
𝐷𝐵 distance of the boundary from the arcing point (mm)
𝐸 is incident energy (J/cm2)
𝐸𝐵 incident energy at the boundary distance (J/cm2)
𝐸𝑛 normalized incident energy
𝐼𝑎 arcing current (kA)
𝐼𝑎,𝐿𝑉 arc current reflected in the LV side of the transformer (A)
𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 arc current reflected in the HV side of the transformer (A)
𝐼𝑝𝑢 pickup setting of the protection relay (A)
𝐼𝑏𝑓 bolted fault current (kA)
𝑙𝑔 log10
𝑡 time (seconds)
𝑡𝑜 opening time of the circuit breaker (seconds)
𝑡𝑝 operating time of the protection device (seconds)
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 total clearing time of the protection device (seconds)
𝑇𝐷 Time dial
𝑉 voltage (kV)
xii
1 Introduction
Aside from the risk of electric shock, the principal safety risk to electrical personnel operating and
maintaining high voltage (HV) and low voltage (LV) switchboards is exposure to arc flash from live
bare power terminals or conductors within switchboards. In the past decade, many industrial
companies across the globe have recognised the significance of understanding and mitigating the
hazards posed by arc flash events occurring in their facilities. While reported injuries caused by an
arc flash are rare, the cost related to these injuries can be very high, making them one of the most
important categories of injuries to avoid in an industrial workplace.
An arc flash will primarily occur when personnel are undertaking switching functions or
maintenance work that require switchboard doors to be opened or covers to be removed. In order to
quantify the amount of energy released during such an event, arc flash studies must be performed.
The purpose of this project is to determine the existing arc flash incident energy levels of HV and
LV switchboards installed in the Solomon Hub, which is owned by Fortescue Metals Group Limited
(“Fortescue”). The term “switchboard” will also include ring main units (RMUs) and motor control
centres (MCCs) for the rest of this document. The principal aims of the project are to reduce the
incident energy to less than 8 cal/cm2 where possible, and to determine the appropriate arc flash
personal protective equipment (PPE) where it is not feasible to reduce the incident energy to less
than 8 cal/cm2. To achieve these aims, the following tasks were conducted:
Verification of existing power network models and expanding the models where required;
Short circuit studies to determine maximum and minimum three-phase fault currents at the
switchboards;
Maximum and minimum arc current calculations;
Coordination studies to determine the clearing times of the protection devices for the
corresponding arc fault currents; and
1
Incident energy and arc flash boundary calculations.
This thesis discusses how the study was conducted, the results of the studies based on the existing
state of the system, the proposed solutions as well as the arc flash studies results based on these
solutions. In addition, a section detailing different solutions that were investigated to mitigate the arc
flash hazard is included.
This report begins with a background section that will provide sufficient information about the
internship project and will give comprehensive facts in regards to the arc flash study.
2
2 Background
2.1 Engineering Internship
Murdoch University engineering students must complete the unit ENG470-Engineering Honours
Thesis as one of the requirements for Bachelor of Engineering at Murdoch University. The internship
is one of two types of projects that engineering students at Murdoch University can undertake. The
internship placement provides students with exposure to their prospective industry while gaining
practical problem-solving experience. The aim of the unit is to develop the following graduate
attributes: communication, critical and creative thinking, social interaction, independent learning,
ethics and in-depth knowledge of the project topic.
The internship project took place at Fortescue’s corporate office in Perth under the direct supervision
of a senior Electrical Engineer. The placement was a full time position for 18 weeks where the main
task undertaken was the arc flash studies for the Solomon Hub. As part of the electrical engineering
team, the intern also undertook minor tasks such as power network modelling and simulations. These
tasks provided opportunities to turn theory learned from formal studies into practice, while gaining
invaluable skills and knowledge of how to become a successful engineer.
2.2 Fortescue Metals Group
Since the company’s inception in 2003, Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) has managed to acquire
several tenements in the Pilbara region of Western Australia where significant iron ore deposits have
been discovered. The company owns port facilities and a 620 km rail infrastructure that is used to
transport iron ore from the company’s two operating hubs, which include Cloudbreak, Christmas
Creek, Firetail and Kings Valley mines, as shown in Figure 1. The mining operation was built on an
existing mine lease and is now producing 165 million tonnes of iron ore per year, making Fortescue
the fourth largest iron ore producer in the world.
3
Figure 1: Fortescue Metals Group Limited Operations Map [1]
2.2.1 Solomon Hub
Solomon Hub is located 120 km west of Chichester Hub and includes Firetail and Kings Valley
mines. Solomon Hub has almost twice the resource of Chichester Hub and produces more than 70
metric tonnes of iron ore per year [1]. The arc flash studies were conducted for switchboards installed
in the Solomon Hub, and hence this report will only focus on Solomon Hub’s electrical system.
2.2.1.1 Solomon Hub power system arrangement
Power for Solomon Hub is supplied by four 15MVA Solar Titan 130 (“MPU”) [2] and two GE
LM6000PF Dual Fuel Gas Turbine Generators with maximum individual capacity of 63.5MVA [3].
The power plant is owned by TransAlta and operated as an islanded electrical system. The plant
supplies power to the mining, crushing, screening, overland conveying, stock-piling and train load
out facilities, workshops, administration services buildings and an accommodation village.
Power from the LM6000 generators and MPUs is generated at 11kV. The MPUs are used to supply
power to the Primary Diesel Facility, Stockyard and RMU 10 at 11kV; while some of the generated
power is fed to Substation 1 for transmission at 132kV. Likewise, power from the LM6000
generators is stepped-up to 132kV by two transformers installed in Substation 1 for transmission.
4
From Substation 1, power is transmitted to Substation 2 and Substation 3. In Substation 2, a 50MVA
transformer is used to step-down the voltage to 33kV and feed to a 33kV switchboard where
electricity is distributed to RMU 11, RMU 14 and Firetail ore processing facility (OPF) main 33kV
switchboard via two feeders. The power network set-up for Substation 3 is the same, although power
is distributed to RMU 29, RMU 12 and Kings Valley OPF.
The main 33kV switchboards in Firetail OPF and Kings Valley OPF have a number of outgoing
feeders that supply power to various plant switchrooms. From each switchroom, power is reticulated
to 6.6kV and 400V switchboards to provide power for motors and other electrical equipment
installed at the OPFs. The power network interconnection diagram for the Solomon Hub is shown in
Appendix A.
2.3 Project Background
Electricity is a widely used energy resource as it provides an efficient source of power for
applications such as lighting, heating and many others. Well maintained and operated electrical
equipment will offer a very high level of service and safety. One of the major pieces of electrical
equipment installed in an industrial facility is a switchboard. A switchboard is an assembly of panels
containing busbars, protection devices and auxiliary equipment that are critical to the safe and
continuous operation of electrical equipment. Electricity is transmitted to a switchboard from a
power supply, where it is distributed to downstream equipment. Shown in Figure 2 is a switchboard
installed in Substation 2 at the Solomon Hub that is used to distribute electricity to RMU 11, RMU
14 and Firetail OPF.
5
Figure 2: Switchboard installed in Substation 2
A switchboard is the main point of isolation if downstream equipment is being tested or requires
maintenance and needs to be de-energised. However, electrical personnel working with, or in close
proximity to a switchboard must be aware that, under certain conditions, electrical switchboards
present a serious hazard. Industrial power networks operate at higher energy levels and higher
voltage levels than domestic systems and therefore an awareness of these additional hazards is
essential. When personnel are working on a switchboard, they are exposed not only to electric shock
but also to an arc flash hazard.
An arc flash hazard is a dangerous condition caused by an electric arc as a result of electrical faults
[4]. Because of the significant and even catastrophic nature of these events, elimination and
mitigation strategies continue to receive attention. An arc flash will primarily occur when personnel
are switching or racking a circuit breaker or maintenance work is being performed in the
switchboard. In order to determine the hazard posed by an arc flash event, arc flash studies must be
performed.
In August 2014, Fortescue’s Perth Engineering team initiated arc flash investigations as a critical
safety initiative. The goal of the overall study was to determine the arc flash hazard posed by
switchboards installed in the Solomon Hub and to find solutions to mitigate the hazard. The arc flash
6
hazard assessment was limited to switchboards with voltage levels of at least 400V. Switchboards
that have a lower rating have a relatively low fault current associated with them, hence a low risk of
an arc fault developing with sufficient energy to cause a severe injury.
There is no regulatory requirement for the company to perform an arc flash study. However, to fulfil
the Workplace Health and Safety (WHS) requirement of the company, all measures must be
undertaken to ensure safety of personnel, and hence arc flash studies are recommended.
2.4 Arc flash
An arc flash is the release of heat and light energy when an insulator between energised conductors
fails and current flows through a normally nonconductive medium, such as air [5]. The arc flash
caused by dielectric breakdown is identical to the arc flash emitted by an arc welder. Some of the
causes of arc flash are:
Rats and snakes entering the equipment;
Using an item of under-rated measuring equipment;
Loose joints;
Tools left behind after maintenance; and
Tools accidentally touched two energised conductors.
When objects touch energised conductors, it can result in a short circuit fault. The large fault current
will result in a strong magnetic field, which in turn will propel the object away. As the object moves
away, the current continues to flow and forms very hot arcs which vaporise conductors and ionize
gases. An arc flash can also occur for the same reason when switching or racking a circuit breaker.
In systems with high voltage, tracking can also initiate an arc flash event. This occurs naturally due
to the dielectric breakdown value of air, making it possible for an arc flash to occur over a much
greater air gap, and also due to the tendency of partial discharge to occur over time across insulation,
7
eventually leading to insulation breakdown and an arc fault developing. The arc formation in a
cubicle occurs across different phases [6]:
1. Compression phase: the air where the arc develops is overheated. Then, through
convection and radiation, the remaining volume of air inside the cubicle also increase in
temperature.
2. Expansion phase: as soon as the internal pressure increases, a hole in the cubicle is
formed where the superheated air begins to escape. The pressure increases until it
reaches its maximum value.
3. Emission phase: the superheated air is forced out by an almost constant overpressure
which is the result of the continued contribution of energy by the arc.
4. Thermal phase: after the discharge of air, the temperature inside the cubicle is close to
the arc’s temperature. The final phase lasts until the arc is extinguished, where the
materials inside the cubicle coming into contact, experience erosion with production of
gas, molten material and fumes.
The electric arc between metals is four times as hot as the surface of the sun, which is the hottest
temperature reached on earth [7]. In a bolted fault, such as phase-phase and phase-to-ground faults,
the fault current stays within the conductors where resistance is very low, therefore, little heat is
generated. For an arc fault, there is an appreciable resistance between conductors because a current
is flowing through the air. The heat generated is significant due to the higher resistance path between
conductors. The arc flash may blow equipment doors open and propel parts including molten metals.
The arc flash may continue until the generated voltage has been consumed or a protection device
clears the fault. The potential hazards caused by an arc flash event may include [8]:
8
Burns – an electric arc produces heat energy where exposure experienced by personnel can
cause survivors to suffer debilitating and horrific burn trauma or death.
Projectiles hazard – arc faults result in rapid increase of pressure inside equipment causing
the ejection of loose items or metallic particles.
Intense light – an arc flash event emits high intensity light which can damage the eyes.
Sound waves – an arc flash event may cause permanent hearing loss due to sound generated
from the explosion.
Respiratory trauma – hazardous toxic gases are produced from molten metals or burnt
insulation which are harmful if inhaled.
2.5 Arc flash reported incidents and statistics
The potential for electrical injuries due to arc flash is a serious workplace health and safety problem.
The Department of Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia recorded four arc flash incidents from
2013 - 2015 that can be found in the Department’s Safety Publications Library [9]. All incidents
resulted in irreparable damage to equipment and, fortunately, only resulted in minor injuries to
personnel. The author of this report is aware that the number of arc flash incidents is many times
more than what was reported to the Department of Mines and Petroleum, although normally these
incidents are not reported to the relevant authority, and hence not viewable from public records. On
the 3rd of February 2015, two electricians died due to an arc flash event in a mall in Perth [10]. The
electricians were conducting routine maintenance on a switchboard when the incident happened. The
incident is still under investigation but it is believed that it was caused by human error. This event
highlights that even though arc flash events are uncommon compared to other electrical faults, they
can be very costly and even lethal.
In the USA, a report published by the NFPA states that electrical burns from arc flashes are the cause
of many work-related burns treated at burns centres [11]. Research conducted at a Texas burn centre
over a 20-year period found that 40% of burns were caused by electrical arc injuries and the length
of hospital stay for treatment was 11.3 days [11]. In addition, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
9
shows that for a seven-year period starting in 1992, 2287 U.S. workers died and 32,807 workers
sustained lost time injuries because of electrical shock and burn injuries [12]. Of the 32,807 injuries,
38% were classified as electrical burns [12], which is the category that would include arc flash burns.
Furthermore, a research report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health into arc
flash injuries in the mining industry noted that between 1990 and 2001, there were 836 arc flash
incidents on mine sites [13]. The majority of these incidents occurred during electrical work activities
including: installation (2%), maintenance (5%), repair and troubleshooting (42%), unspecified
electrical work (22%), during normal operation (19%) and unspecified cause (10%) [13]. Although
reported arc flash injuries are infrequent compared to other electrical injuries, the very high costs
associated with these injuries make them one of the most important categories of injuries in an
industrial workplace.
Extended hospitalisation and rehabilitation costs for personnel, coupled with litigation fees, fines,
investigation costs and increased insurance premiums, are often expensive. In addition, an arc flash
event can also cause irreparable damage to equipment which can lead to extensive downtime and
costly replacement and repair. The combined costs of the damage of one incident have been
estimated to potentially reach a total value of over USD 12 million [14]. As such, the potential
impacts highlight the importance of having mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate arc flash
hazards.
2.5.1 Standards and WHS Requirements
Over the last decade, increasing attention has been placed on the arc flash hazards associated with
electrical switchboards. This has driven manufacturers to design and build safer switchboards that
specifically address arc flash risk. Electrical switchboards in Australia with a nominal supply current
of 800A or more shall be protected from arc faults while the equipment is in service or is undergoing
maintenance as per AS/NZS 3000:2007 [15].
10
The Fortescue specification for LV switchboards 100-SP-EL-0001 is currently being revised and
will outline arc fault protection for LV switchboards that have nominal current of 400A and above,
which is in conformity with the enhanced PPE recommended for such switchboards as per AS/NZS
4836 [16] [17] [18]. For HV switchboards, the Fortescue specification 100-SP-EL-0016 states that
HV switchboards must have an arc fault containment rating, which is now becoming an industry
standard worldwide [19].
2.5.1.1 Internal Arc Fault Containment
Fortescue switchboards have Internal Arc Classification (IAC) certification, as specified in Section
8.3 and Annex A of AS/NZS 62271.200 – 2005, which is an adaptation of IEC 62271.200 modified
for Australian conditions. The arc fault containment is intended to offer a tested level of protection
in the event of internal arc fault for personnel in the vicinity of switchgear with rated voltage from
1kV up to and including 52kV [20]. Likewise, AS/NZS 3439.1:2002 provides guidelines for Internal
Arc Fault Containment testing with the intention of protecting personnel standing in front of an LV
switchboard from an internal arcing fault [21].
The IAC testing is subject to agreement between the switchboard manufacturer and the customer.
There are two types of test performed for IAC certification: the “special” test and the “standard” test.
The “special” test is conducted if additional security is required. For this test, arc faults are simulated
in different locations within a switchboard where it is possible for an arc fault to occur [22]. Due to
the additional cost of testing, when IAC certification is requested, the test that is normally conducted
is a “standard” test only. When conducting a “standard” test, the arc is initiated on the outgoing
terminal of the feeder, which is normally cleared instantaneously, and hence the arc flash energy is
reduced [22]. However, faults in other locations within a switchboard are possible. Nonetheless, the
probability of these faults is low, therefore IAC testing for faults at these locations is not generally
required [21]. Figure 3 shows locations within a switchboard where the initiation of an arc fault is
possible.
11
Figure 3: Locations within a switchboard where arc faults can occur: a) outgoing terminal of the feeder, b) feeder, c)
distribution bus, d) main busbar and e) incomer or incoming cable termination. (Redrawn from [23])
If the arc fault occurs at locations other than the outgoing terminal of the feeder, the first upstream
protection device will clear the arc fault. For example, if the fault is at the feeder or at the main
busbar, the first upstream protection device is the incomer. If the fault is at the incomer, the clearing
device is the feeder from the first upstream switchboard (upstream protection device), which is
normally located in another switchroom. Due to protection grading requirements, these protection
devices normally have longer operating times than the incomer protection device. As a result of
longer operating times, the arc flash energy is higher, and the switchboard arc fault containment
certified using the “standard” test might not be able to withstand the energy released under this
scenario.
Support from IAC test reports are needed before personnel can conduct normal operating duties
while the equipment is energised (with all panel doors closed) without requiring an arc flash PPE. In
order to verify that the whole switchboard is capable of withstanding internal arc faults, the test
12
report must specify that the test was conducted for all compartments within the switchboard, rather
than just on the outgoing terminal of the feeder.
The Fortescue’s records do not clearly show if switchboards installed in the Solomon Hub were IAC
certified using the “standard” test or the “special” test. It was known that all HV switchboards and
some LV switchboards have an IAC, however, without the certification to confirm this, personnel’s
safety could not be guaranteed when working on energised switchboards (with all panel doors
closed).
In addition, it is important to realise that even if the switchboards have been IAC tested, this can
only provide protection if covers and doors are closed and properly fixed in place. When the door or
cover of an arc resistant switchboard is open, the arc resistant properties of the equipment are
nullified. Hence, protection cannot be guaranteed if personnel are conducting normal operating
duties or maintenance work while doors are open. Hence, it is necessary that arc resistant
switchboards shall be included in the arc flash study.
2.6 Arc Flash Studies
An arc flash study is used to quantify the arc flash hazard by calculating the arc flash energy. An arc
flash study is considered a continuation of short-circuit and coordination studies because the results
of each of these studies are required for the arc flash hazard analysis. The arc flash hazard assessment
is used to identify and implement controls to reduce the likelihood and severity of an arc flash
accident. After conducting an arc flash assessment, the calculated energy will determine the required
PPE for personnel working on or near electrical equipment. In addition, the result of the assessment
can be used to establish the limits of approach to energised electrical equipment, identify hazard
management, and identify mitigation actions. When performing an arc flash hazard assessment, a
good knowledge of the electrical network in a facility and the electrical protection system is required.
13
Globally, two North American standards have dominated arc flash hazard assessment [24]: The
NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace; and the IEEE Std 1584-2002, IEEE
Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations. Prior to the Australian Standard, ENA NENS
09 – 2014 [25] for arc hazard quantification coming into place in 2014, and even currently, the USA
standards IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E were widely adopted by the Australian Engineering
Community.
2.6.1 NFPA 70E
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70E standard [26] provides guidelines for
electrical safety in the workplace and selection of arc flash PPE. NFPA 70E is a safety standard that
describes work practices that can help protect electrical personnel from electrical hazards including
electrocution, electric shock, arc blast and arc flash. Section 130 of the NFPA 70E provides task and
equipment based tables that can be used in determining arc flash PPE requirements, hence known as
the “table” method. These tables give pre-defined levels of PPE based on the tasks that are to be
performed, the magnitude of the fault current and the associated clearing time of the protection
device. The “table” method takes a three-step approach:
1. Conduct a risk assessment to determine if the condition of the equipment and the task
that is to be performed warrants the used of arc flash PPE. If PPE is not required, no
further action is necessary, otherwise, proceed to step 2.
2. Determine the working distance and calculate the magnitude of the prospective fault
current and the associated clearing time of the protection device.
3. Determine the arc flash PPE category requirement for the task specified in step 1.
The arc flash energy depends on complex relationships between system voltage, bolted and arcing
fault current, arc impedance, clearing time of protection devices, conductor spacing, confinement in
an enclosure, and system grounding [27]. Some of these variables are not considered in the selection
of arc flash PPE based on the “table” method outlined in the NFPA 70E standard. For this reason,
14
the “table” method is of limited practical use and this could explain why there is a general preference
for using the other method outlined in the IEEE Std 1584 - 2002.
2.6.2 IEEE Std 1584 – 2002
The IEEE Std 1584 – 2002: IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, outlines the
methodology, including providing relevant equations, to determine the arc flash boundary and the
incident energy to which employees could be exposed during their work on or near electrical
equipment [28]. The arc flash boundary is the distance from the arc source where personnel are
exposed to 1.2 cal/cm2 of energy that can lead to a second degree burn [29]. Personnel not wearing
arc flash PPE must not go within the arc flash boundary to avoid exposure to high levels of arc flash
energy. The incident energy is the amount of energy that can reach a person’s face or torso standing
at a specific distance relative to the origin of the arc [30]. The incident energy calculation is not
based on exposure on the hands or arms which will be closer to the arc source if conducting energised
work, because injury to these areas is less life threatening. The equations within the IEEE 1584
standard was developed from statistical analyses using data from a large number of laboratory tests
conducted by the IEEE 1584 working group. Table 2 shows the parameter range for electrical
systems where the empirically derived equations are valid [30]. For equipment with voltage levels
above 15kV, equations based on a theoretical model developed by Ralph Lee [7], which are included
in the IEEE 1584 standard, can be applied.
Table 2: Limitations of equations from IEEE 1584
Parameter Applicable Range
System voltage 0.208kV – 15kV
Frequency 50/60 Hz
Bolted fault current 0.7kA – 106kA
Gap between electrodes 13 – 152 mm
Equipment enclosure type Open air, box, MCC, panel, switchgear and cables
Grounding type All types of grounding and ungrounded
Faults Three phase
The IEEE 1584 standard does not consider the risk of an arc flash occurring nor the effect of arc
fault containment. Instead, the standard is limited to the hazard posed by thermal energy, and the
effects of molten metals, projectiles and toxic by-products are not considered. Nonetheless, industrial
15
companies still have an obligation to complete Arc Flash Hazard assessment to mitigate arc flash
hazards. IEEE 1584 is based on the most comprehensive laboratory experiments and calculations
available; therefore, where arc flash hazard quantification is needed, the IEEE 1584 is generally
used.
2.7 Assumptions and Clarifications
The random nature of arcs makes them very difficult to model precisely. The equations in
the IEEE 1584 standard that are used for the analyses are developed based on average values.
Parameters used are selected to achieve what are considered to be the worst case results.
Calculations are based on three-phase faults.
The inrush currents of transformers are assumed to equal 12 times the transformer rating.
The inrush current of DOL motors are assumed to equal 6 times the motor rating.
Other assumptions are stated in the relevant sections where these assumptions are implemented.
2.8 PowerFactory
The software that was used for all the simulations is DIgSILENT PowerFactory. PowerFactory is an
engineering tool used for the analysis of electrical transmission and distribution systems. The
software was developed by programmers and engineers with extensive experience in computer
programming and electrical systems analysis [31]. The equations used and the results of the
simulations have been confirmed in a large number of implementations of power systems throughout
the world.
16
3 Methodology
3.1 System audit, data collection and power system modelling
A system audit was conducted to determine the state of the power network electrical model. During
the system audit, the network model was compared to the latest single line diagrams (SLDs). The
model was found to require a significant amount of work to bring it to a state where it would
accurately represent the complete Solomon Hub power network. It was found that many equipment
parameters used in the PowerFactory model were incorrect. In order to provide accurate incident
energy calculations, the network model needs to be as accurate as possible. Some parameters, like
the cable impedances, can have a significant effect on the fault levels. However, it was found that
many cables were not modelled, and some had incorrect lengths entered, which resulted in incorrect
impedance values. Moreover, some transformers were modelled using typical impedance values
instead of actual nameplate impedance values. Whilst impedance values may differ only slightly, a
small variation of available fault current may significantly affect the calculated magnitude of the
incident energy for a switchboard [32]. As a result, it was necessary to obtain accurate and complete
data pertaining to the cable and transformer specifications. Those data were then used to update the
PowerFactory model. This task identified an unexpected number of existing errors, and therefore
was time-consuming, taking approximately one month of full time investigation by the intern.
Another problem encountered during the project was that many electrical loads and switchboards
that are included in the present arc flash study had not previously been modelled into the simulation
software. Hence, the respective SLDs for these types of equipment were obtained and used to update
the model in the simulation software. The switchboards were modelled using “busbar” blocks while
all the loads were modelled using “general load” blocks in the PowerFactory software. There are
numerous electrical loads connected at each switchboard, however, they were modelled as a single
load. This is because modelling each load separately will give no additional information about the
power network compared with modelling a single composite load [33]. The power ratings of the
loads were taken from the Solomon electrical load list 224632-SL-2000-LL-EL-0002 [34] and the
17
load factors were assumed to equal 100% of the rated capacity. The load factor will not affect the
fault simulations; but in load flow simulations, it will result in maximum current demand, which is
considered to be the worst-case scenario.
Finally, it was found that all LV circuit breakers were not modelled into the simulation software and
the protection settings were not available. The protection devices need to be modelled in the software
so that a Time-Current Curve (TCC) can be generated, which will be used to determine the operating
time of these devices when a fault is simulated. As a result, the intern travelled to Solomon hub to
obtain the settings of the LV circuit breakers, which can be found in Appendix B. Most of the
protection settings were collected except for the settings of a few protection devices that were not
accessible or were not operational during the visit. Consequently, site personnel at Solomon Hub
were requested to gather the remaining protection settings after they became operational.
One more methodological problem encountered in the project is that, unfortunately, even though
most of the required protection settings were obtained, the LV circuit breakers cannot be modelled
into PowerFactory software because Fortescue did not have this included in the PowerFactory
protection devices library. As a result, all the operating times calculations for all LV circuit breakers
were performed manually.
3.2 Short-Circuit Study
Short-circuit simulations were conducted to determine the fault levels at each switchboard. It was
assumed that any unbalanced arc fault will immediately escalate to three-phase faults because air is
ionized around the conductors [30]. Hence, only faults involving three phases were simulated. The
fault currents that flow as a result of three-phase short-circuit faults at each switchboard were
determined using the “complete” method. With this method, fault currents are determined by
superimposing a healthy load-flow condition before the fault initiation, resulting in more realistic
and more accurate fault calculations [31].
18
Unlike in protection studies where the maximum fault current is assumed to provide worst-case
conditions, for an arc flash study, the worst-case short-circuit current assumptions do not always
produce the most severe arc flash incident energy results, as will be explained in the next section.
For simple radial systems similar to the Solomon hub’s electrical network, IEEE 1584 suggested that
two sets of calculations are required [30]. The first calculation is for the minimum short-circuit
current conditions and the second is for maximum short-circuit current conditions.
Both the maximum and minimum short-circuit conditions should be evaluated to determine the effect
on the protective device clearing times and the incident energy exposures. The variations between
the results of these two calculations can have a significant effect on the accuracy of the evaluations
for the arc flash hazard and the PPE requirements for each switchboard. There are different operating
modes that can significantly change the fault levels at the switchboards, which were identified. The
first operating mode was the basis of the maximum short-circuit calculations and included motor
contributions, while the second and third operating modes were the basis of the minimum short-
circuit calculations and excluded motor contributions. The operating modes were:
1. One LM6000 generator and all MPUs are in service (126MVA of generation) for maximum
fault simulations.
2. One LM6000 generator and one MPU are in service (79MVA of generation) for Stockyard
and RMU10 minimum fault simulations.
3. Three MPUs are in service (47MVA of generation) for minimum fault simulations for the
OPFs.
3.2.1 Effect of motor contributions in the calculations
Another variable that can affect the fault levels are current contributions from induction motors.
When a fault occurs, induction motors momentarily contribute current to the fault. The Solomon
Hub’s electrical system includes many induction motors, although around half of the major induction
19
motors are driven by variable speed drives (VSDs). A VSD effectively separates the motors from
the rest of the system, and hence a VSD-driven motor does not contribute to the fault current. The
fault contribution from a single motor is not significant, however, the individual contributions adds
up, which can result in a significant increase in the fault level. Unlike the contribution from the
generators, contributions from motors decay rapidly and may not be present for the whole duration
of an arc flash event [35].
Neither IEEE 1584 nor NFPA 70E provides guidance on how to calculate motor contributions,
however, PowerFactory can calculate motor contributions and include them in fault simulations. For
minimum fault simulations, it was assumed that there are no contributions from the motors, whereas,
for the maximum fault simulations, PowerFactory was set to include contributions from motors, to
obtain the highest fault current magnitude. When calculating the clearing time of protection devices
manually (as was the case for the LV circuit breakers), it is important that contributions from motors
downstream of the faulted bus are excluded because these currents are not passing through the
incoming and upstream protection devices that are used to interrupt the fault current.
To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows a PowerFactory fault simulation analysis where a fault was
introduced in Switchboard 2. It can be seen that Motor M2 is located downstream of Switchboard 2
and contributed 5kA to the fault. The rest of the network, including other motors, supplied a total of
31.835kA of current to the fault. Motor M2’s contribution does not flow through the incomer and
the upstream protection device. Consequently, this can have a significant effect on the incident
energy calculation because it will affect the clearing time of the protection devices. The importance
of using a correct value for the fault magnitude in clearing time calculations is further explained in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
20
Figure 4: Fault simulation showing motor contributions
3.3 Arc current calculations
The bolted fault currents found in the short-circuit study were used to calculate the arcing current
using either equation (1) or equation (2), depending on the voltage level.
For switchboards with a voltage under 1000V [29, p.10]:
𝐼𝑎 = 10K+0.662(𝑙𝑔 𝐼𝑏𝑓)+0.0966V+0.000526G+0.5588V(𝑙𝑔𝐼𝑏𝑓)−0.00304G(𝑙𝑔 𝐼𝑏𝑓) (1)
For switchboards with a voltage of 1000V or higher [29, p.10]:
𝐼𝑎 = 100.00402+0.983(𝑙𝑔 𝐼𝑏𝑓) (2)
where
𝐼𝑎 is the arcing current (kA)
K is a constant which has a value of -.097
𝑙𝑔 is the log10 function
𝐼𝑏𝑓 is the bolted fault current (kA)
G is the gap between conductors seen in Table 3 (mm)
V is the system voltage (kV)
21
Table 3: Distance factors and typical conductor gaps used for the arc flash calculations [30]
Voltage (kV) Typical conductor gaps x (distance factor)
0.208 - 1 32 1.473
>1 - 5 13-102 0.973
>5 - 15 153 0.973
The minimum arc current values were further reduced by 15% as recommended in Section 9.10.4 of
IEEE 1584. This was done because it is very difficult to accurately predict the arcing current and a
small change in current could result in a significant change in clearing time. To illustrate this, the
time current curve (TCC) of a protection relay protecting a 33kV switchboard is shown in Figure 5.
Notice the change in relay clearing time when transitioning from the “definite-time” region of the
TCC to the “inverse” region of the TCC. As illustrated in Figure 5, when the arc fault current is
reduced by 10%, the clearing time is increased from 0.02 s to 0.5 s, which resulted in a significant
increase in incident energy.
Figure 5: TCC illustrating the significant increase in incident energy for a 10% arc current reduction
22
3.4 Coordination studies
The objective of coordination studies is to ensure that protection devices are properly designed and
coordinated [36]. Coordination studies are used to determine the operating time of protection devices
and to ensure that these devices will detect faults and isolate the faulted part of the system without
compromising reliability. Conventionally, coordination studies were targeted at reliability, with all
protection settings adjusted towards clearing bolted faults. However, as there are new arc flash safety
requirements, this means that from now on all coordination studies (including the present study) used
to determine the appropriate settings for the protection devices must not only clear bolted faults but
they must also clear arc faults.
The operating times of protection devices were determined based on the minimum and maximum
arc current values calculated using the equations presented in Section 3.3. The accuracy of the
operating time is important because this is the most dominant factor influencing incident energy [37].
For each switchboard, out of two calculations, the arc fault current magnitude that resulted in
protection device operating time that led to worst-case scenario was used. For switchboards that are
protected by a fuse, the minimum arcing fault currents are the basis of the worst-case calculations
for the incident energy [38]. For switchboards that are protected by circuit breakers or protection
relays, the worst-case calculations vary according to the regions of the TCC. If the arc fault current
magnitude falls completely within any region of the TCC where the time remains constant, the
maximum arc fault current will result in the calculation of the worst-case incident energy. However,
if the arc fault current falls within the “inverse” region of the TCC, depending on the steepness of
the curve, the lower arcing fault values can sometimes result in the worst-case scenario calculations,
because it will correspond to longer clearing times (illustrated in Figure 6). Incident energy is a
function of several parameters including the arc current and the clearing time of the protection
device, where a lower fault current can sometimes be counteracted by an associated increase in fault
clearing time, thereby leading to higher incident energy. Therefore, in order to determine the worst-
case incident energy for instances when the arc current value falls within the “inverse” region of the
23
TCC, two calculations were conducted. The first calculation used the maximum arc current value
and the associated clearing time of the protection device while the second calculation used the
minimum arc current value and the associated clearing time of the protection device.
Figure 6: TCC illustrating the effect of the clearing characteristics of a protection relay on the incident energy
Note that the opening times of the circuit breakers were added to the operating time of protection
devices. The opening time has a value range of 0.03 s – 0.06 s depending on the type and model of
the circuit breaker.
3.5 Incident energy and arc flash boundary calculations
After the coordination study, arc flash boundary and incident energy calculations were performed
using equations from IEEE 1584. Incident energy is the amount of energy that can reach a person’s
face or torso if an arc flash occurs. The incident energy was calculated using equation 3 and equation
4 for switchboards that have a voltage of less than 15kV [29, p.11].
24
𝐸𝑛 = 10𝐾1 + 𝐾2 + 1.081𝑙𝑔 𝑙𝑎 +0.0022G (3)
where
𝐸𝑛 is the incident energy (J/cm2) normalised for time and distance
𝐾1 is a constant that has a value of -0.555 for switchboard incident energy calculations
𝐾2 is a constant that has a value of -0.113 if the system is solidly grounded, otherwise it has a
value of 0
𝑡 610𝑥
𝐸 = 4.184𝐶𝑓 𝐸𝑛 ( )( ) (4)
0.2 𝐷𝑥
where
𝐸 is the incident energy (J/cm2)
𝐶𝑓 is a calculation factor that has a value of 1.5 for a switchboard that has a voltage level of
1kV and below, otherwise, it has a value of 1
𝑡 is arcing time (seconds)
𝐷 is a person’s distance relative to the origin of the arc (mm)
𝑥 is a distance exponent from Table 3
For switchboards where the voltage level is 15kV or above, the theoretically derived equation by
Ralph Lee was used [29, p.12]:
𝑡
𝐸 = 2.142 𝑥 106 𝑉𝐼𝑏𝑓 ( 2) (5)
𝐷
The possible working distances for the switchboards were determined from the equipment manuals
by inspecting the switchboard dimensions. However, these distances will vary depending on the task
that is being performed. To cater for worst-case scenario, the working distance for the LV
switchboards was assumed to be equal to 610 mm while the working distance for HV switchboards
was assumed to be equal to 910 mm. The assumptions were based on the advice of the supervising
electrical engineer at Fortescue who has a good knowledge of switchboard construction.
25
In addition, the arc flash boundary, which is the distance from the arc source at which a person can
receive a second degree burn, was calculated. Any person crossing the arc flash boundary is required
to wear the appropriate arc flash PPE. If the switchboard has a voltage of less than 15kV, equation 6
is used; otherwise, equation 7 is used [29, p.12].
1
𝑡 610𝑥 𝑥
𝐷𝐵 = [4.184𝐶𝑓 𝐸𝑛 ( ) ( )] (6)
0.2 𝐸𝐵
𝑡
𝐷𝐵 = √2.142𝑥106 𝑉𝐼𝑏𝑓 ( ) (7)
𝐸𝐵
where 𝐷𝐵 is the incident energy (J/cm2) and x the distance exponent from Table 3.
3.6 PPE selection
The required PPE if personnel are exposed to arc hazards is shown in Table 4. The PPE category
was chosen based on the magnitude of the incident energy which was calculated in the previous step.
This is the minimum level of PPE recommended from NFPA 70E standard with the intent to protect
personnel from the thermal effects of the arc flash at working distance.
Table 4: PPE requirements based on incident energy exposure [26]
Min Incident Max Incident Energy Required PPE Rating
PPE Category
Energy (cal/cm2) (cal/cm2) (cal/cm2)
0 1.2 0
1.21 4 1 4
4.1 8 2 8
8.1 25 3 25
25.1 40 4 40
40.1 And above X Specialised PPE
required
26
3.7 Process flowchart
The arc flash studies performed for this project were made up of several tasks that were explained in
the previous sections. The aim of the studies is not just to quantify the arc flash hazards and
recommend PPE, but also to find solutions to mitigate the hazard. Figure 7 shows the process flow
chart illustrating the steps conducted to achieve the goals of the arc flash studies.
Figure 7: Flow chart which illustrate the steps conducted to achieve the goals of the arc flash studies
27
4 Results
Switchboards were evaluated to determine if either the incomer or the upstream protection device
should be used for the calculation of the incident energy. In this study, it was assumed that an arc
fault can occur at the load side of the incomer or at the incomer itself. An incoming protection device
can only detect faults at its load side, which is normally in a separate compartment. If this happens,
the incomer will clear the fault, and hence its operating time will be used for the incident energy
calculations. If the fault is at the incoming protection device itself, then the upstream protection
device will provide the protection. The identification of the correct protection device is very
important because the clearing times will vary, depending on which device trips. The arc flash studies
results were categorised based on the location of the fault within switchboards.
4.1 Stockyard
The summary of the arc flash study results for switchboards installed in the Stockyard area is shown
in Table 5. The complete arc flash study results for the Stockyard area can be found in Appendix C.
These results are based on the existing settings of the protection devices. As previously mentioned,
two incident energy calculations were conducted for each switchboard: one is when the fault is at
the load side of the incomer (a “switchboard”) and another is when the fault is at the incomer itself
where the upstream protection device will clear the fault. An arc fault at the incomer can occur when
personnel are switching or racking the incoming protection device. It can be seen that some
switchboards have very high arc flash incident energy that is well above the desired limit of 8
cal/cm2.
Table 5: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at the Stockyard
0.85 x Incident
Maximum Total Arc Flash
Clearing Device Minimum Energy
Equipment Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Location Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
(kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV
Upstream 8.03-13.89 6.81-11.58 0.75- 2.28 14.66-55.72 3336-8259
Incomer
0.4kV
Incomer 8.03-13.89 6.81-11.58 0.06-0.43 1.00-12.92 538-3061
Switchboards
11kV
Upstream 5.37-18.49 3.75-9.21 0.42-0.67 3.59-8.40 2809-6725
Incomer
11kV
Incomer/Upstream 5.37-18.49 3.75-9.21 0.08-0.67 1.58-21.82 1204-17934
Switchboards
28
The incomers possess the greatest arc flash hazard, with SUB-801-SWB01 incomer CB and
SUB901-MCC01 incomer CB having 54.93 cal/cm2 and 55.72 cal/cm2 potential incident energy,
respectively (see Appendix C). These energy levels are higher than the withstand rating of PPE’s
available at the Stockyard area and, therefore, a mitigation strategy must be implemented as soon as
possible.
4.2 Firetail
The results of the arc flash study for switchboards installed at Firetail OPF are summarised in Table
6. The complete arc flash study results for the Stockyard area can be found in Appendix D. It can
be seen that all 6.6kV switchboards have a calculated incident energy of less than 8 cal/cm2, which
is the ideal result. However, people working in 0.4kV and 33kV switchboards are exposed to very
high arc flash incident energy. For the 0.4kV switchboards, it can be seen that the highest potential
incident energy exposure is 43.82 cal/cm2 if an arc fault occurs at SR102-MCC01 incomer. In
addition, it can be seen that the incident energy of 33kV switchboards are well above the desired
limit of 8 cal/cm2.
Table 6: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Firetail OPF
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location (kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV Incomer Upstream 16.38-18.04 13.24-13.28 1.07-1.10 38.43-43.82 6418-7016
0.4kV
Incomer 16.38-18.04 13.24-13.28 1.25 37.62-41.77 6326-6791
Switchboards
6.6kV Incomer Upstream 3.90-5.26 2.93-3.02 0.66-0.67 4.04-5.55 3166-4390
6.6kV
Incomer 3.90-5.26 2.93-3.02 0.41-0.42 2.54-4.93 1967-3888
Switchboards
Substation 2
33kV Incomer
Feeder to 4.52-4.59 2.06-2.10 0.39-0.41 35.41-37.58 4944-5086
/Switchboards
Firetail OPF
Moreover, Table 6 shows that the feeder from Substation 2 will clear faults in all 33kV switchboards.
The incomer and the upstream protection devices for the 33kV switchboards will detect the fault but
the feeder from Substation 2 will operate first. The protection devices do not have the correct
coordination, and hence a three-phase fault in any of the 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF
29
has the potential to result in unnecessary power outages in Firetail OPF. The latter problem will be
considered when recommending the proposed solutions.
4.3 Kings Valley
The results of the arc flash studies for switchboards installed in Kings Valley OPF is summarised in
Table 7. The complete arc flash study results for Kings Valley OPF can be found in Appendix E.
The incident energy of 6.6kV switchboards remain below the desired limit of 8 cal/cm2. However,
the 0.4kV switchboards remain a serious risk, many 0.4kV switchboards have an incident energy
greater than 40 cal/cm2 where there is no available PPE to protect personnel. As such, energised
maintenance work at these switchboards should not be allowed unless steps to mitigate the risk are
taken. This is especially the case for switchboards 2500-SR509-MCC02 where the potential incident
energy is 92.27 cal/cm2.
A further finding is that the incident energy of all 33kV switchboards are below the maximum
incident energy limit of 8 cal/cm2. However, the 33kV protection system has no fault grading from
Substation 3 feeders. Substation 3 feeders to Kings Valley OPF will trip instantaneously for a fault
in any of the 33kV switchboards installed at Kings Valley OPF, including faults at the HV terminal
of the transformers. As a consequence, power will be unnecessarily taken out at the Kings Valley
OPF if a three-phase fault occurs in the 33kV system. This problem will be considered when
recommending the proposed solutions.
Table 7: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Kings Valley OPF
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location (kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV Incomer Upstream 14.98-18.39 12.30-13.40 1.06-1.17 38.11-45.14 6382-7159
0.4kV
Incomer 14.98-18.39 12.30-13.40 0.45-3.00 13.17-92.27 3102-11631
Switchboards
6.6kV Incomer Upstream 3.96-5.36 3.00-3.02 0.66 4.07-5.66 3195-4480
6.6kV
Incomer 3.96-5.36 3.00-3.02 0.42-0.84 2.57-6.67 1990-5302
Switchboards
Substation 3
33kV Incomer Feeder to
4.68-4.86 2.01-2.05 0.08 7.64-7.87 2296-2330
CBs/Switchboards Kings
Valley OPF
30
4.4 RMUs + other attached switchboards
The results of the arc flash study for the RMUs and other switchboards that are fed from the RMUs
are summarised in Table 8. The complete arc flash studies result for these switchboards can be found
in Appendix F. The 0.4kV switchboards’ arc flash incident energy levels are dangerously high. In
particular, the SR701-MCC01 switchboard has a calculated incident energy of 116.54 cal/cm 2 and
there is no commercially available PPE that can withstand this energy exposure. Hence, energised
work on this switchboard should not be allowed until mitigating steps have been taken.
The calculated incident energy for the 6.6kV switchboards remain below 8 cal/cm 2. This is also the
case for most tasks on the 0.69kV switchboard. However, it is not the case when personnel are
switching or racking the 0.69kV switchboard incomers where personnel are exposed to high incident
energy levels reaching 52.08 cal/cm2 for the CV763-VSD02 switchboard incomer. Moreover, it can
be seen that the arc flash incident energy of the 33kV switchboards are below 8 cal/cm 2, which is
desirable. However, these results are based on the existing settings of the protection devices which
do not have correct coordination. The protection settings of these devices will be adjusted to ensure
the reliability of the protection system. However, as a consequence of changing these settings, the
arc flash incident energy at these switchboards will increase. The proposed protection settings to
ensure selectivity and for reduced arc flash incident energy are discussed in Section 7 of this report.
Table 8: Arc flash study results for RMUs and loads fed from the RMUs
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location (kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV Incomer Upstream 7.26-19.04 6.12-15.33 0.60-4.45 15.94-94.42 3531-11815
0.4kV
Incomer 7.26-19.04 6.12-15.33 0.09-6.5 3.13-116.54 1168-13629
Switchboards
0.69kV Incomer Upstream 15.05-21.20 12.50-17.04 0.84-1.11 29.01-52.08 5303-7888
0.69kV
Incomer 15.05-21.20 12.50-17.04 0.09 2.95-4.27 1123-1444
Switchboards
6.6kV Incomer Upstream 3.39-3.53 2.15-2.25 0.77-0.92 4.21-4.79 3304-3775
6.6kV
Incomer 3.39-3.53 2.15-2.25 0.52 2.71-2.83 2100-2198
Switchboards
33kV Incomer Substations
4.36-4.86 2.01-2.09 0.08 7.11-7.93 2216-2340
/Switchboards 1 and 2
31
5 Discussion
From the results of the arc flash studies, it is evident that many switchboards have unacceptably high
incident energy values that need to be improved. Contrary to what was believed by many electrical
personnel, the arc flash hazard posed by LV switchboards has been found to actually be more
significant than the arc flash hazard posed by HV switchboards. This is due to the higher available
fault current for LV systems. When the voltage is stepped down by a transformer, the current is
increased. Electrical personnel interact with LV switchboards more often than HV switchboards.
Therefore, statistically, the risk of having an arc flash incident in LV switchboards is actually higher.
In addition, normally, coordination studies are performed to select the appropriate settings of
protection devices to clear bolted faults. However, for LV systems, the magnitude of the arc current
is much lower than the bolted fault current and therefore, a protection device might take longer to
clear the arc fault or maybe it will not detect it at all. To illustrate this further, a numerical calculation
is shown below to calculate the incident energy of switchboard 2500-SR509-MCC02 installed at
Kings Valley, using the arc current values that were found to result in the worst-case incident energy.
Figure 8 shows the single line diagram that depicts the fault and shows the clearing devices.
Figure 8: Fault simulation showing the faulted switchboard
32
For the protection of the incomer protection device, the maximum arc current of 16.71kA was used
because it would result in worst-case incident energy:
0.417
𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 = 16710 𝑥 = 211𝐴 (7)
33
Where 𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 is the arc current referred to the HV side of the transformer. Using the protection
settings of the upstream protection device, the operating time of the upstream protection device was
calculated using Equation 8 [38, p.108]. The protection device’s 50P element with pickup setting of
700A would not detect the arc fault current of 211 A, hence, the 51P element was used in order to
calculate the result for the hypothetical worst-case incident energy level. The protection device has
a time dial (TD) setting of 0.21, pickup setting of 50 A and the curve type was set to C1.
0.14
𝑡𝑝 = 𝑇𝐷 ( 𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 0.02
) (8)
( 𝐼 ) −1
𝑝𝑢
0.14
𝑡𝑝 = 0.21 ( 211 0.02
) = 1.01 𝑠
( 50 ) −1
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑡𝑝 + 𝑡𝑜 (9)
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 1.01 + 0.05 = 1.06 𝑠
where
TD is the time dial setting of the protection relay
𝐼𝑝𝑢 is the pickup setting of the protection relay
𝑡𝑝 is the operating time of the protection device
𝑡𝑜 opening time of the circuit breaker
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total clearing time of the protection device
𝑐𝑎𝑙
Then, using equation 3 and 4, the incident energy was calculated to be equal to 38.86 .
𝑐𝑚2
33
For the protection of the remaining sections of the switchboard, the incomer, which is an LV circuit
breaker, would clear the fault. Hence, the incomer’s operating time was used for the calculation
which can be found in Appendix B. The minimum arc current of 13.25kA was used in order to
calculate the result for the hypothetical worst-case incident energy level. The protection device’s
short-time and instantaneous time elements have pickup settings of 21.6kA and 26.4kA respectively
which are above the arc current of 13.25kA. Hence, these elements will not detect the fault and
therefore, the long-time element was used for the incident energy calculations. The protection device
has a pickup setting of 2400 and the curve type was set to C-04. The total clearing time of the device
can be approximated from the curve shown in Appendix G, but first, it must be scaled [39]:
𝐼𝑎,𝐿𝑉
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = (10)
𝐼𝑝𝑢
13250
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = = 5.5
2400
Where 𝐼𝑎,𝐿𝑉 is the arc current in the LV side of the transformer. Approximating from the curve, 5.5
equates to 3 seconds total clearing time as seen from the curve in Appendix G. Then, using equation
𝑐𝑎𝑙
3 and 4, the incident energy was calculated to be equal to 92.27 .
𝑐𝑚2
When considering the results of the above calculations, it is evident that the arc flash incident energy
levels are very high. This is because the protection devices were set without consideration for arc
faults. The value of the arc current is a lot lower compared to the bolted fault current in LV systems.
And in this instance, the magnitude of the arc fault falls within the “inverse” region of the TCCs of
the devices, which in turn has led to longer operating times and higher incident energy.
On the other hand, all 6.6kV switchboards were found to have very low arc flash incident energy
levels with potential incident energy exposure not exceeding 8 cal/cm2. Therefore, the existing PPEs
that are currently used in Solomon Hub which are rated at 12 cal/cm2 are appropriate for continued
usage.
34
In addition, the 0.69kV switchboards were found to have low arc flash incident energy levels with
potential incident exposure not exceeding 8 cal/cm2, except when the arc fault occurs at the incomer
where personnel are exposed to incident energy of up to 52.08 cal/cm 2, and therefore energised work
should not be conducted until mitigating procedures have taken place.
Currently, most of the 33kV switchboards have manageable arc hazard levels with arc flash incident
energy having been found to be less than 8 cal/cm2. An exception was the 33kV switchboards
installed at Firetail where the incident energy levels were found to be 23.37 cal/cm2 – 37.58 cal/cm2.
Although the arc flash hazard levels for switchboards other than those installed at Firetail were at
safe levels, the 33kV system has no grading from protection devices installed at Substation 2 and
Substation 3. A three-phase fault anywhere in the 33kV system will result in unnecessary power
outage to other healthy equipment. For example, if there is a fault at the HV terminal of a transformer
in Kings Valley OPF, the protection device installed at Substation 3 will clear the fault which will
result in unnecessary power outages to other equipment operating at Kings Valley. It will be
recommended that the protection settings of these devices be adjusted to ensure the reliability of the
protection system. However, as a consequence of changing these settings, the arc flash incident
energy levels at these switchboards will increase. This is a major problem that needs to be resolved
and this will be considered when recommending solutions for the arc flash studies.
It would seem then that using arc flash studies solely as a means to determine the required PPE
requirements is not the most effective control method for minimizing potential danger to personnel.
Engineers must conduct risk assessments and identify possible risk mitigation strategies by
identifying which controls are feasible for mitigation of arc flash hazards. A hierarchy of controls is
a system used in the industry to help prevent or reduce hazards [40]. Numerous safety organizations
have promoted this method and it is widely accepted in the industry. As depicted by the triangle in
Figure 9, the methods considered to be least effective are at the bottom whilst the methods considered
the most effective are at the top:
35
Figure 9: Hierarchy of controls (redrawn from [40])
A preferred approach is to use solutions higher in the pyramid, that is, elimination, substitution and
engineering; although these alternatives are not always feasible. The different controls to reduce the
arc flash hazard were investigated.
5.1 Elimination
Elimination is the most ideal control method to protect personnel from arc flash hazards. The
elimination of arc flash hazards can be achieved if electrical work is performed only while equipment
is not energised. However, it is not feasible to switch off equipment every time testing or
maintenance functions are performed. This is especially true for the switchboards installed at the
Solomon Hub as the cost of a few hours of de-energised work can result in millions of dollars of lost
revenues. Furthermore, if equipment de-energisation was to become the chosen option, it involves
circuit breaker switching, racking and isolation verification which would also have associated arc
flash hazards that would need to be controlled.
5.2 Substitution
Substituting equipment like switchboards and protection devices for faster arc fault clearing is
impractical. The cost associated with the procurement and installation of this type of equipment
makes this control method infeasible. As a result, this control method was not considered.
36
5.3 Engineering Controls
5.3.1 Optimise protection settings
It has been determined from engineering research that the arc time has a linear effect in the incident
energy [30], whereby reducing the protection device’s clearing time proportionately reduces arc flash
incident energy. Therefore, the most effective solution to mitigate the arc flash hazard is to reduce
the operating time of the protection devices to clear arc faults as rapidly as possible. Protection
settings must be chosen to ensure high levels of protection for equipment while still allowing normal
operating currents and inrush currents to flow without causing equipment to trip. In addition, grading
between protection devices must not be compromised, and therefore the protection device closest to
the fault must be the only one that trips so that service will only be interrupted to a minimal portion
of the power network. Proper coordination between protection devices will result in protection
devices closer to the power source having longer clearing times and higher pickup levels compared
to protection devices further downstream. This means that protection devices downstream can clear
faults faster than the upstream protection devices, thereby avoiding an unnecessary power outage to
a larger portion of the power network. Consequently, optimising protection settings may not always
be a feasible solution for arc flash mitigation due to protection grading requirements.
5.3.2 Installing a maintenance switch
An alternative and simple method for the reduction of incident energy is to install a maintenance
switch. A maintenance switch is an external switch that is wired into a protection device to allow
personnel to activate maintenance mode protection settings. A maintenance mode protection setting
is a pre-set setting which allows fast clearing of arc faults (in most cases, instantaneously) [41].
For protection relays, the 50P element is activated, and for LV circuit breakers, the instantaneous
element is used. Both elements are used to detect faults without unintentional delay. If the
maintenance mode is activated, the grading between the protection devices will be compromised.
However, the maintenance switch will only be engaged when personnel are working on a
switchboard, and it must be deactivated as soon as switching/maintenance work at the switchboard
37
is completed. Switching to maintenance mode can be included in permit conditions to ensure it is a
mandatory step.
5.3.3 Zone Selective Interlocking Scheme
The Zone Selective Interlocking (ZSI) scheme is a method recognised in the engineering field used
to speed up the operating time of protection devices without sacrificing protection devices
coordination and introducing nuisance tripping into the system [42]. This concept allows protection
devices to communicate across the distribution zones. The information is transmitted from the
feeders to the incomers through wires or using communication infrastructure like supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA).
The concept of ZSI is best explained in a visual format, as shown in Figure 10. If a fault occurs
downstream of feeder F3, where the magnitude of the fault exceeds the pick-up settings of both
feeder F3 and the incomer, both protection devices will detect the fault. However, feeder F3 will
send a restraint signal to the incomer which will activate the pre-set time delay for the incomer’s
operating time allowing feeder F3 to clear the fault. The ZSI scheme allows the incomer to clear the
fault with little intentional delay. The incomer cannot be set to trip instantaneously because it needs
to allow the feeder to send the restraint signal where there is an inherent time delay. However, the
incomer time delay can still be set for a faster operating time because the incomer does not need to
grade with downstream protection devices. As a result, proper coordination and selectivity is
maintained while still providing back-up protection for feeder F3.
38
Figure 10: Zone selective interlocking
5.3.4 Remote Operation
Increasing the working distance between the possible origin of an arc flash and the personnel is also
an effective method to reduce exposure to an arc flash hazard. Therefore, another known effective
method to mitigate the arc flash hazard when switching or racking the circuit breakers is to perform
these tasks remotely. The remote operation of the circuit breakers can be achieved by installing a
remote switching and racking panel outside the arc flash boundary or using the SCADA
infrastructure where personnel can operate the equipment in front of a human machine interface
(HMI) panel or a personal computer (PC).
39
5.4 Administrative control
There are administrative controls that are already employed to mitigate arc flash hazards when
working at energised switchboards at the Solomon Hub. These include risk assessments, safety
related working procedures and safety training. Arc flash labels are currently not available, however
Fortescue intends to implement these based on the arc flash study results that were calculated in the
present project. This method of labelling equipment showing the level of arc flash hazard exposure
and the appropriate PPE will assist personnel in making informed choices about how to safely
perform their work.
5.5 PPE
There are PPE clothing options rated at 12 cal/cm2 and 40 cal/cm2 available at Solomon electrical
rooms. However, the use of PPE must be the last line of defence applied and all other means must
be investigated to reduce the arc flash hazard to an acceptable level. PPE clothing options with higher
category ratings are known to be heavy and uncomfortable, and capable of restricting vision and
movement. These drawbacks can make it difficult to complete many tasks, which means that this
protection equipment is also creating a hazard. The requirement set by FMG is the reduction of arc
flash incident energy to not greater than 8 cal/cm2 if feasible, so that the lighter PPEs rated at 12
cal/cm2 available at Solomon Hub can be used.
40
6 Recommendations
From Section 5, it can be seen that numerous arc flash hazard mitigation strategies exist. The
challenge is to find the optimal strategy that can be implemented on an existing facility like the
Solomon Hub. Implementing many of these strategies are difficult for engineers due to excessive
capitals costs and retrofitting costs that limit their feasibility. Incorporating the findings of the present
project, and following thorough research of the engineering literature and discussions with senior
engineers, it was decided that Fortescue would implement three engineering controls at the Solomon
Hub mines: protection settings optimisation, installing maintenance switches and remote operation.
Based on the results of the arc flash hazard studies, optimising the 50P element of protection relays
and the instantaneous protection settings of LV circuit breakers appeared to be the superior option
due to the very low costs associated with this strategy. Therefore, the settings of all LV incomers
and some HV incomers were optimised so that arc faults can be cleared fast, thereby reducing
incident energy exposure. These protection settings will give consideration to the inrush current from
motors and transformers during the energisation stage. Hence, the proposed protection settings will
clear arc faults fast, reducing the incident energy significantly while maintaining protection system
reliability. However, this method is not always feasible due to protection grading requirements, and
hence it can only be applied to some protection devices.
Where grading requirements do not allow for the mitigation of the arc flash hazard by optimising
protection settings, installing maintenance switches is proposed. Switching to maintenance mode
when working on the switchboard will be included in permit conditions to ensure it is a mandatory
step. A physical switch will be wired to the protection device, which will be used to activate the
maintenance mode protection settings. Initially, it was proposed to install 52 maintenance switches.
The majority were to be installed on the upstream protection devices, which are normally located in
another switch room. It was also noted that the existing SCADA infrastructure has the capability of
also being used to remotely activate the maintenance mode settings from upstream protection
41
devices. However, further investigation needs to be conducted to determine the feasibility of using
SCADA to activate the settings.
Arc flash calculations were performed based on the proposed optimised protection settings and
maintenance mode protection settings for the 52 protection devices. It was found that the potential
incident energy exposure from all switchboards would be reduced to less than 8 cal/cm2, which is a
significant improvement on the existing incident energy exposures. However, the number of
maintenance switches that would need to be installed is not practical due to the high cost of
installation and due to large distances, varying from a few hundred metres to just over 1 km, that
would limit accessibility. Ultimately, it was decided to use remote operation to mitigate the arc flash
hazard when switching or racking the LV incomers, which resulted in the reduction in the number
of maintenance switches that needed to be installed to just three, (the settings and locations can be
found in Appendix H). A remote switching and racking panel would be installed inside the
switchroom where the incomers are located. The switches that would be used to remotely switch or
rack the incomers would be wired to the protection devices. This method could eliminate the arc
flash hazard because the remote switching and racking panel would be installed outside the arc flash
boundary, and hence personnels’ safety could be assured.
The proposed optimised protection settings and the results of the arc flash studies based on these
settings can be found in Appendices, I, J, K and L. The findings regarding the proposed solutions of
optimising protection settings, installing maintenance switches and utilising remote operation, if
implemented, will meet the principal aim of this project, which was to reduce the incident energy to
less than 8 cal/cm2. As a result, by applying the three solutions in the appropriate situations, the
existing PPEs rated at 12 cal/cm2 can be used for energised work in the switchboards installed at the
Solomon Hub mines.
42
Finally, it was found that the 33kV system does not have correct protection grading for three-phase
faults. While it is not part of the project, it is a major problem that need to be resolved. Therefore,
protection settings to resolve this problem were proposed which can be found in Appendix M. The
proposed protection settings will ensure the reliability of the protection system while giving
consideration to clearing time for arc flash.
43
7 Conclusion
The main purpose of this project is to conduct arc flash studies for switchboards installed at
Fortescue’s Solomon Hub. The aim of the studies is to find feasible solutions to reduce arc flash
incident energies to less than 8 cal/cm2 and to provide appropriate arc flash PPE recommendations.
The arc flash studies were conducted based on IEEE 1584-2002 Standard, the IEEE Guide for
Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. PowerFactory was used to perform short-circuit analyses
and coordination studies and the results were used to provide the information that is required for the
completion of an arc flash hazard analyses for each switchboard.
The arc flash study results summarised in Section 4 indicate that the existing arc flash incident energy
of some switchboards installed at the Solomon Hub are significantly above the desired level of 8
cal/cm2. Contrary to what was believed at the start of the studies, the LV switchboards represent the
most significant hazards, where many have incident energy greater than 40 cal/cm2, which is above
the withstand rating of PPEs available at Solomon Hub. In addition, it was found that the potential
incident energies of 0.69kV switchboards will depend on the task that is being performed. Switching
or racking the incomer create a significant arc flash hazard with many have incident energies greater
than 8 cal/cm2. Other switchboards that have voltages of 6.6kV and 11kV have low potential incident
energies except for SUB801-SWB01 switchboard, which has a potential incident energy of 21.82
cal/cm2.
Moreover, the 33kV switchboards have manageable arc flash hazards (with arc flash incident
energies less than 8 cal/cm2), with the exception of the 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF,
where the incident energy levels are 23.37 cal/cm 2 – 37.58 cal/cm2. However, the 33kV protection
system has no protection grading, if the correct protection settings are implemented, the incident
energies will increase.
44
While the main objective of this project was to conduct arc flash studies for switchboards installed
in the Solomon Hub, insufficient protection grading was found in a number of areas. As a result, the
recommendations for this project also included protection setting changes to ensure the reliability
and selectivity of the protection system. The main grading problems (for three-phase faults) that
were found were:
The 33kV system at Firetail has no three-phase fault grading. Faults in any of the 33kV
switchboards installed at Firetail will take out the whole Firetail OPF.
The 33kV system at KV has no three-phase fault grading. Fault in any of the 33kV
switchboards installed at KV will take out the whole KV OPF.
The feeders from RMUs have no three-phase fault grading with upstream protection
devices at Substation 2 and Substation 3.
The recommended solutions to reduce the arc flash hazard and to resolve the grading problems are
discussed in Section 6. To mitigate the arc flash hazard, three simple solutions were proposed:
1. Optimise protection settings
2. Maintenance switches
3. Remote operation
The proposed engineering controls will significantly reduce the arc flash incident energy for all
switchboards to less than 8 cal/cm2 which is the principal aim of this project. As a result, the existing
PPEs rated at 12 cal/cm2 can be used for energised work in the switchboards installed at the Solomon
Hub mines without compromising personnel safety. These results represent a significant
achievement and the project is considered to have been a resounding success.
45
8 References
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46
[16] A. Rae, “Engineering Specification for Low Voltage Motor Control Centres and
Switchboards,” Fortescue Metals Group Ltd., Perth, 2010.
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installations and equipment, Sydney: Standards Australia, 2011.
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Metals Group Ltd., 2012.
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metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages above 1 kV and up to and
including 52 kV, Sydney: Standards Australia, 2005.
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Standards Australia, 2002.
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SWITCHGEAR, Perth: Industrial Electrix, 2015.
[23] D. Stonebridge, ARC FAULT PROTECTION IN LV SWITCHGEAR, Perth: Industrial Electrix, 2014.
[24] M. Steyn and G. Nagel, “Arc Flash Hazard Reduction by Fault Clearance Acceleration,” in Arc
Flash & Isolation Safety Conference, Perth, 2015.
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and Maintenance of Personal Protective Equipment for Electrical Arc Hazards, Sydney:
Standards Australia , 2014.
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Workplace, Quincy: National Fire Protection Association, 2015.
[27] G. T. Homce and J. Cawley, “Understanding and Quantifying Arc Flash Hazards in the Mining
Industry,” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 2437-2444,
2011.
[28] K. Lippert, D. Colaberardino and C. Kimblin, “UNDERSTANDING ARC FLASH HAZARDS,” in
Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference, Appleton, 2004.
[29] X. Liang, B. Bagen and D. W. Gao, “An Effective Approach to Reducing Arc Flash Hazards in
Power Systems,” in IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting, Vancouver, 2014.
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Calculations, New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2002.
47
[31] DigSILENT GmbH, PowerFactory 15 User Manual, Gomaringen: DigSILENT GmbH, 2014.
[32] W. Tinsley and M. Hodder, “A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and
Reduction,” in IEEE IAS Pulp and Paper Industry Conference, Victoria, 2004.
[33] International Electrotechnical Commision, IEC 60909-0:2001 - Short-circuit currents in three-
phase a.c. systems - Part 0: Calculation of Currents, Geneva: International Electrotechnical
Commision, 2001.
[34] Aurecon, FMG T155 Solomon Project Ore Processing Facilities, Perth: Fortescue Metals
Group Ltd., 2012.
[35] W. Tinsley, M. Hodder and A. Graham, “ARC FLASH HAZARD CALCULATIONS: MYTHS, FACTS
AND SOLUTIONS,” in IEEE IAS Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference, Appleton,
2006.
[36] M. Holt, “What is Arc Flash?,” Mike Holt Enterprises, Inc., 2004. [Online]. Available:
https://www.mikeholt.com/mojonewsarchive/NEC-HTML/HTML/What-is-Arc-
Flash~20040512.php. [Accessed 11 January 2016].
[37] P. Willis, “Arc Flash Standards - Australian Developments,” in Electrical Arc Flash Forum ,
Melbourne, 2010.
[38] W. Tinsley and M. Hodder, A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction,
Moon Township: Eaton Corporation, 2006.
[39] GE Consumer & Industrial GmbH, Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual, Berlin:
GE Consumer & Industrial GmbH, 2010.
[40] Environmental & Safety Professionals, “Risk Assessment & Risk Management,”
Environmental & Safety Professionals, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.environet.com.au/services.asp?id=20&cid=16. [Accessed 14 01 2016].
[41] N. Thompson, Arc Faults - Safety Measures and Detection, Auckland: NHP, 2013.
[42] C. G. Walker, “Arc flash energy reduction techniques zone selective interlocking & energy-
reducing maintenance switching,” in Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference (PPIC),
Nashville, 2011.
48
9 Appendices
9.1 Appendix A – Solomon Interconnection diagram
49
9.2 Appendix B – LV incomers Settings
It is important to inspect the relevant manuals to understand the interpretation of values in the
following tables.
Table 9: Existing Stockyard .4 kV MCC protection settings
Existing Stockyard .4 kV MCC protection settings
Location Descriptor Protection device I rating In(xICT) LT PU LTD (s) ST PU trip time (s) INS PU
SUB801
SUB801 Terasaki 2500 1 0.9 10 3 0.4 16
Incomer
SK802
SUB801 Terasaki 1250 0.63 0.8 20 8 0.2 10
Incomer
RC901
SUB801 Terasaki 800 0.5 0.8 2.5 6 0.2 12
Incomer
SUB901
SUB901 Terasaki 2500 1 0.9 10 3 0.4 6
Incomer
Table 10: Existing Firetail .4 kV MCC protection settings
Existing Firetail .4 kV MCC protection settings
Protection I LT ST ST Inst
Location Descriptor Ir LT PU
device rating Band PU Band PU
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR203 Firetail SR203 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR104 Firetail SR104 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR102 Firetail SR102 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR502 Firetail SR502 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR402 Firetail SR402 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR303 Firetail SR303-MCC02 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR303 Firetail SR303-MCC01 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
50
Table 11: Existing KV .4 kV MCC protection settings
Existing KV .4 kV MCC protection settings
Protection I LT ST ST
Location Descriptor Ir LT PU Inst PU
device rating Band PU Band
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR303 Kings Valley SR303-MCC03 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR303 Kings Valley SR303-MCC02 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR303 Kings Valley SR303-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 2x
SR104 Kings Valley SR104-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR102 Kings Valley SR102-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR203 Kings Valley SR203-MCC02 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR203 Kings Valley SR203-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR702 Kings Valley SR702-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR402Kings Valley SR402-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 9x 2x
SR509 Kings Valley SR509-MCC03 incomer 3200 2400 C4 10
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 9x 11 x
SR509 Kings Valley SR509-MCC02 incomer 3200 2400 C4 10
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 2x
SR505 Kings Valley SR505-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR503 Kings Valley SR503-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
Table 12: 0.4kV MCCs fed from RMUs
0.4kV MCCs fed from RMUs
I LT LTD trip time INS
Location Descriptor Protection device In(xICT) ST PU
rating PU (s) (s) PU
SR706-MCC01
SR706 Terasaki 1250 0.8 1 10 6 0.4 16
INCOMER
SR705-MCC01
SR705 Terasaki 1600 1 0.8 10 1 0.4 off
INCOMER
SR703-MCC01
SR703 Terasaki 1250 0.8 1 10 6 0.4 16
INCOMER
SR701-MCC01
SR701 Terasaki 1600 1 1 10 6 0.4 16
INCOMER
SR707-MCC01
SR707 Terasaki 1600 1 0.85 10 1 0.4 2
INCOMER
51
Table 13: Exising incomer protection settings for VSDs
Protection
device In LT PU (x In) t ST Inst PU (x In)
CV763-VSD02 incomer ABB 1600 0.975 3 4
CV125-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 1.025 3 4
CV704-VSD03 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV704-VSD02 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV704-VSD01 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV705-VSD03 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 no ST 4
CV153-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 1 144 protection 4
CV123-VSD01 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV113-VSD01 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV763-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 0.9 3 4
CV705-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 1 3 4
CV705-VSD02 incomer ABB 1600 0.95 3 4
52
9.3 Appendix C – Arc flash study results for the Stockyard
Table 14: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Bolted Fault Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
(kA) (kA) (kA) 𝒄𝒎𝟐
SUB801-SWB01
Upstream 30.54 13.89 29.80 11.58 2.18 610 53.78 8062 X
Incomer
SUB801-SWB01
Incomer 30.54 13.89 29.80 11.58 0.43 610 12.92 3061 3
Switchboard
SK801-MCC01
Upstream 28.42 13.12 27.07 10.73 0.91 610 20.67 4213 3
Incomer
SK801-MCC01
Incomer(1) 28.42 13.12 27.07 10.73 610
Switchboard
SK802-MCC01
Upstream 22.74 10.98 21.94 9.08 0.75 610 14.22 3268 3
Incomer
SK802-MCC01
Incomer 22.74 10.98 21.94 9.08 0.06 610 1.40 677 1
Switchboard
RC901-MCC01
Upstream 15.35 8.03 15.31 6.81 1.15 610 15.98 3537 3
Incomer
RC901-MCC01
Incomer 15.35 8.03 15.31 6.81 0.06 610 1.00 538 0
Switchboard
SUB901-MCC01
Upstream 29.48 13.51 28.61 11.21 2.28 610 54.30 8116 X
Incomer
SUB901-MCC01
Incomer 29.48 13.51 28.61 11.21 0.43 610 12.53 2999 3
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
Table 15: Arc flash study results for 11kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Incident
Clearing Maximum Minimum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Bolted Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA)
(kA)
Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
CV801-VSD01
Upstream 19.04 18.28 11.09 9.13 0.08 910 2.57 1993 1
Switchboard
CV801-VSD02
Upstream 19.15 18.38 11.14 9.17 0.08 910 2.59 2005 1
Switchboard
CV802-VSD01
Upstream 19.16 18.39 11.14 9.17 0.08 910 2.59 2007 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD01
Upstream 12.09 11.70 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1214 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD02
Upstream 12.07 11.68 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.58 1204 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD03
Upstream 12.13 11.73 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1218 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD04
Upstream 12.10 11.71 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1215 1
Switchboard
CV901-VSD01
Upstream 12.08 11.69 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1213 1
Switchboard
CV901-VSD02
Upstream 12.10 11.71 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1215 1
Switchboard
CV901-VSD03
Upstream 12.11 11.71 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1216 1
Switchboard
SUB901-SWB01
Upstream 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.42 910 8.40 6725 3
Switchboard
SUB901-SWB01
Incomer 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.37 910 7.40 5903 2
Incomer CB
SUB801-SWB01
Upstream 19.26 18.49 11.18 9.21 0.67 910 21.82 17934 3
Switchboard
SUB801-SWB01
Incomer 19.26 18.49 11.18 9.21 0.67 910 21.82 17934 3
Incomer
RC901-SWB01
Upstream 5.48 5.37 4.48 3.75 0.42 910 3.59 2809 1
Switchboard
RC901-SWB01
Incomer 5.48 5.37 4.48 3.75 0.40 910 3.42 2672 1
Incomer
53
9.4 Appendix D – Arc flash study results for Firetail OPF
Table 16: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the existing protection settings
Minimum
Clearing Maximum Bolted 0.85 x Total Working Incident Arc Flash
Maximum Arc Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current (kA) 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) Current Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR203-MCC01
Upstream 37.59 16.39 35.38 13.28 1.07 610 38.43 6418 4
Incomer
SR203-MCC01
Incomer 37.59 16.39 35.38 13.28 1.25 610 35.76 6330 4
Switchboard
SR104-MCC01
Upstream 37.54 16.38 35.27 13.24 1.1 610 39.46 6535 4
Incomer
SR104-MCC01
Incomer 37.54 16.38 35.27 13.24 1.25 610 35.64 6326 4
Switchboard
SR102-MCC01
Upstream 42.39 18.04 35.34 13.27 1.1 610 43.82 7016 x
Incomer
SR102-MCC01
Incomer 42.39 18.04 35.34 13.27 1.25 610 35.73 6791 X
Switchboard
SR502-MCC01
Upstream 39.80 17.16 35.34 13.27 1.1 610 41.5 6762 X
Incomer
SR502-MCC01
Incomer 39.80 17.16 35.34 13.27 1.25 610 35.73 6545 4
Switchboard
SR402-MCC01
Upstream 40.93 17.54 35.37 13.28 1.09 610 42.13 6831 X
Incomer
SR402-MCC01
Incomer 40.93 17.54 35.37 13.28 1.25 610 37.47 6653 4
Switchboard
SR303-MCC02
Upstream 38.95 16.86 35.32 13.26 1.1 610 40.73 6677 X
Incomer
SR303-MCC02
Incomer 38.95 16.86 35.32 13.26 1.25 610 35.70 6463 4
Switchboard
SR303-MCC01
Upstream 41.07 17.59 35.33 13.26 1.1 610 42.64 6887 X
Incomer
SR303-MCC01
Incomer 41.07 17.59 35.33 13.26 1.25 610 40.65 6667 X
Switchboard
Table 17: Arc flash study results for 6.6kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Working Arc Flash
Bolted Fault Bolted Fault 0.85 x Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Current Arc Current (kA) 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location
(kA)
(kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
2200-SR201-MCC02
Upstream(1) 4.03 3.97 3.56 2.99 910
Incomer
2200-SR201-MCC02
Incomer 4.03 3.97 3.56 2.99 0.41 910 2.54 1967 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-MCC01
Upstream(1) 4.05 3.99 3.59 3.02 910
Incomer
2200-SR201-MCC01
Incomer 4.05 3.99 3.59 3.02 0.41 910 2.55 1977 1
Switchboard
SR103-MCC01
Upstream 4.01 3.96 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 4.07 3195 2
Incomer
SR103-MCC01
Incomer 4.01 3.96 3.55 2.98 0.42 910 2.57 1992 1
Switchboard
SR101-MCC01
Upstream 4.02 3.97 3.56 2.99 0.66 910 4.08 3204 2
Incomer
SR101-MCC01
Incomer 4.02 3.97 3.56 2.99 0.42 910 2.58 1998 1
Switchboard
SR501-MCC01
Upstream 4.02 3.97 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 4.08 3198 2
Incomer
SR501-MCC01
Incomer 4.02 3.97 3.55 2.98 0.42 910 2.58 1997 1
Switchboard
SR401-MCC01
Upstream 3.96 3.90 3.49 2.93 0.67 910 4.04 3166 2
Incomer
SR401-MCC01
Incomer 3.96 3.90 3.49 2.93 0.42 910 2.55 1971 1
Switchboard
SR301-MCC01
Upstream 5.36 5.26 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 5.55 4390 2
Incomer
SR301-MCC01
Incomer 5.36 5.26 3.55 2.98 0.59 910 4.93 3888 2
Switchboard
SR301-MCC02
Upstream 4.39 4.33 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 4.48 3527 2
Incomer
SR301-MCC02
Incomer 4.39 4.33 3.55 2.98 0.42 910 2.83 2199 1
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
54
Table 18: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the existing protection settings
Minimum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Maximum Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Arc Current Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) (kA) Current
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA)
SUB002
2200-SR201-SWB01
Feeder to 4.57 4.57 2.47 2.10 0.39 910 36.32 5006 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2100-SR103-SWB01
Feeder to 4.45 4.45 2.42 2.06 0.39 910 35.41 4944 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2100-SR101-SWB01
Feeder to 4.53 4.53 2.45 2.08 0.39 910 36.02 4986 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2550-SR501-SWB01
Feeder to 4.54 4.54 2.45 2.08 0.41 910 37.58 5092 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2400-SR401-SWB01
Feeder to 4.56 4.56 2.46 2.09 0.41 910 37.58 5092 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2300-SR301-SWB01
Feeder to 4.52 4.52 2.44 2.07 0.41 910 37.48 5086 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
2000-SR001-SWB01 SUB002
Switchboard/Incomer Feeder to 4.59 4.59 2.47 2.10 0.39 910 36.43 5014 4
Firetail
55
9.5 Appendix E – Arc flash study results for Kings Valley OPF
Table 19: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing protection settings
Minimum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Maximum Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Arc Current Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) (kA) Current Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
2300-SR303-MCC03
Upstream 36.34 15.96 34.88 13.12 1.12 610 39.07 6490 4
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC03
Incomer 36.34 15.96 34.88 13.12 0.45 610 13.17 3102 3
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC02
Upstream 39.57 17.08 35.23 13.23 1.11 610 41.67 6780 X
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC02
Incomer 39.57 17.08 35.23 13.23 0.45 610 13.17 3260 3
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC01
Upstream 38.92 16.85 32.10 12.29 1.17 610 43.3 6959 X
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC01
Incomer 38.92 16.85 32.10 12.29 0.45 610 13.97 3229 3
Switchboard
2100-SR104-MCC01
Upstream 36.81 16.12 35.22 13.23 1.11 610 39.15 6500 4
Incomer
2100-SR104-MCC01
Incomer 36.81 16.12 35.22 13.23 0.45 610 13.17 3260 3
Switchboard
2100-SR102-MCC01
Upstream 43.42 18.39 35.26 13.24 1.11 610 45.14 7159 X
Incomer
2100-SR102-MCC01
Incomer 43.42 18.39 35.26 13.24 0.45 610 13.17 3260 3
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC02
Upstream 39.19 16.95 35.05 13.18 1.11 610 41.33 6743 X
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC02
Incomer 39.19 16.95 35.05 13.18 0.45 610 14.05 3242 3
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC01
Upstream 40.49 17.39 34.49 13.01 1.12 610 42.88 6914 X
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC01
Incomer 40.49 17.39 34.49 13.01 0.45 610 14.45 3304 3
Switchboard
2700-SR702-MCC01
Upstream 37.37 16.32 35.78 13.40 1.10 610 39.31 6517 4
Incomer
2700-SR702-MCC01
Incomer 37.37 16.32 35.78 13.40 0.45 610 13.49 3153 3
Switchboard
2400-SR402-MCC01
Upstream 39.91 17.19 34.81 13.11 1.12 610 42.35 6856 X
Incomer
2400-SR402-MCC01
Incomer 39.91 17.19 34.81 13.11 0.45 610 14.27 3276 3
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC03
Upstream 33.56 14.98 32.13 12.30 1.17 610 38.11 6382 4
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC03
Incomer 33.56 14.98 32.13 12.30 2.5 610 91.66 11579 X
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC02
Upstream 38.50 16.71 35.28 13.25 1.06 610 38.86 6467 4
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC02
Incomer 38.50 16.71 35.28 13.25 3 610 92.27 11631 X
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC01
Upstream 37.94 16.51 35.26 13.24 1.11 610 40.18 6615 X
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC01
Incomer(1) 37.94 16.51 35.26 13.24 610
Switchboard
2570-SR505-MCC01
Upstream 37.18 16.25 35.16 13.21 1.11 610 39.5 6538 4
Incomer
2570-SR505-MCC01
Incomer 37.18 16.25 35.16 13.21 0.45 610 13.43 3144 3
Switchboard
2550-SR503-MCC01
Upstream 39.40 17.02 35.31 13.26 1.11 610 41.52 6763 X
Incomer
2550-SR503-MCC01
Incomer 39.40 17.02 35.31 13.26 0.45 610 14.12 3252 3
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
56
Table 20: Arc flash study results for the 6.6kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum
Maximum Incident
Clearing Bolted Bolted 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA) (kA)
2300-SR302-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3197 2
Incomer
2300-SR302-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1993 1
Switchboard
2300-SR301-
MCC02 Upstream 5.46 5.36 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 5.66 4480 2
Incomer
2300-SR301-
MCC02 Incomer 5.46 5.36 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 3.58 2795 1
Switchboard
2300-SR301-
MCC01 Upstream 5.10 5.01 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 5.26 4158 2
Incomer
2300-SR301-
MCC01 Incomer 5.10 5.01 3.57 3.00 0.84 910 6.67 5302 2
Switchboard
2100-SR103-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3196 2
Incomer
2100-SR103-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1993 1
Switchboard
2100-SR101-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3199 2
Incomer
2100-SR101-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1994 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-
MCC03 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3193 2
Incomer
2200-SR201-
MCC03 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1988 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-
MCC02 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3198 2
Incomer
2200-SR201-
MCC02 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1994 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3200 2
Incomer
2200-SR201-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.58 1995 1
Switchboard
2700-SR701-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3195 2
Incomer
2700-SR701-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1992 1
Switchboard
2400-SR401-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3193 2
Incomer
2400-SR401-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1990 1
Switchboard
2500-SR508-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3199 2
Incomer
2500-SR508-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1994 1
Switchboard
2570-SR504-
MCC02 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3200 2
Incomer
2570-SR504-
MCC02 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.58 1998 1
Switchboard
2570-SR504-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3197 2
Incomer
2570-SR504-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.58 1996 1
Switchboard
2550-SR501-
MCC02 Upstream 4.02 3.98 3.59 3.02 0.66 910 4.09 3207 2
Incomer
2550-SR501-
MCC02 Incomer 4.02 3.98 3.59 3.02 0.42 910 2.58 2002 1
Switchboard
57
2550-SR501-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.97 3.59 3.02 0.66 910 4.08 3199 2
Incomer
2550-SR501-
MCC01 Incomer(1) 4.02 3.97 3.59 3.02 910
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
Table 21: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing protection settings
Maximum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Maximum Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Arc Current Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SUB003
2300-SR301-SWB01
Feeder to 4.75 4.75 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.74 2312 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2100-SR103-SWB01
Feeder to 4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2100-SR101-SWB01
Feeder to 4.73 4.73 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.72 2308 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2200-SR201-SWB01
Feeder to 4.75 4.75 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.75 2312 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2700-SR701-SWB01
Feeder to 4.68 4.68 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.64 2296 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2400-SR401-SWB01
Feeder to 4.73 4.73 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.71 2307 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2500-SR508-SWB01
Feeder to 4.71 4.71 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.69 2303 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2570-SR504-SWB01
Feeder to 4.74 4.74 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.73 2309 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2550-SR501-SWB01
Feeder to 4.78 4.78 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.79 2319 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
2000-SR001-SWB01 SUB003
Switchboard/Incomer Feeder to 4.86 4.86 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.87 2330 2
KV
58
9.6 Appendix F – Arc flash study results for RMUs and switchboards
downstream
Table 22: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the existing settings
Maximum
Maximum Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
Upstream
RMU12 4.86 4.86 2.42 2.06 0.08 910 7.93 2340 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU29 4.81 4.81 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.85 2327 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU13 4.78 4.78 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.80 2320 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU17 4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU11 4.58 4.58 2.46 2.09 0.08 910 7.47 2270 2
(SUB002)
Upstream
RMU14 4.50 4.50 2.43 2.07 0.08 910 7.35 2252 2
(SUB002)
Upstream
RMU15 4.45 4.45 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.26 2238 2
(SUB002)
Upstream
RMU16 4.36 4.36 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.11 2216 2
(SUB002)
Table 23: Arc flash study results for the sizer drives switchboards based on the existing protection settings
Maximum
Maximum Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR152-SWB01
Upstream 3.43 3.39 2.55 2.15 0.92 910 4.79 3775 2
Incomer
SR152-SWB01
Incomer 3.43 3.39 2.55 2.15 0.52 910 2.71 2100 1
Switchboard
SR122-SWB01
Upstream 3.58 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.77 910 4.21 3304 2
Incomer
SR122-SWB01
Incomer 3.58 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.52 910 2.83 2198 1
Switchboard
SR112-SWB01
Upstream 3.57 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.77 910 4.21 3306 2
Incomer
SR112-SWB01
Incomer 3.57 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.52 910 2.82 2194 1
Switchboard
Table 24: Arc flash study results for the VSDs based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum Incident
Clearing Maximum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Bolted Fault Bolted Fault Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location
(kA)
(kA)
(kA)
Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
CV113-VSD01
Upstream 25.68 21.18 24.23 17.04 1.05 610 49.75 7647 X
Incomer
CV113-VSD01
Incomer 25.68 21.18 24.23 17.04 0.09 610 4.26 1443 2
Switchboard
CV123-VSD01
Upstream 25.70 21.20 24.25 17.04 1.05 610 49.79 7652 X
Incomer
CV123-VSD01
Incomer 25.70 21.20 24.25 17.04 0.09 610 4.27 1444 2
Switchboard
CV763-VSD02
Upstream 25.43 20.10 23.58 16.60 1.11 610 52.08 7888 X
Incomer
CV763-VSD02
Incomer 25.43 20.10 23.58 16.60 0.09 610 4.22 1433 2
Switchboard
CV125-VSD01
Upstream 25.30 20.89 23.48 16.54 1.05 610 49 7569 X
Incomer
CV125-VSD01
Incomer 25.30 20.89 23.48 16.54 0.09 610 4.20 1428 2
Switchboard
CV705-VSD03
Upstream 25.47 21.02 23.62 16.63 1.05 610 49.34 7604 X
Incomer
CV705-VSD03
Incomer 25.47 21.02 23.62 16.63 0.09 610 4.23 1435 2
Switchboard
CV704-VSD01
Upstream 25.65 21.16 23.82 16.76 1.05 610 49.71 7643 X
Incomer
CV704-VSD01
Incomer 25.65 21.16 23.82 16.76 0.09 610 4.26 1442 2
Switchboard
CV704-VSD02
Upstream 25.66 21.17 23.82 16.76 1.05 610 49.72 7644 X
Incomer
CV704-VSD02
Incomer 25.66 21.17 23.82 16.76 0.09 610 4.26 1442 2
Switchboard
59
CV704-VSD03
Upstream 25.54 21.07 23.82 16.76 1.05 610 49.48 7619 X
Incomer
CV704-VSD03
Incomer 25.54 21.07 23.82 16.76 0.09 610 4.26 1442 2
Switchboard
CV153-VSD01
Upstream 25.00 20.65 23.21 16.35 1.05 610 48.41 7506 X
Incomer
CV153-VSD01
Incomer 25.00 20.65 23.21 16.35 0.09 610 4.15 1416 2
Switchboard
CV763-VSD01
Upstream 17.92 15.05 17.49 12.50 0.89 610 29.14 5319 4
Incomer
CV763-VSD01
Incomer 17.92 15.05 17.49 12.50 0.09 610 2.95 1123 1
Switchboard
CV705-VSD02
Upstream 18.83 15.78 18.32 13.06 0.84 610 29.01 5303 4
Incomer
CV705-VSD02
Incomer 18.83 15.78 18.32 13.06 0.09 610 3.10 1162 1
Switchboard
CV705-VSD01
Upstream 18.80 15.75 18.28 13.04 0.84 610 29.03 5305 4
Incomer
CV705-VSD01
Incomer 18.80 15.75 18.28 13.04 0.09 610 3.10 1161 1
Switchboard
Table 25: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the existing protection settings
Maximum
Maximum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR701-MCC01
Upstream 20.57 10.14 20.48 8.59 1.16 610 24.79 4766 3
Incomer
SR701-MCC01
Incomer 20.57 10.14 20.48 8.59 6.5 610 116.54 13629 X
Switchboard
SR029-MCC01
Upstream 29.72 13.60 29.07 11.36 1.37 610 40.19 6616 X
Incomer
SR029-MCC01
Incomer(1) 29.72 13.60 29.07 11.36 610
Switchboard
SR706-MCC01
Upstream 13.55 7.27 13.42 6.14 1.07 610 15.96 3535 3
Incomer
SR706-MCC01
Incomer 13.55 7.27 13.42 6.14 0.46 610 6.86 1993 2
Switchboard
SR705-MCC01
Upstream 20.40 10.07 19.78 8.36 4.45 610 94.42 11815 X
Incomer
SR705-MCC01
Incomer 20.40 10.07 19.78 8.36 0.43 610 9.12 2418 3
Switchboard
SR703-MCC01
Upstream 13.53 7.26 13.38 6.12 1.07 610 15.94 3531 3
Incomer
SR703-MCC01
Incomer 13.53 7.26 13.38 6.12 0.43 610 6.40 1901 2
Switchboard
SR151-MCC01
Upstream 36.17 15.90 33.63 12.75 2 610 69.84 9627 X
Incomer
SR151-MCC01
Incomer(1) 36.17 15.90 33.63 12.75 610
Switchboard
SR121-MCC01
Upstream 36.2 15.91 34.36 12.97 2.01 610 69.89 9632 X
Incomer
SR121-MCC01
Incomer 36.2 15.91 34.36 12.97 0.09 610 3.13 1169 1
Switchboard
SR111-MCC01
Upstream 36.15 15.89 34.29 12.95 2 610 69.80 9624 X
Incomer
SR111-MCC01
Incomer 36.15 15.89 34.29 12.95 0.09 610 3.13 1168 1
Switchboard
SR707-MCC01
Upstream 45.36 19.04 42.39 15.33 0.60 610 25.33 4836 4
Incomer
SR707-MCC01
Incomer 45.36 19.04 42.39 15.33 0.43 610 18.16 3858 3
Switchboard
(1)
Protection settings not available.
60
9.7 Appendix G – GE LV circuit breaker curve
Refer to the relevant section from the “Operation and Maintenance Manual” for the MPRO 50 trip
unit to understand how to determine the total clearing time from the curve seen in Figure 11.
Figure 11: GE LV circuit breaker curve (approval pending [39]
61
9.8 Appendix H – Maintenance mode protection settings
Table 26: Settings and location of the three maintenance switches
MS at SUB801 11kV Switchboard incomer
50P2 pickup 2550A
Time setting 0
MS at SUB002 33kV switchboard incomer
50P1 pickup 1600 A
Time setting 0
MS at SUB003 33kV switchboard incomer
50P1 pickup 1600 A
Time setting 0
62
9.9 Appendix I – Arc flash study results for Stockyard based on the
proposed solutions
Table 27: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the proposed protection settings
Minimum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Maximum Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Arc Current Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) (kA) Current
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SUB801-
SWB01 Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SUB801-
SWB01 Incomer 30.54 13.89 29.80 11.58 0.23 610 6.91 2002 2 No
Switchboard
SK801-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SK801-MCC01
Incomer 28.42 13.12 27.07 10.73 0.23 610 5.36 1685 2 No
Switchboard
SK802-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SK802-MCC01
Incomer 22.74 10.98 21.94 9.08 0.23 610 5.36 1685 2 No
Switchboard
RC901-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
RC901-MCC01
Incomer 15.35 8.03 15.31 6.81 0.23 610 3.82 1339 1 No
Switchboard
SUB901-
MCC01 Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SUB901-
MCC01 Incomer 29.48 13.51 28.61 11.21 0.23 610 6.70 1961 2 No
Switchboard
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 28: Proposed protection settings for the Stockyard 0.4kV switchboards incomers
SUB801 MCC Incomer SUB901 MCC Incomer SK801 MCC Incomer(1) SK802 MCC Incomer RC901 MCC Incomer
ICT 2500 2500 1250 800
In (xICT) 1 1 1 1
LT (x In) 0.9 0.9 0.85 0.8
LT s 10 10 20 2.5
ST 3 3 8kA 6 6
ST s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
INST 8 6 10 12
(1)
Protection settings to ensure incident energy is less than 8 cal/cm 2.
Table 29: Arc flash study results for the Stockyard 11kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Maximum
Maximum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA)
SUB901-
SWB01 Upstream 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.25 910 5.00 3946 2 No
Incomer CB
SUB901-
SWB01 Incomer 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.25 910 5.00 3946 2 No
Switchboard
SUB801-
SWB01 Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SUB801-
SWB01 Incomer 19.26 18.49 11.18 9.21 0.08 910 2.61 2019 1 Yes
Switchboard
63
Table 30: Proposed protection settings for Stockpile 11kV switchboards incomers
Protection Device Location Relay CTR 51P 50P
CS – 0.52 Pickup – 4
Feeder
SUB801 SEL751A 1000 C2 Time setting – 0.20 s
to SUB901 11kV switchboard
TD – 0.75
CS-0.94
Incomer of main SUB901 11kV Pickup – 4
SUB901 SEL751A 1000 C2
switchboard Time setting – 0.20 s
TD – 0.69
64
9.10 Appendix J – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the
proposed solutions
Table 31: Arc flash study results for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Maximum Minimum
Maximum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA) (kA)
SR203-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR203-MCC01
Incomer 37.59 16.39 35.38 13.28 0.18 610 6.46 1914 2 No
Switchboard
SR104-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR104-MCC01
Incomer 37.54 16.38 35.27 13.24 0.18 610 6.46 1912 2 No
Switchboard
SR102-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR102-MCC01
Incomer 42.39 18.04 35.34 13.27 0.18 610 7.17 2053 2 No
Switchboard
SR502-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR502-MCC01
Incomer 39.80 17.16 35.34 13.27 0.18 610 6.79 1979 2 No
Switchboard
SR402-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR402-MCC01
Incomer 40.93 17.54 35.37 13.28 0.18 610 6.96 2011 2 No
Switchboard
SR303-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR303-MCC02
Incomer 38.95 16.86 35.32 13.26 0.18 610 6.67 1954 2 No
Switchboard
SR303-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR303-MCC01
Incomer 41.07 17.59 35.33 13.26 0.18 610 6.98 2015 2 No
Switchboard
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 32: Proposed protection settings for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards incomers
SR203-MCC01 SR104-MCC01 SR102-MCC01 SR502-MCC01 SR402-MCC01 SR303-MCC02 SR303-MCC01
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer
Rating 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
LT pickup 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie
LT Band C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
Ir 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
ST pickup 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir
ST Band 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
INST pickup 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie
65
Table 33: Arc flash study results for Firetail 33kV switchboards based on the proposed maintenance mode protection settings
Max
Max Min Bolted 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Fault Min Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Current Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
location Current
(kA) (kA) (kA)
time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA)
SUB002 33kV
2000-SUB001-RMU01
switchboard 4.59 4.59 2.47 2.10 0.08 910 7.46 2269 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2200-SR201-SWB01
switchboard 4.57 4.57 2.47 2.10 0.08 910 7.43 2262 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2100-SR103-SWB01
switchboard 4.45 4.45 2.42 2.06 0.08 910 7.25 2236 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2100-SR101-SWB01
switchboard 4.53 4.53 2.45 2.08 0.08 910 7.37 2256 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2550-SR501-SWB01
switchboard 4.54 4.54 2.45 2.08 0.08 910 7.39 2258 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2400-SR401-SWB01
switchboard 4.52 4.52 2.46 2.09 0.08 910 7.42 2263 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2300-SR301-SWB01
switchboard 4.52 4.52 2.44 2.07 0.08 910 7.35 2252 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2000-SR001-SWB01
switchboard 4.59 4.59 2.47 2.10 0.08 910 7.48 2273 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
66
9.11 Appendix K – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the
proposed solutions
Table 34: Arc flash study results for KV 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Minimum 0.85 x
Maximum Incident
Clearing Maximum Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Fault Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA)
(kA)
Current Current Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA) (kA)
2300-SR303-MCC03
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC03
Incomer 36.34 15.96 34.88 13.12 0.20 610 6.98 2015 2 No
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC02
Incomer 39.57 17.08 35.23 13.23 0.20 610 7.51 2118 2 No
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC01
Incomer 38.91 16.85 32.10 12.29 0.20 610 7.40 2098 2 No
Switchboard
2100-SR104-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2100-SR104-MCC01
Incomer 36.81 16.12 35.22 13.23 0.20 610 7.05 2030 2 No
Switchboard
2100-SR102-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2100-SR102-MCC01
Incomer 43.42 18.39 35.26 13.24 0.18 610 7.32 2082 2 No
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC02
Incomer 39.19 16.95 35.05 13.18 0.20 610 7.45 2106 2 No
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC01
Incomer 40.49 17.39 34.49 13.01 0.20 610 7.66 2147 2 No
Switchboard
2700-SR702-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2700-SR702-MCC01
Incomer 37.37 16.32 35.78 13.40 0.20 610 7.15 2049 2 No
Switchboard
2400-SR402-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2400-SR402-MCC01
Incomer 39.91 17.19 34.81 13.11 0.20 610 7.56 2129 2 No
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC03
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC03
Incomer 33.56 14.98 32.13 12.30 0.20 610 6.51 1924 2 No
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC02
Incomer 38.50 16.71 35.28 13.25 0.20 610 7.33 2085 2 No
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC01
Incomer 37.94 16.51 35.26 13.24 0.20 610 7.24 2067 2 No
Switchboard
2570-SR505-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2570-SR505-MCC01
Incomer 37.18 16.25 35.16 13.21 0.20 610 7.12 2043 2 No
Switchboard
2550-SR503-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2550-SR503-MCC01
Incomer 39.40 17.02 35.31 13.26 0.20 610 7.48 2113 2 No
Switchboard
67
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 35: Proposed protection settings for KV 0.4kV incomer
SR303-MCC01 SR303-MCC02 SR303-MCC03 SR104-MCC01 SR102-MCC01 SR203-MCC01 SR203-MCC02
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer
Rating 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
LT pickup 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
LT Band C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min
Ir 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
ST pickup 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir
ST Band 6 6 6 6 5 6 6
INST pickup 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie
SR702-MCC01 SR402-MCC01 SR509-MCC03 SR509-MCC02 SR509-MCC01 SR505-MCC01 SR503-MCC01
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer
Rating 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
LT pickup 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
LT Band C-Min C-Min C4 C4 C4 C-Min C-Min
Ir 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
ST pickup 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir
ST Band 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
INST pickup 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 9 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie
Table 36: Arc flash study results for KV 33kV switchboards based on the proposed maintenance mode protection settings
0.85 x Total Inciden
Maximum Maximum Minimum Working t Arc Flash
Clearing Device Minimum Clearin
Equipment Bolted Fault Arc Current Bolted Fault Distance Energy Boundary PPE MS
Location Arc Current g Time
Current (kA) (kA) Current (kA) (mm) 𝒄𝒂𝒍 (mm)
(kA) (s) (𝒄𝒎𝟐 )
SUB003 33kV
2300-SR301-SWB01 switchboard
4.75 4.75 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.74 2312 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2100-SR103-SWB01 switchboard
4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2100-SR101-SWB01 switchboard
4.73 4.73 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.72 2308 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2200-SR201-SWB01 switchboard
4.75 4.75 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.75 2312 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2700-SR701-SWB01 switchboard
4.68 4.68 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.64 2296 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2400-SR401-SWB01 switchboard
4.73 4.73 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.71 2307 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2500-SR508-SWB01 switchboard
4.71 4.71 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.69 2303 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2570-SR504-SWB01 switchboard
4.74 4.74 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.73 2309 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2550-SR501-SWB01 switchboard
4.78 4.78 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.79 2319 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2000-SR001-SWB01
switchboard
Switchboard/Incomer 4.86 4.86 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.87 2330 2 Yes
incomer
68
9.12 Appendix L – Arc flash study results for RMUs based on proposed
solutions
Table 37: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the proposed maintenance mode protection settings
Maximum
Maximu 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
m Arc Minimum Energy PP
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary MS
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍 E
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU12 4.86 4.86 2.42 2.06 0.08 910 7.93 2340 2 Yes
incomer
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU29 4.81 4.81 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.85 2327 2 Yes
incomer
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU13 4.78 4.78 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.80 2320 2 Yes
incomer
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU17 4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU11 4.58 4.58 2.46 2.09 0.08 910 7.47 2270 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU14 4.50 4.50 2.43 2.07 0.08 910 7.35 2252 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU15 4.45 4.45 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.26 2238 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU16 4.36 4.36 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.11 2216 2 Yes
incomer
Table 38: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Max
Min Bolted 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Max Arc Total Working Arc Flash
Fault Min Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Current Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
location Current (kA)
(kA) (kA)
time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR701-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR701-MCC01
Incomer 20.57 10.14 20.48 8.59 0.23 610 4.92 1589 2 No
Switchboard
SR029-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR029-MCC01
Incomer 29.72 13.60 29.07 11.36 0.26 610 7.63 2141 2 No
Switchboard
SR706-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR706-MCC01
Incomer 13.55 7.27 13.42 6.14 0.23 610 3.43 1245 1 No
Switchboard
SR705-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR705-MCC01
Incomer 20.40 10.07 19.78 8.36 0.23 610 4.88 1581 2 No
Switchboard
SR703-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR703-MCC01
Incomer 13.53 7.26 13.38 6.12 0.23 610 3.43 1243 1 No
Switchboard
SR151-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR151-MCC01
Incomer 36.17 15.90 33.63 12.75 0.09 610 3.13 1169 1 No
Switchboard
SR121-MCC01
Incomer
SR111-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR707-MCC01
Incomer
SR707-MCC01
Incomer 45.36 19.04 42.39 15.33 0.13 610 5.49 1712 2 No
Switchboard
RBS MCC Incomer 7.88 4.72 7.76 3.96 0.26 610 2.43 985 1 No
69
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 39: Proposed protection settings for LV incomers
SR706-MCC01 SR705-MCC01 SR703-MCC01 SR701-MCC01 SR151-MCC01 SR029-MCC01 RBS SR707-MCC01
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer(1) Incomer(1) Incomer(1) Incomer
ICT 1250 1600 1250 1600 3200 1600
In (xICT) 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.9 1
LT (x In) 1 0.8 1 1 C12 0.85
LT s 10 10 10 10 2880 10
ST 4 4 4 4 3 8kA 2kA 6
ST s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.1
INST 12 10 12 10 5 16
70
9.13 Appendix M – Proposed protection settings to resolve grading
problems found
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 40: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main Firetail 33kV switchboard (2000-SR001)
Location Relay CTR 51P CS Curve TD 50P
Feeders
to main Firetail Switchboard SUB002 GE F650 600 0.81 Curve A 0.23 Off
(2000-SR001)
Main Firetail
Incomer for main Firetail
switchboard SEL751A 600 0.81 C1 0.23 Off
switchboard (2000-SR001)
(2000-SR001)
Table 41: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main KV 33kV switchboard (2000-SR001)
Location Relay CTR 51P CS Curve TD 50P
Feeders
De-activate
To main KV Switchboard SUB003 GE F650 600 1.2 Curve A 0.19
(2000-SR001)
Incomers for main KV
KV SEL751A 1200 0.6 C1 0.19 off
switchboard (2000-SR001)
Table 42: Proposed settings for feeders to RMUs for correct coordination between protection devices
Location Relay CTR 51P 50P
CS – 1 Pickup – 6
Feeder SUB002
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU14 (SWB05-CB07)
TD – 0.1
CS – 0.48 Pickup – 2.9
Feeder SUB002
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU11 (SWB05-CB06)
TD – 0.1
CS – 1 Pickup – 6
Feeder SUB003
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU13 (SWB06-CB06)
TD – 0.1
CS – 0.48 Pickup – 2.9
Feeder SUB003
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU12 (SWB06-CB07)
TD – 0.1
71
ARC FLASH STUDIES
An Internship with Fortescue Metals Group
Limited
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
CHRISTIAN BARABONA
BACHELOR OF ENGINEERING
(ELECTRICAL POWER AND INDUSTRIAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS)
JANUARY 2016
Disclaimer
I declare the following work to be my own, unless otherwise referenced, as defined by Murdoch
University’s Plagiarism and Collusion Assessment Policy.
Abstract
A significant safety risk to electrical personnel working on an energised switchboard is the hazard
of exposure to arc flash, which has gained increasing attention over the past decade. Although
reported arc flash injuries are infrequent compared to other electrical injuries, especially electric
shock, the very high costs associated with these arc flash injuries make them one of the most
important categories to avoid in an industrial workplace.
The main objective of this project is to conduct arc flash studies for switchboards installed at
Fortescue’s Solomon Hub to quantify the existing arc flash hazard posed by this type of equipment.
The aim of the study is to find feasible solutions to reduce arc flash incident energy to less than 8
cal/cm2 and to provide appropriate arc flash PPE recommendations.
Switchboards with voltage levels of 0.4kV, 0.69kV, 6.6kV, 11kV and 33kV were investigated. The
arc flash calculations were conducted using the IEEE 1584-2002 Standard, IEEE Guide for
Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. The study found that many switchboards have dangerous
incident energy levels that must be reduced, in order to allow energised work on the equipment. To
mitigate the hazard, three simple solutions were proposed: optimise protection settings, install
maintenance switches and remote operation.
Firstly, optimising protection settings is the least expensive solution to reduce the operating time of
protection devices, and hence limit arc flash incident energy exposure. Secondly, where a permanent
setting will violate the grading requirement of the system, then installing maintenance switches is
proposed. Thirdly, where the first two strategies cannot be implemented because they will violate
the grading requirement of the system, then remote operation is proposed. This will eliminate the arc
flash hazard because personnel will operate the equipment outside the arc flash boundary.
iii
If the recommendations of this study are implemented, the arc flash incident energy of the
switchboards will significantly reduce to not greater than 8 cal/cm2. The implications are improved
safety for personnel, given that energy levels on many switchboards currently pose a significantly
higher arc flash hazard.
iv
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank FMG’s engineering team especially my industry supervisors; Lead
Electrical Engineer Brad Mcleod and Principal Electrical Engineer Cobus Strauss for giving me the
opportunity to undertake an engineering internship as part of their team. The support and guidance
that you have provided is much appreciated and the knowledge I have gained from all of you is
invaluable.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my academic supervisors; Dr Sujeewa Hettiwatte and
Dr Gregory Crebbin for their academic assistance, not only for the internship project but also for the
support they have provided throughout my degree at Murdoch University. I would also like to
acknowledge the rest of the staff at the School of Engineering for facilitating our learning and guiding
us throughout our university studies.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my fellow students for making my time at university enjoyable
and for contributing to my academic and professional development.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and encouragement.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. viii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................... ix
Definitions, Acronyms and Terms Used in this Thesis Report .......................................................... xi
List of symbols ................................................................................................................................. xii
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
2 Background .............................................................................................................................. 3
2.1 Engineering Internship ..................................................................................................... 3
2.2 Fortescue Metals Group ................................................................................................... 3
2.2.1 Solomon Hub ............................................................................................................ 4
2.3 Project Background .......................................................................................................... 5
2.4 Arc flash ............................................................................................................................ 7
2.5 Arc flash reported incidents and statistics ........................................................................ 9
2.5.1 Standards and WHS Requirements ......................................................................... 10
2.6 Arc Flash Studies............................................................................................................. 13
2.6.1 NFPA 70E ................................................................................................................ 14
2.6.2 IEEE Std 1584 – 2002 .............................................................................................. 15
2.7 Assumptions and Clarifications ...................................................................................... 16
2.8 PowerFactory ................................................................................................................. 16
3 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 17
3.1 System audit, data collection and power system modelling .......................................... 17
3.2 Short-Circuit Study ......................................................................................................... 18
3.2.1 Effect of motor contributions in the calculations ................................................... 19
3.3 Arc current calculations .................................................................................................. 21
3.4 Coordination studies ...................................................................................................... 23
3.5 Incident energy and arc flash boundary calculations ..................................................... 24
3.6 PPE selection .................................................................................................................. 26
3.7 Process flowchart ........................................................................................................... 27
4 Results .................................................................................................................................... 28
4.1 Stockyard ........................................................................................................................ 28
4.2 Firetail ............................................................................................................................ 29
4.3 Kings Valley..................................................................................................................... 30
vi
4.4 RMUs + other attached switchboards ............................................................................ 31
5 Discussion............................................................................................................................... 32
5.1 Elimination ..................................................................................................................... 36
5.2 Substitution .................................................................................................................... 36
5.3 Engineering Controls ...................................................................................................... 37
5.3.1 Optimise protection settings .................................................................................. 37
5.3.2 Installing a maintenance switch ............................................................................. 37
5.3.3 Zone Selective Interlocking Scheme ....................................................................... 38
5.3.4 Remote Operation .................................................................................................. 39
5.4 Administrative control .................................................................................................... 40
5.5 PPE ................................................................................................................................. 40
6 Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 41
7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 44
8 References.............................................................................................................................. 46
9 Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 49
9.1 Appendix A – Solomon Interconnection diagram ........................................................... 49
9.2 Appendix B – LV incomers Settings................................................................................. 50
9.3 Appendix C – Arc flash study results for the Stockyard .................................................. 53
9.4 Appendix D – Arc flash study results for Firetail OPF...................................................... 54
9.5 Appendix E – Arc flash study results for Kings Valley OPF .............................................. 56
9.6 Appendix F – Arc flash study results for RMUs and switchboards downstream ............. 59
9.7 Appendix G – GE LV circuit breaker curve ...................................................................... 61
9.8 Appendix H – Maintenance mode protection settings ................................................... 62
9.9 Appendix I – Arc flash study results for Stockyard based on the proposed solutions ..... 63
9.10 Appendix J – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the proposed solutions
65
9.11 Appendix K – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the proposed
solutions ..................................................................................................................................... 67
9.12 Appendix L – Arc flash study results for RMUs based on proposed solutions ................ 69
9.13 Appendix M – Proposed protection settings to resolve grading problems found .......... 71
vii
List of Figures
Figure 1: Fortescue Metals Group Limited Operations Map [1]....................................................... 4
Figure 2: Switchboard installed in Substation 2 ............................................................................... 6
Figure 3: Locations within a switchboard where arc faults can occur: a) outgoing terminal of the
feeder, b) feeder, c) distribution bus, d) main busbar and e) incomer or incoming cable termination.
(Redrawn from [23]) ...................................................................................................................... 12
Figure 4: Fault simulation showing motor contributions ................................................................ 21
Figure 5: TCC illustrating the significant increase in incident energy for a 10% arc current
reduction ........................................................................................................................................ 22
Figure 6: TCC illustrating the effect of the clearing characteristics of a protection relay on the
incident energy ............................................................................................................................... 24
Figure 7: Flow chart which illustrate the steps conducted to achieve the goals of the arc flash
studies ............................................................................................................................................ 27
Figure 8: Fault simulation showing the faulted switchboard .......................................................... 32
Figure 9: Hierarchy of controls (redrawn from [40]) ...................................................................... 36
Figure 10: Zone selective interlocking ........................................................................................... 39
Figure 11: GE LV circuit breaker curve (approval pending [39] .................................................... 61
viii
List of Tables
Table 1: Definitions, acronyms and terms used in this report ........................................................... xi
Table 2: Limitations of equations from IEEE 1584 ........................................................................ 15
Table 3: Distance factors and typical conductor gaps used for the arc flash calculations [30] ....... 22
Table 4: PPE requirements based on incident energy exposure [26] .............................................. 26
Table 5: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at the Stockyard .................................. 28
Table 6: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Firetail OPF .................................... 29
Table 7: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Kings Valley OPF........................... 30
Table 8: Arc flash study results for RMUs and loads fed from the RMUs ..................................... 31
Table 9: Existing Stockyard .4 kV MCC protection settings .......................................................... 50
Table 10: Existing Firetail .4 kV MCC protection settings............................................................. 50
Table 11: Existing KV .4 kV MCC protection settings .................................................................. 51
Table 12: 0.4kV MCCs fed from RMUs ........................................................................................ 51
Table 13: Exising incomer protection settings for VSDs................................................................ 52
Table 14: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 53
Table 15: Arc flash study results for 11kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 53
Table 16: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 54
Table 17: Arc flash study results for 6.6kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 54
Table 18: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 55
Table 19: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 56
Table 20: Arc flash study results for the 6.6kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the
existing protection settings ............................................................................................................. 57
Table 21: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 58
Table 22: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the existing settings .............................. 59
Table 23: Arc flash study results for the sizer drives switchboards based on the existing protection
settings ........................................................................................................................................... 59
Table 24: Arc flash study results for the VSDs based on the existing protection settings .............. 59
Table 25: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the existing protection settings
....................................................................................................................................................... 60
Table 26: Settings and location of the three maintenance switches ................................................ 62
Table 27: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the
proposed protection settings ........................................................................................................... 63
Table 28: Proposed protection settings for the Stockyard 0.4kV switchboards incomers ............... 63
Table 29: Arc flash study results for the Stockyard 11kV switchboards based on the proposed
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 63
Table 30: Proposed protection settings for Stockpile 11kV switchboards incomers....................... 64
Table 31: Arc flash study results for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection
settings ........................................................................................................................................... 65
ix
Table 32: Proposed protection settings for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards incomers ......................... 65
Table 33: Arc flash study results for Firetail 33kV switchboards based on the proposed
maintenance mode protection settings ............................................................................................ 66
Table 34: Arc flash study results for KV 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection
settings ........................................................................................................................................... 67
Table 35: Proposed protection settings for KV 0.4kV incomer ...................................................... 68
Table 36: Arc flash study results for KV 33kV switchboards based on the proposed maintenance
mode protection settings................................................................................................................. 68
Table 37: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the proposed maintenance mode
protection settings .......................................................................................................................... 69
Table 38: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
....................................................................................................................................................... 69
Table 39: Proposed protection settings for LV incomers ................................................................ 70
Table 40: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main Firetail 33kV switchboard (2000-
SR001) ........................................................................................................................................... 71
Table 41: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main KV 33kV switchboard (2000-
SR001) ........................................................................................................................................... 71
Table 42: Proposed settings for feeders to RMUs for correct coordination between protection
devices ........................................................................................................................................... 71
x
Definitions, Acronyms and Terms Used in this Thesis Report
Table 1: Definitions, acronyms and terms used in this report
A Amperes
AC Alternating Current
Arc fault
A fault current flowing through ionized air during an arc flash event
current
Bolted fault A short-circuit or electrical contact between conductors at different voltages in
current which the impedance between the conductors is close to zero
Cal Calories
CB Circuit Breaker
cm Centimetre
DOL Direct On Line
Feeder The first downstream protection device relative to the main busbar
FLA Full Load Amps
Grading Correct coordination between protection devices
HV High Voltage (greater than or equal 1kV)
IAC Internal Arc Classification
Instantaneous
Protection element of low voltage circuit breakers that has no intentional delay
function
Incomer First upstream protection device relative to the main busbar
kA Kilo Amperes
kV Kilo Volts
KV Kings Valley
Long time
Inverse-time overcurrent element of low voltage circuit breakers
function
LV Low Voltage (less than 1kV)
MCC Motor Control Centre
MS Maintenance Switch
MPU Mobile Power Unit
Total time taken by a protection device to initiate trips or alarms exclusive of any time
Operating time
delays inherent in the tripping circuit after a trip is initiated
OPF Ore Processing Facility
PIMS Project Information Management System
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
Racking Process of disconnecting a circuit breaker from the bus
RMU Ring Main Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Short time
Protection element of low voltage circuit breakers that has intentional delay
function
SLD Single Line Diagram
TCC Time-Current Curve
Total Clearing
Sum of the protection device operating time and the opening time of the circuit breaker
Time
Upstream
protection Feeder from the first upstream switchboard
device
V Voltage
WHS Workplace Health and Safety
Working
Distance between the worker and the potential arc source inside the equipment
distance
50P Protection element of protection relays that has no intentional delay
51P Inverse-time overcurrent element of protection relays
xi
List of symbols
𝐶𝑓 Calculation factor
𝐷 distance from the possible arc point to person (mm)
𝐷𝐵 distance of the boundary from the arcing point (mm)
𝐸 is incident energy (J/cm2)
𝐸𝐵 incident energy at the boundary distance (J/cm2)
𝐸𝑛 normalized incident energy
𝐼𝑎 arcing current (kA)
𝐼𝑎,𝐿𝑉 arc current reflected in the LV side of the transformer (A)
𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 arc current reflected in the HV side of the transformer (A)
𝐼𝑝𝑢 pickup setting of the protection relay (A)
𝐼𝑏𝑓 bolted fault current (kA)
𝑙𝑔 log10
𝑡 time (seconds)
𝑡𝑜 opening time of the circuit breaker (seconds)
𝑡𝑝 operating time of the protection device (seconds)
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 total clearing time of the protection device (seconds)
𝑇𝐷 Time dial
𝑉 voltage (kV)
xii
1 Introduction
Aside from the risk of electric shock, the principal safety risk to electrical personnel operating and
maintaining high voltage (HV) and low voltage (LV) switchboards is exposure to arc flash from live
bare power terminals or conductors within switchboards. In the past decade, many industrial
companies across the globe have recognised the significance of understanding and mitigating the
hazards posed by arc flash events occurring in their facilities. While reported injuries caused by an
arc flash are rare, the cost related to these injuries can be very high, making them one of the most
important categories of injuries to avoid in an industrial workplace.
An arc flash will primarily occur when personnel are undertaking switching functions or
maintenance work that require switchboard doors to be opened or covers to be removed. In order to
quantify the amount of energy released during such an event, arc flash studies must be performed.
The purpose of this project is to determine the existing arc flash incident energy levels of HV and
LV switchboards installed in the Solomon Hub, which is owned by Fortescue Metals Group Limited
(“Fortescue”). The term “switchboard” will also include ring main units (RMUs) and motor control
centres (MCCs) for the rest of this document. The principal aims of the project are to reduce the
incident energy to less than 8 cal/cm2 where possible, and to determine the appropriate arc flash
personal protective equipment (PPE) where it is not feasible to reduce the incident energy to less
than 8 cal/cm2. To achieve these aims, the following tasks were conducted:
Verification of existing power network models and expanding the models where required;
Short circuit studies to determine maximum and minimum three-phase fault currents at the
switchboards;
Maximum and minimum arc current calculations;
Coordination studies to determine the clearing times of the protection devices for the
corresponding arc fault currents; and
1
Incident energy and arc flash boundary calculations.
This thesis discusses how the study was conducted, the results of the studies based on the existing
state of the system, the proposed solutions as well as the arc flash studies results based on these
solutions. In addition, a section detailing different solutions that were investigated to mitigate the arc
flash hazard is included.
This report begins with a background section that will provide sufficient information about the
internship project and will give comprehensive facts in regards to the arc flash study.
2
2 Background
2.1 Engineering Internship
Murdoch University engineering students must complete the unit ENG470-Engineering Honours
Thesis as one of the requirements for Bachelor of Engineering at Murdoch University. The internship
is one of two types of projects that engineering students at Murdoch University can undertake. The
internship placement provides students with exposure to their prospective industry while gaining
practical problem-solving experience. The aim of the unit is to develop the following graduate
attributes: communication, critical and creative thinking, social interaction, independent learning,
ethics and in-depth knowledge of the project topic.
The internship project took place at Fortescue’s corporate office in Perth under the direct supervision
of a senior Electrical Engineer. The placement was a full time position for 18 weeks where the main
task undertaken was the arc flash studies for the Solomon Hub. As part of the electrical engineering
team, the intern also undertook minor tasks such as power network modelling and simulations. These
tasks provided opportunities to turn theory learned from formal studies into practice, while gaining
invaluable skills and knowledge of how to become a successful engineer.
2.2 Fortescue Metals Group
Since the company’s inception in 2003, Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) has managed to acquire
several tenements in the Pilbara region of Western Australia where significant iron ore deposits have
been discovered. The company owns port facilities and a 620 km rail infrastructure that is used to
transport iron ore from the company’s two operating hubs, which include Cloudbreak, Christmas
Creek, Firetail and Kings Valley mines, as shown in Figure 1. The mining operation was built on an
existing mine lease and is now producing 165 million tonnes of iron ore per year, making Fortescue
the fourth largest iron ore producer in the world.
3
Figure 1: Fortescue Metals Group Limited Operations Map [1]
2.2.1 Solomon Hub
Solomon Hub is located 120 km west of Chichester Hub and includes Firetail and Kings Valley
mines. Solomon Hub has almost twice the resource of Chichester Hub and produces more than 70
metric tonnes of iron ore per year [1]. The arc flash studies were conducted for switchboards installed
in the Solomon Hub, and hence this report will only focus on Solomon Hub’s electrical system.
2.2.1.1 Solomon Hub power system arrangement
Power for Solomon Hub is supplied by four 15MVA Solar Titan 130 (“MPU”) [2] and two GE
LM6000PF Dual Fuel Gas Turbine Generators with maximum individual capacity of 63.5MVA [3].
The power plant is owned by TransAlta and operated as an islanded electrical system. The plant
supplies power to the mining, crushing, screening, overland conveying, stock-piling and train load
out facilities, workshops, administration services buildings and an accommodation village.
Power from the LM6000 generators and MPUs is generated at 11kV. The MPUs are used to supply
power to the Primary Diesel Facility, Stockyard and RMU 10 at 11kV; while some of the generated
power is fed to Substation 1 for transmission at 132kV. Likewise, power from the LM6000
generators is stepped-up to 132kV by two transformers installed in Substation 1 for transmission.
4
From Substation 1, power is transmitted to Substation 2 and Substation 3. In Substation 2, a 50MVA
transformer is used to step-down the voltage to 33kV and feed to a 33kV switchboard where
electricity is distributed to RMU 11, RMU 14 and Firetail ore processing facility (OPF) main 33kV
switchboard via two feeders. The power network set-up for Substation 3 is the same, although power
is distributed to RMU 29, RMU 12 and Kings Valley OPF.
The main 33kV switchboards in Firetail OPF and Kings Valley OPF have a number of outgoing
feeders that supply power to various plant switchrooms. From each switchroom, power is reticulated
to 6.6kV and 400V switchboards to provide power for motors and other electrical equipment
installed at the OPFs. The power network interconnection diagram for the Solomon Hub is shown in
Appendix A.
2.3 Project Background
Electricity is a widely used energy resource as it provides an efficient source of power for
applications such as lighting, heating and many others. Well maintained and operated electrical
equipment will offer a very high level of service and safety. One of the major pieces of electrical
equipment installed in an industrial facility is a switchboard. A switchboard is an assembly of panels
containing busbars, protection devices and auxiliary equipment that are critical to the safe and
continuous operation of electrical equipment. Electricity is transmitted to a switchboard from a
power supply, where it is distributed to downstream equipment. Shown in Figure 2 is a switchboard
installed in Substation 2 at the Solomon Hub that is used to distribute electricity to RMU 11, RMU
14 and Firetail OPF.
5
Figure 2: Switchboard installed in Substation 2
A switchboard is the main point of isolation if downstream equipment is being tested or requires
maintenance and needs to be de-energised. However, electrical personnel working with, or in close
proximity to a switchboard must be aware that, under certain conditions, electrical switchboards
present a serious hazard. Industrial power networks operate at higher energy levels and higher
voltage levels than domestic systems and therefore an awareness of these additional hazards is
essential. When personnel are working on a switchboard, they are exposed not only to electric shock
but also to an arc flash hazard.
An arc flash hazard is a dangerous condition caused by an electric arc as a result of electrical faults
[4]. Because of the significant and even catastrophic nature of these events, elimination and
mitigation strategies continue to receive attention. An arc flash will primarily occur when personnel
are switching or racking a circuit breaker or maintenance work is being performed in the
switchboard. In order to determine the hazard posed by an arc flash event, arc flash studies must be
performed.
In August 2014, Fortescue’s Perth Engineering team initiated arc flash investigations as a critical
safety initiative. The goal of the overall study was to determine the arc flash hazard posed by
switchboards installed in the Solomon Hub and to find solutions to mitigate the hazard. The arc flash
6
hazard assessment was limited to switchboards with voltage levels of at least 400V. Switchboards
that have a lower rating have a relatively low fault current associated with them, hence a low risk of
an arc fault developing with sufficient energy to cause a severe injury.
There is no regulatory requirement for the company to perform an arc flash study. However, to fulfil
the Workplace Health and Safety (WHS) requirement of the company, all measures must be
undertaken to ensure safety of personnel, and hence arc flash studies are recommended.
2.4 Arc flash
An arc flash is the release of heat and light energy when an insulator between energised conductors
fails and current flows through a normally nonconductive medium, such as air [5]. The arc flash
caused by dielectric breakdown is identical to the arc flash emitted by an arc welder. Some of the
causes of arc flash are:
Rats and snakes entering the equipment;
Using an item of under-rated measuring equipment;
Loose joints;
Tools left behind after maintenance; and
Tools accidentally touched two energised conductors.
When objects touch energised conductors, it can result in a short circuit fault. The large fault current
will result in a strong magnetic field, which in turn will propel the object away. As the object moves
away, the current continues to flow and forms very hot arcs which vaporise conductors and ionize
gases. An arc flash can also occur for the same reason when switching or racking a circuit breaker.
In systems with high voltage, tracking can also initiate an arc flash event. This occurs naturally due
to the dielectric breakdown value of air, making it possible for an arc flash to occur over a much
greater air gap, and also due to the tendency of partial discharge to occur over time across insulation,
7
eventually leading to insulation breakdown and an arc fault developing. The arc formation in a
cubicle occurs across different phases [6]:
1. Compression phase: the air where the arc develops is overheated. Then, through
convection and radiation, the remaining volume of air inside the cubicle also increase in
temperature.
2. Expansion phase: as soon as the internal pressure increases, a hole in the cubicle is
formed where the superheated air begins to escape. The pressure increases until it
reaches its maximum value.
3. Emission phase: the superheated air is forced out by an almost constant overpressure
which is the result of the continued contribution of energy by the arc.
4. Thermal phase: after the discharge of air, the temperature inside the cubicle is close to
the arc’s temperature. The final phase lasts until the arc is extinguished, where the
materials inside the cubicle coming into contact, experience erosion with production of
gas, molten material and fumes.
The electric arc between metals is four times as hot as the surface of the sun, which is the hottest
temperature reached on earth [7]. In a bolted fault, such as phase-phase and phase-to-ground faults,
the fault current stays within the conductors where resistance is very low, therefore, little heat is
generated. For an arc fault, there is an appreciable resistance between conductors because a current
is flowing through the air. The heat generated is significant due to the higher resistance path between
conductors. The arc flash may blow equipment doors open and propel parts including molten metals.
The arc flash may continue until the generated voltage has been consumed or a protection device
clears the fault. The potential hazards caused by an arc flash event may include [8]:
8
Burns – an electric arc produces heat energy where exposure experienced by personnel can
cause survivors to suffer debilitating and horrific burn trauma or death.
Projectiles hazard – arc faults result in rapid increase of pressure inside equipment causing
the ejection of loose items or metallic particles.
Intense light – an arc flash event emits high intensity light which can damage the eyes.
Sound waves – an arc flash event may cause permanent hearing loss due to sound generated
from the explosion.
Respiratory trauma – hazardous toxic gases are produced from molten metals or burnt
insulation which are harmful if inhaled.
2.5 Arc flash reported incidents and statistics
The potential for electrical injuries due to arc flash is a serious workplace health and safety problem.
The Department of Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia recorded four arc flash incidents from
2013 - 2015 that can be found in the Department’s Safety Publications Library [9]. All incidents
resulted in irreparable damage to equipment and, fortunately, only resulted in minor injuries to
personnel. The author of this report is aware that the number of arc flash incidents is many times
more than what was reported to the Department of Mines and Petroleum, although normally these
incidents are not reported to the relevant authority, and hence not viewable from public records. On
the 3rd of February 2015, two electricians died due to an arc flash event in a mall in Perth [10]. The
electricians were conducting routine maintenance on a switchboard when the incident happened. The
incident is still under investigation but it is believed that it was caused by human error. This event
highlights that even though arc flash events are uncommon compared to other electrical faults, they
can be very costly and even lethal.
In the USA, a report published by the NFPA states that electrical burns from arc flashes are the cause
of many work-related burns treated at burns centres [11]. Research conducted at a Texas burn centre
over a 20-year period found that 40% of burns were caused by electrical arc injuries and the length
of hospital stay for treatment was 11.3 days [11]. In addition, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
9
shows that for a seven-year period starting in 1992, 2287 U.S. workers died and 32,807 workers
sustained lost time injuries because of electrical shock and burn injuries [12]. Of the 32,807 injuries,
38% were classified as electrical burns [12], which is the category that would include arc flash burns.
Furthermore, a research report by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health into arc
flash injuries in the mining industry noted that between 1990 and 2001, there were 836 arc flash
incidents on mine sites [13]. The majority of these incidents occurred during electrical work activities
including: installation (2%), maintenance (5%), repair and troubleshooting (42%), unspecified
electrical work (22%), during normal operation (19%) and unspecified cause (10%) [13]. Although
reported arc flash injuries are infrequent compared to other electrical injuries, the very high costs
associated with these injuries make them one of the most important categories of injuries in an
industrial workplace.
Extended hospitalisation and rehabilitation costs for personnel, coupled with litigation fees, fines,
investigation costs and increased insurance premiums, are often expensive. In addition, an arc flash
event can also cause irreparable damage to equipment which can lead to extensive downtime and
costly replacement and repair. The combined costs of the damage of one incident have been
estimated to potentially reach a total value of over USD 12 million [14]. As such, the potential
impacts highlight the importance of having mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate arc flash
hazards.
2.5.1 Standards and WHS Requirements
Over the last decade, increasing attention has been placed on the arc flash hazards associated with
electrical switchboards. This has driven manufacturers to design and build safer switchboards that
specifically address arc flash risk. Electrical switchboards in Australia with a nominal supply current
of 800A or more shall be protected from arc faults while the equipment is in service or is undergoing
maintenance as per AS/NZS 3000:2007 [15].
10
The Fortescue specification for LV switchboards 100-SP-EL-0001 is currently being revised and
will outline arc fault protection for LV switchboards that have nominal current of 400A and above,
which is in conformity with the enhanced PPE recommended for such switchboards as per AS/NZS
4836 [16] [17] [18]. For HV switchboards, the Fortescue specification 100-SP-EL-0016 states that
HV switchboards must have an arc fault containment rating, which is now becoming an industry
standard worldwide [19].
2.5.1.1 Internal Arc Fault Containment
Fortescue switchboards have Internal Arc Classification (IAC) certification, as specified in Section
8.3 and Annex A of AS/NZS 62271.200 – 2005, which is an adaptation of IEC 62271.200 modified
for Australian conditions. The arc fault containment is intended to offer a tested level of protection
in the event of internal arc fault for personnel in the vicinity of switchgear with rated voltage from
1kV up to and including 52kV [20]. Likewise, AS/NZS 3439.1:2002 provides guidelines for Internal
Arc Fault Containment testing with the intention of protecting personnel standing in front of an LV
switchboard from an internal arcing fault [21].
The IAC testing is subject to agreement between the switchboard manufacturer and the customer.
There are two types of test performed for IAC certification: the “special” test and the “standard” test.
The “special” test is conducted if additional security is required. For this test, arc faults are simulated
in different locations within a switchboard where it is possible for an arc fault to occur [22]. Due to
the additional cost of testing, when IAC certification is requested, the test that is normally conducted
is a “standard” test only. When conducting a “standard” test, the arc is initiated on the outgoing
terminal of the feeder, which is normally cleared instantaneously, and hence the arc flash energy is
reduced [22]. However, faults in other locations within a switchboard are possible. Nonetheless, the
probability of these faults is low, therefore IAC testing for faults at these locations is not generally
required [21]. Figure 3 shows locations within a switchboard where the initiation of an arc fault is
possible.
11
Figure 3: Locations within a switchboard where arc faults can occur: a) outgoing terminal of the feeder, b) feeder, c)
distribution bus, d) main busbar and e) incomer or incoming cable termination. (Redrawn from [23])
If the arc fault occurs at locations other than the outgoing terminal of the feeder, the first upstream
protection device will clear the arc fault. For example, if the fault is at the feeder or at the main
busbar, the first upstream protection device is the incomer. If the fault is at the incomer, the clearing
device is the feeder from the first upstream switchboard (upstream protection device), which is
normally located in another switchroom. Due to protection grading requirements, these protection
devices normally have longer operating times than the incomer protection device. As a result of
longer operating times, the arc flash energy is higher, and the switchboard arc fault containment
certified using the “standard” test might not be able to withstand the energy released under this
scenario.
Support from IAC test reports are needed before personnel can conduct normal operating duties
while the equipment is energised (with all panel doors closed) without requiring an arc flash PPE. In
order to verify that the whole switchboard is capable of withstanding internal arc faults, the test
12
report must specify that the test was conducted for all compartments within the switchboard, rather
than just on the outgoing terminal of the feeder.
The Fortescue’s records do not clearly show if switchboards installed in the Solomon Hub were IAC
certified using the “standard” test or the “special” test. It was known that all HV switchboards and
some LV switchboards have an IAC, however, without the certification to confirm this, personnel’s
safety could not be guaranteed when working on energised switchboards (with all panel doors
closed).
In addition, it is important to realise that even if the switchboards have been IAC tested, this can
only provide protection if covers and doors are closed and properly fixed in place. When the door or
cover of an arc resistant switchboard is open, the arc resistant properties of the equipment are
nullified. Hence, protection cannot be guaranteed if personnel are conducting normal operating
duties or maintenance work while doors are open. Hence, it is necessary that arc resistant
switchboards shall be included in the arc flash study.
2.6 Arc Flash Studies
An arc flash study is used to quantify the arc flash hazard by calculating the arc flash energy. An arc
flash study is considered a continuation of short-circuit and coordination studies because the results
of each of these studies are required for the arc flash hazard analysis. The arc flash hazard assessment
is used to identify and implement controls to reduce the likelihood and severity of an arc flash
accident. After conducting an arc flash assessment, the calculated energy will determine the required
PPE for personnel working on or near electrical equipment. In addition, the result of the assessment
can be used to establish the limits of approach to energised electrical equipment, identify hazard
management, and identify mitigation actions. When performing an arc flash hazard assessment, a
good knowledge of the electrical network in a facility and the electrical protection system is required.
13
Globally, two North American standards have dominated arc flash hazard assessment [24]: The
NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace; and the IEEE Std 1584-2002, IEEE
Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations. Prior to the Australian Standard, ENA NENS
09 – 2014 [25] for arc hazard quantification coming into place in 2014, and even currently, the USA
standards IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E were widely adopted by the Australian Engineering
Community.
2.6.1 NFPA 70E
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70E standard [26] provides guidelines for
electrical safety in the workplace and selection of arc flash PPE. NFPA 70E is a safety standard that
describes work practices that can help protect electrical personnel from electrical hazards including
electrocution, electric shock, arc blast and arc flash. Section 130 of the NFPA 70E provides task and
equipment based tables that can be used in determining arc flash PPE requirements, hence known as
the “table” method. These tables give pre-defined levels of PPE based on the tasks that are to be
performed, the magnitude of the fault current and the associated clearing time of the protection
device. The “table” method takes a three-step approach:
1. Conduct a risk assessment to determine if the condition of the equipment and the task
that is to be performed warrants the used of arc flash PPE. If PPE is not required, no
further action is necessary, otherwise, proceed to step 2.
2. Determine the working distance and calculate the magnitude of the prospective fault
current and the associated clearing time of the protection device.
3. Determine the arc flash PPE category requirement for the task specified in step 1.
The arc flash energy depends on complex relationships between system voltage, bolted and arcing
fault current, arc impedance, clearing time of protection devices, conductor spacing, confinement in
an enclosure, and system grounding [27]. Some of these variables are not considered in the selection
of arc flash PPE based on the “table” method outlined in the NFPA 70E standard. For this reason,
14
the “table” method is of limited practical use and this could explain why there is a general preference
for using the other method outlined in the IEEE Std 1584 - 2002.
2.6.2 IEEE Std 1584 – 2002
The IEEE Std 1584 – 2002: IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, outlines the
methodology, including providing relevant equations, to determine the arc flash boundary and the
incident energy to which employees could be exposed during their work on or near electrical
equipment [28]. The arc flash boundary is the distance from the arc source where personnel are
exposed to 1.2 cal/cm2 of energy that can lead to a second degree burn [29]. Personnel not wearing
arc flash PPE must not go within the arc flash boundary to avoid exposure to high levels of arc flash
energy. The incident energy is the amount of energy that can reach a person’s face or torso standing
at a specific distance relative to the origin of the arc [30]. The incident energy calculation is not
based on exposure on the hands or arms which will be closer to the arc source if conducting energised
work, because injury to these areas is less life threatening. The equations within the IEEE 1584
standard was developed from statistical analyses using data from a large number of laboratory tests
conducted by the IEEE 1584 working group. Table 2 shows the parameter range for electrical
systems where the empirically derived equations are valid [30]. For equipment with voltage levels
above 15kV, equations based on a theoretical model developed by Ralph Lee [7], which are included
in the IEEE 1584 standard, can be applied.
Table 2: Limitations of equations from IEEE 1584
Parameter Applicable Range
System voltage 0.208kV – 15kV
Frequency 50/60 Hz
Bolted fault current 0.7kA – 106kA
Gap between electrodes 13 – 152 mm
Equipment enclosure type Open air, box, MCC, panel, switchgear and cables
Grounding type All types of grounding and ungrounded
Faults Three phase
The IEEE 1584 standard does not consider the risk of an arc flash occurring nor the effect of arc
fault containment. Instead, the standard is limited to the hazard posed by thermal energy, and the
effects of molten metals, projectiles and toxic by-products are not considered. Nonetheless, industrial
15
companies still have an obligation to complete Arc Flash Hazard assessment to mitigate arc flash
hazards. IEEE 1584 is based on the most comprehensive laboratory experiments and calculations
available; therefore, where arc flash hazard quantification is needed, the IEEE 1584 is generally
used.
2.7 Assumptions and Clarifications
The random nature of arcs makes them very difficult to model precisely. The equations in
the IEEE 1584 standard that are used for the analyses are developed based on average values.
Parameters used are selected to achieve what are considered to be the worst case results.
Calculations are based on three-phase faults.
The inrush currents of transformers are assumed to equal 12 times the transformer rating.
The inrush current of DOL motors are assumed to equal 6 times the motor rating.
Other assumptions are stated in the relevant sections where these assumptions are implemented.
2.8 PowerFactory
The software that was used for all the simulations is DIgSILENT PowerFactory. PowerFactory is an
engineering tool used for the analysis of electrical transmission and distribution systems. The
software was developed by programmers and engineers with extensive experience in computer
programming and electrical systems analysis [31]. The equations used and the results of the
simulations have been confirmed in a large number of implementations of power systems throughout
the world.
16
3 Methodology
3.1 System audit, data collection and power system modelling
A system audit was conducted to determine the state of the power network electrical model. During
the system audit, the network model was compared to the latest single line diagrams (SLDs). The
model was found to require a significant amount of work to bring it to a state where it would
accurately represent the complete Solomon Hub power network. It was found that many equipment
parameters used in the PowerFactory model were incorrect. In order to provide accurate incident
energy calculations, the network model needs to be as accurate as possible. Some parameters, like
the cable impedances, can have a significant effect on the fault levels. However, it was found that
many cables were not modelled, and some had incorrect lengths entered, which resulted in incorrect
impedance values. Moreover, some transformers were modelled using typical impedance values
instead of actual nameplate impedance values. Whilst impedance values may differ only slightly, a
small variation of available fault current may significantly affect the calculated magnitude of the
incident energy for a switchboard [32]. As a result, it was necessary to obtain accurate and complete
data pertaining to the cable and transformer specifications. Those data were then used to update the
PowerFactory model. This task identified an unexpected number of existing errors, and therefore
was time-consuming, taking approximately one month of full time investigation by the intern.
Another problem encountered during the project was that many electrical loads and switchboards
that are included in the present arc flash study had not previously been modelled into the simulation
software. Hence, the respective SLDs for these types of equipment were obtained and used to update
the model in the simulation software. The switchboards were modelled using “busbar” blocks while
all the loads were modelled using “general load” blocks in the PowerFactory software. There are
numerous electrical loads connected at each switchboard, however, they were modelled as a single
load. This is because modelling each load separately will give no additional information about the
power network compared with modelling a single composite load [33]. The power ratings of the
loads were taken from the Solomon electrical load list 224632-SL-2000-LL-EL-0002 [34] and the
17
load factors were assumed to equal 100% of the rated capacity. The load factor will not affect the
fault simulations; but in load flow simulations, it will result in maximum current demand, which is
considered to be the worst-case scenario.
Finally, it was found that all LV circuit breakers were not modelled into the simulation software and
the protection settings were not available. The protection devices need to be modelled in the software
so that a Time-Current Curve (TCC) can be generated, which will be used to determine the operating
time of these devices when a fault is simulated. As a result, the intern travelled to Solomon hub to
obtain the settings of the LV circuit breakers, which can be found in Appendix B. Most of the
protection settings were collected except for the settings of a few protection devices that were not
accessible or were not operational during the visit. Consequently, site personnel at Solomon Hub
were requested to gather the remaining protection settings after they became operational.
One more methodological problem encountered in the project is that, unfortunately, even though
most of the required protection settings were obtained, the LV circuit breakers cannot be modelled
into PowerFactory software because Fortescue did not have this included in the PowerFactory
protection devices library. As a result, all the operating times calculations for all LV circuit breakers
were performed manually.
3.2 Short-Circuit Study
Short-circuit simulations were conducted to determine the fault levels at each switchboard. It was
assumed that any unbalanced arc fault will immediately escalate to three-phase faults because air is
ionized around the conductors [30]. Hence, only faults involving three phases were simulated. The
fault currents that flow as a result of three-phase short-circuit faults at each switchboard were
determined using the “complete” method. With this method, fault currents are determined by
superimposing a healthy load-flow condition before the fault initiation, resulting in more realistic
and more accurate fault calculations [31].
18
Unlike in protection studies where the maximum fault current is assumed to provide worst-case
conditions, for an arc flash study, the worst-case short-circuit current assumptions do not always
produce the most severe arc flash incident energy results, as will be explained in the next section.
For simple radial systems similar to the Solomon hub’s electrical network, IEEE 1584 suggested that
two sets of calculations are required [30]. The first calculation is for the minimum short-circuit
current conditions and the second is for maximum short-circuit current conditions.
Both the maximum and minimum short-circuit conditions should be evaluated to determine the effect
on the protective device clearing times and the incident energy exposures. The variations between
the results of these two calculations can have a significant effect on the accuracy of the evaluations
for the arc flash hazard and the PPE requirements for each switchboard. There are different operating
modes that can significantly change the fault levels at the switchboards, which were identified. The
first operating mode was the basis of the maximum short-circuit calculations and included motor
contributions, while the second and third operating modes were the basis of the minimum short-
circuit calculations and excluded motor contributions. The operating modes were:
1. One LM6000 generator and all MPUs are in service (126MVA of generation) for maximum
fault simulations.
2. One LM6000 generator and one MPU are in service (79MVA of generation) for Stockyard
and RMU10 minimum fault simulations.
3. Three MPUs are in service (47MVA of generation) for minimum fault simulations for the
OPFs.
3.2.1 Effect of motor contributions in the calculations
Another variable that can affect the fault levels are current contributions from induction motors.
When a fault occurs, induction motors momentarily contribute current to the fault. The Solomon
Hub’s electrical system includes many induction motors, although around half of the major induction
19
motors are driven by variable speed drives (VSDs). A VSD effectively separates the motors from
the rest of the system, and hence a VSD-driven motor does not contribute to the fault current. The
fault contribution from a single motor is not significant, however, the individual contributions adds
up, which can result in a significant increase in the fault level. Unlike the contribution from the
generators, contributions from motors decay rapidly and may not be present for the whole duration
of an arc flash event [35].
Neither IEEE 1584 nor NFPA 70E provides guidance on how to calculate motor contributions,
however, PowerFactory can calculate motor contributions and include them in fault simulations. For
minimum fault simulations, it was assumed that there are no contributions from the motors, whereas,
for the maximum fault simulations, PowerFactory was set to include contributions from motors, to
obtain the highest fault current magnitude. When calculating the clearing time of protection devices
manually (as was the case for the LV circuit breakers), it is important that contributions from motors
downstream of the faulted bus are excluded because these currents are not passing through the
incoming and upstream protection devices that are used to interrupt the fault current.
To illustrate this, Figure 4 shows a PowerFactory fault simulation analysis where a fault was
introduced in Switchboard 2. It can be seen that Motor M2 is located downstream of Switchboard 2
and contributed 5kA to the fault. The rest of the network, including other motors, supplied a total of
31.835kA of current to the fault. Motor M2’s contribution does not flow through the incomer and
the upstream protection device. Consequently, this can have a significant effect on the incident
energy calculation because it will affect the clearing time of the protection devices. The importance
of using a correct value for the fault magnitude in clearing time calculations is further explained in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
20
Figure 4: Fault simulation showing motor contributions
3.3 Arc current calculations
The bolted fault currents found in the short-circuit study were used to calculate the arcing current
using either equation (1) or equation (2), depending on the voltage level.
For switchboards with a voltage under 1000V [29, p.10]:
𝐼𝑎 = 10K+0.662(𝑙𝑔 𝐼𝑏𝑓)+0.0966V+0.000526G+0.5588V(𝑙𝑔𝐼𝑏𝑓)−0.00304G(𝑙𝑔 𝐼𝑏𝑓) (1)
For switchboards with a voltage of 1000V or higher [29, p.10]:
𝐼𝑎 = 100.00402+0.983(𝑙𝑔 𝐼𝑏𝑓) (2)
where
𝐼𝑎 is the arcing current (kA)
K is a constant which has a value of -.097
𝑙𝑔 is the log10 function
𝐼𝑏𝑓 is the bolted fault current (kA)
G is the gap between conductors seen in Table 3 (mm)
V is the system voltage (kV)
21
Table 3: Distance factors and typical conductor gaps used for the arc flash calculations [30]
Voltage (kV) Typical conductor gaps x (distance factor)
0.208 - 1 32 1.473
>1 - 5 13-102 0.973
>5 - 15 153 0.973
The minimum arc current values were further reduced by 15% as recommended in Section 9.10.4 of
IEEE 1584. This was done because it is very difficult to accurately predict the arcing current and a
small change in current could result in a significant change in clearing time. To illustrate this, the
time current curve (TCC) of a protection relay protecting a 33kV switchboard is shown in Figure 5.
Notice the change in relay clearing time when transitioning from the “definite-time” region of the
TCC to the “inverse” region of the TCC. As illustrated in Figure 5, when the arc fault current is
reduced by 10%, the clearing time is increased from 0.02 s to 0.5 s, which resulted in a significant
increase in incident energy.
Figure 5: TCC illustrating the significant increase in incident energy for a 10% arc current reduction
22
3.4 Coordination studies
The objective of coordination studies is to ensure that protection devices are properly designed and
coordinated [36]. Coordination studies are used to determine the operating time of protection devices
and to ensure that these devices will detect faults and isolate the faulted part of the system without
compromising reliability. Conventionally, coordination studies were targeted at reliability, with all
protection settings adjusted towards clearing bolted faults. However, as there are new arc flash safety
requirements, this means that from now on all coordination studies (including the present study) used
to determine the appropriate settings for the protection devices must not only clear bolted faults but
they must also clear arc faults.
The operating times of protection devices were determined based on the minimum and maximum
arc current values calculated using the equations presented in Section 3.3. The accuracy of the
operating time is important because this is the most dominant factor influencing incident energy [37].
For each switchboard, out of two calculations, the arc fault current magnitude that resulted in
protection device operating time that led to worst-case scenario was used. For switchboards that are
protected by a fuse, the minimum arcing fault currents are the basis of the worst-case calculations
for the incident energy [38]. For switchboards that are protected by circuit breakers or protection
relays, the worst-case calculations vary according to the regions of the TCC. If the arc fault current
magnitude falls completely within any region of the TCC where the time remains constant, the
maximum arc fault current will result in the calculation of the worst-case incident energy. However,
if the arc fault current falls within the “inverse” region of the TCC, depending on the steepness of
the curve, the lower arcing fault values can sometimes result in the worst-case scenario calculations,
because it will correspond to longer clearing times (illustrated in Figure 6). Incident energy is a
function of several parameters including the arc current and the clearing time of the protection
device, where a lower fault current can sometimes be counteracted by an associated increase in fault
clearing time, thereby leading to higher incident energy. Therefore, in order to determine the worst-
case incident energy for instances when the arc current value falls within the “inverse” region of the
23
TCC, two calculations were conducted. The first calculation used the maximum arc current value
and the associated clearing time of the protection device while the second calculation used the
minimum arc current value and the associated clearing time of the protection device.
Figure 6: TCC illustrating the effect of the clearing characteristics of a protection relay on the incident energy
Note that the opening times of the circuit breakers were added to the operating time of protection
devices. The opening time has a value range of 0.03 s – 0.06 s depending on the type and model of
the circuit breaker.
3.5 Incident energy and arc flash boundary calculations
After the coordination study, arc flash boundary and incident energy calculations were performed
using equations from IEEE 1584. Incident energy is the amount of energy that can reach a person’s
face or torso if an arc flash occurs. The incident energy was calculated using equation 3 and equation
4 for switchboards that have a voltage of less than 15kV [29, p.11].
24
𝐸𝑛 = 10𝐾1 + 𝐾2 + 1.081𝑙𝑔 𝑙𝑎 +0.0022G (3)
where
𝐸𝑛 is the incident energy (J/cm2) normalised for time and distance
𝐾1 is a constant that has a value of -0.555 for switchboard incident energy calculations
𝐾2 is a constant that has a value of -0.113 if the system is solidly grounded, otherwise it has a
value of 0
𝑡 610𝑥
𝐸 = 4.184𝐶𝑓 𝐸𝑛 ( )( ) (4)
0.2 𝐷𝑥
where
𝐸 is the incident energy (J/cm2)
𝐶𝑓 is a calculation factor that has a value of 1.5 for a switchboard that has a voltage level of
1kV and below, otherwise, it has a value of 1
𝑡 is arcing time (seconds)
𝐷 is a person’s distance relative to the origin of the arc (mm)
𝑥 is a distance exponent from Table 3
For switchboards where the voltage level is 15kV or above, the theoretically derived equation by
Ralph Lee was used [29, p.12]:
𝑡
𝐸 = 2.142 𝑥 106 𝑉𝐼𝑏𝑓 ( 2) (5)
𝐷
The possible working distances for the switchboards were determined from the equipment manuals
by inspecting the switchboard dimensions. However, these distances will vary depending on the task
that is being performed. To cater for worst-case scenario, the working distance for the LV
switchboards was assumed to be equal to 610 mm while the working distance for HV switchboards
was assumed to be equal to 910 mm. The assumptions were based on the advice of the supervising
electrical engineer at Fortescue who has a good knowledge of switchboard construction.
25
In addition, the arc flash boundary, which is the distance from the arc source at which a person can
receive a second degree burn, was calculated. Any person crossing the arc flash boundary is required
to wear the appropriate arc flash PPE. If the switchboard has a voltage of less than 15kV, equation 6
is used; otherwise, equation 7 is used [29, p.12].
1
𝑡 610𝑥 𝑥
𝐷𝐵 = [4.184𝐶𝑓 𝐸𝑛 ( ) ( )] (6)
0.2 𝐸𝐵
𝑡
𝐷𝐵 = √2.142𝑥106 𝑉𝐼𝑏𝑓 ( ) (7)
𝐸𝐵
where 𝐷𝐵 is the incident energy (J/cm2) and x the distance exponent from Table 3.
3.6 PPE selection
The required PPE if personnel are exposed to arc hazards is shown in Table 4. The PPE category
was chosen based on the magnitude of the incident energy which was calculated in the previous step.
This is the minimum level of PPE recommended from NFPA 70E standard with the intent to protect
personnel from the thermal effects of the arc flash at working distance.
Table 4: PPE requirements based on incident energy exposure [26]
Min Incident Max Incident Energy Required PPE Rating
PPE Category
Energy (cal/cm2) (cal/cm2) (cal/cm2)
0 1.2 0
1.21 4 1 4
4.1 8 2 8
8.1 25 3 25
25.1 40 4 40
40.1 And above X Specialised PPE
required
26
3.7 Process flowchart
The arc flash studies performed for this project were made up of several tasks that were explained in
the previous sections. The aim of the studies is not just to quantify the arc flash hazards and
recommend PPE, but also to find solutions to mitigate the hazard. Figure 7 shows the process flow
chart illustrating the steps conducted to achieve the goals of the arc flash studies.
Figure 7: Flow chart which illustrate the steps conducted to achieve the goals of the arc flash studies
27
4 Results
Switchboards were evaluated to determine if either the incomer or the upstream protection device
should be used for the calculation of the incident energy. In this study, it was assumed that an arc
fault can occur at the load side of the incomer or at the incomer itself. An incoming protection device
can only detect faults at its load side, which is normally in a separate compartment. If this happens,
the incomer will clear the fault, and hence its operating time will be used for the incident energy
calculations. If the fault is at the incoming protection device itself, then the upstream protection
device will provide the protection. The identification of the correct protection device is very
important because the clearing times will vary, depending on which device trips. The arc flash studies
results were categorised based on the location of the fault within switchboards.
4.1 Stockyard
The summary of the arc flash study results for switchboards installed in the Stockyard area is shown
in Table 5. The complete arc flash study results for the Stockyard area can be found in Appendix C.
These results are based on the existing settings of the protection devices. As previously mentioned,
two incident energy calculations were conducted for each switchboard: one is when the fault is at
the load side of the incomer (a “switchboard”) and another is when the fault is at the incomer itself
where the upstream protection device will clear the fault. An arc fault at the incomer can occur when
personnel are switching or racking the incoming protection device. It can be seen that some
switchboards have very high arc flash incident energy that is well above the desired limit of 8
cal/cm2.
Table 5: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at the Stockyard
0.85 x Incident
Maximum Total Arc Flash
Clearing Device Minimum Energy
Equipment Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Location Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
(kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV
Upstream 8.03-13.89 6.81-11.58 0.75- 2.28 14.66-55.72 3336-8259
Incomer
0.4kV
Incomer 8.03-13.89 6.81-11.58 0.06-0.43 1.00-12.92 538-3061
Switchboards
11kV
Upstream 5.37-18.49 3.75-9.21 0.42-0.67 3.59-8.40 2809-6725
Incomer
11kV
Incomer/Upstream 5.37-18.49 3.75-9.21 0.08-0.67 1.58-21.82 1204-17934
Switchboards
28
The incomers possess the greatest arc flash hazard, with SUB-801-SWB01 incomer CB and
SUB901-MCC01 incomer CB having 54.93 cal/cm2 and 55.72 cal/cm2 potential incident energy,
respectively (see Appendix C). These energy levels are higher than the withstand rating of PPE’s
available at the Stockyard area and, therefore, a mitigation strategy must be implemented as soon as
possible.
4.2 Firetail
The results of the arc flash study for switchboards installed at Firetail OPF are summarised in Table
6. The complete arc flash study results for the Stockyard area can be found in Appendix D. It can
be seen that all 6.6kV switchboards have a calculated incident energy of less than 8 cal/cm2, which
is the ideal result. However, people working in 0.4kV and 33kV switchboards are exposed to very
high arc flash incident energy. For the 0.4kV switchboards, it can be seen that the highest potential
incident energy exposure is 43.82 cal/cm2 if an arc fault occurs at SR102-MCC01 incomer. In
addition, it can be seen that the incident energy of 33kV switchboards are well above the desired
limit of 8 cal/cm2.
Table 6: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Firetail OPF
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location (kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV Incomer Upstream 16.38-18.04 13.24-13.28 1.07-1.10 38.43-43.82 6418-7016
0.4kV
Incomer 16.38-18.04 13.24-13.28 1.25 37.62-41.77 6326-6791
Switchboards
6.6kV Incomer Upstream 3.90-5.26 2.93-3.02 0.66-0.67 4.04-5.55 3166-4390
6.6kV
Incomer 3.90-5.26 2.93-3.02 0.41-0.42 2.54-4.93 1967-3888
Switchboards
Substation 2
33kV Incomer
Feeder to 4.52-4.59 2.06-2.10 0.39-0.41 35.41-37.58 4944-5086
/Switchboards
Firetail OPF
Moreover, Table 6 shows that the feeder from Substation 2 will clear faults in all 33kV switchboards.
The incomer and the upstream protection devices for the 33kV switchboards will detect the fault but
the feeder from Substation 2 will operate first. The protection devices do not have the correct
coordination, and hence a three-phase fault in any of the 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF
29
has the potential to result in unnecessary power outages in Firetail OPF. The latter problem will be
considered when recommending the proposed solutions.
4.3 Kings Valley
The results of the arc flash studies for switchboards installed in Kings Valley OPF is summarised in
Table 7. The complete arc flash study results for Kings Valley OPF can be found in Appendix E.
The incident energy of 6.6kV switchboards remain below the desired limit of 8 cal/cm2. However,
the 0.4kV switchboards remain a serious risk, many 0.4kV switchboards have an incident energy
greater than 40 cal/cm2 where there is no available PPE to protect personnel. As such, energised
maintenance work at these switchboards should not be allowed unless steps to mitigate the risk are
taken. This is especially the case for switchboards 2500-SR509-MCC02 where the potential incident
energy is 92.27 cal/cm2.
A further finding is that the incident energy of all 33kV switchboards are below the maximum
incident energy limit of 8 cal/cm2. However, the 33kV protection system has no fault grading from
Substation 3 feeders. Substation 3 feeders to Kings Valley OPF will trip instantaneously for a fault
in any of the 33kV switchboards installed at Kings Valley OPF, including faults at the HV terminal
of the transformers. As a consequence, power will be unnecessarily taken out at the Kings Valley
OPF if a three-phase fault occurs in the 33kV system. This problem will be considered when
recommending the proposed solutions.
Table 7: Arc flash study results for switchboards installed at Kings Valley OPF
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location (kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV Incomer Upstream 14.98-18.39 12.30-13.40 1.06-1.17 38.11-45.14 6382-7159
0.4kV
Incomer 14.98-18.39 12.30-13.40 0.45-3.00 13.17-92.27 3102-11631
Switchboards
6.6kV Incomer Upstream 3.96-5.36 3.00-3.02 0.66 4.07-5.66 3195-4480
6.6kV
Incomer 3.96-5.36 3.00-3.02 0.42-0.84 2.57-6.67 1990-5302
Switchboards
Substation 3
33kV Incomer Feeder to
4.68-4.86 2.01-2.05 0.08 7.64-7.87 2296-2330
CBs/Switchboards Kings
Valley OPF
30
4.4 RMUs + other attached switchboards
The results of the arc flash study for the RMUs and other switchboards that are fed from the RMUs
are summarised in Table 8. The complete arc flash studies result for these switchboards can be found
in Appendix F. The 0.4kV switchboards’ arc flash incident energy levels are dangerously high. In
particular, the SR701-MCC01 switchboard has a calculated incident energy of 116.54 cal/cm 2 and
there is no commercially available PPE that can withstand this energy exposure. Hence, energised
work on this switchboard should not be allowed until mitigating steps have been taken.
The calculated incident energy for the 6.6kV switchboards remain below 8 cal/cm 2. This is also the
case for most tasks on the 0.69kV switchboard. However, it is not the case when personnel are
switching or racking the 0.69kV switchboard incomers where personnel are exposed to high incident
energy levels reaching 52.08 cal/cm2 for the CV763-VSD02 switchboard incomer. Moreover, it can
be seen that the arc flash incident energy of the 33kV switchboards are below 8 cal/cm 2, which is
desirable. However, these results are based on the existing settings of the protection devices which
do not have correct coordination. The protection settings of these devices will be adjusted to ensure
the reliability of the protection system. However, as a consequence of changing these settings, the
arc flash incident energy at these switchboards will increase. The proposed protection settings to
ensure selectivity and for reduced arc flash incident energy are discussed in Section 7 of this report.
Table 8: Arc flash study results for RMUs and loads fed from the RMUs
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Boundary
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location (kA) Time (s) ( 𝟐) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎
0.4kV Incomer Upstream 7.26-19.04 6.12-15.33 0.60-4.45 15.94-94.42 3531-11815
0.4kV
Incomer 7.26-19.04 6.12-15.33 0.09-6.5 3.13-116.54 1168-13629
Switchboards
0.69kV Incomer Upstream 15.05-21.20 12.50-17.04 0.84-1.11 29.01-52.08 5303-7888
0.69kV
Incomer 15.05-21.20 12.50-17.04 0.09 2.95-4.27 1123-1444
Switchboards
6.6kV Incomer Upstream 3.39-3.53 2.15-2.25 0.77-0.92 4.21-4.79 3304-3775
6.6kV
Incomer 3.39-3.53 2.15-2.25 0.52 2.71-2.83 2100-2198
Switchboards
33kV Incomer Substations
4.36-4.86 2.01-2.09 0.08 7.11-7.93 2216-2340
/Switchboards 1 and 2
31
5 Discussion
From the results of the arc flash studies, it is evident that many switchboards have unacceptably high
incident energy values that need to be improved. Contrary to what was believed by many electrical
personnel, the arc flash hazard posed by LV switchboards has been found to actually be more
significant than the arc flash hazard posed by HV switchboards. This is due to the higher available
fault current for LV systems. When the voltage is stepped down by a transformer, the current is
increased. Electrical personnel interact with LV switchboards more often than HV switchboards.
Therefore, statistically, the risk of having an arc flash incident in LV switchboards is actually higher.
In addition, normally, coordination studies are performed to select the appropriate settings of
protection devices to clear bolted faults. However, for LV systems, the magnitude of the arc current
is much lower than the bolted fault current and therefore, a protection device might take longer to
clear the arc fault or maybe it will not detect it at all. To illustrate this further, a numerical calculation
is shown below to calculate the incident energy of switchboard 2500-SR509-MCC02 installed at
Kings Valley, using the arc current values that were found to result in the worst-case incident energy.
Figure 8 shows the single line diagram that depicts the fault and shows the clearing devices.
Figure 8: Fault simulation showing the faulted switchboard
32
For the protection of the incomer protection device, the maximum arc current of 16.71kA was used
because it would result in worst-case incident energy:
0.417
𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 = 16710 𝑥 = 211𝐴 (7)
33
Where 𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 is the arc current referred to the HV side of the transformer. Using the protection
settings of the upstream protection device, the operating time of the upstream protection device was
calculated using Equation 8 [38, p.108]. The protection device’s 50P element with pickup setting of
700A would not detect the arc fault current of 211 A, hence, the 51P element was used in order to
calculate the result for the hypothetical worst-case incident energy level. The protection device has
a time dial (TD) setting of 0.21, pickup setting of 50 A and the curve type was set to C1.
0.14
𝑡𝑝 = 𝑇𝐷 ( 𝐼𝑎/𝐻𝑉 0.02
) (8)
( 𝐼 ) −1
𝑝𝑢
0.14
𝑡𝑝 = 0.21 ( 211 0.02
) = 1.01 𝑠
( 50 ) −1
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑡𝑝 + 𝑡𝑜 (9)
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 1.01 + 0.05 = 1.06 𝑠
where
TD is the time dial setting of the protection relay
𝐼𝑝𝑢 is the pickup setting of the protection relay
𝑡𝑝 is the operating time of the protection device
𝑡𝑜 opening time of the circuit breaker
𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total clearing time of the protection device
𝑐𝑎𝑙
Then, using equation 3 and 4, the incident energy was calculated to be equal to 38.86 .
𝑐𝑚2
33
For the protection of the remaining sections of the switchboard, the incomer, which is an LV circuit
breaker, would clear the fault. Hence, the incomer’s operating time was used for the calculation
which can be found in Appendix B. The minimum arc current of 13.25kA was used in order to
calculate the result for the hypothetical worst-case incident energy level. The protection device’s
short-time and instantaneous time elements have pickup settings of 21.6kA and 26.4kA respectively
which are above the arc current of 13.25kA. Hence, these elements will not detect the fault and
therefore, the long-time element was used for the incident energy calculations. The protection device
has a pickup setting of 2400 and the curve type was set to C-04. The total clearing time of the device
can be approximated from the curve shown in Appendix G, but first, it must be scaled [39]:
𝐼𝑎,𝐿𝑉
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = (10)
𝐼𝑝𝑢
13250
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = = 5.5
2400
Where 𝐼𝑎,𝐿𝑉 is the arc current in the LV side of the transformer. Approximating from the curve, 5.5
equates to 3 seconds total clearing time as seen from the curve in Appendix G. Then, using equation
𝑐𝑎𝑙
3 and 4, the incident energy was calculated to be equal to 92.27 .
𝑐𝑚2
When considering the results of the above calculations, it is evident that the arc flash incident energy
levels are very high. This is because the protection devices were set without consideration for arc
faults. The value of the arc current is a lot lower compared to the bolted fault current in LV systems.
And in this instance, the magnitude of the arc fault falls within the “inverse” region of the TCCs of
the devices, which in turn has led to longer operating times and higher incident energy.
On the other hand, all 6.6kV switchboards were found to have very low arc flash incident energy
levels with potential incident energy exposure not exceeding 8 cal/cm2. Therefore, the existing PPEs
that are currently used in Solomon Hub which are rated at 12 cal/cm2 are appropriate for continued
usage.
34
In addition, the 0.69kV switchboards were found to have low arc flash incident energy levels with
potential incident exposure not exceeding 8 cal/cm2, except when the arc fault occurs at the incomer
where personnel are exposed to incident energy of up to 52.08 cal/cm 2, and therefore energised work
should not be conducted until mitigating procedures have taken place.
Currently, most of the 33kV switchboards have manageable arc hazard levels with arc flash incident
energy having been found to be less than 8 cal/cm2. An exception was the 33kV switchboards
installed at Firetail where the incident energy levels were found to be 23.37 cal/cm2 – 37.58 cal/cm2.
Although the arc flash hazard levels for switchboards other than those installed at Firetail were at
safe levels, the 33kV system has no grading from protection devices installed at Substation 2 and
Substation 3. A three-phase fault anywhere in the 33kV system will result in unnecessary power
outage to other healthy equipment. For example, if there is a fault at the HV terminal of a transformer
in Kings Valley OPF, the protection device installed at Substation 3 will clear the fault which will
result in unnecessary power outages to other equipment operating at Kings Valley. It will be
recommended that the protection settings of these devices be adjusted to ensure the reliability of the
protection system. However, as a consequence of changing these settings, the arc flash incident
energy levels at these switchboards will increase. This is a major problem that needs to be resolved
and this will be considered when recommending solutions for the arc flash studies.
It would seem then that using arc flash studies solely as a means to determine the required PPE
requirements is not the most effective control method for minimizing potential danger to personnel.
Engineers must conduct risk assessments and identify possible risk mitigation strategies by
identifying which controls are feasible for mitigation of arc flash hazards. A hierarchy of controls is
a system used in the industry to help prevent or reduce hazards [40]. Numerous safety organizations
have promoted this method and it is widely accepted in the industry. As depicted by the triangle in
Figure 9, the methods considered to be least effective are at the bottom whilst the methods considered
the most effective are at the top:
35
Figure 9: Hierarchy of controls (redrawn from [40])
A preferred approach is to use solutions higher in the pyramid, that is, elimination, substitution and
engineering; although these alternatives are not always feasible. The different controls to reduce the
arc flash hazard were investigated.
5.1 Elimination
Elimination is the most ideal control method to protect personnel from arc flash hazards. The
elimination of arc flash hazards can be achieved if electrical work is performed only while equipment
is not energised. However, it is not feasible to switch off equipment every time testing or
maintenance functions are performed. This is especially true for the switchboards installed at the
Solomon Hub as the cost of a few hours of de-energised work can result in millions of dollars of lost
revenues. Furthermore, if equipment de-energisation was to become the chosen option, it involves
circuit breaker switching, racking and isolation verification which would also have associated arc
flash hazards that would need to be controlled.
5.2 Substitution
Substituting equipment like switchboards and protection devices for faster arc fault clearing is
impractical. The cost associated with the procurement and installation of this type of equipment
makes this control method infeasible. As a result, this control method was not considered.
36
5.3 Engineering Controls
5.3.1 Optimise protection settings
It has been determined from engineering research that the arc time has a linear effect in the incident
energy [30], whereby reducing the protection device’s clearing time proportionately reduces arc flash
incident energy. Therefore, the most effective solution to mitigate the arc flash hazard is to reduce
the operating time of the protection devices to clear arc faults as rapidly as possible. Protection
settings must be chosen to ensure high levels of protection for equipment while still allowing normal
operating currents and inrush currents to flow without causing equipment to trip. In addition, grading
between protection devices must not be compromised, and therefore the protection device closest to
the fault must be the only one that trips so that service will only be interrupted to a minimal portion
of the power network. Proper coordination between protection devices will result in protection
devices closer to the power source having longer clearing times and higher pickup levels compared
to protection devices further downstream. This means that protection devices downstream can clear
faults faster than the upstream protection devices, thereby avoiding an unnecessary power outage to
a larger portion of the power network. Consequently, optimising protection settings may not always
be a feasible solution for arc flash mitigation due to protection grading requirements.
5.3.2 Installing a maintenance switch
An alternative and simple method for the reduction of incident energy is to install a maintenance
switch. A maintenance switch is an external switch that is wired into a protection device to allow
personnel to activate maintenance mode protection settings. A maintenance mode protection setting
is a pre-set setting which allows fast clearing of arc faults (in most cases, instantaneously) [41].
For protection relays, the 50P element is activated, and for LV circuit breakers, the instantaneous
element is used. Both elements are used to detect faults without unintentional delay. If the
maintenance mode is activated, the grading between the protection devices will be compromised.
However, the maintenance switch will only be engaged when personnel are working on a
switchboard, and it must be deactivated as soon as switching/maintenance work at the switchboard
37
is completed. Switching to maintenance mode can be included in permit conditions to ensure it is a
mandatory step.
5.3.3 Zone Selective Interlocking Scheme
The Zone Selective Interlocking (ZSI) scheme is a method recognised in the engineering field used
to speed up the operating time of protection devices without sacrificing protection devices
coordination and introducing nuisance tripping into the system [42]. This concept allows protection
devices to communicate across the distribution zones. The information is transmitted from the
feeders to the incomers through wires or using communication infrastructure like supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA).
The concept of ZSI is best explained in a visual format, as shown in Figure 10. If a fault occurs
downstream of feeder F3, where the magnitude of the fault exceeds the pick-up settings of both
feeder F3 and the incomer, both protection devices will detect the fault. However, feeder F3 will
send a restraint signal to the incomer which will activate the pre-set time delay for the incomer’s
operating time allowing feeder F3 to clear the fault. The ZSI scheme allows the incomer to clear the
fault with little intentional delay. The incomer cannot be set to trip instantaneously because it needs
to allow the feeder to send the restraint signal where there is an inherent time delay. However, the
incomer time delay can still be set for a faster operating time because the incomer does not need to
grade with downstream protection devices. As a result, proper coordination and selectivity is
maintained while still providing back-up protection for feeder F3.
38
Figure 10: Zone selective interlocking
5.3.4 Remote Operation
Increasing the working distance between the possible origin of an arc flash and the personnel is also
an effective method to reduce exposure to an arc flash hazard. Therefore, another known effective
method to mitigate the arc flash hazard when switching or racking the circuit breakers is to perform
these tasks remotely. The remote operation of the circuit breakers can be achieved by installing a
remote switching and racking panel outside the arc flash boundary or using the SCADA
infrastructure where personnel can operate the equipment in front of a human machine interface
(HMI) panel or a personal computer (PC).
39
5.4 Administrative control
There are administrative controls that are already employed to mitigate arc flash hazards when
working at energised switchboards at the Solomon Hub. These include risk assessments, safety
related working procedures and safety training. Arc flash labels are currently not available, however
Fortescue intends to implement these based on the arc flash study results that were calculated in the
present project. This method of labelling equipment showing the level of arc flash hazard exposure
and the appropriate PPE will assist personnel in making informed choices about how to safely
perform their work.
5.5 PPE
There are PPE clothing options rated at 12 cal/cm2 and 40 cal/cm2 available at Solomon electrical
rooms. However, the use of PPE must be the last line of defence applied and all other means must
be investigated to reduce the arc flash hazard to an acceptable level. PPE clothing options with higher
category ratings are known to be heavy and uncomfortable, and capable of restricting vision and
movement. These drawbacks can make it difficult to complete many tasks, which means that this
protection equipment is also creating a hazard. The requirement set by FMG is the reduction of arc
flash incident energy to not greater than 8 cal/cm2 if feasible, so that the lighter PPEs rated at 12
cal/cm2 available at Solomon Hub can be used.
40
6 Recommendations
From Section 5, it can be seen that numerous arc flash hazard mitigation strategies exist. The
challenge is to find the optimal strategy that can be implemented on an existing facility like the
Solomon Hub. Implementing many of these strategies are difficult for engineers due to excessive
capitals costs and retrofitting costs that limit their feasibility. Incorporating the findings of the present
project, and following thorough research of the engineering literature and discussions with senior
engineers, it was decided that Fortescue would implement three engineering controls at the Solomon
Hub mines: protection settings optimisation, installing maintenance switches and remote operation.
Based on the results of the arc flash hazard studies, optimising the 50P element of protection relays
and the instantaneous protection settings of LV circuit breakers appeared to be the superior option
due to the very low costs associated with this strategy. Therefore, the settings of all LV incomers
and some HV incomers were optimised so that arc faults can be cleared fast, thereby reducing
incident energy exposure. These protection settings will give consideration to the inrush current from
motors and transformers during the energisation stage. Hence, the proposed protection settings will
clear arc faults fast, reducing the incident energy significantly while maintaining protection system
reliability. However, this method is not always feasible due to protection grading requirements, and
hence it can only be applied to some protection devices.
Where grading requirements do not allow for the mitigation of the arc flash hazard by optimising
protection settings, installing maintenance switches is proposed. Switching to maintenance mode
when working on the switchboard will be included in permit conditions to ensure it is a mandatory
step. A physical switch will be wired to the protection device, which will be used to activate the
maintenance mode protection settings. Initially, it was proposed to install 52 maintenance switches.
The majority were to be installed on the upstream protection devices, which are normally located in
another switch room. It was also noted that the existing SCADA infrastructure has the capability of
also being used to remotely activate the maintenance mode settings from upstream protection
41
devices. However, further investigation needs to be conducted to determine the feasibility of using
SCADA to activate the settings.
Arc flash calculations were performed based on the proposed optimised protection settings and
maintenance mode protection settings for the 52 protection devices. It was found that the potential
incident energy exposure from all switchboards would be reduced to less than 8 cal/cm2, which is a
significant improvement on the existing incident energy exposures. However, the number of
maintenance switches that would need to be installed is not practical due to the high cost of
installation and due to large distances, varying from a few hundred metres to just over 1 km, that
would limit accessibility. Ultimately, it was decided to use remote operation to mitigate the arc flash
hazard when switching or racking the LV incomers, which resulted in the reduction in the number
of maintenance switches that needed to be installed to just three, (the settings and locations can be
found in Appendix H). A remote switching and racking panel would be installed inside the
switchroom where the incomers are located. The switches that would be used to remotely switch or
rack the incomers would be wired to the protection devices. This method could eliminate the arc
flash hazard because the remote switching and racking panel would be installed outside the arc flash
boundary, and hence personnels’ safety could be assured.
The proposed optimised protection settings and the results of the arc flash studies based on these
settings can be found in Appendices, I, J, K and L. The findings regarding the proposed solutions of
optimising protection settings, installing maintenance switches and utilising remote operation, if
implemented, will meet the principal aim of this project, which was to reduce the incident energy to
less than 8 cal/cm2. As a result, by applying the three solutions in the appropriate situations, the
existing PPEs rated at 12 cal/cm2 can be used for energised work in the switchboards installed at the
Solomon Hub mines.
42
Finally, it was found that the 33kV system does not have correct protection grading for three-phase
faults. While it is not part of the project, it is a major problem that need to be resolved. Therefore,
protection settings to resolve this problem were proposed which can be found in Appendix M. The
proposed protection settings will ensure the reliability of the protection system while giving
consideration to clearing time for arc flash.
43
7 Conclusion
The main purpose of this project is to conduct arc flash studies for switchboards installed at
Fortescue’s Solomon Hub. The aim of the studies is to find feasible solutions to reduce arc flash
incident energies to less than 8 cal/cm2 and to provide appropriate arc flash PPE recommendations.
The arc flash studies were conducted based on IEEE 1584-2002 Standard, the IEEE Guide for
Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. PowerFactory was used to perform short-circuit analyses
and coordination studies and the results were used to provide the information that is required for the
completion of an arc flash hazard analyses for each switchboard.
The arc flash study results summarised in Section 4 indicate that the existing arc flash incident energy
of some switchboards installed at the Solomon Hub are significantly above the desired level of 8
cal/cm2. Contrary to what was believed at the start of the studies, the LV switchboards represent the
most significant hazards, where many have incident energy greater than 40 cal/cm2, which is above
the withstand rating of PPEs available at Solomon Hub. In addition, it was found that the potential
incident energies of 0.69kV switchboards will depend on the task that is being performed. Switching
or racking the incomer create a significant arc flash hazard with many have incident energies greater
than 8 cal/cm2. Other switchboards that have voltages of 6.6kV and 11kV have low potential incident
energies except for SUB801-SWB01 switchboard, which has a potential incident energy of 21.82
cal/cm2.
Moreover, the 33kV switchboards have manageable arc flash hazards (with arc flash incident
energies less than 8 cal/cm2), with the exception of the 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF,
where the incident energy levels are 23.37 cal/cm 2 – 37.58 cal/cm2. However, the 33kV protection
system has no protection grading, if the correct protection settings are implemented, the incident
energies will increase.
44
While the main objective of this project was to conduct arc flash studies for switchboards installed
in the Solomon Hub, insufficient protection grading was found in a number of areas. As a result, the
recommendations for this project also included protection setting changes to ensure the reliability
and selectivity of the protection system. The main grading problems (for three-phase faults) that
were found were:
The 33kV system at Firetail has no three-phase fault grading. Faults in any of the 33kV
switchboards installed at Firetail will take out the whole Firetail OPF.
The 33kV system at KV has no three-phase fault grading. Fault in any of the 33kV
switchboards installed at KV will take out the whole KV OPF.
The feeders from RMUs have no three-phase fault grading with upstream protection
devices at Substation 2 and Substation 3.
The recommended solutions to reduce the arc flash hazard and to resolve the grading problems are
discussed in Section 6. To mitigate the arc flash hazard, three simple solutions were proposed:
1. Optimise protection settings
2. Maintenance switches
3. Remote operation
The proposed engineering controls will significantly reduce the arc flash incident energy for all
switchboards to less than 8 cal/cm2 which is the principal aim of this project. As a result, the existing
PPEs rated at 12 cal/cm2 can be used for energised work in the switchboards installed at the Solomon
Hub mines without compromising personnel safety. These results represent a significant
achievement and the project is considered to have been a resounding success.
45
8 References
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46
[16] A. Rae, “Engineering Specification for Low Voltage Motor Control Centres and
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metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages above 1 kV and up to and
including 52 kV, Sydney: Standards Australia, 2005.
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SWITCHGEAR, Perth: Industrial Electrix, 2015.
[23] D. Stonebridge, ARC FAULT PROTECTION IN LV SWITCHGEAR, Perth: Industrial Electrix, 2014.
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[28] K. Lippert, D. Colaberardino and C. Kimblin, “UNDERSTANDING ARC FLASH HAZARDS,” in
Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference, Appleton, 2004.
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Power Systems,” in IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting, Vancouver, 2014.
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Calculations, New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2002.
47
[31] DigSILENT GmbH, PowerFactory 15 User Manual, Gomaringen: DigSILENT GmbH, 2014.
[32] W. Tinsley and M. Hodder, “A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and
Reduction,” in IEEE IAS Pulp and Paper Industry Conference, Victoria, 2004.
[33] International Electrotechnical Commision, IEC 60909-0:2001 - Short-circuit currents in three-
phase a.c. systems - Part 0: Calculation of Currents, Geneva: International Electrotechnical
Commision, 2001.
[34] Aurecon, FMG T155 Solomon Project Ore Processing Facilities, Perth: Fortescue Metals
Group Ltd., 2012.
[35] W. Tinsley, M. Hodder and A. Graham, “ARC FLASH HAZARD CALCULATIONS: MYTHS, FACTS
AND SOLUTIONS,” in IEEE IAS Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference, Appleton,
2006.
[36] M. Holt, “What is Arc Flash?,” Mike Holt Enterprises, Inc., 2004. [Online]. Available:
https://www.mikeholt.com/mojonewsarchive/NEC-HTML/HTML/What-is-Arc-
Flash~20040512.php. [Accessed 11 January 2016].
[37] P. Willis, “Arc Flash Standards - Australian Developments,” in Electrical Arc Flash Forum ,
Melbourne, 2010.
[38] W. Tinsley and M. Hodder, A Practical Approach to Arc Flash Hazard Analysis and Reduction,
Moon Township: Eaton Corporation, 2006.
[39] GE Consumer & Industrial GmbH, Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual, Berlin:
GE Consumer & Industrial GmbH, 2010.
[40] Environmental & Safety Professionals, “Risk Assessment & Risk Management,”
Environmental & Safety Professionals, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.environet.com.au/services.asp?id=20&cid=16. [Accessed 14 01 2016].
[41] N. Thompson, Arc Faults - Safety Measures and Detection, Auckland: NHP, 2013.
[42] C. G. Walker, “Arc flash energy reduction techniques zone selective interlocking & energy-
reducing maintenance switching,” in Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference (PPIC),
Nashville, 2011.
48
9 Appendices
9.1 Appendix A – Solomon Interconnection diagram
49
9.2 Appendix B – LV incomers Settings
It is important to inspect the relevant manuals to understand the interpretation of values in the
following tables.
Table 9: Existing Stockyard .4 kV MCC protection settings
Existing Stockyard .4 kV MCC protection settings
Location Descriptor Protection device I rating In(xICT) LT PU LTD (s) ST PU trip time (s) INS PU
SUB801
SUB801 Terasaki 2500 1 0.9 10 3 0.4 16
Incomer
SK802
SUB801 Terasaki 1250 0.63 0.8 20 8 0.2 10
Incomer
RC901
SUB801 Terasaki 800 0.5 0.8 2.5 6 0.2 12
Incomer
SUB901
SUB901 Terasaki 2500 1 0.9 10 3 0.4 6
Incomer
Table 10: Existing Firetail .4 kV MCC protection settings
Existing Firetail .4 kV MCC protection settings
Protection I LT ST ST Inst
Location Descriptor Ir LT PU
device rating Band PU Band PU
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR203 Firetail SR203 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR104 Firetail SR104 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR102 Firetail SR102 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR502 Firetail SR502 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR402 Firetail SR402 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR303 Firetail SR303-MCC02 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 6x 10 x
SR303 Firetail SR303-MCC01 Incomer 3200 2400 C2 5
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
50
Table 11: Existing KV .4 kV MCC protection settings
Existing KV .4 kV MCC protection settings
Protection I LT ST ST
Location Descriptor Ir LT PU Inst PU
device rating Band PU Band
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR303 Kings Valley SR303-MCC03 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR303 Kings Valley SR303-MCC02 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR303 Kings Valley SR303-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 2x
SR104 Kings Valley SR104-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR102 Kings Valley SR102-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR203 Kings Valley SR203-MCC02 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR203 Kings Valley SR203-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR702 Kings Valley SR702-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR402Kings Valley SR402-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 9x 2x
SR509 Kings Valley SR509-MCC03 incomer 3200 2400 C4 10
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x 9x 11 x
SR509 Kings Valley SR509-MCC02 incomer 3200 2400 C4 10
MPD32W32 rating Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 2x
SR505 Kings Valley SR505-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
GE 0.75 x C 9x 10 x
SR503 Kings Valley SR503-MCC01 incomer 3200 2400 10
MPD32W32 rating MIN Ir rating
Table 12: 0.4kV MCCs fed from RMUs
0.4kV MCCs fed from RMUs
I LT LTD trip time INS
Location Descriptor Protection device In(xICT) ST PU
rating PU (s) (s) PU
SR706-MCC01
SR706 Terasaki 1250 0.8 1 10 6 0.4 16
INCOMER
SR705-MCC01
SR705 Terasaki 1600 1 0.8 10 1 0.4 off
INCOMER
SR703-MCC01
SR703 Terasaki 1250 0.8 1 10 6 0.4 16
INCOMER
SR701-MCC01
SR701 Terasaki 1600 1 1 10 6 0.4 16
INCOMER
SR707-MCC01
SR707 Terasaki 1600 1 0.85 10 1 0.4 2
INCOMER
51
Table 13: Exising incomer protection settings for VSDs
Protection
device In LT PU (x In) t ST Inst PU (x In)
CV763-VSD02 incomer ABB 1600 0.975 3 4
CV125-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 1.025 3 4
CV704-VSD03 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV704-VSD02 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV704-VSD01 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV705-VSD03 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 no ST 4
CV153-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 1 144 protection 4
CV123-VSD01 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV113-VSD01 incomer ABB 2500 1 144 4
CV763-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 0.9 3 4
CV705-VSD01 incomer ABB 1600 1 3 4
CV705-VSD02 incomer ABB 1600 0.95 3 4
52
9.3 Appendix C – Arc flash study results for the Stockyard
Table 14: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Bolted Fault Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
(kA) (kA) (kA) 𝒄𝒎𝟐
SUB801-SWB01
Upstream 30.54 13.89 29.80 11.58 2.18 610 53.78 8062 X
Incomer
SUB801-SWB01
Incomer 30.54 13.89 29.80 11.58 0.43 610 12.92 3061 3
Switchboard
SK801-MCC01
Upstream 28.42 13.12 27.07 10.73 0.91 610 20.67 4213 3
Incomer
SK801-MCC01
Incomer(1) 28.42 13.12 27.07 10.73 610
Switchboard
SK802-MCC01
Upstream 22.74 10.98 21.94 9.08 0.75 610 14.22 3268 3
Incomer
SK802-MCC01
Incomer 22.74 10.98 21.94 9.08 0.06 610 1.40 677 1
Switchboard
RC901-MCC01
Upstream 15.35 8.03 15.31 6.81 1.15 610 15.98 3537 3
Incomer
RC901-MCC01
Incomer 15.35 8.03 15.31 6.81 0.06 610 1.00 538 0
Switchboard
SUB901-MCC01
Upstream 29.48 13.51 28.61 11.21 2.28 610 54.30 8116 X
Incomer
SUB901-MCC01
Incomer 29.48 13.51 28.61 11.21 0.43 610 12.53 2999 3
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
Table 15: Arc flash study results for 11kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Incident
Clearing Maximum Minimum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Bolted Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA)
(kA)
Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
CV801-VSD01
Upstream 19.04 18.28 11.09 9.13 0.08 910 2.57 1993 1
Switchboard
CV801-VSD02
Upstream 19.15 18.38 11.14 9.17 0.08 910 2.59 2005 1
Switchboard
CV802-VSD01
Upstream 19.16 18.39 11.14 9.17 0.08 910 2.59 2007 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD01
Upstream 12.09 11.70 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1214 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD02
Upstream 12.07 11.68 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.58 1204 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD03
Upstream 12.13 11.73 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1218 1
Switchboard
CV902-VSD04
Upstream 12.10 11.71 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1215 1
Switchboard
CV901-VSD01
Upstream 12.08 11.69 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1213 1
Switchboard
CV901-VSD02
Upstream 12.10 11.71 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1215 1
Switchboard
CV901-VSD03
Upstream 12.11 11.71 7.87 6.52 0.08 910 1.59 1216 1
Switchboard
SUB901-SWB01
Upstream 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.42 910 8.40 6725 3
Switchboard
SUB901-SWB01
Incomer 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.37 910 7.40 5903 2
Incomer CB
SUB801-SWB01
Upstream 19.26 18.49 11.18 9.21 0.67 910 21.82 17934 3
Switchboard
SUB801-SWB01
Incomer 19.26 18.49 11.18 9.21 0.67 910 21.82 17934 3
Incomer
RC901-SWB01
Upstream 5.48 5.37 4.48 3.75 0.42 910 3.59 2809 1
Switchboard
RC901-SWB01
Incomer 5.48 5.37 4.48 3.75 0.40 910 3.42 2672 1
Incomer
53
9.4 Appendix D – Arc flash study results for Firetail OPF
Table 16: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the existing protection settings
Minimum
Clearing Maximum Bolted 0.85 x Total Working Incident Arc Flash
Maximum Arc Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current (kA) 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) Current Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR203-MCC01
Upstream 37.59 16.39 35.38 13.28 1.07 610 38.43 6418 4
Incomer
SR203-MCC01
Incomer 37.59 16.39 35.38 13.28 1.25 610 35.76 6330 4
Switchboard
SR104-MCC01
Upstream 37.54 16.38 35.27 13.24 1.1 610 39.46 6535 4
Incomer
SR104-MCC01
Incomer 37.54 16.38 35.27 13.24 1.25 610 35.64 6326 4
Switchboard
SR102-MCC01
Upstream 42.39 18.04 35.34 13.27 1.1 610 43.82 7016 x
Incomer
SR102-MCC01
Incomer 42.39 18.04 35.34 13.27 1.25 610 35.73 6791 X
Switchboard
SR502-MCC01
Upstream 39.80 17.16 35.34 13.27 1.1 610 41.5 6762 X
Incomer
SR502-MCC01
Incomer 39.80 17.16 35.34 13.27 1.25 610 35.73 6545 4
Switchboard
SR402-MCC01
Upstream 40.93 17.54 35.37 13.28 1.09 610 42.13 6831 X
Incomer
SR402-MCC01
Incomer 40.93 17.54 35.37 13.28 1.25 610 37.47 6653 4
Switchboard
SR303-MCC02
Upstream 38.95 16.86 35.32 13.26 1.1 610 40.73 6677 X
Incomer
SR303-MCC02
Incomer 38.95 16.86 35.32 13.26 1.25 610 35.70 6463 4
Switchboard
SR303-MCC01
Upstream 41.07 17.59 35.33 13.26 1.1 610 42.64 6887 X
Incomer
SR303-MCC01
Incomer 41.07 17.59 35.33 13.26 1.25 610 40.65 6667 X
Switchboard
Table 17: Arc flash study results for 6.6kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum Incident
Clearing Maximum Total Working Arc Flash
Bolted Fault Bolted Fault 0.85 x Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Current Arc Current (kA) 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location
(kA)
(kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
2200-SR201-MCC02
Upstream(1) 4.03 3.97 3.56 2.99 910
Incomer
2200-SR201-MCC02
Incomer 4.03 3.97 3.56 2.99 0.41 910 2.54 1967 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-MCC01
Upstream(1) 4.05 3.99 3.59 3.02 910
Incomer
2200-SR201-MCC01
Incomer 4.05 3.99 3.59 3.02 0.41 910 2.55 1977 1
Switchboard
SR103-MCC01
Upstream 4.01 3.96 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 4.07 3195 2
Incomer
SR103-MCC01
Incomer 4.01 3.96 3.55 2.98 0.42 910 2.57 1992 1
Switchboard
SR101-MCC01
Upstream 4.02 3.97 3.56 2.99 0.66 910 4.08 3204 2
Incomer
SR101-MCC01
Incomer 4.02 3.97 3.56 2.99 0.42 910 2.58 1998 1
Switchboard
SR501-MCC01
Upstream 4.02 3.97 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 4.08 3198 2
Incomer
SR501-MCC01
Incomer 4.02 3.97 3.55 2.98 0.42 910 2.58 1997 1
Switchboard
SR401-MCC01
Upstream 3.96 3.90 3.49 2.93 0.67 910 4.04 3166 2
Incomer
SR401-MCC01
Incomer 3.96 3.90 3.49 2.93 0.42 910 2.55 1971 1
Switchboard
SR301-MCC01
Upstream 5.36 5.26 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 5.55 4390 2
Incomer
SR301-MCC01
Incomer 5.36 5.26 3.55 2.98 0.59 910 4.93 3888 2
Switchboard
SR301-MCC02
Upstream 4.39 4.33 3.55 2.98 0.66 910 4.48 3527 2
Incomer
SR301-MCC02
Incomer 4.39 4.33 3.55 2.98 0.42 910 2.83 2199 1
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
54
Table 18: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at Firetail OPF based on the existing protection settings
Minimum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Maximum Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Arc Current Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) (kA) Current
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA)
SUB002
2200-SR201-SWB01
Feeder to 4.57 4.57 2.47 2.10 0.39 910 36.32 5006 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2100-SR103-SWB01
Feeder to 4.45 4.45 2.42 2.06 0.39 910 35.41 4944 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2100-SR101-SWB01
Feeder to 4.53 4.53 2.45 2.08 0.39 910 36.02 4986 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2550-SR501-SWB01
Feeder to 4.54 4.54 2.45 2.08 0.41 910 37.58 5092 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2400-SR401-SWB01
Feeder to 4.56 4.56 2.46 2.09 0.41 910 37.58 5092 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
SUB002
2300-SR301-SWB01
Feeder to 4.52 4.52 2.44 2.07 0.41 910 37.48 5086 4
Switchboard/Incomer
Firetail
2000-SR001-SWB01 SUB002
Switchboard/Incomer Feeder to 4.59 4.59 2.47 2.10 0.39 910 36.43 5014 4
Firetail
55
9.5 Appendix E – Arc flash study results for Kings Valley OPF
Table 19: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing protection settings
Minimum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Maximum Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Arc Current Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) (kA) Current Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
2300-SR303-MCC03
Upstream 36.34 15.96 34.88 13.12 1.12 610 39.07 6490 4
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC03
Incomer 36.34 15.96 34.88 13.12 0.45 610 13.17 3102 3
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC02
Upstream 39.57 17.08 35.23 13.23 1.11 610 41.67 6780 X
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC02
Incomer 39.57 17.08 35.23 13.23 0.45 610 13.17 3260 3
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC01
Upstream 38.92 16.85 32.10 12.29 1.17 610 43.3 6959 X
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC01
Incomer 38.92 16.85 32.10 12.29 0.45 610 13.97 3229 3
Switchboard
2100-SR104-MCC01
Upstream 36.81 16.12 35.22 13.23 1.11 610 39.15 6500 4
Incomer
2100-SR104-MCC01
Incomer 36.81 16.12 35.22 13.23 0.45 610 13.17 3260 3
Switchboard
2100-SR102-MCC01
Upstream 43.42 18.39 35.26 13.24 1.11 610 45.14 7159 X
Incomer
2100-SR102-MCC01
Incomer 43.42 18.39 35.26 13.24 0.45 610 13.17 3260 3
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC02
Upstream 39.19 16.95 35.05 13.18 1.11 610 41.33 6743 X
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC02
Incomer 39.19 16.95 35.05 13.18 0.45 610 14.05 3242 3
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC01
Upstream 40.49 17.39 34.49 13.01 1.12 610 42.88 6914 X
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC01
Incomer 40.49 17.39 34.49 13.01 0.45 610 14.45 3304 3
Switchboard
2700-SR702-MCC01
Upstream 37.37 16.32 35.78 13.40 1.10 610 39.31 6517 4
Incomer
2700-SR702-MCC01
Incomer 37.37 16.32 35.78 13.40 0.45 610 13.49 3153 3
Switchboard
2400-SR402-MCC01
Upstream 39.91 17.19 34.81 13.11 1.12 610 42.35 6856 X
Incomer
2400-SR402-MCC01
Incomer 39.91 17.19 34.81 13.11 0.45 610 14.27 3276 3
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC03
Upstream 33.56 14.98 32.13 12.30 1.17 610 38.11 6382 4
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC03
Incomer 33.56 14.98 32.13 12.30 2.5 610 91.66 11579 X
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC02
Upstream 38.50 16.71 35.28 13.25 1.06 610 38.86 6467 4
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC02
Incomer 38.50 16.71 35.28 13.25 3 610 92.27 11631 X
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC01
Upstream 37.94 16.51 35.26 13.24 1.11 610 40.18 6615 X
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC01
Incomer(1) 37.94 16.51 35.26 13.24 610
Switchboard
2570-SR505-MCC01
Upstream 37.18 16.25 35.16 13.21 1.11 610 39.5 6538 4
Incomer
2570-SR505-MCC01
Incomer 37.18 16.25 35.16 13.21 0.45 610 13.43 3144 3
Switchboard
2550-SR503-MCC01
Upstream 39.40 17.02 35.31 13.26 1.11 610 41.52 6763 X
Incomer
2550-SR503-MCC01
Incomer 39.40 17.02 35.31 13.26 0.45 610 14.12 3252 3
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
56
Table 20: Arc flash study results for the 6.6kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum
Maximum Incident
Clearing Bolted Bolted 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA) (kA)
2300-SR302-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3197 2
Incomer
2300-SR302-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1993 1
Switchboard
2300-SR301-
MCC02 Upstream 5.46 5.36 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 5.66 4480 2
Incomer
2300-SR301-
MCC02 Incomer 5.46 5.36 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 3.58 2795 1
Switchboard
2300-SR301-
MCC01 Upstream 5.10 5.01 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 5.26 4158 2
Incomer
2300-SR301-
MCC01 Incomer 5.10 5.01 3.57 3.00 0.84 910 6.67 5302 2
Switchboard
2100-SR103-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3196 2
Incomer
2100-SR103-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1993 1
Switchboard
2100-SR101-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3199 2
Incomer
2100-SR101-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1994 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-
MCC03 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3193 2
Incomer
2200-SR201-
MCC03 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1988 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-
MCC02 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3198 2
Incomer
2200-SR201-
MCC02 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1994 1
Switchboard
2200-SR201-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3200 2
Incomer
2200-SR201-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.58 1995 1
Switchboard
2700-SR701-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3195 2
Incomer
2700-SR701-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1992 1
Switchboard
2400-SR401-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3193 2
Incomer
2400-SR401-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1990 1
Switchboard
2500-SR508-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3199 2
Incomer
2500-SR508-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.57 1994 1
Switchboard
2570-SR504-
MCC02 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.08 3200 2
Incomer
2570-SR504-
MCC02 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.58 1998 1
Switchboard
2570-SR504-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.66 910 4.07 3197 2
Incomer
2570-SR504-
MCC01 Incomer 4.02 3.96 3.57 3.00 0.42 910 2.58 1996 1
Switchboard
2550-SR501-
MCC02 Upstream 4.02 3.98 3.59 3.02 0.66 910 4.09 3207 2
Incomer
2550-SR501-
MCC02 Incomer 4.02 3.98 3.59 3.02 0.42 910 2.58 2002 1
Switchboard
57
2550-SR501-
MCC01 Upstream 4.02 3.97 3.59 3.02 0.66 910 4.08 3199 2
Incomer
2550-SR501-
MCC01 Incomer(1) 4.02 3.97 3.59 3.02 910
Switchboard
(1) Protection settings not available.
Table 21: Arc flash study results for 33kV switchboards installed at KV OPF based on the existing protection settings
Maximum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Maximum Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Arc Current Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
(kA) 𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SUB003
2300-SR301-SWB01
Feeder to 4.75 4.75 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.74 2312 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2100-SR103-SWB01
Feeder to 4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2100-SR101-SWB01
Feeder to 4.73 4.73 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.72 2308 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2200-SR201-SWB01
Feeder to 4.75 4.75 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.75 2312 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2700-SR701-SWB01
Feeder to 4.68 4.68 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.64 2296 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2400-SR401-SWB01
Feeder to 4.73 4.73 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.71 2307 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2500-SR508-SWB01
Feeder to 4.71 4.71 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.69 2303 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2570-SR504-SWB01
Feeder to 4.74 4.74 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.73 2309 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
SUB003
2550-SR501-SWB01
Feeder to 4.78 4.78 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.79 2319 2
Switchboard/Incomer
KV
2000-SR001-SWB01 SUB003
Switchboard/Incomer Feeder to 4.86 4.86 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.87 2330 2
KV
58
9.6 Appendix F – Arc flash study results for RMUs and switchboards
downstream
Table 22: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the existing settings
Maximum
Maximum Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
Upstream
RMU12 4.86 4.86 2.42 2.06 0.08 910 7.93 2340 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU29 4.81 4.81 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.85 2327 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU13 4.78 4.78 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.80 2320 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU17 4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2
(SUB003)
Upstream
RMU11 4.58 4.58 2.46 2.09 0.08 910 7.47 2270 2
(SUB002)
Upstream
RMU14 4.50 4.50 2.43 2.07 0.08 910 7.35 2252 2
(SUB002)
Upstream
RMU15 4.45 4.45 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.26 2238 2
(SUB002)
Upstream
RMU16 4.36 4.36 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.11 2216 2
(SUB002)
Table 23: Arc flash study results for the sizer drives switchboards based on the existing protection settings
Maximum
Maximum Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA) Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR152-SWB01
Upstream 3.43 3.39 2.55 2.15 0.92 910 4.79 3775 2
Incomer
SR152-SWB01
Incomer 3.43 3.39 2.55 2.15 0.52 910 2.71 2100 1
Switchboard
SR122-SWB01
Upstream 3.58 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.77 910 4.21 3304 2
Incomer
SR122-SWB01
Incomer 3.58 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.52 910 2.83 2198 1
Switchboard
SR112-SWB01
Upstream 3.57 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.77 910 4.21 3306 2
Incomer
SR112-SWB01
Incomer 3.57 3.53 2.67 2.25 0.52 910 2.82 2194 1
Switchboard
Table 24: Arc flash study results for the VSDs based on the existing protection settings
Maximum Minimum Incident
Clearing Maximum 0.85 x Total Working Arc Flash
Bolted Fault Bolted Fault Energy
Equipment Device Arc Current Minimum Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location
(kA)
(kA)
(kA)
Current (kA) Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
CV113-VSD01
Upstream 25.68 21.18 24.23 17.04 1.05 610 49.75 7647 X
Incomer
CV113-VSD01
Incomer 25.68 21.18 24.23 17.04 0.09 610 4.26 1443 2
Switchboard
CV123-VSD01
Upstream 25.70 21.20 24.25 17.04 1.05 610 49.79 7652 X
Incomer
CV123-VSD01
Incomer 25.70 21.20 24.25 17.04 0.09 610 4.27 1444 2
Switchboard
CV763-VSD02
Upstream 25.43 20.10 23.58 16.60 1.11 610 52.08 7888 X
Incomer
CV763-VSD02
Incomer 25.43 20.10 23.58 16.60 0.09 610 4.22 1433 2
Switchboard
CV125-VSD01
Upstream 25.30 20.89 23.48 16.54 1.05 610 49 7569 X
Incomer
CV125-VSD01
Incomer 25.30 20.89 23.48 16.54 0.09 610 4.20 1428 2
Switchboard
CV705-VSD03
Upstream 25.47 21.02 23.62 16.63 1.05 610 49.34 7604 X
Incomer
CV705-VSD03
Incomer 25.47 21.02 23.62 16.63 0.09 610 4.23 1435 2
Switchboard
CV704-VSD01
Upstream 25.65 21.16 23.82 16.76 1.05 610 49.71 7643 X
Incomer
CV704-VSD01
Incomer 25.65 21.16 23.82 16.76 0.09 610 4.26 1442 2
Switchboard
CV704-VSD02
Upstream 25.66 21.17 23.82 16.76 1.05 610 49.72 7644 X
Incomer
CV704-VSD02
Incomer 25.66 21.17 23.82 16.76 0.09 610 4.26 1442 2
Switchboard
59
CV704-VSD03
Upstream 25.54 21.07 23.82 16.76 1.05 610 49.48 7619 X
Incomer
CV704-VSD03
Incomer 25.54 21.07 23.82 16.76 0.09 610 4.26 1442 2
Switchboard
CV153-VSD01
Upstream 25.00 20.65 23.21 16.35 1.05 610 48.41 7506 X
Incomer
CV153-VSD01
Incomer 25.00 20.65 23.21 16.35 0.09 610 4.15 1416 2
Switchboard
CV763-VSD01
Upstream 17.92 15.05 17.49 12.50 0.89 610 29.14 5319 4
Incomer
CV763-VSD01
Incomer 17.92 15.05 17.49 12.50 0.09 610 2.95 1123 1
Switchboard
CV705-VSD02
Upstream 18.83 15.78 18.32 13.06 0.84 610 29.01 5303 4
Incomer
CV705-VSD02
Incomer 18.83 15.78 18.32 13.06 0.09 610 3.10 1162 1
Switchboard
CV705-VSD01
Upstream 18.80 15.75 18.28 13.04 0.84 610 29.03 5305 4
Incomer
CV705-VSD01
Incomer 18.80 15.75 18.28 13.04 0.09 610 3.10 1161 1
Switchboard
Table 25: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the existing protection settings
Maximum
Maximum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR701-MCC01
Upstream 20.57 10.14 20.48 8.59 1.16 610 24.79 4766 3
Incomer
SR701-MCC01
Incomer 20.57 10.14 20.48 8.59 6.5 610 116.54 13629 X
Switchboard
SR029-MCC01
Upstream 29.72 13.60 29.07 11.36 1.37 610 40.19 6616 X
Incomer
SR029-MCC01
Incomer(1) 29.72 13.60 29.07 11.36 610
Switchboard
SR706-MCC01
Upstream 13.55 7.27 13.42 6.14 1.07 610 15.96 3535 3
Incomer
SR706-MCC01
Incomer 13.55 7.27 13.42 6.14 0.46 610 6.86 1993 2
Switchboard
SR705-MCC01
Upstream 20.40 10.07 19.78 8.36 4.45 610 94.42 11815 X
Incomer
SR705-MCC01
Incomer 20.40 10.07 19.78 8.36 0.43 610 9.12 2418 3
Switchboard
SR703-MCC01
Upstream 13.53 7.26 13.38 6.12 1.07 610 15.94 3531 3
Incomer
SR703-MCC01
Incomer 13.53 7.26 13.38 6.12 0.43 610 6.40 1901 2
Switchboard
SR151-MCC01
Upstream 36.17 15.90 33.63 12.75 2 610 69.84 9627 X
Incomer
SR151-MCC01
Incomer(1) 36.17 15.90 33.63 12.75 610
Switchboard
SR121-MCC01
Upstream 36.2 15.91 34.36 12.97 2.01 610 69.89 9632 X
Incomer
SR121-MCC01
Incomer 36.2 15.91 34.36 12.97 0.09 610 3.13 1169 1
Switchboard
SR111-MCC01
Upstream 36.15 15.89 34.29 12.95 2 610 69.80 9624 X
Incomer
SR111-MCC01
Incomer 36.15 15.89 34.29 12.95 0.09 610 3.13 1168 1
Switchboard
SR707-MCC01
Upstream 45.36 19.04 42.39 15.33 0.60 610 25.33 4836 4
Incomer
SR707-MCC01
Incomer 45.36 19.04 42.39 15.33 0.43 610 18.16 3858 3
Switchboard
(1)
Protection settings not available.
60
9.7 Appendix G – GE LV circuit breaker curve
Refer to the relevant section from the “Operation and Maintenance Manual” for the MPRO 50 trip
unit to understand how to determine the total clearing time from the curve seen in Figure 11.
Figure 11: GE LV circuit breaker curve (approval pending [39]
61
9.8 Appendix H – Maintenance mode protection settings
Table 26: Settings and location of the three maintenance switches
MS at SUB801 11kV Switchboard incomer
50P2 pickup 2550A
Time setting 0
MS at SUB002 33kV switchboard incomer
50P1 pickup 1600 A
Time setting 0
MS at SUB003 33kV switchboard incomer
50P1 pickup 1600 A
Time setting 0
62
9.9 Appendix I – Arc flash study results for Stockyard based on the
proposed solutions
Table 27: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards installed at the Stockyard based on the proposed protection settings
Minimum
0.85 x Incident
Clearing Maximum Maximum Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Arc Current Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA) (kA) Current
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SUB801-
SWB01 Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SUB801-
SWB01 Incomer 30.54 13.89 29.80 11.58 0.23 610 6.91 2002 2 No
Switchboard
SK801-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SK801-MCC01
Incomer 28.42 13.12 27.07 10.73 0.23 610 5.36 1685 2 No
Switchboard
SK802-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SK802-MCC01
Incomer 22.74 10.98 21.94 9.08 0.23 610 5.36 1685 2 No
Switchboard
RC901-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
RC901-MCC01
Incomer 15.35 8.03 15.31 6.81 0.23 610 3.82 1339 1 No
Switchboard
SUB901-
MCC01 Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SUB901-
MCC01 Incomer 29.48 13.51 28.61 11.21 0.23 610 6.70 1961 2 No
Switchboard
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 28: Proposed protection settings for the Stockyard 0.4kV switchboards incomers
SUB801 MCC Incomer SUB901 MCC Incomer SK801 MCC Incomer(1) SK802 MCC Incomer RC901 MCC Incomer
ICT 2500 2500 1250 800
In (xICT) 1 1 1 1
LT (x In) 0.9 0.9 0.85 0.8
LT s 10 10 20 2.5
ST 3 3 8kA 6 6
ST s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
INST 8 6 10 12
(1)
Protection settings to ensure incident energy is less than 8 cal/cm 2.
Table 29: Arc flash study results for the Stockyard 11kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Maximum
Maximum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA)
SUB901-
SWB01 Upstream 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.25 910 5.00 3946 2 No
Incomer CB
SUB901-
SWB01 Incomer 12.18 11.78 7.92 6.56 0.25 910 5.00 3946 2 No
Switchboard
SUB801-
SWB01 Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer CB
SUB801-
SWB01 Incomer 19.26 18.49 11.18 9.21 0.08 910 2.61 2019 1 Yes
Switchboard
63
Table 30: Proposed protection settings for Stockpile 11kV switchboards incomers
Protection Device Location Relay CTR 51P 50P
CS – 0.52 Pickup – 4
Feeder
SUB801 SEL751A 1000 C2 Time setting – 0.20 s
to SUB901 11kV switchboard
TD – 0.75
CS-0.94
Incomer of main SUB901 11kV Pickup – 4
SUB901 SEL751A 1000 C2
switchboard Time setting – 0.20 s
TD – 0.69
64
9.10 Appendix J – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the
proposed solutions
Table 31: Arc flash study results for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Maximum Minimum
Maximum 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Minimum Energy
Equipment Device Fault Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current
(kA)
Current
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA) (kA)
SR203-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR203-MCC01
Incomer 37.59 16.39 35.38 13.28 0.18 610 6.46 1914 2 No
Switchboard
SR104-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR104-MCC01
Incomer 37.54 16.38 35.27 13.24 0.18 610 6.46 1912 2 No
Switchboard
SR102-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR102-MCC01
Incomer 42.39 18.04 35.34 13.27 0.18 610 7.17 2053 2 No
Switchboard
SR502-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR502-MCC01
Incomer 39.80 17.16 35.34 13.27 0.18 610 6.79 1979 2 No
Switchboard
SR402-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR402-MCC01
Incomer 40.93 17.54 35.37 13.28 0.18 610 6.96 2011 2 No
Switchboard
SR303-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR303-MCC02
Incomer 38.95 16.86 35.32 13.26 0.18 610 6.67 1954 2 No
Switchboard
SR303-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR303-MCC01
Incomer 41.07 17.59 35.33 13.26 0.18 610 6.98 2015 2 No
Switchboard
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 32: Proposed protection settings for Firetail 0.4kV switchboards incomers
SR203-MCC01 SR104-MCC01 SR102-MCC01 SR502-MCC01 SR402-MCC01 SR303-MCC02 SR303-MCC01
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer
Rating 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
LT pickup 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie 0.75 x Ie
LT Band C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2 C2
Ir 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
ST pickup 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir 5 x Ir
ST Band 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
INST pickup 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie
65
Table 33: Arc flash study results for Firetail 33kV switchboards based on the proposed maintenance mode protection settings
Max
Max Min Bolted 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Fault Min Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Current Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
location Current
(kA) (kA) (kA)
time (s) (mm) ( 𝟐)
(mm)
𝒄𝒎
(kA)
SUB002 33kV
2000-SUB001-RMU01
switchboard 4.59 4.59 2.47 2.10 0.08 910 7.46 2269 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2200-SR201-SWB01
switchboard 4.57 4.57 2.47 2.10 0.08 910 7.43 2262 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2100-SR103-SWB01
switchboard 4.45 4.45 2.42 2.06 0.08 910 7.25 2236 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2100-SR101-SWB01
switchboard 4.53 4.53 2.45 2.08 0.08 910 7.37 2256 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2550-SR501-SWB01
switchboard 4.54 4.54 2.45 2.08 0.08 910 7.39 2258 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2400-SR401-SWB01
switchboard 4.52 4.52 2.46 2.09 0.08 910 7.42 2263 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2300-SR301-SWB01
switchboard 4.52 4.52 2.44 2.07 0.08 910 7.35 2252 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
SUB002 33kV
2000-SR001-SWB01
switchboard 4.59 4.59 2.47 2.10 0.08 910 7.48 2273 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer
incomer
66
9.11 Appendix K – Arc flash study results for the Firetail OPF based on the
proposed solutions
Table 34: Arc flash study results for KV 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Minimum 0.85 x
Maximum Incident
Clearing Maximum Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
Arc Energy
Equipment Device Bolted Fault Fault Arc Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
Location Current (kA)
(kA)
Current Current Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA) (kA)
2300-SR303-MCC03
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC03
Incomer 36.34 15.96 34.88 13.12 0.20 610 6.98 2015 2 No
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC02
Incomer 39.57 17.08 35.23 13.23 0.20 610 7.51 2118 2 No
Switchboard
2300-SR303-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2300-SR303-MCC01
Incomer 38.91 16.85 32.10 12.29 0.20 610 7.40 2098 2 No
Switchboard
2100-SR104-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2100-SR104-MCC01
Incomer 36.81 16.12 35.22 13.23 0.20 610 7.05 2030 2 No
Switchboard
2100-SR102-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2100-SR102-MCC01
Incomer 43.42 18.39 35.26 13.24 0.18 610 7.32 2082 2 No
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC02
Incomer 39.19 16.95 35.05 13.18 0.20 610 7.45 2106 2 No
Switchboard
2200-SR203-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2200-SR203-MCC01
Incomer 40.49 17.39 34.49 13.01 0.20 610 7.66 2147 2 No
Switchboard
2700-SR702-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2700-SR702-MCC01
Incomer 37.37 16.32 35.78 13.40 0.20 610 7.15 2049 2 No
Switchboard
2400-SR402-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2400-SR402-MCC01
Incomer 39.91 17.19 34.81 13.11 0.20 610 7.56 2129 2 No
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC03
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC03
Incomer 33.56 14.98 32.13 12.30 0.20 610 6.51 1924 2 No
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC02
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC02
Incomer 38.50 16.71 35.28 13.25 0.20 610 7.33 2085 2 No
Switchboard
2500-SR509-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2500-SR509-MCC01
Incomer 37.94 16.51 35.26 13.24 0.20 610 7.24 2067 2 No
Switchboard
2570-SR505-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2570-SR505-MCC01
Incomer 37.18 16.25 35.16 13.21 0.20 610 7.12 2043 2 No
Switchboard
2550-SR503-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
2550-SR503-MCC01
Incomer 39.40 17.02 35.31 13.26 0.20 610 7.48 2113 2 No
Switchboard
67
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 35: Proposed protection settings for KV 0.4kV incomer
SR303-MCC01 SR303-MCC02 SR303-MCC03 SR104-MCC01 SR102-MCC01 SR203-MCC01 SR203-MCC02
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer
Rating 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
LT pickup 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
LT Band C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min C-Min
Ir 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
ST pickup 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir
ST Band 6 6 6 6 5 6 6
INST pickup 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie
SR702-MCC01 SR402-MCC01 SR509-MCC03 SR509-MCC02 SR509-MCC01 SR505-MCC01 SR503-MCC01
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer
Rating 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
LT pickup 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
LT Band C-Min C-Min C4 C4 C4 C-Min C-Min
Ir 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
ST pickup 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir 4 x Ir
ST Band 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
INST pickup 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 9 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie 10 x Ie
Table 36: Arc flash study results for KV 33kV switchboards based on the proposed maintenance mode protection settings
0.85 x Total Inciden
Maximum Maximum Minimum Working t Arc Flash
Clearing Device Minimum Clearin
Equipment Bolted Fault Arc Current Bolted Fault Distance Energy Boundary PPE MS
Location Arc Current g Time
Current (kA) (kA) Current (kA) (mm) 𝒄𝒂𝒍 (mm)
(kA) (s) (𝒄𝒎𝟐 )
SUB003 33kV
2300-SR301-SWB01 switchboard
4.75 4.75 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.74 2312 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2100-SR103-SWB01 switchboard
4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2100-SR101-SWB01 switchboard
4.73 4.73 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.72 2308 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2200-SR201-SWB01 switchboard
4.75 4.75 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.75 2312 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2700-SR701-SWB01 switchboard
4.68 4.68 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.64 2296 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2400-SR401-SWB01 switchboard
4.73 4.73 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.71 2307 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2500-SR508-SWB01 switchboard
4.71 4.71 2.38 2.02 0.08 910 7.69 2303 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2570-SR504-SWB01 switchboard
4.74 4.74 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.73 2309 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2550-SR501-SWB01 switchboard
4.78 4.78 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.79 2319 2 Yes
Switchboard/Incomer incomer
SUB003 33kV
2000-SR001-SWB01
switchboard
Switchboard/Incomer 4.86 4.86 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.87 2330 2 Yes
incomer
68
9.12 Appendix L – Arc flash study results for RMUs based on proposed
solutions
Table 37: Arc flash study results for the RMUs based on the proposed maintenance mode protection settings
Maximum
Maximu 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Minimum Total Working Arc Flash
m Arc Minimum Energy PP
Equipment Device Fault Bolted Fault Clearing Distance Boundary MS
Current Arc Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍 E
Location Current
(kA)
Current (kA)
(kA)
Time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU12 4.86 4.86 2.42 2.06 0.08 910 7.93 2340 2 Yes
incomer
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU29 4.81 4.81 2.40 2.04 0.08 910 7.85 2327 2 Yes
incomer
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU13 4.78 4.78 2.39 2.03 0.08 910 7.80 2320 2 Yes
incomer
SUB003 33kV
switchboard
RMU17 4.72 4.72 2.37 2.01 0.08 910 7.70 2305 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU11 4.58 4.58 2.46 2.09 0.08 910 7.47 2270 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU14 4.50 4.50 2.43 2.07 0.08 910 7.35 2252 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU15 4.45 4.45 2.41 2.05 0.08 910 7.26 2238 2 Yes
incomer
SUB002 33kV
switchboard
RMU16 4.36 4.36 2.36 2.01 0.08 910 7.11 2216 2 Yes
incomer
Table 38: Arc flash study results for 0.4kV switchboards based on the proposed protection settings
Max
Min Bolted 0.85 x Incident
Clearing Bolted Max Arc Total Working Arc Flash
Fault Min Arc Energy
Equipment Device Fault Current Clearing Distance Boundary PPE MS
Current Current 𝒄𝒂𝒍
location Current (kA)
(kA) (kA)
time (s) (mm) ( ) (mm)
𝒄𝒎𝟐
(kA)
SR701-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR701-MCC01
Incomer 20.57 10.14 20.48 8.59 0.23 610 4.92 1589 2 No
Switchboard
SR029-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR029-MCC01
Incomer 29.72 13.60 29.07 11.36 0.26 610 7.63 2141 2 No
Switchboard
SR706-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR706-MCC01
Incomer 13.55 7.27 13.42 6.14 0.23 610 3.43 1245 1 No
Switchboard
SR705-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR705-MCC01
Incomer 20.40 10.07 19.78 8.36 0.23 610 4.88 1581 2 No
Switchboard
SR703-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR703-MCC01
Incomer 13.53 7.26 13.38 6.12 0.23 610 3.43 1243 1 No
Switchboard
SR151-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR151-MCC01
Incomer 36.17 15.90 33.63 12.75 0.09 610 3.13 1169 1 No
Switchboard
SR121-MCC01
Incomer
SR111-MCC01
Remote operation will eliminate arc flash hazard.
Incomer
SR707-MCC01
Incomer
SR707-MCC01
Incomer 45.36 19.04 42.39 15.33 0.13 610 5.49 1712 2 No
Switchboard
RBS MCC Incomer 7.88 4.72 7.76 3.96 0.26 610 2.43 985 1 No
69
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 39: Proposed protection settings for LV incomers
SR706-MCC01 SR705-MCC01 SR703-MCC01 SR701-MCC01 SR151-MCC01 SR029-MCC01 RBS SR707-MCC01
Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer Incomer(1) Incomer(1) Incomer(1) Incomer
ICT 1250 1600 1250 1600 3200 1600
In (xICT) 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.9 1
LT (x In) 1 0.8 1 1 C12 0.85
LT s 10 10 10 10 2880 10
ST 4 4 4 4 3 8kA 2kA 6
ST s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1 0.2 0.2 0.1
INST 12 10 12 10 5 16
70
9.13 Appendix M – Proposed protection settings to resolve grading
problems found
Highlighted in red are the protection settings changes that need to be implemented to reduce the arc
flash incident energy.
Table 40: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main Firetail 33kV switchboard (2000-SR001)
Location Relay CTR 51P CS Curve TD 50P
Feeders
to main Firetail Switchboard SUB002 GE F650 600 0.81 Curve A 0.23 Off
(2000-SR001)
Main Firetail
Incomer for main Firetail
switchboard SEL751A 600 0.81 C1 0.23 Off
switchboard (2000-SR001)
(2000-SR001)
Table 41: Proposed settings for protection devices for the main KV 33kV switchboard (2000-SR001)
Location Relay CTR 51P CS Curve TD 50P
Feeders
De-activate
To main KV Switchboard SUB003 GE F650 600 1.2 Curve A 0.19
(2000-SR001)
Incomers for main KV
KV SEL751A 1200 0.6 C1 0.19 off
switchboard (2000-SR001)
Table 42: Proposed settings for feeders to RMUs for correct coordination between protection devices
Location Relay CTR 51P 50P
CS – 1 Pickup – 6
Feeder SUB002
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU14 (SWB05-CB07)
TD – 0.1
CS – 0.48 Pickup – 2.9
Feeder SUB002
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU11 (SWB05-CB06)
TD – 0.1
CS – 1 Pickup – 6
Feeder SUB003
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU13 (SWB06-CB06)
TD – 0.1
CS – 0.48 Pickup – 2.9
Feeder SUB003
GE F650 300 Curve A Time setting – 0.25 s
To RMU12 (SWB06-CB07)
TD – 0.1
71
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Short-Circuit, Coordination, and Arc-Flash Studies for
Data Centers: Best Practices and Pitfalls
Karl A. Homburg, PE, Staff Power Systems Engineer, Square D Engineering Services
1. Abstract
Data Center power systems present unique challenges for the application of electrical equipment.
These challenges, such as multiple operating modes, must be carefully implemented if the
desired system performance under normal and abnormal conditions is to be achieved. This
paper describes the challenges that a typical data center presents to the system study engineer,
common pitfalls that must be avoided, and describes how a well-performed system study is
crucial to the successful performance of a data center power system.
2. Power System Analysis Software
While it is possible to perform power system studies utilizing hand calculations, the complexities
of data center power systems would tend to make these calculations tedious at best. Due to the
high reliability requirement of data centers they are usually designed with several possible
operating scenarios for many different contingencies. Every operating scenario is essentially a
completely separate power system that may have completely different fault currents, arc-flash
incident energy levels and power flows. It is also possible that some contingency scenarios, like
operation on generator power, may require protective relays to be programmed with multiple sets
of trip characteristics based on the scenario they are operating under. The best way to find and
mitigate problems with the design of a data center is on the computer where changes are less
expensive than changes to equipment and there is reduced risk of downtime before equipment is
in service. With the proper software, multiple contingency and operating scenarios can be
completely evaluated ahead of time.
3. Short-Circuit, Coordination and Arc-Flash Studies
A power system study is an extremely important document for any power system. Today even
the smallest power systems are having power system studies performed to comply with more
stringent codes and regulations. Due to the high reliability requirement imposed upon the
operation of data centers it is an absolute necessity.
A power system study typically consists of short circuit, coordination, and arc-flash hazard
studies. While sometimes these individual areas may be considered separately they are all very
much interrelated and it is recommended that these be performed at the same time, by the same
entity, to ensure the most accurate results.
Data centers also present additional challenges to the engineer tasked with performing a power
system study. Many data centers are served by multiple utility sources and generators that can
be operated in several different configurations. All configurations must be considered in order for
the engineering study to completely predict the operation and identify any shortcomings in the
power system.
3.1. Short Circuit Study
3.1.1. Background
The purpose of a short circuit study is to identify the maximum available fault current at all
locations, called busses, in the power system. It is then compared with the ratings of the
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Short-Circuit, Coordination, and Arc-Flash Studies for Data Centers
individual power system components to determine if the equipment is adequately rated to safely
withstand or interrupt the calculated fault current.
The results of the short circuit study are also used in both the coordination study and the arc-flash
study. How this information is used will be discussed later.
The results of the study are usually presented in a table like that shown in Fig. 1. The table lists
each bus, its voltage, the type of equipment connected to the bus, the calculated available fault
current as well as the equipment’s short circuit rating. The table then indicates whether the
equipment is adequately or inadequately rated for the available short circuit current.
Fig. 1 Short-Circuit Coordination Comparison Table
If equipment is found to be inadequately rated for the available fault current, action must be
taken. The National Electrical Code, as well as other regulations, require that all electrical
equipment be adequately rated for the available fault current. Equipment that is inadequately
rated can be a serious safety hazard. As such it may result in melted or bent bus bars, enclosure
rupture or even a failure of the intended interrupting device to interrupt the fault, any of which can
lead to more extensive fault damage and/or loss of service continuity than would otherwise be the
case.
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3.1.2. Short Circuit Study – Pitfalls
Data centers present some pitfalls when performing a short circuit study. Since the short circuit
study is concerned with the maximum available fault current, we need to look at the operating
scenario that will supply the most fault current and consider all sources of fault current. In most
cases the operating scenarios and motor information are not readily apparent upon examining the
one-line diagram of the power system. The system study engineer must obtain this information
from the system designer.
Fig. 2 Fault Currents with Open Tie
Fig. 3 Fault Currents with Closed Tie
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3.1.2.1. Motor Contribution
One often overlooked source of fault current are motors operating on the system. Large data
centers may have very large chillers and air handlers to deal with the heat generated by the
equipment within. It is not uncommon mistake for some system designers to choose short circuit
rating of equipment based on an infinite bus calculation of the transformers feeding them while
neglecting the contribution of motors in the system. A typical motor will contribute 6 times its full
load current as fault current. If little margin is included when short circuit ratings are chosen the
motor contribution could easily push the distribution equipment over the edge.
3.1.2.2. Parallel Operation
Often data centers are not designed to parallel sources during steady state operations. Some
designs however may operate one or more transformers in parallel with one or more generators.
If this is the case all of the operating scenarios must be considered to determine the scenario that
produces the maximum available fault current. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the difference in fault
current on a main tie main system with the tie breaker both open and closed. If the utility has
been assumed to be an infinite bus the available fault current would be double. Since real utility
sources are not infinite busses the available fault current from the utility will have a significant
effect on the secondary fault current. In most cases it will be much less than double but still
significantly more than the current available from a single transformer. This effect can be even
more significant when multiple generators are paralleled.
Even in data centers that do not intentionally operate with parallel sources many of them do
experience some time in which sources are paralleled. This is the case if switching is performed
as a closed transition. Under this scenario sources are briefly paralleled to allow the switching of
sources without interruption to the load. If this is done automatically the time the sources are
paralleled is very brief, up to only a few seconds. If the switching is done manually the time can
be significantly longer based on the time needed for the worker operating the equipment. During
the time that the sources are paralleled the power system equipment is exposed to the much
larger fault current of the paralleled sources.
There are differing opinions as to whether switchgear should be operated in a closed transition
scenario while only rated for the open transition fault current. One common view holds that if the
closed transition is automatically controlled by a control system such that the tie breaker and both
mains are closed for only a very short period of time it is acceptable to choose the equipment
based on the open tie fault current. This is because the probability of a fault during this very brief
period of time is extremely low and workers are not typically standing in front of the equipment
during operation.
Conversely if the closed transition is done by a worker manually operating circuit breakers the
time period the breakers are closed is significantly longer and the worker is in close proximity to
the switchgear. In these cases equipment that is fully rated for the closed tie fault current is
typically recommended. It should be noted that there is, by no means, universal agreement on
what ratings to use for a closed transition. It is ultimately the responsibility of the engineer of
record to make the decision.
3.1.2.3. Single Line to Ground Faults
Single line to ground fault can be a concern when a delta-wye connected 3 phase 4 wire system
or wye-grounded generators are employed especially when the substation transformers or
generators are very close or are close coupled to the distribution switchgear. When the distance
is small the zero sequence impedance is significantly smaller than the positive and negative
sequence impedance. This difference can cause the single line to ground fault magnitude to be
up to theoretical maximum of 150% of the magnitude of a three phase fault.
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Fig. 2 shows a one-line diagram of a main-tie-main service entrance with the tie breaker open.
The transformers are assumed to be close coupled to the switchgear. As can be seen in the
figure the available single line to ground fault is about 105% of the available three phase fault.
Fig. 3 shows what happens when the tie breakers are closed. Not only does the three phase fault
current increase dramatically but so does the difference between the three phase fault and the
single line to ground fault. When the transformers are paralleled the single line to ground fault is
about 109% of the three phase fault.
Fortunately after even as little as a few tens of feet for smaller transformers the zero sequence
impedance increases to the point where the single line to ground fault will be less than the three
phase fault. For the example we have been using it would take about 90 feet of cable to reduce
the SLG fault current to the level of the 3P fault current. If dealing with a closed tie situation the
required cable length approximately doubles to about 180 feet.
3.1.2.4. X/R Ratio
The X/R ratio is a measure of the ratio of the inductive reactance (X), consisting of the inductive
components of cable, transformer, generator, etc., impedances, to the resistive components (R)
of those impedances; the applicable ANSI [1] [2] and IEEE [3] standards are very specific on the
method for calculating it. Every practical electrical power system has some inductive impedance,
making the X/R ratio always larger than zero. An inductor stores energy in a magnetic field,
which requires current flow. Because this energy cannot be dissipated instantaneously an
inductor opposes changes to current flow. For fault conditions, this means that after a fault is
initiated there will be a DC offset to the fault current; the higher the X/R ratio, the higher the DC
offset. This DC offset must be taken into account when calculating the interrupting duty of fault
interrupting devices such as circuit breakers. The result, for low-voltage interrupting devices, is
that the fault duty that is used in comparison to the interrupting rating of the device will be higher
(theoretical maximum is 31% higher for a molded-case circuit breaker with interrupting rating
greater than 20kA) than the actual calculated fault current if the X/R ratio calculated at the point of
the fault is greater than the X/R ratio for which the device has been tested. This can become an
issue if the device has an interrupting rating only marginally higher than the available fault
current. Such a scenario unfortunately, occurs often in data center applications, especially where
relatively large low-voltage generators are operated in parallel.
3.2. Coordination Study
3.2.1. Background
The purpose of a coordination study is to determine the proper settings for overcurrent protective
devices in the power system. Ideally the selection of the proper settings will both protect the
power system equipment as well as remove only the smallest portion of the electrical system as
necessary from service in order to isolate a fault. In most cases however compromises must be
made in order to provide the best overall system reliability.
In order to determine the proper setting for the Overcurrent protective devices they are plotted on
time-current curve graphs (TCCs). The time-current characteristics of properly coordinated
devices will not overlap on a TCC graph. An example of a TCC graph is shown in Fig. 5. The
devices in this TCC graph correspond to the devices shown in the one-line diagram in Fig. 4.
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3.2.2. Interpreting a TCC Graph
The TCC graph relies on the information determined in the short circuit analysis to determine
where the device time-current curve is cut off. Each device will have its characteristic cut off at
the maximum fault current available for the bus it is connected to. As stated earlier, most of the
time when there is no overlap on the TTC graph the devices can be said to coordinate.
Many data centers utilize ANSI draw-out style switchgear, or similar, “hybrid,” switchboard
construction, at the service entrance. This type of switchgear has the benefit of being able to
conduct rated fault currents for time periods up to 30 cycles. This withstand capability allows the
instantaneous function of the main circuit breaker to be turned off in many cases avoiding overlap
and providing for better coordination
There are couple of exceptions to the no overlap concept. If two devices are operating in a
current-limiting mode at the available fault current, the curves will fall below 0.01s on the TCC
graph. Even though they do not show overlap on the graph additional techniques are required to
judge selectivity. Generally this occurs with fuses and requires the use of fuse ratio tables to
determine selectivity.
With circuit breakers there are some instances where the overlap of device characteristics does
not necessarily mean that the devices do not coordinate. Most often this occurs with thermal
magnetic circuit breakers. This is illustrated in Fig. 5. Several circuit breaker manufacturers
publish what are called selectivity tables for their circuit breakers. These are similar to the fuse
ratio tables that have existed for fuses for many years. Fig. 6 shows a portion of such a table as
it relates to the thermal magnetic circuit breakers presented in Fig. 5. Listed in the table is an
upstream breaker, a downstream breaker and a maximum available fault current for which the
downstream breaker will open and clear a fault before the upstream breaker opens. Generally a
note similar to the one shown in Fig. 5 is added to the TCC to indicate that the breakers
coordinate even though they overlap.
Fig. 4 One-Line of Example TCC
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Fig. 5 Typical TCC Graph
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Fig. 6 Circuit Breaker Selectivity Table
3.2.3. Coordinating Parallel Generators
The coordination of parallel generators can pose a challenge. It is not uncommon for the feeder
breakers in generator paralleling switchgear to have a similar long time trip rating as the
generator breakers. In such an instance it may be impossible to adjust the devices to have good
selective coordination while providing protection that matches the generator’s decrement curve.
If two identically sized generators with identical impedance characteristics are operating in
parallel, the fault current will be split approximately equally between the two generators. This
means that the generator breakers will only see half of the fault current that a feeder breaker
would see. Using this relationship, the generator breaker curves can be shifted to the right by a
factor of two. This shifting of the curves allows a visual representation of the actual conditions
that exist during the parallel operation. The same methodology applies to numbers of generator
breakers greater than two – the curves would be shifted by a factor of 3 for 3 breakers, 4 for 4
breakers, etc. Strictly speaking, such shifting of curves applies only to faulted conditions where
the fault is downstream of both breakers with shifted curves, and not to overloads. If only one of
the sources is in operation, however, fault overcurrent coordination would still be based on the
non-shifted curves.
This technique could also be applied to a generator paralleled with a transformer or two
generators of different sizes. The scaling factors would simply need to be adjusted based on the
ratio of the impedances of the sources.
Fig. 7 is a sample one-line of two parallel generators. The generator paralleling switchgear feeds
a distribution switchboard that then feeds several UPSs, one of which is shown. Fig. 8 shows a
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TCC drawing based on the one-line. As can be seen perfect selective coordination is obtained all
the way up to the switchboard feeder breaker. There is a lack of selective coordination with the
generator breaker however. This is because the generator breaker had to be adjusted so that the
generator is adequately protected for short-circuit conditions.
Since there are two parallel generators Fig. 9 shows the generator breaker and decrement curve
shifted to the right. Since there are two generators the curves were shifted by a factor of two. As
can be seen, when two generators are operating in parallel perfect selective coordination exists.
Fig. 7 Parallel Generator Example TCCs One-Line Diagram
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Fig. 8 Parallel Generator Example TCC – Un-shifted
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Fig. 9 Parallel Generator Example TCC - Shifted
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3.3. Arc-Flash Study
3.3.1. Background
An arc-flash hazard analysis has become a standard part of many system studies. The purpose
of the analysis is to determine the available arc-flash incident energy at all of the busses in the
power system so that electrical workers are aware of the potential hazard and can make informed
choices about personal protective equipment.
The foundations of arc-flash analysis are the IEEE-1584-2002 [4] and NFPA 70E-2009 [5]
standards. The calculation methodologies require the results of the short circuit and coordination
studies. The results of these studies must be applied carefully to the arc-flash analysis so that
realistic estimates of the available incident energy are made.
3.3.2. Multiple Operating Scenarios
Once again, multiple operating scenarios will need to be considered by the system study
engineer in order to properly calculate the incident energy levels in the system. Unlike short
circuit studies where we are concerned with the maximum available fault current with arc-flash
studies we are really concerned with all possible available fault currents. In many cases the
highest incident energy levels are produced by the scenario that produces the lowest available
fault current. This is because fault currents that fall just below the instantaneous or short time
pickup of circuit breakers will last for a much longer time period and therefore expose an electrical
worker to more energy.
3.3.3. PDUs and Transformers
According to IEEE 1584, busses operating at 240V or less fed by transformers less than 125kVA
in size do not need to be considered in an arc-flash hazard analysis and can be assumed to be
Category 0 (1.2 cal/cm^2) Many data centers, however, use transformers larger than 125kVA in
their PDUs. This can pose a problem if trying to keep the incident energy levels in the power
system low.
There are two problems with 480 to 208V transformers related to arc-flash within data centers.
The first has to do with the physical construction of the PDUs and the second is related to the low
level of arcing faults on the 208V terminals of the transformer.
3.3.3.1. Low Level Arcing Faults
The arcing fault current on the secondary of a 480 to 208V transformer is usually relatively low
when compared to the instantaneous pickup of the 480V breaker feeding the PDU. Due to this
the primary breaker usually takes several seconds to clear a fault on the 208V side. When the
arc-flash calculations are stopped at two seconds, per IEEE 1584, a Category 3 arc-flash
hazard/risk rating is very common. It should be noted, that for locations where clear egress is not
possible, it may be prudent to extend the calculations past 2 seconds. Unfortunately, there are
very few cost effective solutions to decrease the hazard at this location in a power system. One
work-around is to consider the equipment construction and layout.
3.3.3.2. PDU Construction
Typically, PDUs are constructed with the 208V secondary breakers and a branch circuit
panelboard within the same enclosure. This poses two risks. First the primary of the transformer
represents a 480V hazard while a worker is performing work on the 208V components. The
second risk is exposure to the line side of the 208V secondary breakers. As discussed earlier
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this location is quite often Category 3. Since all of the components are in the same enclosure this
rating must be applied to the entire PDU.
There is a possible solutions to this problem.
3.3.3.2.1. Provide Separate Enclosure for Panelboards
A solution is to move the branch circuit panelboards to a separate enclosure. Most of the time
the 208V breaker feeding the branch circuit panelboard is capable of interrupting the arcing fault
fast enough to allow for a Category 0 rating at the panel. By moving it to a separate enclosure
the worker is no longer exposed to the unprotected transformer secondary when working on the
branch circuit panelboard. The hazard still exists in the PDU but workers need access to the
PDU much less often then the panelboards.
3.3.4. UPS Systems and Arcing Fault Currents
It has been common practice when performing arc-flash studies to assume that a UPS system
will switch into bypass during an arcing fault. If the arcing fault current is too low, however, this
may not be the case.
Information about the behavior of a UPS system for low level arcing faults is difficult to obtain
from most of the major UPS manufacturers. The information that is available shows that different
UPS models have different behaviors even from the same manufacturer.
In general, if the arcing fault current is less than the overload rating of the UPS the unit will not
switch into bypass and the only current flow will be from the output of the UPS itself.
For slightly higher faults the unit may operate in what one manufacturer called pulsed parallel
mode in which both the UPS output and the bypass are paralleled for approximately 40
milliseconds at which time the UPS output breaker will open leaving only the bypass to supply the
fault.
The third scenario is one in which the fault current significantly exceeds the UPS overload rating.
In this case the UPS will immediately switch to bypass mode.
The scenario that produces the worst case incident energy level could vary significantly
depending on the UPS size, available fault current and overcurrent protection types. Each
system should be carefully considered in consultation with the UPS manufacturer’s published
data to make a determination.
3.3.4.1. UPS Example
For example, one particular UPS system, with a Static Transfer Switch (STS), will conduct for
overloads that exceed 155% of the on-line modules. This essentially places the UPS output and
the bypass source in parallel to feed the fault for 40 milliseconds. The downstream faulted bus
will therefore experience an available fault current consisting of both the UPS inverter capability
and the bypass source for that duration. If the fault has not cleared in that time, the STS will
continue to conduct while the UPS output breaker opens and the bypass breaker closes
To apply this to an arc flash analysis for loads supplied by such a UPS system, the idea is to
compare the calculated arcing current at the downstream busses, supplied from the UPS to the
overload capability of the UPS (155% of the online modules). If the calculated arcing current at
the downstream bus exceeds the overload capability of the UPS, then the downstream panel can
be evaluated in Bypass mode only. If the arcing current is insufficient to cause the STS to
conduct in "pulsed parallel" operation, then that downstream bus should be evaluated separately
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Short-Circuit, Coordination, and Arc-Flash Studies for Data Centers
for arc flash based on the UPS supply only and in bypass, with the worse case determined and
reported.
4. Power System Data
Accurate data about the power system is essential for any system study to accurately predict its
behavior. Sometimes even seemingly insignificant errors in the system data can produce
significant errors in the study results. This is especially the case with an arc-flash hazard
analysis.
4.1. Effects of Inaccurate Data on System Studies
It is possible for small errors in the power system data to have a very significant effect on arc-
flash calculations. It is therefore necessary that the power system data be as accurate as
possible. Underestimating cable lengths can cause arc-flash incident energy levels to be
underreported. Overestimating lengths could also have an effect when comparing the withstand
ratings of equipment when performing a short circuit analysis if the fault current fall close to the
actual equipment rating.
Another area that could cause significant errors is neglecting to consider the type of conduit used
for feeders. Assuming magnetic conduit when PVC is actually used or vice-versa can have a
significant effect on the fault current calculations.
Finally, a third common area that can introduce errors is the available utility fault current.
4.1.1. Incorrect Cable Lengths
As stated earlier, incorrectly estimating the lengths of the power cables in the system can have a
negative impact on the study results. There are two concerns that are in opposition with each
other. The first concern would be to overestimate the length. Overestimating the length would
cause the study results to underestimate the available fault current at a bus and determining that
devices are adequately rated when they are not. Generally, this would only be a problem for a
gross overestimation of the lengths since most of the time equipment rating are not chosen to be
too close to the available fault current. It is also relatively easy to guard against this situation.
Simply scanning through the short circuit comparison table will quickly show devices that are
close to their interrupting rating. If there is little confidence in the accuracy of the cable lengths
some time could be spent on only these cable to obtain more accurate information.
The second concern would be underestimating the cable lengths. This is an issue more related
to the arc-flash analysis. When performing an arc-flash analysis the clearing time of the
upstream devices is taken from the device time current curve based on the arcing fault current
calculated using the equations in IEEE 1584. In order to illustrate the underlying issue Fig. 10
shows a time-current curve of a circuit breaker. Also shown, is an example of an arbitrary arcing
fault current that may be calculated using the IEEE 1584 equations (1850A). This current would
be used to determine the clearing time of the breaker. In addition to the calculated arcing fault
current IEEE 1584 specifies that the device clearing time also be determined at 85% of the
calculated current. The incident energy is then calculated at both arcing current levels and
clearing times. The highest incident energy level of the two is reported. Since it is impossible to
exactly predict the arcing fault current this is done to account for arcing fault currents that are
close to a point of discontinuity on the protective device time-current curve. With the example in
Fig. 10 the first calculated current falls into the instantaneous trip region of the circuit breaker
clearing in less than 0.02s. The low arcing tolerance (85%) current falls into the long time region
of the breaker taking several seconds to clear, Since time is generally the most influential factor
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in determining the incident energy level during an arcing fault there will be a very significant
difference in incident energy.
Unlike the short circuit analysis it is difficult to determine from the output of an arc-flash analysis if
a bus is close to making the jump in incident energy by being close to the point of discontinuity of
a protective device. If that were the case the study engineer could simply scrutinize the few, if
any, cable lengths where the fault current was close. Fortunately, The IEEE 1584 low arcing
tolerance can provide some cover. Tables Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 below shows the results
of a comparison of the difference in arcing fault currents for cables of 50, 100 and 1000 feet in
length based on an underestimation of the cable length by 15%. As expected, underestimating
the length of smaller gauge conductors has a much larger effect than on larger gauge conductors.
Also, note that the longer the cable length, the larger the effect. Generally, the tables show that
the IEEE 1584 low arcing current tolerance has the capability of easily accounting for a 15% error
in cable lengths with some room to spare for other inaccuracies in the model.
This is by no means an exhaustive analysis and should not be considered a hard and fast rule.
Cable lengths should always be measured as precisely as possible. There is no ANSI/IEEE
standard that specifies a recommended accuracy of cable lengths. The study engineer must
make his own determination based on his confidence in the accuracy of the cable data.
Table 1 – 50 Foot Feeder Arcing Current
Feeder Size 50 Feet Arcing Fault +57.5 (15%) Feet +57.5 Feet
Current (kA) Arcing Fault Current (15%)Difference in
(kA) Arcing Fault Current
6 Sets 500 kcmil 30.38 30.09 -0.96%
5 Sets 500 kcmil 30 29.66 -1.15%
4 Sets 500 kcmil 29.44 29.03 -1.41%
3 Sets 500 kcmil 28.55 28.05 -1.78%
2 Sets 500 kcmil 26.93 26.26 -2.55%
1 Set 500 kcmil 23.02 22.07 -4.30%
1 Set #4/0 AWG 21.31 20.21 -5.44%
1 Set #3 AWG 12.92 11.73 -10.14%
Table 2 – 100 Foot Feeder Arcing Current
Feeder Size 100 Feet Arcing +15 (15%) Feet +15 Feet (15%)
(Steel Conduit) Fault Current (kA) Arcing Fault Current Difference in Arcing
(kA) Fault Current
6 Sets 500 kcmil 28.55 28.05 -1.78%
5 Sets 500 kcmil 27.88 27.31 -2.09%
4 Sets 500 kcmil 26.93 26.26 -2.55%
3 Sets 500 kcmil 25.49 24.69 -3.24%
2 Sets 500 kcmil 23.02 22.07 -4.30%
1 Set 500 kcmil 17.9 16.8 -6.55%
1 Set #4/0 AWG 15.59 14.44 -7.96%
1 Set #3 AWG 7.78 6.97 -11.62%
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Table 3 – 1000 Foot Feeder Arcing Current
Feeder Size 1000 Feet Arcing +150 Feet Arcing +150 Feet (15%)
Fault Current (kA) Fault Current (kA) Difference in Arcing
Fault Current
6 Sets 500 kcmil 13.9 12.84 -8.26%
5 Sets 500 kcmil 12.53 11.52 -8.77%
4 Sets 500 kcmil 10.94 10 -9.40%
3 Sets 500 kcmil 9.07 8.24 -10.07%
2 Sets 500 kcmil 6.83 6.16 -10.88%
1 Set 500 kcmil 4.03 3.61 -11.63%
1 Set #4/0 AWG 3 2.67 -12.36%
1 Set #3 AWG 1.16 1.03 -12.62%
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Fig. 10 Arcing Fault Current Tolerance
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4.1.2. Incorrect Conduit Type
Not considering the conduit type is another area where errors can be introduced into a power
system study. Table 4 lists some cable and conduit combinations and the available fault currents
at the ends of the runs. All of the cable run lengths are 100 feet and the available fault current at
the beginning of the run is 65kA.
In some cases the differences can be significant. For very large feeds and very small feeds the
difference tends to be less significant but at around a 400A feeder (1 Set 500 kcmil) the
difference can be very significant.
Table 4 – Fault Currents and Conduit Type
Feeder Size Fault Current Fault Current Difference Difference
Steel PVC Conduit (A) (%)
Conduit (A) (A)
6 Sets 500 kcmil 55969 57411 1442 2.51
5 Sets 500 kcmil 54433 56073 1640 2.92
4 Sets 500 kcmil 52270 54164 1894 3.50
3 Sets 500 kcmil 49002 51228 2226 4.35
2 Sets 500 kcmil 43503 46143 2640 5.72
1 Set 500 kcmil 32404 35329 2925 8.28
1 Set #4/0 AWG 27570 29414 1844 6.27
1 Set #3 AWG 12212 12381 169 1.36
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4.1.3. Utility Fault Current Data
A final, common area of concern, when considering data accuracy is the available fault current as
given by the electric utility. Although it has improved in recent years there are still many utilities
that only give the maximum available fault current at a customer’s service entrance. This is most
often the case with 480V service entrances. For medium voltage service entrances it is common
to get the maximum value along with an actual present value.
The maximum value is needed to run the short circuit analysis however lower values should
always be considered when performing an arc-flash hazard analysis since lower fault currents
quite often produce higher incident energy levels.
Determining what to use for the minimum levels for a 480V or 208V service entrance may seem
to require pure guesswork but some basic analysis and reasonable assumptions can be used to
determine realistic values. There are no methods given in the present standards to assist in
determining realistic values. The method below is presented simply as an example. The study
engineer should always use a method and assumptions that fit best with his experience with
power systems and utilities in the area of the project.
If the service transformer size is known it can be modeled with a primary side source. Table 5
shows the fault currents on the secondary of a 1500kVA transformer (5.75%Z) based on a range
of primary side fault currents. Because in most cases the transformer impedance is a much more
significant factor than the utility system impedance the secondary fault current does not change
greatly with large changes in the primary side available fault current. Table 5 illustrates this.
Except in very rural areas it is not common to see fault currents less than 3kA at distribution
voltages. The table shows that at 3kA the available fault current is still 71% if the infinite bus
value, making this a pretty reasonable assumption for a low level estimate.
Table 5 – Transformer Fault Current Ranges
1500kVA 5.75%Z 480V Secondary 1000kVA 5.75%Z 480V Secondary
Secondary Fault Secondary Fault
Primary Current (kA) Percent of Current (kA) Percent of
Available Fault 1500kVA Infinite Bus 1000kVA Infinite Bus
Current (kA) Transformer Current Transformer Current
Infinite Bus 31.4 100.00% 20.9 66.56%
10 28 89.17% 19.4 61.78%
9 27.7 88.22% 19.2 61.15%
8 27.3 86.94% 19 60.51%
7 26.8 85.35% 18.8 59.87%
6 26.1 83.12% 18.4 58.60%
5 25.3 80.57% 18 57.32%
4 24.1 76.75% 17.4 55.41%
3 22.4 71.34% 16.5 52.55%
2 19.6 62.42% 14.9 47.45%
1 14.2 45.22% 11.6 36.94%
It is also not uncommon for the electric utility to provide only an available fault current on the
secondary of the service transformer. In this case the previously analysis method can still be
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used however, an assumption needs to be made in regards to the transformer kVA rating. If one
were to choose a kVA rating that matched the service entrance ampacity it would likely be larger
than the transformer installed by the utility. It is not uncommon for the utility to install a
transformer one size smaller than the rated ampacity of the service entrance while quoting a fault
current for the “properly” sized transformer. For the example in Table 5 this would be a 1000kVA
transformer with the same impedance (5.75%Z). At 3kA primary side fault current this give a
fault current on the secondary that is close to 50% of the larger transformer infinite bus value.
Again, this is probably not a bad estimate if only given the secondary side fault current.
Most of the time, when the lower fault currents are used for the arc-flash analysis, only a few
locations will see their incident energy levels increase. The reason for the increase is usually
because the high estimate of the available fault current placed the arcing fault current close to a
point of discontinuity of a protective device. The main purpose for using the lower available fault
current value is to root out those cases and extreme accuracy in the low level estimate is not
normally necessary.
5. Conclusions
Data center power systems offer special challenges to the study engineer and the design
engineer. The selection and arrangement of the components in the power system significantly
affect the arc flash study outcome. Design practices that used to be common (infinite bus short
circuit calculation, large PDU transformers, etc) are not conducive to controlling arc flash
energies. Arc flash mitigation must be designed into the data center power system at the concept
stage. Additionally, due to the various operating scenarios, data center power system studies
require an extra level of diligence of the study engineer. Select a study team that has sufficient
resources to evaluate the system parameters completely and accurately, and invests the
necessary effort to acquire a reasonable compromise between selectivity (reliability) and arc flash
energies.
6. References
[1] ANSI C37.010, Application Guide for AC High-Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a
Symmetrical Current Basis
[2] ANSI/IEEE C37.5, IEEE Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in
Enclosures
[3] IEEE 141-1993, IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power Distribution for Industrial
Plants (IEEE Red Book)
[4] IEEE 1584-2002, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations
[5] NFPA 70E-2009, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace
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ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS
By Mike Lang
Principal Field Engineer
I. ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED
OSHA’s 29 CFR Part 1910.132(d) states:
The employer shall assess the workplace to determine if hazards are present, or are likely to be present,
which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment (PPE). If such hazards are present, or likely
to be present, the employer shall:
1910.132(d)(1)(i)
Select, and have each affected employee use, the types of PPE that will protect the affected
employee from the hazards identified in the hazard assessment;
1910.132(d)(1)(ii)
Communicate selection decisions to each affected employee; and,
1910.132(d)(1)(iii)
Select PPE that properly fits each affected employee.
Additionally 29 CFR Part 1910.335 calls for the employer to provide
“…electrical equipment that is appropriate for the specific parts of the body to be protected and for the
work to be performed…” when employees are called upon to work wherever there is a potential
electrical hazard.
NFPA 70E Standard for Electrical Safety in The Workplace is viewed by OSHA as an industry consensus
standard that can be used by employers as guides to making the assessments required by OSHA
standards. Section 110.8(B)(1) of NFPA 70E requires that an electrical hazard analysis be performed to
ensure that workers are properly protected whenever they work on or near equipment that is not in an
“electrically safe condition.” This includes work required to deenergize the equipment. Refer to Article
120 for guidance on putting equipment in an electrically safe condition.
Part of an electrical hazard analysis is an arc flash hazard analysis. According to NFPA 70E Section 130.3,
the goal of arc flash hazard analysis is to identify:
The Flash Protection Boundary, defined in Article 130.3(A) as “an approach limit at a distance
from exposed live parts within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an
electrical arc flash were to occur.”
The proper personal protective equipment (PPE) and protective
clothing necessary, based on an incident heat energy calculation for
the working distance for the task to be performed, as described in
Article 130.3(B) and Article 130.7. The results of the incident energy
calculations are typically expressed in cal/cm2.
Appropriate safety related work practices.
NFPA 70E cites two approaches to proper PPE selection: an analytical method and a table-based
method. Performing an arc flash hazard analysis by an analytical method provides the additional benefit
of an in-depth look at your electrical system. The results of the analysis can be used to reduce arc flash
energies, improve overall system performance, reduce downtime, and better manage costs.
II. USING AN ANALYTICAL METHOD TO SELECT PPE Figure 1: PPE for Hazard/Risk
Category 2 (right) and 4 (left).
{Courtesy of WH Salisbury Co.}
Appendix D of NFPA 70E and the IEEE Standard 1584™-2002, Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard
Calculations, provide guidance on performing an arc flash hazard analysis. IEEE 1584 identifies a
systematic, nine-step approach for performing a comprehensive arc flash hazard analysis.
Since fault current and time are two of the most important variables in the calculations, the process
begins with a short circuit study to determine the available “bolted” fault current at each location in the
system. Arcing fault currents are less than the maximum bolted fault current and must be estimated. Let
through data must be obtained for current limiting overcurrent protective devices. Clearing times for all
other overcurrent protection device must be obtained to accurately predict the duration of the arc fault
current. See the following section for additional details and other factors that affect arc flash energies.
A choice of formulas for calculating the Flash Protection Boundaries and incident energy can be found in
NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584. Note that IEEE 1584 contains separate equations for calculating the dramatic
reduction in arc flash energies possible with certain current limiting fuses. Using these fuses can
significantly reduce the energy delivered to an arc fault and thus the category of PPE workers are
required to wear. See Arc Flash Notes 2 and 4 for additional information.
If a worker is required to be within the Flash Protection Boundary, PPE must be selected for the
expected incident energy calculated during the analysis. Protective clothing must be chosen so that the
clothing rating in cal/cm2 is greater than the calculated incident energy. When this rating is determined
by testing according to appropriate ASTM standards, the clothing should, in most cases, protect the
majority of the worker’s body from receiving 2nd degree burns.
NFPA 70E 130.7(C) contains extensive information and guidelines on the selection of PPE for work where
electrical hazards are present. These sections include protection of head, face, neck , chin, eyes, body,
arms, hands, feet, and legs. Section 130.7(C)(13) covers arc flash protective equipment in more detail.
NFPA 70E provides Table 130.7(C)(11) for general information for selecting clothing based on
Hazard/Risk Categories. These categories are referred to
frequently in selecting PPE. Note that with the exception
for Category 0, Flame-Resistant (FR) clothing of adequate
rating is required for all workers that must be within the
Flash Protection Boundary. As the table indicates, layering
is typically required to achieve higher ratings. Non-FR
synthetic fiber clothing, including blends of synthetic
fibers with cotton, is prohibited for all layers because it
not only easily ignites but can melt into workers flesh -
even as an under layer. For a discussion about APTV and Table 1: Typical Protective Clothing Characteristics
taken from Table 130.7 (C) (11) from NFPA 70E
EBT. see the note to the table in NFPA 70E.
Working on energized components, and hence selection of PPE should be the last alternative
considered. As such, PPE should be viewed as the last line of defense for protecting workers.
III. THE NINE STEPS OF ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS
Step 1: Collect System and Installation Data.
The data needed for an arc flash hazard analysis is similar to that needed for a short circuit and
coordination study. It is essential to model the system in detail to get a reasonable assessment
of the arc flash hazard. For many facilities, this will mean collecting all the data needed to build
an up-to-date one-line diagram.
For facilities with a recent short circuit study, it may mean:
Extending the existing study to include control equipment.
Refining a study that omitted impedances to ensure calculations of the highest possible short
circuit currents. Worst-case arc flash energies may be achieved with lower fault currents if
clearing times for overcurrent protective devices are considerably longer.
Suggested data collection forms are included in the IEEE guide, as are other useful tips on
collecting data from your system and your utility.
Step 2: Determine System Modes of Operation.
The IEEE 1584 guide provides examples of different modes of operation, including operation
with more than one utility feed, tie breakers opened or closed, and generators running. This
information is important in determining the different short circuit currents that might be
available to each location for the different modes. As noted in Step 1, the highest available fault
current may not yield the worst-case arc flash energy, since the worst-case energy also depends
on the opening time of the overcurrent protection devices.
Step 3: Determine Bolted Fault Currents.
Calculate the bolted fault currents from the data gathered in Step 1 and Step 2. Refer to IEEE Std
141-1993 (IEEE RedBook™) for details on methodology pertaining to these calculations. The
typical method is to enter the data into a commercially available software program that allows
you to model your system and easily switch between modes of operation.
Step 4: Determine Arc Fault Currents.
The bolted fault current calculated for each point in the system represents the highest possible
fault current expected to flow to that point. In the case of an arcing fault, the current flow to the
fault will be less, due to the added impedance of the arc. It is important to adequately predict
these lower current levels, especially if the overcurrent protective devices are significantly
slower at these reduced levels, as these situations have been known to provide worst-case arc
fault hazards.
Step 5: Find Protective Device Characteristics and Duration of Arcs.
IEEE 1584 offers guidance on using the time-current curves of overcurrent protective devices
including how to handle average-melt-time-only curves and relay-operated circuit breakers, for
example. For certain types of current limiting fuses, time-current curves are not required,
because their characteristics have been incorporated into the final Flash Protection Boundary
and incident energy equations.
Step 6: Document System Voltages and Classes of Equipment.
Factors that affect arc energies, such as bus gap and voltage, are required for IEEE 1584
equations. A table is provided with typical bus gaps for various equipment up to 15kV.
Step 7: Select Working Distances.
Typically, this is assumed to be the distance between the potential arc source and the worker’s
body and face. Incident energy on a worker’s hands and arms would likely be higher in the event
of an arcing fault because of their closer proximity to the arc source. Typical working distances
for various types of equipment are suggested in a table.
Step 8: Determine Incident Energy for All Equipment.
The analyst will need to choose equations based upon voltage level, type of overcurrent
protective device and equipment. In addition to the current limiting fuse equations, the IEEE
guide provides other equations that call for the data described above. These calculations
provide heat energy densities in either cal/cm2 or joules/cm2, values necessary in selecting
appropriate PPE and FR clothing. Because of the complexity and number of manual calculations
possible, software is recommended to complete this step. Most software gives you a choice of
equations, including three other incident energy equations identified in Appendix D of NFPA
70E. Factors affecting the choice of equations include: type of equipment, voltage levels, and
protective devices. A spreadsheet-type calculator is included with IEEE 1584 and can be useful
for sample calculations and small systems.
Step 9: Determine Flash Protection Boundary for All Equipment.
Instead of solving for cal/cm2 at a given working distance, this
equation solves for a distance at which the incident heat energy
density would be 1.2 cal/cm2 (or 5.0 joules/cm2). Due to the same
reasons mentioned in Step 8, software is also recommended for this
calculation.
IV. USING THE TABLE METHOD TO SELECT PPE
NFPA 70E also offers Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) as an acceptable method for selecting protective clothing and
other PPE. In order to do so, you must be certain that the parameters of your electrical system are
covered by these tables and their various footnotes.
The steps required to select PPE with the table method are:
Identify the type of equipment that will be accessed while not in an electrically safe condition.
Confirm that fault current limits identified in 130.3(A) for flash protection boundary apply. If the
available fault current is less than 50,000A and the clearing time is less than 6 cycles (300kA
cycles) then the default Flash Protection Boundary of 4 feet can be used.
Confirm that the notes of Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) regarding available fault current and clearing
times apply to the application.
Locate the equipment and task to be performed within Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), .
Identify the Hazard/Risk Category and the need for Voltage Rated gloves and tools.
Identify the required Flame-Resistant (FR) clothing and other personal protective equipment
using Table 130(C)(10), Protective Clothing and Personal Protective Equipment Matrix.
An excerpt of Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is shown below in Figure 2 for selecting the proper PPE for testing
voltage in a 480V motor control center that is protected by a circuit breaker with a clearing time of 2
cycles for the available fault current of 25,000A. Since the fault current is less than the 65,000A
identified in Note 2 and the clearing time is within the approved range, the table is acceptable. For this
situation the Hazard/Risk Category is 2* and both
voltage rated gloves and tools are required.
Referring to Table 130(C)(10) reveals that Hazard/
Risk Category 2* requires the following:
A short sleeve T-shirt and long pants made
from untreated natural fiber or other fiber Figure 2: Hazard/Risk Category Classifications
that is nonmelting per ASTM F1506-00. excerpted from NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a).
An outer layer of a FR long sleeve shirt and
FR pants. Alternatively FR coveralls are allowed.
The “2*” requires the use of a double layered arc flash rated hood.
Other PPE identified includes a hard hat, safety glasses (or goggles), hearing protection, leather
gloves and leather work shoes.
See NFPA 70E 130.7 for more information on the requirements for PPE and FR clothing.
Use of current limiting fuses may reduce the level of PPE required. See Arc Flash Note 2.
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