Origin essentialism

PHIL UA-78 Metaphysics

Prof. Cian Dorr
23rd September 2024

1
Origin essentialism
Salmon’s reconstruction of Kripke’s argument from footnote 56

Sufficiency For any table t and hunk h: if it is possible for t to be a table originally
formed from h, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be
originally formed from h.
Origin Uniqueness Necessarily, no table is originally formed from two distinct hunks.
Weak Compossibility For any two non-overlapping hunks, if each is such that it is
possible for there to be a table originally formed from it, it is possible
that both of them originally form tables.
Necessity of Distinctness For any objects x and y, if x ̸= y, then it is impossible for
it to be the case that x = y.
Overlap Essentialism For any non-overlapping hunks h1 and h2 and table t, if t is
originally formed from h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed
from h2 .
2
Why is this argument valid?

1. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that t is a table and h1 and h2 are

non-overlapping hunks, such that t could have been a table originally formed from h1
and also could have been a table originally formed from h2
2. By Sufficiency, it is necessary that any table originally formed from h1 is identical to
t, and also necessary that any table originally formed from h2 is identical to t.

3
Why is this argument valid?

1. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that t is a table and h1 and h2 are

non-overlapping hunks, such that t could have been a table originally formed from h1
and also could have been a table originally formed from h2
2. By Sufficiency, it is necessary that any table originally formed from h1 is identical to
t, and also necessary that any table originally formed from h2 is identical to t.
3. But by Weak Compossibility, it is possible that both h1 and h2 are such that some
table is originally formed from them.
4. Hence it is possible that t is a table originally formed from both h1 and h2 .

3
Why is this argument valid?

1. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that t is a table and h1 and h2 are

non-overlapping hunks, such that t could have been a table originally formed from h1
and also could have been a table originally formed from h2
2. By Sufficiency, it is necessary that any table originally formed from h1 is identical to
t, and also necessary that any table originally formed from h2 is identical to t.
3. But by Weak Compossibility, it is possible that both h1 and h2 are such that some
table is originally formed from them.
4. Hence it is possible that t is a table originally formed from both h1 and h2 .
5. So by Origin Uniqueness, it’s possible that h1 = h2 .
6. But this contradicts the Necessity of Distinctness.

3
The other premises: Origin Uniqueness

Origin Uniqueness seems unproblematic given the intended interpretation of

‘originally formed from’.

▶ Of course we could combine two or more hunks of wood to form a table! But the
resulting table is ‘originally formed’ not from any of those small hunks, but from a
bigger hunk that each of them is part of.

4
The other premises: Weak Compossibility

Weak Compossibility seems pretty plausible: what, if not overlap, could explain the
impossibility of making two hunks into tables, if each alone could be made into a table?

5
The other premises: Weak Compossibility

Weak Compossibility seems pretty plausible: what, if not overlap, could explain the
impossibility of making two hunks into tables, if each alone could be made into a table?
But if we wanted to be cautious, we could avoid the need for this premise by replacing
‘non-overlapping’ throughout the argument with ‘such that it is possible that both are
made into distinct tables’. This corresponds to Kripke’s parenthetical remark ‘(We
assume that there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of
making a table from one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the
other.)’

5
The other premises: Weak Compossibility

Weak Compossibility seems pretty plausible: what, if not overlap, could explain the
impossibility of making two hunks into tables, if each alone could be made into a table?
But if we wanted to be cautious, we could avoid the need for this premise by replacing
‘non-overlapping’ throughout the argument with ‘such that it is possible that both are
made into distinct tables’. This corresponds to Kripke’s parenthetical remark ‘(We
assume that there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of
making a table from one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the
other.)’
The conclusion will then be:
Weaker Origin Essentialism For any hunks h1 and h2 such that it’s possible that h1
and h2 are both made into two distinct tables, and any table t that is
originally formed from h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed
5
from h2 .
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

The Necessity of Distinctness (ND) is interesting and controversial.

The SEP article by Robertson Ishii tries to make it seem unproblematic by talking
about ‘the necessity of identity/distinctness’, suggesting that somehow these are a
package deal. But this is very misleading! The Leibniz’s Law argument for NI does not
establish ND.

6
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Immediately after the passage quoted above, Kripke suggests two arguments for ND!
Here is the first:
» However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X ̸= Y; if X and Y were both
identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence
X = Y.)

7
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Immediately after the passage quoted above, Kripke suggests two arguments for ND!
Here is the first:
» However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X ̸= Y; if X and Y were both
identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence
X = Y.)
There must be some blunder here. It looks like the only properties of identity being
appealed to are transitivity and symmetry. But there are many transitive and
symmetric relations R for which it can be false that x bears R to y without it being
necessarily false—e.g. being the same height as.

7
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Immediately after the passage quoted above, Kripke suggests two arguments for ND!
Here is the first:
» However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X ̸= Y; if X and Y were both
identical to some object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence
X = Y.)
There must be some blunder here. It looks like the only properties of identity being
appealed to are transitivity and symmetry. But there are many transitive and
symmetric relations R for which it can be false that x bears R to y without it being
necessarily false—e.g. being the same height as.
Kripke seems to be simply assuming that if X = Z at some possible world w, then
X = Z. But that’s just equivalent to ND, which he’s supposed to be arguing for!
7
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Here’s Kripke’s second argument:

» Alternatively, the principle follows from the necessity of identity plus the
’Brouwersche’ axiom, or, equivalently, symmetry of the accessibility relation
between possible worlds.

Here, Kripke is referring to the following principle, named for L.E.J. Brouwer:

B If something is the case, then it is necessarily possible for it to be the

case.

8
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

FYI: ‘The accessibility relation between possible worlds’ can be defined as follows:

World w is accessible from world v := At v, w is a possible world.

The symmetry of accessibility entails that the actual world A is a possible world at
every possible world, hence that A is necessarily a possible world, hence that everything
that is the case is necessarily possibly the case.
(We can also use the necessity of B to go the other way, but that’s a bit more
complicated.)

9
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

B and (the necessity of) NI jointly entail ND:

▶ Suppose x ̸= y. Then by B, it is necessarily possible that x ̸= y—i.e. it is

necessarily not necessary that x = y. But by the necessity of NI, it is necessary
that if x = y then it is necessary that x = y, and hence necessary that if it’s not
necessary that x = y, then x ̸= y. So, it is necessary that x ̸= y.

10
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

B and (the necessity of) NI jointly entail ND:

▶ Suppose x ̸= y. Then by B, it is necessarily possible that x ̸= y—i.e. it is

necessarily not necessary that x = y. But by the necessity of NI, it is necessary
that if x = y then it is necessary that x = y, and hence necessary that if it’s not
necessary that x = y, then x ̸= y. So, it is necessary that x ̸= y.

But why believe B??? I don’t know any good snappy arguments.

10
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Fortunately, we can drop ND as a premise if we just slightly weaken the conclusion, as

follows:

For any non-overlapping hunks h1 and h2 , if t is originally formed from

h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed from h2 and not from h1 .

11
The other premises: Necessity of Distinctness

Fortunately, we can drop ND as a premise if we just slightly weaken the conclusion, as

follows:

For any non-overlapping hunks h1 and h2 , if t is originally formed from

h1 , it is impossible for t to be originally formed from h2 and not from h1 .

If we combine this move with the previous weakening, we get

Weakest Overlap Essentialism For any hunks h1 and h2 that could be made into
two distinct tables and any table t originally formed from h1 , it is
impossible for t to be originally formed from h2 and not from h1 .

This follows from Sufficiency and Origin Uniqueness.

11
Problems with Sufficiency: plans

Consider a table t made in 1760 by Thomas Chippendale from a certain hunk h.

Sufficiency implies that if h had, instead, been stored until 1970 and then made into an
austerely cubical modernist table by designer Milo Baughman, then t would have been
a modernist table. That may seem dubious!

12
Problems with Sufficiency: plans

Response (Salmon 1979): weaken Sufficiency to:

Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for t to be a
table originally formed from h according to P, then it is impossible for a
table distinct from t to be originally formed from h according to P.

13
Problems with Sufficiency: plans

Response (Salmon 1979): weaken Sufficiency to:

Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for t to be a
table originally formed from h according to P, then it is impossible for a
table distinct from t to be originally formed from h according to P.
The original argument for Overlap Essentialism still goes through if we strengthen
Weak Compossibility to:
Weak Plan Compossibility If h1 and h2 are non-overlapping hunks, h1 could be
made into a table according to P1 , and h2 could be made into a table
according to P2 , then it could be that: h1 is made into a table according
to P1 and h2 is made into a table according to P2 .
(We also need to add the premise that necessarily every table is made according to
some plan—this seems unproblematic.) 13
Problems with Sufficiency: recycling

A single hunk of wood can be shaped into a table; disassembled; and later made into a
table again, according to the same or a different plan.
Sufficiency implies that whenever this happens, we get the same table both times.
Plan Sufficiency has the same implication in situations where the same plan is used
both times. That may seem dubious!

14
Salmon’s argument against Plan Sufficiency

Maybe it’s not so bad to think that these are cases where we get the same table
again—after all, things do seem to routinely survive disassembly and reassembly.
Salmon (1979) gives an argument against Sufficiency and Plan Sufficiency based on
the following cases.
Table Of Theseus With Reassembly A table is made in 1900 out of hunk h
according to plan P. Over the next fifty years, bits of h are gradually replaced,
until finally at t + 50 none of the original bits of h are part of a table. Then, all
the bits of h are gathered and reassembled into a table, again according to P.
Salmon’s judgment: The original table survives the part-replacements and is in 1950
composed of matter not overlapping h. So, it is not the table made of h in 1950.

15
Salmon’s argument against Plan Sufficiency

Maybe it’s not so bad to think that these are cases where we get the same table
again—after all, things do seem to routinely survive disassembly and reassembly.
Salmon (1979) gives an argument against Sufficiency and Plan Sufficiency based on
the following cases.
Table Of Theseus With Reassembly A table is made in 1900 out of hunk h
according to plan P. Over the next fifty years, bits of h are gradually replaced,
until finally at t + 50 none of the original bits of h are part of a table. Then, all
the bits of h are gathered and reassembled into a table, again according to P.
Salmon’s judgment: The original table survives the part-replacements and is in 1950
composed of matter not overlapping h. So, it is not the table made of h in 1950.
(This is non-obvious! Hobbes 1655 gives essentially the same case with ships, and uses
it to argue that no ship can survive replacement of any of its parts.) 15
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon further weakened Sufficency:

Only-table Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever originally formed from h, and formed
according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be the
only table originally formed from h and formed according to P.

16
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon further weakened Sufficency:

Only-table Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever originally formed from h, and formed
according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to be the
only table originally formed from h and formed according to P.

This of course requires weakening the conclusion:

Only-table Overlap Essentialism If h1 and h2 are non-overlapping hunks and t is the

only table ever originally formed from h1 , then it is impossible for t to be
the only table ever originally formed from h2 .

16
Weakening Sufficiency

Robertson Ishii (1998) pointed out a problem:

Not Quite Theseus At possible world w, hunk h is shaped into a table at t; this
table is disassembled, and then much later at t′ , a hunk h′ almost but not entirely
overlapping h is shaped into a table according to the same plan. None of this
wood is ever again used for tables.
At w′ , almost the same story plays out except that h′ is used at t and h is used at
t′ .

Only-table Plan Sufficiency that the table made at t at w is made at t′ at w′ and vice
versa. This seems implausible.

17
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon yet again weakened Sufficency:

No-overlap Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever formed from any matter overlapping h, and
formed according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to
be the only table ever formed from any matter overlapping h and formed
according to P.

18
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon yet again weakened Sufficency:

No-overlap Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever formed from any matter overlapping h, and
formed according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to
be the only table ever formed from any matter overlapping h and formed
according to P.
This requires even further weakening the conclusion:
No-overlap Overlap Essentialism If h1 and h2 are non-overlapping hunks and t is
formed from h1 and is the only table ever formed from any matter
overlapping h1 , then it is impossible for t to be formed from h2 and the
only table ever originally formed from h2 .

18
Weakening Sufficiency

In response, Salmon yet again weakened Sufficency:

No-overlap Plan Sufficiency For any table t, hunk h, and plan P: if it is possible for
t to be the only table ever formed from any matter overlapping h, and
formed according to P, then it is impossible for a table distinct from t to
be the only table ever formed from any matter overlapping h and formed
according to P.
This requires even further weakening the conclusion:
No-overlap Overlap Essentialism If h1 and h2 are non-overlapping hunks and t is
formed from h1 and is the only table ever formed from any matter
overlapping h1 , then it is impossible for t to be formed from h2 and the
only table ever originally formed from h2 .
It would be understandable if all these weakenings shook our confidence that there’s 18
Qualitativeness
The concept of a qualitative property

Intuitively: a qualitative property is one that isn’t “about” any specific objects.
Qualitative Presumably not qualitative
Being spherical Being identical to Robert M. Adams
Being either green or spherical Being either green or identical to Kripke or
identical to Adams
Being more than ten miles from all cities Being more than ten miles from NYC
Being a state that contains a big city Being a state that contains NYC

19
The concept of a qualitative property

Intuitively: a qualitative property is one that isn’t “about” any specific objects.
Qualitative Presumably not qualitative
Being spherical Being identical to Robert M. Adams
Being either green or spherical Being either green or identical to Kripke or
identical to Adams
Being more than ten miles from all cities Being more than ten miles from NYC
Being a state that contains a big city Being a state that contains NYC
Adams calls qualitative properties ‘suchnesses’. He calls properties of the form being
identical to x for some x ‘thisnesses’.
These labels didn’t catch on. Amazingly, the label ‘haecceity’ (pron. hax-ee-ity) for
what Adams calls a ‘thisness’ did catch on.

19
Qualitative relations and states of affairs

The contrast between qualitative and non-qualitative isn’t just about properties, but
also applies to relations and states of affairs.
Qualitative Presumably not qualitative
Being bigger than Being closer to NYC than
Being six feet away from Mentioning more Kripke more often than
That at least one park is rectangular That Central Park is rectangular
That it’s possible for every donkey can talk That it’s possible for every donkey to be in
NYC

20
Closure under definability

Any property, relation, or state of affairs that we can define in terms of qualitative
ingredients is itself qualitative.
E.g.: being red and touching are both qualitative; so touching at least one red thing,
not being red, that some red thing touches some non-red thing,…are all qualitative.

21
Caution!

Given the examples, it is tempting to assume that any property, relation, or state of
affairs expressed by a predicate/sentence involving the proper name of an object is not
qualitative.
But this is controversial! Consider the property of being either red or identical to
Kripke, and red. Some hold that this property is identical to being red, and hence
qualitative despite the fact that we just expressed it using a predicate including a
proper name.

22
Caution!

Given the examples, it is tempting to assume that any property, relation, or state of
affairs expressed by a predicate/sentence involving the proper name of an object is not
qualitative.
But this is controversial! Consider the property of being either red or identical to
Kripke, and red. Some hold that this property is identical to being red, and hence
qualitative despite the fact that we just expressed it using a predicate including a
proper name.
Here is one pretty popular view that entails this:

Intensionalism If n-ary relations R and S are such that it is metaphysically necessary

that for any x1 , . . . , xn , R holds of x1 , . . . , xn if and only if S holds of
x1 , . . . , xn , then R = S.

22
Haecceities

Can we at least say for every object x, x’s haecceity—i.e., the property of being
identical to x—is non-qualitative?
Even this is controversial. For example, maybe God exists, and His haecceity is
identical to the qualitative property being omnipotent.

23
Haecceities

Can we at least say for every object x, x’s haecceity—i.e., the property of being
identical to x—is non-qualitative?
Even this is controversial. For example, maybe God exists, and His haecceity is
identical to the qualitative property being omnipotent.
Adams attributes to Leibniz the view that all haecceities—and in fact all properties,
relations, and states of affairs whatsoever—are qualitative. Given this, we can’t give
100% uncontroversial examples of anything non-qualitative.

23
The Identity of Indiscernibles and
Anti-Haecceitism
The Identity of Indiscernibles

In addition to the law named after him, Leibniz also endorsed its converse:

Identity of Indiscernibles (version 1) If y has every property that x has, then x = y.

This sounds exciting but is actually equivalent to the Reflexivity of Identity:

Proof: Suppose y has every property that x has. By Reflexivity, x is identical to x,

or in other words, x has the property of being identical to x. So, y has the
property of being identical to x, or in other words, y is identical to x.

24
The Identity of Indiscernibles

Using the notion of a qualitative property, we can state a more controversial principle
(that probably comes closer to what Leibniz had in mind):

Identity of Indiscernibles (version 2) If y has every qualitative property that x has,

then x = y.

25
The debate about the Identity of Indiscernibles, pre-Adams

Black (1952): it seems possible (maybe even physically possible) for the world to be
symmetric. For example, there could be just two globes of iron, exact duplicates of one
another, revolving around each other forever in otherwise empty space. Such objects
would be distinct while having exactly the same qualitative properties. So the Identity
of Indiscernibles is possibly false.

26
The debate about the Identity of Indiscernibles, pre-Adams

Black (1952): it seems possible (maybe even physically possible) for the world to be
symmetric. For example, there could be just two globes of iron, exact duplicates of one
another, revolving around each other forever in otherwise empty space. Such objects
would be distinct while having exactly the same qualitative properties. So the Identity
of Indiscernibles is possibly false.
Response (cf. Adams’s discussion of Hacking): that’s not possible! If it seems possible,
maybe that’s because you’re confusing it with a genuine possibility that that’s sort of
like it, namely a world with a single sphere in an interestingly non-Euclidean space
where you can follow a straight line and get back where you started.

26
The debate about the Identity of Indiscernibles, pre-Adams

Black (1952): it seems possible (maybe even physically possible) for the world to be
symmetric. For example, there could be just two globes of iron, exact duplicates of one
another, revolving around each other forever in otherwise empty space. Such objects
would be distinct while having exactly the same qualitative properties. So the Identity
of Indiscernibles is possibly false.
Response (cf. Adams’s discussion of Hacking): that’s not possible! If it seems possible,
maybe that’s because you’re confusing it with a genuine possibility that that’s sort of
like it, namely a world with a single sphere in an interestingly non-Euclidean space
where you can follow a straight line and get back where you started.
Adams gives a new argument against II that we’ll discuss next time.

26
Anti-haecceitism

Kripke memorably describes, and argues against, a certain picture:

» One thinks, in this picture, of a possible world as if it were like a foreign country.
One looks upon it as an observer. Maybe Nixon has moved to the other country
and maybe he hasn’t, but one is given only qualities. One can observe all his
qualities, but, of course, one doesn’t observe that someone is Nixon. One observes
that something has red hair (or green or yellow) but not whether something is
Nixon. So we had better have a way of telling in terms of properties when we run
into the same thing as we saw before; we had better have a way of telling, when
we come across one of these other possible worlds, who was Nixon.
Some logicians in their formal treatment of modal logic may encourage this
picture…. Nevertheless, intuitively speaking, it seems to me not to be the right
way of thinking about the possible worlds. A possible world isn’t a distant country
that we are coming across, or viewing through a telescope. 27
Anti-haecceitism

But what is this view that Kripke doesn’t like? If we drop the epistemological remarks
about ‘having a way of telling’, the idea seems to be that the array of qualitative facts
that hold at a world fixes all the facts that hold there:
Anti-Haecceitism (PW version) For any metaphysically possible worlds v and w, if
v ̸= w, then there is some qualitative state of affairs that holds at v but
not w.
For example: there is no possible world just like the actual world except that two
electrons swap roles.

28
Anti-haecceitism

But what is this view that Kripke doesn’t like? If we drop the epistemological remarks
about ‘having a way of telling’, the idea seems to be that the array of qualitative facts
that hold at a world fixes all the facts that hold there:
Anti-Haecceitism (PW version) For any metaphysically possible worlds v and w, if
v ̸= w, then there is some qualitative state of affairs that holds at v but
not w.
For example: there is no possible world just like the actual world except that two
electrons swap roles.
▶ Adams seems to think that Anti-Haecceitism follows from the Identity of
Indiscernibles applied to possible worlds.
This is a mistake: in principle, two worlds at which exactly the same qualitative
states of affairs obtain could differ as regards other qualitative properties, like
28
being actual or being a world such that some red thing is green at it.
Application 3: Anti-haecceitism

This is a case where we don’t really need to bring in possible worlds to get at the idea.
The following seems to do the job:

Anti-Haecceitism (modal version) Every possible state of affairs is necessitated by

some possible qualitative state of affairs.

This is equivalent to the PW version if we assume the Leibniz Biconditionals and the
principle that no two worlds are such that exactly the same propositions are true at
them.

29
Application 2: Anti-haecceitism

PW to Modal: Suppose p is a possible state of affairs. By a Leibniz Biconditional, p

holds at some possible world, w. Let q be the conjunction of all qualitative states of
affairs that hold at w. Suppose for reductio that q could be true while p was false.
Then by the Leibniz Biconditional, there is a possible world v where q is true and p is
false. But every qualitative state of affairs that holds at w is necessitated by q and
hence holds at v. So v = w, contradicting the assumption that p is true at w but not v.

30
Application 2: Anti-haecceitism

PW to Modal: Suppose p is a possible state of affairs. By a Leibniz Biconditional, p

holds at some possible world, w. Let q be the conjunction of all qualitative states of
affairs that hold at w. Suppose for reductio that q could be true while p was false.
Then by the Leibniz Biconditional, there is a possible world v where q is true and p is
false. But every qualitative state of affairs that holds at w is necessitated by q and
hence holds at v. So v = w, contradicting the assumption that p is true at w but not v.
Modal to PW: Suppose for reductio that possible worlds v, w are distinct although the
same qualitative states of affairs hold at v and w. Let p be the conjunction of states of
affairs that hold at v. This doesn’t hold at any other worlds, since no two possible
worlds are such that exactly the same states of affairs hold at them. By
Anti-Haecceitism (modal), there is some possible qualitative state of affairs q that
necessitates p. q must be true at some possible world by the Leibniz Biconditional.
But since q necessitates p, p is true at any world where q is true, so q isn’t true at any
world other than w. So, q is true at w but not v.
30