The Disarmament

and
International Security Committee
(DISEC)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action :

Iran Nuclear Deal In Jeopardy?
Table of Content

DISEC MANDATE 6
A. DISEC MANDATE
B. Working Mechanism 7
C. Key Terms 8

INTRODUCTION 9

A. Background of the Iranian Nuclear Project 9

B. Significance of the Issue 9

HISTORY 10

A. Evolution of Iran's Nuclear Program & Timeline 10

B. International Concerns and Resolutions 12
C. Major Stakeholders 14
I. United Kingdom 14
II. Russia 14
III. China 15
IV. France 15
V. USA 15
VI. Germany 16
VII. Israel 16

CURRENT STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 17

A. Key Facilities and Capabilities 17

B. Iran's Stance on Nuclear Development 18
C. International Monitoring and Verification 18

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 19

A. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 19

B. Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW) 22
C. IAEA Safeguards Agreement with Iran 23
D. UN Security Council Resolutions 23

CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS 24

A. Proliferation Risks 24
B. Regional Security Implications 25

CASE STUDIES 26

A. South Asia - India and Pakistan 26

B. Middle East - Israel and Neighboring States 26
C. Korean Peninsula - North Korea 27

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMA) 28

BIBLIOGRAPHY 28
 DISEC MANDATE
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), is the First
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. DISEC works in close
cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission. All 193 member
states of the UN can attend.

Overview of DISEC’s Mandate

The primary mandate of DISEC is threefold and structured into distinctive stages:
1. General debate
2. Thematic discussions
3. Action on drafts

Delegates deliberate upon and develop recommendations, strategies, and resolutions

pertaining to issues of disarmament, arms control, and international security. Its work is
founded upon the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, emphasizing the
maintenance of international peace and security, the promotion of disarmament, and
the prevention of conflict.

Key Areas of Focus:

1. Disarmament: DISEC is entrusted with promoting and advancing the disarmament

process across various sectors, including nuclear, chemical, biological, and
conventional weapons. It seeks to reduce the global stockpiles of arms, mitigate the
risk of weapons proliferation, and promote the peaceful use of technology.

2. Arms Control: The committee examines strategies and measures for controlling the
spread of arms and technologies that could potentially destabilize regions and threaten
global security. This encompasses both preventing the illicit trade in arms and
managing the responsible transfer of weapons.

3. Non-Proliferation: DISEC works towards preventing the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, by fostering international cooperation,
facilitating treaties, and encouraging states to adhere to non-proliferation agreements
and disarmament commitments.

4. Conflict Prevention: Beyond its disarmament-focused aspects, DISEC is concerned

with identifying and addressing the root causes of conflicts, particularly those that could
escalate into wider international crises. By addressing socio-economic, political, and
environmental factors that contribute to conflicts, the committee plays a role in
preemptively reducing the potential for violence.

5. Peacekeeping: DISEC's mandate also includes examining the role of peacekeeping

operations and the effective implementation of peace agreements. This involves
assessing the challenges faced by UN peacekeeping forces and recommending
measures to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness.

6. Emerging Threats: As the nature of security threats evolves, DISEC remains

attentive to emerging challenges such as cyber warfare, terrorism, and unconventional
weapons. The committee endeavors to address these modern threats within the
context of its mandate.

Working Mechanism

DISEC convenes annually during the General Assembly session, bringing together
representatives from all UN member states. Delegates engage in comprehensive
discussions, debates, and negotiations to draft resolutions that reflect the collective
perspectives and interests of the international community.

Note: Resolutions of the General Assembly are an expression of consensus and are
NOT binding on member states. A prima facie distinction exists between resolutions
passed by the General Assembly and international instruments including inter alia
international conventions, treaties, and draft articles which are binding and enforceable
in law.
Although General Assembly resolutions are not a direct source of public international
law, they constitute state practice that directly contributes to customary international
law. Article 103 of the UN charter stipulates as follows:

“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”

Delegates are required to understand how their respective country interprets, applies,
and practices this principle. Please refer to foreign policy considerations, and domestic
legislation giving effect to international instruments (if any). Properly utilizing this
concept in an active committee is a question of the delegate’s due diligence and
preparation.

Key Terms:

Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear weapon, device designed to release energy in an

explosive manner as a result of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of
the two processes. Fission weapons are commonly referred to as atomic bombs.
Nuclear weapons produce enormous explosive energy.

JCPOA: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a long-term deal

reached between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14, 2015. Its purpose is to give
an end to Iran’s nuclear programme, setting out detailed measures on the limit of
uranium enrichment and the way that the deal is going to be monitored by the IAEA,
which will give an end to sanctions imposed on Iran if Iran complies and commits to
it.

Uranium enrichment: Uranium is a chemical element which is a critical component

for nuclear energy. The main uranium isotope in nature is 238U in a percentage of
99,3% while another isotope, 235 Uranium (almost 0,7% in nature) is useful for
nuclear technology. Thus, to increase its amount, 238u Needs to undergo
enrichment. Uranium can take two forms, either low enriched (LEU) or high enriched
(HEU). 12

Ballistic missile: Ballistic missile is a rocket-propelled self-guided strategic-weapons

system that follows a ballistic trajectory to deliver a payload from its launch site to a
predetermined target. Ballistic missiles can carry conventional high explosives as
well as chemical, biological, or nuclear munitions.

Non-proliferation: The prevention of an increase or spread of something, especially

the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation
Treaty or NPT.14

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Iranian Nuclear Project:

Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s. The United States supplied the Tehran
Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) with a small 5MWt research reactor (TRR), fueled
by highly enriched uranium (HEU), in 1967. In 1973,
the Shah unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by
the end of the century, charging the newly founded Atomic Energy Organisation of
Iran (AEOI) with oversight of this task.

In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several nuclear technology-related
contracts with foreign suppliers and invested in education and training for its
personnel. In 1976, Iran paid one billion dollars for a ten percent stake in Eurodif’s
Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and a fifteen percent stake in the RTZ
uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia. Tehran signed a $700 million contract to
purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa and sent Iranian technicians abroad
for nuclear training. By the time of the 1979 revolution, Iran had developed an
impressive baseline capability in nuclear technologies.

Much of Iran’s nuclear potential fled the country in the wake of the Revolution. This
loss, compounded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s opposition to nuclear
technology, resulted in the near disintegration of Iran’s nuclear program post-1979.
Work on nuclear projects that had been ongoing under the Shah, such as the
construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, was suspended. In 1984,
Khomeini expressed a renewed Iranian interest in nuclear power, seeking the
assistance of international partners to complete construction at Bushehr.

Significance of the Issue:

An atomic nuclear project refers to the process of harnessing the energy released
from the nucleus of atoms, typically through nuclear fission or fusion. This energy
can be used to produce electricity, as seen in nuclear power plants, which account
for about 10% of the world's electricity production. Nuclear power plants use the heat
produced during atomic fission to boil water and generate steam, which is then used
to spin turbines and produce electricity.

On the other hand, a nuclear weapon is a device that uses nuclear fission or fusion
to release a large amount of energy in the form of an explosion. Nuclear weapons
were developed during World War II as part of the Manhattan Project, which aimed
to create atomic bombs. The two main types of nuclear weapons are atomic bombs,
which use only nuclear fission, and thermonuclear bombs, also known as hydrogen
bombs, which use both nuclear fission and fusion for destructive purposes.
The Iranian nuclear programme has significant implications in various aspects,
including international relations, nuclear proliferation, energy security, and the
non-proliferation treaty. Some key points to consider are:

1. International Relations: The Iranian nuclear programme has been a focus of

international diplomacy for decades, with Iran being one of the original 62
signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was reached between Iran and
several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. However, the
2018 U.S. withdrawal from the deal and subsequent Iranian violations have
cast doubt on the deal's future.

2. Nuclear Proliferation: Iran's nuclear programme has generated widespread

concern that Tehran may seek to become a nuclear weapons state, which
could trigger regional instability and potentially lead to a nuclear arms race in
the Middle East.

3. Energy Security: Iran's nuclear program is intended to solve its energy

problem and enhance its energy security. However, international sanctions
have crippled Iran's energy production in recent years, and the country may
not be able to accrue as much money for its oil as it has in the past.

4. Non-Proliferation Treaty: Iran's compliance with the NPT has been a subject
of debate, with the DISEC finding Iran in noncompliance with the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in 2005. The JCPOA aimed to address these
concerns by restricting Iran's nuclear program.

HISTORY

Evolution of Iran's Nuclear Program & Timeline:

1950s: Iran's nuclear programme was launched with the help of the United States
under the Eisenhower administration’s Atoms for Peace.

1960s: The Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established in 1967, run
by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
1970s: The Shah approved plans to construct up to 23 nuclear power stations by
2000. In March 1974, the United States supplied a five-megawatt Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) that began operation in 1967. In the same year, Iran signed the
NPT's Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

1980s: The Iranian Revolution and the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran
resulted in a severing of U.S.-Iranian ties, halting Iran's nuclear projects. In the late
1980s During Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency, beginning in the late 1980s,
Iran's nuclear program revived and In 1985, Iranian radio programs openly
discussed the significance of the discovery of uranium deposits in Iran

1990s: Iran formed a joint research organization with Russia, providing Iran with
Russian nuclear experts and technical information. In 1995, Iran and Russia signed
an agreement for the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

2000s: Iran breached several key restrictions imposed by the nuclear deal¹². Here
are the details of the breach:

1. Uranium Enrichment: Iran enriched uranium to almost 84 percent, which is far

higher than the 3.67 percent allowed by the deal. This level of enrichment
significantly exceeds the limit set by the deal and brings Iran closer to having
weapons-grade uranium.

2. Use of Advanced Centrifuges: Iran admitted to using advanced

uranium-enrichment centrifuges installed at its underground plant at Natanz.
According to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Iran can only accumulate enriched
uranium with first-generation IR-1 machines. However, Iran was found to be
feeding uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas feedstock into advanced IR-2m
machines.

These actions were in violation of the terms of the nuclear deal and raised
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program. It's important to note that the
development of nuclear weapons involves a complex process and requires a
significant amount of resources and expertise¹. It's also subject to international laws
and treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
2010s: Iran experienced two economic sanctions periods that were interrupted by
the Iran Deal. In 2015, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) reached a nuclear deal, known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
In 2018, After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran began
breaching several of the most stringent restrictions imposed by the deal. Here are
some of the breaches:

1. Uranium Stockpile and Enrichment: Iran lifted the cap on its stockpile of
uranium and increased its enrichment activities beyond the 3.67 percent
permitted under the JCPOA.
2. Resumption of Prohibited Activities: Iran resumed activity at nuclear facilities
that were previously prohibited from uranium enrichment under the terms of
the deal.
3. Non-compliance with JCPOA Commitments: In January 2020, the Iranian
government announced that it would no longer abide by any of its
commitments under the JCPOA.
4. Suspension of the Additional Protocol: In February 2021, Iran suspended the
implementation of the Additional Protocol on safeguards and reduced
cooperation with the IAEA.

These actions were linked by the Iranian government to the failure of the deal to
deliver sanctions relief and, by default, the Trump administration’s decision to
withdraw from the deal in 2018 and reimpose sanctions. Iran stated that it would
return to its obligations under the JCPOA if sanctions were lifted.

2020s: Iran has continued to develop its nuclear programme, with the United States
reimposing sanctions on Iran's banking and oil sectors. In 2021, Iran suspended
compliance with the Additional Protocol, a voluntary agreement that grants
inspectors "snap" inspections. In 2023, Iran's breakout time—the time needed to
enrich enough uranium to a level usable for one bomb—was estimated to be within
three weeks.

International Concerns and Resolutions:

The Iranian nuclear programme has been a major international concern, leading to
various resolutions and agreements. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) was a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers to
address concerns about Iran's nuclear program. The United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) has adopted several
resolutions as part of international efforts to address Iran's nuclear program, with the
central demand being the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program and
confidence-building measures. The Natanz Enrichment Complex is Iran's primary
enrichment facility, housing both the commercial Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and
the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The significance of the Natanz facility lies in
its role in Iran's uranium enrichment activities, which has been a point of
international concern and a focus of diplomatic efforts to address Iran's nuclear
program.

The 2001 Natanze incident is a significant event in the history of Iran's nuclear
program. In 2001, Iran began to construct its main enrichment facility in Natanz,
which was approximately two hundred miles south of Tehran. This event marked a
key development in Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology and drew international
attention to its nuclear ambitions. The Natanz facility has since been a subject of
international concern and has been at the center of diplomatic efforts and
negotiations aimed at addressing Iran's nuclear program.

There were many international concerns regarding Iran's nuclear programme. These
countries and and their contributions include:

1. United States: The US was one of the most vocal opponents of the nuclear
negotiations with Iran, which led to a final agreement in July 2015. After the
US withdrew from the deal in 2018, it imposed heavy sanctions on Iran to stop
it from producing a nuclear weapon.

2. Israel: Israel was one of the most vocal opponents of the nuclear negotiations
with Iran and has expressed its commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining
military nuclear capabilities by any means. Israel has also threatened to take
military action against Iran if necessary.

3. Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia has signaled a willingness to obtain a nuclear

weapon if Iran successfully develops one.

4. United Kingdom and France: These countries were part of the international
community that negotiated the nuclear deal with Iran. They have expressed
concerns about Iran's nuclear program and have supported the US in
imposing sanctions on Iran.
In response to these concerns, Iran has vowed revenge for attacks on its nuclear
facilities, such as the one at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, which it had
pointed towards Israel. Iran has also accelerated its production of weapons-grade
uranium, which has raised concerns among the international community.

Concerns about the Iranian Nuclear Programme have led The United Nations
Security Council to pass several resolutions concerning the issue. The most
significant resolution is Resolution 2231, which was passed on July 20, 2015, and
endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran. The resolution
sets out an inspection process and schedule while also preparing for the removal of
United Nations sanctions on Iran when Iran met the requirements on January 16,
2016. The resolution retains the arms embargo on Iran for five years after
implementation and the ballistic missile-related restrictions for eight years. Other
resolutions include Resolution 1696, which was passed on July 31, 2006, and
demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The
UN Security Council has also passed resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran,
including travel bans, asset freezes, and bans on exports of nuclear- and
missile-related dual-use goods to Iran.

These efforts reflect the global significance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.
The Natanz facility and the 2001 Natanze incident have been pivotal in shaping the
international response to Iran's nuclear activities and remain key elements in the
ongoing diplomatic efforts to address this issue.

Major Stakeholders:

United Kingdom:
The United Kingdom has taken a multifaceted approach in dealing with Iran's
nuclear program, employing sanctions, negotiations, support for international
inspections, and participation in alternative trade mechanisms. Through the
implementation of sanctions, the UK has sought to curb Iran's ability to develop
nuclear weapons and weapons delivery systems, involving asset freezes on
individuals linked to restricted weapons-related activities in Iran. Concurrently, the
UK has engaged in
diplomatic negotiations with Iran, participating in talks with the P5+1 and the
European Union to address global apprehensions surrounding Iran's nuclear
ambitions, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.
In support of international efforts, including those by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the UK has worked to ensure the verification of Iran's nuclear
measures and compliance with international agreements. Additionally, alongside
France and Germany, the UK played a role in establishing INSTEX, a barter system
designed to facilitate transactions with Iran and bypass US-led sanctions. However,
the dissolution of INSTEX in 2023, announced by France and Germany due to
Iranian obstruction, underscored the complexities and challenges in maintaining
alternative trade mechanisms amidst the intricate geopolitics surrounding Iran's
nuclear program.

Russia:
Russia has been involved in the construction of Iran's first nuclear power plant,
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. The construction began in the 1990s, and the plant
became operational in 2011. Russia continued to provide fuel and technical support
for the facility.Russia, along with China, has often been a key player in negotiations
related to Iran's nuclear program. The P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom,
France, Russia, China, plus Germany) negotiations with Iran aimed to address
concerns about Iran's nuclear activities and to reach an agreement to ensure the
peaceful nature of its program.Russia was one of the countries involved in the
negotiations leading to the JCPOA, an agreement reached in 2015 between Iran
and the P5+1 countries, plus the European Union. The JCPOA aimed to limit
Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Russia played a role in both
negotiating and implementing the deal. Both countries have engaged in arms deals,
with Russia supplying military equipment to Iran. These arms sales have been a
source of contention and concern for the international community, especially given
the potential impact on regional stability.Russia has, at times, taken a stance against
increased sanctions on Iran and has generally emphasized diplomatic solutions to
address concerns over Iran's nuclear program. Russia's positions often align with its
broader geopolitical interests.

China:
China has been involved in the Iranian nuclear program and has played a significant
role in the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities.
According to The Wall Street Journal, China and Russia have encouraged Iran's
nuclear ambitions, providing patronage and support, which has allowed Iran to make
significant advancements in its nuclear program. Additionally, a report from Reuters
highlights that China's role in a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia is seen as a
significant aspect of the agreement, indicating China's involvement in the complex
dynamics of the region, including Iran's nuclear program. Furthermore, a study
published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace mentions that China
once partnered with the United States to sanction and halt Iran's nuclear program,
indicating China's evolving stance towards Iran's nuclear activities. China's
involvement in the Iranian nuclear program is closely linked to its economic interests,
particularly in securing access to Iran's significant natural gas and oil reserves.
Beijing has provided economic support to Iran, including the purchase of Iranian oil
in violation of sanctions, which has been vital for Iran's economy and its various
industries. Additionally, China has made strategic investments in critical Iranian
sectors such as mining and transportation to ensure access to Iran's natural
resources. The potential impact of a new nuclear deal on China's activities in the
region is a subject of concern, as it could lead to increased Chinese investments and
trade with Iran, thereby deepening China's influence in the region.

France:
France has been a significant stakeholder in the Iranian nuclear program. France,
along with Germany and the United Kingdom, has been part of the E3 group that has
been negotiating with Iran to end its nuclear program. France has been willing to
cooperate with Iran on its civilian nuclear power program if Tehran would suspend its
uranium enrichment activities. In 2015, the E3/EU+3 group and Iran concluded a
long-term agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA), which France supported.

USA:
The United States has been a significant stakeholder in the Iranian nuclear program.
The U.S. has been concerned about Iran's nuclear program's potential to destabilize
the region and has been committed to preventing Iran from developing nuclear
weapons. It has been involved in negotiations with Iran to limit its nuclear program
and has imposed economic sanctions on Iran to pressure it to comply with
international
demands. In 2015, U.S. was part of the E3/EU+3 group that negotiated the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) with Iran, which placed significant
restrictions on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. However, in
2018,under Trump's administration, the US. withdrew from the JCPoA, claiming that
it failed to curtail Iran's missile program and regional influence. ]U.S. has since
imposed additional economic sanctions on Iran, including those related to its nuclear
program, which have had a significant impact on Iran's economy. The U.S. has also
expressed concern over Iran's ballistic missile program and its support for terrorist
groups. The U.S. relationship with Iran has been complex, with periods of
cooperation and tension.The U.S. has also been concerned about Iran's human
rights record and its regional activity.

Germany:
Germany has been a significant stakeholder in the Iranian nuclear program.
Germany, guided by the stabilization of the "balance of power" in the region, has
supported compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and
has been against the imposition of crippling economic sanctions. Germany has
sought to be an active mediator in the tense situation, aiming at peaceful interaction
with the Iranian government by complying with the agreements reached earlier.
Along with France and the United Kingdom, Germany has been part of the E3 group
that has been negotiating with Iran to end its nuclear program. Germany's approach
to the Iranian nuclear crisis has evolved significantly, transitioning from a "soft"
stance to a more "hard" one after 2006, driven by deteriorating Iranian-Israeli
relations and the perceived "nuclear threat" from Iran. The German government
played a pivotal role in imposing EU economic sanctions on Iran, despite the
beneficial economic partnership with Iran, prioritizing transatlantic cooperation and
its moral obligation to Israel. Germany's active engagement in the Middle East region
as a mediator in reducing tensions has been underscored by its use of diplomatic
methods to resolve the Iranian crisis. The 2018 German Coalition Treaty emphasizes
the importance of preserving and ensuring the implementation of the Iran Nuclear
Agreement, with Germany committing to comply with all agreements and contribute
to creating conditions for Iran to carry out unimpeded economic activities.
Furthermore, Germany opposes the military use of nuclear energy and has
expressed concerns about the instability in the Middle East due to the desire for
nuclear capabilities, as reflected in the 2006 Bundeswehr White Paper.
Israel:
Israel's nuclear policy significantly affects its relationship with Iran. Israel has been a
vocal opponent of the Iran nuclear deal and has made the Iran nuclear file its top
national security priority. However, after the agreement, Israel's attention shifted to
non-nuclear challenges, such as Iran's growing role in Syria and its support for
Hezbollah, impacting the Israel-Iran relationship. Israel's nuclear policy is pending on
the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, and its focus in nuclear matters has been
primarily on Iran. Israel rejects the idea that Iran would adhere to the doctrine of
deterrence, which states that two nuclear powers will not attack each other if they
both are nuclear powers. Iran now has enough fissile material to make several
nuclear bombs and has made limited progress on developing a nuclear weapon.
Israel's nuclear policy is pending on the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, and
its focus in nuclear matters has been primarily on Iran.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

Key Facilities and Capabilities:

Iran's nuclear program consists of several key facilities, including nuclear reactors
and various nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Some of the most notable facilities are:

1. Natanz Enrichment Complex: This facility is Iran's main uranium

enrichment site, where it has been operating various cascades of centrifuges,
including IR-1, IR-4, and IR-6.

2. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): Located at Natanz, this facility is used for
research and development activities related to Iran's nuclear program.
3. Arak Nuclear Complex: This complex includes the Arak Heavy Water Reactor,
which is under construction and will be capable of producing weapons-grade
plutonium.

4. Anarak Waste Storage Facility: This facility is used for the storage of nuclear
waste.

5. Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC): This centre
is involved in the research and production of nuclear fuel.

6. Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (INTC): This centre is involved in the

development of nuclear technology.

7. Isfahan Missile Complex: This complex is involved in the development and

production of missiles.

8. Parchin Military Complex (Nuclear): This complex is believed to be involved in

Iran's nuclear weapons program.

These facilities are subject to monitoring and verification by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance with non-proliferation obligations and
the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

Iran's nuclear program has been a subject of international concern, Israel being the
major stakeholder due concerns about the potential threat it poses to the region and
its own security. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and that it has no
plans to develop nuclear weapons However, there have been accusations and
concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions and potential weaponization activities,
leading to intense international diplomacy and monitoring efforts.

As of October 2023, Iran has enriched 128.3 kg of uranium to 60%. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported that Iran's nuclear program has reached
a point where, within three weeks, it might be able to enrich enough uranium for five
fission weapons. Iran has been operating various cascades of centrifuges, including
IR-1, IR-4, and IR-6, at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, and has been conducting
research and development activities related to its nuclear program.
Since the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), Iran has accelerated the expansion of its nuclear program, exceeding
JCPOA restrictions on uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge research and
development. Iran has also been enriching uranium up to 60%, which is beyond the
JCPOA limits.

The IAEA plays a critical role in monitoring Iran's compliance with nuclear-related
measures, and its reports have highlighted Iran's activities and the need for
continued oversight. The status of Iran's nuclear program remains a complex and
sensitive issue, with ongoing international efforts to address concerns and ensure
compliance with non-proliferation obligations.

Iran's Stance on Nuclear Development:

Iran has consistently stated that it is not seeking nuclear weapons, and that it needs
atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's highest
authority, emphasized the country's need for peaceful nuclear energy, stating, "We
will sooner or later need peaceful nuclear energy. If we do not pursue it, our
independence will be harmed.".

The country has also emphasized the importance of its right to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, as allowed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

International Monitoring and Verification:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified Iran's compliance with
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) since 2016, but some experts
have questioned the completeness and accuracy of the IAEA reports. They also
accused Iran of exploiting a loophole in the JCPOA to exceed its allotment of heavy
water twice.

The U.S. Congress and President Trump have expressed dissatisfaction with the
JCPOA and threatened to withdraw from it or re-impose sanctions on Iran. President
Trump has accused Iran of violating the "spirit" of the deal, while Iran has denied any
wrongdoing.
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has claimed to have evidence of Iran's past nuclear
weapons program, which he said proved that the JCPOA was based on false
premises. Other countries have dismissed Netanyahu's presentation as irrelevant or
supportive of the JCPOA.

International and expert community reactions to Netanyahu's presentation were

largely dismissive of its informational value, and suspicious that the timing and
theatrics of the event were intended to persuade President Trump to withdraw from
the JCPOA. Iran and the IAEA
have refuted the Israeli allegations, while the White House has suggested some
coordination with Israel.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark
international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and
furthering the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. It has
been extended indefinitely since May 11, 1995, and has been ratified by 191 states,
making it the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement. The treaty establishes
a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which is used to verify compliance with the treaty through
inspections conducted by the IAEA. The NPT represents the only binding
commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the
nuclear-weapon states. It also requires non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude
agreements with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all of their nuclear
activities. The NPT is a critical component of global efforts to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

● The NPT recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states (NWS): the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China. These are the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the only
states that possessed nuclear
 weapons when the treaty was signed in 1968. These states have committed
to pursue nuclear disarmament and to refrain from transferring nuclear
weapons or technology to other states.

● The NPT also has 186 non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) that have agreed
not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on
all their nuclear activities. These states are entitled to the benefits of peaceful
nuclear cooperation and assistance from the NWS and other parties to the
treaty.

I. Purpose: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is

the centerpiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to
promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the
goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

II. Problems with NPT: The two most significant challenges are
disarmament and non-proliferation, and the tension between nuclear-weapon
states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Noncompliance is the most serious
non-proliferation challenge facing the NPT, and the NPT review process has
not proved to be an effective tool for tackling noncompliance. the NPT failed
to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, and failed to prevent some states
from pursuing (successful or unsuccessful) nuclear weapons programmes.

III. Loopholes
- Withdrawal and reprocessing: The treaty does not provide penalties for
quitting or violating the treaty, and it does not require the five nuclear-weapon
states to cut back on their nuclear weapons
- Nuclear trade with non-NPT states: The treaty does not preclude nuclear
trade with states not party to the NPT, which could potentially lead to the
spread of nuclear technology and materials
- Paragraph 14 loophole: This loophole allows fissile material used for
non-explosive military purposes, such as naval propulsion, to be exempt from
inspections and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Nuclear-powered ships: The NPT does not prohibit non-nuclear-weapon
states from building or operating
 nuclear-powered ships, although the IAEA has not detected any
non-nuclear-weapon state exercising this loophole
- Articles 1 and 2 is that it is unclear what constitutes “assistance,”
“encouragement,” or “inducement” to a non weapon state; the second
problem is that it is unclear what constitutes “manufacture” of a device; the
third problem is that it is unclear what constitutes a nuclear explosive device
- Non-Compliance: acquisition of fissile material and the development of
nuclear weapons. States like Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya have been
cited for non-compliance with the NPT as they have been developing nuclear
enrichment capabilities, which could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

IV. Timeline:
- 1950s: The concept of a non-proliferation treaty begins to take shape, with the
United States and the Soviet Union discussing the idea of a treaty to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons
- 1968: The NPT is opened for signature and signed by the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
- 1970: The NPT enters into force with 46 states-parties 1974: The first review
conference of the NPT is held, with the treaty members deciding to hold such
conferences every five years to review the implementation of the treaty
- 1975: The second review conference adopts its final document 1980: The
third review conference adopts its final document
- 1985: The fourth review conference adopts its final document
- 1990: The fifth review conference adopts its final document1.
- 1992: France, the last of the five recognized nuclear-weapon states, accedes
to the NPT1.
- 1993: North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT but
suspends that withdrawal on June 11, 1993
- 1995: The sixth review conference adopts its final document.
- 2000: The seventh review conference adopts a final document that outlines
the so-called 13 Steps for progress toward nuclear disarmament.
- 2010: The eighth review conference adopts its final document
- 2015: The ninth review conference ends without the adoption of a consensus
substantive outcome

V. Articles of NPT:
● Article I of the NPT, nuclear-weapon states pledge not to transfer nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient or in any way
assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state in the manufacture
or acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
● Article II of the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge not to acquire or
exercise control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and
not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such devices
● Article III of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states pledge to accept IAEA
safeguards to verify that their nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes
● Article VI of the NPT, all Parties undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, to
nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament..
● Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
● Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to
conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear
weapons in their respective territories.
● Article VIII Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty.
The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty
● Article IX This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature.
● Article X of the NPT provides a “right” to withdraw from the treaty if the
withdrawing party “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of
● Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese
texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States. its country.” It also requires that a withdrawing
state-party give three months' notice.
VI. States that have ratified NPT: A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty,
including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the
NPT
VII. Signatories:
Nuclear-Armed States Recognized by the NPT:

A. United States
B. Russia (formerly the Soviet Union)
C. China
D. France
E. United Kingdom

Non-Nuclear-Armed States that are Signatories to the NP:The majority of the

countries in the world (191 states) are signatories to the NPT. They have
agreed not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons
Non-Signatories to the NPT:
1. India: India is not a signatory to the NPT and conducted
nuclear tests in 1974.
2. Pakistan: Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT and
conducted nuclear tests in 1998.
3. Israel: Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons but has
neither confirmed nor denied its nuclear capabilities. Israel has not
signed the NPT.
4. North Korea: North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003.

Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW):

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is the first legally binding
international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons. It was
adopted on 7 July 2017, opened for signature on 20 September 2017, and entered
into force on 22 January 2021. The treaty prohibits the development, testing,
production, stockpiling, stationing, transfer, use, and threat of use of nuclear
weapons. It also includes provisions for assistance to individuals affected by the use
of nuclear weapons and environmental remediation in affected areas. The TPNW
was adopted by the United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding
Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, leading towards their total elimination, with
122 votes in favor, one against, and one abstention
TPNW prohibits States Parties from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing,
acquiring, possessing, or stockpiling nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Signatories are barred from transferring or receiving nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices, control over such weapons, or any assistance with
activities prohibited under the Treaty. States are also prohibited from using or
threatening to use nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Lastly,
States Parties cannot allow the stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in their territory. In addition to the
Treaty’s prohibitions, States Parties are obligated to provide victim assistance and
help with environmental remediation efforts.

IAEA Safeguards Agreement with Iran:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran have a safeguards
agreement in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). The agreement, known as the Safeguards Agreement, was entered
into force on May 15, 1974. It is based on INFCIRC/214, which outlines the terms of
the agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in
connection with the NPT.

The agreement requires Iran to accept safeguards to verify that its nuclear activities
are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It also
establishes the framework for cooperation between Iran and the IAEA to facilitate the
implementation of the safeguards.

The agreement includes provisions for Iran to provide the IAEA with a declaration
containing a general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear
fuel cycle-related facilities and other nuclear facilities. The IAEA’s efforts and
interactions with Iran to clarify information relating to the correctness and
completeness of Iran’s nuclear program are carried out in accordance with this
safeguards agreement.

The agreement is a critical component of global efforts to prevent the spread of

nuclear weapons and promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Past UN Security Council Resolutions:
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the
United Nations (UN) and is charged with ensuring international peace and security. It
is composed of 15 members, including five permanent members with veto power
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten
non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The
Security Council has the authority to take military action, impose sanctions, and
establish peacekeeping missions to address threats to international peace and
security. It has adopted several resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program,
imposing sanctions and demanding compliance with non-proliferation obligations.
These resolutions reflect the Security Council's efforts to address concerns about
Iran's nuclear activities and ensure compliance with international obligations.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted several resolutions
related to Iran's nuclear program. These resolutions are part of the international
efforts to address concerns about Iran's nuclear activities and ensure compliance
with non-proliferation obligations. Here are some key resolutions and their relation to
Iran's nuclear program:

1. UNSC Resolution 1696 (2006): This resolution expressed concern at the

intentions of Iran's nuclear program and demanded that Iran halt its uranium
enrichment program.

2. UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006): This resolution established a Security Council

Sanctions Committee and imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to stop its uranium
enrichment.

3. UNSC Resolution 1747 (2007): This resolution tightened sanctions against

Iran over its uranium enrichment and established a ban on Iran's arms exports.

4. UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008): This resolution reaffirmed the demand for Iran
to take steps required by the IAEA to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful
purpose of its nuclear program and imposed additional sanctions on Iran.

5. UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015): This resolution endorsed the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1, which aimed to
ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. It laid the
groundwork for the Security Council to lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran when it
met the requirements.

These resolutions reflect the international community's efforts to address concerns

about Iran's nuclear program and ensure compliance with non-proliferation
obligations. The sanctions and demands outlined in the resolutions are a response
to Iran's uranium enrichment activities and are aimed at encouraging Iran to pursue
a peaceful nuclear program in compliance with its international obligations.

CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS

Proliferation Risks

Iran's nuclear program has been causing proliferation risks in 2023, primarily due to
its increasing stockpiles of uranium enriched to 60 percent. This growth could lead to
less time needed to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. Iran also did little to enhance
transparency, complicating diplomacy to curb Iran's nuclear program. As monitoring
gaps grow, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will find it more difficult to
reconstruct Iran's nuclear activities and establish baseline inventories. In the latter
half of 2023, Iran took some steps to de-escalate nuclear tensions, such as slowing
the rate at which it produced uranium enriched to 60 percent and allowing the IAEA
to install enrichment monitors at two of its uranium enrichment facilities. However,
Iran did not follow through on certain plans that would have increased the
proliferation risk, such as installing additional centrifuges at Fordo uranium
enrichment facility. These moves did not do anything to limit proliferation risk in the
short term but could signal Iran's willingness to take further steps if the United States
is willing to take reciprocal steps to stop the cycle of escalation.In 2024, the U.S.
focus should be on increasing the monitoring and oversight of Iran's nuclear
program. Negotiating a future deal will become more difficult as the monitoring gap
persists. Increased monitoring reduces the likelihood of Washington miscalculating
Tehran's intentions. The U.S. could incentivize Iran to allow the IAEA to reinstall
monitoring equipment at facilities it has not accessed since 2021 and provide the
IAEA with data from those facilities recorded between February 2021 and June
2022. Additionally, the U.S.
could incentivize Iran to allow inspectors limited access to those facilities. Tehran
does not appear to be interested in negotiating a more comprehensive nuclear
agreement until after the U.S. presidential election in 2024.

Regional Security Implications

The Iran nuclear deal, a part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
has been on life support since President Trump withdrew in May 2018 and launched
a "maximum pressure" campaign against Tehran. President Joe Biden has delayed
reentering the agreement, retaining sanctions on Iran in a diminished form. Iran
initially exercised "strategic patience" to compensate for the economic loss, but in
May 2019, it shifted to "maximum resistance" by reducing compliance and increasing
military pressure on the US and its allies. It is uncertain if Iranian policy will change
under newly elected President Ebrahim Raisi, who may take a tougher approach.
While other JCPOA participants have played an important intermediary role in
reducing sanctions, the US must be an active and full member to continue
supporting the deal. The Iran-Iraq nuclear deal, which was aimed at addressing
proliferation concerns, could potentially survive if political will, diplomatic skill, and
luck are present. The deal, which was intended to provide significant sanctions relief
for Iran and cooperation with its peaceful nuclear activities, was designed to take a
year to produce enough uranium-235 fuel for a nuclear weapon. It also dismantled
Iran's plutonium research and production capabilities, with Iran eventually being
allowed to reconstitute this infrastructure after
15 years. The deal also imposed strong monitoring, safeguards, and verification
measures to ensure compliance. A UN Security Council resolution enshrined the
JCPOA in international law, keeping an arms embargo on Iran for the first five years
of its implementation until 2020 and restricting ballistic missile development for eight
years until 2023. Until 2025, other JCPOA participants retain the option to snap back
international sanctions on Iran in case of a significant violation. The US and Iran
have been negotiating a nuclear deal since the Biden administration took office. The
US demanded that Iran comply with its commitments and raised new demands
beyond those in the Joint Comprehensive Plan for the East (JCPOA). The Iranian
government responded with its own set of demands. The US claims that Iran has
made unacceptable nuclear advances since 2019 and requires compensatory
nuclear restrictions. Iran also wants to address its reduced compliance
with enhanced IAEA monitoring and its refusal to answer questions about past
nuclear work. The US also demands guarantees for reentry into the JCPOA,
including follow-up missile and regional security talks and a commitment from the US
not to withdraw from the JCPOA in the future. Iran is also seeking the removal of
over 1,500 Trump-era sanctions on nuclear and non-nuclear-related entities and
activities. The Biden administration divided these sanctions into three baskets based
on perceived inconsistency with the deal.

CASE STUDIES

South Asia - India and Pakistan:

The relationship between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbors in

South Asia, has been characterized by a complex mix of historical animosities,
territorial disputes, and security concerns. Both countries have engaged in a series
of conflicts since their partition in 1947, including wars over the disputed region of
Kashmir. The presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both countries adds an
additional layer of complexity to their relationship and significantly raises the stakes
in any potential conflict. India and Pakistan conducted their first nuclear tests in
1998, openly declaring themselves as nuclear-armed states. This nuclearization of
South Asia fundamentally altered the security dynamics in the region, introducing the
concept of nuclear deterrence as a central feature of their strategic calculations.
However, it also raised concerns about the potential for nuclear escalation during
periods of heightened tension or conflict. The Kashmir dispute remains a major
flashpoint between India and Pakistan, with both countries claiming sovereignty over
the region and engaging in periodic clashes along the Line of Control (LoC). The
presence of nuclear weapons adds a dangerous dimension to these tensions, as any
escalation in the conflict could risk nuclear confrontation.

● CHALLENGE: Long-standing regional rivalry, conflicts, and territorial disputes

have driven India and Pakistan to develop nuclear capabilities. Their nuclear
tests in 1998 escalated tensions in the region.
 ● IMPACT: The presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia poses a constant
threat to regional stability and global non-proliferation efforts.

Middle East - Israel and Neighboring States:

Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it has never officially
acknowledged their existence. This policy of opacity, known as "nuclear ambiguity,"
has been maintained by Israel for decades as part of its deterrence strategy in a
region characterized by hostility and insecurity. Israel's nuclear capabilities have
significant implications for regional security dynamics, particularly concerning its
relationships with neighboring states and broader regional dynamics. The possibility
of a nuclear-armed Israel has influenced the security calculations of other countries
in the Middle East, leading to efforts by some states to acquire their own nuclear
capabilities or seek security assurances from external powers. One of the most
pressing concerns in the region is the Iranian nuclear program. Iran's pursuit of
nuclear technology has raised alarm bells among its neighbors, particularly Israel,
which sees Iran as a significant security threat. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran
has led to heightened tensions and triggered international efforts to curb Iran's
nuclear ambitions, including the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) in 2015. The Middle East is also characterized by ongoing conflicts
and rivalries, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the proxy wars in Syria and
Yemen, and tensions between regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.
These conflicts further complicate efforts to address nuclear proliferation and
promote stability in the region.

● CHALLENGE: Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons but

maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Surrounding states, such as Iran,
have expressed concerns and initiated nuclear programs.
● IMPACT: The undeclared nuclear status of Israel and regional tensions
have complicated NPT compliance and regional security dynamics.

Korean Peninsula - North Korea:

North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has been a persistent challenge for the
international community, prompting concerted efforts from organizations like the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address the threat. Despite North
Korea's secretive nature and lack of cooperation, the IAEA has endeavored to
monitor the country's nuclear activities using various tools, including satellite imagery
and occasional on-site inspections. However, the agency has faced significant
hurdles due to restricted access to key facilities and limited information.

● CHALLENGE: North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its

withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 have resulted in regional instability and the
threat of nuclear conflict.
● IMPACT: The North Korean case underscores the difficulties in
preventing non-compliance and withdrawal from the NPT, as well as the
challenges in denuclearization efforts.

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMA)

● How has the JCPOA affected Iran's nuclear program and what concerns are
still being present?
● What military nuclear capabilities can Iran possess, taking into consideration
the uranium enrichment restrictions?
● How effectively could Iran's actions be monitored by the international
community? How would a “nuclear Iran” affect the region and the globe in
general?
● What measures can be taken by DISEC to ensure that Iran complies with the
safeguards and agreements set by the IAEA regarding its nuclear program?
● How can the DISEC ensure the transparency and compliance of Iran's
nuclear program, and what role can the international community play in this
process?
● What are the implications of Iran's nuclear program for regional stability and
security, and how could these implications be addressed?
● How can the DISEC and the international community ensure that any
resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue is sustainable and verifiable over the
long term?
● How effectively could Iran's actions be monitored by the international
community? How would a “nuclear Iran” affect the region and the globe in
general?

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