JP DIGESTS

LIANG VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 125865 ; January 28, 2000

Summary Facts:

 Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist at the Asian Development Bank (ADB),

faced two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly making defamatory
remarks against fellow ADB employee Joyce Cabal in 1994.
 The charges were brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City, which issued a warrant for Liang's arrest.
 Liang was released on bail set at P2,400.00 per charge and placed under the
custody of the ADB Security Officer.
 The MeTC judge received a communication from the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) indicating that Liang was covered by immunity from legal process
under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the ADB's headquarters in the country.
 Based on this communication, the MeTC judge dismissed the criminal cases
without notifying the prosecution.
 The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to file
a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City.
 The RTC set aside the MeTC's ruling and ordered the enforcement of the arrest
warrant.
 Liang's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to elevate the case to
the Supreme Court, arguing that he was covered by immunity and that no
preliminary investigation was conducted.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner Jeffrey Liang covered by immunity from legal process
under the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government?
2. Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases without notice to the
prosecution a violation of due process?
3. Whether or not a preliminary investigation required in cases cognizable by the
MTC?

Ruling:

1. No, The Supreme Court ruled that Jeffrey Liang is not covered by
immunity from legal process for the act of slandering a person.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the DFA's determination of immunity is
only preliminary and has no binding effect on the courts. The court noted that the
immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute and is subject to the
condition that the act was performed in an official capacity.
The court also stated that slandering a person could not be covered by the
immunity agreement because defamation is a crime, and our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime in the name of official duty.
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2. Yes, The Supreme Court found that the dismissal of the criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution violated the prosecution's right to due process.
The court emphasized that due process is a right of both the accused and
the prosecution. The MeTC's ex parte dismissal of the cases based on the DFA's
communication without notifying the prosecution violated the prosecution's right
to due process. The prosecution should have been given the opportunity to
present evidence to rebut the DFA's protocol.

3. No, The Supreme Court held that a preliminary investigation is not

required in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The Supreme Court clarified that preliminary investigation is not a matter
of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC, and its absence does not affect the
court's jurisdiction or the validity of the information.

What have I learned from this case:

Defamation cannot be covered by immunity. Diplomatic agent enjoys

immunity from criminal jurisdiction except in cases related to professional or commercial
activities outside official functions. And that preliminary investigation is not required in
cases handled by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. TEJANO, JR.

G.R. No. 173615 ; Oct 16, 2009
Summary Facts:

 Respondent Tejano served as Vice-President and Manager at PNB and faced

allegations of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.
 The allegations pertained to fraudulent transactions with various corporate
entities while PNB was still under government ownership.
 On February 24 and March 17, 1994, Tejano and eight other employees were
charged administratively before the PNB Management Hearing Committee.
 The Committee found Tejano guilty of misappropriating funds and extending
unwarranted credit, recommending forced resignation without forfeiture of
benefits.
 The PNB Board of Directors imposed a harsher penalty of forced resignation with
forfeiture of benefits.
 Tejano's request for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to appeal to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).
 The CSC dismissed his appeal as untimely and later claimed it lost jurisdiction
due to PNB's privatization on May 27, 1996.
 Tejano contested this ruling in the Court of Appeals, which ruled in his favor,
leading PNB to file a petition for review.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the CSC's jurisdiction over Tejano's case continue despite
the privatization of PNB under EO No. 80?

Ruling:

1. Yes, the CSC’s jurisdiction shall continue over the dispute.

The Court determined that the CSC retained jurisdiction over the appeal
despite PNB's privatization. The Court stated that the CSC's jurisdiction is
established by law and remains until the case is conclusively resolved.
Privatization of PNB did not retroactively affect the CSC's jurisdiction over
pending cases at the time of the bank's conversion. Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 80 did not explicitly transfer jurisdiction over pending cases.

The Court emphasized that laws generally have prospective effects and
should not be applied retroactively unless clearly stated.The CSC acquired
jurisdiction over Tejano’s appeal upon filing, which continued until the case's final
disposition.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the CSC was competent to adjudicate
Tejano's administrative case appeal.
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What have I learned from this case:

Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a

controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is
not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal.
The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before
its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no
retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
enactment of the statute.

CANDY VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 223042 ; Oct 6, 2021

Summary Facts:

 Petitioners Candy a.k.a. Baby/Jillian Muring Ferrer (Candy) and Dhayme Jamuad
a.k.a. Nikki Muring Ferrer (Nikki) were charged with qualified trafficking in
persons under Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003.
 The charges stemmed from events in November 2008 in Cebu City.
 Candy and Nikki, along with other co-accused who remained at large, were
accused of recruiting, transporting, and maintaining eight females and one male,
seven of whom were minors, for prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation.
 The case was initially tried in the Regional Trial Court-Branch 6, Cebu City,
where both Candy and Nikki pleaded not guilty.
 The prosecution presented testimonies from three minor victims, AAA, BBB, and
CCC, who described how they were recruited and transported by the petitioners
to Cebu with promises of better earnings as dancers and sex workers.
 The trial court found Candy and Nikki guilty, sentencing them to life imprisonment
and a fine of P2,000,000.00 each.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and additionally awarded
moral and exemplary damages to the victims.
 Candy and Nikki filed separate petitions to the Supreme Court, challenging their
convictions on various procedural and substantive grounds.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petitioners' arrests were valid and the information filed against
them sufficient according to law.
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2. Whether or not the evidence presented sufficiently established the elements of

qualified trafficking in persons.

Ruling:

1. No, The Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the warrantless arrests
could not be raised for the first time on appeal and thus, the objection was
deemed waived.
The Supreme Court held that objections regarding the legality of arrest and
the sufficiency of the information filed should have been raised prior to entering a
plea. The failure to do so constituted a waiver of such defenses. Moreover, the
information filed sufficiently charged the petitioners under the law.

2. Yes, The SC held that it is sufficiently established

The testimonies of the minors were found credible and compelling. They
illustrated clear recruitment and transportation for illegal purposes, fulfilling the
elements under Sections 4(a) and 6 of RA 9208. The minors, whose rights were
protected by law, could not legally consent to the proposed activities due to their
age.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the argument that minors' consent was
irrelevant due to their status under law. Furthermore, the facts warranted the
conclusion that both petitioners operated in conspiracy and intended to exploit
the minors, thus dismissing any claims of victimhood on their part.

What have I learned from this case:

The court reinforced the notion that consent from minors, especially in
contexts of trafficking, is irrelevant due to coercive circumstances and
vulnerability. It established that even individuals who have been victimized can
be held criminally liable if they engage in direct actions that contribute to
trafficking others.

It also upheld the principle that procedural objections regarding arrests and
information sufficiency should be raised timely, or they are waived.
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ABS-CBN CORPORATION VS. GOZON

G.R. No. 195956 ; Mar 11, 2015

Summary Facts:
 ABS-CBN Corporation (petitioner) and several officers and employees of GMA
Network, Inc. (respondents), including Felipe Gozon, Gilberto R. Duavit, Jr.,
Marissa L. Flores, Jessica A. Soho, Grace Dela Peña-Reyes, and John Oliver T.
Manalastas.
 The controversy arose from GMA-7's news coverage of the homecoming of
Filipino overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz on July 22, 2004.
ABS-CBN conducted live audio-video coverage of the event and allowed Reuters
Television Service to air the footage under a special embargo agreement, which
restricted its use by other Philippine subscribers without ABS-CBN's consent.
 GMA-7, a subscriber of Reuters and CNN, received a live video feed of the event
from Reuters and aired it in its program "Flash Report."
 ABS-CBN alleged that GMA-7 aired the footage without consent, leading to a
complaint for copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the
Intellectual Property Code.
 That on or about the 22nd of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, being the Head of News Operations and the Program Manager,
respectively, for the News and Public Affairs Department of GMA Network, Inc.,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and broadcast the
footage of the arrival of Angelo [d]ela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport of which ABS-CBN holds the exclusive ownership and copyright by then
and there using, airing, and broadcasting the said footage in its news program
“FLASH REPORT” without first obtaining the consent or authority of said
copyright owner, to their damage and prejudice.
 The Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Dela Peña-Reyes
and Manalastas, but the Department of Justice (DOJ) initially ruled in favor of the
respondents, citing good faith as a defense.
 The DOJ later reversed its decision, finding probable cause to charge all
respondents.
 The Court of Appeals reinstated the initial DOJ resolution, leading ABS-CBN to
file a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether news footage is copyrightable under the law.

2. Whether lack of knowledge that a material is copyrighted and good faith are valid
defenses against copyright infringement.

3. Whether Secretary Agra committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered

the filing of the Information against all respondents despite the erroneous
piercing of the corporate veil.
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Ruling:

1. Yes, The Court ruled that news footage is copyrightable under the law.

The Supreme Court clarified that news footage is subject to copyright

protection under the Intellectual Property Code, which grants exclusive rights to
authors and broadcasting organizations.

2. No, Lack of knowledge that a material is copyrighted is not a defense

against copyright infringement. As well as Good faith is not a defense in a
criminal prosecution for violation of the Intellectual Property Code.

The Intellectual Property Code provides for strict liability in cases of

copyright infringement, meaning that good faith or lack of knowledge is not a
valid defense.

3. Yes, The Court found no sufficient evidence to hold Gozon, Duavit, Jr.,
Flores, and Soho liable, as their active participation in the alleged crime was not
established.

We find that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of

discretion when it resolved to file the Information against respondents despite
lack of proof of their actual participation in the alleged crime.

The “Principals” of a crime are those "who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; those who directly force or induce others to commit it; or
those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished." There is conspiracy "when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it"

Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime
Itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission
of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to
show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that
there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the
product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
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What have I learned from this case:

Conspiracy is not presumed. It is necessary that a conspirator should

have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the
execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or it may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators

DUNGO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209464 ; July 1, 2015

Summary Facts:
 Petitioners Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. were found guilty of
violating the Anti-Hazing Law (Republic Act No. 8049).
 Incident took place on January 14, 2006, in Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Laguna.
 Victim Marlon Villanueva, a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) fraternity, died
from injuries sustained during an initiation rite.
 The Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the Information
against the petitioners on February 1, 2006, later amended.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City found the petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt on February 23, 2011.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision on April 26, 2013, and
upheld it in a resolution on October 8, 2013.
 Prosecution presented twenty witnesses, including medical professionals and
other individuals who identified the petitioners' presence at the initiation site.
 Defense presented seven witnesses, including the petitioners, claiming alibi and
denial.
 Both RTC and CA found the prosecution’s evidence credible and sufficient to
convict the petitioners.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the RTC and CA violate the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them by convicting
them of a crime different from that charged in the Information?

2. Whether or not the presence of the petitioners during the hazing sufficient to
establish their participation in the crime?

3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum?

Ruling:
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1. No, The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decisions of
the RTC and CA, holding that the Information properly charged the offense
proved.

The Supreme Court held that the Information sufficiently informed the
petitioners of the charges against them, including the planned initiation rite and
their roles in inducing the victim to be present.

2. Yes, The Court ruled that the presence of the petitioners during the hazing,
coupled with other circumstantial evidence, was sufficient to establish their
participation in the crime.

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to
the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze
the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders
would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation
to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually
participate in the infliction of physical injuries.

In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners'

participation in the hazing because of their presence in the venue. As correctly
held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at Villa
Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She testified that
she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store.

3. Yes, The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is mala prohibita. The
Senate deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the antihazing
statute to be malum prohibitum.

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita

crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized
act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in
se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. In the final
analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question
of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation
of the statute

What have I learned from this case:

As a general rule a mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy. The exception of the rule, under R.A. No. 8049, the
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participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by

the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they
prevented the commission of the acts therein.

When an act is Mala Prohibita, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public
welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the

Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by
special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes under
special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there
may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.

PEOPLE VS. RAMOY

G.R. No. 212738 ; March 9, 2022
Summary Facts:

 The case "People vs. Ramoy" involves a petition for review on certiorari.
 Petitioners: Atty. Anna Liza R. Juan-Barrameda, Mischaella Savari, and Marlon
Savari.
 Respondents: Rufino Ramoy and Dennis Padilla.
 Petitioners served as poll watchers during the 2010 Barangay Elections.
 On October 25, 2010, Mischaella and Marlon filed a complaint against Paul
Ramones Borja for soliciting votes and distributing election paraphernalia inside
a polling place.
 On January 17, 2011, another complaint was filed against respondents and five
others for conspiring with Borja.
 Assistant City Prosecutor Irene S. Resurreccion found probable cause and
recommended filing three criminal Informations against respondents for violating
the Omnibus Election Code.
 Respondents filed motions for reconsideration and a petition for review before
the DOJ, both denied.
 RTC denied the respondents' Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations.
 Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which quashed the
Informations.
 Petitioners sought a review of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
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1. Are the acts constitutive of premature campaigning still punishable under current
election laws?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err in quashing the Informations on the ground that they
charge more than one offense?

Ruling:

1. No, The Supreme Court held that premature campaigning is no longer

punishable under current election laws, as established in Penera v. COMELEC.

Under the Omnibus Election Code, a person is considered a candidate

only at the start of the campaign period; any partisan political activities before
this period are lawful. Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-
11-169069, charging respondents with premature campaigning, did not
constitute an offense and were quashed.

2. Yes, the CA erred in quashing the information.

In Criminal Case No. Q-11-169067, the Information charged a single

offense of unlawful electioneering, with unlawful presence inside the polling
place being an inherent part of the offense.

The doctrine of absorption was applied, concluding the Information did

not charge more than one offense and should not be quashed. Nevertheless, it is
manifest that when the act of unlawful campaign is performed inside a polling
place, unlawful presence at the polling place is consummated simultaneously, on
the same occasion, and by the same act. In this sense therefore, the offender's
presence inside the polling place becomes a component, or an essential element
in the offense of unlawful campaign and ceases to be a separate crime.

What have I learned from this case:

The crime which the offender originally or primarily intended to commit

absorbs the offense which is executed in its furtherance. In the Doctrine of
absorption, although there have been multiple violations, that crime that is
ascertained to be an inherent part, an element, or that is made in furtherance of
the other crime is not treated as a separate offense but is deemed included in
the other crime.
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