Chapter Three: The Formation of Modern State and Nation Building Process

The political process that was set in motion by the mid-19 th c as an antithesis to the era of
Yejju/ princes or conventionally called Zemene Mesafint was able to produce, in half
century, a full-fledged empire state of un-equals. This was a product a conjuncture of three
historical processes- the drive to centralize historic Ethiopia, which was generally kwon as
Abyssinia, the derive to expand to the rich lands in the center-south and the European derive
to curve up the continent of Africa as a whole.

The conjuncture of three derives created the fundamentally different Ethiopia with two
contradictory phenomenon’s. On the one hand, multi ethnic Ethiopia was created; on the
other hand, it led to a century of ethnic and religious domination of one group over the
others or in short it creates nation state of un-equals. Typically, before 1991, different
phenomenon took place in the political History of Ethiopian state. Consequently, three
emperors Tewodros, Yohannis, and Menilik laid the foundation for the modern empire state
of Ethiopia.

3.1. The Rise of Tewdros as Modern State Builder (1855-1868)

To point out, Kasa an Amahara shifta leader crowned Emperor Tewodros in 1855 and
brought the era of princes to an end and bring one rule to divided territory of the north. He
also attempted to bring the church under his control and reduce the power of regional leaders
by establishing regional administration responsible to him.

Moreover, Tewodros also divided the greatly enlarged kingdom in to four major provinces
and thirty nine districts through reducing the power of regional leaders by establishing local
administrations responsible to him. What is more, Tewodros made public that “his attention
once and for all to break every threat to his mission, suppress Islam, abolish slavery, end the
autonomy of provincial rulers of the era of princes, establish strong central government with
standing army, and above all, reunite Ethiopia as a Christian empire”

When the creation of the modern multi-ethnic empire state was started by Tewodros around
1850s, ‘historic Ethiopia’ (roughly a major parts of today’s northern half of the country and
part of Eritrea) had been under feudal anarchy for over eighty years and central authority
existed in name only. In the struggle for supremacy among the Tigray, Amhara, and Oromo
elites various competing warrior classes emerged.
Tewodros, who was able to close the chapter of the era of the princes/ era of the Yejju, has
both sense of history and sense of modernization. His sense of history had to do with the past
of the Christian kingdom have been weakened by the intrusion of the Oromo whom he vowed
to stop by restoring the country to its former glory. His modernization derive, had provoked
both internal resistance and external conflict.

The dominant mobilizing factors of Tewodros as an empire builder were religion and region.
Tewodros was the first Ethiopian ruler who explicitly conscious of the ethnic in his project of
empire building and consciously challenged the supremacy of the Oromo princes over the
Abyssinian kingdom. Thereafter, ethnicity was to become one of the key factors in the modus
operandi of the Ethiopian state.

Another key thing to add is, even if it lacks consistency and method, Tewodros’s reforms
embrace social, cultural, administrative, and military reforms which enables him to secure his
financial problems and absolute power over the regional lords of zemene mesafint. Most
importantly, he also strongly argued that church would refrain from interfering in politics and
the state would also leave spiritual matters to the church. In addition, he confiscated the
property of most churches and distribute to the farmers which marked the transition from old
fragmented system of government or zemena mesafint to the modern one

However, to the contrary, “church and most of the provincial nobles did not recognize his
ambition for reforms and finally his reform were reverted; Thus, Tewoderos plans for the
reunification and modernization of Ethiopia on unequal bases were not realized in his time
and finally dead in 1868”.

Although his rise to power was spectacular, Tewodros rule was short lived (1855-1868) and
none of his missions were accomplished. Internally, his attempt to unify the state pitted him
against the regional, those who were enjoying autonomous fiefdoms during the period of
weaker kings before him. Externally, his mission of acquiring firearms to build a stronger
army pitted against the British.

In conclusion, one may consider it as the transition between the traditional Ahamara
kingdom, and the modern Ethiopian state of today. Thereafter, the struggle for power of the
time was won by Dejazmach Kasa Mercha from Tigray who took the name Emperor
Yohannis IV in 1871.

3.2. Emperor Yohannis IV and the Process of State Building (1871-1889)

Emperor Yohannes pursued the goal of unity initiated by Tewodros; however his approach
were decidedly different. “Unity was not to be achieved by overthrowing regional opponents,
eliminating Islam, or taming the Church, but instead by accepting a measure of cultural
diversity and the existence of other centers of power, something which has been called
‘controlled regionalism’” with sami-autonomy; but still, did not end the cultural dominance
of the Amhara and Amharigna remained the language of his court.

Chapter Six

Politics and Government in the post 1991

5.1. Federal restructuring of state

The reversal in the international scene with the end of the Cold War, the retrenchment of
Soviet power and the entrenchment of the United States as the global hegemon, were the
catalyst in the dramatic shift of political fortunes witnessed in the Horn at the close of the
20th century. The Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev cut off military aid to Ethiopia,
while the United States, having rediscovered an interest in its old client, cast Somalia adrift
and took Ethiopia once more under its wing. The repositioning of the superpowers sounded
the death knell for the military regimes in both war-torn countries.

There was great popular relief that the civil war over, and great hopes were pinned on the
anticipated ‘peace dividend’. The realization of such hopes hinged on the willingness of other
rebel movements to accept the political formula devised by the EPRDF. In March 1990, the
EPRDF issued a proposal for the ‘Smooth and Peaceful Transition in Ethiopia’, outlining a
procedure that was to be followed almost to the letter the following year.

It stipulated the formation of a provisional government in which all political forces would be
represented, and elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. A
preliminary step was taken at a meeting held in London in the final days of the military
regime, called by the Americans to secure a peaceful transfer of power in Addis Ababa. Talks
with Dergue representatives broke down almost immediately, leaving the Eritrean and Tigray
rebel leadership to plan the next step with Herman Cohen, the United States Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs.

It was decided to convene a national conference two months later in Addis Ababa to prepare
the transitional phase. An agreement to hold a referendum on independence in Eritrea in two
years’ time had been agreed already. Oromo participation was imperative for the success of
the plan, yet although OLF representatives were in London they took no substantive part in
the meeting. The cool reception that Oromo aspirations for independence had received from
the TPLF and EPLF made the OLF wary, and the appearance of an Oromo rival in the OPDO
under Abyssinian auspices reinforced age-old distrust. To make things worse, before moving
on to Addis Ababa, the EPRDF forces crossed the Blue Nile and marched into Wallega, deep
in Oromo territory. The move outflanked the OLF, preventing it from securing control of
western Oromia. It protested vigorously but in vain: its protests were directed to the United
States, which had already endorsed the transfer of power to the EPRDF.

In the manoeuvres that preceded the change of regime, the Oromo rebels came under intense
pressure from several sides to accept EPRDF’s terms. Caught unprepared by the rapid turn of
events and with its leadership still dispersed, the OLF was unable to formulate a coherent
response to EPRDF initiatives. In London, Herman Cohen urged them to cooperate, assuring
them Washington would see that the EPRDF fulfilled its promises. ‘No democracy, no aid’,
he reportedly said. The negotiations then shifted from London to Khartoum, where leaders of
other rebel movements were brought to meet EPRDF leaders and had the EPRDF programme
for Ethiopia’s future explained to them. This involved a frantic search in the region for
survivors of factions, some of which were no longer active and others that had only a nominal
existence. The Sudanese regime helped in the search with intelligence and transport. In
Khartoum they were presented with a National Charter, asked to subscribe to its principles,
and sign it. For the aged rebels who had languished in exile for years, it was an offer they
could not refuse. The EPRDF had all of them flown to Addis Ababa.

The recasting of the Ethiopian state as a federation on an ethnic basis by giving nationalities
the right to ‘administer their own affairs within their own defined territory’, passed with a
minimum of reflection. Objections were brusquely overruled by the chair, and were futile, in
any case, given the fact that the sponsors of the Charter – EPRDF and OLF – commanded a
comfortable majority in the meeting. Masterfully stage-managed by the EPRDF, the
Conference endorsed every item of a Transitional Charter. A transitional government with a
two-year mandate was chosen at this meeting, representing seven political groups. The
EPRDF held the office of president and prime minister, occupied by the leaders of the TPLF
and EPDM respectively, as well as the ministries of defense, interior and foreign affairs.
The OLF got four ministerial posts. The Conference then transformed itself into a transitional
council of representatives that was subsequently expanded to include representatives of
thirty-two organisations. The Transitional Charter also provided for local and regional
administrative councils to be elected on the basis of nationality within three months. In June
1992, the EPRDF guerrilla army was named the national defence force, a clear indication that
this party was firmly in the saddle.

Redesigning the administration on the basis of nationality was the next task. The principles
were outlined in the Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National/Regional Self-
Government (No. 7, 1992). Ethiopia was to be divided into ethnic units, a task many would
have considered impossible given the country’s history of population shifts and
intermingling, inter-marriage and assimilation, the paucity of reliable ethnographic and
demographic data, and the lack of native expertise for this task, not to mention the notorious
fluidity of ethnic identities. Such considerations did not weigh heavily on the members of the
Boundaries Commission set up by the Transitional Council of Representatives, none of
whom claimed relevant expertise.

Stalin’s stale formula, later inserted verbatim in the 1995 Ethiopian constitution, was the
guideline: ‘a nation, nationality or people is a group of people who have or share a large
measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in
common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory. The Constitution also determined ex post
facto that the regions are ‘established on the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity,
and consent of the people concerned.

In fact, the operating principle was language and the only other tools available to the
Boundaries Commission for this formidable task was the rudimentary ethnographic and
historical data gathered by the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in the 1980s.
Relying on these data, the Commission submitted a plan for discussion in the Transitional
Council of Representatives in the first week of November 1991. It divided Ethiopia into
fourteen regions, called kilil, and was proclaimed law by the end of the year. A radical
departure from the past, the result was also grossly lopsided. On the one hand, it created huge
units by putting all Amharigna-speaking provinces into one kilil, nearly all Oromo into
another and the same for the Somali and Afar. On the other hand, it divided the non-Oromo
areas of the south into five kilil, and upgraded sparsely populated former districts like
Gambella and Beni Shangul to kilil status. Only months later, the five kilil in southern
Ethiopia merged to form the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNPPR)
commonly referred to as Debub (South). There were gross differences in land size,
population and resources among the kilil. With onethird of Ethiopia’s territory, twenty seven
million inhabitants in 2007, the best watered and less densely populated land producing most
of the country’s commercial crops and housing the bulk of its industrial capacity, Oromia
overshadowed the rest. Two kilil in the lowland periphery – Gambella and Beni Shangul
Gumuz – were worst off in all respects. The oddest construct was the old city of Harar that
became a kilil in its own right as the home of the miniscule Adari community, despite the fact
that Oromo speakers are a majority in the kilil and the city itself. The town of Dire Dawa
became a bone of contention between Somali and Oromo and was kept under federal
jurisdiction, as was Addis Ababa.

The federal structure was in place before its constitutional foundations were laid. A
constitutional commission was appointed in August 1992, and the drafting process was
completed in mid-1994. The draft adhered closely to the EPRDF master plan, and the Front
had enough supporters among the commission’s members to ensure compliance. Since the
structure was already in place, there was little public interest in the matter, despite the
commission’s efforts to promote it by inviting comments and organising public debates.
Elections for a constituent assembly followed in June 1994, and the constitution of the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was proclaimed in August 1995.

On the face of it, this was a remarkable departure from Ethiopian political tradition. It
rejected the unitary model of the state and the centralised form of government that previous
regimes had struggled so hard to forge. It accepted cultural pluralism and rejected the link
between culture, nationality and citizenship inherent in that model. It recognised the
voluntary nature of membership in the state, as well as the right to renounce it. All in all, it
seemed a reversal of direction followed in the century-old process of Ethiopian state building.

The Constitution went to great lengths to redress the iniquity inherent in centre/periphery
linkage. Article 8 reads: ‘All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and
Peoples of Ethiopia.’ ‘Nations’, ‘nationalities’ and ‘peoples’ have the right ‘to a full measure
of self-government, which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the
territory they inhabit’ (Art. 39). On paper, the division of power between the federal
government and the kilil stretched federalism to the limit. The powers of the former were
limited to defence, foreign affairs, currency, inter-state transport and commerce. ‘All powers
not given expressly to the Federal government alone, or concurrently to the Federal
Government and the States, are reserved to the States’.

5.2. Institutionalization of Identity Politics

In fact the use of identity as criteria in politics was started during the rise of Emperor
Tewdross II. However, institutionalization of identity politics understood in two ways. The
first is by those who believe the past social injustice and inequality is corrected through the
recognition of multiple identities on equal bases. The other is those who believes recognizing
identity and institutionalization of identity politics as a threat for the unity of the country and
led to disintegration. As of the first, Ethiopia is understood as the multi-ethnic country with
diverse identity in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture, language…etc as a criteria to organize
different structure of the state; especially, after 1995.

After this time, multi-ethnic politics became the organizing factor of Ethiopian politics. All
regional states in Ethiopia those followed the 1994/5 Ethiopian constitution, organized based
ethno-linguistic federal structure. In this respect, the first major political force to pursue a
multi-ethnic agenda was the Ethiopian student movement (ESM) those who fight the Imperial
regime from 1965 to 1974 with the question of land to the tiller, national equality and social
justice; were aimed at redressing past injustice regardless of ethnic or religious partnership.
The Ethiopian student movement was a truly multi-ethnic force whose members were drawn
from all varied ethnic groups of the country.

Since 1991, Ethiopia as state reconstructed and transformed based on ethno-linguistic

identity. The coalition of TPLF led EPRDF came from different Ethnic background. EPRDF
and its constitution laid foundation for the institutionalize identity politics. The FDRE
constitution formally and officially recognized identity politics and state structure was also
organized based on identity markers like ethnicity, language, and other cultures. The right to
self-determination of nation nationalities, including secession based on identity politics.
Therefore, from 1995 onwards, all nation nationalities organized themselves in their
respective region based on ethno-linguistic criteria and identity politics became
institutionalized.

5.3. Parliamentary Form of Government

From 1994 onwards, the form of government in Ethiopia at least on paper became
parliamentary. Under Ethiopian constitution, the government is headed by a prime minister.
The council of ministers forms the cabinet and the cabinet members are appointed by the
prime minister and approved by the House of People’s Representatives. The HoPRs elect the
president for the six year term. The party in power following the legislative elections select a
prime minister and ministers are selected by the prime minister and approved by the house of
people’s representatives. The prime minister presides over the council of ministers, and is
responsible for formal administrative function of government.

The legislative branch of Ethiopian government consists of two party parliaments. The upper
chamber is called the house of federation and the lower chamber is the House of People’s
Representatives. The house federation has 117 seats, which are filled by representatives
chosen by states assemblies to serve five year terms. And the House of people’s
representatives has 548 seats, which are filled by a direct popular vote of the peoples of each
district.

In Ethiopia’s parliamentary form of government, the federal Supreme Court forms the
judicial branch of the government. The president and vice-president of the federal Supreme
Court are recommended by the prime minister and appointed by the house of people’s
representatives. Other federal judges are chosen by the federal judicial administrative council
and submitted to the house of people’s representatives for appointment.

5.4. Mushrooming Of Political Parties and Informalization of Politics

In the eve of, and following, the fall of the Derg, political parties emerged in abundance.
Among the major ones in competition were the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
(OPDO); the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM); the Sidama People’s
Democratic Organization (SPDO); the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP); the Bench
Madji People’s Democratic Organization (BMPDO); the Benishangul Gumuz People’s
Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF); the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF, made up of OPDO, ANDM, SEPDO, and TPLF and led by Meles Zenawi in 2010);
the Gedeyo People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (GPRDF); the Guragé Nationalities
Democratic Movement (GNDM); the Kafa Shaka People’s Democratic Organization
(KSPDO); the Kembata, Alabaa, and Tembaro (KAT) party; and the South Omo People’s
Democratic Movement (SOPDM). Additionally, there were the Walayta, Gamo, Gofa,
Dawro, and Konta People’s Democratic Organization (WGGPDO); the Afar Revolutionary
Democratic Union Front (ARDUF); the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and
Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE), led by Dr. Beyene Petros in 2010; Southern Ethiopia
People’s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), also led by Dr. Beyene Petros in 2010; and scores
of other minor parties and interest groups. Right from the start, the TPLF provided many of
the parties that were its own satellites with political leadership, ideological direction, and
security protection, whereas the others have had to fend for themselves in the elections
conducted thus far.

Of the parties that were prominent after the EPRDF came to power, a few played prominent
roles. Among them was the All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), which was
established by Emperor Haile Selassie’s personal physician, Dr. Asrat Woldeyes; Hailu
Shawel; and Nekea Tibeb in November 1991. This party claimed to represent the interest of
the Amharas and opposed the ethnic policies of the EPRDF. Its president, Dr. Asrat
Woldeyes, was later jailed after being accused of calling for armed rebellion to overthrow the
state. This party was later transformed by Ato Hailu Shawel into the All Ethiopian Unity
Party.

The Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE) was
created following the Addis Ababa conference of December 18 to 22, 1993. The meeting was
led by Dr. Beyene Petros, president of the Hadiya National Democratic Organization
(HNDO). The founding members of the CAFPDE were the following: the Agew People’s
Democratic Movement (APDO); the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU); the Kembata
People’s Congress (KPC); the National Democratic Union (NDU); the Joint Political Forum
(TJPF); and the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), which included
the Burji People’s Democratic Organization (BPDO), the Gedeo People’s Democratic
Organization (GPDO), the Gurage People’s Democratic Front (GPDF), the Kaff a People’s
Democratic Union (KPDU), the Kembata People’s Congress (KPC), the Omo People’s
Democratic Front (OPDF), the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), the Wolayta People’s
Democratic Front (WPDF), and the Yem Nationality Democratic Movement (YNDM).

The Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) was established in April 1991, at a
conference in Washington, DC, strongly backed by exiles. The organizers were the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Meison), the
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), and the Tigray Democratic People’s Movement
(TDPM), along with prominent civic groups and human rights and community associations.
The COEDF as a party is multiethnic, and it is known for organizing the Paris Peace and
Reconciliation Conference and later the Addis Ababa Conference held in December 1993.

The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), known by its Amharic name Kinijit, was a
party that derived from the merging of the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), the United
Ethiopian Democratic Party–Medhin (UEDP-Medhin), Kestedamena, and the Ethiopian
Democratic League. When it entered the 2005 elections, Kinijit claimed to advance unity,
peace, and democracy, as well as the rule of law, and said it wished to free Ethiopia from
ethnic-based authoritarian rule.

After the demise of the once-powerful party Kinijit, or CUD—which splintered into three
major factions, led by Hailu Shawel, Bertukan Mideksa, and Berhanu Nega, the last one
advocating an armed struggle—the main opposition parties met again and created the Forum
for Democratic Dialogue (FDD), known by its Amharic designation Medrek. Medkrek is
made up of a dozen parties; among them are the Oromo People’s Congress (OPC) and the
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), led by Dr. Merera Gudina; Unity for
Democracy and Justice (UDJ), led by Judge Bertoukan Mideksa, who is currently serving a
life sentence; Arena Tigray for Democracy and Sovereignty, based in the province of Tigray
and led by the former president of Tigray, Gebru Asrat, and former defense minister of
Ethiopia, Siye Abraha; the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), led by Bulcha
Demeksa; and the Somali Democratic Alliance Forces (SDAF). There are also individual
members participating in Medrek. One is the former president of Ethiopia, Dr. Negasso
Gidada.

Medrek’s platform asks for the reform of the electoral system and the reduction of executive
powers. It promotes the creation of a new educational policy whereby the current system of
general education, which ends in grade 10, would be extended to 12th grade as was the case
before the EPRDF came to power. Medrek elevates democracy and asks that decentralization
take place and regions in Ethiopia be fully autonomous. Members suggest that Afan Oromo
should become Ethiopia’s official language, together with Amharic. The parties insist that
genuine federal structure be created. They are no longer insisting that the secession clause,
article 39, be rescinded immediately. Their platform asks for ending Ethiopia’s status as the
largest landlocked country in the world by regaining the Asab port from Eritrea. It demands
that the present policy of state-owned land be replaced by privatization.

Chapter Seven: Changes and Continuities

Every government and their activities always passed through different continuities and
changes. The same is true for Ethiopia’s successive regimes. Starting from ancient time to
this present time Ethiopia passed through different political dynamism.

During the ancient time of Da’amat and Axumite period Ethiopia in terms of geography and
demography limited to the northern part of Ethiopia which excludes many ethnic groups of
the centre south and south. Socio-economic and political structure and its modus operandi has
been changed over time. Since its modern formation starting from the era of Emperor
Tewdros II, Ethiopia tried to institutionalize the state in modern form. For instance modern
army, government structure from some sort of decentralization to centralized form of
government, expansion to the south, state society relations, state-religious relation,
regionalism and ethnicity as an ideology were used.

Even if their ideology and objectives were the same, Yohanness IV change his approach in
building the state; by allowing some sort of autonomy for regional lords through controlled
regionalism. Emperor Menilik also works on to create empire state with a single identity out
of diverse ethnic identities. In terms of modernization changes were observed; however,
suppression, expansion through use of force, assimilation, different political conspiracy
against one another and slavery continued. Haile Sellassie aslo continued the same trend; in
terms state building and nation building. Of course he contributed much in completing some
of the modernization process started by Menilik. However, still the modernization process
and any changes brought to the empire are all for the advantages of Abyssinian forces and
nobilities.

He consolidated the empire building process through assimilation and suppression other
identities and nations. He introduce the first written constitution, some modern government
structure, ministerial offices, however, all reforms and changes lack implementation and used
for creating his absolute power over the Ethiopian state.

Derg regime comes to power through coup det at with combination of people’s movement
against the imperial regime of Haile Selissie. There are also some changes and continuities in
the methods of coming to power and controlling the government office; for instance, use of
forced, coup, revolution, people’s movement, pseudo election and etc. Even though it call
Republic, Derg continued a highly centralized unitary form of government and monopolized
by a group the lower military echelon. Derg used extreme forces to avoid its rivals which
highly affect the country’s human and economic resources.
TPLF led EPRDF government came to power since 1991 through revolution. It introduces
new government structure which could be taken as the synthesis of all successive regimes
before it. Liberal constitution, federalization of the state, free market economy and multi-
party system; however, it fails to fulfil promises and implement on the ground. This finally
leads to public discontent in the country brought some sort of reforms in 2018.

Example: the similarities in structure between the Derg’s and Haile Selassie’s administration
of this dependent state can be shown as follows:

Haile Sellassie Mengistu Haile

Mariam

 The crown council Ministry of the interior- central planning of interior Ministries
 Awraja governer -Awaraja administrator
 Wored - - Woreda Administrators

 Atbia -Peasant Associations (kebele)
 Balabat -Peasant association officers