Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf
Article 2 The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
mem bership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 4. All
Members shall refrain in their interna tional relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political inde pendence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
4. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accord ance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforce ment action.
5. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
6. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Mem bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement meas
ures under Chapter VII
Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986)1:
1. On 9 April 1984 the Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Netherlands filed in
the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United States of
America in respect of a dispute concerning responsibility for military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. In order to found the jurisdiction of the Court the
Application relied on declarations made by the Parties accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court under Article 36 of the Statute.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was at once
communicated to the Government of the United States of America. In accordance with
paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified
of the Application.
15. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were presented on
behalf of the Government of Nicaragua : in the Application "Nicaragua, reserving the right to
supplement or to amend this Application and subject to the presentation to the Court of the
relevant evidence and legal argument, requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows :
(a) That the United States, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and
otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in
and against Nicaragua, has violated and is violating its express charter and treaty obligations
to Nicaragua, and in particular, its charter and treaty obligations under : - Article 2 (4) of the
United Nations Charter ; - Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States ; - Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States ; - Article 1, Third, of the
Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.
(b) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary
international law, has violated and is violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua by :
- armed attacks against Nicaragua by air, land and sea ; - incursions into
Nicaraguan territorial waters ; - aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace ; -
efforts by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the
Government of Nicaragua.
(c) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary
international law, has used and is using force and the threat of force against Nicaragua.
1
Nicabura_case_on_sovereignity[1].pdf
(d) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary
international law, has intervened and is intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua.
(e) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary
international law, has infringed and is infringing the freedom of the high seas and interrupting
peaceful maritime commerce.
f) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary
international law, has killed, wounded and kidnapped and is killing, wounding and
kidnapping citizens of Nicaragua.
23. As a matter of law, Nicaragua claims, inter alia, that the United States has acted in
violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, and of a customary
international law obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force ; that its actions amount
to inter- vention in the interna1 affairs of Nicaragua, in breach of the Charter of the
Organization of American States and of rules of customary international law forbidding
intervention ; and that the United States has acted in violation of the sovereignty of
Nicaragua, and in violation of a number of other obligations established in general customary
international law and in the inter-American system. The actions of the United States are also
claimed by Nicaragua to be such as to defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded between the Parties in 1956, and to be in
breach of provisions of that Treaty.
202. The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct
its affairs without outside interference ; though examples of trespass against this principle are
not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parce1 of customary international law.
As the Court has observed : "Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty
is an essential foundation of international relations" (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35), and
international law requires political integrity also to be respected. Expressions of an opinio
juris regarding the existence of the principle of non-intervention in customary international
law are numerous and not difficult to find. Of course, statements whereby States avow their
recognition of the principles of international law set forth in the United Nations Charter
cannot strictly be interpreted as applying to the principle of non-intervention by States in the
interna1 and external affairs of other States, since this principleis not, as such, spelt out in
thecharter. But it was never intended that the Charter should embody written confirmation of
every essential principle of international law in force. The existence in the opinio juris of
States of the principle of non-intervention is backed by established and substantial practice. It
has moreover been presented as a corollary of the principle of the sovereign equality of
States. A particular instance of this is General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV), the Decla-
ration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Rela- tions and Co-
operation among States. In the Corfu Channel case, when a State claimed a right of
intervention in order to secure evidence in the territory of another State for submission to an
international tribunal (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 34), the Court observed that :
212. The Court should now mention the principle of respect for State sovereignty, which in
international law is of course closely linked with the principles of the prohibition of the use of
force and of non-intervention. The basic legal concept of State sovereignty in customary
international law, expressed in, inter alia, Article 2. paragraph 1, of the United Nations
Charter, extends to the internal waters and territorial sea of every State and to the air space
above its territory. As to superjacent air space, the 1944 Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation (Art. 1) reproduces the established principle of the complete and exclusive
sovereignty of a State over the air space above its territory. That convention, in con- junction
with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further specifies that the sovereignty
of the coastal State extends to the territorial sea and to the air space above it, as does the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 1982. The Court
has no doubt that these prescriptions of treaty-law merely respond to firmly established and
longstanding tenets of customary international law.
213. The duty of every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of others is to be considered
for the appraisal to be made of the facts relating to the mining which occurred along
Nicaragua's coasts. The legal rules in the light of which these acts of mining should be judged
depend upon where they took place. The laying of mines within the ports of another State is
governed by the law relating to internal waters, which are subject to the sovereignty of the
coastal State. The position is similar as regards mines placed in the territorial sea. It is
therefore the sovereignty of the coastal State which is affected in such cases. It is also by
virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports.
252. These violations cannot be justified either by collective self- defence, for which, as the
Court has recognized, the necessary circum- stances are lacking, nor by any right of the
United States to take counter- measures involving the use of force in the event of intervention
by Nica- ragua in El Salvador, since no such right exists under the applicable international
law. They cannot be justified by the activities in El Salvador attributed to the Government of
Nicaragua. The latter activities, assuming that they did in fact occur, do not bring into effect
any right belonging to the United States which wouldjustify the actions in question.
Accordingly, such actions constitute violations of Nicaragua's sovereignty under cus- tomary
international law.
(11) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on
Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general
embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under
Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties
signed at Managua on 21 January 1956 ; IN FAVOUR : President Nagendra Singh ; Vice-
President de Lacharrière ; Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara, Mbaye, Bedjaoui,
Ni and Evensen ; Judge ad hoc Colliard ;
(12) By twelve votes to three, Decides that the United States of America is under a duty
immediately to cease and to refrain from al1 such acts as may constitute breaches of the
foregoing legal obligations ;
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda (2005)-
That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, by occupying its territory and by actively extending
military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated there,
has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law:
— the principle of non-use of force in international relations, including the prohibition of
aggression;
— the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peaceful means so as to ensure
that international peace and security, as
well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy;
— respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and
hence to choose their own political and economic system freely and without outside
interference;
— the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States,
including refraining from extending any assistance to the parties to a civil war operating on
the territory of another State.
2. That the Republic of Uganda, by committing acts of violence against nationals of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, by killing and injuring them or despoiling them of their
property, by failing to take adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the
DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and/or failing to punish persons under its
jurisdiction or control having engaged in the abovementioned acts, has violated the following
principles of conventional and customary law:
— the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obligation to respect, and
ensure respect for, fundamental human rights,
including in times of armed conflict, in accordance with international humanitarian law;
— the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obligation, at all times, to
make a distinction in an armed conflict
between civilian and military objectives;
— the right of Congolese nationals to enjoy the most basic rights, both
civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural.
In its first submission the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare: “1. That the
Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, by occupying its territory and by actively extending
military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated there,
has violated the following principles of conventional and customary law: — the principle of
non-use of force in international relations, including the prohibition of aggression; — the
obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peaceful means so as to ensure that
international peace and security, as well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy; — respect for
the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples
163. The Court considers that the obligations arising under the principles of non-use of force
and non-intervention were violated by Uganda even if the objectives of Uganda were not to
overthrow President Kabila, and were directed to securing towns and airports for reason of its
perceived security needs, and in support of the parallel activity of those engaged in civil war.
164. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court made it clear that the principle of non-
intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed
force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108, para.
206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented with probative evidence
as to military intervention. The Court further affirms that acts which breach the principle of
non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a
breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para.
209).
165. In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly concludes
that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC.
Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC and in
the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a
magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. to self-determination,
and hence to choose their own political and economic system freely and without outside
interference; — the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of States, including refraining from extending any assistance to the parties to a civil war
operating on the territory of another State.”
164. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court made it clear that the principle of non-
intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed
force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108, para.
206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented with probative evidence
as to military intervention. The Court further affirms that acts which breach the principle of
non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a
breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para.
209)
165. In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly concludes
that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC.
Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC and in
the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a
magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.
164. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court made it clear that the principle of non-
intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed
force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108, para.
206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented with probative evidence
as to military intervention. The Court further affirms that acts which breach the principle of
non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a
breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para.
209). 165. In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly
concludes that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the
DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC
and in the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a
magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.
266. It is recalled that, in its Counter-Memorial, Uganda submitted three counter-claims (see
paragraph 5 above). Uganda’s counter-claims were presented in Chapter XVIII of the
Counter-Memorial. Uganda’s first counter-claim related to acts of aggression allegedly
committed by the DRC against Uganda. Uganda contended that the DRC had acted in
violation of the principle of the non-use of force incorporated in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
United Nations Charter and found in customary international law, and of the principle of non-
intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Uganda’s second counter-
claim related to attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa, and on
Ugandan nationals, for which the DRC is alleged to be responsible. Uganda contended that
the acts of the DRC amounted to an illegal use of force, and were in breach of certain rules of
conventional or customary international law relating to the protection of persons and
property. Uganda’s third counter-claim related to alleged violations by the DRC of specific
provisions of the Lusaka Agreement. Uganda also requested that the Court reserve the issue
of reparation in relation to the counter-claims for a subsequent stage of the proceedings (see
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 664, para. 4).
314. The DRC contends that Uganda’s second counter-claim is partially inadmissible on the
ground that Uganda has ascribed new legal bases in its Rejoinder to the DRC’s responsibility
by including claims based on the violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. According to the DRC, Uganda thus breaks the connection with the principal
claim, which refers to “the violation of the United Nations Charter provisions on the use of
force and on non-intervention, as well as the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the
protection of persons and property in time of occupation and armed conflict”. The DRC also
asserts that the alleged modification of the subject-matter of this part of the dispute is
manifestly incompatible with the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001.
THE COURT, (1) By sixteen votes to one, Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in
military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by
occupying Ituri and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support
to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-
use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention;
Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648 in Münster (Germany), ended the Thirty Years’
War, which started with an anti-Habsburg revolt in Bohemia in 1618 but became an
entanglement of different conflicts concerning the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire,
religion, and the state system of Europe.
This contest was a civil “German war,” but foreign powers played a crucial role. The Peace
of Westphalia ended with the signing of two treaties between the empire and the new great
powers, Sweden and France, and settled the conflicts inside the empire with their guarantees.
A new electorate was established for the exiled son of the revolt’s leader, the elector Palatine.
Bavaria kept the electorate that it had been given for its support of the emperor Ferdinand II
during the revolt.
This compromise in 1648 meant a change of the empire’s fundamental Golden Bull of 1356
and was a symbol that all conflicts occurring since 1618 were resolved and that those who
made peace did not avoid radical cuts and invented fresh ideas in order to make peace.
Catholics and Protestants (now including Calvinists as well as Lutherans) accepted each
other. Several regulations guaranteed their balance: 1624 was declared the “normal year” of
any territory’s denomination, minorities were tolerated or had a right to emigrate, and no one
could be forced to convert any longer.
The Peace of Westphalia is regarded as a milestone in the development toward tolerance and
secularization. This settlement also strengthened the imperial Estates: they could enter into
foreign alliances and decide important matters, such as peace and war, along with the
emperor. The suspected ambition of the Habsburgs for a “universal monarchy” was thereby
controlled, in particular because the Franco-Spanish negotiations in Münster did not bring
peace between France and Spain and left open conflict areas, such as Lorraine. Moreover,
France and Sweden got territorial “satisfaction,” especially in Alsace and Pomerania. The
Peace of Westphalia also confirmed the legal independence of the Swiss Confederation,
whereas by a separate peace with Spain, in Münster, the United Provinces of the Netherlands
officially became a sovereign state after eighty years of war.
The Peace of Westphalia was crucial in German and international history. Its precise role in
the European state system and international law is, however, subject to controversy, such as
the debate over the “Westphalian System” in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
Controversies about the Peace of Westphalia are not new. The history of its reception and
interpretation is as long as the history of its emergence. Unquestionably, though, the
negotiations were a milestone in diplomacy and peacemaking. Sources on the peace are most
valuable for always changing methods and perspectives of history. Research on the Peace of
Westphalia increased enormously with its 350th anniversary in 1998 and its several
conferences and exhibitions.
United Nations Charter Article 1(2):
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
colletive measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in con formity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of inter national disputes or situations which might lead
to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all with out
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
Genocide Convention, 1948: Article I:
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention
%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of
%20Genocide.pdf
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Principle of self-determination
https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm
Self-Determination Integral to Basic Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms, Third
Committee Told as It Concludes General Discussion
The right to self-determination was an integral element of basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) heard today
as it concluded its general discussion on that subject, and on the elimination of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
“It is only through the realization of this very basic right of people to determine, with no
compulsion or coercion, their own future, political status and independence that we can begin
to address others such as dignity, justice, progress and equity,” said the representative of
Maldives. Yet millions of people were stripped of the right to determine their own fate, due
either to military intervention, aggression, occupation or to exploitation by foreign Powers.
International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute, Article 641:
For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
