Article 2(4) of the UN Charter

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

A.1 Some examples of uses of force that are generally considered to fall within the scope of
Article 2 (4) include:

o Using force on the territory of another state

o Using force to reclaim disputed territory

o Using force directly arising from a political dispute between states

https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Wood_article.pdf

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/prohibited-force/contextual-elements-of-a-prohibited-
use-of-force/2A397504F38FFA9DE9600879761A904C

https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/
20.500.13051/13231/17_53YaleLJ207_1943_1944_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986)1:

On 9 Apnl 1984 the Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the

Netherlands filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting pro-

ceedings against the United States of America in respect of a dispute concerning

responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua.

In order to found the jurisdiction of the Court the Application relied on declara-

tions made by the Parties accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court

under Article 36 of the Statute.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was at

once communicated to the Government of the United States of America. In

accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, al1 other States entitled to appear

1
Nicabura_case_on_sovereignity[1].pdf
before the Court were notified of the Application.

3. At the same time as the Application was filed, the Republic of Nicaragua

also filed a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of

the Statute. By an Order dated 10 May 1984, the Court rejected a request made

by the United States for removal of the case from the list, indicated, pending its

final decision in the proceedings, certain provisional measures, and decided that,

until the Court delivers its final judgment in the case, it would keep the matters

covered by the Order continuously under review.

The Court should now mention the principle of respect for State

sovereignty, which in international law is of course closely linked with the

principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention.

The basic legal concept of State sovereignty in customary international

law, expressed in, inter alia, Article 2. paragraph 1, of the United Nations

Charter, extends to the internal waters and territorial sea of every State and

to the air space above its territory. As to superjacent air space, the 1944

Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Art. 1) reproduces

the established principle of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a

State over the air space above its territory. That convention, in con-

junction with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further

specifies that the sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the territorial

sea and to the air space above it, as does the United Nations Convention

on the Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 1982. The Court has no

doubt that these prescriptions of treaty-law merely respond to firmly

established and longstanding tenets of customary international law.

213. The duty of every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of

others is to be considered for the appraisal to be made of the facts relating

to the mining which occurred along Nicaragua's coasts. The legal rules in

the light of which these acts of mining should be judged depend upon

where they took place. The laying of mines within the ports of another

State is governed by the law relating to internal waters, which are subject to

the sovereignty of the coastal State. The position is similar as regards mines

placed in the territorial sea. It is therefore the sovereignty of the coastal

State which is affected in such cases. It is also by virtue of its sovereignty

that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports.

The finding of the United States Congress also expressed the view that the Nicaraguan
Government had taken "significant steps towards establishing a totalitarian Communist
dictatorship". However the régime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any
particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law ; to hold
otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty. on which
the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social,
economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua's domestic policy options,
even assuming that they correspond to the description given of them by the Congress finding,
cannot justify on the legal plane the various actions of the Respondent complained of. The
Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one
State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or
political system.

Similar considerations apply to the criticisms expressed by the United States of the external
policies and alliances of Nicaragua. Whatever the impact of individual alliances on regional
or international political- military balances, the Court is only competent to consider such
questions from the standpoint of international law. From that aspect, it is sufficient to say that
State sovereignty evidently extends to the area of its foreign policy, and that there is no rule
of customary international law to prevent a State from choosing and conducting a foreign
policy in co-ordination with that of another State.
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda (2005)-

. That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary

activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by occupying

its territory and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and

financial support to irregular forces having operated there, has violated

the following principles of conventional and customary law:

— the principle of non-use of force in international relations, including the prohibition of

aggression;

— the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by peaceful means so as to ensure

that international peace and security, as

well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy;

— respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to

self-determination, and hence to choose their own political and economic system freely and
without outside interference;

— the principle of non-intervention in matters within the domestic

jurisdiction of States, including refraining from extending any assistance to the parties to a
civil war operating on the territory of

another State.

2. That the Republic of Uganda, by committing acts of violence against

nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by killing and

injuring them or despoiling them of their property, by failing to take

adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the DRC

by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and/or failing to punish

persons under its jurisdiction or control having engaged in the abovementioned acts, has
violated the following principles of conventional

and customary law:

— the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obligation to respect, and
ensure respect for, fundamental human rights,

including in times of armed conflict, in accordance with international humanitarian law;

— the principle of conventional and customary law imposing an obligation, at all times, to
make a distinction in an armed conflict

between civilian and military objectives;

— the right of Congolese nationals to enjoy the most basic rights, both

civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural.

. In its first submission the DRC requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

“1. That the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

by occupying its territory and by actively extending military,

logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces

having operated there, has violated the following principles of

conventional and customary law:

— the principle of non-use of force in international relations,

including the prohibition of aggression;

— the obligation to settle international disputes exclusively by

peaceful means so as to ensure that international peace and

security, as well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy;

— respect for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples

163. The Court considers that the obligations arising under the principles of non-use of force
and non-intervention were violated by Uganda

even if the objectives of Uganda were not to overthrow President Kabila,

and were directed to securing towns and airports for reason of its perceived security needs,
and in support of the parallel activity of those

engaged in civil war.

164. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court

made it clear that the principle of non-intervention prohibits a State “to

intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support

of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108,

para. 206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented

with probative evidence as to military intervention. The Court further

affirms that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention “will

also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a

breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations”

(ibid., pp. 109-110, para. 209).

165. In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court

accordingly concludes that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also

the territorial integrity of the DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted

an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC and in the civil war

there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such

a magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.
to self-determination, and hence to choose their own political and economic system freely
and without outside interference;

— the principle of non-intervention in matters within the

domestic jurisdiction of States, including refraining from

extending any assistance to the parties to a civil war

operating on the territory of another State.”

164. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court made it clear that the principle of non-
intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed
force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108, para.
206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented with probative evidence
as to military intervention. The Court further affirms that acts which breach the principle of
non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a
breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para.
209)

165. In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly concludes
that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the DRC.
Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC and in
the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a
magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

164. In the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), the Court made it clear that the principle of non-
intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed
force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 108, para.
206). The Court notes that in the present case it has been presented with probative evidence
as to military intervention. The Court further affirms that acts which breach the principle of
non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a
breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para.
209). 165. In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court accordingly
concludes that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the territorial integrity of the
DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the DRC
and in the civil war there raging. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a
magnitude and duration that the Court considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition
on the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

266. It is recalled that, in its Counter-Memorial, Uganda submitted three counter-claims (see
paragraph 5 above). Uganda’s counter-claims were presented in Chapter XVIII of the
Counter-Memorial. Uganda’s first counter-claim related to acts of aggression allegedly
committed by the DRC against Uganda. Uganda contended that the DRC had acted in
violation of the principle of the non-use of force incorporated in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
United Nations Charter and found in customary international law, and of the principle of non-
intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Uganda’s second counter-
claim related to attacks on Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in Kinshasa, and on
Ugandan nationals, for which the DRC is alleged to be responsible. Uganda contended that
the acts of the DRC amounted to an illegal use of force, and were in breach of certain rules of
conventional or customary international law relating to the protection of persons and
property. Uganda’s third counter-claim related to alleged violations by the DRC of specific
provisions of the Lusaka Agreement. Uganda also requested that the Court reserve the issue
of reparation in relation to the counter-claims for a subsequent stage of the proceedings (see
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 664, para. 4).

314. The DRC contends that Uganda’s second counter-claim is partially inadmissible on the
ground that Uganda has ascribed new legal bases in its Rejoinder to the DRC’s responsibility
by including claims based on the violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. According to the DRC, Uganda thus breaks the connection with the principal
claim, which refers to “the violation of the United Nations Charter provisions on the use of
force and on non-intervention, as well as the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the
protection of persons and property in time of occupation and armed conflict”. The DRC also
asserts that the alleged modification of the subject-matter of this part of the dispute is
manifestly incompatible with the Court’s Order of 29 November 2001.
THE COURT, (1) By sixteen votes to one, Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in
military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by
occupying Ituri and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial support
to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-
use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention;

treaty of Westphalia (1648).

Article 2(7) of the UN Charter

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

NATO's Kosovo intervention in 1999

Lotus case

o (para. 50): Criminal law is fundamentally territorial, meaning a state has the
right to enforce its criminal laws within its own borders. However, many legal
systems extend their jurisdiction beyond national borders, applying their
criminal laws to offenses committed outside their territory. This could be
through mechanisms like the principle of nationality, where a state prosecutes
its own citizens for crimes committed abroad, or the protective principle,
where a state enforces laws to protect its essential interests even for acts outside
its borders. This implies that while territoriality is key, it is not an absolute
principle in international law and does not perfectly align with the concept of
territorial sovereignty.

o (para. 169): A state's criminal jurisdiction is inherently tied to its territorial

sovereignty. This means a state generally cannot exercise its criminal
jurisdiction beyond its own territory without legal justification (e.g., through
treaties or international agreements). Unlawful exercises of criminal
jurisdiction outside a state's territory, such as investigations or prosecutions
 conducted without consent, would violate the territorial sovereignty of the state
where the offense occurred.

United Nations Charter Article 1(2):

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf

Genocide Convention, 1948: Article I:

https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention
%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of
%20Genocide.pdf