Akshat Sharma

Professor Sanjal Shastri

INRS302
30th November 2024

Transitional Justice in Rwanda: Establishing Positive Peace in the Post-Genocide Era

Introduction

The 1994 Rwandan genocide, a catastrophic event in human history, resulted in the murder of
nearly 800,000 Tutsi, the minority ethnic group in Rwanda, by the majority Hutu population. The
roots of ethnic tensions in Rwanda can be traced back to German and Belgian colonial rule,
during which the colonial powers adopted a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy that exacerbated
divisions between the two groups. These tensions were socially constructed by the colonizers to
serve their administrative and economic interests. Historically, Hutus and Tutsis had lived
harmoniously for centuries, but colonial policies institutionalized ethnic distinctions, favoring the
Tutsi minority in administrative roles while marginalizing the Hutu majority (Nyseth Nzitatira et
al., 2022).

Following independence in 1962, the Hutu-led government sought to consolidate power,

systematically targeting and marginalizing Tutsis, who were viewed as threats to Hutu power.
Over decades, violence, persecution, and discrimination forced nearly half of the Tutsi
population to flee Rwanda. In exile, Tutsi refugees formed militias, including the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), which later launched an invasion of Rwanda in 1990, sparking the
Rwandan Civil War. A brief ceasefire in 1993, brokered under the Arusha Accords, was shattered
in 1994 with the assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, whose plane was
shot down under mysterious circumstances (Geraghty, 2020).

The president’s assassination served as the catalyst for the genocide. In its aftermath, extremist
Hutu leaders seized control of the government and launched a campaign calling for the ‘total
annihilation’ of the Tutsi population. The government, military, and local militias such as the
Interahamwe coordinated the mass killings, arming civilians and encouraging their participation.
For three months, the genocide unfolded with unparalleled brutality until the RPF, led by Paul
Kagame, defeated the Hutu-led government and took control of the country, effectively ending
the genocide. A major retaliation by the new Tutsi-led government was anticipated, as evidenced
by more than 2 million Hutus fleeing the country out of fear. However, instead of seeking
retribution against the civilian population, the RPF government chose to implement mechanisms
of transitional justice, aiming to espouse accountability, reconciliation, and a foundation for
lasting peace in a country whose socio-economic fabric had been completely shattered
(Geraghty, 2020).
This paper seeks to address the question: How has the implementation of transitional justice
mechanisms contributed to establishing a positive peace in Rwanda following the 1994
genocide? It argues that transitional justice in Rwanda, encompassing both, traditional
mechanisms, such as national rehabilitation programs and unique, and context-dependent
mechanisms, like the Gacaca courts has facilitated reconciliation and acceptance of the truth
among the Rwandan people, building social cohesion, camaraderie, and a common identity. The
healing of past wounds through transitional justice mechanisms has served as the precursor for
transitioning away from a conflict-torn society, aided by efforts at socio-economic upliftment.
The culmination of all these factors, the paper argues, has contributed to the establishment of a
positive peace in Rwanda.

Literature Review

Transitional Justice is defined by the United Nations (2019) as the “processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past conflict,
repression, violations, and abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve
reconciliation.” It is a framework of judicial and non-judicial measures designed to facilitate the
transition from periods of conflict or oppression toward peace and stability (Jones, 2020).
Webber (2012) categorizes transitional justice mechanisms into two distinct approaches:
retrospective justice and prospective justice. Retrospective justice emphasizes accountability by
holding perpetrators accountable through formal legal processes, while prospective justice
prioritizes rebuilding relationships and fostering community healing.

Teitel (2008) further distinguishes transitional justice mechanisms as either general or

context-specific. General mechanisms include widely used approaches such as truth
commissions and criminal trials, while context-specific mechanisms are tailored to the unique
needs of a society. An example of the latter is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid tribunal combining Cambodian and international judges to
prosecute those responsible for the Cambodian genocide. According to Teitel, the short-term aim
of transitional justice is to facilitate reconciliation, marked by social cohesion, through justice,
accountability, and the acceptance of truth. This process serves as the foundation for establishing
positive peace, the ultimate goal of these mechanisms.

The discourse on transitional justice underwent a significant shift in the early 1990s. Prior to this,
transitional justice institutions were often perceived as a threat to national reconciliation. Truth
commissions and criminal tribunals, tasked with investigating divisive and violent histories, were
frequently criticized for “opening old wounds” and generating political instability (de Greiff,
2012). As Leebaw (2008) highlights, a divide also existed among proponents of transitional
justice, where reconciliation was viewed primarily as a pragmatic compromise between
conflicting groups to halt violence, achieving what is often termed negative peace. Truth
commissions, in particular, were seen as secondary to prosecutions, as uncovering painful truths
was believed to perpetuate hatred and conflict rather than healing.

The transitional justice mechanisms implemented in Argentina and Chile illustrate these early
trends. In Argentina, the limited prosecution of the military junta following the Dirty War
reflected a cautious approach to justice, while Chile, after Pinochet’s dictatorship, lacked truth
commissions altogether (Ziadeh, 2014).

The shift in discourse was spearheaded by prominent human rights activists in the early 1990s,
such as Nelson Mandela and José Zalaquett, who argued that truth-telling was essential to
building a society rooted in respect for human rights. They contended that positive peace could
only be achieved when the innate human rights of all individuals are acknowledged and
respected. This universal acknowledgment would serve as the foundation for a regime that treats
all citizens equally and reflects the shared consensus of the people (Leebaw, 2008).
Consequently, the concept of reconciliation was redefined to extend beyond merely stabilizing
and legitimizing state authority. It came to embody the aspiration for a political community
grounded in mutual consent and shared norms. Reconciliation, in this context, became a
transformative process, establishing the trust and solidarity necessary for achieving positive
peace (Gready & Robins, 2020).

Balint et al. (2017) assert that by establishing a historical record of abuses that are denied,
transitional justice institutions seek to challenge conventional understandings of the past,
building a shared history. Where such shared histories are constructed and past atrocities are
acknowledged, reconciliation follows. For this purpose, they cite the successful reconciliation
process of post-apartheid South Africa. According to Leebaw (2008), one of the most common
arguments made on behalf of transitional justice institutions is that they will end impunity, not
only by holding leaders accountable but also by conveying a message to the broader public that,
in the new regime, no one will be above the law. Leebaw further supports this argument by citing
Antonio Cassese, the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), who argued that trials are the only “civilized alternative to revenge” and that
without justice, “feelings of hatred and resentment seething below the surface will, sooner or
later, erupt and lead to renewed violence.”

Victims are at the heart of transitional justice, which prioritizes their rights and dignity as citizens
and human beings. The framework seeks to provide accountability, acknowledgment, and redress
for the harm they have suffered. By placing victims at the center and emphasizing their dignity,
transitional justice offers a pathway toward a renewed social contract — one in which all citizens
are included, and everyone’s rights are protected (van Zyl, 1999).

Transitional justice, while crucial for promoting accountability and reconciliation in post-conflict
societies, is not without significant limitations. A common critique is selective justice, where
mechanisms often disproportionately target certain groups while overlooking others. For
instance, in Bosnia, the ICTY was criticized for focusing primarily on Serbs, ignoring crimes
committed by Croat and Bosniak perpetrators, who largely evaded justice (Zupan, 2007).
Transitional justice mechanisms can also inadvertently re-traumatize survivors, particularly
through truth-telling initiatives. In South Africa, for example, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission required victims to recount their suffering in the presence of perpetrators, often
without adequate emotional or psychological support (van Zyl, 1999). Resource and capacity
constraints pose additional challenges as overburdened systems may lead to rushed judgments or
inadequate reparations. For example, Sierra Leone’s Special Court struggled with limited
funding, affecting its ability to process cases comprehensively (Leib & Ruppel, 2021). Moreover,
the focus on individual accountability in prosecutions often overlooks structural violence and
systemic inequalities that enabled the conflict, such as the enduring economic disparities in
post-apartheid South Africa (Cole, 2007)

Discussion

The first step towards reconciliation in Rwanda was to hold the perpetrators of the genocide
accountable. This was achieved through both: international and local mechanisms. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to prosecute
high-ranking officials responsible for orchestrating the genocide. An international medium for
the prosecution of these officials was advantageous, as the perpetrators were largely wealthy
elites with numerous militias under their command. National and local accountability
mechanisms thus, may not have had the capacity to deliver justice to these individuals as a
consequence of their wealth and influence. The ICTR achieved significant milestones, including
the prosecution of over 93 individuals, with landmark cases such as that of Jean-Paul Akayesu,
the interim Prime Minister, being given a life sentence. By individualizing guilt, the ICTR played
a critical role in countering collective blame, a key factor in fostering reconciliation (Breed,
2023).

The most notable aspect of Rwanda’s transitional justice system are the Gacaca courts, uniquely
adapted from traditional Rwandan conflict-resolution practices to address the aftermath of the
1994 genocide. Following the mass atrocities, Rwanda’s formal judiciary faced insurmountable
challenges, with over 120,000 genocide suspects in custody and a legal system devastated by the
conflict. In response, the Gacaca courts were established in 2001 to decentralize justice and
manage the overwhelming case backlog. Between 2001 and 2012, these community-based courts
processed over 1.2 million cases, significantly reducing the burden on the national judiciary
(Geraghty, 2020).

The structure of the Gacaca courts emphasized community participation. Judges, known as
inyangamugayo (persons of integrity), were elected by their communities and typically had no
formal legal training. Their primary qualifications were moral standing and the trust of their
peers. These courts operated at different levels, with local courts handling less severe crimes,
while district and appellate Gacaca courts addressed more complex cases. This participatory
structure allowed for widespread coverage and localized justice, ensuring community ownership
of the reconciliation process (Geraghty, 2020).

The Gacaca courts aimed to achieve multiple objectives. They provided a platform for
truth-telling, requiring perpetrators to confess their crimes publicly. This not only ensured
accountability but also helped create a collective historical record, countering denial and
misinformation about the genocide. The courts also prioritized reconciliation by facilitating
direct interactions between survivors and perpetrators, addressing violence and human rights
abuses committed in the past often in the presence of community members. This participatory
approach helped rebuild trust within fractured communities and enabled the reintegration of
confessed perpetrators into society, particularly through reduced sentences for those who showed
remorse (Dickson, 2023). The Gacaca courts’ achievements were profound. According to the
Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (2020), 87% of participants believed
the courts contributed to reconciliation, and 90% reported the courts to be important in bringing
justice to victims of violence.

Another important feature of Rwanda’s transitional justice approach was the establishment of a
shared historical narrative to counter denial, a crucial step towards reconciliation. Truth-telling
initiatives, such as those facilitated by the Gacaca courts, encouraged perpetrators to confess and
publicly acknowledge their crimes. National reconciliation programs further reinforced these
efforts. The Ndi Umunyarwanda (“I Am Rwandan”) initiative, launched in 2013, emphasized the
creation of a unified Rwandan identity, moving beyond ethnic divisions. Reflecting elements
from the social constructivist theory, this initiative sought to redefine collective identity by
challenging the socially constructed ethnic distinctions that had been amplified during colonial
rule. This initiative complemented the truth-telling and restorative justice processes of the
Gacaca courts by addressing the root causes of societal fragmentation. Similarly, the Ingando
solidarity camps provided a space for dialogue and education, facilitating mutual understanding
between survivors and perpetrators. These measures contributed to what Galtung (1969) defines
as positive peace, characterized by social cohesion, the restoration of relationships, and the
elimination of structural violence.

The Rwandan government complemented transitional justice mechanisms with socio-economic

programs aimed at rebuilding trust. Initiatives such as the One Cow Per Poor Family (Girinka)
program promoted food security and economic collaboration among communities, while the
Vision 2020 Program (V2020) focused on poverty reduction and infrastructure development.
These programs addressed the economic disparities that had previously exacerbated ethnic
tensions, creating an environment conducive to lasting peace (Dickson, 2023).

Statistical evidence demonstrates the impact of these measures. According to the Rwanda
Governance Board (2021), 95% of Rwandans reported feeling safer in their communities, while
trust between citizens and institutions reached 92%. Moreover, the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission (2020) revealed that 94.7% of Rwandans believe reconciliation is a
daily reality, indicating the success of these initiatives in establishing positive peace.

While Rwanda’s transitional justice mechanisms have been praised for their innovation and
impact, they were not without significant limitations. A primary critique is selective justice,
particularly the failure to prosecute crimes committed by the RPF during and after the genocide.
Human Rights Watch (2019) estimates that RPF soldiers were responsible for the deaths of
nearly 50,000 Hutu civilians, highlighting significant abuses that went unaddressed. This
selective approach undermines the pillar of truth, as it fails to acknowledge that both parties to
the conflict committed atrocities, albeit on vastly different scales. Such an imbalance has fueled
lingering grievances among sections of the Hutu community, who perceive transitional justice as
biased and incomplete (Leebaw, 2008).

The Gacaca courts, while instrumental in addressing the overwhelming caseload of

genocide-related crimes, faced notable challenges in their implementation. Judges elected from
local communities often lacked formal legal training, leading to inconsistent verdicts and
procedural shortcomings. The reliance on community testimonies created opportunities for
personal vendettas and false accusations, further complicating the justice process
(Twagiramungu, 2017). Additionally, the public nature of the hearings frequently resulted in
re-traumatization for survivors, as they were required to recount their experiences and confront
perpetrators without adequate psychological support. Many survivors (44%) continue to suffer
from untreated trauma, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as mental health
resources remain scarce in Rwanda. This poses a major challenge to transitioning away from the
memories of the past (Pham et al., 2004).

Moreover, transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda have been criticized for their limited focus
on addressing structural violence and systemic inequalities. While accountability for individual
crimes was emphasized, insufficient attention was given to the socio-economic conditions and
governance failures that contributed to the genocide. Socio-economic disparities, particularly the
perception of relative deprivation among the Hutu majority compared to the more prosperous
Tutsi minority, played a significant role in fueling resentment and tensions that escalated into
genocide (Twagiramungu, 2017).

Finally, the Rwandan government’s political manipulation of transitional justice mechanisms has
drawn criticism for undermining the process. The RPF is accused of using the justice system to
consolidate power, silence dissent, and enforce a state-controlled narrative of the genocide.
Notably, the RPF has faced criticism for prosecuting only Hutu leaders while shielding its own
Tutsi leaders from accountability. Although Rwanda is formally a democracy, it functions as a de
facto one-party state under RPF dominance, raising serious concerns about the fairness and
inclusivity of its transitional justice efforts (Khan, 2022).
Conclusion

While Rwanda’s transitional justice mechanisms have achieved significant progress in

addressing the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the journey toward lasting reconciliation and
equitable peace remains incomplete. Initiatives such as the Gacaca courts, Ndi Umunyarwanda,
and socio-economic programs like Girinka and Vision 2020 have addressed key aspects of
accountability, national unity, and economic rebuilding. However, persistent challenges continue
to pose barriers to a truly inclusive and sustainable peace.

Looking ahead, a complete transition to democracy is essential for Rwanda’s future. Establishing
genuine political pluralism, safeguarding freedom of expression, and creating space for diverse
voices will strengthen trust in state institutions and ensure that justice mechanisms are impartial
and representative of all Rwandans. Mechanisms to ensure accountability at all levels of
governance and promote open dialogue are critical for advancing reconciliation and fostering
social cohesion. Additionally, addressing socio-economic challenges is vital for building a
cohesive society. Currently, 49% of Rwandans live in multidimensional poverty, while the
unemployment rate stands at 16.8%, with rural areas disproportionately affected compared to
urban regions (Khan, 2022). Bridging this rural-urban divide and reducing inequalities are
crucial steps for social harmony. Finally, addressing the lingering psychological scars of the
genocide remains a critical priority. Expanding access to mental health services, particularly for
survivors suffering from PTSD, is essential to supporting both individual recovery and broader
societal reconciliation.
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