DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
 Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

An Illustrated Overview of ESM and ECM Systems

by

Goran Sven Erik Pettersson

Major, Swedi^ Army
M.S., Swedish Armed Forces Staff and War College, 1991

Submitted in partial fiilfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

September 1993
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September 993 Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

An Illustrated Overview of ESM and ECM Systems

6. AUTHOR(S)

Pettersson, Goran, S. E.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

Naval Postgraduate School

Monterey, CA 93943-5000

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AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
Naval Postgraduate School I

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11.SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of
the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This thesis gives an overview of electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems.
The objective is to give the intended reader, students of the EW
curriculum new to the subject, an introduction to several
different electronic warfare systems. The thesis consists of seven chapters discussing different areas of EW. The first
two chapters introduce the reader to the definitions of EW and the threat which equipment is designed to counter.EW
The following two chapters are a presentation of typical ESM and ECM systems. The final three chapters cover the
integration of ESM and ECM systems as well as two subjects, suppression of enemy air defense and directed energy
weapons, which differ from the typical ECM systems. Included with each chapter describing systems is a conclusion
section which discusses possible future developments for the group of systems.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

ESM, ECM, Recei\ers, Integrated Svstems, Directed Energy Weapons,

16. PRICE
1^
CODE
Decovs. Chaff

17 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Same as report
NSN 75A0-01 -280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Sid 239-18
298- 102
 ABSTRACT

This thesis gives an overview of electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic

countermeasures (ECM) systems. The objective is to give the intended reader, students of

the EW curriculum new to the subject, an introduction to several different electronic

warfare systems. The thesis consists of seven chapters discussing different areas of EW.

The first two chapters introduce the reader to the definitions of EW and the threat which
EW equipment is designed to counter. The following two chapters are a presentation of

typical ESM and ECM systems. The final three chapters cover the integration of ESM
and ECM systems as well as two subjects, suppression of enemy air defense and directed

energy weapons, which differ from the typical ECM systems Included with each chapter

describing systems is a conclusion section which discusses possible future developments

for the group of systems.

Ill
 .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. PURPOSE 1

B. STRUCTURE 1

II. BACKGROUND 3

A. ELECTRONIC WARFARE 3

B. THE THREAT TO COUNTER 4

L Ground Forces 5

2. Naval Forces 7

3 Air Forces 8

4. Radar 8

5. Laser 9

6. Infrared 10

7 Summary 12

III. ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES 13

A ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES RECEIVERS 14

1. Crystal Video Receiver (CVR) 14

2. Tuned RF Receiver (TRF) 15

3. Superheterodyne Receiver (SHR) 15

4. Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver (IFM) 15

5. Combined Receivers 16

6. Microscan Receiver 16

7. Conventional Channelized Receiver 17

8. Bragg Cell Channelizer 17

iv
 ...
.

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

9. Summary 18

B. ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES SYSTEMS 19

1 Microwave Systems 20

a, AN/SLQ-32 EW System (Raytheon) 20

2 Communications System 23

a. AN/MLQ-34 TACJAM-A (Lockheed Sanders) 23

C. WARNING SYSTEMS 25

1 Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) 25

a. AN/APR-39A(V)3 Threat Warning System (Litton

Applied Technology) 26

b..AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set

(Hughes Aircraft Company) 28

2. Missile Warning Systems (MWS) 31

a. Passive Systems 32

(1). AN/AAR-44 33

(2). AN/AAR-47 33

(3). AN/AAR-FX 34

(4). Silent Attack Warning System (SAWS) 35

b. Active Systems ...35

(1). AN/ALQ-153 Tail Warning Set

(Westinghouse Defense and Electronics Center) 37

(2). AN/ALQ- 156(A) Missile Warning System

(Lockheed Sanders Inc.) 37

3 Laser Warning Systems (LWS) 38

a. AN/AVR-2 (Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc) 40

D. CONCLUSIONS 41

v
 .
. .

IV. ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES 43

A. RADAR COUNTERMEASURES 43

1 General Description 43

a. Noise Jamming 43

b. Radar deception 44

(1). Range-Gate Pull-Off 45

(2). Angle Deception 45

(3), Cross-Eye 45

2. Radar Countermeasures System 46

a. Sidekick (Raytheon) 46

b. AN/ALQ-184(V) Self Protection Pod (Raytheon) 47

B LASER COUNTERMEASURES 49

C. INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES 50

1 General Description 50

2. Infrared Countermeasure Systems 52

a. Matador (LORAL) 52

b. AN/ALQ-144 (Lockheed Sanders Inc) 53

c. Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) 54

D OFFBOARD COUNTERMEASURES 56

1 . General Description 56

a. Chaff 56

b Smoke and Aerosol 58

c. Radar reflectors 59

(1). Replica Naval Decoy (Irvin Great Britain Ltd.) 59

d. IR-Flares 60

e. RF-Expendables 61

vi
 (1). GEN-X, Generic Expendable Cartidge (Texas

Instruments) 61

(2). STRAP, Straight Through Repeater Antenna

Performance (Tracor) 62

(3). Carmen (THORN EMI Electronics) 63

f. Flying Decoys 65

(1) LORALEI (Loral Electro-Optical) 65

(2). TALD, Tactical Air Launched Decoy

(Brunswick Defense) 66

g. Recoverable Decoys 68

(1). AN/SSQ-95 Active Electronic Buoy (Litton,

ATD/Magnavox) 68

(2) AN/TLQ-32 Antiradiation missile decoy (ITT) 68

h. Towed Decoy 69

i. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 71

j. Dispensing Systems for Chaff, IR-flares and RF-decoys 73

(1). RAMPART (ML Aviation Ltd) 75

(2). Shield Tactical Decoy System (Marconi

Underwater Systems Ltd) 75

(3). BOL (Celsius Tech) 77

(4). BOP (Celsius Tech) 78

E. COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES 79

1. General Description 79

2. Communication Countermeasures System 80

a. TACJAM-A (Lockheed Sanders/AEL) 80

b. AD/EXJ AM (Loral Control Systems) 81

vii
 .

F. CONCLUSIONS 81

V. INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS 83

A GENERAL DESCRIPTION 83

B GROUNT) APPLICATIONS 85

1. Vehicle Integrated Defense System, VXDS 85

C. NAVAL APPLICATIONS 85

\ AN/SLQ-3 2 (Raytheon) 85

2. EW 400 (Celsius Tech) 86

3 Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare Suite, AIEWS 87

D AIRBORNE APPLICATIONS 87

1. Integrated Electronic Warfare System, INEWS 87

2. APR-39A(V)2 Threat warning system and Electronic Warfare

Controller (TWS/EWC) 88

E. CONCLUSIONS 89

VI SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE (SEAD) 91

A RADIATION HOMING SYSTEMS 92

1. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, HARM (Texas

Instruments) 92

2. Anti Radiation Missile - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 94

B CONCLUSIONS 95

VII DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 97

A. LASER WEAPONS 98

1 . High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle (MBB,

Diehl) 99

B HIGH-POWERED MICROWAVE (HPM) 101

C. NON-NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) 102

viii
 D. CONCLUSIONS 104

APPENDIX A MONOLITHIC MICROWAVE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT

TECHNOLOGY 105

APPENDIX B TRANSMISSION IN THE ATMOSPHERE 106

APPENDIX C JOINT ELECTRONICS TYPE DESIGNATION SYSTEM

(JETDS) 108

APPENDIX D FORMULAS FOR ECM 109

APPENDIX E LIST OF ACRONYMS HI

LIST OF REFERENCES 115

LIST OF FIGURES 120

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 124

IX
 I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE
This tutorial is written with two main purposes:

- First to be an introduction to ECM and ESM systems for the students of the EW
curriculum and among them especially the international students

- Second to give the author the possibility to investigate a broad spectrum of systems.

B. STRUCTURE
This tutorial categorizes equipment using the traditional definitions, some systems

described fall outside the old EW definition but are included by the new, wider definition.
For each group of equipment there is a short presentation including a description of the

techniques involved One or more typical systems for the group are discussed At the end

of each chapter are the author's conclusions about the systems described and the trends for

the future in that area. These conclusions are based both on discussions with people from

the industry but mostly from the facts amassed during the work for this tutorial.

The information for this unclassified tutorial has been collected from three main

sources:

- Open literature, books and magazines.

- Visits to conferences and exhibitions

- Information from the industry.

Because of military and economical considerations many details about the systems

configuration and performance are secret and have not been made available to the author

1
for inclusion in this tutorial. Also, because the width of the subject many in-depth details

about different systems and technologies have been left out and the reader is

recommended to refer to the sources listed in the tutorial for further information.

The written tutorial is accompanied by five videos from manufacturers of different

systems and by a bank of computerized pictures which either can be shown using

Microsoft PowerPoint or turned into viewgraphs.

 n. BACKGROUND

A. ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Electronic warfare (EW) has traditionally been divided into three categories:

- Electronic Support Measures (ESM).

- Electronic Countermeasures (ECM).

- Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM).

To this group has been added signal intelligence (SIGINT) which in many ways is

similar to ESM but has a longer time perspective.

The general definitions have been:

EW - Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine,

exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which

retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

ESM - Actions taken to search for, intercept, locate and immediately identify radiated

electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition and the tactical

employment of forces Direction finding of radios and radars is an ESM technique.

ECM - Actions taken to prevent or reduce the enemy's effective use of the

electromagnetic spectrum. ECM includes jamming and electronic deception.

ECCM - Actions taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum against

electronic warfare. [Ref 1]

These definitions have been under review and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" Operations

Directorate has suggested the following new definitions:

- Electronic Combat (EC).

 - Electronic Protection (EP).

- Electronic Warfare Support (EWS).

EC includes either electromagnetic or directed energy to attack the entire list of

possible targets with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying enemy capabilities.

EC is the offensive part of EW and is replacing ECM.

EP replaces ECCM and is the protection of friendly forces against friendly or enemy

employment of EW.

EWS replaces ESM and comprises the collection actions primarily geared toward

tactical support of the joint force commander This definition of EWS is more orientated

toward collection so combat threat warning systems will probably rather be a part of EC.

[Ref 2]

The difference between the old and the new definitions is mainly that the new ones

emphasize the use of EW as an offensive weapon, the old definitions were more reactive.

The new definitions also clearly includes directed energy weapons as EW.

B. THE THREAT TO COUNTER

The purpose of this chapter is to give a description of the possible threat to which

different platforms could be exposed. This description is expressed in general terms and is

not intended to be an operational evaluation but rather a summary of the technical

capabilities represented by modern weapon systems The chapter discusses those parts of

the threat arsenal that can be countermeasured by EW-systems at the protected platform.

The main threat against the platforms of ground, naval and airborne forces are identified

and discussed.

4
 1. Ground Forces

The ground forces main platform is the armored vehicle (AV) which includes

both the armored fighting vehicle (AFV) and the main battle tank (MBT). The main threat

against the AV is the anti tank guided missile (ATGM), depending on the terrain in which

the AV operates the threat from ATGM can come from air launched or surface launched

systems. The ATGM guidance system can operate using either IR/EO, radar, TV or laser

technologies. The threat against the AV also includes direct fire from tanks using laser

range finder and thermal sights. Artillery and mortars firing guided munitions are also an

increasing threat with both IR and millimeter wave (MMW) seekers being used (see

Figures 2-1 and 2-2).

s^
v:^K

Figure 2-1. BONUS Guided Artillery Sub-Munitions

Figure 2-2. STRIX IR Guided Mortar Munitions
 2. Naval Forces

The main threat against ships continues to be the anti-ship cruise missile

(ASCM). An example of a modern ASCM is the follow-on to the Exocet. The original

Exocet is a subsonic sea-skimming missile while the one in development will be capable of

Mach 2.0-2.5, with an increase in range from 65 km to 180 km. Some of the larger

Russian ASCM's are capable of even higher speeds but then their mode of attack will not

be sea-skimming but instead a step dive toward the target. Modern ASCM's will also be

equipped with better ECCM and could include multiple sensors such as radar and IR
seekers. The times the missiles are transmitting will also decrease which, together with

the increased speed, reduces the time for defensive reactions. When a navy operates close

to shore there will also be a threat from weapons using laser designators and IR guided

missiles as well as from land based ASCM (see Figure 2-3). [Ref 3, Ref 4]

Figure 2-3. Land Based ASCM

 3. Air Forces

The main threat against aircraft is missiles, radar or EO/IR guided, air or surface

launched. Most aircraft losses in modern conflicts have been caused by IR guided missiles

and often the pilot has been unaware of the attack until impact. The IR missiles is being

improved by taking advantage of progress in detector and seeker area. Modem IR

missiles are not limited to target the aircraft's hot parts, this gives the missiles ability to

attack from all aspects. Modern IR-missiles will also have seekers which work in multiple

bands which makes deception with flares more complicated. Combinations of RF and IR

seekers will also be possible [Ref 5]

4. Radar

Radar has been in use since world war II, first for surveillance but later also for

guidance of weapon systems. Radar systems have traditionally been the main antagonist

for EW systems in a continuous measures - countermeasures race Some of the latest

radar challenges to EW systems are described below;

- Monopulse radar using a single pulse for angle determination which makes

deception techniques used against conical scan radars obsolete

- Low probability of intercept radars, using either spread spectrum, waveform

coding or pulse compression, which will challenge the ECM receivers detection
sensitivity.

- Pulse repetition frequency and carrier agility which limits the effective

generation of noise or false targets.

- High pulse repetition fi^equency which creates a very dense pulse environment

and places high demands on radar warning receivers (RWR) (the largest problem

is not necessary pulses from enemy radar but instead friendly emission from

adjacent battle areas).

 - Phased array antennas which give an opportunity to instantaneously switch the

beam, it is also possible to introduce sidelobe blanking This will make

identification by scan rate obsolete and sidelobe blanking will make sidelobe

jamming to mask a platform in another direction much more difficult. [Ref 6]

For further information about radars the reader is referred to specific radar

literature.

5. Laser

The threat from weapon systems using lasers has increased rapidly during the last

decades. Today lasers are used in several different functions in weapon systems (see

Figure 2-4). The most important applications of lasers in weapon systems include:

- Rangefinders: Range information is provided to fire control systems.

- Designators: the target is illuminated by a laser and the missile homes in on

the radiation reflected from the target.

- Beamriders: the laser is pointed at the target and the missile uses a rear

detector to follow the beam to the target.

- Blinding systems: intense radiation is used to cause temporary blinding of

personnel and sensor damage (see Chapter VIT High Energy Beam Weapons).
 LASER AAA GUNS AREA DEFENSE
. SYSTEMS

LASER ILLUMINATOR
TRACKERS

LASER PORTABLE
BEAMRIDER MISSILES

USER LASER BEAMRIDER

GUIDED MISSILES
MISSLES

LASER TANK
FIRE CONTROL

Figure 2-4. Weapon Systems Using Lasers

6. Infrared

Systems utilizing IR radiation are today in use for both detection and guidance

purposes. So far IR has had its greatest impact in missile seekers and in sights. With the

use of new detector materials today's missile seekers are able to detect longer

wavelengths. The effect of this development is that the IR-missiles are not limited to

homing in on hot objects such as the engine exhaust but instead can attack from a wider

range of engagement angles. There has also been a change in the techniques used by the

seekers since the first IR-missiles appeared in the early 60's (Figure 2-5). The first IR-

missiles were equipped with a chopping reticle which made it possible to reject the

background. The next generation of seekers used a small field of view to scan the area of

10
interest. With the development of the focal plane array (FPA) technology it is today

possible to build staring seekers. The modern seekers constructs a image of the target and

by using a microprocessor the system is able to discriminate the target from the

background. The advanced IR seekers are not susceptible to some of the countermeasures

used against reticle based systems. [Ref 5) For further information about IR-radiation see

Appendix B.

RETICLE "CHOPPING" SEEKERS SCANNING SEEKERS STARING SEEKER

nnDDDD
n nnonn
DaDDDD
DDDDDn
DDDDDD
1970* 1»S0« 20OO*

Figure 2-5. Development of IR Seekers

11
 7. Summary
Table 1 gives a summary over the importance of different threats against different

platforms

TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF THREATS AGAINST DIFFERENT PLATFORMS

Threat/Platform Ground vehicle Ship Aircraft
Radar guided Low High High
missile
Laser guided missile High Low, except at Medium
close ranges
IR guided missile Medium Medium, as part of High
a multi sensor anti-
ship missile

Laser rangefmder High Low Medium, from anti

aircraft artillery

(AAA)
IR/EO sights High Low Medium, from
short range missile
systems and AAA.
Surveillance radar Low High High

12
 m. ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES

The purpose of ESM is to search, intercept, locate and identify sources of enemy

radiation. The information acquired by ESM is used for threat recognition and

deployment of countermeasures. ESM differs from electronic intelligence (ELINT) by

being limited to systems which react in real-time

ESM is divided into two broad categories:

- Warning systems operating in real time and used mainly for self protection.

- Reconnaissance/surveillance systems operating in near real time and used to update

the local electronic order of battle (EGB), for ECM deployment and in some cases

also to give information about target location for launch of missiles. [Ref 1]

The border between the two categories is not distinct and it is common that the

warning systems are called RWR while the reconnaissance/surveillance systems are
referred to as ESM systems.

The ESM system normally consists of the following:

- Antennas.

- Receivers.

- Signal processor.

- Computer with emitter library.

- Display unit.

Different approaches regarding the antennas are used to determine the direction to

the emitter. By using several antennas, normally four, with separate receivers the direction

can be determined by comparing the amplitude from the different receivers or by

comparing the time on arrival. The direction can also be found by using a directional

13
antenna which is rotated There are also special direction finding antenna arrangement like

the Rotman lens (see SLQ-32).

A. ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES RECEIVERS

The receiver is that part of the system which has the largest influence on the

characteristics of the ESM system. There are several different receiver approaches to

achieve the desired characteristics for the system. Below is a short description of the most

important ESM receivers followed by a table describing the different system's

characteristics.

1. Crystal Video Receiver (CVR)

The CVR consists of a frequency multiplexer, detectors, log video amplifiers (see

Figure 3-1). The multiplexer splits the input signal spectrum into bands where it is

detected and amplified.

ComprMslve
RF AmpJMtvr Vld*o
Ampllflef

Band
Video Crystal
MtillifMeier
Video
Band Receiver
w- Vidao
2

CVR
Band 3
Video

Figure 3-1. Crystal Video Receiver

14
 2. Tuned RF Receiver (TRF)

The TRF is an improved CVR, a computer controlled filter is put in front of the

crystal video detector. The filter can be switched in or out and improves the receivers

sensitivity by noise bandwidth reduction and limiting of extraneous signals. The TRF is a

good receiver in a low density environment due to its narrow bandwidth.

3. Superheterodyne Receiver (SHR)

In the SHR the incoming frequency is translated down to a lower intermediate

frequency (IF) before detection (see Figure 3-2) This lower frequency renders possible

filtering and amplification which cannot be performed at the higher frequency. This gives

the SHR higher sensitivity and better frequency selectivity than the CVR.

Y Wide Band
Filter -^^
T
IF Filler
Signal Wideband
f^unprhpt
Fli»d
Frequency
Otcillator

Figure 3-2. Superhetrodyne Receiver

4. Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver (IFM)

The IFM receiver divides the incoming signal into two paths (see Figure 3-3).

By delaying one of the signals a phase shift will occur that is a function of the input

frequency. The two signals are fed into a phase correlator and an envelope detector which

converts the phase difference into frequency information.

15
 Splltt*r

Sin Instantaneous
Y\ Phase
D«t»ctOf
Video
Cot Conversion
Frequency
Information
Frequency
"0" Measurement
Limiting
Ampllftef
Otiay IFM
line

Figure 3-3. Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver

5. Combined Receivers

By combining different types of receiver it is possible to design a system which

provides the advantages of both receivers and eliminates the major disadvantages. A
combination of the IFM, CVR and SHR gives a system which can handle both pulse

Doppler and CW without losing the ability against spread spectrum signals. The system

can take advantages of the SHR narrow bandwidth and use the CVR and/or IFM to cue

the SHR
6. Microscan Receiver

The microscan receiver has many similarities with the SHR. By rapidly sweeping

the local oscillator, the receiver is caused to sweep the entire RF bandwidth in a pulse

width (see Figure 3-4) With increased sweep rate the effective bandwidth becomes wider

but at the same time the sensitivity declines The POI will be excellent but only if the

pulse is long enough to be intercepted at least once during the sweep, if not, which is the

case for some modern radar, the POI will be dramatically reduced By applying different

scan strategies including parking on a signal and varying filter bandwidth the

disadvantages could be overcome.

16
 7. Conventional Channelized Receiver

The channelized receiver is a group of parallel SHRs (see Figure 3-4), this gives a

broad bandwidth and at the same time a high sensitivity and high POI. The disadvantage

with this approach is that the receiver becomes large and expensive. By use of MMIC

(see Appendix A) the cost and size can be reduced and channelized receiver will probably

be the norm in high performance ESM systems.

8. Bragg Cell Channelizer

The Bragg cell is an acousto-optic device which converts RF energy into a

deflection of a laser beam proportional to the frequency of the RF signal (see Figure 3-4).

17
 ^ ^

Mulli
pleier
— Combiner
MulNpleacr
. —j"
— Encoder

Frequency Data
-— Channelized
Receiver
z^
=§^
Local
CHclttators

Detector Array

y Frequeftcy
Tranalaion
FrequerKy
Information
Bragg Cell
Instantaneous
Fourier
Transform
LaMr
Source IFT

^ Frequerwy
Tranaiatlon
- Weight1r>g

Microscan
Compressive
S%wept "nmlf^g
Receiver
Local and Amplifier
OacMlator Sync Ffequer>cy
Data

Figure 3-4. Channelized Receiver / Bragg Cell / Microscan Receiver

9. Summary

Table 2 gives a summary of the characteristics for the different receivers, some of

the features compared might need to be defined:

- Pulse width, minimum length of pulse required for detection by the receiver.

- CW, PRI agile, Frequency agile and Spread Spectrum, the receiver's ability to

detect and measure.

18
TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT RECEIVERS [Ref 7]
Receiver CVR IFM IFM SHR Micro-scan Bragg-cell Conven-
CVRy tional
Features SHR
PW(ns) 40 20 20 50 125 100 35
CW Fair (if Degradable Yes Yes Yes Yes ^'es
equipped
with chopper)
PRI agile Good Good Good Good Fair Good Good
(Imprecise
TOA)
Frequency Fair Good Good Poor Good Good Good
agile (does not
measure
frequency)
Spread Fair Fair Acceptable Poor Fair Good Good
Spectrum (does not (does not
measure measure
frequency) amplitude)
In- Wide Wide Narrow Wide Wide Wide Wide
stantaneous
BW
Frequencv' Poor Good Excellent Good Good Good Good
response
Sensitivity Fair Fair Excellent Fair Good Good Good
POI High High Poor High Higli High High
Simul- Poor Poor Good Moderate Good Good Good
taneous
signals
Immunity to Poor Poor Good Fair Good Good Good
jamming
Dynamic Good Good Excellent Fair Fair Fair Excellent
range
Power con- Lowest Low Medium Low Medium High Highest
sumption
Size& Smallest Small Medium Medium Small Small Large
Weight
Cost Lowest Low Low Low High Medium Highest

[Ref. l,Ref 7]

B. ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES SYSTEMS

ESM systems are normally divided into two categories depending on frequency

coverage, communication surveillance systems (0.5-500 MHz) and microwave

surveillance systems (0.5-20 GHz).

19
 1. Microwave Systems

(L AN/SLQ-32 EW System (Raytheon)

SLQ-32 is a ship-borne threat detection and analysis system (see Figure 3-

5). There are several versions of the system, some of which incorporate ECM (see
chapter V Integrated Electronic Warfare Systems and chapter IV Electronic

Countermeasures. The SLQ-32 is designed to provide warning, identification and

direction finding of radar-guided anti-ship missiles and the radar associated with the

targeting and launch of the missiles. More than 360 systems have been delivered to the

US Navy.

The system consists of two antenna arrays (one for each side of the ship),

IFM and direction finding receivers (DFR), a direction frequency correlator/digital

tracking unit (DFC/DTU), a computer including threat library and a display unit (see

Figure 3-6), The two different receiver types are used to achieve both frequency and

direction. The data from the receivers are correlated in the DFC to form a pulse

descriptor word (PDW), which is then stored by frequency and angle cell in the emitter file

memory. If three or more pulses of this frequency and from this angle are received within

a time interval of 32 ms the DTU notifies the computer that a new emitter is present. The

computer directs the DTU to store pulses of the emitter to provide sufficient pulses for

fiirther analysis. The data is used to calculate pulse repetition interval (PRI), scan period

and type of scan. These parameters are used along with frequency to characterize the

emitter for identification. The observed signals characteristics are compared with the

threat emitter library. The computer sends the emitter information to the display for

fijrther actions by the operator. When an ambiguous identification occurs the system will

treat the emitter as though it is the most threatening of the possible matches.

20
Figure 3-5. AN/SLQ-32 Antenna Array

21
 1 Freq
16 Angle
Direction
Channels Angle
Finding Angle Pulse
Receiver Encoder 1 Rate

16 ^ (DFR)

Presorter
Scan
Type
Display
(DFC DTU) Computer Control
Console

Instantaneous
Frequency
Semi Omni 1
a- Measuring
Receiver
(IFM)
Frequency

Figure 3-6. Block Diagram for AN/SLQ-32

The IFM receiver determines the frequency of the received energy while

the DFR provides the system with angle and amplitude information The IFR uses semi

omni antennas while the DFR uses four multibeam antennas, each covering 90 degrees, to

determine the direction to the emitter(see Figure 3-7). The multibeam antenna determines

the direction by focusing the incoming signals to a point detector representing the

direction of the emitter. The focusing property of the lens is independent of frequency

which makes accurate direction finding possible over a wide frequency band.

22
 Direction Finding
Antenna Elements Collector Receivers
^ A
>>
Signal
Out

Signal

N
Input Microwave
Ports Lens

Figure 3-7. Multibeam Lens Antenna

The display unit presents the data on a polar display which is divided into

three rings. The receiving ship and friendly emitters are shown in the center, hostile

missile emitters are shown in the middle ring while hostile non-missile emitters are shown

in the outer ring. [Ref. 8, Ref. 9, Ref. 10]

2. Communications System

(L AN/MLQ-34 TACJAM-A (Lockheed Sanders)

TACJAM-A is a tactical VHP jamming system The system is deployed on

a tracked vehicle. The ESM part of the system consists of multiple receivers to allow the

system to monitor many frequencies simultaneously The monitoring of frequencies is

computer controlled and the operator inputs frequency range, signal characteristics and

operational characteristics. The receiver automatically scans the desired frequency range

and provides the operator with a report over channels which match the given description

(see Figure 3-8). Multiple stations may be connected by wire or radio to form a

coordinated automatic direction finding and emitter position fixing network. The

demodulated audio output fi-om the receivers is available to the operator through a split

headset.

23
 The block diagram for the ESM part is shown in Figure 3-9. The system

operates as follows:

- The RF distributor interfaces the ESM subsystem to antennas in four

bands.

- The tuner down-converts a broad bandwidth for digitization.

- The acquisition units applies digital FFT for detection and direction

finding.

- The analysis unit provides automatic signal recognition and

demodulation, parallel channels permit high throughput rate.

- The acquisition/analysis (ACQ/ ANAL) automatically optimizes the

system in response to tasking, it selects and schedules signals for

jamming and maintains active and historical data bases.

Frequency range is 20 - 200 MHz. [Ref 8, Ref 11, Ref 12, Ref 13]

TASKING:
SIGNAL FREQUENCY RANGE
SIGNAL CHARACTERISTICS SIGNAL ENVIRONMENT
OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
VOICE CONTENT

OPERATOR ANAUrZES THE

VOICE CONTENT OF SIGNAL TACJAM-A EQUIPMENT
TO MAKE THE FINAL
DETERMINATION
TACJAM-A EQUIPMENT ANALYZES
AND MEASURES THE OF OF EACH
REPORTING DETECTED SIGNAL ONLY THOSE
FREQUENCY .WHICH MATCH THE TASKING ARE
SIGNAL CHARACTERtSTiCS REPORTED TO THE OPERATOR
EMITTER LOCATION FOR FINAL THREAT DETERMINATION
VOICE CONTENT

Figure 3-8. TACJAM-As Man-Machine Interface

24
 - )

CTL/
HF VHF UHF SHF
CAL uw I

r!oc< Hegri (m 45 5' SfWCk Mii-sio-e'oo

I II t
»<«flri (t)) <»4 VC'Crnor Md-siD-eioc
Irtxjl Pov«» (I.W1 :6 A/l.iuOe MH-STD-eiOO
RF DISTRIBUTION
Op«rair*g )omo (C) -i5»i& Ht^TKjry/Son fog/Ti#Tgu* MK-STD-eiOO
'"
^^ »<* **<
TUNER

KEYBOARD
Tcsr
SUN-4
ACQUISITION
ANALYSIS GRAPHIC
ACQUISITION ANALYSIS (optlonaO TERMINAL

ZL
GPS, NAV, MHI (MIL-STO-1S53)
-^ AUDIO
ACQ/ANAL SCSI
DATA LINKS (RS-4Z2)
CONTROUER
SYSTEM CLOCK (10 MHi COAX) — HIGH SPEED JAM BUS

ETHERNET (IEEE-802 3)

Figure 3-9. TACJAM-A Block Diagram

C. WARNING SYSTEMS
1. Radar Warning Receivers (RWR)

The RWR is an ESM system with scaled-back capacity, it was developed to meet

the requirement for deployment in aircraft, submarines and armored vehicles. The

platforms' limited space puts heavy constraints on volume and weight The system should

further provide sufficient warning against radar and be able to distinguish between

different types and modes of operation To be able to provide sufficient warning the RWR
needs to be capable of real time signal processing. The RWR measures the signals
frequency, pulse width, amplitude, angle of arrival and time of arrival. The RWR
compares the measured parameters against a library over known threat emitters. The

amplitude and time/angle of arrival are used to determine the direction and an approximate

distance to the emitter.

25
 The RWR can be equipped with a variety of receivers including crystal video,
wide and narrow band superhetrodyne and tuned radio-frequency. Combinations of

different receivers are also possible to meet the requirement of sensitivity, probability of

intercept and ability to operate in a high pulse density environment. For platforms

operating at high altitude a RWR which can handle a high pulse density is favorable while

a platform operating at low altitude can use a less complex and cheaper RWR with less
capability to handle high pulse densities.

The threat emitters are prioritized depending on the detected mode of operation

(searching, illuminating, tracking or guidance) and weapon system associated with the

identified emitter. The presentation of the threat is normally done both visually by means

of a blinking symbol and audibly with different tones representing different types of threats

or by a synthetic voice describing the threat emitter.

The RWR can either be used as a stand-alone system or as a part in an integrated

EW system (see Chapter V). Two RWRs are described below and they represent two

different types depending on requirements. ALR-39A is designed for helicopters and light

aircraft operating at low level, ALR-67 is a system designed for frontline carrier-based

tactical aircraft. [Ref 1, Ref 14, Ref 15]

CL AN/A PR-39A (1^3 Threat Warning System (Litton Applied Technology)

The ALR-39 is a lightweight radar warning system that provides the pilot

with both audio warning in form of synthetic speech and a graphical presentation of the

threats. The graphical presentation identifies the threat type and the azimuth to the

emitter. It also indicates if the threat is searching or locked and tracking, and when the

lock is broken.

The system consists often units (see Figure 3-10):

26
 - One digital signal processor.

- Two crystal video receivers.

- Four E/J band spiral antennas

- One C/D band omnidirectional blade antenna.

- One display unit.

- One control unit.

MCMCATOH aOXTWO.
V»«T

Figure 3-10. AN/APR-39A(V)3

The system is able to identify the threats by pulse repetition interval (PRI),

pulse width (PW), pulse frequency modulation (PFM) and scan rate. The system does not

measure frequency. The system has the following limitations of detection for different

radar types:

27
 - CW: not possible.

- Pulse Doppler (PD); limited.

- Low effective radiated power (ERP): limited.

- Low probability of intercept (LPI): not possible.

The APR-39s library is capable of storing 200 emitters, it is

reprogrammable either by change of the user data module or through a memory loader.

[Ref 8, Ref 16]

b..AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set (Hughes Aircraft

Company)

The ALR-67 is a faurth generation RWR It is a compact system designed

with MMIC (see Appendix A). The system consists of both channelized and

superhetrodyne receivers to enhance detection of all relevant radar threats. Thanks to the

use of three different types of antennas the ALR-67 can provide coverage of all

polarization in the microwave threat band including the millimeter wave (MMW). The

system is designed to be able to operate in a very dense pulse environment. The systems

different parts and their location at the aircraft are shown in Figure 3-1 1 and 3-12.

28
 Signal g'/
Interception

Receiver

RFDown
Conversion ^-^ Signal
and Detection
Millimeter and
Wave Signal Conditioning
Conditioning

Pulse/CW Detection and Generation ^p? -;^:^ Countefmeasures

of Signal Description

Countermeasures
Threat Identification and Prioritization
Computer
Si^ AudiO
Tones
and
Azlmutfi Display
Pilot
Visual Presentation
of Threats
kidlcator
— ^>-^^L. Interfaces
Control SUtusUnIt to System

Figure 3-11. AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set

29
 Quadrant Receiver

Countermeasures
Computer

Figure 3-12. AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set

The countermeasures receiver generates digital words describing the

parameters of the pulsed and CW radar waveforms detected. Measured parameters

include amplitude, angle of arrival, time of arrival, frequency, pulse width and modulation.

By using the rapid tuning superhetrodyne receivers CWs can be detected and measured.

The fiilly channelized receiver has 22 parallel filters to accomplish pulse intercept.

30
 Via the countermeasures computer the ALR-67 interfaces with several CM
systems including dispensers and HARM. [Ref. 8, Ref. 17, Ref. 18]

2. Missile Warning Systems (MWS)

The functions of a Missile Warning System is to detect an approaching missile

and give a warning to the pilot and to the aircraft defensive systems. The integration of

MWS into the Electronic Warfare Suite of the aircraft will be discussed in the Integration
section. MWSs have been in use on aircraft since the late 70's. They have gained

increased importance because of the proliferation of highly lethal IR and EO missiles. Of

the aircraft losses suffered during the conflicts in the last decades a majority have been to

IR missiles. Because many IR/EO surface-to-air missiles work independently of a radar, a

RWR will not be sufficient to give warning. The increased ECCM capability in modern

missiles has decreased the effectiveness of on-board countermeasures and today the trend

is toward using more oflf-board systems. Because of the decoys short operating life the

timing of the deployment becomes critical for its effectiveness. The MWS can provide
information about the time to intercept and the direction of the approaching missile and

trigger launch of off-board countermeasures.

MWS can be divided into two groups: active and passive The active systems

use a pulsed Doppler radar when the passive works with IR or EO. The choice of system

depends heavily on the type of platform used. For a stealthy platform a passive MWS is

the natural choice so as not to give away the advantage created by the platform. For a

platform with large signatures an active MWS could be a good choice. Some of the most

important advantages and disadvantages with the different systems are shown in Table 3.

31
TABLE 3 COMPARISON BETWEEN ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MWS
Active MWS Passive MWS
Avoidance of detection low
Fair, relatively Very good
compared with other
radiating sources on
platform
Weather sensitivity Almost all weather Poor performance in bad
capability weather
Range estimation Yes No
Time-to-intercept Good Poor
estimation
Ability to detect missile in Yes, in all phases Some systems unable to
different phases detect missile after rocket-
motor burn out

Similar techniques as those used in MWS is used in passive detection systems for air

defense surveillance systems. These systems are deployed both in sea and land

applications. Normally those systems are not considered EW-systems and are not

discussed further here. [Ref 8, Ref 14, Ref 19, Ref 20]

a. Passive Systems

The passive MWS uses the IR radiation generated from the incoming
missiles for detection. The exclusion of detectable energy transmission is the passive

systems' greatest advantage compared with active systems Information about the

wavelengths at which the different systems operate has not been released but it can be

assumed that they are optimized against the radiation from the rocket-motor, which

represents a wavelength of 4.3 \xtc\. It is expected that the propulsion systems of future

generations of threat missiles will be cooler than the current systems which will lead to

new classes of warning systems operating at longer wavelengths. [Ref 20]

32
 (1). AN/AAR-44

The system is produced by Cincinnati Electronics

Corporation and is fitted to the USAF C-130s The AN/AAR-44 uses search continually

while tracking and verifying missile launches. The system is able to handle multiple missile

and has some countermeasure discrimination. To eliminate false alarms the AN/AAR-44

is equipped with multidiscrimination modes against solar radiation and terrain reflections.

Different fields of view can be attained by using different sensor unit configurations. [Ref

8, Ref 21]

(2). AN/AAR-47

The system is produced by Loral Electro-Optical Systems

AN/AAR-47 is installed on helicopters and slower fixed-wing aircrafls in the US Navy and

Marine Corps. The system consists of four sensors, a central processor and a control

indicator. To achieve spherical coverage additional sensors can be added. The system

uses algorithms and signal processing techniques to achieve a low false alarm rate. The

data from the sensors are analyzed by the processor both independently and as a group

Loral also markets the AAR-47 as warning receiver for armored vehicles The AAR-47

should, according to Loral, be able to detect not only incoming anti-tank missiles but also

shells from larger caliber weapons. The latest modification of the AAR-47 sensor includes

detectors for laser warning The four detectors are mounted around the existing optics

(see Figure 3-13) and operate in different wavelengths between 0.4 and LI [am. The laser

detector gives the AAR-47 a laser warning capability. [Ref 8, Ref 21, Ref 22]

33
 Figure 3-13. AAR-47 Detector Unit

(3), AN/AAR-FX

The system is produced by Cincinnati Electronics

Corporation (see Figure 3-14) and is sized for fighter aircraft. The system uses

continuous track-while-search processing and has simultaneous multi-threat capability.

The AN/AAR-FX uses multi-spectral discriminators to reject backgrounds and

countermeasures. [Ref 23]

34
 Figure 3- 14 AN/AAR-FX

(4) Silent Attack Warning System (SAWS)

The SAWS is a second generation IR warning system being

developed under the sponsorship of the US Air Force. SAWS is designed to detect,

declare and categorize potential hostile aircraft and missiles. The system uses the scanning

array technique which at the start of the project showed much lower false-alarm rates than

systems using staring arrays. The system is supposed to be able to differentiate between a

missile and an aircraft It should be able to categorize the missiles in burn or post-burn

and the aircraft's in normal or after-burner mode [Ref 21]

b. Active Systems

The active MWS systems uses pulse Doppler radar to detect incoming
missiles. The radar gives accurate time-to-intercept predictions at all altitudes and during

almost all weather conditions. The main challenge for the radar based systems is the

effects of clutter. The effects of clutter varies with aircraft speed, altitude and approach

angle of the attacking missile (see Figure 3-15). The most demanding case is a tail-chase

35
 "

high speed missile attack at low altitude. The amplitude of the clutter received increases

with decreasing altitude and the spectrum of the clutter return signals becomes broader

with increasing ground speed. The backlobe of the antenna can produce positive clutter

Doppler returns which can compete with the positive Doppler return of the incoming

missile (see Figure 3-16). [Ref 24, Ref 25]

( T^
T7~ r!'''!
I
I I 4

,
J,.-

MISSIUE
SIDE/BACKLOBE
CLUTTEfi RETURN

V MAIN BEAM
\ CLUTTER RETURN

Figure 3-15. Clutter Return for Active MWS

36
 MAINLOB?

BACKLOBEO
*DOPPLER

SIDELOBES

90"
ZERO OOPPLCrt

Figure 3-16. Doppler Return from Incoming Missile

(1). AN/ALQ-153 Tail Warning Set (Westinghouse Defense and

Electronics Center)

The ALQ-153 is installed in the USAF B-52G/H. It is a

range-gated Doppler system and it continuously displays the most imminent threat. The

system automatically calculates range and time-to-intercept and transfer the information to

automatic countermeasures equipment. [Ref 8]

(2). AN/ALQ- 156(A) Missile Warning System (Lockheed

Sanders Inc.)

The ALQ-156 consists of a pulse Doppler radar, probably

operating in the C/D-band, which detects incoming missiles and can trigger an automatic

ECM dispenser. The system evaluates the threats by comparison of the closing rates. The

system is stated to be able to operate close to the ground with good detection probabilities

37
of missiles. Depending on the type of aircraft, the system uses two or four antennas (see

Figure 3-17). [Ref 26]

1^ ANTENNAS
FORWARD
ANTENNA

RECEfVER/TRANSMITTER
UNIT

Figure 3-17. AN/ALQ- 56(A)

1 Missile Warning System

3. Laser Warning Systems (LWS)

Laser warning systems have become a part of the survivability equipment during

the last decade because of the rapid growth in weapons systems utilizing the laser either

for missile guidance or for range finding. Because of the properties of the laser radiation,

laser systems needs a line of sight between the pointer and the target. For this reason laser

38
warning systems have so far mainly been installed on aircraft and armored vehicles. For

ships operating in coastal areas LWS will become an important part of the overall warning

equipment. Because of the laser beams' small width, a warning from a LWS means with a

high probability that the platform is targeted but the small beam width at the same time

means that a large platform like a ship needs several detectors to insure proper warning.

The LWS gives the following information:

- Warning, if the platform is targeted.

- Angle of arrival, direction to the laser threat.

- Pulse repetition interval, which is compared to the emitter library and used to

identify the threat emitter.

The LWS takes advantage of the laser radiation's high coherence to fiUer out the

background using a four-stepped etalon. The angle of arrival is achieved by using a slit

system together with a detector array (see Figure 3-18). The LWS can be used as one

component in an integrated EW system (see Chapter V).

39
 LASER RADIATION

DETECTOR ARRAY

Figure 3-18. Angle of Arrival Determination

a, AN/A VR-2 (Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc)

The AN/A VR-2 is a airborne laser detecting set It detects, identifies and

characterizes optical signals. The system consists of four sensor units (see Figure 3-19),

one interface unit comparator and one display unit With the four sensor units mounted

the AN/ A VR-2 covers 360° around the aircraft. The sensor unit is equipped with three

sensor heads one for each band I, II and III, there is space left in the unit for a band IV

sensor head. The sensor unit receives the laser signals, validates the signals, identifies

threat type, prioritizes the threats and passes the threat message to the interface unit

comparator. The pilot gets the warning about the laser threat from the display The

system can also be used as a part of an integrated radar and laser warning receiver system.

40
The same sensor heads as used in AN/AVR-2 have been used in a laser warning system

for the Ml Abrams tank. [Ref. 27, Ref. 28]

Figure 3-19. AN/AVR-2 Detector Unit

D. CONCLUSIONS
Because todays threat from missiles uses a wide array of techniques for their guidance

the warning systems needs to be able to detect not only radar and laser radiation but also

IR radiation from passive missile systems. The use of all aspect-attacking IR missiles has

further increased the requirements of the warning system by making detection of incoming

missiles from all angles a necessity.

41
 The increased pulse density created by the deployment of pulse doppler radar, both

enemy and friendly, has created demand for systems with a high signal processing

capability. The dense pulse environment and the introduction of frequency and PRI agile

signals has lead to a renewed importance of direction finding, in this case as a method to

discriminate between different signals. Because the ability to handle a dense signal

enivronment is strongly related to the price of the warning system, it has become

important to analyse in which kind of threat environment the platform will operate; the

pulses present are very different for a low flying helicopter compared to those encountered

by a high flying interceptor. Below is a table describing potential countermoves because

of the introduction of the systems described in this chapter.

TABLE 4 POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES TO ESM SYSTEMS

ESM (microwave) - The use of special "war modes" could make the system unable
to identify the radar.
- Low probability of intercept radar will challenge the ESM
receivers sensitvity
ESM - Spread spectrum techniques.
(communication) - Increased capability for coding will make the possibilities for
effective decoding for tactical use small.
RWR - Complex wave forms makes identification harder.
- mode makes the reaction times
Late switch to active short.

MWS passive - Reduction of IR signature decreases the MWS detection

range.
MWS active - Decreased radar cross section and use of stealth techniques.
- Use of deceptive jamming to create false alarm which causes
distraction
LWS - Illuminating only during the very last phase of an engagement
with semi-active laser weapons gives the platform short time to
react to the warning
- Destructive illumination with high energy laser operating in
thesame band as the detector.
-Use of cheap laser illuminators emulates beam riding systems
and that way creates false alarms.

42
 IV. ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

The electronic countermeasures described in this chapter are divided into five

categories:

- Radar CM.

- Laser CM.

- Infi-ared CM.

- Off-board CM.

- Communication CM.

Infrared and laser CM are used mainly for self protection, communications CM is

used to support an operation while radar and off-board CM can be used both as self
protection and as support for a strike.

A. RADAR COUNTERMEASURES
1. General Description

The radar countermeasures can be divided into two categories: denial and

deception. Denial is normally achieved by using noise jamming that masks the echo from

the aircraft. Deception is performed by introducing signals designed to fool or conflise the

radar by appearing as one or more false targets. [Ref 14]

(L Noise Jamming

The objective with noise jamming is to introduce a noise like signal into the

radar system to mask or obscure the target echo. The operator sees the noise on the PPI

as a large area of clutter. Depending on the power of the jammer, the noise will be above

the radar's threshold in only the main lobe or both in the main lob and in the side lobes. By

43
changing the radiated power with respect to the radar's antenna gain, the jammer can

introduce a constant amount of noise into the radar and thereby deny the radar the

direction information.

There are several techniques to introduce noise at the right frequency. If

the frequency of the radar is unknown or is changing, or to cover the operating frequency

of several radars a technique called barrage can be used. This is a broad band jamming

covering a spectrum of frequencies much wider than the operating bandwidth of the radar.

The disadvantage with this approach is that most power will be wasted on frequencies not

needed to jam which will lead to a high power requirement.

If the radar's frequency is known, spot jamming can be used. The spot

jamming technique uses a bandwidth centered at the radar frequency; the jammers

bandwidth is normally somewhat larger than the bandwidth of the radar.

Swept jamming is another technique for broad band noise which is

achieved by sweeping a narrow band noise signal across the range of frequencies to be

jammed.

By utilizing the frequency and direction information from an RWR the

noise jamming can be limited in bandwidth and directed thereby substantially increasing

the power in the radar receiver [Ref 14, Ref 29]

b. Radar deception

There are several different techniques used for deception of radars and two

main approaches;

- Generation of a large number of false targets to overload the system.

- Provision of incorrect target bearing, range and/or velocity information

to the radar.

44
 Some of the specific techniques to achieve incorrect targeting are described

below.

(1). Range-Gate Pull-Off

This is the most fundamental deception technique used

against tracking radars. The deceiver initially repeats the received radar pulse which

makes the radar indicate this as a target and because of the strong return adjust its

sensitivity. The decption jammer then starts to increase the time delay in the repeated

signal, this is done to fool the radar to follow the false target. When the distance between

the real and false targets is larger than the range gate of the radar, the deceptive signaling

is discontinued. If succesful this will lead to the radar losing its tracking on the actual

target.

(2). Angle Deception

To employ a succeful angle deception, the jammer must know

which angle-measurment technique the radar is using Con-scan radar systems can be

deceived by transmitting a signal when the radar beam is pointed away from the platform

and stopping the transmission when the beam is pointed toward it The combination of the

real echo and the deceiving signal will be interpreted by the radar which will result in

incorrect information about the target's angular position.

Range-gate pull-off and angle deception are often used

together in deceptive systems.

(3). Cross-Eye

The cross-eye deception technique is effective against

tracking radars including mono-pulse The tracking system has a tendency to align itself in

a direction perpendicular to the wave front of the signal being tracked. By using two

repeaters located at different ends of the platform it is possible to create a phase-front

45
distortion which causes the radar to misinterpret the position of the target (see Figure 4-

1). [Ref. 1, Ref. 14, Ref 29, Ref. 30, Ref 31]

REAL UAOET POSITION

WAVE FRONT DISTORTION

Figure 4- 1 . Cross-Eye Deception

2. Radar Countermeasures System

CL Sidekick (Raytheon)

Sidekick is an active ECM system for anti-ship defense that works together

with SLQ-32. The system is designed for small and midsized ships (900-4500 tons). The

transmitter uses a multibeam array antenna which works after the same lens principle as

the receiver antenna in SLQ-32. Each array element is fed by an individual low-power

miniature travelling wave tube (TWT) (see Figure 4-2) This design improves the system's

reliability since an individual TWT failure only cause a slight degradation of the system's

performance and not a total failure. The multibeam array antenna also gives the system a

46
high effective radiated power (ERP) and the possibility of instantly-directed jamming

beams. The jamming power is said to be sufficient to prevent burn-through of a typical

targeting radar until the source is within the hard kill envelope. A typical anti-ship missile

radar is said not to burn through the deception jamming power until it can no longer adjust

its flight path enough to hit the ship. The Sidekick system can engage radars of different

types and in different directions simultaneous The system selects jamming techniques

depending on the identification of the radar done by the SLQ-32. [Ref 32]

Antenna TWTs Beamport

Elements \-^ ^ A Countermeasures
Control Unit Computer
Control

Driver Exdter
Jamming Jamming
Signal
Signal
Out /A In

CXitput Microwave
Ports Lens

Figure 4-2. AN/SLQ-32 Multibeam Lens Antenna

b. AN/ALQ-184(V) Self Protection Pod (Raytheon)

The ALQ-184 is an active countermeasure system against surface-to-air

missiles, radar-directed gun systems and airborne interceptors. The system can function as

both repeater, transponder and noise jammer. The different parts of the system are shown

in Figure 4-3. The pod uses a multibeam system similar to that used in Sidekick with each

lens producing up to 15 beams. The ALQ-184 is equipped with 16 mini-TWTs.

47
 Pump cs^'-t LVPS No. 1
Accum ^ Transmitter
Assy LB RF Assy LB SSA Driver HVPS (2) Assy (2)

r^r'*^'
( il^^ -lU)-*
fc'
-^
f .

V
Aft Transmit
Antenna Assy Auxiliary

(Articulated)
Receiver

«*A., t^'
^^4a^->...
LVPS No. 2
Fwd
••*«
kjwt^ LB Tech .
Antenna Assy
-* Generator _„«-r«^ (Articulated)
LB Service LB vco mummm
Module Assy .^*^ Techniques v^
Generator '»^ '

Set On Assy
i'-— ' "-^J^^^ Sub-Band

Att Receive
^ •r^ Processing
System Control ,,^^ . Fwd Receive Assy
Antenna Assy Assembly VCO Assy' Antenna
A . .
Assy

Figure 4-3. AN/ALQ- 1 84( V) Self Protection Pod

The block diagram for ALQ-184 describing the operation is shown in

Figure 4-4. An incoming RF signal is focused by the lens to the DF receiver representing

the signal direction The receiver determines signal presence and encodes the signal by

angle-of-arrival and frequency subband. The signal is compared against a threat library in

the central processor. Once a signal has been classified as a threat, the ECM control

determines the ECM mode response and initiates the pod's active countermeasures in real-
time operation. The transmit switches select the transmission angle to be transmitted and

the Rotman lens provides the correct phasing and feeds the mini TWTs to the antenna

array elements.

In the transponder and noise modes, an internally generated signal is

selected from the voltage controlled oscillator (VCO) assembly. This signal is modulated

by the techniques generator. In the repeater mode, the signal is retransmitted to the threat

48
 u
radar with the selected deceptive modulation. The system has a preset pulse-count

threshold which stops it from transmitting until a certain number of pulses have been

received. [Ref 8, Ref 33]

Sector
^ Frequency
Measured

^
Omni
Recei/er
II
R«c«)ver
lL«ns X OF
Receiver
C> Preprocessor

H
Central ^j,^ System Data
_y arxl Conlrol
MPMT Processir>g
Interlace
Switch

i^
\Jr.
ECM
Channel Control Cl ECM
Umts Waveform
EfeL Generator

£
Min.-TWT
Amptifters
xr MPMT
Switch
AmpHier
Mods VCOs
xr
^-^
Transmit
Array
^--O — Lens
MPMT
Switch
Integrated Multibeam Electronic
Warfare System Block Diagram

Figure 4-4. AN/ALQ- 84(V)

1 Self Protection Pod Block Diagram

B. LASER COUNTERMEASURES

There are today two very different ways to utilize laser for the guidance of missiles: by

laser designator or beam riding (see Chapter II Background) The countermeasure against

beam riders is to transmit a laser beam toward the sight with the purpose of destroying

some of the electronics or optics in the system (see Chapter VII High Energy Beam

Weapons). The method against laser designators is more similar to deceptive

countermeasures. In systems using laser designators the incoming missile homes on the

49
laser radiation reflected from the target The target's countermeasure is to use a laser and

illuminate another object that will serve as a decoy. The most modern laser designator

systems have some resistance against this type of deceptive jamming and are expected to

use some form of code in the laser beam. In order to be able to defeat these systems the

platform needs to have a receiver that can detect the code and implement modulations to

the deceptive laser. More of a brute force approach to counter laser designators is to

direct either a high energy laser or direct fire toward the illuminating laser with the

purpose of distracting the operator.

C. INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
1. General Description

Because the threat from IR-guided weapons so far have been mainly from anti

aircraft missiles the countermeasure field is dominated by airborne systems. With the fast

introduction of both IR sights and IR guided missiles and munition to the battlefield the

need for IR-countermeasures for ground forces has increased To understand the IRCM it

is neccessary to have some knowledge about how the threat, mainly the IR-missile, works

(see Chapter II Background).

There are two different methods of IR countermeasures, saturation and

deception. For the saturation method the IRCM device introduces large amounts of IR

noise into the IR seeker. The noise has to be in the bandwidth of the seeker's detector and

the purpose is to saturate the detector and if possible damage it. For this type of IRCM

some of the systems described in Chapter VII can be used. The deception type of CM
uses a modulated IR signal into the seeker. The modulated signal together with the

radiation from the target creates false information about the target's real location. For this

to be effective the energy of the modulated signal in the detector's band needs to be higher

50
than the same energy from the target. This "blinking" method of CM is effective against

reticle based and conical scanning systems. To be able to deceive the missile seeker the

CM system needs to know the seeker's reticle modulation frequency, or in the case of a

conical scanning system, the conical scan frequency. These frequencies will change from

missile to missile, but by observing the energy reflected from the missile's optics the

frequency can be measured.

The IR radiation from the IRCM can be produced in several different ways. The

most common radiation source in today's system is the arc lamp but there are also systems

using electrical and fuel-heated ceramics For directed systems, lasers are used to produce

the radiation. The fuel'heated systems are normally used for aircraft with limited electrical

power resources. The modulation of the radiation can be achieved either by pulsing the

source as in the case of the arc lamp or by mechanical modulation which is the case with

the heated ceramics. To avoid detection of the platform because of radiation from the IR

source in the visible region, the device is normally equipped with a filter.

Figure 4-5 gives an approximate expression for the power required. The

efficiency of the CM is dependent on:

- The number of different threats operating in the different wavelengths that the

system is supposed to counter, this increases the jam-to-signal ratio (J/S).

- The amount of radiation the platform emits

- The solid angle which must be covered by the system

- The percentage of the IR radiation from the source that falls in the band of the

detector, the arc lamp's maximum occurs at short wavelengths of

approximately 1.5|im (see Appendix B). [Ref 5, Ref 14]

51
 («)
A GKEATEN MX OF THREATS THE PftOTECmON VOLUME, n, HAS
W
NCREASeSJ/S INCREASED WTTH AU-AfiPCCT THREATS

AAC LAMP SOURCES HAVE A SMALL (e)

PERCENTAGE OF THEIR OUTPUT IN
THREAT SPECTRAL BAND

1 10 10» 10> 10* 3 4 S • 7

RELATIVE PLATFORM SIGNATURE WAVELENGTH

Figure 4-5. Influences on the Power Requirements

2. Infrared Countermeasure Systems

a. Matador (LORAL)

Matador is a powerful IRCM system designed to protect large aircraft and

surface vehicles (see Figure 4-6). The system is modular and for large transport aircraft

one transmitter per engine is the suggested configuration The transmitters use arc lamps

which are electronically synchronised by the electronics control unit to achieve the desired

modulation. The transmitter's IR source has an output between 4 and 12 kW. The system

is pre-programmed with a multi-threat jamming code and new codes can be added to cope

with new threats. Matador is in operation with the USAF and is deployed on the Air

Force One Presidential Transport [Ref 8, Ref 1 1, Ref 34]

52
 Figure 4-6. Matador

b. AN/ALQ-144 (Lockheed Sanders Inc)

AN/ALQ-144 is IRCM system designed for helicopters (see Figure 4-7).

The IR source consists of an electrically heated graphite source. The transmitter is

omnidirectional with a cylindrical source The radiation is modulated, this is achieved by

rotating two drums with slots around the source. The transmitter has an output of

between 1.2 and 2 kW. [Ref 8, Ref 1 1, Ref 35]

53
 Figure 4-7. AN/ALQ-144

c. Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM)

DIRCM will probably be neccessary to counter the threat from modern IR

missiles. By directing the IR radiation toward the missile the same effect can be achieved

as for omnidirectional systems using only a small fraction of the power. This is even more

important against missiles operating in the longer wavelength IR band (8-12|am) where it

is difficult to find a continuously radiating high power source.

Northrop has developed an DIRCM designed to protect against IR guided

missiles including those operating at longer wavelengths (see Figure 4-8). The system is

housed in a ball turret which makes it possible to provide a 360-degrees azimuth coverage

54
and -90 to +40 degrees elevation. To find the missile, the DIRCM needs to be directed by

a MAWS (see Chapter III. Electronic Support Measures), but when aimed at the missile

the DIRCM can take over the tracking using its IR tracking sensor. The DIRCM uses
two parallel beams (probably laser) of IR energy to jam the missile. It can be expected

that the two beams are of different wavelengths to provide sufficient intensity for both

short and long IR wavelengths. [Ref 5, Ref 36]

Figure 4-8. DIRCM

55
D. OFFBOARD COUNTERMEASURES
1. General Description

The ofifboard countermeasures consist of several different systems representing a

wide range of techniques to decrease the susceptibility of the platform they are designed to

protect. The systems range from relatively simple chaffs to complex UAV equipped with
auto pilot and sophisticated repeater transmitters. There are both active and passive

systems in the group as well as expendable and recoverable systems. The common factor

for these systems is that they operate outside of the protected platform.

(L Chaff

Chaff was the first countermeasure invented to counter the radar. Even

today chaff is widely used to protect aircraft as well as ships against both detection and

radar guided missiles. The use of chaff is divided in two different missions, masking and

seducing. The masking measure is, as the name indicates, an attempt to hide the platform,

normally an aircraft, from detection. This is achieved by having a corridor or barrier pre-

laid by a special aircraft, the strike force can then attack through the chaff corridor

without being detected by the radars. To avoid the exposure of a chaff-laying aircraft,

systems using unmanned vehicles are under development (see TALD). To be effective the

chaff barrier has to provide a stronger echo than the target in each of the radar's

processing cells

The seducing measure is today in use in both aircraft and ships. The idea is

to throw out chaff in a burst away from the platform in order to create the impression of a

target. The radar guided missile is then seduced to target the chaff cloud instead of the

platform. In the case of ships, the seduction is often supported by on-board electronic

countermeasures.

56
 1

Todays chaff is normally a dipole made of thin glass fiber coated with

aluminum or zinc. The chaff is usually package in cartridges or cassettes (see Figure 4-9)

and is ejected by electromechanical, pneumatic or pyrotechnical methods.

t.Tz'
tXti
ti
»1

r:l5 rip if £;.--,

'
,-

- f

Figure 4-9. Chaff Cassettes

The radar return from each dipole is a fijnction of radar wavelength. The

peak return occurs when the radar wavelength is approximately twice the length of the

dipole. Resonances also occur at integer multiples of the dipole length but with much

lower amplitudes. To achieve good results against radars with different frequencies the

chaff in a cartridge is cut to different lengths representing different frequencies. The

magnitude on the radar return is also dependent on the orientation of the dipole compared

to the orientation of the radar. The maximum return is achieved when illuminated from

the side while it is near to zero when illuminated from the end. The maximum radar cross

section at the resonant frequency from a single dipole is approximately 0.866^^ while the

average is approximately 0. 5X^. As is obvious from the formula the number of dipoles

57
necessary to create a certain radar cross section increases with the square of the

frequency.

After being dispensed the chaff forms a cloud The initial length of the

cloud equals the time the dispensing aircraft traveled during the dispensation time. The

cloud is spread out because of turbulence caused by the dispensing aircraft. The cloud

continues to grow because of differences in fall rates among the chaff, the prevailing wind

and the air turbulence.

"Smart chaff" or "Chips Expendables" are under development by the US

Air Force. The smart chaff is actually a miniature active RF decoy which consists of a

self-powered single chip repeater. The chip uses the MMIC technology (see Appendix A)

and has an integrated antenna The smart chaff will, in contrast to ordinary chaff, not be

limited to one frequency, instead it is expected to be effective over a wide range of

frequencies.

The effectiveness of chaff is severely reduced by radars using MTI (Moving

Target Indicator) and pulse-Doppler. Both systems are able to resolve targets against

static clutter backgrounds, to which category a slow moving chaff clouds belongs.

Because of the scintillations caused by the continuous movements of the dipoles neither of

the radars are capable of totally eliminating the effects of the chaff. [Ref 1, Ref 14, Ref

29, Ref 37, Ref 38]

b. Smoke and A erosol

Smoke has been used since historic time to give cover in the visible

wavelength. When not normally considered an electronic warfare component it is a very

effective counter measure against several EO and ER systems. Smoke's ability to scatter

radiation is a function of the wavelength of the radiation and the particle size in the smoke,

the longer the wavelength the larger particles necessary. Generally it is easier to produce

58
smoke with smaller particles and smoke with larger particles also tend to dissipate faster.

Aerosols can be used in a similar fashion to smoke The aerosol cloud will interfere with

the radiation because of a reduction in intensity caused by absorption and scattering.

Unlike the smoke case, the aerosol also causes scattering because of the different

refractive index in the small particles. [Ref 14]

c. Radar reflectors

Radar reflectors are used to create target-like radar echoes. Because of

their form they have a large radar cross section and thereby create an echo normally

received from a much larger target The corner reflector is a simple device which

produces a relatively high return over a wide range of angles. An even better coverage is

achieved by using a Luneberg lens The lens has a focal length equal to half the lens

thickness. To turn the lens into a reflector the far surface is given a reflective coating.

[Ref 14, Ref 29]

(1). Replica Naval Decoy (Irvin Great Britain Ltd )

Replica is a RF passive naval decoy intended to provide a

ship-like target to seduce/distract an anti-ship missile (see Figure 4-10). The decoy is a

octahedral shaped radar reflector and to achieve better azimuth coverage they are

normally deployed in linked pairs. The reflectors inflate and operates with fiill radar cross

section a few seconds after hitting the sea [Ref 8]

59
 Figure 4-10. Replica Naval Decoy

iL IR-FJares

IR-Flares are used to seduce missiles with IR-seekers. To be able to attract

the missile the flare has to produce intense radiation in the waveband the seeker is using

(see Appendix B). The intensity from the flare decreases with increasing altitude and

velocity, this complicates the use of flares for fighter aircraft. The flares normally burn for

just a few seconds which makes the timing of the launch critical There are two ways to

assure proper timing of the launch, either continuous launch of flares when the aircraft

reaches an altitude where it is exposed to IR-missiles (for example take-off and landing in

an unsecured area) or automatic launching as a part of an integrated EW-system. The

different launcher systems for airborne, land and naval applications are discussed flirther

under dispenser systems. For IR flares to be effective against modern IR-missiles they

need to emulate closely the platform; by using sensors sensitive in more than one

waveband the missile is able to discriminate a "one-color" flare from the platform. [Ref

14]

60
 e. RF-Expendables

(1). GEN-X, Generic Expendable Cartidge (Texas Instruments)

The GEN-X is a active radar decoy which provides endgame

protection for tactical aircrafts against radar guided missiles (Figure 4-11), The decoy

measures 6 in. in length and 1.3 in. in diameter. Power to the decoy is provided by a

lithium battery. The decoy has no propulsion and is stabilized in its free-fall by four small

fins which are unfolded after ejection from the dispenser. Both the ALE-39 and ALE-47

dispensers can be used for the GEN-X decoy. The projectile has a forward-facing spiral

antenna system located on the nose cone. The receiver and transmitter in the decoy

consist of four Microwave Monolithic Integrated Circuits (see Figure 4-12). The MMIC
technology is essential for production of a GEN-X sized decoy with high performance and

relatively low price. When released from the aircraft the decoy repeats received radar

signals to seduce the incoming missile. The GEN-X is said to have three field-

programmable '-r^nds between which it can switch if it does not pick up any signals in the

band it initially searches. [Ref 8, Ref 38, Ref 39, Ref 40, Ref 41]

Figure 4-11. GEN-X Decoy

61
 _,, ,_y_ ^^^^ J^^st, ^ „ _ _
^9a£h _ _ — .
,

-
, .„

K>'Tjj»i«^7sj, - - -

P^h

^g ^ -V *. -f
t

-.-i-r,/.^ ,3 1-?

Figure 4-12. GEN-X Decoy

(2). STRAP, Straight Through Repeater Antenna Performance

(Tracor)

The STRAP is under development by Tracor for the USN.

The Strap differs from GEN-X in two major areas, it uses two antennas, one each for

reception and transmission, and it uses Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA) instead

of solid-state amplifiers. The advantage with using TWTA is that they are more powerful,

the disadvantages are the cost and the power requirement. On the STRAP the power

requirement has been solved by using a thermally heated cathode for the TWTA. This has

been possible because the TWTA is only supposed to work for a short time. [Ref 1 1, Ref

39, Ref 40]

62
 (3). Carmen (THORN EMI Electronics)

Carmen is an expendable active decoy against radar guided

antiship missiles. The decoy purpose is to seduce an incoming missile, thereby achieving a

"soft-kill". After detection of the ASM threat by the ship's own sensors (see Figure 4-13),

Carmen is launched clear of the ship from a standard 130 mm launcher. The decoy

descends slowly by parachute to provide sufficient time for the decoy to seduce the threat

away from the protected platform electronically (see Figure 4-14). Carmen uses MMIC
technology to achieve low weight and volume and high reliability. Further, the decoy is

equipped with TWTA to provide high power (see Figure 4-15). The frequency bands

covered are H,I and J. [Ref 8, Ref 42)

..... 1

m ^^^^^s^hI^^^Bh
.
"•-:'
-.^^a wk ^^^^J^SbMbW^BBH^B^^B
• .'''"?>^^^ WML
''
B?jEii^8B!SBfl|8PB|wWPBB^Bil|WPB^^B
^**35Ai*iH I^EH IBS!*^^2u^3Sb!i^^mR^^hhcS^IB^I^h^^I^^H^3I^^I^^^^I
-r .'-''••»>**sfi
^?^^*: *.".;
^B
JC jMj ^gg^^^ffiljj^jfeartpBBBBB^HHB^^^^W
.

yS^P^^^Pgfj^M|B^KB|BBH|^a!Sy^BH^^B
.-

* :yiL
1 «*jL''''-^*jf3
''':<Lvt-y ^^gi B ^^
K^ M AjnW^itftjffyCiVgf^^MSwpgfli^M^^Bw^nSjW'^^^^^^^^^B
^ —
^pM^SX^^nSS^SSdSScSK^i^r^^ ^ -Jt^B^^
^^Mr^
^ fM^^^^^S^aa^S^^Sg^^SS^W^^SSm
"4feiwffiiBPfl^MBByjlBTifSWtffr!gMH»HH
"^.'..JT'' ^fffTvf
\.;iv(-_^j|^g
'.- Vs'^^^^l w, ^^^^Sr^*P^iji^iiti3BmViSj^^S9ffKtUBtB^O^K3^3IK^^BK^^Sm
t •

^r/^^ K| ^^^^^^^^ne^^s^^SSS^^^b^bS^A
'.jC^^ji
^R ^S^^S^^Bv^^^^^BBSg^^S^Sl^^St^^
JL^^^ ^ tSo^iys^Jwff^P^PT^jBBBj^H^^^^Bffii^B^wlB^^BM^B^M^B
'

'^^^^^^^^Ss^S^iKSKkSB^
yi^^f^. teSySBjCTjjBMiaMBsjj^^
'
'^^B^'',"^
w
t^'fi

S^ ?>y3BMBwgSBlJwiK
^^^:M^ ^^j^'^S^aafiSlKBHPIaHy^HB^B

Figure 4-13. ASM Attack un Ship

63
Figure 4-14 Launch of Carmen Decoy

64
 Propulsion assembly

Sifsty and arming section

Parachute section

Thermal Battery
Compass

Antenna
TWTA

Signal processing

Antennae

Figure 4-15. Carmen Decoy

/ Flying Decoys

A flying decoy is a drone with its own navigation and possibly propulsion.

The main advantage with a free flying decoy is that it is possible to send the decoy in front

of the platform it is supposed to protect. This option provides a better ability to counter

all-aspect weaponry such as heat-seeking missiles operating in the longer wavelengths. It

also improves the possibilities to counter missiles with processors capable of

discriminating between the relative velocities of the platform and the gravity-bound

decoys.

(1). LORALEI (Loral Electro-Optical)

The Loralei is an expendable decoy which emulates the host

aircraft in order to seduce the attacking threat. The decoy simulates the aircraft's flight

and spectral signatures. The system is powered by a rocket motor and is able to protect

65
the aircraft from attack in the forward hemisphere. By using a time-delayed ignition the

decoy is able to fly close to the host aircraft initially to increase the probability that the

threat missile is seduced. Loral states that it is possible to incorporate EO/IR as well RF

capabilities into Loralei. [Ref 34, Ref 38]

(2). TALD, Tactical Air Launched Decoy (Brunswick Defense)

The TALD is an unpowered decoy which is launched fi'om

high altitudes (see Figure 4-16). The decoy's glider flight is controlled by an autopilot.

The maximum range of the TALD is stated to be approximately 130 km. The system is

equipped with a passive radar reflector in the front as well as with an active repeater

system. The repeater system has one antenna, receiving and transmitting, under each

wing. The TALD can also have a chaff" dispenser. The system is programmable in the

field to allow simulation of different flight profiles. Because the TALD is unpowered it

gives an opportunity for sophisticated weapon systems to discriminate it from the platform

it was supposed to protect.

Brunswick is working on an upgrade of TALD called ITALD

(Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy). The main improvement will be that ITALD

will be equipped with a turbojet engine. ITALD will be able to emulate an attacking

aircraft more closely with an expected low altitude speed of Mach 0.8. The effective

range will be increased to approximately 280 km. ITALD can also be configured as an

anti-radiation missile (see Chapter VI Suppression of Enemy Air Defense). [Ref 8, Ref

38]

66
 Figure 4-16. TALD, Tactical Air Launched Decoy

(3) Delilah, Tactical Decoy System (Israel Military

Industries Ltd )

Delilah is a development of the TALD. An earlier version

called Samson was deployed with great success by the Israeli Air Force against air defense

systems in the Bekaa Valley 1982 Delilah is a jet engine powered radar decoy and it can

be launched at altitudes between 150 and 30,000 ft. The maximum speed is Mach 0.8 and

the range is approximately 400 km The payload can be either passive, in the form of a

Luneberg lens, or active, in the form of RF repeaters. [Ref 8, Ref 43]

67
 g. Recoverable Decoys

(1) AN/SSQ-95 Active Electronic Buoy (Litton,

ATD/Magnavox)

The SSQ-95 is an antiship missile decoy, it is packaged in a

sonobuoy container and can be dropped from an aircraft or helicopter, launched from the

deck of the ship or towed behind the ship. The decoy is equipped with a receiver and a

TWT transmitter. The power to the decoy is provided by a battery that is activated by sea

water. The SSQ-95 is expected to operate in the I/J bands. [Ref 44]

(2). AN/TLQ-32 Antiradiation missile decoy (ITT)

The system is designed to protect the AN/TPS-75 radar

system by seducing incoming antiradiation missiles. Three decoys systems will be

deployed with each radar system. The TLQ-32 is said to be capable of protecting the

radar site from multiple missile launches simultaneous. The decoy's small size and

relatively few exposed parts give the system a good survivability in case of a close

detonation (see Figure 4-17). It is not know what radiation patterns the decoy uses but

both continuous, in order to attract the missile, or intermittent, in order to confuse it, are

possible. [Ref 45]

68
 Figure 4-17. AN/TLQ-32 Antiradiation missile decoy

h. Towed Decoy

Towed decoys are used in both naval and airborne applications but the

conditions of use are different In the airborne application the use of a towed decoy has

several advantages compared with expendables. Because the decoy is connected to the

platform the expensive and power consuming equipment can be inside platform and be

used several times, it will also reduce the weight and size constraint on the equipment. In

the case of an aircraft the decoy of course needs to be kept on a distance from the

platform so the platform is not damaged by a missile hitting the decoy. The towed decoy

will be most effective when the attack against the aircraft comes perpendicular to the

course of the aircraft and least effective against a forward attack. There are several

techniques for using towed decoys in order to protect the platform. One technique is just

to produce a stronger return using a repeater jammer. Another method is "blinking" which

69
means that the transmitter in the aircraft and the one in the decoy transmit alternately, this

will cause a back-and-forth motion in the threat angle which might stop a missile launch

because of the apparent instability in tracking. Figure 4-18 shows different possible

configurations for airborne towed decoys, from the most complicated with all components

in the decoy to a solution where the decoy actually only is a remote antenna. [Ref 46, Ref

47]

ON BOARD OFF BOARD

TOW LINE

A/C
POWER

CONVERT

A/C
POWER

CONVERT

TOW LINE&
POWER LINE & TRANSMISSION LINE
ECM
SIGNAL

iSm^^^^ TOWLINE
fc : ' •
g,
:

TRANSMISSION LINE

Figure 4-18. Different Possible Configurations for Airborne Decoys

70
 In the ship applications the towed decoy can be a small boat equipped with

both radar reflectors and active repeater transmitter. The purpose of the decoy is mainly

to break a missile's lock on the ship and seduce it towards the decoy. An example of a

towed decoy for naval applications is shown in Figure 4-19. The decoy in the picture is

called TOAD (Towed Offboard Active Decoy) and is built by Marconi Defence Systems

Ltd. TOAD is equipped with radar reflectors, receiver, signal processor, transmitter and

an antenna which is possible to point toward the threat. The system covers the I and J

bands. [Ref 8]

'''^C-r Jl ).UHi|iii«<Hiriii!~!m J. \-

Figure 4-19. Towed Offboard Active Decoy (TOAD)

/. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UAV can be used for offboard countermeasures (see Figure 4-20). There

are two principal methods in which UAV can be used. One method is to use the UAV as

71
a decoy (compare TALD) equipped with radar reflectors and possible a repeater-

transmitter. The purpose of this method would be to distract the air defense. During the

Israeli attack in the Beekaa valley in 1982, UAVs were used to seduce the Syrian missile

batteries to turn on their radars and thereby give away their EOB (Electronic Order of

Battle). The use of UAVs as decoys could also be done with the purpose of removing

attention and resources from the striking force, the attack of which would be coordinated

with the UAV. The second method to use UAV as an offboard countermeasure could be
as a substitute for a jammer aircraft. By equipping a UAV with ECM it would be possible

to achieve some advantages compared with a jammer aircraft The UAV is less expensive,
it is also smaller, which makes it easier to avoid detection, and as is apparent from its

name, it is unmanned which make it possible to plan missions without considerations for

the loss of pilots. For these reasons it is possible to operate closer to the threat radar.

This has several advantages, the primary being that the power necessary to achieve the

desired effect in the radar is reduced. As can be seen in the equation for ECM (Appendix
D) a jammer at half the distance only needs a quarter of the power Another advantage of

operating away from the protected platform is that the effect of the jamming will not

interfere with the platform's own weapons to the same degree which makes it possible to

use wideband countermeasures without jepordizing the friendly systems. [Ref 48, Ref 49]

72
 Figure 4-20. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

/ Dispensing Systems for Chaff, IR-flares and RF-decoys

The requirements for a dispensing system are very different for different

applications. Below is a brief description of the application-specific considerations for

landbased, naval and airborne dispensing systems.

Because the threats against landbased systems have mainly been IR/EO

guided systems, the dispensing systems have been concentrated toward smoke launchers.

Smoke is today the most widespread countermeasure system for armoured vehicles. With

the increasing threat from anti-tank systems using laser guidance and IR-guided systems,

the importance of reliable smoke launchers becomes more important. To get smoke of the

right sort in the right place at the right time has become a challenging task. To shorten the

response times in order to decrease the susceptibility, the launching systems are becoming

integrated with the vehicle's different warning systems (see integrated EW systems) Only

one landbased system using both chaff, IR-decoys and smoke for protection of key

military installations is known and that is the British system RAMPART.

73
 Dispenser systems for chaff are today the most common countermeasure

on naval ships and for many smaller ships chaff is the only countermeasure system. The

chaff, IR and RF decoys are normally dispensed by rocket systems. This is done to get the

decoys a sufficient distance away from the platform. The dispenser system is usually a

part of an integrated EW-system (see Chapter V. Integrated Electronic Warfare Systems)

which calculate what countermeasure should be used and in which direction the decoys

should be deployed The British Shield system is described below as an example of naval

dispensing systems.

For airborne systems the location of the dispensing system is of great

significance for effectivness of chaff and IR flares For chaff used in a self-protection role

it is important that the chaff cloud blooms rapidly to create a sufficient return to the radar

when the cloud and the aircraft are in the same range bin For this reason it is desirable to

locate the chaff dispenser so the chaff is dispensed into turbulent flow; this is achieved

forward of wing roots and close to the engine exhaust. For IR-flares the considerations

are almost opposite. The intensity of the flare decreases with increasing velocity so the

flare should be ejected into non-turbulent flow. The velocity with which the flare is

ejected has to be balanced so as to be not so slow that the miss distance is insufficient to

protect the aircraft, but not so high that the missile seeker does not respond and breaks the

lock-on. In many systems IR-flares and chaff use the same dispenser unit so the location

of the dispenser has to be a compromise between the different requirements. Typical

locations of dispenser units are shown in Figure 4-21. [Ref 8, Ref 14, Ref 37]

74
 Figure 4-21 . Typical Locations of Dispenser Units

(1) RAMPART (ML Aviation Ltd)

RAMPART is a landbased countermeasure system against IR,

laser, TV and radar guided missiles. The system also has a feature against low flying

aircraft. The system consists of a number of firing units which can be spread out up to 15

km. The firing units are activated by radio

from a central transmitter The firing units are equipped with

rocket decoys for chaff and IR, smoke (both rapid and slow burning) and the Skysnare

airborne obstruction. Skysnare is an airborne tethered obstruction that is placed around

the target to cause weapon aiming problems for low flying aircraft. The idea behind the

obstructions is to force the aircraft to climb to higher altitudes where it will be exposed by

active air defense systems. [Ref 8]

(2). Shield Tactical Decoy System (Marconi Underwater Systems

Ltd)

Shield is a chaff" and IR decoy system against anti-ship

missiles (see Figure 4-22). The system is modular which allows different launcher

configurations. Launchers with three, six, nine and twelve barrels are available. The

system is equipped with an automaitc response library which takes the input from the ships

75
different sensors and selects the best deployment pattern for the decoys. The launcher

system is equipped with rockets with either chafif, IR or a combination of both. The

rockets are fitted with a variable fijse which allows the chaff to be dispensed at different

positions along the trajectory. The fuse is electronically programmed just prior to launch

to take wind changes into account. The submunition IR round deploys each submunition

further away from the platform which makes the IR center move away from the ship. The

system is also able to fire both active offtoard and acoustic decoys.

Shield has four different operational modes to protect the

platform:

Conflision - the purpose is to confijse hostile radars by

creating multiple false targets.

Distraction - incoming missiles will lock on to chafif clouds

before they lock on to the platform, this is achieved by

deploying chafif around the ship at a distance of up to 2.5

km.

Seduction/Break lock - seduction of the missile to change

targets from the platform to the decoy. The decoys are

deployed so they, together with the effect of the wind and

the platform's manoeuvre, cause the missile to move with

the decoys and break the lock on the ship.

Seduction dump mode - the decoy is deployed outside the

missile range gate and an onboard jammer is used to shift

the gate position to the decoy. [Ref 8, Ref 1

1]

76
 „^_a_^.M^j/'v'^^ '

Figure 4-22. Shield Tactical Decoy System

(3). BOL (Celsius Tech)

BOL is an chaff dispenser which lets the aircraft carry chaff

for self protection without any reduction in weapon payload capacity. The dispenser is

constructed to work with the LAU-7 Sidewinder launcher. By changing some parts in the

original missile launcher it turns into a chaff dispenser (see Figure 4-23). The chaff

dispenser module consists of a chaff" compartment, an electromechanical feed mechanism

and an electronics unit. For cooling of the IR missile, a new gas bottle is mounted in the

77
nose of the launcher. Each dispenser holds 160 chaff packages. Chaff cloud dispersion is

synchronised by an on-board countermeasures computer. [Ref 8, Ref 37]

. r r;;.;:?:V

:BOtmcdula:::

^-r""""'
1

New gas bottle

Figure 4-23. BOL Chaff Dispenser

(4) BOP (Celsius Tech)

BOP is a pyrotechnical dispenser which is produced in

different versions for compatibility with installation configurations to avoid the risks

connected with flares (Figure 4-24). The BOP/B can be loaded with up to six 55 mm

78
diameter standard NATO type flares. The dispenser can be controlled by an automatic

EW-system (see integrated EW-system). An optional IR sensor can be mounted at the

rear to indicate whether the IR flares have ignited correctly. [Ref. 8, Ref. 37]

^--^-m^^'^^m^ P 1^'Wf'< v^

Figure 4-24. BOP Pyrotechnical Dispenser

E. COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES
1. General Description

The purpose of communications countermeasures is to deny the enemy the

possibility to command his troops by way of radio The countermeasures can be in form

of jamming or deception. Radio deception, which can be in the form of giving false and

misleading information, will not be discussed further. Jamming can be either in the form

of noise which reduces the signal-to-noise ratio or in the form of psycho-acoustic

modulations which distracts and enables the receiving operator. The jammer system

normally operates in a responsive mode; the transmitter is connected to a receiver system

which activates it when an active channel is detected. To ensure that the channel is still

active it uses a process called look-through, which means that the jamming is interupted

79
periodically to provided for the receiver to check. There are different ways to jam several

channels. The channels can be preset and the jammer can operate in a time-division

multiplex mode, this means that the jammer is moving between the different channels

which creates the impression of simultaneous jamming. The different preset channels can

be given different priorities which means that the jammer will return to the channels with

different intervals. Some systems are using multiple transmitters so some channels with

high priority can have true continous jamming. Another method to jam several channels

simultaneous is to use wide band jamming. [Ref 50]

2. Communication Countermeasures System

CL TACJAM-A (Lockheed Sanders/A EL)

TACJAM is a mobile VHP jamming system, the ESM part of the system is

described in Chapter III ESM Systems. The system is designed to cover a wide frequency

range and compared to older systems lighten the operator's workload. TACJAM has a

modular design and if a system component fails the system automatically reconfigures

itself to a degraded performance. The system consists of multiple exciter and transmitter

sets to allow it to disrupt many frequencies simultaneously. The jamming is computer

controlled and has look-through capability. To increase the maximum output power, two

amplifier chains can be combined, this is done by a combiner unit which also uses phase

control to synchronize the two amplifier chains (see Figure 4-25).

Specifications

Frequency range: 20 - 200 MHz

Power; 3 - 4 kW ERP

80
 Modulation modes: Amplitude modulation (AM), frequency modulation

(FM), continous wave (CW), frequency shift key (FSK), Noise and single side band

(SSB). [Ref. 8, Ref. ll,Ref. 51]

SINGLE CHANNEL 30 270V CX

J i
HE FILTER
UNIT
HIGH POWER HF HF ANTENNAS
~} DC
AMPLIFIER COMBINER
POWFR
UNIT UNIT
VHE FILTER DC
UNIT f
POWEB
HIQH SPEED LOWER POWER
JAM BUS UNIT
(2 CHANNELS)
SYSTEM CLOCK
t\0 MHl COM.)
_ HF FILTER
UNIT
HIGH POWER
ETHERNET (IEEE-302 31
- SF
AMPLIFIER
UNIT
POWER VHF
COMBINER
VHF ANTENNAS

_ VHF FILTER UNIT

UNIT DC
f
DC

Figure 4-25. TACJAM-A Blockdiagram for ECM section

b. AD/EXJAM (Loral Control Systems)

EXJAM is an artillery (155 mm howitzers) delivered jammer. The sytem

consists of five devices stacked within the projectile. The jammer is a broadband barrage

transmitter for disrupting enemy communications The jammers are released in the

trajectory by an automatic flise. The system provides the possiblity of deploying jammers

around a command post thereby limiting its ability to receive radio communications. [Ref

8]

F. CONCLUSIONS
The ECM systems uses many different technologies and methods to achieve their

purpose, below is a summary of the expected future for the different types of ECM
described in this chapter.

81
 The competition between radar and ECM will, with a high degree of certainty,

continue. New ECM systems will no longer only be able to counter the "red" threat but

must be able to counter western systems as well. The high cost of developing

sophisticated on-board systems will probably lead to a challenge by off-board systems.

The use of MMIC will make expendable RF-decoys an attractive alternative. Chaff will

probably continue to be a cost-effective self protection against a large part of the radar

guided threats. Future systems might well use a combination of on and off board systems

to achieve the desired deception at a reasonable cost

Laser CM will probably become more common because of the latest successes for

laser guided weapons. Systems which are able to deceive designator based systems could

be deployed in the defense of high value assets.

Infrared CM will, because of the effectivness of IR-missiles, increase in importance.

With the deployment of all aspects attacking IR missiles, directed IRCM will be the

preferred CM method. New missile seekers with less sensitivity to deception will probably
lead to IRCM of the destructive type.

82
 V. INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The introduction of new threats using new techniques for detection and guidance has

lead to the development and deployment of new countermeasure systems to counter them.

These new CMs have been added to a growing arsenal of EW systems on the platforms.
The trend today is to integrate these CMs to achieve a higher efficiency than if the CMs
worked without coordination. The EW systems should also be integrated with the other
systems on the platform to achieve further synergy effects The modern threat is also

pushing for integrated systems by reducing the reaction time for deployment of CM.

With an integrated system it is possible to produce an interpretation of real-time data

from several different sensors and either present a recommendation to the tactical action

officer or apply the ECM automatically. For expendables the timing of the deployment is

critical for their effectiveness By using the information achieved from the MWS together
with information from the navigation system regarding wind and speed, an optimal

automatic launch is possible.

By fusion of the information from different sensors,an integration processor can get a

more complete picture of the threat (see Figure 5-1). Fusion of the ESM information with

the IR-signature and the targets speed achieved from the radar can give a better

probability of identification and thereby a better chance to deploy the best ECM. The

information from the ESM can serve as target information for weapon systems

By integrating the platforms weapon systems with the EW systems it is possible to

obtain a better evaluation of the effects of the CM. The platform's radar can track the

83
incoming missile and through the common processor communicate the missile's behavior

to the ECM unit. This way it would be possible to determine the effect of the soft kill and,

if necessary also be able to decide when to go over to the hard kill method.

FCM
SENSOR
X /
X CATLING
GUN

X, y
RADAR INTEGRATION SURFACE-AIR
SENSOR • PROCESSOR MISSILE
•
^ \

\^
• •
• •

• •

SENSOR / OPERATOR(S) WEAPON

Figure 5-1 Blockdiagram for Integrated EW System

The most important advantage might be a less obvious one: by integrating the systems

it would be possible to avoid the systems fighting each other A central control unit could

manage the different components of the system so that no components which would

interfere with each other are active at the same time. If the integrated system is designed

and specified as a integrated system it will also decrease the risk of interference compared

with a merger of independent systems

Today there are several integrated systems in operation or under development; below

is a presentation of a few systems for ground, naval and airborne applications. [Ref 52,

Ref 53, Ref 54, Ref 55]

84
B. GROUND APPLICATIONS
Only recently has EW become a part of the normal equipment for fighting vehicles.
The components of the threat against a tank are also different than those for a ship or

aircraft. The threat is mainly from ami tank missiles guided by either laser or IR/EO while

the threat from radar guided weapons is small.

1. Vehicle Integrated Defense System, VTDS

VXDS is a system under development by the Tank-Automotive Command. The

system will combine threat sensor, navigation systems, identification friend or foe (IFF)

and countermeasures. The sensors include laser and radar warning. The CM consists of
smoke grenade launchers and semi-automatic counterfire The launcher will be able to

carry IR screening, visual as well as millimeter wave smoke. The IFF system is a laser

interrogate/RF response system For navigation the vehicle is equipped with GPS. The

central processor interprets the information from the different sensors and provides the

commander with a graphic presentation with the threats prioritized. Further development

of the VIDS will incorporate the VLQ-6 Hardhat multithreat jammer system into the

integrated suite. [Ref 8]

C. NAVAL APPLICATIONS
1. AN/SLQ-32 (Raytheon)

The SLQ-32 (see Chapter III. ESM and IV. ECM) was originally designed as a

stand alone system. Today the system is interfaced with other sensors and on some ships

also with the Combat Direction System (CDS) which enable the EW intercepts to be
transferred to the ship command where it can be used in the managing of the battle. The

Light Airborne Multipurpose Platform (LAMP) using the AN/ALQ-142 ESM system can

be integrated with the SLQ-32. Signals detected by the ALQ-142 are transmitted to the

85
SLQ-32 This integration gives the system a capability to detect threats over the radar

horizon it also enables the system to locate threat emitters using cross bearing correlation.

[Ref. 9]

2. EW 400 (Celsius Tech)

The EW 400 an integrated ship-borne warning and self protection system (see
is

Figure 5-2). The system is built around the EW computer which gets information from
radar warning receivers, laser warning receivers and the ships weapon and C-' systems.

The EW computer can apply the CM and suggest appropriate steering commands to the
steering indicator; this way the ship can coordinate chaff launch and ship maneuver to

achieve maximum effect of the CM. [Ref 8]

ESM Antenna System Laser Trainable Launcher Medium-Range

Warning Receivers Launchers
OMNI AfTE>'Nrt 4^
^^^^
I IFNSANTCNNA p*^^.

1 r
X,

Active ECM System

A\\\\>v\\V>\\\SV\SSSS\\\\N\\SS\SV\\\S\\.SS\\\\\VVSSS\\\S\.\SS\S.S\S\.SVXSS\\\

^^ Bndgcpouiicn
CD Weapon Control Console

miiii iitpi •
Sleering Indicuor

ESM Operators Console

•
III iiiiiiiffl

PEAB Electronic Warfare Sisttm JKT7 ^J>D Weapon Control System

^\s\s\\\\\vssv\v\\\v>.\.\v\ss\v.v\\sv\s.v.\\sv\.svvo.s\\s\\\N.\vsyv.\\\\\s\s\vs

Figure 5-2. Electronic Warfare System EW 400

86
 3. Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare Suite, AIEWS
AIEWS is the US Navy's name for a program for a future EW system. The

objective for the program is a system which integrates active and passive EW equipment
with weapons and offboard countermeasures. The systems should be able to handle

multiple threats using both hard and soft kill systems. Further, the system should give the

option of automatic decision making. To meet the threat from IR attacks the AIEWS will

be equipped with laser based IR-jamming system [Ref 8, Ref 9]

D. AIRBORNE APPLICATIONS
1. Integrated Electronic Warfare System, INEWS
INEWS is a USAF project which tries to minimize the use of redundant hardware

by integrating all the EW systems. One of the principals in the program is to let the

INEWS be one of the fundamental building blocks for the aircraft instead of being looked

at as an additional equipment load. By combining an array of different threat warning and

countermeasure systems the INEWS will provide an multispectral warning and automatic

countermeasures capability for the total electromagnetic threat The system will share data

with the integrated communications, navigation and identification avionics (ICNIA)

system. To achieve this performance, it will take advantage of the recent development in

monolithic microwave integrated circuits (MMIC) and very high speed integrated circuits

(VHSIC). A principal diagram over the system is shown in Figure 5-3. [Ref 8, Ref 9,

Ref 56]

87
 RADAR LASER MISSILE CW PULSED IR
cw WARNING WARNING APPROACH RADAR RADAR JAMMER
RECEIVER RECEIVER RECEIVER DETECTOR JAMMER JAMMER

i
4 1
ii
_J +
1
+
1 1

1
1
,

M M U
"i ^
'

AVIONICS
SYSTEMS
PROCESSOR -- MISSION
SYSTEMS

DISPENSERS

EXPENDABLES >

Figure 5-3. Prinicpal Diagram over INEWS

2. APR-39A(V)2 Threat warning system and Electronic Warfare Controller

(TWS/EWC)
The TWS/EWC is an integration of different EW systems around the APR-39
RWTl (see Figure 5-4) The lEWS interfaces already operational laser and missile warning

systems with RF jammers and dispenser systems. The integrated system provides

multispectral warning as well as semiautomated and automated countermeasures without

being originally designed as an integrated system. [Ref 8, Ref 57]

88
 APR-39A(V)2 lEWS INTERFACES

VIDEO/POWER DISCRETE
APR-39A(V)2 ALQ-162
TWS/EWC JAMMER
RS-422
& DISCRETES
I 1553B

AVR-2
E
AAR-47
553B
I 1553B
ASM-687/
i
ALQ-136
LWS MWS RRT JAMMER
MLA/

I
ALE-39 ALE-47
DISPENSER DISPENSER

Figure 5-4. Blockdiagram over APR-39A(V)2 as Integrated EW system

E. CONCLUSIONS
Integrated EW systems will be more or ;vss the role model in the future, the reason for

this will be:

- Extreme short reaction times requires the option of automatic countermeasures.

- The introduction of threats using several different sensors.

- The fusion of sensors increases the possibilities in evaluating the threats reaction

to countermeasures.

- Increased effectiveness by combining different types of countermeasures, such as

on and off board.

89
 - Increased ability to avoid different systems jamming eacii other.

The integrated systems will not only coordinate the different EW fijnctions but will
also be integrated with the platform's other systems like navigation and avionics/steering.

This will make a truly coordinated response including both ECM and platform maneuvers

possible. For platforms utilizing stealth by minimizing their radar cross section, the design

of the EW systems antennas will be an important part of the original design of the
platform.

90
 VI. SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE (SEAD)

The purpose of SEAD is to render an integrated air defense system (IADS)

inoperable through soft and/or hard icili. SEAD is done to allow the follow-on strike

aircraft to perform their missions without interference from the air defense. A primary

component in the SEAD system is the attack aircraft using anti-radiation missiles (ARM)

and emitter locator systems (ELS). The Tornado aircraft shown in Figure 6-1 is equipped

for SEAD and electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR); by using a data link one

aircraft with an ELS system can transmit emitter information to another aircraft carrying

anti-radiation missiles. [Ref 58]

ADVANCED
MtSSlONSPECtnC DtSPLAVS EMHTf R LOCATOR SYSTEK

FUB

OOm DATA LINK

m LWE SCANNEB or ?i HARM MISSILES TOWtAOO 5ELF.PB0THCT JAMMER

m IMAGING SYSTEM (TSPJ)

Figure 6-1. Tornado Aircraft Equipped for SEAD

91
A. RADIATION HOMING SYSTEMS
1. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, HARM (Texas Instruments)
The HARM uses an anti-radiation homing seeker to track the radar emissions
(see Figure 6-2). The missile has a maximum speed of Mach 2+. The prefragmentated

warhead uses a laser range radar as a proximity fuse to determine time for detonation so

as to maximize the damage to the target's antenna. For guidance during the midcourse

phase the missile has its own inertial navigation system and auto pilot. The HARM can be
launched in two different modes, reactive and preemptive. In the reactive mode the

HARM maintains the tracking of the enemy radar from launch to impact. This mode is

normally used at shorter distances. A submode of the reactive mode is the self protect

launch which is used when the launching aircraft is engaged by an enemy radar guided

weapon.

HARM Features
~ -.OC.^Cl ..li. L.iJ

-,.li.li-..«v (r.n.

V-liJ ^l-iH- I CI I '.:• .-viol

^
t_i-X-/

TT \ii
I on « sol

."p;i,' ;rcj ...- r.-.. .ii r.-.;;iT.< 'C-;:. , .lilt. . ;1.JI

*ti^.|'Joi.ii ini-iii i! ;>.n ir.'.tii' II -yMjiji

Figure 6-2. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile

92
 In the preemptive mode the missile is launched toward a known target location.

Before launch, information regarding the target's location and characteristics is passed to

the missile, normally from the aircraft's RWR. The aircraft's airspeed and altitude is also

passed to the missile prior to launch. Shortly after launch the missile starts its midcourse

trajectory during which it is guided by its own inertial navigation system. When the

missile reachs the calculated target area it is pointed toward the projected target and the

seeker is activated. If the seeker finds the target the missile's guidance system will home in

on the radiation until impact. If the missile does not find the target when the seeker

becomes active it will continue toward the calculated target position. After a certain time

the missile will enter a energy conserving profile with the purpose of increasing its range,

during which time it tries to acquire a target. If a target is found the missile enters the

guidance mode again. The preemptive mode is illustrated in figure 6-3. [Ref 43, Ref 59,

Ref 60, Ref 61]

BBQINS SEARCH FOR

pmiAPnr TARGET

HARMEOM
FUGHT PROFILE

BEQD4S SEARCH FOn

AUBINATE TARGET

LAUNCH AT
TARGET WITH
HAiOOFF/NAV
BVIORS
PWMAflnr LOCATION ALTBMATE
VMTH ERROR

Figure 6-3. HARM in Preemptive Mode

93
 2. Anti Radiation Missile - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Another method of achieving SEAD is to use UAVs as ARMs. The UAV

equipped with a radar homing seeker can be put into a patrol route to search an area for

radar emitters, during this patrol the UAV can be using an energy preserving speed to

increase durability. When a radar in the area becomes active the UAV can home in on the
radar using a radar homing seeker A typical radar homing sensor is shown in Figure 6-4.

The sensor has a frequency range of 2-18 GHz, a total weight of 12 lb. and a range

against typical radar of approximately 10 km. [Ref 62]

Figure 6-4 Radar Homing Seeker

94
B. CONCLUSIONS
The importance of SEAD was shown in the Gulf war and ARMs are becoming a part

of many nations arsenals. Expected improvements of the ARM will probably come in both

the navigation system and in the ability to counter different types of ARM-CM. In the

navigation field the inclusion of GPS could lead to improved precision in the midcourse

phase, the ARM would become more or less a cruise missile with an anti-radiation seeker.
In the case of resistance to CM there are several possible developments;
- Artificial intelligence which could make the missile discriminate between the radar

and decoys by way of operation patterns

- Multiple sensors which makes endgame guidance possible against shut down

radar.

- Improved navigation which will make close hit possible even if the radar is turned

off during the guidance phase

Other development in the area might be the inclusion of radar homing seekers to other

missile systems both air-to-air and surface-to-surface

95
96
 Vn. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

Directed energy weapons (DEW) can be divided into three categories: lasers, high-

powered microwave (HPM) weapons and charge particle beam weapons. Of these

categories, the lasers seem to have the highest potential in the shorter perspective. HPM
and charge particle beam weapons are not predicted to enter the battlefield during the next

decade. A general advantage for beam weapons over conventional weapons is that they

do not rely on a magazine of explosive shells but instead on an almost unlimited power

supply. Beam weapons also have the advantage of a high velocity, literally the speed of

light. This makes the time to reach the target negligible, which significantly simplifies

weapon guidance, it also gives the systems a potential to engage many targets in a short

time (Figure 7-1). [Ref 63]

Figure 7-1. Example of possible deployment of beam weapons

97
A. LASER WEAPONS
Laser weapons can be divided into two categories: jamming and destructive. The

jamming systems use the laser beam either to introduce false information into a seeker (see

Chapter IV. ECM) or to saturate the detector while the destructive systems use high

power in order to destroy components, normally sensors, in the target. The laser could

also be used against personnel, especially against the unprotected human eye. Depending

on the intensity the radiation can cause:

- Irritation, the illuminated individual is forced to turn the head away.

- Flash blindness, at this energy-level there will also be permanent injuries to the

eye.

The destructive laser systems can either be optimized against the detector or be high

power systems which by introducing energy to the surface layer of the target creates

thermal and mechanical effects which causes breakdowns. If the laser operates in the

same wavelength as the sensor, the radiation becomes magnified by the seeker's own

optics which can increase the radiation density in the detector by a factor of 100 000. A
consequence of this fact is that tuneable lasers would be of great importance as weapons

because they could radiate at the sensor's wavelength and thereby use only a small fraction

of the power otherwise necessary. Figure 7-2 shows possible weapon lasers against

different sensors. There are several methods for frequency conversion which would lead

to a laser tuneable in a large part of the optical spectrum. The free electron laser (FEL)

with its potential for both high power and tuneablity would be a suitable laser for weapons

applications, studies are under way to build a ship-borne weapon system based on the

FEL. [Ref 64, Ref 65, Ref 66, Ref 67]

98
 Laser Sensor
Wave length ^im

A
Carbon
dioxide 10 IRV8-12|im

Hydrogen
fluoride IRV 3-5 ^m

Night vision

Human eye
0.3

Figure 7-2. Wavelengths for different sensors and potential laser weapons

1. High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle (MBB, Diehl)

The high energy laser (HEL) system is a short-range system for use against low

flying aircraft, helicopters and missiles. It has an expected range of 8000 m. The sytem

99
uses a 10.6 [xm carbon dioxide laser. The laser is fueled with hydrocarbon fuel and a

nitrogenous oxidator, which both are carried by the vehicle. The two components form

the carbon dioxide which is used in the stimulated emission. The laser beam is directed at

the target by a focusing mirror on an extendable arm (see Figure 7-3). The hot ftimes

from the gas formation are vented rearwards from the laser generator system.

The HEL achieves its purpose by directing the beam onto a small spot with a

very high energy density which causes the material to become heated, melted and

vapourised The HEL system is still in the study phase but a small scale version has been

succesflilly tested. [Ref 68]

100
 ((•fltcOOB from
Targ»(
Focuting Opttes
•nd Tfachw

Figure 7-3. High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle

B. HIGH-POWERED MICROWAVE (HPM)

The concept used for HPM is in many ways similar to RF-jammers (see Figure 7-4)

but instead of distracting or deceiving the system, the HPMs purpose is to affect and if

possible destroy the electronic equipment itself The HPM systems could potentially be

used in three different levels:

- As traditional jammers but with a power that would make it possible to totally

101
 dominate the target and decrease the "burn through" distance to almost zero.

- To destroy microcircuits in electronic systems.

- To heat up targets and thereby cause mechanical and thermally induced breakdown.

Wave guide

—^^^ Antenna

High- Pulse Microwave

voltage generator source
generator

Figure 7-4 Block diagram for HPM system

Because of the high power radiation generated by the HPM it stands a high risk of

jamming friendly electronic systems To be able to operate HPM close to other systems
the antennas need to be highly directional and the site would need to be masked by the

terrain. A solution to this problem will probably be that HPM systems operate as

independent units away from other systems Another drawback for HPM systems is that

modern aircraft normally have protection from electromagnetic pulses which will also be

effective against HPM A trend in aircraft design working in favour of the HPM is that

modern stealth aircraft are designed to maximize absorption of microwaves which might

make them highly succeptible to microwave thermal effects. [Ref 69]

C. NON-NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)

Even though the EMP generated by a high altitude nuclear detonation might by

definition be considered an EW weapon it is not discussed fijrther here. The development

of a non-nuclear EMP generator has emerged as a possible effective weapon which does

102
not cause severe loss of life. By using an EMP weapon it would be possible to upset

electronic components to cause loss of data and other failures which would lead to system

collapse.

The EMP generator consists of a helical coil inside a copper cylinder surrounded by

high explosives. A bank of capacitors are used to supply the initial current which creates a

magnetic field in the gap between the coil and cylinder. The explosion compresses the

magnetic field which creates a very short-duration pulse of high power. Los Alamos has

conducted tests where the generator has produced a 12- 16 MA pulse during a rise time of
400 ns. The EMP generator is planned to be fitted into a slightly modified air launched

cruise missile (ALCM) (see Figure 7-5) By using a well-tuned antenna the EMP would

be focused into a 30 degree beam The ALCM would be programmed to fly over the

target, for example a command center, and at passage detonate its EMP generator. [Ref

70]

103
 ALCM MODIFIED TO CARRY NON-LETHAL
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) WEAPON

ENLARGED
FACETED NOSE
TO CARRY EMP
GENERATOR

OPTICALLY
'
TRANSPARENT
WINDOW

/
30°
EMP
BEAM
Figure 7-5. Electromagnetic pulse weapon

D. CONCLUSIONS
The use of directed energy weapons will probably be one of the fastest growing

branches of EW under the coming decade due to the rapid deployment of EO/IR guided
weapon systems. On the battlefield anti-sensor lasers are likely to become a common

component in the self protection weaponry of tanks and AFVs and the use of laser in an

anti personnel (eye destructive) role might be the role in coming conflicts. If the

development of non-nuclear EMP is successful it has the potential to become the weapon

of choice in low level conflicts and in retaliation attacks.

104
 APPENDIX A MONOLITHIC MICROWAVE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT
TECHNOLOGY

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has sponsored a program to

develop the Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit (MMIC) Technology. The MMIC
can be described as a building block for microwave equipment similar to Integrated

Circuits (IC) for electronics. The aim of the program was to develop the MMIC
technology to reduce future costs for producing complex microwave subsystems. The

result of the program is a series of standard building blocks, such as amplifiers,

synthesizers, transmitters and receivers. The introduction of MMIC has made it possible

to significantly reduce size, weight and cost for many EW systems The use of MMIC has

also helped to improve the reliability of the systems. These improvements have been

achieved without the expected loss in performance compared to hybrid designs where

transistors can be selected to optimize the performance [Ref 71]

The use of MMIC has made possible products which were earlier not feasible

because of cost or size. Among the new products are expendable decoys like GEN-X,

lightweight, high performance RWR like ALR-67(V) and smart chaff.

105
 APPENDIX B TRANSMISSION IN THE ATMOSPHERE

The infrared emission from a body is dependent on its temperature and emissivity.

As can be seen in Figure B-1 the total radiated power increases with increased

temperature while the wavelength for the peak decreases. The tail pipe of a jet engine has

a temperature of approximately 800 K, which represents a peak wavelength of 4 \xm. The

emissivity describes how much power the body radiates. For a perfect emitter, called a

black body, the emissivity is equal to one.

Figure B- 1 . Spectral Radiant Emittance of a Blackbody

106
 When IR radiation propagates through the atmosphere some of it is reflected,

scattered or absorbed. These phenomena are wavelength-dependent which means that the

transmission of IR is better for some wavelengths. Figure B-2 shows the percentage of

radiation transmission over a 1 nautical mile path for a given sea level atmosphere as a

function of wavelength. Because of this phenomenon, the detector technology is

concentrated to wavelengths where the atmosphere has a high transmittance, so called

windows.

|<— Near infrirw) —fc|« Middle minred >^ - Faf inlnred-

100 1 r

20

3 4
J_\
5
k L
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1* 15
Wavelength (microns)

Figure B-2. Atmospheric Attenuation of IR Radiation

107
APPENDIX C JOINT ELECTRONICS TYPE DESIGNATION SYSTEM (JETDS)

The JETDS is a designation system used by the DoD; which gives a brief

classification of equipment. The code consists of the letters AN followed by three letters,

a number and, in some cases, another letter. The letters following AN represent, in order,

platform installation, equipment type and purpose The number is the designated number

for the piece of equipment and the letter following it provides additional information about

the most common modifications.

Below is a list of the most commonly-used designations for EW equipment [Ref

73]

TABLE 5JOINT ELECTRONICS TYPE DESIGNATION SYSTEM

Installation Type Purpose
A: Piloted aircraft A: Invisible light, heat D: Direction finder,
radiation reconnaissance or
surveillance
F: Fixed ground L: Countermeasures E: Ejection or release
M: Mobile ground N: Sound in air G: Fire control
P: Portable P; Radar H: Recording or
reproducing
S: Water R: Radio Q: Special combination
of purposes
T: Ground, S: Special combination R; Receiving, passive
transportable of types detecting
U: General utility V; Visual and visible T: Transmitting
light

V: Vehicular ground W: Armament Y: Surveillance and

control
Z: Piloted-pilotless
airborne vehicle
combination

108
 APPENDIX D FORMULAS FOR ECM

This appendix gives the most commonly used formulas regarding ECM systems

The purpose with the calculations is to find either at what range the platform will be

visible to the radar or what jamming power is necessary to hide it It is important to

remember that these formulas only give an estimate of the real result and that the real

result is dependent, among other things, on attenuation, fluctuations in the radar cross

section and ECCM techniques used by the radar.

The most important factor to determine the effectiveness of noise jamming is the jam

to signal ratio (J/S). The ratio express the jammer's power intercepted by the radar

compared to that intercepted from the target By setting J/S to the minimum required to

conceal the target the burn-through distance, R, can be found. If the jammer is used for

self-screening the J/S will be as follows.

T PBG47iR^
± ^ J r J

S PGaB
r r J

J= Power of the noise

S= Power of the echo

Pj-= Power of the radar

Pj= Power of the jammer

B-,= Bandwidth of the jammer

Br= Bandwidth of the radar overlapping the jammer

0;= Gain of the jammer antenna in the direction of the radar

109
 Gy= Gain of the radar antenna in the direction of the target

cr= Radar cross section of the target

R= Distance between the jammer and the radar

If the jammer is used as a stand-off jammer, this means that the jammer and the

target to be protected are different platforms, the J/S will be as follows.

P B G G 47[ (r;^

^
P (G^^aB fR^^
V
J J

Gjr= Gain of the jammer antenna in the direction of the radar

Gy\= Gain of the radar antenna in the direction of the jammer

Rf^ Distance from radar to target

R\= Distance from radar to jammer

no
 APPENDIX E LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAED Active Airborne Expendable Decoy

AEB Active Electronic Buoy

AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle

AIEWS Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare Suite

AG Acousto-Optic

AOCMS Airborne Optical Counter-Measures System

ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

ASE Aircraft Survivability Equipment

ASPJ Airborne Self-Protection Jammer

ATOM Anti Tank Guided Missile

ATIRCM Advanced Threat InfraRed Counter-Measures

ATRJ Advanced Threat Radar Jammer

CM Counter-Measures

CVR Crystal Video Receiver

CW Continuous Wave

DF Direction Finding

DSP Digital Signal Processing

EC Electronic Combat

ECCM Electronic Counter Counter-Measures

ECM Electronic Counter-Measures

ECR Electronic Combat Reconnaissance

EGCM End Game Counter-Measures

111
EIDF Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding

ELINT ELectronic INTelligence

EME Electro-Magnetic Environment

EO Electro-Optic

EOB Electronic Order of Battle

EP Electronic Protection

ERP Effective Radiated Power

ESM Electronic Support Measures

EW Electronic Warfare

EWS Electronic Warfare Support

FFT Fast Fourier Transform

FPA Focal-Plane Array

GBCS Ground Based Common Sensor

HARM High-Speed Antiradiation Missile

HOJ Home On Jam

lEWCS Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Common Sensor

IFM Instantaneous Frequency Measurement

IFM Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver

m InfraRed

LRCM InfraRed Counter-Measures

IRMWS Infrared Missile Warning Subsystem

LOB Line Of Bearing

LPI Low Probability of Intercept

LWS Laser Warning System

MAW Missile Approach Warning

112
MMIC Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit

MMW Milli-Meter-Wave

MSAS Multifunction Strike Avoidance System

MWS Missile Warning System

MWS Missile Warning System

OBCM OfF-Board Counter-Measures

PD Pulse Doppler

PFM Pulse Frequency Modulation

PMAWS Passive Missile Approach Warning System

POI Probability Of Intercept

PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency

PRI Pulse Repetition Interval

PW Pulse Width

RF Radio Frequency

RWR Radar Warning Receiver

SAWS Silent Attack Warning System

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SEW Surface Electronic Warfare

SHR Superhetrodyne Receiver

SIGINT SIGnal INTelligence

SSDS Ship Self Defense System

TDOA Time Difference Of Arrival

TO A Time Of Arrival

TRF Tuned RF Receiver

TWT Travelling Wave Tube

113
TWTA Travelling Wave Tube Amplifier

UAV Unmanned Air Vehicles

VCO Voltage Controlled Oscillator

114
 LIST OF REFERENCES

[l.]Schleher, D,, Introduction to Electronic Warfare, Artech House Inc., 1986.

[2.]Tanksley, M., 29th Annual AOC EW Technical Symposium and Convention 1992.

[3.]Anderson, R.R., and Pierskalla K , "Surface EW 2000 - Challenges of the Future",

Journal of Electronic Defense, January 1992.

[4.]Friedman, N., "Providing Defense Against Anti-Ship Missiles", International

Countermeasures Handbook, 1 990.

[5.]Keirstead, B., and Herther J., "Aircraft Survivability in the 21st Century - ATIRCM",
Journal of Electronic Defense, May 1992.

[6.]Morris, G. V., and Kastle, T. D., "Trends in Electronic Counter-Countermeasures",

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[7.]Dodd, R W., "EW Receivers Use Multiple Technologies", Defense Electronics,

September 1990.

[8.]Blake, B., Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 1992-93, Jane's Information
Group Ltd., 1992.

[9.]Raytheon Company Electromagnetic Systems Division, AN/SLQ-32(V)2, 1987.

[10.]Hardy, S. M., "The Long Voyage of Navy EW", Journal of Electronic Defense,
August 1992.

[1 l.JThe International Defense Electronics System Handbook 1992, Cardiff Publishing,

1992.

[12.]Lockheed Sanders Inc., The Next Generation of C3CM.

[13.]Vollrath, T. L., "The Next Generation of C3CM The Army's TACJAM-A Points to
the Future", Journal of Electronic Defense, January 1992.

[14.]Ball, R. E., The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Inc., 1985.

115
[15.JJED Staff, "A Sampling of Radar Warning Receivers", Jourfial of Electronic
Defense, September 1992.

[16.]Litton Applied Technology, AN/APR-39A(V)3 Threat Warning System.

[17.]Hughes Aircraft Company, AN/ALR-67(V)3 Countermeasures Receiving Set, 1992.

[18.] "Hughes Flight Test DF Version of Advanced Special Receiver, Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 19 October 1992.

[19.]Deyerle, C. M., and Thomsen, K E , "Missile Warning on USAF Fighters", Journal

of Electronic Defense, May 1992.

[20.]Gershanoff, H., "Using EO/IR to Find Threats", Journal of Electronic Defense,

February 1993.

[21.]Hardy, S. M., "Heeding the Warning", Journal of Electronic Defense, May 1993.

[22.]LoraI Infrared & Imaging Systems, Passive Missile Warning.

[23.]Cincinnati Electronics Corp., AN/AAR-FX.

[24.]Black, A A., "Pulse Doppler for Missile Approach Warning", Journal of Electronic
Defense, August 1991.

[25.]Russell, B., "AN/ALQ-161 Tail VJarnmgYuncUon", Journal of Electronic Defense,

August 1991.

[26.]Lock:heed Sanders, The Technology of Survival AN/ALQ-156A Pulse Doppler

Missile Warning System, 1991.

[27.]Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc., Laser Warning Receivers.

[28.]Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc., AN/AVR-2 Laser Detecting Set, 1992.

[29.]Hoisington, D. B., Electronic Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School.

[30.]Neri, F., "New Technologies in Self-Protection Jammers", Journal of Electronic

Defense, My 1991.

[31.]Steeg, G. F., "On-Board Active Electronic Countermeasures", Journal of Electronic

Defense, September 1990.

116
[32.]Raytheon, SIDEKICK Lightweight Active Countermeasures Combat Tested ECM
for Small Ships.

[33.]Raytheon, AN/ALQ-184(V) Self Protection Pod.

[34.JLORAL Electro-Optical Systems, IRCM Infrared Countermeasures Systems

[35.]Lockheed Sanders, The Technology of Survival AN/ALQ-144 Infrared

Countermeasures Set, 1991.

[36.]"Directed IR Jammer Gives Full Coverage", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19
October 1992.

[37.]Celsius Tech, BO 300 A Breakthrough in Passive Countermeasures.

[38.]Streetly, M., "Expendable Decoys", International Defense Review 8 1990, 8/1990.

[39.]Galatowitsch, S., "Expendables Cover the Spectrum", Defense Electronics,
September 1990.

[40.]Braun, A. E.,"US Expendable Technology Continues Evolving", Journal of

Electronic Defense, December 1990

[41.]McKinney, T., "GEN-X Decoy Production Cell May Aid Other Avionic Programs",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 October 1992.

[42.JTHORN EMI Electronics Ltd., Shipborne Off-Board Active Decoy Carmen.

[43.]Streetly, M., Airborne Electronic Warfare; History, Techniques and Tactics, Jane's
Publishing Inc., 1988.

[44.]"Litton Looking at New Markets", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 October
1992.

[45.]Hardy, S., "Air Force Approves Antiradiation Missile Decoy for Production",
Journal of Electronic Defense, May 1993.

[46.]Alterman, S., "Eeny, Meeny, Miny, MOE! Catch a Missile with a Tow", Journal of
Electronic Defense, September 1990.

[47.]Greenbaum, M., "The Complementary Roles of On-Board and Off-Board EW",

Journal of Electronic Defense, November 1992.

[48.]Hardy, S., "Finding a Place On Board", Journal of Electronic Defense, February

1992.

117
 .

[49.]Ramey, D. R., "Recoverable Off-Board Countermeasures for Ship Defense", Journal

of Electronic Defense, December 1 99 1

[50.]Wiethachter, N. R., "Keeping an Eye on the Enemy Integrated Communications EW

Required for Land Forces", International Defense Review, 3/1993.

[51.]Sanders Surveillance Systems Division, Tactical Communications Jammer System,

1984.

[52.]Neri, F. "New Electronic Defense Techniques", EW Desigfi Engineers' Handbook,

1993.

[53.]Lum, Z. A., "Shipboard EW Targets 21st Century Combatant", Journal of Electronic

Defense, April 1993.

[54.]Seward, T. C, "Surface Ship E^'\ Journal of Electronic Defense, May 1991.

[55 ]McMiller, M., "New Concepts in Aircraft Survivability", Journal of Electronic

Defense, April 1992.

,[56.]Rawles, J. W., "The News About INEWS", Defense Electronics, October 1989.

[57.]Litton Applied Technology, APR-39A(V)2 Threat Warning System, 1992.

[58.]Brown, D. A., and Mecham, M., "Germans Offer Tornado ELS for Testing on U.S.
F/A-18", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 October 1992.

[59.]Barnard, P., and O'Grady, D., "Harm Weapon Modeling in Suppressor Simulation",
The Proceedings of the 1993 Joint Western-Mountain Region EW Technical Symposium,
1993.

[60.]Texas Instruments, AGh4-88 High-Speed Anti-Radar Missile, 1991.

[61 .]"Enhanced HARM in Production", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 October
1992.

[62.]E-Systems, Intelligent Radar Homing Sensor, 1986.

[63.]Rawles, J.W., "Directed Energy Weapons: Battlefield Beams", Defense Electronics,

August 1989.

[64.]Walles, S., "Hur skyddar vi oss mot laserhotet?", Artilleri Tidskrift, v. 122.2, 1993.

118
 . .

[65.]Fulghum, DA., "Wild Weasels May Get Optics-Blinding Laser", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 8 March 1993.

[66.]Scott, W. B., "USAF Airborne Laser to Show Missile Kill", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 22 March 1 993

[67.]Steinvall, O., "Laser, fran sensor till vapen", The Royal Swedish Academy of War
Sciences Proceedings and Journal, v 196:5, 1992.

[68.]Cullen, T., and Foss, C. P., Jane's Land-Based Air Defence 1993-94, Jane's
Information Group Ltd., 1993.

[69.]Madsen, K., "Hogeffet Pulsad Mikrovagsstralning - hot mot elektronik", FOA

tidningen, v. 29, April 1991.

[70.]Fulghum, D. A., "EMP Weapons Lead Race For Non-Lethal Technology", Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 24 May 993 1

[71.]"MMIC Technology Benefits in EW Systems", Aviation Week & Space Technology,

19 October 1992.

[72.]Hudson, R. D., Infrared System Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, 1969.

[73.]Naval Air Systems Command, Electronic Warfare and Radar Systems Engineering
Handbook, October 1992.

[74.]Lockheed Sanders, Radio Frequency and ECM Characteristics, 1992.

119
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1 , BONUS Guided Artillery Sub-Munition, The Royal Swedish Academy of
War Sciences Proceedings and Journal.

Figure 2-2 STRIX IR Guided Mortar Munition, Arme Nytt

Figure 2-3. Land Based ASCM, Artilleri Tidskrift.

Figure 2-4. Weapon Systems Using Lasers, Hughes Danbury Optical Systems.

Figure 2-5. Development of IR Seekers, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 3-1 . Crystal Video Receiver, Introduction to Electronic Warfare, Artech House
Inc.

Figure 3-2. Superhetrodyne Receiver, Introduction to Electronic Warfare, Artech House

Inc.

Figure 3-3. Instaneous Frequency Measurement Receiver, Introduction to Electronic

Warfare, Artech House Inc.

Figure 3-4. Channelized Receiver / Bragg Cell / Microscan Receiver, Introduction to

Electronic Warfare, Artech House Inc.

Figure 3-5. AN/SLQ-32 Antenna Array, Raytheon Company Electromagnetic Systems

Division.

Figure 3-6. Block Diagram for AN/SLQ-32, Raytheon Company Electromagnetic

Systems Division.

Figure 3-7. Multibeam Lens Antenna, Raytheon Company Electromagnetic Systems

Division.

Figure 3-8. TACJAM-A;s Man-Machine Interface, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 3-9. TACJAM-A Block Diagram, Sanders Surveillance Systems Division.

Figure 3-10. AN/APR-39A(V)3, Litton Applied Technology.

120
Figure 3-11. AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set, Hughes Aircraft
Company.

Figure 3-12. AN/ALR-67(V)3 Counter Measures Receiving Set, Hughes Aircraft

Company.

Figure 3-13. AAR-47 Detector Unit, Loral

Figure 3-14. AN/AAR-FX, Cincinnati Electronics.

Figure 3-15. Clutter Return for Active MWS, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 3-16. Doppler Return from Incoming Missile, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 3-17. AN/ALQ- 156(A) Missile Warning System, Lockheed Sanders.

Figure 3-18. Angle of Arrival Determination, Hughes Danbury Optical Systems.

Figure 3-19. AN/AVR-2 Detector Unit, Hughes Danbury Optical Systems.

Figure 4-1 . Cross-Eye Deception, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 4-2. AN/SLQ-32 Multibeam Lens Antenna, Raytheon Company Electromagnetic

Systems Division.

Figure 4-3. AN/ALQ- 84(V)

1 Self Protection Pod, Raytheon Company Electromagnetic
Systems Division.

Figure 4-4. AN/ALQ- 84(V)

1 Self Protection Pod Block Diagram, Raytheon Company
Electromagnetic Systems Division.

Figure 4-5. Influences on the Power Requirements, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 4-6. Matador, Loral

Figure 4-7 AN/ALQ- 144, Lockheed Sanders.

Figure 4-8. DIRCM, Aviation Week & Space Technology.

Figure 4-9. Chaff" Cassettes, Celsius Tech.

Figure 4-10. Replica Naval Decoy, Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems.

Figure 4-11. GEN-X Decoy, Texas Instruments.

121
Figure 4-12. GEN-X Decoy, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 4-13. ASM Attack on Ship, THORN EMI.

Figure 4-14. Launch of Carmen Decoy, THORN EMT

Figure 4-15 Carmen Decoy, THORN EMT

Figure 4-16. TALD, Tactical Air Launched Decoy, Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare
Systems.

Figure 4-17. AN/TLQ-32 Antiradiation missile decoy. Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 4-18. Different Possible Configurations for Airborne Decoys, Journal of Electronic
Defense.

Figure 4-19. Towed Offboard Active Decoy (TOAD), Jane's Radar and Electronic
Warfare Systems.

Figure 4-20. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Journal of Electronic Defense.

Figure 4-21. Typical Locations of Dispenser Units, Celsius Tech

Figure 4-22 Shield Tactical Decoy System, Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems.

Figure 4-23 BOL Chaff Dispenser, Celsius Tech.

Figure 4-24. BOP Pyrotechnical Dispenser, Celsius Tech.

Figure 4-25. TACJAM-A Blockdiagram for ECM section, Sanders.

Figure 5-1 . Blockdiagram for Integrated EW System, Western-Mountain Region EW

Technical Symposium.

Figure 5-2 Electronic Warfare System EW 400, Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare
Systems.

Figure 5-3. Prinicpal Diagram over INEWS, Western-Mountain Region EW Technical

Symposium

Figure 5-4. Blockdiagram over APR-39A(V)2 as Integrated EW system, Litton Applied

Technology.

122
Figure 6-1. Tornado Aircraft Equipped for SEAD, Aviation Week & Space Technology.

Figure 6-2. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, Texas Instruments.

Figure 6-3. HARM in Preemptive Mode, Western-Mountain Region EW Technical

Symposium.

Figure 6-4. Radar Homing Seeker, E-Systems.

Figure 7-1 . Example of possible deployment of beam weapons, FOA-Tidningen.

Figure 7-2. Wavelengths for Different Sensors and Potential Laser Weapons.

Figure 7-3. High Energy Laser Air Defense Armoured Vehicle, Jane's Land-Based Air
Defence.

Figure 7-4 Block diagram for HPM system

Figure 7-5. Electromagnetic pulse weapon, FOA-Tidningen

Figure B-1 . Spectra! Radiant Emittance of a Blackbody, Infrared Systems Engineering,

John Wiley & Sons.

Figure B-2. Atmospheric Attenuation of IR Radiation, Infrared Systems Engineering,

John Wiley & Sons.

123
 INITAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center

Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145

2. Library, Code 0142

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002

3. Director, Space and Electronic Combat Division (N64)

Space and Electronic Warfare Directorate
Chief of Naval Operations
Washington DC 20350-2000

4. Electronic Warfare Academic Group, Code EW

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000

5. Dan Farley, LCDR., USN

Naval Postgraduate School, Code EC/Fa
Monterey, California 93943-5000

6. Professor Frederic H. Levien

Naval Postgraduate School, Code EC/Lv
Monterey, California 93943-5000

7. Goran Pettersson, Major, Swedish Army

Nodsta 7030
S-761 92 NORRTALJE
SWEDEN

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Naval Postgraduate School, Code ECAVd
Monterey, California 93943-5000

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