INTRODUCTION

WAR IN UKRAINE: A CROSSROADS FOR EUROPE AND RUSSIA

Russia's engagement in Ukraine has caused a significant upheaval in the security environment in
Europe since the middle of 2022. The core concepts of freedom, self-determination, and peace on
the continent are feared by Western officials to be under danger from moves to reorganise Europe's
security system. Vladimir Putin's decision to annex Crimea and his efforts to destabilise eastern
Ukraine have caused serious concerns among Western policymakers about Russia's adoption of a
combative national security strategy that might negatively affect both the stability of Europe and its
relations with the rest of the world.

There is no way to predict how the conflict in Ukraine will turn out. Russia's campaign in Ukraine has
debunked long-held notions that war was "a thing of the past" on the European continent. In
capitals across Europe, conversations regarding security and defence structures, policies, and
strategic direction have been sparked by the shifting security environment.

The idea that Putin's goal has been endorsed throughout Europe is far from certain. If anything, the
EU has become more divided as a result of his never-ending conflict. Depending on how they are
resolved, the future security architecture in Europe may change. Currently, France and Germany in
particular are considering a future European security architecture that incorporates Russia to some
extent. Self-defence against Russia is necessary for East Europeans to feel secure. The latter do so in
order to see Russia fail and Ukraine prosper. They contend that Russia's invasion of Ukraine
threatens the safety and stability of Europe and that a Russian triumph will exacerbate this threat.

Security experts must re-evaluate their theories on global security in light of the protracted, high
intensity confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. The West needs to reconsider the sanctions it
has placed on Russia, including their potential impact and the best way to break free from any future
ties to Russia in the fields of technology, energy, and other industries.

In keeping with the idea of networked security, the purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the
primary security concerns in Europe and analyse the significant security difficulties of the present
and the future. Understanding the evolution of transatlantic relations as well as European and global
security in light of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is a key goal of this essay.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF UKRAINE TO RUSSIA

The Soviet Union, the main adversary of the United States throughout the Cold War, was supported
by Ukraine. The Black Sea Fleet, a few nuclear weapons, and a large portion of the union's
agricultural and defense industries were all located there. Only after Russia, it was the most
populous and powerful of the fifteen Soviet republics.

Ukraine has made an effort to carve its own path as a sovereign nation during the course of its three
decades of independence while also making an effort to link itself more closely with Western
organisations like the EU and NATO. However, Kyiv found it difficult to reconcile its international
policy while resolving its serious internal disputes. The bulk of the Russian-speaking population in
the east favoured closer ties with Russia, but the more nationalistic Ukrainian-speaking population in
the country's western areas typically supported closer ties with Europe.

When Russia seized Crimea in 2014 and started assisting insurgents there, Ukraine spiralled into a
war. The Crimean Peninsula was taken by Russia, marking the first territorial annexation in Europe
since World War II. With almost 14,000 fatalities between 2014 and 2021, the conflict in the Donbas
was the worst to affect Europe since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. The conflicts illustrated the swift
change in the global security environment from American unipolar dominance to increasing
competitiveness among the major countries.

Eight million ethnic Russians lived in Ukraine as of the 2001 census, mostly in the south and east.
Moscow's 2014 actions in Crimea and the Donbas were justified by the necessity to protect these
people. Many Russian elites see the divorce with Ukraine as a historical mistake and a threat to
Russia's standing as a great power after the fall of the Soviet Union. A severe blow to Russia's
reputation for destroying Russia would be dealt if Russia lost control of Ukraine and allowed it to slip
into Western hands.

The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 in an effort to promote
"brotherly relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples." However, since the breakup of the
union, many Russian nationalists in both Russia and Crimea have wished for the restoration of the
peninsula. The dominant maritime force in the area, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, is based in
Sevastopol. Russia was Ukraine's primary trading partner for a long time, but recently, things have
gotten much worse. China ultimately outperformed Russia in Ukrainian trade. The Eurasian
Economic Union, which currently consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, was to
be expanded to include Ukraine by Moscow.

For many years, Moscow relied on Ukrainian pipelines to provide gas to clients in Central and
Eastern Europe, paying Kiev billions of euros in transit fees. Although Russian gas transit via Ukraine
resumed at the start of 2023, volumes were reduced, and the pipelines remained in grave danger.

After its preferred candidate for Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was deposed by a reformist
rival as part of the Orange Revolution public revolt in 2004, Russia was determined to maintain its
influence and authority in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union. This electoral setback
for the Kremlin in Ukraine follows similar electoral setbacks in Georgia in 2003, known as the Rose
Revolution, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, known as the Tulip Revolution. 2010 saw the election of
Yanukovych as president of Ukraine due to public discontent with the Orange administration.

President Yanukovych gave up on attempts to formally develop a closer economic collaboration with
the EU in late 2013 under pressure from his backers in Moscow. Russia had been urging Ukraine to
join the EAEU, which had not yet been established, at the same time. Many Ukrainians viewed
Yanukovych's choice as a betrayal by a genuinely dishonest and incompetent government, and it led
to the Euromaidan countrywide rallies.

Some Western analysts argue that Moscow's growing rage over NATO's post-Cold War expansion
into the former Soviet Union's sphere of influence is what led to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The US
and NATO are alleged to have consistently violated their early 1990s agreements not to expand the
alliance into the former Soviet Union, according to Putin and other top Russian officials. They saw
the expansion of NATO during Russia's difficult time as an embarrassing imposition over which they
could do little more than watch.

In the weeks leading up to the NATO summit in 2008, President Vladimir Putin warned American
diplomats that any efforts to incorporate Ukraine in the alliance "would be a hostile act towards
Russia." A few months later, Russia invaded Georgia, purportedly showing Putin's willingness to
resort to violence in order to further his country's goals. (Some objective observers faulted Georgia
for launching the "August War," but pointed the finger upon Russia for escalating hostilities.
Russia may project power further into the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa, where it
has historically had limited influence, with a stronger and more advanced military presence there.
Some commentators contend that the failure of the West to hold Russia accountable for annexing
Crimea only enhanced Vladimir Putin's determination to resort to using military action to further his
foreign policy goals. Russia's strategic advances in the Donbas became more precarious up until its
invasion in 2022. Supporting the separatists had, at least momentarily, given it more negotiating
leverage with Ukraine.

The EU and its member states vehemently condemn both Russia's savage attack against Ukraine and
its illegitimate annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson regions. They also condemn
Belarus' participation in Russian military aggression. Since February 2022, the European Council and
the Council of the European Union have met frequently to address the situation in Ukraine from a
variety of perspectives. EU leaders repeatedly asked Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and independence and to immediately halt all military actions in the country as well as
to unconditionally withdraw all troops and military equipment from it. They emphasised Ukraine's
right to choose its own path in life and lauded its people for their bravery in defending their country.
In response to the military aggression, the EU has dramatically tightened sanctions against Russia,
adding a huge number of individuals and businesses to the sanctions list and adopting hitherto
unheard-of restrictive measures.

Ukraine: A Realist Case, by John Mearsheimer

The efficacy of "realism" in assessing Russia's decision to invade Ukraine has been the subject of
considerable debate ever since the conflict began in February 2022 in both international relations
and the greater public intellectual conversation. John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of international
relations at the University of Chicago and renowned offensive realist, is the commentator at the
centre of this discussion. Although Mearsheimer is a realist, this essay contends that his aggressive
realism is only one of several realist theories that might be used to explain the Ukraine War.

It is argued that more complex and ultimately convincing explanations for why Russian President
Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine can be found in classical and neoclassical realist frameworks,
which go beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which
Mearsheimer's offensive realism belongs). Both classical and neoclassical realism must do this in
order to include data from non-realist research into a larger framework of power politics, such as the
notions of civilization and ontological security. Both classical and neoclassical realism show that
realism is capable of providing intricate arguments for why a state, like Russia, decides to take
action, like invading Ukraine, even though neither offers ideal solutions.

Addressing the benefits of "realism" as a theoretical framework for International Relations, Russia's
plan to invade Ukraine in February 2022 has sparked major online debate, with important ongoing
discussions taking place on social media platforms like Reddit and Twitter.

On the one hand, a small number of self-identified realists in the academic and research
communities make the audacious claim that realism completely explains (and even predicted)
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which was largely a result of the hasty US-supported expansion of NATO
eastward and the denigration of Russia's status as a great power. According to international
perception, Russia responds to changing material circumstances by making logical decisions.
However, a significant portion of non-realists have questioned what they see as realist presumptions
regarding NATO expansion and provided further ideational or psychological justifications for Russian
President Vladimir Putin's choice to initiate hostilities.
Mearsheimer has undoubtedly been one of the most prominent and contentious critics of the
situation in the Ukraine, and his realism tenets have been a hot issue of debate. Numerous
magazines, including The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Affairs,
and Foreign Politics, have given Mearsheimer significant column space since Russia decided to
invade Ukraine.

This is hardly shocking considering that Mearsheimer has long been one of the most outspoken and
successful IR publicists (Mayer and Smith 2019). His concept of "aggressive realism" has won him a
lot of admirers, particularly from policy specialists, think tanks, and the general people in many
countries (mainly in the United States, Russia, and China). This is partly due to the austerity of his
offensive realism, which is predicated on the idea that states, particularly great powers, are
"concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect
them from each other" and that "the [anarchic] international system creates powerful incentives for
states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals" (Mearsheimer 2001, 21).

Mearsheimer (2014) first garnered significant attention in the context of Ukraine in his article for
Foreign Affairs in 2014 titled "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault." According to his argument,
"the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis."
Mearsheimer (2014, 77-8) claims that Russia's "core strategic interests, a point Putin made
emphatically and repeatedly," were imperilled by the EU's promotion of democracy and NATO's
eastward expansion, which prompted Russia to invade Crimea and destabilise the Donbas
regionalism.

The structural realist analysis of the crisis in Ukraine has some obvious advantages. Because
structural realism underlines the chaotic character of international relations, according to Barry
Posen (2022), "it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security,
sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation." "Offensive
realism holds that states should (and do) assume the worst over others' intentions," explains Shiping
Tang (2008, 453). While offensive realism holds that nations are naturally aggressive due to anarchy,
it is imperative to assume the worst about other people's motivations. Due to the inherent
pessimism of structural realists, they therefore got a head start in assessing the prospect that Russia
may increase their operations. Another advantage of structural realism, as Posen explains, is the
assumption that the circumstances that international anarchy provides for nations take precedence
over other international issues like conventions, multilateralism, economic interdependence, and
morality.

Anarchy can encourage people to act and alter society if it allows the powerful total freedom.
Competition is encouraged by anarchy, especially when it comes to measures that increase security.

In light of the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, it is fair to state that structural realist concerns
about the shifting power structures of Eastern Europe and how this would result in further instability
and possibly even conflict in Ukraine were quite foresighted.

Mearsheimer presents a compelling argument that Russia's forceful retaliation in Ukraine, including
the annexation of Crimea, was prompted by the West's misguided institutional growth and
democracy promotion strategies. Because structural changes were occurring in its self-described
"near abroad"—the former Soviet Union territories, with the exception of the Baltic three, which are
now independent states and, since 2004, NATO and EU members—Russia waged a brief war in
Georgia as a warning shot about the consequences of applying for NATO membership (Jibladze
2007). During the Russo-Georgian conflict, Ukraine also came under intensive discussion, and
worries about the West's interactions there were underlined (Kuzio 2009; Larrabee 2010).

Although George Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau have been mentioned in recent public intellectual
conversation on the Ukraine war, nothing has been done to explain the various tenets of their realist
philosophy. Importantly, the 'political realist' study of Morgenthau (1948) and Kennan (1954)
precedes the behavioural revolution and so more appropriately fits within the 'traditional' school of
realism. The influence of human nature on individuals and groups when making foreign policy
decisions is often more of a focus for classical realists than structure (Smith and Yuchshenko 2021).
Other prominent 'classical realists' who have largely been excluded from the conversation include
Reinhold Niebuhr (1953) and E. H. Carr (1939), as well as more recent voices like Sten Rynning (2011)
and Patrick Porter (2016).

Limitations of Structural Realism in Explaining the Ukraine War

Many learners and professionals in the field of global politics believe that realism is no longer
relevant. The main tenets or arguments of realism theory, such as anarchy, self-help, and power
balance, may have been significant for describing occurrences in the past, but in the present, other,
more effective theories have supplanted them due to altered circumstances. New times demand
fresh thinking, and shifting circumstances demand updated or completely new theories. The western
concepts of liberal democracy, interdependence, and the importance of institutions in international
politics were glorified during the Post-Cold War era. The "end of history" was allegedly signalled by
the Cold War's conclusion, according to scholars like Francis Fukuyama. According to Fukuyama, the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 signalled the triumph of Western
liberal democracy and the completion of humankind's conceptual development. As a result, he
favoured making Western liberal democracy the only acceptable form of government.

Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle, and Bruce Russett, proponents of the democratic peace theory, said
that democracies don't engage in hostilities with one another, thereby equating democracy with
peace. The thesis of interdependence's proponents believed that as a result of trade and investment
links, states were becoming increasingly dependent on one another.

There are some evident benefits to the structural realist explanation of the Ukrainian conflict. Barry
Posen (2022) claims that because structural realism emphasises the chaotic nature of international
relations, "it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security,
sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation." According
to Shiping Tang (2008, 453), "Offensive realism holds that states should (and do) assume the worst
over others' intentions."

Crimea and the Black Sea

Numerous disagreements have arisen between the successor states since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. These problems have a negative impact on relations between Russia and Ukraine.
Numerous problems, including those involving territory, the military, politics, the economy, and
ethnicity, are in dispute between Russia and Ukraine. For many Russians, it has been especially
difficult to accept the breakup of Ukraine. Ukraine was viewed as an integral component of Russia
during the imperial era. During the Soviet era, the Bolsheviks rejected this idea and accepted Ukraine
as an independent East Slavic country. Ukraine's desire to forge its own distinct identity conflicts
with Russia's current attempt to position itself as the "elder brother" of Ukraine.
The two most contentious issues in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship in 1992-1993 were
disagreements over Ukraine's disarmament and Russian supplies to Ukraine. Since the start of 1994,
the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the events in Crimea have assumed a significant, if not
starring, role in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The Crimean peninsula is the present focal point of the
dispute between Kiev and Moscow on political, economic, military, and topographical issues. The
upcoming Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine was expected to settle
these disagreements.

Despite the unwillingness of many Russians to acknowledge it, Ukraine has existed as an
independent state ever since. Ukraine has faced extremely major political, ethnic, economic,
cultural, demographic, and psychological challenges as a result of its more than three centuries of
historical integration with Russia. The unfortunate truth is that most Russians do not acknowledge
Ukraine's independence, including those members of their administration who we would consider to
be fine men, liberals, and reformers. People in Ukraine are aware of this. The fact that Ukrainians are
aware of the fact that no other nation on world has a greater need for security guarantees against
Russia is one explanation for this. Between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, the southernmost
point of the Ukrainian mainland is where Crimea protrudes. The Kerch Strait, which is less than two
miles wide at its narrowest point, separates it from Russia to the east. (In 2018, Russian President
Vladimir Putin opened a $4 billion bridge over the strait connecting Crimea to Russia.)

Moscow organised a hotly contested referendum on Crimea's status after Russian forces occupied
the peninsula in 2014, and claimed the results revealed that a resounding majority of citizens
wanted to join the Russian Federation. At the time, Crimea was the only region of Ukraine with a
majority ethnic Russian population, with a population of around 60%.

Determining Crimea's Future

In February 1954, the Soviet government gave Ukraine control of Crimea. However, the bulk of its
citizens are Russian, including many retired Black Sea navy personnel. The ethnic Ukrainian
population of Crimea makes up just approximately 26% of the total population. In tandem with the
Ukrainian sovereignty movement in 1990–1991, separatist and autonomist attitudes grew in Crimea,
and the country's vote in January 1991 showed support for demands for autonomy. The Crimean
parliament proclaimed its statehood in September 1991, while being a constituent region of Ukraine.
In a referendum in December 1991, a tiny majority of voters in Crimea (54%) favoured Ukrainian
independence.

The Crimean parliament proclaimed its independence on May 5, 1992, and on May 6, 1992, it
approved a constitution establishing that independence and granting the Crimean people dual
citizenship with Russia. In addition, the Crimean parliament approved a resolution mandating a vote
on Ukraine independence. In response, the Ukrainian Verhovna Rada invalidated the declaration of
independence. It gave the Crimean parliament the ultimatum to change its mind and revisit a few
Constitutional clauses, or risk immediate presidential rule from Kiev.

The Republican Movement of Crimea, a group with Russian influences, was actively collecting the
necessary number of signatures to organise a Crimean referendum on independence from Ukraine
at the same time. The officials in Kiev, especially Nikolay Bagrov, the head of the Crimean
parliament, made every effort to stop the confrontation from escalating. Their efforts caused Kiev
and Simferopol to reach an agreement. With the adoption of the Act on Division of Powers Between
Authorities of Ukraine and Republic of Crimea, Kiev made certain concessions.
For Russian officials who were unhappy with Ukraine's independence and its consequences,
particularly Ukraine's position on the partition of the Black Sea Fleet, the conflict between Kiev and
Simferpool was a sign of hope. Vladimir Lukin, the then-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Russian Parliament, stated in January 1992 that Russia may cast doubt on Ukrainian control of
the Crimea in an effort to put pressure on Ukraine to renounce its claim to the Black Sea Fleet.25 In
reaction to this declaration, the Russian Parliament passed a resolution calling for an investigation
into the circumstances surrounding the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. Not to
mention, the Russian Parliament passed a resolution declaring the 1954 transfer of Crimea to
Ukraine to be illegal in May 1992.

The Crimean leadership undertook the most overt endeavour to investigate the situation regarding
Kiev's and Moscow's stance on Crimea's independence in May 1994. The notion of changing the
Crimean Constitution served as a benchmark for defining the stances of both Kiev and Moscow. As
previously mentioned, the clauses pertaining to the independence of Crimea, dual citizenship
between Crimea and Russia, and independent Crimean armed formations were not included in the
constitution's original draught.

The proclamation issued by President Kravchuk transferring the interior ministry of the Crimean
Republic to the interior ministry of Ukraine was also rejected by Meshkov. The leaders of the
independent interior, security, and justice ministries of Crimea were chosen. In Kiev, these events
sparked a furious response. The May 20, 1994 resolution was immediately renounced by President
Kravchuk and the Verhovna Rada, who also requested that the Crimean parliament put its legislation
into accordance with Ukrainian legislative acts.

Russia did not want to get sucked into a messy Crimean endeavour, damaging its weak chances of
obtaining these concessions. Second, the collapse of Ukraine's territorial integrity and the secession
of Crimea could set a precedent that would be very bad for Russia. The example of "independent
Crimea" might be used as yet another justification in Chechnya, Tatarstan, and other areas seeking
to break away from Russia. Third, it appeared that Yeltsin and Kravchuk both understood that, in the
event of a military war in Crimea, they would not be able to fully control the developments there.

Already, efforts have been undertaken to improve relations with Russia through expanding bilateral
economic cooperation. A framework agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the
Crimean Republic and the Russian Federation was signed on May 13, 1994. The pact cannot be
treated as an international agreement because Crimea has no international standing, according to
Kravchuk's administration officials in Kiev. They also pointed out that Russia did not get the central
Ukrainian government' approval before engaging in these connections with Crimea.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine could degenerate into a "time bomb" over the Crimea issue.
While Ukrainian nationalists attempt to give the exaggerated "Russian threat" in Crimea political
priority, anti-Ukrainian Russian fanatics stir up nationalist sentiments there. Politicians in Crimea
might reaffirm their demands for greater independence from Kiev and turn to Russia for defence.
Under such conditions, parliaments and defence ministries would exert pressure on the presidents
of Russia and Ukraine. Generals in Moscow may order the Russian Army to defend Russians in
Crimea, and high-ranking military officials in Kiev could advocate for maintaining the territorial
integrity of Ukraine using military means. Deputies in both parliaments may use the Crimea
controversy in their politicking and power battles.

Black Sea:
In addition to being a route for grain exports from Ukraine, the Black Sea, which is bordered by
Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, was a crucial naval area for both Russia,
which has a fleet stationed there, and for Ukraine.

Days after the invasion, Turkey barred warships from the Bosphorus Strait, thus cutting off access to
the Black Sea for any nation that did not share a border with it. In December 2021, the last U.S.
warship departed. The ships that Russia had brought into the area to join its Black Sea Fleet were all
that remained.

Despite the ongoing crisis with Russia, an arrangement permitting Ukraine to ship millions of tonnes
of grain through the Black Sea has been extended. One day before the previous agreement was
about to expire, the United Nations and Turkey announced a two-month extension. There have been
worries that Russia might leave the agreement. After concerns about a global food scarcity due to
the conflict in Ukraine, it was initially decided upon in July of last year. Since then, the arrangement
has been extended multiple times despite Russia's protest of the Western sanctions imposed on its
agricultural industry.

Under the terms of the agreement, more than 30 million tonnes of grain have left Ukraine, largely
for the world's poorest nations. Moscow claims that sanctions are keeping Russian farmers from
being able to export more food and fertiliser to the rest of the world. The UN's envoy to Russia,
Vassily Nebenzia, told reporters on Wednesday: "We still do not lose hope that the issues we are
addressing can be resolved. Better would be sooner. In November of last year, Russia momentarily
withdrew from the agreement and accused Ukraine of attacking its navy in the Crimea; however, it
quickly rejoined.

Minsk Agreement

In September 2014, Ukraine and the rebels backed by Russia reached a 12-point cease-fire
agreement in the capital of Belarus.

Five months into the battle, which had already claimed the lives of more than 2,600 people, it
contained provisions for prisoner swaps, the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the removal of
heavy weaponry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy claims that the death toll has already
increased to almost 15,000 people.

In February 2015, leaders of two pro-Russian separatist regions signed a 13-point agreement with
representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and the two nations. The leaders of France, Germany,
Russia, and Ukraine, who were all present in Minsk at the same time, released a joint statement
endorsing the agreement. It outlined military and political measures that have not been carried out.
Russia's claim that it is not a party to the conflict and is not therefore bound by its rules has been a
significant roadblock.

NATO’S ROLE IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS

NATO has provided weapons and financial support to Ukraine's armed forces and defence groups
ever since Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have also
received training from allies. The participation of Ukrainian military in NATO operations and
exercises has also improved their skills. Since 2016, NATO's assistance has been coordinated through
the Comprehensive support Package (CAP), which consists of multiple trust funds and capacity-
building initiatives centred on critical problems like logistics, cyber security, and the prevention of
hybrid warfare. At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the leaders of the allies approved to a
strengthened CAP.
What is the position of NATO regarding the occupied areas in Ukraine?

NATO also condemns Russia's illegal plan to annex four regions of Ukraine in September 2022:
Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. This would be the largest attempted annexation of
European territory by force since the Second World War. Moscow compelled Ukraine to hold the
phoney referendums in these regions. They are not legitimate, so NATO won't accept them. Ukraine
currently resides on these lands and always will. The UN General Assembly's resounding vote to
condemn Russia's attempted annexations sends a clear statement that the world stands with
Ukraine in protecting the rules-based international order and that Russia is in the wrong.

How is NATO enhancing the defence of its members' nations and citizens?.

In the eastern portion of the Alliance, more than 40,000 soldiers, together with significant aviation
and naval capabilities, are currently directly under NATO command; they are supported by hundreds
of thousands more from national deployments by Allies. In addition to the existing battlegroups in
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, NATO hastily constructed four additional multinational
battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.

NATO Allies' societies and infrastructure are becoming more resilient. This calls for strengthening
cyber defences and capacities as well as teaming up in the case of cyberattacks. The Allies have
strengthened their naval presence in the Baltic and North Seas and have tightened security around
other important infrastructure and installations in response to the disruption of the Nord Stream
pipelines. In order to ensure the protection of vital undersea and energy infrastructure, NATO
nations are expanding intelligence sharing and surveillance across all sectors. Allies are also
improving their energy security, strengthening their defences against hybrid threats, such as
disinformation, and increasing their degree of readiness for CBRN and nuclear attacks.

EUROPEAN SECURITY INITIATIVES: CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARD

It is not surprising that the European Union is regarded as one of the most influential regional
political organization in the world, encourages democratic principles in its member nations. 19 of
these nations use the euro as their official currency. Improvements in political and economic
cooperation were sought after after World War II across the whole European continent. Due to this,
the EU was established. The EU's GDP reached 14.45 trillion euros in total in 2021. About $15.49
trillion is what that translates to. The GDP of the United States at that time was about $23 trillion.

The European Coal and Steel Community, which had just six members when it was established in
1950 and included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, is where the
EU had its start. As a result of the Rome Treaty, it was given the name European Economic
Community in 1957 and later changed to European Community (EC). The integration of the member
countries' internal affairs, security, and foreign policy was strengthened as a result. In order to
encourage the free flow of goods, services, people, and capital across its internal boundaries, the EU
formed a common market that year.

At first, the EC concentrated on a unified agriculture policy and the removal of trade restrictions. In
the initial wave of expansion, 1973 saw the addition of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
Beginning in 1979, the European Parliament is now directly elected.

Establishing a common market

The Single European Act began a six-year strategy to unify state rules in order to create a common
European market in 1986.
In 1993, the European Union (EU) was established in place of the European Community (EC). On
January 1, 1999, the euro was introduced as a common unified currency for participating EU nations.

Denmark and the United Kingdom negotiated "opt-out" clauses that allowed nations to keep their
own currencies if they so desired.

Additionally, a number of more recent EU members have either opted out of adopting the euro or
have not yet satisfied the requirements.

The Crisis of European Debt

Following the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, the EU and the European Central Bank found it
difficult to deal with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece's high sovereign debt levels and weak
economic development.

In 2010, the EU provided financial bailouts to Greece and Ireland subject to the execution of
budgetary austerity measures. Portugal was the next in 2011. In 2012, Greece need a second bailout.

After the European Union and the European Central Bank took a number of actions to support the
afflicted countries' banking and government debt, the crisis subsided.

Long-Term Approaches

These included the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in October 2012, which was
created to help EU members experiencing serious financial difficulties, including a lack of access to
the bond markets. The European Financial Stability Facility's interim backstop, which had been in
existence since 2010, was replaced by the ESM.

In 2014, 2016, and 2019, the European Central Bank carried out a series of "targeted longer-term
refinancing operations" to offer loans to EU financial institutions under advantageous terms.

The 2011 Stability and Growth Act's stipulations mandating member states to aim for public debt
levels below 60% of GDP and yearly government budget deficits below 3% of GDP over the medium
term were eased by the European Union in 2015.

North-South Issues in the EU

The crisis was addressed by the relief measures, but they didn't address one of its root causes—the
stark wealth and economic growth gap between the richer, more industrialised north of the
European Union and its less developed, more rural south.

The economically suffering southern economies are unable to benefit from currency depreciation to
increase their level of international competitiveness because the industrialised north and the more
rural south utilise the same currency. Exporters from the south finally find it difficult to compete
with their northern rivals, who have quicker productivity development, in the absence of currency
depreciation.

What Happens in the U.S.

Federal transfer payments in the US assist in addressing similar regional and state economic
imbalances.

States with higher average incomes typically make up a disproportionately big amount of the federal
government's revenue, whereas states with lower average incomes typically make up a larger
portion of its expenditures.
The COVID-19 epidemic in the European Union sparked joint expenditure measures that some have
referred to as "an incomplete and fragile fiscal union in the making."

While the original members of the EU consisted of Western European countries, the Union has
expanded its membership to include newly-formed Eastern European nations following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Presently, the EU comprises various member states, including
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia, among others. This expansion reflects the evolving nature of the EU as it embraces new
countries and strives for a more inclusive and diverse union.

Key Security Initiatives:

1)The Union is able to assume a prominent position in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention,
and the bolstering of global security, thanks to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is
an essential component of the EU's all-encompassing crisis management strategy, which makes use
of both civilian and military resources.

It is essential to make civilian CSDP quicker, more adaptable, more effective in order to increase its
capacity to address these and other security threats and issues. Our civilian missions must have staff
available in sufficient numbers and of high enough quality to be able to do this.

2) In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established. It supports the development of the
military capabilities of its 27 Member States (all EU nations).

It encourages cooperation, starts fresh projects, and presents options for enhancing defensive
capabilities. It also supports the development of cooperative defence capabilities among Member
States that are open to doing so. The EDA plays a crucial role in advancing the capabilities that
support the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Josep Borrell, the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the
European Commission, is in charge of the EDA, which has 180 employees and is based in Brussels.

The Civilian CSDP Compact's initial cluster focuses exclusively on capability building. It comprises of
specific promises made by Member States to build the necessary capacities and increase their
accessibility to civilian CSDP activities. This includes pledges to boost MS contributions to the civilian
CSDP, such as those to raise the representation of women in civilian CSDP missions at all levels and
to reach a 70/30 split between seconded and contracted employees.

3) The European Union's Frontex agency is in charge of organising and assisting border control
activities at the EU's external frontiers. Frontex is also known as the European Border and Coast
Guard Agency. Since its founding in 2004, Frontex has expanded the scope of its mission to handle
issues with migration, border control, and security.

The following list summarises Frontex's primary goals and duties:

Border management and surveillance: Frontex supports EU member states in making sure that the
external borders are effectively monitored and controlled. This entails doing risk analysis, deploying
border surveillance equipment (such as drones and vessels), and giving member states operational
support throughout border control activities.

Frontex plans, organises, and carries out coordinated operations and quick interventions at the
external frontiers. with order to assist member states with border control operations such as the
identification, screening, and registration of migrants as well as the prevention of cross-border crime
and trafficking, it sends out its own teams, known as European Border and Coast Guard Teams.
US-EU RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY TIMES

The blatant unilateralism of President Donald Trump has harmed US-EU relations. He has referred to
the EU as a "foe" and said that it is "worse than China, just smaller" (Kwong, 2018). He praised Brexit
and urged other members of the union to do the same. He has ostracised autocrats like Viktor Orbán
and bullied democratic leaders like Angela Merkel. The latter has not aided the EU institutions in
their search for supranational tools to compel adherence to the requirements for membership in the
rule of law.

The agenda of the transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP), which Barack Obama
abandoned, was not only rejected by the 45th President of the United States, but he also imposed
"national security" tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from European allies and threatened to
add more. More zealously than any of his predecessors, Obama also subjected European
corporations to American extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly when the US withdrew from the
Iran nuclear deal.

Many Europeans no longer believe that they share common ground with their most important ally as
a result of Trump's withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces treaty, the Open Skies agreement, the World Health Organisation (WHO), and his attacks
against the WTO appellate body. In fact, Trump has shown contempt for European priorities,
including those related to development aid, human rights, and attempts to enhance global health.

To be clear, Trump is not the only cause of the transatlantic stalemate. With the COVID-19
pandemic, the EU has appeared equally liable to split apart as it has to come together after more
than a decade of crisis management. Societies and economy have been destroyed by the
coronavirus catastrophe. While EU member states were able to come to a political consensus on a
historic recovery package and a seven-year financial framework, those discussions also exposed few
disagreements on the conditionality of the rule of law in the distribution of cash that has grown after
the worst of the pandemic is gone.

MARKET EFFECTS ON RUSSIA’S INCURSION OF UKRAINE

The illegitimate and unwarranted Russian assault against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the
food and energy markets. EU nations are closely coordinating their efforts to guarantee a steady
supply of energy at reasonable costs.

Energy costs and supply security

Since mid-2021, energy prices have been erratic. As a result of Russia's unwarranted and
unjustifiable action against Ukraine, fuel prices throughout the EU have increased, raising concerns
about the security of the energy supply as well. The decision by Russia to halt gas exports to a
number of EU members has worsened the issue. Energy price increases and supply interruptions are
the Council's and the EU's key priorities. EU nations are working together and closely coordinating
their responses to the high pricing and market imbalances in the energy sector.

The EU needs to work together to address the energy problem. The only option for EU nations to
effectively limit risks and lessen the effects of the crisis is to work together. Joint energy purchases,
for instance, can save import prices.

Given the unpredictability of the energy supply, solidarity among EU nations is required to support
those that are more dependent on Russian energy and, consequently, more vulnerable to any supply
interruptions.
The EU's solution to the energy crisis primarily aims to:

Ensure that consumers in the EU have access to affordable, competitive energy and improve the EU's
energy security and emergency preparedness and increase EU countries' energy independence and
resilience. To achieve this, the EU's member states are collaborating on:

-restricting petrol prices that are too high

-enhancing cooperation and supply sharing

-lowering energy expenses for businesses and homes

-lowering the EU's reliance on foreign energy

-ensuring the supply of gas

Limiting petrol costs from rising too much-

The EU member states have agreed on a market adjustment mechanism that will prevent periods of
extremely high petrol prices in the EU and lessen the effects of price increases on consumers and the
economy. Petrol transaction prices will be capped when and if they reach unusually high levels.

The legislation, which is a brief emergency solution, intends to control extremely high petrol prices
that do not correspond to prices on the global market while preserving the security of the energy
supply and the stability of the financial markets.

The mechanism becomes operational on February 15, 2023. It may be suspended or deactivated in
accordance with the regulation's established guidelines.

The Council approves a temporary measure to control petrol prices that are out of control (press
release, 19 December 2022).

Energy, Transport, Telecommunications Council, 19 December 2022

In light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the EU's climate targets for 2050, the leaders of the 27 EU
member states decided at an informal summit of heads of state or government in March 2022 to
gradually reduce their reliance on Russian fossil resources.

Following the adoption of the Versailles Declaration in March, officials decided to gradually reduce
imports from Russia by:

-reducing total reliance on fossil fuels and diversifying energy sources and transportation, including
for LNG

-accelerating the development of hydrogen and renewable energy

-enhancing connectivity among EU energy networks

-enhancing energy effectiveness

The majority of the energy used in the EU in 2020 was imported, with Russia serving as the region's
primary source of fossil fuels.

Infographic: Infrastructure for liquefied natural gas in the EU

Graph detailing the infrastructure needed for LNG imports into EU nations the complete infographic
In order to increase the EU's energy resilience and independence, particularly in the event of energy
shortages, it is essential to decrease its reliance on Russian fuels. This also presents an opportunity
to hasten the transition to renewable energy sources.

The Commission proposed the REPowerEU plan in May 2022 in response to the leaders' request for
a plan to carry out their decision regarding Russian imports. The voluntary EU Energy Platform,
which allows coordinated common energy purchases for all EU member states and some European
partners, was formed by the EU as part of the strategy.

Ensuring the gas supply:

As gas supply deliveries became less regular - when Russia stopped supplying several EU members -
the Council immediately took the following actions:

EU gas consumption was reduced by a reliable supply of gas during the winter season.

As gas supply deliveries became less regular - when Russia stopped supplying a number of EU
nations - the Council immediately took action to:

Petrol consumption in the EU was reduced by a reliable supply during the cold season.

In order to ensure that storage facilities were filled before the cold weather set in, the Council
adopted a new regulation on gas storage in June 2022. Underground gas storage facilities on the
territory of member states had to be filled to at least 80% of their capacity by 1 November 2022 and
to 90% by the following winters.

The European Union's member states are committed to achieving the European Green Deal's
objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving climate neutrality by 2050. This
necessitates a complete renovation of the EU's energy infrastructure and the substitution of cleaner
energy sources for fossil fuels.

Despite the fact that several new agreements have been reached by EU member states in the past
year to guarantee the supply of energy resources (particularly gas) from countries other than Russia,
they should now take this cooperation a step further by coordinating their efforts. An initiative for an
EU Energy Platform has already been put forth by the European Commission. This platform would
aggregate EU gas demand, engage in joint purchasing, and make better use of infrastructure,
including LNG terminals in the EU.

The Nord Stream Pipelines: What Are They?

Two pipelines, each with two lines, make up Nord Stream.

A 1,224 km underwater gas pipeline called Nord Stream 1 connects Lubmin, Germany, to Vyborg,
Russia, via the Baltic Sea. 2011 saw its completion.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which connects Ust-Luga in Leningrad with Lubmin, was finished in
September 2021 and, when it is fully operating, has the potential to transport 55 billion cubic metres
of gas annually.

Regarding Russia, which has the greatest natural gas reserves in the world, sales of gas and oil
account for almost 40% of its budget.
Nord Stream 2 is significant because it gives direct access to its most significant European consumer,
Germany, reduces operational costs by eliminating transit fees, and eliminates the hazards
associated with moving gas through transit countries.

It gives Russia a dependable customer while increasing Europe's reliance on it.

Europe has increased its reliance on gas imports over the past few years as a result of a decline in
domestic gas output. Since there are no simple alternatives, it is difficult to reduce reliance on
Russian gas.

Effects on international financial markets:

In the week after the invasion, Moscow's MOEX index fell by over 9% (Financial Times, 2022d). Large
losses were also recorded by stock market indices. Europe, and probably the rest of the world, may
soon see extensive impacts. Commodity price increases are amplified by supply chain interruptions
as a large refugee inflow occurs as almost 7 million Ukrainians flee their homeland. Russia's economy
is predicted to experience considerable contraction as a result of the economic sanctions imposed by
the US, Europe, and other countries .Rising energy revenues are unlikely to offset the negative
economic effects of the international withdrawal from Russia.

Given that the two nations are major exporters, this could be the biggest blow to the world economy
since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, possibly even surpassing the effects of Covid-19.

75% of the wheat imported by nations in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa comes
from Russia and the Ukraine (World Bank, 2022b).

40% of the world's exports of seed oil come from Ukraine. Ukraine accounts for 5% of wheat exports
and more than 13% of maize exports. According to the World Bank's 2022b report, Russia exports
25% of the world's natural gas, 18% of its coal, 11% of its crude oil, 18% of its wheat, and 14% of its
fertilisers. In July 2022, flows through Nord Stream 1 were decreased to 20% of their maximum.

REGIONAL MARKET SPILLOVER

Because Russia dominates the energy sector, the spike in energy costs in 2022 is reportedly related
to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022 ,even if the invasion itself had
been anticipated towards the end of 2021 .As of September 9, 2022, according to the UN Human
Rights Office (OHCHR), there had been 15,246 civilian casualties, with 6114 persons killed and 9132
injured. However, "actual figures are considerably higher." 3 October 2022; OHCHR. The Russian
invasion affected the world economy and disrupted supply networks on a macroeconomic level. For
instance, the World Economic Outlook 2022 report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
predicted a 1.2% decline in global economic growth.

Energy prices increased by up to 20% in just five months (from February to July) in 2022 after the
invasion, most likely as a result of worries about a ban on Russian crude oil and gas . The price was
$92.77/B on February 24 (the day the invasion started), but it increased to $123.64/B at its peak on
March 8, for the highest price since July 3, 2007). From February 28 to August 3, 2022, the price rose
steadily for about five months, averaging $106.96/B (i.e., +15.3% compared to February 24).

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
LANDSCAPE

The invasion directly jeopardises the security and stability of Europe. The foundational values of the
European security architecture—sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law—are
undermined. Concerns are raised about the possibility of more territorial aggression and the
destabilisation of the post-Cold War security system in Europe as a result of Russia's aggression of
Ukraine. The territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine are strongly emphasised by European
nations. It is believed that Russia's invasion of Ukraine violates international law and imperils the
notions of territorial integrity that support European security.

Security worries among European countries have increased as a result of the crisis. Fears over
possible future Russian aggression in the region have been stoked by Russia's aggressive activities in
Ukraine and the acquisition of Crimea. This is seen by European nations as a direct threat to the
security framework put in place following the Cold War actions in Ukraine.

Economic and Financial restrictions: These restrictions concentrate on the financial, energy, defence,
and technological pillars of the Russian economy. Access to international financial markets may be
restricted, trade and investment with specific parties may be prohibited, and the assets of parties to
a war may be frozen.

Embargo on Arms: Some nations have put limitations on the transfer of weapons and military
hardware to Russia. These steps are intended to stop the movement of weapons that might be used
in the conflict or to ward off additional violence.

Travel Bans and Asset Freezes: Travel bans and asset freezes are frequently part of sanctions against
people or organisations that have been found to be responsible for or engaged in invasions or
violations of human rights.

Export Restrictions: To prevent the flow of products and technologies having possible military uses
to Russia, export restrictions may be put in place. These limitations are meant to limit Russia's
capacity to strengthen its armed forces and prevent additional aggression.

The strength of the targeted nation, the efficacy of international cooperation, and potential
countermeasures implemented by the sanctioned nation are only a few examples of the variables
that may affect the effectiveness and impact of sanctions.

The primary goal of humanitarian assistance has been to provide individuals impacted by the
violence with urgent emergency help. This comprises basic non-food necessities like food, water,
shelter, and medical supplies. Aid organisations strive to provide the fundamental need of displaced
people, refugees, and communities impacted by armed conflict.

Shelter and housing:

The provision of short- and long-term housing for displaced people and those whose homes have
been damaged or destroyed has been a focus of aid efforts. This entails supplying temporary
shelters, mending broken down infrastructure, and assisting with housing programmes for
vulnerable groups.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES BETWEEN THE EU AND UKRAINE

Since the EU is one of Ukraine's main economic partners, there are numerous opportunities to
import and sell goods to Ukraine from the EU as well as vice versa. Raw commodities like iron, steel,
mining products, agricultural products, machinery, and chemical products are the main export items.
Currently, Ukraine is attempting to simplify regulations in order to aid small enterprises doing
business with the EU. The EU's SME Flagship Initiative also offers assistance to small firms.
An Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine has been in effect proviso since November
2014. A Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which is a component of this
association agreement, has been in effect proviso since January 2016. It lowers the tariffs that
European businesses must pay when supplying Ukraine. The agreement eases commerce by
streamlining customs procedures and gradually bringing Ukrainian laws, regulations, and practises,
including standards, into line with those of the EU.

Under the framework of the comprehensive Association Agreement (AA), the European Union (EU)
and Ukraine have been implementing their Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA)
since January 1, 2016, with the political and cooperation aspects being provisionally in effect since
November 2014. The DCFTA, based on predictable and enforceable trade regulations, aims to
enhance market access for goods and services for both parties involved.

The Association Agreement:

-makes exporting to and importing from Ukraine for EU firms more convenient and economical

-provides several advantages for your company, including the removal of tariffs and the quick and
effective facilitation of traffic through customs at foreign borders

Tariffs

The agreement between the EU and Ukraine raises both the competitiveness of European
companies on the Ukrainian market and vice versa. Overall, the deal abolished the vast majority of
tariffs on goods trade with the EU (98.1%) and Ukraine (99.1%).

Commercial products

While many industrial products tariffs were dropped when the agreement went into effect, there
were several product categories for which transitional periods were agreed.

EU

94.7% of the tariff lines were eliminated by the agreement.

The EU is still steadily removing tariffs on a select few commodities throughout the following
transitional periods.

minerals - 2019 chemicals - 2021 fertilisers - 2023 wood products - 2021 shoes - 2021 copper items -
2021 aluminium items - 2023 cars and the majority of motor vehicles – 2023

49.2% of industrial products may enter Ukraine duty-free when the agreement went into effect.

By 2023, the proportion of EU exports that Ukraine has liberalised is expected to reach 96%. These
additional tariffs are being gradually eliminated and apply to the following product lines.

minerals, in 2023, organic chemicals, in 2019, fertilisers, in 2019, tyres made of rubber, in 2021,
leather goods, in 2021, and fabrics used for headgear, in 2019

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The EU has implemented a number of trade-related restrictive measures in response to the illegal
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation in 2014, the Russian Federation's
recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts' non-government-controlled regions as independent
entities in February 2022, and the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military
aggression against Ukraine in 2022.

Ban on the Export of Unprocessed Wood

Any kind of export restrictions are prohibited by the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

A 2005 restriction on ten wood species of minimal commercial significance was amended and
supplemented with a 10-year export ban for all unprocessed wood in Ukraine in 2015. Since 2015,
the EU has brought up the export ban at all levels and on all occasions, arguing that it violates the
AA/DCFTA. The EU requested the formation of an arbitration panel (the Panel) in 2020 to resolve this
conflict. The Panel came to the conclusion that the export restrictions violate Article 35 of the AA,
which precludes export restrictions, in December 2020.

REGIONAL ORDER IN POST SOVIET EUROPE AND ASIA

The existence of two competing sets of institutions, or even blocs, today defines the regional order:
on the one hand, the Western or Euro-Atlantic NATO and the EU, and on the other, the Eurasian or
Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
While Ukraine, Georgia, and, to a lesser extent, Moldova, have ambitious integration goals with the
former, and Armenia and Belarus are (often reluctant) members of the latter, Russia and the West
contest the allegiances of the six republics in the middle.

Both blocs leave open the possibility of integrating the states in between, either formally becoming
members or undergoing deep integration. There is no ongoing communication between the
opposing institutions, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
NATO-Russia Council, and the Council of Europe have all failed to establish order, as the recent wars
in several states in the region and the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West have
amply shown. Both supporters and detractors of the idea of a regional order in Europe in the 1990s
frequently confused it with the notion of codifying the West's geopolitical victory in the Cold War by
extending its security net and institutions throughout the territory of the former communist bloc.

As previously mentioned, neither the West nor Russia, nor the entire world, have benefited from the
significant deterioration in Russia-West ties. But the countries in between have fared worse. The
wider conflict has frequently been used as a pawn in their political and economic fates. The main
theatre of combat, Ukraine, has been most hit. It no longer has jurisdiction over Crimea, which has
more than 2 million people. Over 10,000 people have died as a result of the war in the Donbas. Over
1.1 million Ukrainians have registered as refugees in Russia, while at least 1.8 million have been
internally displaced.18 With a nearly collapsed gross domestic product and soaring inflation, the
crisis has placed a tremendous economic strain on the entire nation.

The Donbas War and other separatist conflicts in the area have been used by Russia as geopolitical
pawns, and as a result, the territorial conflicts in Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moldova
over Transnistria, and Ukraine act as impermissible roadblocks to potential membership in Euro-
Atlantic institutions.19 As a result, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are unlikely to regain their
geographical integrity as long as Moscow believes that doing so would make it easier for them to
join or even further integrate with Western organisations. Additionally, because of the unsolved
conflicts, trade flows are disrupted and investors continue to be leery of the governments that lie in
the middle of hostilities.

The struggle over the regional order has slowed down the transition from communist control and
prevented resolution of festering problems. The post-Soviet pathologies that affect the in-between
nations in varied degrees include ineffective modern governance institutions, partially reformed
economies without fully functioning markets, a lack of or weak rule of law, and widespread
corruption. These differences are caused by a variety of elements, but the struggle between Russia
and the West played a significant role in many of the issues.

STREGNTHENING DETERRENCE ON NATO’S EASTERN EDGE

Europe and is wreaking havoc and inflicting a great deal of misery to people. Russia is seen as a
sceptic to the security of the Allies and a menace to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. The
rules-based international order is undercut by its aggressive military rhetoric and a disposition to
garner force to further its political objectives. Terrorism is however, the most profound danger to
the security of NATO and its citizens.

Preserving its members' liberty and safety

The core idea behind the formation of NATO was to ensure peace and stability within Europe, with
the pursuit of Collective Defence that was pledged upon.

It is the concept of deterrence which formed the groundwork for all the military pursuits undertaken
by NATO, which includes averting conflict and war, protecting the Allies and upholding the values of
democracy, preservation of human rights and the rule of law.

Responsiveness, readiness, and reassurance of NATO

The Wales Summit's 2014 Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was a catalyst for the Alliance's deterrent and
defence posture. In order to reassure their citizens, ward off potential aggression, and fortify their
defence, NATO Allies were provided with assurance measures as part of the RAP.

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, Heads of State and Government supported an enhanced
deterrence and defence posture based on the RAP. In order to defend Alliance territory, populations,
airspace, and maritime communication links, the Alliance deployed a wide range of alternatives to
be able to respond to any threats from wherever they may originate. NATO multinational
battlegroups have been stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland since 2017,to maintain an
increased forward presence.

NATO Readiness Initiative was commissioned to improve its ability to respond quickly, either to
quickly respond to a military crisis if necessary or to reinforce Allies in support of deterrence or
collective defence, including high-intensity warfare. It provided thirty large naval warships, thirty
kinetic air squadrons, and thirty heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions at 30 days' readiness or
less. As bigger combat units, these forces are formed and trained.

NATO has acknowledged that it needs to protect itself in cyberspace. The new Comprehensive Cyber
Defence Policy, highlights core missions and the Alliance's overall deterrence and defence posture to
increase the Alliance's resilience in cyberspace. This was approved by allies at the NATO Summit in
2021.

Defence investment

NATO leaders in 2014 approved a Defence Investment Pledge by NATO Leaders in 2014, urged all
Allies to halt budget cuts to the military and work towards the NATO-agreed goal of spending at
least 2% of GDP on defence within ten years. NATO summarises that 2022 will be the eighth
consecutive year of increased defence spending by European Allies and Canada, with a cumulative
investment of almost USD 350 billion since 2014. The allies are working towards allocating at least
20% of yearly defence budgets to the development of significant new equipment. Last but not least,
the Pledge made Allies responsible for making sure that their land, air, and maritime forces adhere
to NATO-agreed standards for sustainability and other agreed metrics. They also promised to make
sure that their armed forces can work together effectively by putting NATO standards and doctrines
into practise.

CHALLENGES TO BORDER CROSSINGS AND AIRSPACE RESTRICTION

Following the issuance of tit-for-tat airspace bans by the European Union and Moscow, airlines are
preparing for potentially protracted obstructions of important east-west flight corridors. In response
to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, comparable action has also been taken by the United States and
Canada.

Airspace constraints in the area as a result of the conflict provide difficulties for aviation and air
travel. Among the important topics are: No-Fly Zones: Due to security concerns, several regions of
Ukraine, notably those affected by the conflict, have been deemed no-fly zones.

The unprecedented actions are intended to put pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop
invading Ukraine, which is Europe's worst attack on a state since World War Two.

The industry's economic recovery has been hampered by the sanctions, which also dealt a hit to the
leasing sector, which is headquartered primarily in Ireland and was told to halt working with Russian
airlines.

Without access to Russian airspace, analysts predict that airlines will be forced to alter their routes
to the south in order to avoid Middle Eastern conflict zones. Recent flights from American and
European airlines to Asia have had to make significant detours.

Increased border control measures and new checkpoints have been established as a result of the
fighting. This has affected trade and mobility by causing delays and disturbances in the movement of
goods, services, and people across borders.

Significant numbers of people have been displaced as a result of the conflict, both within Ukraine
and across borders. As refugees seek sanctuary in neighbouring nations, this has increased the
pressure on border crossings, putting further strain on border security and humanitarian resources.

International agencies help crisis-affected nations manage border checks and border controls, such
as the United Nations and the International Organisation for Migration. To support effective and safe
border management procedures, they provide technical assistance, capacity building, and
coordination.

AVERTING A PROTRACTED WAR: EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS

The actions of Ukraine and Russia will, of course, have a significant impact on the course and final
result of the conflict. But other capitals have an interest in what occurs as well besides Kyiv and
Moscow. The outcome of this war, which is the most significant interstate conflict in decades, will
have huge repercussions for the United States. It is appropriate to consider the potential outcomes
of this war, what different outcomes would entail for American interests, and what Washington
might do to encourage the outcome that best serves American interests.
Many commentators have proposed scenarios for the war's short-term course—or even for its
outcomes.2 These hypothetical situations are useful for thinking about the future, but they are less
useful for evaluating which potential outcomes are most relevant to the United States. Perhaps it
would be more beneficial for U.S. policymakers to think about which specific features of the
conflict's future course would have the most bearing on American interests. Instead of elaborate,
detailed scenarios, we look at five essential factors that characterise different conflict trajectories:

Territorial control; the use of nuclear weapons by Russia; the possibility of a NATO-Russian battle;
the length of the war; and the manner in which it will be ended.

The United States has a humanitarian interest in subjecting fewer Ukrainians to Russian rule, and
fewer people would be living under Russian occupation.

less important advantages

• Ukraine might become less reliant on aid from abroad and more economically sustainable.

• It is unlikely that regions under Russian administration in December 2022 will have a big economic
impact.

• Greater territorial integrity oversight by Ukraine could strengthen the rule.

Russia will continue to violate the rule barring a complete retake of Ukrainian territory.

The United States has a stake in upholding the international legal principle of territorial integrity and
demonstrating that aggression does not pay. However, it's unclear how increased Ukrainian
territorial control after the line of December 2022 will affect that desire. For instance, Moscow
would continue to violate the territorial integrity standard even if Ukraine took control of all the area
that it had annexed since February 24, 2022.

A protracted conflict would have effects for U.S. foreign policy in addition to the possibility for
Russian advances and the economic repercussions for Ukraine, Europe, and the rest of the globe. As
long as the conflict is taking up the time of senior leaders and consuming U.S. military resources, the
U.S. will struggle to concentrate on its other global goals, particularly the battle with China.

WAR ON DISINFORMATION: DISTORTING THE TRUTH

Russia's campaign of aggression against Ukraine is being fought and disseminated online as well.
Perhaps all new age warfare will be encompassing online thrust to support the ground level physical
war. In the history of warfare, we have seen wartime disinformation campaign by the Western allied
nations e.g. Delmer’s “Black Propaganda,” shared plenty which today can be called the “fake news.”

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated how social media is changing, experienced
and understood. While media has played a role in previous wars as well— in this context, for
instance, Russian soldiers were identified on the battlefield in the Donbas region during the 2014
invasion and videos from the war in Syria were shared on TikTok and others social media.

Russia's utilization of information warfare against Ukraine and democratic nations has led to an
increase in the dissemination of disinformation during its extensive invasion of Ukraine in February
2022. The narratives of disinformation have evolved from propaganda and distortions of historical
events, such as the assertion that Crimea had always been a part of Russia after its annexation in
2014, to false allegations regarding neo-Nazi infiltration within the Ukrainian government and
conspiracy theories concerning Ukraine/US bioweapons laboratories. Typically, these narratives
coincide with more stringent limitations on political opposition both domestically and
internationally, which is also the case in Russia. These endeavors represent just a few examples of
how the Russian government and associated entities employ disinformation as a weapon to divert,
confuse, and undermine their adversaries.

Information overload, confusion, and cognitive biases contribute to these trends; platform and
algorithm designs can accelerate the spread of misinformation by facilitating the development of
echo systems and confirmation bias mechanisms that separate the news and information people
view and interact with online.

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENTS: SEEKING CONCILIATORY EFFORTS

The leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia participate in the Normandy Format. It was
started in 2014 to help with dispute resolution through communication and agreements. This
framework has been used for a number of meetings, including the Minsk agreements that seek to
settle the Eastern Ukraine conflict peacefully. These discussions have centred on putting a ceasefire
into effect, enacting political changes, and resolving difficulties with border security and regional
autonomy.

The OSCE has been essential in keeping track of the violence, promoting communication, and aiding
peace efforts. The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has been sent in to keep track of the
ceasefire, observe the ground situation, and assist in establishing favourable conditions for a
peaceful conclusion. The OSCE has additionally helped the disputing parties communicate and
negotiate.

The EU has taken part in diplomatic initiatives to end the crisis and assist Ukraine. In addition to
sanctioning Russia and promoting Ukraine's political and economic independence, the EU has
emphasised the value of respecting international law and territorial integrity. The EU has also taken
part in diplomatic discussions in an effort to bring the crisis to a peaceful conclusion and offer aid to
those who have been harmed.

LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE CRISIS BY EU

The crisis made it clear that the EU has to improve its defence capabilities and foster closer member-
state defence cooperation. It emphasised the value of boosting defence capability, making
investments in defence readiness, and encouraging tighter cooperation when tackling security
concerns. It brought to light how dependent on Russian natural gas supplies European energy
security is. To lessen reliance on a single supply, the EU has prioritised energy diversification,
including investigating alternate energy sources and enhancing connection between member states.

Disinformation efforts, cyberattacks, and hybrid threats were all made public throughout the crisis,
including the deployment of hybrid threats and disinformation. Since then, the EU has concentrated
on fending off hybrid threats, boosting cybersecurity, increasing resilience against misinformation,
and encouraging media literacy to resist it. It has interfered with regional stability, called into
question the notions of territorial integrity and border security, and sparked geopolitical changes in
Europe. The crisis has brought into sharp relief the significance of preserving a robust and united
European security architecture, encouraging defence cooperation, confronting hybrid threats, and
aiding peacemaking initiatives. In order to protect European security and avert future crises of a
similar nature, it is important to remain vigilant, work together, and take preventive actions.