Russia and Ukraine Conflict: Conflict Analysis and Resolution

A landmark global issue of today's world, the continuing conflict between Russia and

Ukraine has attracted the worldwide spotlight and had a profound impact on international

relations. The eight-year conflict that began with Russia's annexation of Crimea dramatically

escalated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which represents the most

dangerous issue to European peace and stability since the end of the Cold War in 1991 (Mankoff,

2022). “A year after the fighting began, many defense and foreign policy analysts cast the war as

a major strategic blunder by Russian President Vladimir Putin.” (Masters, 2023). The two

countries endured a comprehensive conflict that has developed into a prolonged and highly

resentful battle due to their common history, culture, and political relationships. This essay seeks

to explore the root causes of the Russia-Ukraine war. Additionally, this essay will look at

previous efforts to resolve it as well as their difficulties. Lastly, this article examines numerous

strategies, considering both pragmatic and diplomatic actions that might lead to dispute

settlement.

Conflict Analysis

Historical Background

Considering both nations have historical, cultural, and linguistic links, the ties between

Russia and Ukraine historically have been marked by complicated relationships. Russia views

Ukraine as being essential to its existence and ambitions abroad. According to Putin, Russians

and Ukrainians are "one people" whose were historically closed indicates that they should now

experience a similar political destiny (Mankoff, 2022). More than past a millennium, Kyiv, the

capital of Ukraine today, were the central of Kyivan Rus, the first Slavic state and the origin of
both Russia and Ukraine (Conant, 2023). Right Bank or West Ukraine was conquered by the

Russian Empire over a hundred years afterward, in 1793. In the following years, The

Russification campaign made it illegal to learn and use Ukrainian and compelled people to

convert to Russian Orthodoxy. Ukraine saw some of its worst disasters during the 20 th century.

Additionally, after the 1917 communist revolution, Ukraine was one of several countries that

experienced a violent civil war before being fully integrated into the Soviet Union in 1922

(Conant, 2023). Starting in the 1930s, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin engineered a humanitarian

crisis that resulted in the suffering and life losses of millions of Ukrainians. These past tragedies

left behind permanent fault lines for Ukraine.

In addition, conflicts developed when Ukraine proclaimed its independence after the fall

of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Conant, 2023). Ukraine served as one of the Soviet Union's

foundations during the Cold War. The Black Sea Fleet, certain nuclear weapons, and a sizable

share of the union's agricultural and military sectors were all based in Ukraine, which was the

second-most populated and prominent among the Soviet republics, after Russia (Masters, 2023).

Ukraine's decision to sever ties in 1991 proved to be the dying superpower's mercy because it

was crucial to the union. Ukraine has worked to carve out a distinctive path for itself as an

independent state throughout its thirty years of independence. Nonetheless, Ukraine failed to

resolve its serious internal problems and create harmony in its foreign policy.

Territorial Disputes

The problem of Crimea, an area with a predominance of Russian ethnicity, is one of the

primary causes of war. After a contentious referendum, Russia seized Crimea in 2014, igniting

global outrage and escalating tensions between the two countries. Based on a census in 2001,

there were around eight million ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine Russia's claim that it had a
duty to safeguard these people in 2014 was utilized as justification for its actions in Crimea and

Donbas. Crimea was ceded from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 by Soviet leader, Nikita

Khrushchev, to enhance the "brotherly ties between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples."

(Masters, 2023). Nevertheless, several Russian patriots have asked for the peninsula to come

back since the collapse of the union. Furthermore, in 2013–2014, given Ukraine's ties to the EU,

tensions with Russia peaked. In late 2013, President Yanukovych, a former leader of Ukraine,

gave up trying to formally build a closer economic alliance with the EU. Many Ukrainians

viewed Yanukovych's choice as a breach of trust by a government that was completely corrupt

and incompetent, and it led to the Euromaidan countrywide demonstrations. Putin referred to the

Euromaidan revolt as a "fascist coup" that was backed by the West and threatened the ethnic

Russian majority in Crimea (Masters, 2023). Therefore, Putin issued the order to invade Crimea,

which he subsequently justified as a mission of rescue. In addition, Donbas, the collective name

for the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, has been the scene of ongoing military

confrontations. These regions' pro-Russian rebels have proclaimed independence, setting up a

drawn-out confrontation with Ukrainian soldiers (International Crisis Group, 2023). Most of the

population in Donbas speaks Russian, and after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, its proxies took

control of over thirty percent of eastern Ukraine. Russian intentions to annex Kyiv were pushed

back, and Donbas became the center of attention (Kirby, 2022).

Geopolitical Factors

The war has wider geopolitical aspects since Ukraine wants to protect its sovereignty and

develop deeper links with Europe and NATO, while Russia seeks to preserve power in its former

Soviet domain. Putin and other Russian officials have said that the US and NATO keep violating

their early 1990s commitments not to expand the alliance into the former Soviet Union.
Russia sees NATO's expansion during these turbulent times as a humiliating constraint. Despite

not yet being a member, Ukraine built its ties with NATO in the years leading up to the 2022

invasion. Ukraine is one of only six enhanced opportunities allies in 2020, a special status

designated for NATO's closest non-member partners. Ukraine also engage in annual military

exercises with NATO. (Masters, 2023). Additionally, Ukraine reiterated its desire to join NATO

as a full member in the future.

Economic Factors

For many years, Russia was Ukraine's top trading partner, but in current years, this

relationship has drastically deteriorated. China outperformed Russia in trade with Ukraine

(Devonshire-Ellis, 2023). Moreover, Moscow leaned on Ukrainian pipelines for ages to pump its

gas to consumers in Central and Eastern Europe, and it gave Kyiv billions of dollars per year in

transit fees. Before its invasion of Crimea, Russia intended to draw Ukraine into its unified

market, the Eurasian Economic Union, which currently consists of Armenia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Amidst the wars between the two nations, Russian gas kept

flowing into Ukraine in early 2023, albeit quantities decreased, and the pipelines were still in

grave danger (Stern, 2023).

International Involvement

The acts of various state and non-state actors have exacerbated the conflict. The

probability that the conflict will turn into a world war is increased by the presence of NATO, the

European Union, the G7, as well as other U.S. allies, including Japan and Australia. The result of

the conflict will influence which of these alliances grasp and which actors will take a role in the

post-conflict international order, The Western allies have been giving Ukraine arms, funds, and
logistical assistance and involving in economic sanctions against Russia. The Western allies are

composed of several of the greatest and most developed countries in which collectively endorsed

the UN's condemnation of the Russian invasion. The Ukrainian troops have received technical

assistance from non-state actors like Elon Musk's SpaceX, and Musk has permitted the Ukrainian

troops to employ his Starlink satellite equipment for their communications (Special Eurasia,

2023). On the other hand, despite not having any immediate allies in this warfare, Russia might

have relied on Minsk and Belgrade. Despite not sharing any defense treaty, China is in some

ways Russia's partner. China has grown to be Russia's main trading partner and funding source

since the conflict started (Guyer, 2023). India, a non-aligned nation, continues to buy crude from

Russia. The volume of trade between India and Russia has reached an all-time high.

Humanitarian Consequences

Due to the conflict's severe humanitarian costs, which include human casualties,

displaced populations, and infrastructure destruction, affected populations continue to face

difficult humanitarian situations. By August 2022, Russian attacks in Ukraine had directly

resulted in 5,552 civilian deaths and 8,513 injuries in Ukraine. Local authorities estimate that the

massive murders took the lives of up to 24,328 individuals (Haque et al., 2022). Moreover, by

April 2022, nearly 5 million Ukrainians have been pushed to flee the country, and 7 million have

been internally displaced within Ukraine. Another 13 million Ukrainians, many of whom are

unable to travel and are impossible to safely approach with supplies, are considered to be in the

hardest-hit regions, according to estimates from the UN (United Nations, 2022). In addition, the

conflict not only caused fatalities and displacement, but it also influenced Ukrainians' well-being

and security by demolishing hospitals and restricting the delivery of supplies and medical aid. In

addition to being assaulted, a number of hospitals and healthcare facilities from 21 cities across
Ukraine were also severely damaged, along with a significant number of homes, schools, roads,

and bridges. (Haque et al., 2022). As facilities are damaged and production is suspended, the

outage of water, gas, power, and internet services also affected supplies of meds and other goods.

Previous Conflict Resolution

The Normandy Format

In 2014, after Russia sparked a dispute in Donbas, French, German, Russian, and

Ukrainian officials established the Normandy framework (Wintour, 2022). It was named after the

WWII Normandy landings. On the sidelines of the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of

the Allied landings, the first discussion was held in Normandy. The Normandy format was

developed to provide a forum for high-level political conversations that would encourage

advancement in the effort to end the crisis in eastern Ukraine. The Trilateral Contact Group

(TCG), made up of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, was created in 2014 as the forum for

meetings to create a peace strategy (Lohsen & Morcos, 2022). The Minsk Protocol and Package

of Measures, which jointly established the terms for the conflict's resolution, were the results of

negotiations. Four collaborative teams on political, security, economic, and humanitarian matters

were then established, and representatives from the separatist regions participated in each of

them.

The Minsk Agreements

The Minsk agreements seek to establish a truce between the Ukrainian government and

rebels backed by Russia in the country's east. They are called after the Belarusian city, Minsk,

where they took place in 2014 and 2015. In addition, they outlined an agenda for elections in the

seized Luhansk and Donetsk regions as well as a strategy for reintegrating the region into the
remaining parts of Ukraine (Haynes, 2022). There are two signed agreements, which are Minsk I

and Minsk II. In Minsk I, in September 2014, Ukraine and the rebels supported by Russia

reached an agreement on a 12-point cease-fire. Its terms comprised the removal of massive arms,

the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and prisoner exchanges (Al Jazeera, 2022). In Minsk II,

a 13-point deal was reached in February 2015 by delegates of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and

the authorities of the separatist-held territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. Nine of those points

deal with managing the real dispute in the ruled region, including a ceasefire, the removal of

powerful arms, an amnesty for combatants, an exchange of hostages and detainees, and the

removal of "all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and also mercenaries" from

Ukraine. The other four points involve a discussion on local elections, temporary legislation

granting Luhansk and Donetsk a special status, and restoring "full control" over the Ukrainian

government's border with Russia (Haynes, 2022).

Nonetheless, although the initial Minsk agreements put an end to continuous combat, it

has lately grown more intense. Russia's claim that it is not an actor in the conflict and is not thus

obligated by its rules has been a significant roadblock (Al Jazeera, 2022). Having the intention of

deploying Russian peacekeeping forces, Vladimir Putin has been blamed for terminating the

accords after recognizing the self-declared republics' independence. Additionally, Russia and

Ukraine have interpreted the agreements in quite different ways. Even with some devolved

powers granted to the two areas, the Ukrainian government sees them to unify Ukraine and

completely recover Ukrainian sovereignty. Russia, on the other hand, thinks that the agreements

stipulate a procedure whereby Luhansk and Donetsk would first be awarded a special status and

a government that is allied with Russia before being merged with the remaining parts of Ukraine

(Haynes, 2022).
The Challenge of Conflict Resolution

Numerous substantial obstacles prevent an inclusive and durable resolution to the Russia-

Ukraine conflict from being achieved. First and foremost, Russia has never viewed peacekeeping

in the same manner. The Russian strategy views peacekeeping as the preservation of the

internal order while maintaining current regimes in power for the purpose of security, whereas

the United States and European nations perceive peacekeeping as an opportunity to safeguard

human rights and freedoms with a final objective of eliminating authoritarian regimes while

encouraging liberal principles (Blinova, 2023). These two points of view contrast one another,

recall the Cold War-era struggle for ideological hegemony, and show that there is still an

underlying latent resistance between them. Moreover, attempts to resolve the dispute are

complicated by the war's larger geopolitical consequences, with Russia attempting to preserve

influence and Ukraine desiring deeper links with Europe and NATO, which results

in international actors' different stakes and views on the issue (Millen, 2022). The existence of

non-state actors, militias, and mercenaries in the area of dispute increases complexity because of

the potential for their conduct to affect local dynamics and obstruct peace attempts. Moreover,

the international community's enactment of sanctions against Russia has made things even more

difficult, damaging local economies and changing the nature of negotiations. In addition, decades

of disputes and propaganda have increased suspicion among both sides, which makes it

challenging to open up real communication and engage in sincere negotiations.

Suggested Conflict Resolution

dispute. There are various recommended approaches for resolving disputes that can be taken into

account. Reopening diplomatic lines and starting an effective discourse with all parties engaged

must be the priority. Direct discussions between Russia, Ukraine, and other pertinent parties need

to be promoted with the goal of identifying points of agreement and comprehending one

another's worries. Second, if both parties desire such agreements to be successful, unarmed or

lightly armed monitors can aid in their execution, such as giving flag warning indications if one

or both parties are willfully breaching their agreements. To guarantee cooperation and stop

potential infractions, an unbiased monitoring system needs to be put in place. Certainly, this

stage has not yet been reached by Russia and Ukraine, but it is straightforward to imagine a

situation in which Russia and Ukraine Moscow reach a fragile agreement and require outside

assistance to strengthen it.

However, if diplomacy and negotiations efforts are still too challenging to be done, a

long-term political, military, and industrial strategy that is founded on a viable concept that

works must support Western strategy, rather than a quest for compromise with an opponent

whose fundamental demands are in direct opposition to Western objectives. The immediate

strategic objective of the West must be to alter Moscow's assessment of its security requirements,

as it managed in the 1980s. Since conflict was deemed to be too expensive, containment

succeeded in persuading the Soviet authorities that lowering hostilities and embracing significant

economic change was the better course of action. The larger objective for Western policymakers

must be to persuade a post-Putin administration that in order for Russia to enhance security, it

needs to de-imperialize its national defense strategy. Anytime the Putin era ends, new

opportunities for integrating Russian and Western security objectives may arise, but only if the
next Russian leader decides that Russia needs to forge mutually beneficial security ties with the

West to regulate its ties with China and keep Russia from growing excessively reliant on Beijing.

If Russia wants to employ the means of cooperation, the West must make sure they are ready.

Moreover, the fundamental goal of confronting Russia must become the center of a

transatlantic agreement in order to secure Ukraine and all of Europe. This entails supplying the

Ukrainian armed forces with all the tools they need to combat the Russian occupiers as the battle

progresses. It involves sharing intelligence and working together on cyber defense, as well as

providing military assets on an ongoing and comprehensive foundation, providing lend-lease

finance to cover the costs of the battle, and more. If Russia realizes that Western funds will

continue to go to Ukraine for the foreseeable future, its military calculations are more likely to

shift. In the end, nothing can replace NATO membership for Ukraine, so once the war is done,

Ukraine should aspire to join. NATO should provide Ukraine with an unambiguous route to full

membership in consideration of Russia's aggressiveness and possible future expansionist

aspirations.

Conclusion

To conclude, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a complicated

and multidimensional geopolitical dispute with a long history. The war, which has its roots in

territory disputes and historical relationships, has grown into a geopolitical confrontation

involving multiple states and non-state entities. The Normandy Format and the Minsk

Agreements were failed attempts at conflict resolution in the past, and the conflict still exists. A

complex and coordinated strategy is necessary to end the dispute in a lasting way. It should entail

persistent diplomatic efforts and direct communication between Russia and Ukraine. Continuous

political, economic, and security factors should also be taken into account while developing an
all-encompassing solution approach. In the end, the international community must stand behind

Ukraine's sovereignty and stability while pursuing chances for collaboration with Russia. The

possibility exists to influence Russia's security considerations and persuade a post-Putin

administration to seek security connections with the West that are mutually advantageous.

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