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The origins of the Ukrainian Crisis

Preprint · April 2020

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.36305.97120

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The origins of the Ukrainian Crisis
The conflict in a country divided between Russia and the EU
Written by Luca Cenciarini

Introduction

In March of 2014, Russian soldiers occupy the Crimea peninsula, a territory owned by Ukraine
(Amadeo 2020). The invasion represents a strong political gesture, which has been the casus belli of
the conflict between the two countries, originated for a complex historical background, the struggle
to build a national identity, and political power.

The actors involved are many, operating around the Ukrainian population, which is divided by
national ideologies and pulled between the promising European Union and the political influence,
alongside military contentiousness, of Russia, with a ‘nostalgic’ look at the Soviet Union.

The essay will explore the roots of the conflict, aiming to find the main causes of the Ukrainian crisis.
We will provide a brief background and indagate the role played by the major institutions, social
groups and political leaders. As well, a prospective on the future of the conflict will be considered,
trying to find out if a stability can be reached and kept by the countries, without provoking further
outbreaks.

A brief history of the conflict

A first friction between the Ukrainian population and the Russian political pressure, was provoked
by the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and his decisions against an association agreement
towards the European Union in 2013 (Higgins 2014). The strong will of Ukrainian citizens and
political movements in favour of a nationalist approach in opposition to Russian influence, led to a
period of protests against the government, whose leader (Viktor) was, then, removed from power in
2014 during the Ukrainian Revolution (Conant 2014).

The event triggered a declared hostility between a reinforced sense of nationalism carried by
Ukrainian, and a counter anti-revolution and pro-Russian movement, in the buffer territories between
the two countries. The Crimea peninsula was one of the major areas where the conflict exploded. A
military invasion of pro-Russian forces was carried inside the region owned by Ukraine, starting an
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effective armed conflict and cutting every connection and transport with Ukraine (Bebler 2015).
Crimea became the chessboard in which the clash evolved, showing an impressive counter action,
carried by the Ukrainian military force, underestimated by Russia. The cause of such a strong reaction
can be found in the high sense of independence and nationality fuelled by the previous revolt against
the pro-Russian leader (Sherr 2020). The official annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation was
made official by a Referendum, highly deflected towards a propaganda of demonization of the
Ukrainian power and the control of the voting process (Bebler 2015).

The conflict expanded in the buffer region of Donbass, in eastern-southern Ukraine. Ukrainian
elections in 2010 showed a divided country, with a strong support of Yanukovych by voters in the
south-east part, nearby Russian borders (Conant 2014). After the annexation of Crimea to the Russian
federation, a wave of separationist’s movements rose inside Donbass’ regions. Like a chain, violent
riots, occupations of public institutions and calls for segregation occurred, one after the other, in the
major cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, followed by most of the surrounding regions (Mitrokhin 2015).
What seemed, from a first analysis, a civil war inside Ukrainian territories, between secessionist rebel
forces and Ukrainian militaries, was covertly supported by the Russian federation and its forces in an
‘hybrid warfare’ (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015), marking the motivation to undermine Ukrainian
legitimacy, without risking to be accused and persecuted by international organizations.

In September 2014, the agreement of Minsk declared the first of many fragile ceasefires (Mitrokhin
2015), leading to a slow process of peace-making, with many conditions and compromises between
Ukraine, the Russian federation and the independence-seeking regions of Donbass. The armed
conflict was not completely stopped by the agreements, with a permanent state of ‘frozen conflict’,
only decreased by a summit in Paris, where progress towards peace settlement was made (BBC 2019).

The historic and cultural relation between Ukraine and Russia

The 2014 revolution was not the first form of detachment of Ukraine from the Russian political power.
Ukraine has been one of the more relevant states in the history of the Soviet Union, with a significant
role. We noticed in the previous chapter a strong influence and sense of ownership of the Russian
leaders, concerning the Ukrainian political matters. This cultural and political circumstance can be
considered as a consequence of the past membership of Ukraine In the Soviet Union, being controlled
politically and militarily for years. The Ukrainian independence in 1991, achieved during the process
of dissolutions of the USSR (Bebler 2015), could not eradicate the permanence of the Russian culture
and language spread over the country, especially in the south-east region.

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The conflict has its roots in the significant division inside the country, which resembles the condition
of many states during the Cold War, disputed between the Soviet Bloc and the Western Bloc. The
polarization that we examined previously, regarding 2010 elections in Ukraine (Conant 2014), is the
consequence of the strong presence of the Russian culture and political influence, which lasted for
many years in one of the most sensitive and delicate periods of history.

Matthew Rojansky, as quoted by Krishnadev Calamur (2014), says that the two countries are ‘joined
at the hip’. They share different cultural, economic and social characteristics: for example, Russian
language is prevalent in the south east part of the country; Russian companies are largely investing
in Ukraine and millions of Ukrainians work in Russia (ibid.). As well, Ukraine has been a strategic
stronghold, in relation to western countries and for its position in the Black Sea (Menkiszak 2016).
Many links connected the two countries, creating an unbalanced relation of co-dependence and
preventing Ukraine to develop an actual sense on nationality and self-determination. The country
manifested more a desire of sovereignty and antipathy, especially in the west region, against Russian
historic oppression, rather than a real national ethos.

However, when the links began to weaken and Russia had to lower its control over Ukraine, the
conditions became optimal for the building of an independent nation. The collapse of Viktor
Yanukovych’s governance, highly manipulated by the Russian leader Vladimir Putin (Conant 2014),
provoked with a chain effect, two particular effects, in relation to Russia:

- Russia became aware that Ukraine would have become harder, if not impossible, to control,
and countermeasures were formulated in order to do not lose one of the connections that
benefited Russia and expanded its international influence (Calamur 2014).
- The question of national belonging reopened some unsolved issues in those regions where the
fragile coexistence between Russian and Ukrainian ownership was still not contested. It is the
case of the already discussed south-eastern regions, where things remained frozen since the
end of the Cold War, and a ‘neither / or’ question was not demanded (ibid.).

Like many other conflicts, it is essential to examine the historic background of the country in order
to understand how it developed. In the Ukrainian case, the 2014 crisis was a vicious reaction to the
collapse of a state of steadiness, left behind and unsolved since the end of the Soviet Union.

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The role of the European Union

The revolt against the president Yanukovych was not just a nationalist momentum or an affront to
Russian control. In fact, a precise event raised the unrest of Ukrainian citizens.

From the early 2000s, the European Union shifted its focus outside the European border, moving
towards the eastern countries, planning on new agreements and alliances. The idea was to avoid direct
‘assimilation’ proposals inside the union; but, instead, building strong partnerships and closer
political ties (MacFarlane and Menon 2014). From the Eastern side, an alliance of Ukraine with the
EU was incompatible with the programme of Russia to build a Russia-led economic space between
close countries, geographically and historically, called Custom Union. The refusal to sing the
Association Agreement proposed by EU to Ukraine in 2013, widely supported by the western part of
the country, marked an official statement regarding its position between the European Union and
Russia (Havlik 2014).

The civil unrest that followed was, in fact, called Euromaidan (Maidan is the square in Central Kyiv
where the protest started), referring to the importance of the European question into the popular
debate. The cities of Kyiv and Lviv, where the revolt reached its maximum, were opened to
agreements with the west, and the opposition of the government implied the impossibility of a self-
built nation, away from Russian influence (Diuk 2014).

The position of Europe during the conflict, and the possibility of an intervention, was openly
discussed. The Ukraine warfare, alongside the case in Georgia in 2008 (where Russia was involved
as well), represent ‘the most security crisis in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union’
(MacFarlane and Menon 2014). A Union built on democracy and whose values of freedom and self-
determination were exalted by the student protests of 2014 in Kyiv, was expected to take urgent
measure to prevent a worsening of the situation.

The first response was a set of restrictive measures regarding Russia and Crimea, with the recognition
of an illegal annexation and a deliberate destabilization. They included economic sanctions,
restriction of cooperation and exclusion of Russia from the G8 summit for a limited period (European
Council 2020). The sanctions directed to Russia did not gave, unfortunately, the expected results
(Kruk 2019). One can say that a direct military intervention, supported by the individual states, would
have been more effective, like the limited action taken by NATO in Eastern Europe (Monaghan
2014); but the democratic structure and the complex decision making progress could not handle the
rapid process of a lawless conflict between ‘hybrid regimes’ (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015).

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Conclusion

Ukraine crisis emerged, first, from an internal division and, second, from an international antagonism.
Its conflict evolved from a civil unrest carried by the pro-Europe west side and degenerated in the
south-east side, with the emergence of a warfare condition. The cultural and political bound between
Ukraine and Russia was discovered to be highly influenced by their historical background.

Unresolved issues in buffer regions, generated during the Cold War, emerged again when the country
began to slowly approach towards the western values and agreements, provoking the counter response
of Russia, whose authority and economic plans were put in discussion. Even if the authoritative action
of Russia could not have been detained efficiently by EU sanctions and the conflict continued to
undermine eastern Europe’s security, a gradual diplomatic process achieved important agreements
towards a peace condition with Russia, whose political position is still crucial for Ukraine stability,
after many revolts and years of oppression.

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