Department of Civil Engineering
Assignment no. 4
Name: Abdul Moaeed
Reg. no: FA22-CVE-072
Section: 3B
Subject: Transportation Engineering
Submitted To: Dr. Danish Farooq
Q1. Describe the important aspects to enhance the capacity of Pakistan ports for CPEC
Projects?
A. Improving the capacity of Pakistan's ports for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) projects involves several crucial aspects in transportation engineering:
1. Infrastructure Development: Enhance port infrastructure by constructing new
terminals, berths, and storage yards. This involves modernizing existing facilities
and expanding capacity to accommodate increased cargo traffic.
2. Dredging and Channel Deepening: Increase the depth of harbor channels and
basins to accommodate larger vessels and ensure smooth navigation. Dredging is
vital for ports to handle bigger ships, enhancing their overall capacity.
3. Efficient Handling Equipment: Invest in modern and efficient cargo handling
equipment like cranes, forklifts, and conveyor systems to expedite cargo handling
processes and reduce turnaround times for ships.
4. Technology Integration: Implement advanced technologies such as RFID (Radio
Frequency Identification), automated systems, and digital management tools for
cargo tracking, inventory management, and overall operational efficiency.
5. Connectivity and Access: Improve road and rail connectivity to ports for efficient
transportation of cargo to and from the ports. This includes the development of
dedicated corridors and transportation networks to facilitate smooth movement.
6. Environmental Considerations: Ensure sustainable development by
implementing eco-friendly practices, such as reducing emissions from port
operations and minimizing environmental impact through proper waste
management.
7. Security Measures: Enhance security measures to protect cargo and
infrastructure from potential threats, ensuring safe operations and minimizing
risks of disruptions.
8. Capacity Planning and Forecasting: Conduct thorough studies and assessments
to predict future cargo volumes and plan capacity expansions accordingly. This
proactive approach helps in avoiding congestion and optimizing resources.
9. Regulatory and Policy Framework: Streamline regulations and policies
governing port operations to promote efficiency, transparency, and investment in
the sector. This includes facilitating private sector participation and ensuring a
conductive business environment.
10. International Standards Compliance: Align port operations and facilities with
international standards and best practices to attract global shipping lines and
improve competitiveness in the maritime industry.
11. Multi-Modal Connectivity: Develop efficient multi-modal transportation
networks that integrate ports with road, rail, and air transport systems. This
integration ensures seamless movement of cargo from ports to various
destinations within Pakistan and beyond, optimizing logistics and supply chain
efficiencies.
12. Port Layout Optimization: Optimize the layout and design of port terminals for
better space utilization and operational efficiency. This might involve
reconfiguring storage areas, optimizing traffic flow, and improving berth
allocation to handle diverse types of cargo effectively.
13. Investment and Funding: Secure sustainable funding mechanisms, both
domestic and international, to finance infrastructure projects aimed at expanding
port capacity. This could involve public-private partnerships (PPPs), foreign direct
investment, or international loans and grants.
14. Skilled Workforce Development: Invest in training and skill development
programs for port personnel to handle advanced equipment and manage
modern port operations efficiently. Skilled manpower is essential for the effective
utilization of upgraded port infrastructure.
15. Resilience and Disaster Management: Implement measures to enhance the
resilience of port infrastructure against natural disasters and potential
disruptions. This includes developing robust disaster management plans and
investing in resilient construction techniques.
16. Feasibility Studies and Risk Assessment: Conduct thorough feasibility studies
and risk assessments for new projects to ensure their viability and identify
potential challenges or risks. This proactive approach helps in mitigating risks and
optimizing project outcomes.
17. Customs and Trade Facilitation: Streamline customs procedures and implement
trade facilitation measures to expedite clearance processes, reducing dwell times
for cargo at ports and enhancing overall efficiency.
18. Collaboration with Stakeholders: Foster collaboration between various
stakeholders including government entities, port authorities, shipping lines,
logistics companies, and local communities. Engaging stakeholders in decision-
making processes helps in aligning objectives and garnering support for port
development initiatives.
19. Maintenance and Upkeep: Develop comprehensive maintenance schedules and
plans to ensure the sustained functionality and efficiency of port infrastructure.
Regular maintenance and upgrades prevent deterioration and extend the lifespan
of assets.
20. Green Initiatives: Embrace sustainable practices such as using renewable energy
sources, implementing eco-friendly technologies, and minimizing environmental
impact through green port initiatives. This demonstrates a commitment to
environmental stewardship while fostering long-term sustainability.
21. Port Connectivity with Economic Zones: Ensure seamless connectivity between
ports and designated economic zones along the CPEC route. Developing
dedicated logistics and transport infrastructure linking ports with these zones
encourages industrial growth and facilitates efficient movement of goods.
22. Digitalization and Smart Port Technologies: Embrace digital transformation by
integrating smart port technologies. This includes IOT (Internet of Things) for
real-time monitoring of cargo, predictive analytics for optimizing operations, and
AI-driven solutions for efficient resource allocation and decision-making.
23. Inland Waterways Development: Explore the potential of inland waterways to
complement existing transportation modes. Enhancing navigability of rivers and
developing inland waterway transport can provide an alternative, cost-effective
mode for moving bulk cargo.
24. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Foster collaborations between public and
private entities to leverage expertise and resources. PPP models can expedite
infrastructure development by tapping into private sector efficiencies and
innovation while sharing risks and responsibilities.
25. Regulatory Reforms and Streamlined Procedures: Simplify regulatory
processes and customs procedures to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and facilitate
smoother operations at ports. This can involve digitizing paperwork, introducing
single-window clearance systems, and reducing paperwork redundancies.
26. Capacity Utilization Studies: Conduct studies to optimize the utilization of
existing capacity. Analyze peak and off-peak periods to efficiently manage
resources and plan expansions or upgrades accordingly, avoiding overcapacity or
underutilization.
27. Intermodal Transport Hubs: Establish intermodal transport hubs to enhance the
efficiency of cargo transfers between different modes of transportation. These
hubs streamline cargo handling processes and improve overall logistics efficiency.
28. Resilient Supply Chains: Strengthen supply chain resilience by diversifying
transportation routes and modes. This minimizes disruptions caused by
unforeseen events such as geopolitical tensions or natural disasters, ensuring
uninterrupted flow of goods.
29. International Collaboration and Best Practices Adoption: Collaborate with
international port operators, leveraging their expertise and adopting best
practices from successful ports globally. This knowledge transfer can significantly
enhance operational efficiency and management strategies.
30. Long-Term Strategic Planning: Develop long-term strategic plans for
sustainable development and growth of ports, considering evolving trade
patterns, technological advancements, and global economic trends. This ensures
adaptability and competitiveness in the long run.
Gwadar Port and Chinese dual use facilities:
Chinese maritime ambitions have been a cause of concern among many Western and
non-Western nations for some time now. One of the most recent reports addressing
Chinese maritime ambitions and port investments concluded that “China is shopping […]
At the top of its wish list would be permanent, secure military installations with support,
logistics and repair infrastructure. The ports themselves would be deep water and
secure; in countries with which China enjoys good relations; and ideally near strategic
choke points.” One of the most relevant examples of such ambitions is found in the Port
of Gwadar, located in Pakistan. For years, concerns have been expressed over the fact
that China could decide to use many of its foreign ports as naval bases for the PLA Navy
(PLAN).
The commercial and (potential) military value held by the Port of Gwadar is better
understood through the concept of China's “strategic strongpoints” which makes
reference to certain foreign ports with high strategic value, whose terminals and
commercial zones are operated by Chinese firms. These strongpoints enable the Chinese
Government to strengthen commercial, diplomatic and economic ties with the host
country, allowing the latter to make use of the facilities as well. Most importantly, these
ports have the potential to be used for military purposes, predominantly during wartime
The following brief addresses the potential for dual use of the Port of Gwadar based on
its activities and the wider context of Chinese maritime ambitions in the Indo-Pacific
region. With such analysis, it is able to grasp what are the characteristics of Chinese
foreign ports that allow them to be used for both commercial and military purposes.
Port of Gwadar
The port of Gwadar is located in the South of Pakistan, relatively close to the border with
Iran. Its first stages became operational in 2008, but the port hasn't seen regular
commercial service since then. While it is primarily used for local artisanal fishing at the
moment, it is intended that the population there will be eventually displaced to host all
kinds of commercial activity. With the continuous growth of Chinese maritime
commerce and naval activity, this particular port has gathered the attention of many
analysts due to its strategic location. Chinese analysts view it as a top choice for
establishing a new overseas strategic strongpoint, owing to its prime geographic
location and strong Sino-Pakistani ties. Not only does it allow the PRC to strengthen its
cooperation with Pakistan, but it also provides it with an alternative access to the
Arabian Sea in case the Strait of Malacca is blocked. As ascertained by Drazen Jorgic,
“Beijing and Islamabad see Gwadar as the future jewel in the crown of the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative to
build a new ‘Silk Road’ of land and maritime trade routes across more than 60 countries
in Asia, Europe, and Africa.”
According to China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI)'s Isaac Kardon, Connor Kennedy
and Peter Dutton, there are several traits in common between the most relevant
strongpoints operated by China in the region. The first is their strategic geographical
location. Most, if not all, ports are located at geographically vital locations, close to
important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and providing access to important bodies
of water. Second management coordination. They are a product a high-level
coordination between state-owned enterprises, Chinese party officials, and other private
firms. Third, they have a comprehensive commercial scope. They are part of a wider
strategy followed by the government which encompasses the parallel development of
rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure to support its Belt and Road Initiative. Lastly the
potential for military use. Ports are equipped dual-use functions which enable them to
support military activity in case it was required, with vast storage facilities that could be
used to store weapons, and piers which can support large PLAN vessels—including
aircraft carriers.
Gwadar lies around 400 km east of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow corridor that connects
all countries in the Persian Gulf with the global markets, and through which the 40 % of
China's imported oil transits. Additionally, Gwadar serves as an exit to the in-land
commercial route that China has from its western part in Xinjiang Region, through
Pakistan, down to the port in the Indian Ocean. In other words, it is the so-called
Chinese “exit to the [Arabian] sea.” A corridor that in the future may serve as a brilliant
geopolitical tool for China to maintain its control over the region. A key element of its
importance, however, is it being the entry point from the Middle East region for the
energy flows to China.
The Sino-Pakistan relations assure Chinese energy imports coming through Gwadar as
an alternative to the Malacca Dilemma, viewed by some as a potential threat to Chinese
national security. This concept refers to the reliance by China on the shipments that
arrive through the Malacca Strait, a region between the Sumatra Island and the Malayan
Peninsula that has Singapore to the east. Due to Singapore's closer ties with India and
the US, China fears its energy supplies could be blocked. This would lead to a significant
drawback in its economic evolution and growth.
Gwadar is another example, among the many in existence, which showcase Chinese
reliance on its commercial activity as a means to attain a degree of national security. It
shows the growing obsession of China for commercial growth, a focus that has in turn
led China to deeply tighten its relations with Pakistan. In the words of Hu Jintao back in
2006 in an address at Islamabad, China is “deeply touched by the outpouring of
brotherly affection of the Pakistani people. In the words of one Pakistani friend, such
friendship is ‘higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Indian Ocean and sweeter than
honey.’” Additional references to the high importance of Gwadar for China can be found
in Xi Jinping´s 2015 visit to Pakistan, where he stated the port was one of the four pillars
of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and pledged a Chinese investment of $46
million over the following 15-year period.
Gwadar is an asset for China, but one that still remains to be properly operated. It is
linked to the transport infrastructure that the Chinese Government intends to build in
Pakistan, and for now, China seems to be more involved in expanding its network of
ports in Africa. But while that corridor is widely discussed as if it was operational, very
little modern infrastructure has been built to date. This has raised concerns over the
potential military use that China could give to it.
Gwadar's potential for military use
The low level of commercial activity that the port has had over the last decade has led
some observers to argue that the port is on the verge of becoming another “naval base
in China's string of pearls across the Indian Ocean.” Yet, to date, the only military activity
the port has seen has been of Chinese-built vessels, although not from the PLAN but
from the Pakistani Navy. Thus, the development of the port until it can become an
important asset for Beijing will still take some time, given the existing lack of
infrastructure to support activity in the port.
The potential of Chinese foreign ports in general, and Gwadar in particular, to be used
for military purposes lies in the characteristics of their infrastructure, useful for both
commercial and military activity. In terms of physical capacity, Gwadar's facilities can
support the largest vessels of the PLA Navy, including the Type 075 amphibious-assault
ship, the Type 071 Landing platform dock, and even the large aircraft carriers. Thus, the
case of Gwadar proves that China builds its foreign ports keeping in mind the option of
them being used by its PLAN vessels, thus making its facilities big enough to serve for
such purposes in the future.
It has been suggested that Gwadar would not have any utility in a wartime scenario due
to the lack of political commitment between both Chinese and Pakistani authorities to
provide with military support. More precisely, host countries could refuse Chinese
military use of these ports in a wartime scenario, fearing they may be considered
belligerents as well. Isaac Kardon and Wendy Leutert argue that “if armed conflict were
to occur, China may not have access to port facilities in states seeking to maintain
neutrality,” including the case of Gwadar. Thus, the problem is not that Chinese-built
ships can't fit in the port, but that many host countries would be reluctant to allow the
PLAN to use their ports as naval bases. But China could nevertheless decide to use its
facilities for PLAN vessels in a peacetime scenario. As ascertained in a report by the
China Maritime Studies Institute, “if the infrastructure projects mature, Gwadar could
become a key peacetime replenishment or transfer point for PLA equipment and
personnel. Prepositioning parts, supplies, and other materials at Gwadar would be a
productive use of the port and airfield facilities.”
Nevertheless, there have been some Chinese statements which indicate that China has
the intention to use Gwadar as a base for the PLA Navy sooner or later. Several years
ago, an anonymous officer was quoted saying “the food is already on the plate; we can
eat it whenever we want to.” This opens up the debate over dual-use Chinese facilities
abroad, and whether China is developing such network of ports with a hidden intention
of turning them into naval bases when desired.
The logic behind dual use
Chinese ports are usually established close to important SLOCs and strategic
chokepoints vital for commerce in the region, but also with relevance for military
operations. Although the PLAN does only have one base abroad (Djibouti), a Chinese
analyst quoted by Kardon and Leutert argues that “wherever Chinese interests go, our
security boundary must also go.” According these authors, this means that, in practice,
all Chinese-operated ports are envisioned for dual-use functions. “Commercial port
facilities enable considerable military logistics and intelligence capabilities in peacetime.
In addition, the global scale and distribution of PRC firms' network of ports abroad
establish a degree of Party-state control over China's commercial and military supply
chains.” Furthermore, logistics and intelligence capabilities enable the PLAN to project
its power far from its national coasts during peacetime.
However, in spite of this, the use of these foreign ports in wartime scenarios is not as
likely to happen in the short to medium term, given that in many cases host nations
would be reluctant to permit their use out of fear they may be also considered as
belligerents in such a conflict. “If armed conflict were to occur, China may not have
access to port facilities in states seeking to maintain neutrality,” add Kardon and Leutert.
Thus, Chinese ports provide a restricted form of power projection: they enable the PLA
to operate with growing scope and scale in peacetime but provide a limited combat
support function in wartime. “Rather than raise international threat perceptions with
overt shows of military presence, the PLA may opt to embed plainclothes personnel into
PRC firms and use nominally commercial warehousing, communications, and other
equipment to quietly meet military needs.”
Public Chinese laws, such as the National Defense Mobilization Law from 2010, or the
National Defense Transportation Law from 2017, are indicative of strong willingness to
give these civilian assets a defense-related employment. The former describes the
importance of combining both peacetime and wartime production, and even mandates
that “any organization or individual has the obligation to accept the expropriation of
civil resources in accordance with the law.” The latter specifies that its purpose is to
strengthen “the construction of national defense transportation, promoting the
development of military and civilian integration in the transportation field, and
guaranteeing smooth progress of national defense activities.”
The fusion of civil and military is done on a sequential basis, with the primary objective
of preparing the port for military utilization without raising suspicion or inviting
resistance. Beijing looks for ports with terminals that can support PLA vessels of
considerable size, including its Type 075 Amphibious Assault ships, and even its aircraft
carriers. Then, develops an adjacent region with commercial buildings, industrial parks,
free trade zones and power plants. With this adjacent system supported by the port's
activity, the port is in turn sustained by the activity along such region. Co-locating other
support industries such as communications, shipbuilding and transport logistics, the
entire system then boosts the military utility of the port, which is ready to host PLAN
surface combatants.
Although the lack of reliable public sources and information makes it hard to conclude
whether the Chinese government directs commercial companies to acquire commercial
port assets with an explicit intention of using them for military purposes, it is clear that
Beijing and Party leaders are aware of the fact that security is required to sustain
economic development at the scale of the BRI. Former State Councilor Yang Jiechi
stated“a tree cannot grow tall or bear fruit in a barren land torn apart by the flames of
war,” and many PLAN officers have complained over the fact that Chinese companies
working at these ports have not been able to meet the appropriate defense
requirements for them.
Thus, it is clear that Beijing is pursuing a policy of port projects in the Indo-Pacific region
with a dual-use functionality, while periodically claiming the opposite, which will allow
for an expansion of its economic influence in the short term and could eventually be
adapted for military use in the long run. In order to support its commercial growth and
activity in the region, it tasks the PLAN with the mission of protecting its commerce,
building port infrastructure with the capacity to host PLAN vessels.
Conclusion
As with most of Chinese foreign ports, Gwadar does not yet have the capacity to be
provided with the capacity for military use, although it has dual-use commercial facilities
which could provide for it in the future. The main point behind this is that the PLAN's
military capacity and its expansion outwards are not able to go at the same pace as
Chinese economic expansion across the world. Furthermore, Beijing is still a
continental power facing constant risks in the waters closer to home and would not
benefit from additional military outposts that expand its influence beyond the continent.
But as its commercial expansion grows, so does China's need to secure its international
shipping and most critical outposts. Thus, most of these ports, including Gwadar, are
equipped with infrastructure capable of fitting the PLAN's largest vessels, and are
already providing Beijing the chance to make periodic visits and port calls for
replenishment and resupply. Together with this suitability of their commercial
infrastructure, Chinese public laws bind firms operating the ports to accept the
expropriation of its facilities for military use whenever it is required. Thus, although the
evidence shows that military use of these facilities in the future would be only as a
means to secure its shipping across the most important SLOCs, China is indirectly laying
the grounds for a strong network of military facilities across the Indo-Pacific region and
beyond.
References:
1. Reports and Publications:
Asian Development Bank (ADB): ADB often publishes reports on
infrastructure development, including ports. Exploring their website or
databases could yield reports specific to Pakistan's port infrastructure and
development needs for CPEC.
World Bank: The World Bank frequently publishes studies and reports on
transportation infrastructure and logistics. Their documents might contain
valuable information on enhancing port capacity for CPEC.
2. Government and Organization Websites:
Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Pakistan: The official website or
publications by the ministry might contain policy documents, strategies,
and plans related to the development of ports in Pakistan.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Authority: Reports or
publications by the CPEC Authority might include details about
infrastructure development plans, including ports and transportation
projects.
Government of Pakistan:
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Secretariat: https://cpec.gov.pk/
Gwadar Port Authority (GPA): https://gwadarport.gov.pk/
Port Qasim Authority (PQA): https://www.pqa.gov.pk/
News Articles:
Business Recorder: https://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/36
CPEC Info: https://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/36
Academic Papers:
Employment Outlook of China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Meta
Analysis (2021): https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333421520_Employment_Ou
tlook_of_China_Pakistan_Economic_Corridor_A_Meta-Analysis
Progress Update | China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Secretariat Official
Website: https://cpec.gov.pk/progress-update
Other Sources:
FAQs | China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Secretariat Official
Website: https://cpec.gov.pk/
