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G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021,

Decision, Carandang, [J]
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Gesmundo, [CJ]
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Perlas-Bernabe, [J]
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
Separate Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
Separate Opinion, Inting, [J]
Separate Opinion, Zalameda, [J]
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, M. Lopez, [J]
Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Gaerlan, [J]
Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, J. Lopez, [J]
Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Dimaampao, [J]

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 252578. December 07, 2021 ]
ATTY. HOWARD M. CALLEJA, ATTY. JOSEPH PETER J. CALLEJA, ATTY. CHRISTOPHER
JOHN P. LAO, DE LA SALLE BROTHERS INC., AS REPRESENTED BY BR. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, FSC, DR. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, NAPOLEON L. SIONGCO, AND RAEYAN M.
REPOSAR, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252579]
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC); ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
(AMLC); SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE,
PRESIDENT VICENTE C. SOTTO III; AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252580]
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, EIRENE JHONE E. AGUILA, GIDEON V. PEÑA, MICHAEL T. TIU,
JR., FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO, EUGENE T. KAW,
PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
CHIEF ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE
B. RACELA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252585]
BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, FERDINAND
GAITE, AND EUFEMIA CULLAMAT; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE
D. BROSAS; ACT-TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FRANCE L. CASTRO,
KABATAAN PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO; BAYAN MUNA PARTY-
LIST PRESIDENT, SATURNINO OCAMPO; MAKABAYAN CO-CHAIRPERSON LIZA LARGOZA
MAZA; BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST CHAIRPERSON NERI J. COLMENARES; ACT-TEACHERS
PARTY-LIST PRESIDENT ANTONIO TINIO, AND ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST VICE PRESIDENT
ARIEL CASILAO, AND MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL, NATHANAEL SANTIAGO,
PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252613]
RUDOLF PHILIP B. JURADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252623]
CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CTUHR), REPRESENTED BY DAISY
ARAGO, PRO-LABOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER (PLACE), REPRESENTED BY ATTY.
NOEL V. NERI, ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., VIOLETA ESPIRITU, AND VIRGINIA FLORES,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; HON. SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC); ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. FELIMON SANTOS JR.
AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. ARCHIE
GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252624]
CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, FELICITAS A. ARROYO, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, AMPARITA STA.
MARIA, MARIA ILSEA W. SALVADOR, MARIANNE CARMEL B. AGUNOY, XAMANTHA XOFIA
A. SANTOS, MARIA PAULA S. VILLARIN, PAULA SOPHIA ESTRELLA, IGNATIUS MICHAEL D.
INGLES, ERNESTO B. NERI, FR. ALBERT E. ALEJO, S.J., PAULA ZAYCO ABERASTURI,
WYANET AISHA ELIORA M. ALCIBAR, SENTRO NG MGA NAGKAKAISA AT PROGRESIBONG
MANGGAGAWA (SENTRO), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL JOSUA T. MATA,
PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA,
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE
B. RACELA, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE CHIEF GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252646]
SANLAKAS, REPRESENTED BY MARIE MARGUERITE M. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
RODRIGO R, DUTERTE, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED
FORCES, SENATE, AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252702]
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW-NAGKAISA) HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
NATIONAL PRESIDENT ATTY. JOSE SONNY MATULA; TRADE UNION LEADERS OF THE
NAGKAISA LABOR COALITION (NAGKAISA), NAMELY, ANNIE ENRIQUEZ GERON
(PRESIDENT OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES LABOR INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATION), DANIEL
EDRALIN (SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL AND
RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRY), RENATO MAGTUBO (CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTIDO
MANGGAGAWA), DEOBEL DEOCARES (PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR), DANILO LASERNA (FFW-VP FOR EDUCATION/HEAD OPERATIONS); CO-CHAIR OF
THE CHURCH LABOR CONFERENCE (CLC) JULIUS H. CAINGLET (FFW-VP FOR ADVOCACY
& NETWORKING), RUEL POLON (PRESIDENT OF TF LOGISTIC PHILS WORKERS UNION);
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU) CHAIRMAN ELMER LABOG, ELEANOR DE GUZMAN
(WORKERS' RESISTANCE AGAINST TYRANNY & FOR HUMAN RIGHTS) AND PASCUAL
PAUSAL (KILOS NA MANGGAGAWA); TRADE UNION LEADERS OF THE UNI GLOBAL
UNION-PHILIPPINE LIAISON COUNCIL NAMELY, JESUS EXEQUIEL NIDEA (PRESIDENT),
ROLAND DELA CRUZ (EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT); AND KILUSANG ARTIKULO TRESE
(A.13) CONVENOR ROLANDO LIBROJO, PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252726]
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, SENATE, AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252733]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO REYES, JR.,
BAYAN CHAIRPERSON MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, MOVEMENT AGAINST TYRANNY
CONVENOR GUILLERMINA "MOTHER MARY JOHN" D. MANANZAN, O.S.B, FORMER
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP) PRESIDENT FRANCISCO NEMENZO, PH.D.,
FORMER UP DILIMAN CHANCELLOR MICHAEL TAN, KARAPATAN ALLIANCE PHILIPPINES
(KARAPATAN) SECRETARY GENERAL CRISTINA E. PALABAY, KARAPATAN CHAIRPERSON
ELISA TITA P. LUBI, FORMER NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS
CHAIRPERSON FELIPE M. DE LEON, JR., PH.D., FORMER DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) SECRETARY PROF. JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, FREE
JONAS BURGOS MOVEMENT CHAIRPERSON EDITA T. BURGOS, RENATO R.
CONSTANTINO, JR., FORMER NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION UNDERSECRETARY
MA. CORAZON J. TAN, FORMER DSWD UNDERSECRETARY MARIA LOURDES TURALDE
JARABE, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS CHAIRPERSON DANILO HERNANDEZ
RAMOS, CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE MARCOSES AND MARTIAL LAW
(CARMMA) CONVENOR BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS IÑIGUEZ, D.D.,
FORMER BAYAN MUNA PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE TEODORO A. CASIÑO, MAE P.
PANER, VERGEL O. SANTOS, FR. WILFREDO DULAY, M.D.J., PROF. MICHAEL PANTE
(ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY), PROF. TEMARIO C. RIVERA (UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES), PROF. JOSEPH ANTHONY Y. LIM (ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY),
FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, FORMER UP CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DIRECTOR
CYNTHIA N. ZAYAS, PH.D., KILUSANG MAYO UNO SECRETARY GENERAL RONALDO M.
ADONIS, PINAG-ISANG SAMAHAN NG MGA TSUPER AT OPEREYTOR (PISTON)
NATIONWIDE CHAIRPERSON JUANITO AQUINO RANJO, JR., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY CHAIRPERSON EDELINA PADILLA-DELA PAZ, M.D., GABRIELA-YOUTH
SECRETARY-GENERAL CLARICE JOY PALCE, VOICES OF WOMEN FOR JUSTICE AND
PEACE CONVENOR TINA-AGEL S. ROMERO, AMIHAN NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
PEASANT WOMEN SECRETARY GENERAL CATARINA T. ESTAVILLO, PAMALAKAYA
CHAIRPERSON FERNANDO L. HICAP, SALINLAHI ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN'S CONCERNS
SECRETARY GENERAL EULE C. RICO BONGANAY, ANAKBAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
VINZHILL PERFAS SIMON, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS DEPUTY SECRETARY
GENERAL JOANNA MARIE GASPAR ROBLES, BAHAGHARI SPOKESPERSON REY
KRISTOFFER VALMORES SALINAS, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) PRESIDENT SANTIAGO Y.
DASMARIÑAS, JR., COURAGE SECRETARY GENERAL MANUEL R. BACLAGON, NOEMI
LARDIZABAL DADO, PAMILYA NG DESAPARECIDOS PARA SA KATARUNGAN
CHAIRPERSON ERLINDA T. CADAPAN, ASHER P. CADAPAN, HUSTISYA! PAGKAKAISA NG
MGA BIKTIMA PARA SA HUST1SYA CHAIRPERSON EVANGELINE P. HERNANDEZ,
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) CHAIRPERSON-EMERITUS CARMEN
"NANAY MAMENG" DEUNIDA, SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT
ARESTO (SELDA) CHAIRPERSON TRINIDAD G. REPUNO, PETITIONERS, VS. H.E. RODRIGO
R. DUTERTE, SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AND ALAN PETER CAYETANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252736]
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, JAY L. BATONGBACAL, DANTE B.
GATMAYTAN, THEODORE O. TE, VICTORIA V. LOANZON ANTHONY CHARLEMAGNE C. YU,
FRANCISCO ASHLEY L. ACEDILLO, AND TIERONE JAMES M. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR.
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DELFIN N. LORENZANA, EDUARDO M. AÑO, CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ III, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, AND MEL GEORGIE
B. RACELA, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, DIRECTION AND
INSTRUCTIONS, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252741]
MA. CERES P. DOYO, JOSEFA ANDRES MAGLIPON MARCELO, MARIA A. RESSA, RACHEL
E. KHAN, MARIA ROSARIO F. HOFILEÑA, LILIBETH SOCORRO FRONDOSO, MARIA TERESA
D. VITUG, MARIO S. NERY, JR., BEATRICE P. PUENTE, FLORANGEL ROSARIO-BRAID,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, LEILA M. DE LIMA, JOSE CHRISTOPHER Y. BELMONTE, SERGIO
OSMEÑA III, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, SR., LORENZO R. TAÑADA III, JOSE MANUEL I.
DIOKNO, EDMUNDO G. GARCIA, LUTGARDO B. BARBO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
PETITIONERS, VS. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
HERMOGENES ESPERON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER; TEODORO
L. LOCSIN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; DELFIN
LORENZANA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; EDUARDO AÑO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE; MENARDO I. GUEVARRA,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; GREGORIO BALLESTEROS HONASAN II, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY;
MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL; WENDEL E. AVISADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; THE ANTI- TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC)
CREATED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11479; THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA); AND ANY PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL,
SUPERVISION, OR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 11479, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252747]
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSELITO O. ALTAREJOS, IVY
MARIE B. APA, ANNA MAY V. BAQUIRIN, ARNEL BARBARONA, JUNELIE O. BARRIOS,
MARIA VICTORIA JOY B. BELTRAN, LIAN NAMI ALOEN P. BUAN, MARA ALYSSABEL D.
CEPEDA, RICHARD C. CORNELIO, FRANCES BEA C. CUPIN, ARDEE E. DELOLA, ERNEST
JEWELL B. DIÑO, LEONILO O. DOLORICON, CECILIA VICTORIA O. DRILON, GLENDA M.
GLORIA, BARTHOLOME TANKEH GUINGONA, ABDULMARI L. IMAO JR., JAZMIN B. LLANA,
GRACE MARIE LOPEZ, BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, DIANDRA DITMA A. MACARAMBON,
GUTIERREZ M. MANGANSAKAN II, AMADO ANTHONY G. MENDOZA III, VINCENT MARCO
C. MORALES, KRISTINE ONG MUSLIM, ELIZABETH JUDITH C. PANELO, NORBERTO S.
ROLDAN, JOSELITO B. SARACHO, RAISA MARIELLE B. SERAFICA, ELIZABETH ROSE O.
SIGUION REYNA, LISA I. TAPANG, LUIS V. TEODORO JR., ROLAND B. TOLENTINO,
MICHAEL JUDE C. TUMAMAC, EDGIE FRANCIS B. UYANGUREN, MA. SALVAC1ON E.
VARONA, AND DENZEL Q. YORONG, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252755]
KABATAANG TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG KARAPATAN REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL
CONVENER BRYAN EZRA C. GONZALES, YOUTH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT CHRISTIAN B. GULTIA, YOUTH ACT NOW AGAINST
TYRANNY REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL CONVENER RAOUL DANIEL A. MANUEL,
MILLENNIALS PH REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMITTEE HEAD JOSE RIO I. IWASAKI,
SAMAHAN NG PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT IAN RED D.
LIGOT, GOOD GOV PH REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DEXTER ARVIN E. YANG, YOUTH
STRIKE 4 CLIMATE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT JEFFERSON A.
ESTELA, LIBERAL YOUTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMITTEE CHAIR
DAVIN RENN S. SANTOS, AKSYON KABATAAN REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY-
GENERAL PRINCESS CYNTHIA NATHALIE DRILON, LA SALLE DEBATE SOCIETY
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND TEAM CAPTAIN HANS XAVIER W. WONG, DLSU
UNIVERSITY STUDENT GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT LANCE ISIAH C.
DELA CRUZ, SANGGUNIAN NG MGA MAG-AARAL NG PAARALANG LOYOLA NG ATENEO
DE MANILA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT JAMESUN W. BEJARIN, UP DILIMAN
UNIVERSITY STUDENT COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON SEAN ANGELO A.
THAKUR, UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS CENTRAL STUDENT COUNCIL, REPRESENTED
BY ITS DIRECTOR FOR ARTLETS THERESE MARIE B. IFURUNG, STUDENT COUNCIL
ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON, JEZA
ANTONETTE A. RODRIGUEZ, NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED BY ITS DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL JANDEIL B. ROPEROS,
PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE MEMBERS OF
THE ANTI TERRORISM COUNCIL: HERMOGENES ESPERON IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TEODORO LOCSIN JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DELFIN LORENZANA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, EDUARDO AÑO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CARLOS DOMINGUEZ III IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, MENARDO GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GREGORIO HONASAN IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, BENJAMIN
DIOKNO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL, THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY
VICENTE SOTTO III IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND ALAN
PETER CAYETANO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252759]
ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, BANTUAS M. LUCMAN, MUSA I. MALAYANG, DALOMILANG N.
PARAHIMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, VICENTE C.
SOTTO III, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, ALAN PETER
S. CAYETANO, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC) BOTH
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, RESPECTIVELY, AS
ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE ATC, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252765]
THE ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 252767]
BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, BISHOP REUEL NORMAN O. MARIGZA, RT. REV. REX B.
REYES JR., BISHOP EMERGENCIO PADILLO, BISHOP GERARDO A. ALMINAZA, DR. ALDRIN
M. PEÑAMORA, DR. ANNELLE G. SABANAL, DR. CHRISTOPHER D. SABANAL, FR.
ROLANDO F. DE LEON, SR. MA. LIZA H. RUEDAS, SR. ANABELL "THEODORA" G.
BILOCURA, REV. MARIE SOL S. VILLALON, DR. MA. JULIETA F. WASAN, FR. GILBERT S.
BILLENA, JENNIFER F. MENESES, DEACONESS RUBYLIN G. LITAO, JUDGE CLETO
VILLACORTA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, RURAL MISSIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE SISTERS' ASSOCIATION IN MINDANAO, PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R.
DUTERTE, SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY SEN.
VICENTE SOTTO III, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN
PETER CAYETANO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, AS CHAIRMAN OF
THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252768]
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
AND ACTION (GABRIELA) INC., GERTRUDES R. LIBANG, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR,
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, MARIVIC V. GERODIAS, LOVELY V.
RAMOS, LEONORA O. CALUBAQUIB, MONICA ANNE E. WILSON, SILAHIS M. TEBIA,
PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA; SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT VICENTE C. SOTTO III; AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.
[UDK No. 16663]
LAWRENCE A. YERBO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICES OF THE HONORABLE SENATE
PRESIDENT AND HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252802]
HENDY ABENDAN OF CENTER FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVES, CALVIN DHAME LAGAHIT OF CEBU NORMAL UNIVERSITY - STUDENT
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CHRISTIAN LOUIE ILUSTRISIMO OF CEBU NORMAL UNIVERSITY -
STUDENTS REPUBLIC PARTY, BENNA LYN RIZON OF CEBU NORMAL UNIVERSITY -
REFORMATIVE LEADERS (RELEAD) PARTY, LYRNIE REGIDOR OF UP CEBU - UNION OF
PROGRESSIVE STUDENTS, HANNSON KENT J. NAMOC OF UP CEBU - NAGKAHIUSANG
KUSOG SA ESTUDYANTE, GILBERT G. APURA, JR. OF UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS -
STUDENT POWER PARTY, DAVID C. SUICO OF UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS - STUDENT
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, AND MARY THERESE T. MAURIN OF
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU LAW STUDENT SOCIETY, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL; ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL NAMELY:
HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER; HON. TEODORO LOCSIN,
JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. EDUARDO AÑO, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT; HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, SECRETARY OF FINANCE; HON. MENARDO
GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; HON. GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, SECRETARY OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY; AND HON. MEL GEORGIE B.
RACELA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC)
SECRETARIAT, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252809]
CONCERNED ONLINE CITIZENS REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY MARK L. AVERILLA,
NOELLE THERESA E. CAPILI, ROBBY DERRICK S. CHAM, VICTOR LOUIS E. CRISOSTOMO,
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ, MARITA Q. DINGLASAN, THYSSEN C. ESTRADA, MARK ANGELO
C. GERONIMO, BALBINO PADA GUERRERO JR., JOVER N. LAURIO, JOHN CARLO T.
MERCADO, RAYMOND DE VERA PALATINO, LEAN REDINO P. PORQUIA, MARCEL DAR
STEFAN T. PUNONGBAYAN, ALBERT LOUIS R. RAQUEÑO, OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO,
JULIUS D. ROCAS, JUAN MIGUEL R. SEVERO, MA. GIA GRACE B. SISON, PETITIONERS,
VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
CHIEF ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., SECRETARY
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III,
SECRETARY OF INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO HONASAN
II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252903]
CONCERNED LAWYERS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (CLCL) MEMBERS RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
PACIFICO A. AGABIN, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, EDRE U. OLALIA, ANNA MARIA D. ABAD,
ANACLETO REI A. LACANILAO III, J. V. BAUTISTA, ROSE-LIZA EISMA-OSORIO, EMMANUEL
R. JABLA, PETITIONERS, VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT VICENTE SOTTO III, AND THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
HOUSE SPEAKER ALAN PETER CAYETANO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252904]
BEVERLY LONGID, SAMIRA GUTOC, JOANNA K. CARIÑO, AMIRAH ALI LIDASAN, NORA P.
SUKAL, ABDUL HAMIDULLAH ATAR, JUMORING BANDILAN GUAYNON, FRANCISCA
TOLENTINO, WINDEL B. BOLINGET, DRIEZA A. LININDING, TERESA DE LA CRUZ, LORENA
BAY-AO, CHAD ERROL BOOC, JEANY ROSE L. HAYAHAY, AND JUDITH PAMELA A. PASIMIO,
PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., DELFIN N. LORENZANA, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, EDUARDO M. AÑO,
TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, MEL
GEORGIE B. RACELA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252905]
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (CENTERLAW), INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, JOEL R. BUTUYAN, WHO IS ALSO SUING IN HIS OWN BEHALF; AND
MEMBERS ROGER R. RAYEL, GILBERT T. ANDRES, CRISPIN FRANCIS M. JANDUSAY,
KIMBERLY ANNE M. LORENZO, GELIE ERIKA P. ESTEBAN, ELREEN JOY O. DE GUZMAN,
NICOLENE S. ARCAINA, AND SHAWN DUSTIN B. COSCOLUELLA;
FOUNDATION FOR MEDIA ALTERNATIVES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, LIZA GARCIA; DEMOCRACY.NET.PH, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS TRUSTEE,
CARLOS ADRIAN A. NAZARENO; VERA FILES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
ELLEN T. TORDESILLAS, WHO IS ALSO SUING IN HER OWN BEHALF, AND ITS
JOURNALISTS MEEKO ANGELA R. CAMBA, ANTHONY L. CUAYCONG, REIVEN C.
PASCASIO, MERINETTE A. RETONA, ROSALIA C. REVALDO, ELIJAH J. RODEROS, CELINE
ISABELLE B. SAMSON, IVEL JOHN M. SANTOS, AND ESTRELITA C. VALDERAMA; AND
PROFESSORS OF THE LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW,
NAMELY, DEAN MA. SOLEDAD DERIQUITO-MAWIS, PROFESSOR CARLO L. CRUZ,
PROFESSOR MARILYN P. CACHO-DOMINGO, PROFESSOR SENEN AGUSTIN S. DE
SANTOS, PROFESSOR MARLA A. BARCENILLA, PROFESSOR ROMEL REGALADO
BAGARES, PROFESSOR JUAN CARLOS T. CUNA, AND PROFESSOR JOHN PAUL ALZATE
DELA PASION PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES; ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL; EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY AS REPRESENTED BY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL AS REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ATTY. MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA;
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA;
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AS REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY
WENDEL E. AVISADO; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AS REPRESENTED BY GENERAL
ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA; ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AS
REPRESENTED BY LIEUTENANT GILBERT CAPAY, AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AS REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR ERIC BITO-ON DISTOR, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252916]
MAIN T. MOHAMMAD, JIMMY P. BLA, NAZR S. DILANGALEN, PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES (PAHRA) (REPRESENTED BY ROSEMARIE R. TRAJANO),
RUPERT AXEL M. CRUZ, MARIA PATRICIA CERVANTES-POCO, LEO ANGELO R.
AÑONUEVO, TAKAHIRO KENJIE C. AMAN AND MUHAMMAD MUKTADIR A. ESTRELLA,
PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA,
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGIE
B. RACELA, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS COMPONENT HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252921]
BRGY. MAGLAKING, SAN CARLOS CITY, PANGASINAN SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN (SK)
CHAIRPERSON LEMUEL GIO FERNANDEZ CAYABYAB; BRGY. TALAMBAN, CEBU CITY SK
COUNCILOR JOAHANNA MONTA VELOSO; BRGY. TALAYAN, QUEZON CITY SK COUNCILOR
NESTIE BRYAL COSIPAG VILLAVIRAY; BRGY. DOLORES, TAYTAY, RIZAL SK COUNCILOR
FRANCHESCA IL CAMONIAS PERSIA; BRGY. MALHACAN, MEYCAUAYAN CITY, BULACAN
SK COUNCILOR JELLY BEAN AIRAN SANGUIR SANTIAGO; BRGY. MAYBUNGA, PASIG CITY
SK CHAIRPERSON PATRICIA MAE ANGELES TORRES; BRGY. SAN JOAQUIN, PASIG CITY
SK CHAIRPERSON JAMES PAUL T. JOYNER; BRGY. ORANBO, PASIG CITY SK
CHAIRPERSON PAULO D. TUMLOS; BRGY. KAPITOLYO, PASIG CITY SK CHAIRPERSON
ALEXIS RAFAEL M. TORRES; BRGY. POBLACION ILAWOD, LAMBUNAO, ILOILO SK
CHAIRPERSON LOVELYN Q. LOSARIA; SK FEDERATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
LEGANES, ILOILO PRESIDENT ILOILO NIEL JOSHUA J. RAYMUNDO; PASIG CITY LOCAL
YOUTH DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON IRISH E.
TAGLE; ALYANSA NG KABATAANG PASIGUEÑO REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN LOUISE S.
TUNGOL; KILOS PASIG AND JOVITO R. SALONGA (JRS) POLICY STUDIES MEMBERS RAM
ALAN CRUZ; ELEAZAR SALONGA; MARGARITA SALONGA SALANDANAN, ROBERT JOHN
OCAMPO ROBAS; EDISON LATI; MARIA ANTHEA BALUTA, AND ADRIAN SOMIDO,
PETITIONERS, VS. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRPERSON OF
THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL; EDUARDO M. AÑO, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT; DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND
MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 252984]
ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS IN THE PHILIPPINES (REPRESENTED BY
ITS CO-CHAIRPERSONS, FR. CIELITO R. ALMAZAN OFM AND SR. MARILYN A. JAVA RC
AND ITS CO-EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES, FR. ANGELITO A. CORTEZ, OFM AND SR. CRISVIE
T. MONTECILLO, DSA), RAFAEL VICENTE R. CALINISAN, NOEL R. DEL PRADO AND ADRIAN
N. VIVAS, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR., DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN N. LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY EDUARDO M. AÑO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY MENARDO I. GUEVARRA,
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GREGORIO B.
HONASAN II, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MEL GEORGE
B. RACELA, ALL MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL FILEMON SANTOS, JR. AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF GENERAL ARCHIE FRANCISCO F. GAMBOA, RESPONDENTS, X X
[G.R. No. 253018]
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (UP) SYSTEM FACULTY REGENT DR. RAMON
GUILLERMO, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER, EDUCATION INTERNATIONAL AND ALLIANCE
OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT)-PHILIPPINES SECRETARY-GENERAL RAYMOND
BASILIO, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU)-MANILA PROFESSOR AND ACT PRIVATE
SCHOOLS PRESIDENT DR. ROW ELL MADULA, UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST)
FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL PRESIDENT AND ACT-PRIVATE
SCHOOLS SECRETARY-GENERAL JONATHAN V. GERONIMO, UP-DILIMAN DIRECTOR OF
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND CONGRESS OF TEACHERS AND EDUCATORS
FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY-UP (CONTEND-UP) CHAIRPERSON DR. GERRY
LANUZA, ACT-NCR UNION TREASURER ANNARIZA C. ALZATE, ACT-NCR UNION
SECRETARY AND QUEZON CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (QCPSTA)
VICE-PRESIDENT RUBY ANA BERNARDO, QCPSTA PRESIDENT AND ACT-NCR UNION
REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBER KRISTHEAN A. NAVALES, ACT-NCR UNION CALOOCAN
CHAPTER PRESIDENT AND ACT-NCR UNION REGIONAL COUNCIL MEMBER GRACE
EDORA, FORMER DIRECTOR AT KOMISYON SA WIKANG FILIPINO (KWF) DR. AURORA
BATNAG, UP-DILIMAN VICE CHANCELLOR FOR COMMUNITY AFFAIRS DR. ALELI
BAWAGAN, ALL UP ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES UNION NATIONAL PRESIDENT AND UP ASST.
PROF. CARL MARC RAMOTA, UP-DILIMAN COLLEGE OF SCIENCE DEAN DR. GIOVANNI A.
TAPANG, POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP)-MANILA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY DEAN PROF. RAMIR M. CRUZ, ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY (ADMU)
FULL PROFESSOR AND TANGGOL KASAYSAYAN LEAD CONVENER DR. FRANCIS
GEALOGO, DLSU-MANILA PROFESSOR AND TANGGOL WIKA LEAD CONVENER DR. DAVID
MICHAEL SAN JUAN, UP-DILIMAN ACTING DIRECTOR OF CAMPUS MAINTENANCE OFFICE
MS. PERLITA C. RANA, ALL UP ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES UNION BOARD MEMBER DR.
MELANIA FLORES, PUP-MANILA CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES CHIEF PROF.
PAULO BENEDICTO C. VILLAR, UST SIMBAHAYAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
DIRECTOR DR. ARVIN EBALLO, UST SIMBAHAYAN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR PROF. FROILAN
ALIPAO, PUP-MANILA DEPARTMENT OF COOPERATIVES AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRPERSON DR. HILDA F. SAN GABRIEL, PUP-MANILA DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH CHAIRPERSON KRUPSKAYA T. VALILA, PUP-MANILA
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY CHAIRPERSON LOUIE C. MONTEMAR, UP-DILIMAN
DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO AT PANITIKAN NG PILIPINAS CHAIRPERSON DR. VLADIMEIR
GONZALES, DLSU-MANILA DEPARTAMENTO NG FILIPINO CHAIRPERSON DR. RHODERICK
NUNCIO, DLSU-MANILA PROFESSORS DR. RAQUEL SISON-BUBAN, DR. ERNESTO V.
CARANDANG II, DR. DOLORES TAYLAN, PROF. RAMILITO CORREA, DR. MARIA LUCILLE
ROXAS, MON KARLO MANGARAN, DEBORRAH ANASTACIO, JECONIAH DREISBACH, BILLY
DE GUZMAN, AND ROMAN GALLEGO, DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE OF MAKATI
TEACHER ERSELA CARILLO, PHILIPPINE NORMAL UNIVERSITY (PNU)-MANILA
PROFESSOR DR. JOEL COSTA MALABANAN, UNIVERSITY OF MAKATI PROFESSOR KEVIN
PAUL D. MARTIJA, PUP-MANILA PROFESSORS PATRICIA CAMILLE VILLA, EMY RUTH
GIANAN, MARVIN LOBOS AND SONNY M. VERSOZA, COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
PROFESSOR LYRRA I. MAGTALAS, ADMU PROFESSORS DR. GARY DEVILLES, DR.
VINCENZ SERRANO AND MARK BENEDICT LIM, ADMU TEACHER ELLA MARA MELANIE
DONAIRE, UP-DILIMAN PROFESSORS SHARON ANNE PANGILINAN, DR. ROMMEL
RODRIGUEZ, AND DR. GRACE CONCEPCION, ASST. PROF. CLOD MARLAN KRISTER V.
YAMBAO, ASST. PROF. LOUISE JHASHIL SONIDO, AND PROF. SOFIA G. GUILLERMO, UP-
MANILA PROFESSOR REGINALD VALLEJOS, BULACAN STATE UNIVERSITY (BULSU)
PROFESSORS MARY DEANE DC CAMUA, MARICRISTH T. MAGALING, JAIME V.
VILLAFUERTE, ISRAEL DC SAGUINSIN, JENNIFER DELFIN, JENINA S. REYES, KEANU
HAROLD G. REYES, BOIE L. LOPEZ, JEVINSON B. FERNANDEZ, JUSTINE G. MENESES,
ANGELO O. SANTOS, REGGIE REY C. FAJARDO, EDUCATORS MARIEL S. QUIOGUE AND
DANIM R. MAJERANO, UST-MANILA INSTRUCTORS/ PROFESSORS/TEACHERS ADRIAN
ROMERO, LEONARDO GUEVARRA, JR., JOHN CHRISTIAN VALEROSO, AND DR.
CHUCKBERRY PASCUAL, PETITIONERS, VS. H.E. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALAN PETER CAYETANO
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253100]
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, AS MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, ARMED FORCES OP THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL GILBERT GAPAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE CHIEF GENERAL CAM1LO PANCRATIUS PASCUA CASCOLAN, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253118]
BALAY REHABILITATION CENTER, INC. (BALAY), CHILDREN'S LEGAL RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. (CLRDC), COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN-
ASIA PACIFIC (CATW-AP), DR. BENITO MOLINO, MEDICAL ACTION GROUP (MAG), TASK
FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES (TFDP), GREGORIO V. BITUIN, JR., FAMILIES OF
VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND), PETITIONERS, VS. RODRIGO ROA
DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY & CHAIRPERSON
OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253124]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, IBP NATIONAL PRESIDENT DOMINGO EGON Q.
CAYOSA AND IBP GOVERNORS BURT M. ESTRADA, DOROTEO LORENZO B. AGUILA,
BABY RUTH F. TORRE, ELEAZAR S. CALASAN, ERIC C. ALAJAR, GIL G. TAWAY IV, GINA H.
MIRANO-JESENA, JAMES JAYSON J. JORVINA, AND CHRISTY JOY S. SOLLESTA,
PETITIONERS, VS. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL COMPOSED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SECRETARIAT AS MEMBERS, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. GILBERT GAPAY, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, REPRESENTED BY LT. GEN. CAMILO CASCOLAN, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253242]
COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR PEOPLE'S DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE, INC,
(CPDG) REPRESENTED BY VICE PRESIDENT ROCHELLE M. PORRAS; KALIKASAN
PEOPLE'S NETWORK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (KPNE) REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL
COORDINATOR JOSE LEON A. DULCE; CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS-
PHILIPPINES (CEC) REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR LIA MAI T. ALONZO;
CLIMATE CHANGE NETWORK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES, INC. (CCNCI)
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR KARLENMA M. MENDOZA; UNYON NG
MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA (UMA) REPRESENTED BY CHAIRPERSON ANTONIO L.
FLORES; MACSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO PARA SA PAGUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG)
REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL COORDINATOR CRISTINO C. PANERIO; PHILIPPINE
NETWORK OF FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMMES, INC. (PNFSP) REPRESENTED BY
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE BEVERLY P. MANGO; CHILDREN'S REHABILITATION CENTER (CRC)
REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR NIKKI P. ASERIOS; IBON FOUNDATION, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA; SAMAHAN AT
UGNAYAN NG MGA KONSYUMERS PARA SA IKAUUNLAD NG BAYAN (SUKI) REPRESENTED
BY CONVENOR ROLANDO D. CALIMLIM; AND EUFEMIA P. DORINGO, PETITIONERS, VS.
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC),
VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ALAN PETER CAYETANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253252]
PHILIPPINE MISEREOR PARTNERSHIP, INC., REPRESENTED BY YOLANDA R. ESGUERRA;
CAUCUS OF DEVELOPMENT NGO NETWORKS, INC., REPRESENTED BY SANDINO
SOLIMAN; CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES-CARITAS FILIPINAS
FOUNDATION INC., REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO JR. E. LABIAO; AND DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION NETWORK PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SUSANA M. BALINGIT,
PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE MEMBERS OF
THE ANTI- TERRORISM COUNCIL: HERMOGENES C. ESPERON JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DELFIN N. LORENZANA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, EDUARDO M. AÑO IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, AND MEL
GEORGIE B. RACELA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253254]
PAGKAKAISA NG KABABAIHAN PARA SA KALAYAAN (KAISA KA), ACTION AND SOLIDARITY
FOR THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN (ASSERT-WOMEN), DAP-AYAN TI BABBAI, KAISA KA
YOUTH, PAGKAKAISA NG MGA SAMAHAN NG MANGINGISDA (PANGISDA-WOMEN),
ORIANG, PAMBANSANG KONGRESO NG KABABAIHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKKK), SARILAYA,
WORKERS FOR PEOPLE'S LIBERATION - WOMEN, WOMEN'S LEGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
BUREAU (WLB), THE YOUNG WOMEN INITIATIVES (YOUWIN), LUALHATI BAUTISTA, CAITLIN
LOUISE M. CASEÑAS, NIZA CONCEPCION, PRECY D. DAGOOC, CORAZON V. FABROS,
MYLEN F. GOYAL, PROF. MARIA LAYA T. LARA, CLAIRE DE LUNE LOPEZ, MARIA JOCELYN
KARA MAGSANOC, AIDA SANTOS MARANAN, DR. JUNICE LIRZA D. MERGAL, ANA MARIA
NEMENZO, ATTY. CLARA RITA PADILLA, TERESITA ANG SEE, ROSEMARIE D. TRAJANO AND
RHODA URIZAR VIAJAR, PETITIONERS, VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR. TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., EDUARDO M.
AÑO, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ III, MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II,
AND MEL GEORGIE B. RACELA, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR
CONTROL, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTIONS, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 254191 (FORMERLY UDK No. 16714)]
ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE AMIHILDA SANGCOPAN; DEPUTY
SPEAKER MUJIV S. HATAMAN; ATTY'S. SATRINA MOHAMMAD, JAMAR M. KULAYAN
ALMAN-NAJAR L. NAMLA AND BENSAUD O. DEGUSMAN; RAMEER TAWASIL; AND SHEIKH
JAMSIRI T. JAINAL, PETITIONERS, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA; NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, RET. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON JR.;
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. TEODORO L. LOCSIN JR.;
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GEN. DELFIN N. LORENZANA;
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RET. GEN.
EDUARDO AÑO; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ III; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. MENARDO I.
GUEVARRA; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY, HON. GREGORIO HONASAN; THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC); THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING
AGENCY (NICA); SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT VICENTE C. SOTTO III; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, THEIR AGENTS AND ALL
PERSONS ACTING IN THEIR BEHALF, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 253420]
HAROUN ALRASHID ALONTO LUCMAN, JR., JAYVEE S. APIAG, TYRONE A. VELEZ,
LEONARDO VICENTE B. CORRALES, MARIO MAXIMO J. SOLIS AND SALUGPONGAN TA'
TANU IGKANOGON COMMUNITY LEARNING CENTER, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. EUGENIA VICTORIA M. NOLASCO, PETITIONERS, VS.
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH VICENTE SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH ALAN PETER CAYETANO IN HIS
CAPACITY AS HOUSE SPEAKER, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
Before this Court are 37 separate Petitions for Certiorari and/or Prohibition led under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court (Rules), all assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11479
or the "Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020" (ATA).
A Brief Discussion on the History of Terrorism
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; but clue to the lack of a well-accepted de nition, even
scholars have encountered di culty in pinpointing its exact origin.1 One of the earliest
examples is that of the Jewish Zealots known as the Sicari - a group active during the Roman
occupation of the Middle East during the rst century.2 The Sicari would use short daggers to
murder Romans and Greeks in broad daylight and in front of witnesses to send a message to
the Roman authorities and the Jews who have pledged their allegiance to them.3 From 1090 to
1279, the Hashshashin (The Order of Assassins) killed Persians, Turks, and Syrians in the name
of spreading pure Islam.4
The the term "terrorism" emerged from the French Revolution's period of terror known as
the regime de la terreur.5 During this period, the new government performed a series of
massacres and public executions6 to intimidate counterrevolutionaries and everyone whom it
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 considered as its enemies.7 In other words, terrorism was then viewed as a positive and
necessary response to the threats faced by the state.8
By the 19th century, the general meaning of the term was closer to its contemporary
understanding — subversive and illegal activities of the opponents of the ruling class
performed in an attempt to change the order.9 In 1878, the Narodnaya Volya ("People's Will" or
"People's Freedom") was organized for the deliberate and methodical killing of selected
victims, most of whom were high-ranking Russian government o cials, culminating in the
assassination of Tsar Alexander II, more commonly known as Alexander the Liberator.10
In the 20th century, violence was the motivating factor for many contemporary acts of terrorism
which added new methods brought about by the technological and social developments of the
time.11 The 1930's also introduced a wave of political assassinations which led the League of
Nations to prevent and punish terrorism and to establish an international criminal court.12
Fast-forward to the 21st century, terrorism is now associated with a plethora of acts which may
be categorized according to the methods and means used, the goals pursued, and the actors
behind them.13 On September 11, 2001, militants associated with the Islamic extremist group
Al-Qaeda committed a series of hijackings which resulted to the death of almost 3,000 people,
injuries to several hundred thousands of people, and billions of dollars in damage.14 This
incident, more commonly known as "9/11", gave rise to a cohesive global response to intensify
the ght against terrorism.15 However, despite several bombings,16 sieges,17 and
massacres18 worldwide, billions worth of damage in infrastructure, and the immeasurable fear
instilled in the hearts of innocent people, there is still no single de nition of terrorism which all
states agree to.
According to scholarly literature, however, four distinctive characteristics are attributed to
contemporary terrorism:
First and foremost, terrorism is violence (or its threat) for political e ect. Second, terrorism is a
planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act. Third, terrorists are not bound by established
rule of warfare or codes of conduct, and fourth, terrorism is designed to have far-reaching
psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target or victim.19 (Citations omitted)
Even if states and experts cannot agree on the de nition of terrorism, one thing is clear: "in the
modem world, terrorism is considered the most prevalent and the most dangerous form of
endangering the security of both national states and the citizens thereof."20
Terrorism in the Philippines
Filipinos are no strangers to acts of terrorism. According to the Global Terrorism Index of 2020,
there have been more than 7,000 deaths due to terrorism in the Asia-Paci c region from 2002
to 2019, and over 3,000 of these have occurred in the country.21 Some of these incidents
include:22
Event/Location
Year
Killed
Wounded
Rizal Day Bombings
2000
22
100-
General Santos City
2002
13
60-
Zamboanga City
2002
23
100-
Davao International Airport
2003
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143
Koronadal City
2003
10-
42-
General Santos City
2004
14+
70-
SuperFerry 14 bombing
2004
116-
-
Valentine's Day Bombings in Davao, Makati, and General Santos
2005
8-
147-
Mindanao Bombings
2009
13
91
Basilan Raid
2010
0
26
Davao Night Market Bombing
2016
14
60-
Jolo Cathedral Bombing
2019
23-
109
In 2017, pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants forcibly took over Marawi City
and displaced 98 percent of the city's total population and residents from nearby areas.23 It
was considered the most violent urban terrorist attack in the Philippines' recent history.24
Local extremist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,
and the Jemaah Islamiyah have claimed responsibility for the terrorist acts.25 Alarmingly,
foreign terrorist groups have also made their presence felt in the country. The ISIS has
conducted terrorist operations through several local groups such as the Maute group, the ASG,
and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement.26 The Philippines has also been a constant
destination for foreign terrorist ghters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa.27
As a response to the growing problem of terrorism, R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the
"Human Security Act of 2007" (HSA), was enacted, on February 8, 2007. However, despite its
passage, the prevalence of terrorism in the country not only persisted but even escalated.
On June 18, 2012, R.A. No. 10168 or the "Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act
of 2012" was signed into law. it was passed pursuant to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution No. 137328 and other binding terrorism-related resolutions of the UNSC
issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In UNSC No. 1373, member states have agreed to
undertake several measures to combat terrorism which include inter alia the following:
(a) Prevent and suppress the nancing of terrorist acts;
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 (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by
their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other nancial assets or economic resources of persons
who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission
of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities,
including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
such persons and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any
funds, nancial assets or economic resources or nancial or other related services available,
directly or indirectly, for the bene t of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or
participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of
such persons[.]29
As with the HSA, R.A. No. 10168 did little to curb incidences of terrorism. The Court notes that
out of almost 200 countries surveyed in the 2020 Global Terrorism Index, the Philippines
ranked 10th worldwide, and remains to be the only country in Southeast Asia to be a part of
the top 10.30
Even the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic was not enough to prevent the commission of
these heinous acts.1a⍵⍴h!1 In August 2020, suicide bombers attacked Jolo, Sulu.31 This
resulted to the death of at least 14 people and the wounding of 75 others.32
Legislative History and Underpinnings of the ATA
On August 13, 2019, the Senate Committees on National Defense and Security, Peace,
Uni cation and Reconciliation, and Finance jointly conducted a hearing on Senate Bill (SB)
Nos. 6, 21, and 640, all of which sought to amend certain provisions of the HSA. On
September 30, 2019, the Senate Committees jointly submitted Committee Report No. 9,
recommending the approval of SB No. 1083 to substitute SB Nos. 6, 21, and 630.
SB No. 1083 was sponsored at the plenary in the Senate on October 2 and November 5, 2019.
This was deliberated upon on the oor on December 17, 2019, January 21, 2020, and January
27, 2020. After amendments, on February 26, 2020, the Senate approved on third and nal
reading SB No. 1083 entitled "An Act to Prevent, Prohibit, and Penalize Terrorism, thereby
Repealing Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the 'Human Security Act of 2007.'"33
On May 29, 2020, the Committees on Public Order and Safety and on National Defense and
Security adopted the Senate version of the bill as an amendment to House Bill (HB) No. 6875,
entitled "An Act to Prevent, Prohibit, and Penalize Terrorism, thereby Repealing Republic Act
No. 9372 Otherwise Known as the 'Human Security Act of 2007.'" On May 30, 2020, the House
Committees jointly submitted Committee Report No. 340 to the House of Representatives,
recommending the approval, without amendment, of HB No. 6875.34
In a letter dated June 1, 2020, President Rodrigo R. Duterte certi ed the necessity for the
immediate enactment of HB No. 6875 "to address the urgent need to strengthen the law on
anti-terrorism and e ectively contain the menace of terrorist acts for the preservation of
national security and the promotion of general welfare."35
On June 2, 2020, HB No. 6875 was sponsored at the plenary for approval on second reading.
On the same evening, the plenary approved HB No. 6875 on second reading with no
amendments accepted.36
Thereafter, on June 3, 2020, HB No. 687537 passed the third reading with the House voting
173-31 with 29 abstentions.38 The nal tally of votes was changed the next day to 168-36, in
order to re ect the corrections and retractions of several members.39
On June 9, 2020, the enrolled bill signed by then Speaker of the House Alan Peter Cayetano
and Senate President Vicente Sotto III was transmitted to the O ce of the President for the
President's signature. Consequently, on July 3, 2020, President Duterte signed R.A. No. 11479,
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 otherwise known as the ATA. The legislation was published in the Manila Bulletin and the
O cial Gazette on July 6, 2020, and took e ect on July 22, 2020.
According to the ATA's principal author, Senator Pan lo Lacson, only one person has been
convicted and only one group has been outlawed under the HSA due to the several di culties
in implementing this law.40 The requirement of a predicate crime and the imposition of the
P500,000.00 penalty per day of detention without a warrant, in case of the acquittal of the
accused, are only some of the hurdles which law enforcement agencies have faced.41
The shortcomings of the HSA, along with other laws on money laundering, have also been
noted by international bodies. One of these bodies is the Asia/Paci c Group (APG) on Money
Laundering, an inter-governmental organization composed of 41 member jurisdictions in the
Asia-Paci c region, including other groups and observers from outside the region.42 The
Philippines is one of its founding members.43
The APG is a "non-political and technical body committed to the e ective implementation and
enforcement of the internationally accepted standards against money laundering, nancing of
terrorism and proliferation nancing set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)."44 Its
members undergo a regular mutual evaluation mechanism which culminates in a report
containing the suggested measures which must be undertaken to ght money laundering and
its related activities such as terrorism, drug tra cking, and kidnapping.45
In its 2019 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), the APG noted that the Philippines had several
de ciencies in relation to the FATF standards. These will be discussed in detail below. These
de ciencies cannot simply be disregarded, because non-compliance with the FATF
recommendations result to negative e ects, the most signi cant of which are severe
regulations such as discouragement of foreign investment and trading from compliant
countries and international organizations.46
Current Developments Relative to the 37 Petitions
As aforementioned, 37 separate Petitions for Certiorari and/or Prohibition have been led
before this Court to challenge the ATA and prevent its implementation.
Petitioners primarily assail the validity of Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA due to their perceived
facial vagueness and overbreadth that purportedly repress protected speech.47 It is argued
further that the unconstitutionality of the de nition of terrorism and its variants will leave it with
"nothing to sustain its existence."48
Petitioners who initiated the now consolidated challenges on the constitutionality of the ATA
come from di erent sectors of society. Petitioners in the consolidated challenges include inter
alia members of party-lists,49 former and incumbent members of Congress,50 members of
socio-civic and non-governmental organizations,51 members of Indigenous Peoples' (IPs)
groups, Moros,52 journalists,53 taxpayers, registered voters, members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, students, and members of the academe.54
Some of the petitioners in G.R. No. 252904 (Longid v. Anti-Terrorism Council) include members
of organizations critical of the government and are impleaded in the petition for proscription
which the Department of Justice (DOJ) led in 2018 pursuant to Section 17 of the HSA
docketed as R-MNL-18-00925-CV (Department of Justice v. The Communist Party of the
Philippines and the New People's Army a.La Bagong Hukbong Bayan) now pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.55
Apart from the members of the academe and human rights lawyers who are petitioners in G.R.
No. 252736 (Carpio. v. Anti-Terrorism Council), two former members of this Court also initiated
this petition, former Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Carpio) and former Associate
Justice and Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Carpio-Morales).
To demonstrate petitioners' standing and how the enactment of the ATA personally a ects
them, they argue that petitioner Carpio's impassioned activism and criticism on the perceived
inability of the Duterte administration to defend the rights of the Philippines over the West
Philippine Sea dispute may expose him to prosecution for Inciting to Commit Terrorism under
Section 9. They also claim that petitioner Carpio's words may be misconstrued under Section
4(c) as "extensive interference" with "critical infrastructure" intended to provoke or in uence
the government to take a particular action.56 They also brought to the attention of the Court a
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 now deleted Facebook post of presidential son and House of Representative member Paolo
Duterte wherein he accused petitioner Carpio of being one of the personalities behind a
destabilization plot.57
It is also averred that petitioner Carpio-Morales is exposed to the risk of being prosecuted
under Section 4(c) of the ATA after she initiated a complaint with the International Criminal
Court (ICC) against People's Republic of China (PROC) President Xi Jinping that may severely
damage diplomatic relations between the Philippines and PROC. In a statement, President
Duterte branded petitioner Carpio-Morales a "spokesman of the criminals."58
Petitioners point out that the advocacy e orts of petitioners Carpio and Carpio-Morales have
earned the ire of President Duterte who blamed them of any violence that may erupt as a result
of the rising tension in Palawan. National Security Adviser (NSA) Hermogenes Esperon
(Esperon) also described petitioner Carpio as a warmonger over the West Philippine Sea
dispute.59
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 252767 (Pabillo v. Duterte), petitioners comprise of o cials of various
religious and church groups including petitioner Rey Claro Cera Casambre (Casambre), who is
one of the individuals named in the petition for proscription the DOJ initiated in the RTC of
Manila.60
Another petitioner, the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP) alleges that on December
26, 2019, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) caused the freezing of ve bank
accounts belonging to RMP - Northern Mindanao Sub-Region in Cagayan de Oro City, and
RMP in Metro Manila for allegedly being connected to terrorism nancing under R.A. No.
10168.61 Petitioner RMP also claims that it had been described as Communist Party of the
Philippines and the New People's Army (CPP/NPA) fronts, recruiters, and has been accused of
providing material support to the CPP/NPA on various instances by o cials of the
government.62
Petitioner Sisters' Association in Mindanao (SAMIN) also asserts that its members experienced
harassment due to their critical stand against the militarization of Moro and Lumad
communities. Sr. Emma Cupin, MSM, a member of petitioner SAMIN is now allegedly facing
trumped-up charges of robbery-arson and perjury. She was allegedly charged with robbery-
arson based on a complaint the military led in relation to a purported NPA attack on a military
detachment. Meanwhile, the perjury case was supposedly initiated by NSA Esperon after RMP
and other organizations led a petition for Writ of Amparo to seek protection from the
purported red-tagging, harassments, and other attacks on their members.63
It is also claimed that the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) faces credible
threat of prosecution due to its support for the rights of IPs, particularly, the Lumads. After the
arrival of Lumad evacuees in UCCP Haran, arsonists have allegedly set the tents and the
dormitories of the evacuees on re. Anti-riot police were brought to force evacuees to return to
their communities, and the paramilitary group "Almara" has allegedly threatened them with
violence.64
On various occasions, the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Con ict has
allegedly identi ed some of the religious or church groups, who are petitioners in this case, as
established by the CPP/NPA in its social media accounts or during the interviews of its
o cials.65 Petitioners suggest that the foregoing instances demonstrate the credible threat of
prosecution they face under the ATA.66
Petitioner General Assembly of Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action,
Inc. (GABRIELA), its o cers, members, and supporters also aver that they have been targets of
human rights violations perpetrated by state forces and are constant targets of red-baiting and
red-tagging. Trumped-up charges have allegedly been led against several members and
o cers due to their a liation to the organization.67
Petitioners who are members of the academe also maintain that the ATA will have a destructive
chilling e ect on academic freedom, an aspect of freedom of expression. According to them,
their free thoughts and ideas in open debates and academic discussions on various issues
about the government and society will expose them to potential prosecution under the ATA.68
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 In August 2020, the DOJ commenced the crafting of the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 11479. The DOJ approved and released the IRR on October 14, 2020.69
On September 23, 2020, respondent Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) issued Resolution No.
1070 automatically adopting the list of designated terrorists by the UNSC as well as directing
the concerned agencies to impose and implement the relevant sanctions measures without
delay, from the time of designation made by the UNSC and its relevant Sanctions
Committee.71 In accordance with Section 36 of the ATA, respondent AMLC was also "directed
to issue an ex parte order to freeze without delay any funds and other assets that are owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, including funds and assets derived or generated therefrom, by
the designated individuals, groups, undertakings, entities included in the aforementioned UN
Consolidated List."
On December 9, 2020, the ATC issued Resolution Nos. 1272 and 1373 designating as terrorists
the CPP/NPA, and 16 organizations associated with the Islamic State and "other Daesh-
a liated groups in the Philippines."74 Following the issuance of these resolutions, the AMLC
issued Sanctions Freeze Orders against the CPP/NPA75 and the Daesh-a liated groups.76
On February 24, 2021, the ATC issued Resolution No. 1677 wherein 10 individuals were
designated as terrorists for their alleged membership in extremist groups designated under
ATC Resolution No. 13 "based on veri ed and validated information obtained and consolidated
by the National Intelligence Commiitee"(NICA).78
On April 21, 2021, the ATC issued Resolution No. 1779 designating 19 individuals as terrorists
due to their alleged ties with the CPP/NPA. Among the individuals designated in said resolution
is petitioner Casambre.80
Incidentally, two Aetas, Jasper Gurung and Junior Ramos, were arrested in August 2020. They
were the rst individuals to be charged for violating Section 4 of the ATA after allegedly ring at
the military which led to the death of one soldier in Crim. Case Nos. 2021-1284 to 1288. In an
Order81 dated July 15, 2021, the RTC of Olongapo granted the Demurrer to Evidence of the
accused and ordered the dismissal of the charges on the ground of insu ciency of
evidence.82
Issues
The following are the issues identi ed by the Court in its Revised Advisory dated January 5,
2021 based on a cursory reading of the petitions:
A. Preliminary issues
1. Whether petitioners have legal standing to sue;
2. Whether the issues raised in the petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy;
3. Whether petitioners' direct resort to the Supreme Court is proper;
4. Whether facial challenge is proper; and
5. Whether R.A. No. 11479 should already be declared unconstitutional in its entirety if the
Court nds that the de nition of terrorism and the powers of the ATC are constitutionally in rm.
B. Substantive issues
1. Whether Section 4 de ning and penalizing the crime of "terrorism" is void for vagueness or
overbroad in violation of the constitutional right to due process, free speech and expression, to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation, and non-detention solely by reason of
political beliefs.
2. Whether Sections 5 to 14 de ning and penalizing threats to commit terrorism, planning,
training, preparing, and facilitating terrorism, conspiracy, proposal, inciting to terrorism,
material support, and other related provisions, are:
a. void for vagueness or overbroad in violation of the above-stated constitutional rights, as well
as the freedom of religion, association, non-detention solely based on political beliefs, and
academic freedom; and
b. violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.
3. Whether the uniform penalties for all punishable acts under Sections 4 to 14 violate the
constitutional proscription against the imposition of cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment;
4. Whether surveillance under Section 16 violates the constitutional rights to due process,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy of communication and
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 correspondence, to freedom of speech and expression, to freedom of religion, and the
accused's right to be presumed innocent;
5. Whether judicial authorization to conduct surveillance under Section 17 violates the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and forecloses the remedies
under the rules on amparo and habeas data;
6. Whether the following powers of the ATC are unconstitutional:
a. power to designate terrorist individuals, groups and organizations under Section 25 for:
i. encroaching upon judicial power and the Supreme Court's rule-making power;
ii. in icting punishment ex post facto based on the adoption of the UNSC Consolidated List of
designated terrorists, and other requests for designation by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions; and
iii. violating due process and constitutional rights due to the lack of clear parameters for
designation, absence of notice and hearing prior to designation, and lack of remedies to
contest wrongful designation.
b. power to approve requests for designation by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions for violating the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol;
c. power to apply for the proscription of terrorist individuals, groups, and organizations under
Section 26 for violating due process and constitutional rights;
d. power to authorize arrest and detention without judicial warrant based on mere suspicion
under Section 29 for violating the separation of powers (executive and judicial), and the
constitutional rights to due process, against unreasonable searches and seizures, to bail, to be
presumed innocent, and speedy disposition of cases;
e. power to adopt security classi cations for its records under Section 45 for violating the right
to information;
f. power to establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems on terrorism,
terrorist activities and counterterrorism operations under Section 46(e) for violating the
constitutional rights to clue process and privacy of communication and correspondence;
g. power to grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers under Section 46(g) for
lack of clear parameters; and
h. power to require private entities and individuals to render assistance to the ATC under
Section 46(m) for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
7. Whether Section 27 of R.A. No. 11479 on preliminary and permanent orders of proscription
violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, and unconstitutionally
punishes mere membership in an organization;
8. Whether the detention period under Section 29 of R.A. No. 11479 contravenes the
Constitution, the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the Rules of Court, and international obligations
against arbitrary detention;
9. Whether the restriction under Section 34 violates the constitutional rights to travel,
against incommunicado detention, to bail and R.A. No. 9745, or the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009;"
10. Whether Sections 35 and 36, in relation to Section 25, on the AMLC's authority to
investigate inquire, and examine bank deposits, and freeze assets, violate the separation of
powers (judicial), as well as the constitutional right to due process, and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
11. Whether Section 49 on the extra-territorial application of R.A. No. 11479 violates the
freedom of association and the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder;
12. Whether Section 54 on the ATC and DOJ's power to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power for failure to meet the
completeness and su cient standard tests;
13. Whether Section 56 repealing R.A. No. 9372, or the HSA violates the constitutional
mandate to compensate victims of torture or similar practices and right to due process;
14. Whether R.A. No. 11479 violates the IP's and Moros' rights to self-determination and self-
governance under the Constitution; and
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 15. Whether the House of Representatives gravely abused its discretion by passing HB No.
6875 (consolidated version of the HBs to amend the HSA) in violation of the constitutionally-
prescribed procedure.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues
Considering the number, variety, and permutation of the issues raised in the 37 petitions which
cover almost every conceivable and supposed constitutional violation of the enactment and
enforcement of the ATA, some of which are mere hypothetical/theoretical suppositions, the
Court nds it necessary and essential to dwell, rst and foremost, on the attendant procedural
issues upon which respondents are seeking its dismissal, in order to properly frame the
substantive issues and to rightly resolve the merits of this case.
Without meaning to pre-empt the full and detailed discussion below, the Court gives the
petitions clue course only in part. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has examined the
interplay between the procedural issues, beginning with the doctrines on judicial review.
The Court takes cognizance of this case under its expanded judicial power.
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable", but also "to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government," to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The characterization of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 speaks of two
essential components, and the rst is what is now called the traditional scope of judicial power.
This traditional concept of judicial power has existed since the Court was established.83
The 1987 Constitution, however, expanded the concept of judicial power. The development of
the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution arose from the use and
abuse of the political question doctrine during the Martial Law era under former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino,84 the Court reproduced Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion's explanation on the provision before the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it rst and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial
law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during
the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political question and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and e ect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme
Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in e ect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime.
xxxx
Brie y stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and o ces of the
government as well as those of its o cers. In other words, the judiciary is the nal arbiter on
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 the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its o cials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.85 (Emphasis and citations omitted)
The Court nds that this case mainly calls for the exercise of the Court's expanded judicial
power. This is because the primordial issue animating the 37 petitions is the constitutionality of
the ATA, a legislative (and not a judicial/quasi-judicial) act. Moreover, these 37 petitions
undoubtedly ascribe grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of Congress in enacting a law that violates fundamental rights.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioners, in seeking to check the grave abuse of
discretion of the Congress in enacting the ATA, argue that the constitutional concerns raised by
the ATA deserve a proactive judicial response. Relevantly, in Imbong v. Ochoa,86 this Court had
said:
x x x [U]nlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned
a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.87
Respondents on the other hand seek the dismissal of the 37 petitions, inter alia, on the ground
that the propriety of the ATA's enactment is a political question that is beyond judicial
scrutiny.88 Citing Drilon v. Garcia,89 the OSG argues that this Court must respect what
motivated Congress to enact the ATA and how it wished to accomplish such
intention.90 In Tañada v. Cuenco91 this Court said:
x x x [T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum x x x, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.92
The Court disagrees with the OSG. In the landmark case Tañada v. Angara,93 the Court held
that:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide."
(Article VIII, Section 1) emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Conception, "the judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its o cials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and rmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress
from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve
grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any o cer,
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 agency, instrumentality or department of the government.94 (Citations omitted; emphases
supplied)
The political question doctrine, then, cannot be raised by the government as a defense against
the constitutional challenges to the ATA. This is in light of the Court's expanded power of
judicial review, and more so because the question as to whether any part or instrumentality of
the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
exceeding jurisdiction is not a political question.95 This is besides the fact that petitioners have
complied with the requisites which call for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review,
whether under the traditional or under the expanded sense.
Petitioners' compliance with the requisites for judicial inquiry
When the issue of the unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is an established
doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review if the following requisites are
present:
(1) An actual and appropriate case and controversy exists;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
The rst requisite of actual case or controversy is complied with when the matter before the
court involves a "con ict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution."97 In Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,98 it was explained that the Court
does not generally act on petitions which merely allege that the assailed law is unconstitutional:
It is not enough that laws or regulations have been passed or are in e ect when their
constitutionality is questioned. The judiciary interprets and applies the law. "It does not
formulate public policy, which is the province of the legislative and executive branches of
government." Thus, it does not - by the mere existence of a law or regulation - embark on an
exercise that may render laws or regulations ine cacious. Lest the exercise of its power
amount to a ruling on the wisdom of the policy imposed by Congress on the subject matter of
the law, the judiciary does not arrogate unto itself the rule-making prerogative by a swift
determination that a rule ought not exist. There must be an actual case, "a contrast of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."99 (Citations omitted)
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a con ict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract di erence or dispute.100 The issues presented must be de nite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse interests.101 There must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.102 Corollary thereto, the case must not be moot or academic, or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.103 All these are
in line with the well-settled rule that this Court does not issue advisory opinions,104 nor does it
resolve mere academic questions, abstract quandaries, hypothetical or feigned problems, or
mental exercises, no matter how challenging or interesting they may be.105 Instead, case law
requires that there is ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts.106
Closely linked to this requirement is that the question must be ripe for adjudication.107 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse e ect
on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.108
Petitioners argue that the present petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy as the
ATA and its IRR are already being enforced amidst serious allegations of unconstitutionality.
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 They invoke the doctrine of expanded judicial review to convince this Court that an actual and
justiciable controversy exists.109
In contrast, respondents allege that at the time the petitions were led, the IRR of the ATA was
not yet issued, nor has the government done any act in furtherance of the law. Moreover, the
OSG states that mere theories and possibilities of abuse do not constitute a con ict of legal
rights. They argue that petitioners failed to present a prima facie grave abuse of discretion and
that the burden is not satis ed by the mere assertion that the law is unconstitutional since all
laws are presumed to be valid. Lastly, they assert that the case is not yet ripe for adjudication
since the government has yet to do any act which constitutes an immediate threat to
petitioners' rights.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the requisite of an actual case or controversy has been
complied at least with respect to certain issues falling within the purview of the delimited facial
analysis framework as will be herein discussed. This is because the consolidated petitions, in
challenging the ATA, have su ciently raised concerns regarding the freedom of speech,
expression, and its cognate rights. As such, the petitions present a permissible facial challenge
on the ATA in the context of the freedom of speech and its cognate rights - and it is only on
these bases that the Court will rule upon the constitutionality of the law. Further, with respect to
certain provisions of the ATA, petitioners have su ciently shown that there is a credible and
imminent threat of injury, as they may be subjected to the potential destructive consequences
of designation as well as possible detention and prosecution. In fact, the Court is mindful that
several of the petitioners have already come under the operation of the ATA as they have been
designated as terrorists.
Locus Standi
The second requisite of personal and substantial interest concerns legal standing. Legal
standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question."110 The concept of locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. It
requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.111 The test is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to "assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of di cult constitutional questions."112 Thus, as a general rule, a
party is not permitted to raise a matter in which he has no personal interest.
Where the party challenges the constitutionality of a law, he or she must not only show that the
law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he su ers in some
inde nite way. He or she must show that he or she has been, or is about to be, denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he or she is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.113 This rule is what
governs when the constitutionality of a statute is questioned by a party who must, at the very
least, show a credible threat of prosecution under the penal statute assailed.
Here, petitioners are suing before this Court as concerned Filipino citizens, members of the
Philippine Bar, members of Congress, taxpayers, and victims of terrorist-tagging by State
forces, who are under a credible threat of prosecution under the ATA. They also allege that their
standing is satis ed due to the transcendental importance of the matters involved in this case
and the serious threat the law poses on their sacred constitutional rights.114 They maintain
that injury to the individual is not the sole basis for the grant or recognition of standing before
the Court as injury to a public right is also a su cient basis.115 Lastly, they argue that they are
mounting a facial challenge on the grounds of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth, which
allow third-party standing.
On the other hand, respondents allege that petitioners have no legal standing because they
lack direct, substantial, and personal interest in this case.116 The OSG points out that merely
alleging motherhood statements such as "transcendental importance" or the violation of their
constitutional rights are insu cient since petitioners fail to show any speci c injury or su ering
which have been brought about by the law.117
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 Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who was appointed by the Court as amicus curiae in
this case, emphasized the necessity of exempting the present petitions from the strict
application of the rule on standing, explaining that:
The ruling case law is that petitioners who assail a law as void on the basis of its vagueness
and overbreadth are exempted from the strict rule on standing. A law that is vague and overly
broad is considered as an immense evil and destructive of fundamental rights in a democratic
regime, it ought to be struck down at the earliest opportunity by anyone in the body politic. It is
a threat not just to one but it is a threat to all and anyone can represent all in excising it out
from our statute book.118 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court adopts the view of Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, which nds support in the
following pronouncement in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council119 (Southern
Hemisphere):
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts a ecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its aws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption
or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.120 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In an attempt to undermine petitioners' legal standing, the OSG cites Southern
Hemisphere121 where the Court dismissed the petitions challenging the constitutionality of the
HSA - the predecessor of the ATA - on the ground that petitioners lacked legal standing,
among others.122 This Court, speaking through the ponencia of former Associate Justice
Carpio-Morales, held that petitioners in that case were unable to show that they have su ered
some actual or threatened injury because no case has been led against them.123 The Court
also pointed out that there were other parties not before It with direct and speci c
interests, e.g., the rst case of proscription led against the Abu Sayyaf group.124 The OSG
now prays that the present petitions be dismissed on the same ground.
The Court is not impressed.
As had already been pointed out earlier in this discussion, petitioner Casambre in G.R. No.
252767 is among the 19 individuals designated as terrorists under ATC Resolution No. 17 due
to his purported ties to the CPP/NPA. In addition, petitioner RMP in G.R. No. 252767 reported
that its bank accounts had been frozen upon orders from the AMLC for allegedly being used to
nance terrorism.125
It also did not escape the Court's attention that on May 12, 2021, respondent NSA Esperon
labelled CPP Founding Chairperson Jose Maria Sison as the "number 1 red-tagger" and
played an unveri ed and unauthenticated video where Jose Maria Sison purportedly
enumerated organizations supporting armed rebellion. Thereafter, respondent NSA Esperon
alleged that the International League of Peoples' Struggle, a formation of international solidarity
with links to the CPP, met in Hongkong in 2020. He added that the meeting was attended by
"Anakbayan, [Kilusang Mayo Uno], Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, GABRIELA, and several
others,"126 and the Court notes that these organizations are among those challenging the ATA.
Considering the application of the contested provisions of the ATA and the threat of the
imposition of consequences associated with being a terrorist, several petitioners including inter
alia petitioners Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Casambre, RPM, Anakbayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and GABRIELA have personal interests in the outcome of the
consolidated petitions. The Court nds that petitioners have su ciently alleged the presence of
credible threat of injury for being constant targets of "red-tagging" or "truth-tagging."
Therefore, they satisfy the requisites of the traditional concept of legal standing.
The above notwithstanding, the Court nds that even if Casambre, RPM, Anakbayan, Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and GABRIELA had not come under the actual
operation of the ATA, there would still have been no legal standing impediments to grant due
course to the petitions because they present actual facts that also partake of a facial challenge
in the context of free speech and its cognate rights. It is clear that unlike Southern Hemisphere,
the ATA presents a freedom of expression issue, and on this point, the pronouncement in Disini
v. Secretary of Justice127 (Disini) is now the prevailing authority:
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 In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can
raise any constitutional ground - absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of
ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from
assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free
speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception
is to counter the "chilling e ect" on protected speech that conies from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being
charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.128 (Emphases
supplied)
Besides, petitioners may be treated as non-traditional suitors who may bring suit in
representation of parties not before the Court. In Funa v. Villar,129 the rule on non-traditional
suitors as recognized in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo130 was summarized. The legal standing of
the following individuals is recognized when speci c requirements have been met:
(1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(2) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(3) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled at the earliest time; and
(4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the o cial action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.131
From the foregoing characterizations of the rule on locus standi, it is settled that legal standing
is a procedural technicality which this Court may choose to waive or relax in cases involving
transcendental importance to allow individuals or groups to sue even though they may not
have been personally injured by the operation of the law.132 Indeed, procedural barriers should
not be allowed to impede this Court's prerogative in resolving serious legal questions which
greatly a ect public interest.133
Regardless of the type of non-traditional suitor that they allege to be - legislators, concerned
citizens, or taxpayers - all petitioners cry foul over the law's grave and imminent threat to their
constitutional rights. They are asking this Court to recognize that the ATA infringes on their
rights to due process, free speech, expression, association, and academic freedom, to name a
few. These petitions involve matters of transcendental importance and constitutional questions
which must be addressed by this Court immediately.
Earliest Opportunity
As to the third requisite of "earliest opportunity," this Court held in Arceta v.
Mangrobang134 that it does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest
opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have
been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Since the present constitutional
challenge against the statute was directly led with this Court, the third requisite of judicial
review of "earliest opportunity" is complied with because the issue of constitutionality is raised
at the rst instance.
Lis Mota
The fourth requisite of lis mota means that this Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other
ground.135 Thus, petitioners must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved
unless the constitutional question raised is determined.136 The lis mota requirement is based
on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,137 and to justify
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 its nulli cation, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one
that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.138
The Court nds that the lis mota requirement is complied with by the very nature of the
constitutional challenge raised by petitioners against the ATA which deal squarely with the
freedom of speech, expression, and its cognate rights. Evidently, freedom of expression and its
cognate rights are legally demandable and enforceable, and any violation or perceived violation
by the law that chills or restricts the exercise of such rights inescapably involve questions
regarding its constitutionality.
Nevertheless, the Court should dismiss the following petitions: Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc.
v. Duterte, docketed as G.R. No. 253118, and Yerbo v. O ces of the Honorable Senate
President and the Honorable Speaker of the House of Representatives (Yerbo), docketed as
UDK No. 16663.
The Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. petition must be dismissed on the ground of lack of merit,
as the arguments raised in questioning the validity of the ATA are hinged on existing laws and
not the Constitution. While petitioners did claim that they are at extreme risk of being
designated as terrorists and suspected of violating Sections 4 to 13 of the ATA and that many
provisions of the ATA violate the fundamental right to due process and equal protection under
the Constitution, the context of these arguments are based on their claim that the ATA violates
and diminishes the protections under R.A. No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act;
R.A. No. 9745, or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009; and R.A. No. 10353, or the Anti-Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012, which protections they claim are guaranteed by the
Constitution. Further, a careful reading of this petition shows no allegation or claim of a
supposed violation of the freedom of speech, expression, or their cognate rights.
Meanwhile, the Yerbo petition should be dismissed for being fundamentally awed both in form
and substance. The Yerbo petition has utterly failed to comply with the requirements of form,
whether under Rule 56 or Rule 65 of the Rules, and has not raised any substantial argument
that would merit this Court's attention. While the petitioner claims that the ATA uses an
overbroad de nition of terrorism, he does not discuss his speci c reasons why he believes it to
be so and does not provide arguments in support thereof, stating merely that this claim was
"[a]ccording to Human Rights Watch."139 He also included a statement that "[t]he new
counterterrorism law could have a horri c impact on basic civil liberties, due process, and the
rule of law," but attributes the same to a person named "Phil Robertson"140 with no proper
reference therefor and similarly, no particular reasons why be thinks this is so. The petitioner
would go on to cite statements and declarations of the Human Rights Watch and Phil
Robertson two more times, seemingly drawing around these sources as the basis of his
petition. The foregoing is indicative of what the petitioner will eventually submit as his
"arguments" against the ATA, because after an exceptionally terse discussion on why Section
29 runs afoul of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the petitioner merely averred that:
As to his other grounds for seeking the nullity of certain provisions and/or sections of RA No.
11479, herein petitioner adopts the legal arguments and diseussions of his co-petitioners for
lack of time since he Avas told by LBC and JRS Express that it takes at least two (2) weeks for
his documents/mail matter to reach Metro Manila.141 (Emphasis supplied)
To the Court's mind, this explanation, and more so the failure to state any substantial argument
by merely adopting those in the other petitions, is simply unacceptable and shows utter
disrespect to the Court. Considering that this Court is a court of last resort, it should not waste
its time and resources in entertaining petitions containing averments such as the one quoted
above.
Hierarchy of Courts, Direct Recourse, and the Doctrine of Transcendental Importance
Relative to the exercise of judicial review, this Court must also delve on the propriety of ling
these 37 petitions directly with this Court. Case law has shown that this Court may relax
procedural requirements, particularly the rule on standing, on account of transcendental
importance — the Court will do the same for this case, as the resolution of its merits is of
paramount importance since it immediately a ects the fundamental rights of the people. For
indeed, when those who challenge the o cial act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
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 signi cance to the people, this Court can exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of
the suit in the manner necessary for the just resolution of the case.142
Under Section 5(1) of Article VIII, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certioriari,
prohibition, and mandamus. In GIOS-SAMAR v. Department of Transportation and
Communications143 (GIOS-SAMAR), the Court held that:
The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant to its provisions, granted
us original jurisdiction over certain cases. In some instances, this jurisdiction is shared with
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, litigants do not have
unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. The doctrine of hierarchy of
courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law,
notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This
doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional ltering mechanism designed to enable
the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest
law of the land.144 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,145 the Court enumerated the
instances where deviation from the strict application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
permitted. These include: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (3) in cases of rst impression; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better
decided by the Court; (5) when the exigency or time element presented in the case cannot be
ignored; (6) when the petition led reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7) when petitioners
have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (8) when
the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.146 Under any of these circumstances, a petitioner may be permitted to seek direct
resort to this Court through certiorari and/or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules.
In the present petitions, there are serious and compelling reasons justifying direct resort to this
Court. Genuine issues involving the constitutionality of the ATA are raised in the petitions which
must be immediately addressed. Various constitutional provisions safeguarding the right to free
speech and its cognate rights have been invoked in challenging the law. The far-reaching
implications, which encompass both present and future generations, if these constitutional
issues remain unresolved, warrant the immediate action of this Court. While the intention of the
legislature in enacting the ATA is noble and laudable, this Court cannot simply brush aside the
perceived threats to fundamental rights that petitioners raised. The necessity of resolving these
pressing issues a ecting fundamental rights is clear.
To be clear, parties cannot acquire direct audience before this Court by merely invoking the
doctrine of transcendental importance if the matter they bring raises issues of fact which
require the presentation of evidence. As recounted in GIOS-SAMAR, the term "transcendental
importance" was rst used in Araneta v. Dinglasan,147 a case which involved no dispute as to
the facts.148 Therefore, there was no impediment for a direct recourse to this Court. In similar
cases such as Angara v. Electoral Commission149 and Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority150 (Chavez v. PEA), the Court a rmed that it is when there are no factual questions -
or when there are extant factual issues but they are not material to the constitutional issue -
that direct recourse to this Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution may be
permitted. Otherwise, the hierarchy of courts must be observed. Thus, in Chavez v. PEA, the
Court declared:
The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it
is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant
case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The
Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over
the instant case.151 (Emphasis supplied)
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 Consequently, inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, petitions which purport to be facial
challenges but are actually riddled with material questions of fact cannot be ordinarily
entertained. A loose invocation of transcendental importance is not su cient. Thus, in GIOS-
SAMAR, the Court ruled that:
x x x [T]he transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe us with the power to tackle
factual questions and play the role of a trial court. The only circumstance when we may take
cognizance of a case in the rst instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the
exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the su ciency of the factual basis of
the President's proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.152
Nevertheless, as will be shown, infra, the consolidated petitions present an actual case or
controversy concerning the e ects of certain provisions of the ATA on the freedom of
expression and its cognate rights. As observed, the Court may take up and facially pass upon
those questions of constitutionality with no need to delve into extant factual issues. To that
extent, the hierarchy of courts need not be strictly observed, permitting direct recourse to this
Court.
Facial and As-Applied Challenges in Constitutional Litigation
In constitutional litigation, two modes of challenging the constitutionality of a statute have
emerged: "as-applied" and "facial." Petitioners came to this Court through the latter mode,
seeking to nullify the entirety of the ATA even before it could be enforced.
In an as-applied challenge, the question before the Court is the constitutionality of a statute's
application to a particular set of proven facts as applied to the actual parties. It is one "under
which the plainti argues that a statute, even though generally constitutional, operates
unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plainti s particular circumstances."153 Put in
another way, the plainti argues that "a statute cannot be applied to [him or] her because its
application would violate [his or] her personal constitutional rights."154 Thus, an as-applied
challenge is strictly predicated on proven facts particular to an individual and his or her relation
to the statute in question. If the facts so warrant, "case severability" may occur, where the
Court "severs" or separates the unconstitutional applications of the statute from
the constitutional applications of the same statute,155 but the statute itself may not be
completely struck down. That said, it is conceivable that a case which starts out as an as-
applied change may eventually result in the total invalidation of the statute if, in the process,
the Court is satis ed that it could never have any constitutional application.156 Meanwhile, a
facial challenge seeks the entire invalidation of a statute because, in the words of United States
v. Salerno157 (Salerno) as cited in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan158 (Estrada) "no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."159
Philippine jurisprudence has described a facial challenge as "an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its aws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities."160 As will be
demonstrated, the originally American concepts of "as-applied" and "facial" challenges have
not, over time, been understood in Philippine jurisprudence in the same way as in American
case law.
Scholars point to the 1912 case of Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railway Co. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co161 (Yazoo) as one the earliest cases where the U.S. Supreme Court used an "as-applied"
analysis. In this case, the railway company argued that a Mississippi statute "imposing a
penalty on common carriers for failure to settle claims for lost or damaged freight in shipment
within the state within a reasonable speci ed period" is unconstitutional under the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court was not
convinced, nding that the statute merely provided a "reasonable incentive for the prompt
settlement, without suit, of just demands of a class admitting of special legislative treatment."
The railway company had also argued that if the statute was void as to them, then it is void in
toto or as to all other possible cases where the statute might apply. The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed, opining as follows:
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 x x x [T]his Court must deal with the case in hand, and not with imaginary ones. It su ces,
therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases like the present, the statute is valid. How the state
court may apply it to other cases, whether its general words may be treated as more or less
restrained, and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail, are matters upon which we
need not speculate now.162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Yazoo, the U.S. Supreme Court rea rmed the traditional principle on standing that it
cannot rule upon the rights of individuals not before it. It can only grant relief to a plainti for
matters that are of interest to him. The case, therefore, upheld the principle that constitutional
rights are generally understood to be "personal and may not be asserted vicariously."163
In the 1940 case of Thornhill v. Alabama,164 however, the U.S. court rst suggested that the
traditional rules on standing might be di erent in the context of the First Amendment.165 In
that case, one Byron Thornhill, a union member of the Brown Wood Preserving Company, was
on strike and was proven to have told Clarence Simpson, a non-union member, that "they were
on strike, and did not want anybody to go up there to work." On said facts, Thornhill was found
guilty of a misdemeanor under Section 3448 of the 1923 Alabama State Code, which
prohibited "go[ing] near to or loiter[ing] about the premises or place of business of [another]
person x x x with the intent of in uencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy
from, sell to, have business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, rm, corporation,
or association x x x x." The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Thornhill's conviction and ruled that
Section 3448 was facially invalid based on the overbreadth doctrine, viz.:
Proof of an abuse of power in the particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack
on the constitutionality of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of ideas.... [The]
threat [of censorship] is inherent in a penal statute, like that in question here, which does not
aim speci cally at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom
of speech or of the press.... An accused, after arrest and conviction under such a statute, does
not have to sustain the burden of demonstrating that the State could not constitutionally have
written a di erent and speci c statute covering his activities as disclosed by the charge and
the evidence introduced against him.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, it was in Thornhill that the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly recognized the rami cations of
the overbreadth doctrine to standing. This was later emphasized in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,167 viz.:
x x x [T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit - in the First Amendment
area - "attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow speci city." Dombrowski v. P ster, 380 U. S., at 486. Litigants, therefore, are permitted
to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because
of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Therefore, in contrast to an as-applied challenge, a facial challenge permits third-party
standing before the court.
Later, in Salerno, it was said that "a facial challenge to a legislative Act is the most di cult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenge must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid."168 In Salerno, which this Court
cited in Estrada, the question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the Bail Reform Act
of 1985 may be facially invalidated for violating the Fifth and Eight Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. The U.S. Court said: "[t]he feet that the Bail Reform Act might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insu cient to render it
wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment."169
Since Salerno, U.S. jurisprudence took on a trajectory which this Court has not pursued. In
2015, the U.S. Supreme Court clari ed in City of Los Angeles v. Patel170 that facial challenges
are allowed under the First Amendment,171 Second Amendment,172 the Due Process Clause
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 of the Fourteenth Amendment,173 and the Foreign Commerce Clause.174 One scholar notes
that a facial invalidation even occurred under the Equal Protection Clause in the 1954 case
of Brown v. Board of Education.175 Another observes that Separation of Powers may also be a
basis,176 citing INS v. Chadha177 and Clinton v. City of New York.178
In Philippine jurisprudence, however, the Court has consistently adhered to the scope of facial
challenges relative only to free speech cases.
One of the earliest instances where this Court applied a "facial" analysis of the constitutionality
of a statute was the 1969 case of In The Matter Of Petition For Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality Of Republic Act 4880.179 At issue were the additions made by R.A. No. 4880
to the Revised Election Code prohibiting early nominations of candidates and limiting the
campaign period. Petitioners directly resorted to this Court, arguing that the new sections
violated the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. Although a majority of the Court's
members viewed R.A. No. 4880 as overly broad, it was not enough to satisfy the 2/3 majority
to strike down the law as required by Section 10, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. Still,
the ponencia made the important point that facial challenges have been permitted only in
freedom of speech cases, citing Thornhill, among others, viz.:
x x x [W]e now consider the validity of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 4880 of the too early
nomination of candidates and the limitation found therein on the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity alleged by petitioners to o end against the rights of free speech, free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. In e ect what we are asked to do is to
declare the act void on its face, no evidence having been introduced as to its actual operation.
There is respectable authority for the court having the power to so act. Such fundamental
liberties are accorded so high a place in our constitutional scheme that any alleged
infringement manifest in the wording of statute cannot be allowed to pass
unnoticed.180 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The concept of a "facial challenge" did not appear again until Associate Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza applied it in his Separate Opinion in the 2000 case of Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment,181 in which he said:
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area
of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to
challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional, but it
might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the
interest of prevcntiim a "chilling" e ect on freedom of expression. x x x182 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Justice Mendoza reiterated his position in his Concurring Opinion in Estrada. In the main
opinion of that case, the Court formally adopted the doctrine that facial challenges are limited
only to freedom of expression cases. Since then, Philippine jurisprudence has developed to
clarify the scope of a facial challenge, but in all cases, the Court has not deviated from the
principle that it is permitted only when freedom of expression and its cognate rights are
a ected. In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,183 the Court initially declared that penal statutes
cannot be the subject of facial invalidation, viz.:
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of
parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute
a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions
to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v.
Harris,184 this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its de ciencies, and requiring
correction of these de ciencies before the statute is put into e ect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative' remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x
x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory, for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided."
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 For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a
"manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been
violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been
charged.185 (Emphasis sand underscoring supplied, italics in the original)
The above ruling was then reiterated in Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections,186 where it was stressed that in Philippine jurisdiction, the Court has not until that
point declared any penal law unconstitutional based on the void-for-vagueness the doctrine,
which holds "that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and di er as to its application."187 Former Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio dissented, explaining that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are indeed
inapplicable to penal statutes for purposes of mounting a facial challenge, but only when such
penal statutes do not involve free speech.
The applicability of facial challenges of penal statutes was brought up again in Southern
Hemisphere,188 where this Court said:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling e ect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle
for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow speci city." The possible harm
to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left
to fester because of possible inhibitory e ects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
e ect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In
the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied; underscoring in the original)
However, Justice Carpio's dissent in Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections was
adopted by the Court in Disini, where the Court categorically stated that "when a penal statute
encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable." Thus, in Disini, the Court applied a facial analysis in
invalidating Section 5 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act based on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, viz.:
A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
even if lie claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free
speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling e ect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills
him into silence. x x x
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension
on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling e ect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front
in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not
punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of
nelizcns and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
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 Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Only a few months alter Disini, the Court said in Imbong that facial challenges may be launched
to assail the validity of statutes which concern cognate rights to the freedom of speech, viz.:
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to
one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modi cations. While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.189 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On this score, the inclusion of the phrase "other fundamental rights" has been construed by
petitioners as including all other rights in the Constitution. Thus, they suppose that the ATA
may be facially challenged for violating, inter alia, due process, the right to be presumed
innocent, or the right to bail. However, based on its peculiar context (i.e., assertion of religious
freedom), it is highly apparent that the phrase "other fundamental rights", as explained
in Imbong, was clearly in reference to freedom of expression and its cognate rights (such as
religious freedom) in juxtaposition to "strictly penal statutes".
In sum, the prevailing Philippine jurisprudence is that facial challenges on legislative acts are
permissible only if they curtail the freedom of speech and its cognate rights based on
overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Facial challenges have not been recognized
as applicable to other provisions of the Constitution or the separation of powers. On this point,
it is worth repeating that Philippine jurisprudence on facial challenges developed in a di erent
trajectory from the American experience since Salerno. And the Court, at this time, nds it
improper to expand the scope of facial challenges to all other constitutional rights, as it is not
even material, much more necessary for the just disposition of this already complex case.
Moreover, it appears that if such position is adopted at this time, the judiciary will be put in a
precarious position where it may be inundated with numerous petitions to invalidate statutes as
soon as they come into e ect.
Furthermore, as a rule, facial challenges are disfavored. As explained by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republic Party:190
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial invalidity often rest on
speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of "premature interpretation of statutes on
the basis of factually barebones records."191 Facial challenges also run contrary to the
fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither "anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it" nor "formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied."192 Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by
preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. We must keep in mind that "[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people."193 (Citations omitted)
Thus, the Court remains cognizant of the dangers of favoring facial challenges that Washington
State Grange identi ed. A contrary judicial policy may a ect the balance which the separation
of powers seeks to keep and may e ectively turn the Court into a "third chamber of Congress".
Considering the above discussion, the Court grants due course to these consolidated petitions
as permissible facial challenges only in relation to the provisions of the ATA which involve and
raise chilling e ects on freedom of expression and its cognate rights in the context of actual
and not mere hypothetical facts. These permissible issues for facial analysis are, as adopted
from the Court's Advisory dated January 5, 2021 are:
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 1. Whether Section de ning and penalizing the crime of "terrorism" is void for vagueness or
overbroad in violation of the constitutional right to x x x free speech and expression;
2. Whether Section [5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12] de ning and penalizing threats to commit terrorism,
[training terrorism], x x x proposal, inciting to terrorism, [training as material support], are:
a. Void for vagueness or overbroad in violation of the [freedom of speech and expression x x x
and freedom of association] x x x194
The Court shall also rule upon the following issues which relate to provisions of the ATA that
have a chilling e ect on speech in the context of the actual facts presented in this case, viz.:
6. Whether the following powers of the ATC are unconstitutional:
a. Power to designate terrorist individuals, groups and organization under Section 25 x x x
b. Power to approve requests for designation by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions x x x
c. Power to apply for the proscription of terrorist individuals, groups, and organizations under
Section 26 x x x
d. Power to authorize arrest and detention without judicial warrant based on mere suspicion
under Section 29 x x x
7. Whether Section 28 of R.A. 11479 on preliminary and permanent orders of proscription x x x
unconstitutionally punishes mere membership in an organization
8. Whether the detention period under Section 29 of R.A. 11479 contravenes the
Constitutional, the Revised Penal Code, the Rules of Court, and international obligations
against arbitrary detention;
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11. Whether Section 49 on the extra-territorial application of R.A. 11479 violates the freedom of
association x x x x195
Finally, the Court also nds it prudent to discuss the issue of whether the House of
Representatives gravely abused its discretion by passing HB No. 6875 (consolidated version of
the house bills to amend the Human Security Act) in violation of the constitutionally-prescribed
procedure.196
The Court, in its sound discretion, delimits the issues in these cases accordingly, and hence
nds it proper to refrain from adjudicating all other issues that do not relate to the freedom of
expression and its cognate rights, or those that are too speculative and raise genuine
questions of fact that require the submission of concrete evidence, such as:
2. Whether Sections x x x [7, 13] to 14 de ning and penalizing threats to commit terrorism,
planning, training, preparing, and facilitating terrorism, conspiracy, proposal, inciting to
terrorism, material support, and other related provisions, are:
a. x x x
b. violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.
3. Whether the uniform penalties for all punishable acts under Sections 4 to 14 violate the
constitutional proscription against the imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment;
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5. Whether judicial authorization to conduct surveillance under Section 17 x x x forecloses the
remedies under the rules on amparo and habeas data;
6. Whether the following powers of the ATC are unconstitutional:
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b. power to approve requests for designation by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions for violating the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
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c. power to adopt security classi cations for its records under Section 45 for violating the right
to information;
f. power to establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems on terrorism,
terrorist activities and countcrtcrrorism operations under Section 46 (c) for violating the
constitutional rights to due process and privacy of communication and correspondence;
g. power to grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers under Section 46 (g) for
lack of clear parameters; and
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 h. power to require private entities and individuals to render assistance to the ATC under
Section 46 (m) for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
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9. Whether the restriction under Section 34 violates the constitutional rights to travel,
against incommunicado detention, to bail and R.A. No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009);
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13. Whether Section 56 repealing R.A. No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007), violates the
constitutional mandate to compensate victims of torture or similar practices and right to due
process;
14. Whether R.A. No. 11479 violates the Indigenous Peoples and Moros' rights to self-
determination and self-governance under the Constitution;
These shall be resolved in the proper actual case entailing the adjudication of questions of feet
and the reception of evidence which the Court is institutionally incapable to perform. The Court
must emphasize, however, that this holding, does not, will not, and should not preclude
subsequent challenges by individuals or groups who may, in the future, eventually come before
this Court once again to assail the constitutionality of the unresolved provisions of the law.197
R.A. No. 11479 cannot be declared unconstitutional in its entirety.
Petitioners aver that the essential provisions animating the ATA are impaired by constitutionality
which would leave the law without any reason to exist since its legislative purpose can no
longer be served.198 They suggest that without Section 4, the crimes penalized in Sections 5
to 12 will lose their meaning as they are all dependent on its de nition of what constitutes
terrorism.199 Meanwhile, the OSG claims that because of the separability clause of the ATA,
the rest of the provisions will survive.200 The separability clause of the ATA states that:
If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the
other parts or provisions hereof which are not a ected thereby shall remain and continue to be
in full force and e ect.201
This issue is resolved by the fact that the Court does not nd the essential provisions of the
ATA, particularly the de nition of terrorism under Section 4 of the ATA, absolutely
unconstitutional, as will be explained in full below.
Section 4 and Related O enses
Having circumscribed the scope of issues that should be the appropriate subjects for decision
in this case due to the nature of the petitions led against the ATA, the standing of petitioners,
and the transcendental signi cance of the matters raised, the Court now turns to resolve the
constitutional challenges involving Section 4, as well as those speci c to its related o enses.
Petitioners maintain that Section 4 of the ATA, which de nes terrorism as a crime, is void for
vagueness and overbreadth. They claim that the provision violates due process for failing to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid, and
gives law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions, thereby becoming an
arbitrary exing of the government muscle.202 The perceived imprecision in the language of
Section 4 is allegedly aggravated by the phrase "regardless of the stage of execution", which
they interpret as punishing any kind of action including expressions of thought.203
In particular, petitioners contend that Section 4 (a) is vague as the act is punished so long as
there is intent to "cause death or serious bodily injury to any person." This allegedly gives law
enforcers free rein to charge people as terrorists by simply claiming that an act was committed
with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury regardless of the outcome.204
Petitioners also argue that Section 4 (b) is vague, since "extensive damage or destruction" has
no ascertainable standards under the ATA, as well as overbroad, because the same phrase is
not limited to physical or material damage. Thus, petitioners insist that Section 4 (b) can
penalize legitimate criticism as "terrorism" because it may extensively damage the reputation
of the government.205
Section 4 (c) is also being assailed for being vague and overbroad. Petitioners aver that it is
vague because the terms "extensive" and "interference" are not de ned. Without any objective
standard to guide police o cers, petitioners maintain that these stale agents will have to rely
purely on their own instincts, perceptions, or predilections. The provision also allegedly su ers
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 from overbreadth because the failure to de ne the parameters of the term "interference" may
cover any form of dissent, thereby chilling constitutionally protected speech or assemblies
expressing grievances against the government.206
Petitioners similarly interpret Section 4 (d) and (e) as vague and overbroad due to the perceived
imprecision of certain phrases such as "of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical
weapons" and "weapons, explosives" and the absence of standards in narrowing the scope of
prohibited acts. In addition, Section 4 (e) is also deemed to be overbroad because the phrase
"dangerous substances" may cover anything harmful to humans, including lawful
substances.207
With regard to the proviso of Section 4, petitioners insist that without a clear de nition of the
phrases "serious risk to public safety" and "serious physical harm", it gives a presumption that
any act that can be characterized with "intent" to cause a certain measure of "risk" or "harm"
which constitutes as terrorism. Petitioners interpret the argument of the OSG that the proviso is
a matter of defense that the accused has the burden to prove as repugnant to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.208
Petitioners further argue that the vagueness of Section 4 cannot be remedied by the IRR as this
would constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.209 They also submit that the vague
formulation of Section 4 cannot be saved by invoking international legal instruments.210
Notably, the overarching issue relative to Section 4 before the Court, as summarized in the
Court's Advisory for the oral arguments is whether the challenged provision is void for
vagueness and overbroad.
Section 4 has two distinct ports - the main part provides the actus reus, the mens rea, and the
corresponding imposable penalty for the crime of terrorism, while the second part is the
proviso.
Section 4 of the ATA provides:
Section 4. Terrorism. - Subject to Section 49 of this Act, terrorism is committed by any person
who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution:
(a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or
endangers a person's life;
(b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or
public facility, public place or private property;
(c) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage or destruction to
critical infrastructure;
(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons,
explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and
(e) Release of dangerous substances, or causing re, oods or explosions
when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate the general public or a
segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke or in uence by
intimidation the government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or
destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a
public emergency or seriously undermine public safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism
and shall su er the penalty of life imprisonment without the bene t of parole and the bene ts of
Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as "An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99
of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code": Provided, That,
terrorism as de ned in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which
are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's
life, or to create a serious risk to public safety. (Emphasis supplied)
When deconstructed, Section 4 of the ATA consists of two distinct parts: the main part and
the proviso.
The main part of Section 4 provides for the actus reus, the mens rea, and corresponding
imposable penalty for the crime of terrorism; in this regard, the main part is thus subdivided
into three components. The rst component enumerates the conduct which consists of
the actus reus of terrorism, i.e., Section 4(a) to (e), or the overt acts that constitute the crime.
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The second component enumerates the purposes or intents of any of the actus reus, i.e., to
intimidate the general public or a segment thereof; to create an atmosphere or spread a
message of fear; to provoke or in uence by intimidation the government or any international
organization; to seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social
structures of the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety.
This is the mens rea component of terrorism, which is inferred from the nature and context of
the actus reus. The third component provides the imposable penalty for the crime of
terrorism, i.e., life imprisonment without the bene t of parole and the bene ts of R.A. No.
10592.211
On the other hand, the proviso, if rephrased into its logical inverse, purports to allow for
advocacies, protests, dissents, stoppages of work, industrial or mass actions, and other similar
exercises of civil and political rights to be punished as acts of terrorism if they are "intended to
cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a
serious risk to public safety."
On the basis of this deconstruction, it is evident that the main part chie y pertains to conduct,
while the proviso, by clear import of its language and its legislative history, innately a ects the
exercise of the freedom of speech and expression. Hence, considering the delimitation
pursuant to the facial analysis as above explained, the Court's ruling shall focus on (albeit not
exclusively relate to) the proviso of Section 4 in light of its chilling e ect to petitioners in this
case.
Tests of Constitutionality in Facial Challenges and Guiding Premises in Statutory Construction
in the Analysis of Section 4
It is a long-standing principle in statutory construction that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nulli ed, it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.212 The grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.213 Thus, in passing upon the validity of a law, the Court will a ord
some deference to the statute and places a heavy burden on the party assailing the law to
prove the basis for its invalidity by demonstrating that there is a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, and not one that is speculative or argumentative.214
The Constitution, however, abhors prior restraints on speech.215 Thus, a law does not enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality if it restrains speech.216 Instead, a presumption of
unconstitutionality arises. This presumption proceeds from the constitutional command under
Section 4, Article III that no law shall be passed abridging free speech, expression, and their
cognate rights. And this mandate, in turn, is actualized by the Court through the many
iterations of the dictum that said rights are accorded preference or a high place in the
constitutional scheme that any alleged infringement manifest in the language of the statute
cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed.217 In such cases, therefore, it becomes the burden of
government to establish the law's constitutionality. Instructive on this rule is the separate
opinion of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City:218
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation, the right
to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such as free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.
Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which cither classi es on the basis of an inherently
suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of
constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the
government demonstrates otherwise. The government must show that the statute is supported
by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest are
narrowly tailored.219 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The Court has thus declared that any restriction to the freedom of speech or expression should
be treated as an exemption220 - any act that chills or restrains speech is presumed invalid and
any act that chills or restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows.221
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The Court has usually approached the analysis of whether there is an impermissible restraint
on the freedom of speech based on the circumstances of each case and, from there,
determined the appropriate test with which to evaluate the government issuance or act that
constituted such restraint.222 In this regard, it should be noted that in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan223 and Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,224 the Court said
that "the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases." Thus, the Court shall endeavor to apply these doctrines in light of the
facial challenge on the proviso of Section 4 as petitioners themselves raise.
Under the vagueness doctrine, a law is constitutionally defective when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and di er as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary Hexing of the Government muscle.225
Closely related to the vagueness doctrine226 is the overbreadth doctrine, under which a law
may be struck down as unconstitutional if it achieves a governmental purpose by means that
are unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.227 In Philippine
jurisprudence, originally, it had special application only to free-speech cases under non-penal
laws.228 However, the prevailing doctrine, as espoused in Disini, is that penal statues may be
facially challenged under the overbreadth doctrine to counter the "chilling e ect" on protected
speech that comes from statutes violating free speech because a person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime.229 As distinguished from the
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.230
Meanwhile, the strict scrutiny standard is a two-part test under which a law or government act
passes constitutional muster only if it is: (1) necessary to achieve a compelling State interest;
and (2) the least restrictive means to protect such interest or narrowly tailored to accomplish
said interest.231 Unlike the overbreadth doctrine, it is not limited to free speech cases. It is
employed by the courts when the law or government act interferes with other basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution.232 When the freedom of speech is involved, strict
scrutiny has been applied when the restraint on speech is content-based, i.e., the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.233
In this relation, a content-based prior restraint on speech is constitutionally permissible if it
passes the clear and present danger rule, which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil which
the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high."234 The latest iteration of the clear and present danger rule is the "Brandenburg test",
which the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,235
explaining that "constitutional guarantees of free speech and tree press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."236
Thus, the Court shall proceed from the foregoing analytical framework, as will be seen below.
The main part of Section 4 of the ATA cannot be assailed through a facial challenge.
To recall, the issues raised by petitioners against the main part of Section 4, i.e., that it is void
for vagueness, that it is overbroad, or that it fails to meet the strict scrutiny test, assume that
what are sought to be punished therein is speech. This assumption is inaccurate.
As had been observed above, the main part of Section 4 chie y pertains to conduct. It is plain
and evident from the language used therein that the enumeration refers to punishable acts, or
those pertaining to bodily movements that tend to produce an e ect in the external world,
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 and not speech. The acts constitutive of the crime of terrorism under paragraphs (a) to (e) are
clearly forms of conduct unrelated to speech, in contradistinction with the enumeration in
the proviso, which are forms of speech or expression, or are manifestations thereof.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the perceived vagueness and overbreadth of the main
part of Section 4 may be inconsistent with the delimited facial challenge framework as herein
discussed. Nonetheless, to guide the bench, bar and public, the Court deems it prudent to
clarify some of petitioners' mistaken notions on the same. As shown below, none of petitioners
have amply demonstrated, even prima facie, its facial unconstitutionality. Hence, the
presumption of constitutionality of said main part - being a primarily non-speech provision -
must stand. Proceeding therefrom, it is instructive to rst examine the general de nition of
terrorism.
Terrorism, as de ned in Section 4 of the ATA, is not impermissibly vague.
The Court must reiterate, for purposes of this discussion, that there is no consensus de nition
of terrorism in the international community. Even the UN O ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
notes that the 2011 judgment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which had declared that
there exists a customary de nition of transnational terrorism, has been widely
criticized.237 Admittedly, this lack of consensus in the international community has presented
challenges in the international e ort to stop terrorism.
The absence, however, of an internationally-accepted standard de nition of terrorism is of no
moment and should not concern the Court. The UNODC itself is aware that under the principle
of incorporation, "domestic law will prevail in practice, including for constitutional
reasons."238 For this reason, the Court has approached the de nitional issue primarily from
the perspective of Philippine constitutional law and criminal law theory. There will, of course, be
a time when international law will come into play with some of the other issues of this case. But
for purposes of Section 4 of the ATA, what the Court is confronted with is a question involving
Philippine constitutional and criminal law.
That said, the Court does not agree that Section 4 deserves total invalidation due to the
perceived vagueness and imprecision of the de nition of terrorism as a crime, as provided in
the main part of Section 4.
As previously demarcated, the main part of Section 4 has three components; with the rst
component providing the actus reus, and the second component providing the mens rea. It is
from these rst two components - the actus reus and the mens rea - as expressed in the main
part of Section 4, that the crime of terrorism should be construed.
Thus, in the case of Section 4(a), it should be clari ed that the crime proven is not terrorism if
all that the prosecution is able to prove is that the accused committed an act intended to cause
death, serious bodily injury, or danger to a person's life. Section 4(a) does not punish the very
act of intending death, serious bodily injury, or danger to a person's life. Such a reading
improperly dissects that portion of Section 4, and reads it in a vacuum; one should not be
completely impervious to terrorism's overarching concept which is, essentially, to cause or
threaten to cause damage or harm of su cient magnitude in order to achieve the actor's
intended result/purpose, such as to intimidate the general public, create an atmosphere or
spread a message of fear, or intimidate or destabilize the government. The same observation
rings true for the acts mentioned under Section 4(b) to (e). The Court notes in this regard that
neither the text nor the congressional records support petitioners' view as to the lack of clarity
and preciseness in the de nition of terrorism, as borne out by the following exchanges in the
Senate:
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, if we read the provision carefully, the acts enumerated in (A) to (E)
would be punished when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate or
put fear except an actual bombing because that would be covered by other sections. It is just
the purpose to induce government by force to do or to abstain from doing such an act. Our
question here, Mr. President, what is the di erence between this and the crime of grave threats
under the Revised Penal Code?
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Senator Lacson. It is the purpose, Mr. President. A simple crime of grave threats without the
purpose of sowing terrorism or committing terroristic acts, iba po iyon. We are always bound
by the intent and purpose of the act.
Senator Drilon. In other words, it is a national security issue that makes it an act of terrorism or
not?
Senator Lacson. Not necessarily, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Yes, but...
Senator Lacson. As we de ned it and as the gentleman mentioned earlier, ito iyong Section 4,
iyong fundamental. Ito po, "The purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate,
put in fear, force or induce the government or any international organization, or the public to do
or to abstain from doing any act, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political
economic or social structures of the country..."
Senator Drilon. So, just in answer to my question, what distinguishes an ordinary crime of
grave threat is the purpose of the o ender in committing the crime.
Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. So that, if it is for the purpose of intimidating, put in fear, force or induce the
government or any international organization, or the public to do or abstain from doing an act,
that is considered a terrorist act.239 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In Valenzuela v. People of the Philippines,240 the Court has stated that "as a postulate in the
craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the
law expressly provide when the felony is produced", for "without such provision, disputes
would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed,
thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is
assigned the legislative role of de ning crimes."
A textual review of the main part of Section 4 shows that its rst and second components
provide a clear correlation and a manifest link as to how or when the crime of terrorism is
produced. When the two components of the main part of Section 4 are taken together,
they create a demonstrably valid and legitimate de nition of terrorism that is general enough to
adequately address the ever-evolving forms of terrorism, but neither too vague nor too broad
as to violate due process or encroach upon the freedom of speech and expression and other
fundamental liberties.
Petitioners say much about the supposed vagueness of many of the clauses or phrases in
Section 4, such as "regardless of the stage of execution", "endangers a person's life",
"extensive damage or destruction", "government or public facility, public place or private
property", "extensive interference", "weapons and explosives", or "dangerous
substances."241 Petitioners ground the vagueness of these words and phrases on the fact that
the ATA itself does not de ne them and consequently, deprives persons of "fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden."242 They contend that Section 4 is intentionally
ambiguous to allow for operational expediency243 and "encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions."244
The Court, once again, disagrees.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,245 the Court said that "the absence of a statutory de nition
of a term used in a statute will not render the law 'void for vagueness,' if the meaning can be
determined through the judicial function of construction."246 Furthermore, in Caltex v.
Palomar,247 the Court said:
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).248 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,249 this Court explained that:
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a su ciently de nite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
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 doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous speci city, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes. x x x250 (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, a law remains valid if the perceived vague terms used therein can be
saved by proper judicial construction. After all, the phraseology/wording of penal laws are
generally broad in nature. It is well-settled that penal laws, such as the ATA, inherently have an
in terrorem e ect which is not reason enough to invalidate such laws. Otherwise, the state may
be restricted from preventing or penalizing socially harmful conduct.251 Moreover, it is likewise
settled that "lawmakers have no positive constitutional or statutory duty to de ne each and
every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act."252 In reminding courts to take extra caution before annulling a law on the
ground of vagueness or overbreadth, amicus curiae Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
explained that:
This extra cautious approach is a recognition of the principle of separation of power where
Congress is given the power to make laws, to set the policy of what is protected and
unprotected conduct, a policy that is not interfered by the judiciary unless demonstrated as
clearly violative of the tenets of the Constitution. Thus, courts set high barriers before allowing
these challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth to succeed. In the words of this Court in
David v. Arroyo, (G.R. No. 1713, et seq. May 3, 2006), viz: "... a facial challenge on the ground
of overbreadth is the most di cult to challenge to mount successfully, since the challenges
must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be
valid."253 (Emphasis in the original)
To be invalidated, the law must be utterly vague on its face, such that it cannot be clari ed by
cither a saving clause or by construction.254
In Dans v. People,255 as reiterated in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, the Court used a simpler
test which consists merely of asking the question: "What is the violation?" Anything beyond
this, the "how's" and the "why's," are evidentiary matters which the law itself cannot possibly
disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case.256 Based on these tests, petitioners failed to
demonstrate that the same is impermissibly vague. To demonstrate, a person of common
intelligence can understand that Section 4(a) punishes an "act intended to cause death, serious
physical injury, or danger to another person." He cannot, under the guise of "vagueness", feign
ignorance and claim innocence because the law had not speci ed, in exacting detail, the
instances where he might be permitted to kill or seriously endanger another person to
intimidate the government. The same goes for all the other acts listed in Section 4(b) to (e) in
conjunction with the mens rea components. Ultimately, how these terms will be construed will
depend on the facts of a given case. In the absence of such facts, the Court cannot now come
up with a formulaic understanding of such terms which could then be indiscriminately applied
to future cases. Verily, su cient leeway should be given to the courts for the conduct of judicial
construction in relation to actual cases; and, it is in the context of actual cases that our
relatively new jurisprudence on the subject of terrorism should be allowed to evolve.
The various general terms in Section 4 are not unconstitutionally vague.
In addition to the discussion above, the Court points out that a limiting construction may be
imposed on a statute if it is "readily susceptible" to such a construction, such that the "text or
other source of congressional intent identi ed a clear line that this Court could draw."257
A cursory examination of each of the supposedly general terms in the main part of Section 4
betrays no reasonable or justi able basis to hold them as unconstitutionally vague. A few
points to keep in mind:
Firstly, the Court is not without authority to draw from the various aids to statutory
construction, such as the legislative deliberations, to narrowly construe the terms used in the
ATA and thus limit their scope of application. For example, the phrase "engages in acts
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 intended to" can be construed by the Court to simply refer to acts that cause or result in the
speci cally listed or enumerated acts (i.e., death, serious bodily injury, etc.). The phrase
"endangers a person's life" in subsection (a), on the other hand, can be construed as a
restatement of the contemplated scenarios of "death or serious bodily injury" in the same
provision. In parallel, the extensive destruction caused to "government or public facility, public
place, or private property," as stated in subsection (b), can be construed as contemplating the
same severity of damage as that contemplated in critical infrastructure in subsection (c), and
which critical infrastructure is in turn de ned under Section 3(a). To mention, examples of
terrorist acts in recent history are the Marawi siege and the Jolo bombings in 2019. At this
juncture, and without precluding the evolution of jurisprudence through actual cases, it is safe
to assume that anything less that fails to meet the standard of su cient magnitude may not be
properly categorized as terrorism as de ned under the statute, but rather as mere ordinary
crimes. Hence, the terms used in the purposes, such as "intimidation," "public emergency,"
"seriously undermine public safety," and "atmosphere" of fear, must all be understood in this
context.
Secondly, the meaning of the other terms used in the main part of Section 4 can be found in
jurisprudence as well as in dictionaries. For example, Black's Law Dictionary de nes "bodily
injury"258 as "any physical or corporeal injury; not necessarily restricted to injury to the trunk
or main part of the body as distinguished from the head or limbs; physical injury only; localized
abnormal condition of the living body; injury caused by external violence;"259 and "public
place"260 as "a place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place
devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than
private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighbouring public,
among others."261 Jurisprudence, on the other hand, de nes "public safety"262 as that which
"involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the
general public from signi cant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or
disasters,"263 while the phrase "political structure"264 has been used in jurisprudence265 in
reference or relating to the government, its structure, and/or its administration.266
The phrase "regardless of the stage of execution" is not unconstitutionally vague.
In the same vein, it is further observed that Section 4 penalizes any of the enumerated acts
under subsections (a) to (e) regardless of the stage of execution, i.e., attempted, frustrated, and
consummated. An attempt to commit or the frustrated commission of any of the enumerated
acts may be somehow regarded as inchoate crimes, i.e., crimes that were initiated but not
completed, or acts that assist in the commission of another crime.267 In foreign cases and
legal literature, inchoate crimes are regarded as incomplete o ences, but which are deemed to
have been committed despite the non-completion of the substantive o ense, or the target
crime or ultimate o ense sought to be achieved, and the non-realization of the intended
harm.268 They are punished as a preventative measure to curtail the occurrence and incidence
of harm, particularly in cases "where there is a substantial likelihood of harm occurring, and
where that harm is of a particularly egregious nature."269
Petitioners argue that since Section 4 punishes terrorism regardless of the stage of execution,
"the mere thought and inception of an idea in a person is criminalized to be already an act of
terrorism".270 This argument, however, nds no support in criminal law theory and
jurisprudence. No law can punish a man for what he thinks, imagines, or creates in his
mind. Mental acts are not punishable even if they would constitute a crime had they been
carried out. Mere intention producing no e ect can never be a crime.271
Since Section 4(a) to (e) is an enumeration of acts, then the phrase "regardless of the stage of
execution" that immediately follows can only refer to "external acts" and speci cally, the acts
of execution,272 such as, for example, Hying airplanes into towers, bombing churches, and
taking hostages. To illustrate, the acts referred to in Section 4 (a) are similar to murder under
Article 248273 or serious illegal detention under Article 267274 of the RPC. Section 4 (e), which
refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition, importation, or possession of
an explosive or incendiary device is similar to the o ense punished under Section 3 of
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 Presidential Decree No. 1866,275 as amended and destructive arson under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1613.276
The assailed phrase itself is likewise not vague. The three stages of execution - attempted,
frustrated, and consummated are de ned under Article 6 of the RPC. The Court notes that
Article 10 of the same Code provides that it shall have supplementary e ect277 to special
penal laws, such as the ATA. It can be reasonably inferred that Congress, by explicitly referring
to "stages of execution", intended for terrorism, whether attempted, frustrated, or
consummated, to be punished with life imprisonment without parole and the bene ts under
R.A. 10592. The legislative intent, therefore, is to treat attempted terrorism just as seriously as
consummated terrorism. This is in congruence with the preventative thrust of the ATA and
provides legal basis to prosecute and convict actors in failed terrorist plots.
The qualifying clause "when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context" is not
unconstitutionally vague.
Petitioners cite the case of Groot v. Netherlands,278 where the UN Human Rights Committee
allegedly held that the similar phrase "the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to
intimidate the general public" is insu cient to satisfy the principle of legal certainty.279 This is
a bewildering misquotation of the case, because the UN Human Rights Committee actually
decided that Groot's communication was inadmissible and ruled that the interpretation of
domestic legislation is essentially a matter for the courts of the State concerned, viz.:
4.3 The author has further claimed to be a victim of a violation of article 15 of the Covenant,
because he could not have foreseen that article 140 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of
which he was convicted, was applicable to his case by virtue of its imprecision. The Committee
refers to its established jurisprudence [Sec, inter alia, the Committee's decision in
communication No. 58/1979 (Anna Marou dou v. Sweden), para. 10.1 (Views adopted on 9
April 1981).] that interpretation of domestic legislation is essentially a matter for the courts and
authorities of the State party concerned. Since it does not appear from the information before
the Committee that the law in the present case was interpreted and applied arbitrarily or that its
application amounted to a denial of justice, the Committee considers that this part of the
communication is inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
Petitioners additionally argue that "nature" and "context" is vague because "nature" may mean
"inherent character" or "instinct, appetite, desire" or "a spontaneous attitude" or "external
world in its entirety"; while "context" means either "the interrelated conditions in which
something exists or occurs" or "parts of a discourse".280 This is a facetious argument and
symptomatic of the mischievous wordplay that some lawyers cunningly exploit. Petitioners
forget the maxim noscitur a sociis in statutory construction which has been explained as
follows:
x x x [W]here a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and speci c by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. This is because a word
or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its
meaning may, thus, be modi ed or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in xing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give e ect
to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase
in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be
modi ed or restricted by the latter.281
Thus, "nature" in Section 4 cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean "instinct, appetite,
desire," "a spontaneous attitude," "external world in its entirety," because such de nitions
would render the word "nature" absurd in connection with the other terms in Section 4.
Therefore, "nature," as used in Section 4, can only refer to the inherent character of the act
committed. By a similar process of elimination, "context" can only refer to the interrelated
conditions in which any of the acts enumerated in Section 4(a) to (e) was committed. These are
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 the standards which law enforcement agencies, the prosecution, and the courts may use in
determining whether the purpose of or intent behind any of the acts in Section 4(a) to (e) is to
intimidate the public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear,
to provoke or in uence by intimidation the government or any international organization, etc.
Terrorism as de ned in the ATA is not overbroad.
Likewise, petitioners' claim of overbreadth on the main part of Section 4 fails to impress. A
careful scrutiny of the language of the law shows that it is not overbroad since it fosters a valid
State policy to combat terrorism and protect national security and public safety, consistent
with international instruments and the anti-terrorism laws of other countries.
The Court notes that the ATA's de nition of terrorism under the main part of Section 4 is
congruent with the UN's proposed Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism282 which de nes terrorism under Article 2(l) as follows:
1. Any person commits an o ence within the meaning of the present Convention if that person,
by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the
environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the present
article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss;
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
The ATA de nition is also similar to the de nition as provided under Title II, Article 3 of Directive
(EU) 2017/541283 of the European Union:
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following intentional
acts, as de ned as o ences under national law, which, given their nature or context,
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, are de ned as terrorist
o ences where committed with one of the aims listed in paragraph 2:
(a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage-taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a xed platform located on the
continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in
major economic loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of explosives or weapons,
including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, as well as research into, and
development of, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons;
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing res, oods or explosions, the e ect of which
is to endanger human life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural
resource, the e ect of which is to endanger human life;
(i) illegal system interference, as referred to in Article 4 of Directive 2013/40/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council (1) in cases where Article 9(3) or point (b) or (c) of Article 9(4) of
that Directive applies, and illegal data interference, as referred to in Article 5 of that Directive in
cases where point (c) of Article 9(4) of that Directive applies;
(j) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in points (a) to (i).
2. The aims referred to in paragraph 1 are:
(a) seriously intimidating a population;
(b) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from
performing any act;
(c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or
social structures of a country or an international organisation.284 (Emphases supplied)
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 Noticeable patterns from the di erent de nitions of terrorist acts in other international
instruments285 equally bear similarities to the de nition adopted under Section 4 of the ATA.
Anent anti-terrorism laws of other countries, the Court observed that the United Kingdom's
Terrorism Act 2000286 de ned terrorism as follows:
(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where -
(a) the action foils within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to in uence the government or an international governmental
organization or to intimidate the publie or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious racial or
ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it -
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic
system.287 (Emphases supplied)
While the 2002 Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act of Singapore288 provides:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), for the purposes of this Act, "terrorist act" means the use or threat
of action -
(a) where the action -
(i) involves serious violence against a person;
(ii) involves serious damage to property;
(iii) endangers a person's life;
(iv) creates a serious risk to the health or the safety of the public or a section of the public;
(v) involves the use of rearms or explosives;
(vi) involves releasing into the environment or any part thereof, or distributing or otherwise
exposing the public or any part thereof to -
(A) any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance;
(B) any toxic chemical; or
(C) any microbial or other biological agent, or toxin;
(vii) disrupts, or seriously interferes with, any public computer system or the provision of any
service directly related to communications infrastructure, banking and nancial services, public
utilities, public transportation or public key infrastructure;
(viii) disrupts, or seriously interferes with, the provision of essential emergency services such as
the police, civil defence and medical services; or
(ix) involves prejudice to public security or national defence; and
(b) where the use or threat is intended or reasonably regarded as intending to -
(i) in uence or compel the Government, any other government, or any international
organisation to do or refrain from doing any act; or
(ii) intimidate the public or a section of the public, and includes any action speci ed in the
Second Schedule.
As seen from these instruments, the language employed in Section 4 of the ATA is almost
identical to the language used in other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the
de nitions nor the standards set by others must be followed by the Congress to the letter. It
simply shows that Congress did not formulate the de nition of terrorism out of sheer
arbitrariness, but out of a desire to be at par with other countries taking the same approach,
presumably so that they could also take a more proactive attitude in combating terrorism,
especially in light of the well-documented variety of modes, targets, and purposes of attacks
that have been described as "terroristic".
The present realities point to the conclusion that terrorism is constantly evolving - a matter
emphasized by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda during the interpellations:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ZALAMEDA:
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Now, Counsel, you are saying that the USA or the Human Security Acy is a better law than the
ATA because it states [therein] the predicate crimes to constitute terrorism, am I right? One of
the reasons why you think it is a better law?
ATTY. CADIZ:
Yes, your Honor, the predicate crimes are enumerated.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ZALAMEDA:
But would this not restrict the prosecution and deterrence of terrorism, if you state the
predicate crimes?
ATTY. CADIZ:
I don't believe so, Your Honor. But let us put this in a proper context. We all live in an imperfect
world, there will be imperfections, we could not guarantee a terror-free country, no country will
be able to guarantee that, Your Honor, but in balancing our individual right as stated in the Bill
of Rights, Your Honor, I think the Human Security Act is the better law, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ZALAMEDA:
But you say that terrorism, the concept of terrorism is continuously evolving. If you state in the
law the predicate crimes, how about in the future where a future de nition of terrorism may
encompass other acts or other crimes?
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ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ZALAMEDA:
x x x When predicate crimes [are] not encompassed by the Human Security Act
because terrorism is continuously evolving, what happens now if there is such act?
ATTY. CADIZ:
Your Honor, I could not, at this point in time, think of any other evolving predicate crime which
is not covered by the Human Security Act, Your Honor.289 (Emphases supplied)
The Court notes that the general wording of the law is a response to the ever-evolving nature of
terrorism. The Court recognizes that Congress cannot be expected to enumerate all speci c
acts which may be resorted to by terrorists in pursuing their goals. Congress should not be
compelled to use overly speci c terminologies in de ning terrorism when, by the normal
political processes, it has perceived that the intended results of terrorist acts greatly vary from
one attack to another.
The Congress, in enacting the ATA, now allows the government to take a preventative stance
against terrorism. Terrorism laws worldwide were not merely enacted for punishment but mainly
for prevention.290 Not only is it impossible to predict all the means and methods which
terrorists may use to commit their dastardly deeds, but it will also be debilitating on the
counter-terrorist operations of the State. The Court is well aware of how terrorists can choose
to take children as hostages and to kill them at will291 or they can simply disseminate a video
of a pilot being burned to death, along with a statement that those who have sided with the
United States "will be punished."292 Thus, government cannot a ord to patiently wait for an
act of terror to happen because lives are always at stake. Requiring an exhaustive list of
predicate crimes from Congress is impractical because of the wide range of possible terrorist
acts. As one scholar puts it:
The advent of terrorist attacks designed to cause mass casualties, with no warning, sometimes
involving the use of suicide, and with the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
weapons means that we can no longer wait until the point of attack before intervening. The
threat to the public is simply too great to run that risk...the result of this is that there are
occasions when suspected terrorists are arrested at an earlier stage in their planning and
preparation than would have been the ease in the past.293 (Emphasis supplied)
Without a doubt, the discussions on the history of terrorism and the reasons behind the
enactment of anti-terrorism laws worldwide unequivocally show that terrorism greatly threatens
the safety and security of the people. "In the modern world, terrorism is considered the most
prevalent and the most dangerous form of endangering the security of both national states and
the citizens thereof."294 This Court cannot turn a blind eye to the grim realities brought about
by terrorism. Addressing this complex problem is not only essential for physical safety per se
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 but for the genuine enjoyment of human rights. According to the O ce of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights:
Terrorism clearly has a very real and direct impact on human rights, with devastating
consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In
addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize Governments, undermine civil
society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. All of
these also have a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights.
Security of the individual is a basic human right and the protection of individuals is,
accordingly, a fundamental obligation of Government. States therefore have an obligation to
ensure the human rights of their nationals and others by taking positive measures to protect
them against the threat of terrorist acts and bringing the perpetrators of such acts to
justice.295 (Emphases supplied)
To reconcile the seemingly competing interests of national security and exercise of human
rights, it is important to acknowledge that human rights are not absolute. Under a strict
scrutiny lens, national security is a compelling state interest that justi es some necessary,
proportionate, and least intrusive restrictions on the exercise and enjoyment of particular
liberties. The Court nds that the main part of Section 4 of the ATA adopts the necessary,
proportionate, and least restrictive means in its implementation to counter the complex issue of
terrorism in the country. Again, the general wording of the law is a response to the ever-
evolving nature of terrorism. Congress cannot be expected to enumerate all speci c acts which
may be resorted to by terrorists in pursuing their goals.
In any event, concerned citizens are not left without a remedy since any perceived vagueness
or overbreadth of the terms used in the main part of Section 4 may still be assailed in the
appropriate actual cases that may be brought before the courts at the proper time beyond the
auspices of this delimited facial challenge. Inasmuch as terrorism is an ever-evolving
phenomenon, so too must jurisprudence evolve based on actual cases, not speculative
theories or ideas.
The "Not Intended" Clause of Section 4's proviso is unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny
test, as well as the void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.
Section 4's proviso, however, is a di erent story. It states:
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Provided, That, terrorism as de ned in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent,
stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political
rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to
endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.296 (Emphasis supplied)
The proviso is a proper subject of a facial analysis, because based on its text, it is a provision
that innately a ects speech and expression as it directly pertains to "advocacy, protest,
dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and
political rights". It has been argued that the proviso may be seen as a safeguard on the
freedom of expression to the extent that in order to convict an advocate, dissenter, or protester
under Section 4, the State must be able to prove that the advocacy, dissent, protests, and
other mass actions are intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to
endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety. Instructive on this point is
the exchange between Senator Lacson and his colleagues, viz.:
Senator Drilon: Currently, we see a lot of rallies, protests in Hong Kong. That kind of protests
has led to the collapse of the economy of Hong Kong practically. The anti-government protests
have gone on for six months and have really harmed the economy. Now, assuming for the sake
of argument, that something similar happens here, would that act or the act of the protesters
be considered as an act of terrorism because they are compelling the government to do
something by force or intimidation?
Senator Lacson: No, Mr. President. It will not be included because the fundamental rights are
always respected even in this proposed measure.
Senator Drilon: Yes, but supposed as in Hong Kong, there were instances of violence.
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 Senator Lacson. But we are always bound by the purpose, Mr. President. To allow them to
exercise their fundamental rights, their freedom, even to choose their leaders, to exercise
su rage. If that is the purpose, it does not constitute an act of terrorism, Mr.
President...that such acts, no matter how violent, if the purpose is not as enumerated under the
proposed measure, then those are not acts of terrorism.
For example, even if there is violence on the streets to call for freeing Senator De Lima, that is
not terrorism, Mr. President. That is a legitimate exercise of the freedom to assemble. But they
may be punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Senator Drilon: After the MOA-AD was rejected as unconstitutional, there was some violence in
Mindanao, and the objective was, very clearly, to press for the passage of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law. If this measure was law at that time, would the members of the Bangsamoro be
liable for terrorism? The purpose, Mr. President, is to compel the government to enact the
Bangsamoro Basic Law.
Senator Lacson: Well, I suppose what they are ghting for is their right to self-determination,
Mr. President. So, it may not constitute a terrorist act. x x x
Senator Hontiveros: If, for example, a labor group threatens to strike or to conduct work
stoppage, and said strike or work stoppage may be argued by some to result in major
economic loss, even destroy the economic structure of the country, could members of this
labor group be considered terrorists?
Senator Lacson: Mayroon pong proviso rito na basta legitimate exercise of the freedom of
expression or mag-express ng dissent, hindi po kasama rito, hindi mako-cover. Explicitly
provided po iyan set Section 4, iyong last paragraph po. Nandiyan.
Senator Hontiveros: What if in the process of strike or work stoppage nagkaroon ng dispersal,
nagkaroon ng karahasan?
Senator Lacson. Hindi po kasi, unang-una, hindi naman iyon ang intent. Ang intent ng mga
nagprotesta, mga laborers ay mag-strike, mag-express ng kanilang sariling dissent o iyong
expression ng kanilang pagprotesta sa puwedeng sabihin na naling mga bad labor practices.
So, hindi po papasok dito sa probisyong ito. Malinaw po iyon. x x x (senators talking about the
ending proviso of Section 4)
Senator Pimentel: Why was there a need to immediately qualify? Is there a danger or a close
relationship between exercise of basic rights and some acts which can be mistaken for as
terrorist acts?
Pero nag-aalala lamang ako na immediately after de ning terrorist acts, we have to clarify that
the exercise of fundamental rights will not be covered. So, mayroon palang danger na
mapagkamalan ang exercise of basic rights as a terrorist act kasi sinunod kaagad natin.
Senator Lacson: For clarity and for emphasis, Mr. President, para lamang malinaw, this is one
of the safeguards. Kasi if we do not include that proviso, I am sure the gentleman will be
interpellating along that line. Bakit kulang? That is why we deemed it wise na i-qualify na
lamang natin na hindi kasama iyong legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression, et cetera.
Senator Pimentel: So, in the legitimate exercise of a right, can there be an attack?
Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. Puwedeng mag-erupt.
Senator Lacson. Iyong legitimate exercise of the freedom of expression, et cetera, might result
in some violence that could result in destruction of properties or loss of lives, hindi po mako-
cover iyon, and that is the reason why we included that proviso or that quali cation. Para
lamang malinaw, Mr. President.
Senator Pimentel. In that scenario where there is a legitimate exercise of fundamental rights,
who made the attack?
Senator Lacson. Those expressing dissent in the exercise of their freedom of expression. Kung
mag-result regardless of who initiated, that could be initiated by their act of expressing their
freedom of dissent or expression na nag-result sa violence, then they should not be covered
under the de nition of a terrorist act because, again, babalik na naman tayo sa intent and
purpose.
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 Senator Pimentel: De nitely, ang intent niya is legitimate exercise of fundamental rights. So, we
just made it doubly clear, Mr. President. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; italics in the
original)
During the Oral Arguments, however, the following exchange transpired:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARANDANG:
The [proviso] of Section 4 states: Terrorism shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent,
stoppage of work and so on which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to
a person, to endanger [a] person's life or to create a serious risk to public safety. Does this
e ectively put the burden of evidence on the accused to prove that the exercise of his rights is
legitimate?
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL RIGODON:
Yes, Your Honor, because this proviso is a matter of defense, Your Honor. x x x Once the
prosecution has established the commission of the acts mentioned in the rst paragraph and
has also established the purpose, then it is incumbent upon the accused to raise as a defense
that he is merely exercising his civil or political rights.297 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Based on the above, the most contentious portion of the proviso is the clause "which are not
intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety". For purposes of brevity, it is henceforth referred to as the
"Not Intended Clause."
The "Not Intended Clause" under Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth
The OSG's interpretation of the proviso is consistent with Rule 4.4. of the ATA's IRR and
therefore accurately represents the government's o cial position. The OSG is of the view that
under Section 4's proviso, the mens rea behind the speech may be attributed or inferred in the
same manner as it can be done with the overt acts of terrorism de ned under Section 4(a) to
(e). During the Oral Arguments, this was made apparent in the following exchange:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARANDANG:
You know that intent is in the mind, how can you...how can you extract intent from the mind of
the person?
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL RIGODON:
Perhaps is there is...through the overt act, your Honor. We can perhaps apply by analogy the
principles developed by the Supreme Court with respect to the crimes under the Revised Penal
Code where the intent was gathered from the overt acts committed by the accused.298
This is an unprecedented view and is practically problematic, especially because the proviso's
scope of application is indeed very large and contemplates almost all forms of expression. It
may be recalled that in Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec,299 the Court held that:
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech
sometimes referred to as 'symbolic speech[,]' such that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, the communicative element of the
conduct may be su cient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression]."300
The proviso also applies to "other similar exercises of civil and political rights," which, under
constitutional law jurisprudence, refers not only to those guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution, but also those protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.301
The proviso was supposedly included in Section 4 to safeguard and protect said rights. To the
Court's mind, it was enough for Congress to state that terrorism as de ned in Section 4 "shall
not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other
similar exercises of civil and political rights." However, Congress unnecessarily included the
"Not Intended Clause," thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. In fact, the
government's o cial understanding of the "Not Intended Clause" achieves the exact opposite
of the proviso's supposedly noble purpose. As rightly pointed out by petitioners, it "shifts the
burden" upon the accused "to prove that [his] actions constitute an exercise of civil and
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 political rights,"302 contrary to the principle that it is the government that has the burden to
prove the unconstitutionality of an utterance or speech.
Admittedly, there are existing laws that penalize certain kinds of speech when communicated
with a speci c intent, but they are not constitutionally defective because the burden of proving
said intent lies with the government. For instance, in libel cases, it is the prosecution who must
prove that the speaker had a "malicious" state of mind in publishing the defamatory
statement.303 The courts, of course, may infer "malicious intent" or "actual malice" based on
the defamatory nature of the statement,304 but in so doing, the accused is not burdened with
proving the lack of such intent. The prosecution's burden is not shifted to the accused. In
contrast, the "Not Intended Clause" requires a person accused under Section 4 to prove that
his advocacy, protest, dissent, or any other exercise of his civil and political rights was not
tainted with intent to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's
life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.
More signi cantly, the "Not Intended Clause" causes serious ambiguity since there are no
su cient parameters that render it capable of judicial construction. To demonstrate this
ambiguity, one may dangerously suppose that "intent to cause death or serious physical harm
to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety" may be
inferred from strong public clamor attendant to protests, mass actions, or other similar
exercises of civil and political rights. However, by their very de nition, these types of speeches
are intended to express disapproval against someone else's proposition or stance on a given
issue and corollary to that, to advance one's own proposition305 and thus, should not be
considered as terrorist conduct. Without any su cient parameters, people are not guided
whether or not their impassioned and zealous propositions or the intense manner of
government criticism or disapproval are intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a
person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety. Notably, these
types of speech essentially refer to modes of communication by which matters of public
interest may be discussed truthfully and brought to the attention of the public. They are
vehicles by which the core of civil liberties in a democracy are exercised.
On this score, it is thus important to highlight that, more dangerous than the proviso's post-
indictment e ects are its pre-indictment e ects. Even prior to a court action being led against
the protester or dissenter, the proviso creates confusion as to whether the exercise of civil and
political rights might be interpreted by law enforcers as acts of terrorism and on that basis, lead
to his incarceration or tagging as a terrorist. Such liberties are abridged if the speaker-before
he can even speak-must ready himself with evidence that he has no terroristic intent. This is
not acceptable under the Constitution. To this extent, Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno's observations
ring true:
No other law makes the exercise of constitutional rights a crime when actuated by a certain
intent. No other law empowers the State to arrest its people for exercising rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, based solely on a law enforcer's subjective opinion of their state of mind, x x
x By including such exercise in its de nition of terrorism, the law puts petitioners [and other
speakers] smack in the hot zone of proscribed criminal activity. The sword that the law dangles
over their heads is real. The chilling e ect on their rights is palpcible.306
As such, the Court agrees with petitioners that the proviso's "Not Intended Clause" is void for
vagueness as it has a chilling e ect on the average person. Before the protester can speak, he
must rst guess whether his speech would be interpreted as a terrorist act under Section 4 and
whether he might be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for it. They will have to contend
whether the few hours they would spend on the streets to redress their grievances against the
government is worth the prospect of being inde nitely incarcerated, considering that terrorism
under Section 4 would be an unbailable o ense as per Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure.307 The danger of the clause is made graver by the fact that by shifting the
burden to the accused to explain his intent, it allows for law enforcers to take an "arrest now,
explain later" approach in the application of the ATA to protesters and dissenters-only that it
must be the latter who does the explaining, which makes it even more insidious. The chilling
e ect created by the aforesaid vague clause is sharply brought to the fore in this case
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especially when one considers the ATA's provisions on designation, proscription, and arrest
and detention. The vagueness of such provision is likely to result in an arbitrary exing of the
government muscle, which is equally aversive to due process.
In this relation, the Court recognizes that a person's reputation in uences his capacity and
credibility as a speaker. In the 1912 case of Worcester v. Ocampo,308 the Court said:
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The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life,
liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole
scheme of human civilization.
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A good name is to be chosen rather than great riches, and favor is better than silver or
gold.309
An ordinary citizen might forego speaking out against the government if only to avoid being
branded as a terrorist by the government. Even when a dissenter has successfully defended
himself in court, he may never be fully rid of the stigma of having been once labelled a
"terrorist" by his own government. Terrorism is a very serious thing - and one may not be
inclined to listen to a person's opinion on matters of public interest solely because he is tagged
as a terrorist. A person who has never been charged as a terrorist would be more credible. One
can preserve his reputation by strictly and cautiously choosing the words he or she would
speak regarding public matters - or to be more certain, by choosing not to say anything at all.
But that is precisely what is meant to be "chilled".
Moreover, the vagueness is magni ed by the fact that there are also threat, proposal, and
inciting to terrorism provisions in the ATA. If speech is to be penalized, then threat, proposal,
and inciting are not the proper o enses to cover the punishable speech. Therefore, the "Not
Intended Clause" only serves to confuse the safeguarding purpose of Section 4's proviso. To
the Court, the same cannot be saved by judicial construction, thus rendering it void for
vagueness.
Furthermore, the "Not Intended Clause" renders the proviso overbroad. By virtue of the said
clause, Section 4 supposes that speech that is "intended to cause death or serious physical
harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety" is
punishable as terrorism. This abridges free expression, since this kind of speech ought to
remain protected for as long as it does not render the commission of terrorism imminent as per
the Brandenburg standard, which, as will be explained below, is the proper standard to delimit
the prohibited speech provisions, such as inciting to terrorism, proposal, and threat. By plainly
punishing speech intended for such purposes, the imminence element of
the Brandenburg standard is discounted as a factor and as a result, the expression and its
mere intent, without more, is enough to arrest or detain someone for terrorism. This is a clear
case of the chilling of speech.
The Strict Scrutiny Standard vis-a-vis the Brandenburg Test relative to Inciting to Terrorism, etc.
Under its original formulation in Schenck v. U.S.,310 the question under the clear and present
danger rule is "whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger rule that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent."311 It has undergone several permutations
since Schenck but the rule was forti ed by the U.S. Supreme Court into its current form
in Brandenburg v. Ohio312 (Brandernurg), which states that:
x x x [T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.313
When quizzed on the proviso of Section 4, which punishes o enders with life imprisonment,
the OSG always ended up talking about incitement to terrorism,314 which is also punished
under Section 9. Notably, the Brandenburg standard, with its more stringent formulation, is
more in line with the strict scrutiny standard, which equally applies to facial challenges as
per Romualdez. In this light, the government has the burden of demonstrating that the speech
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 being restrained was: (1) directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action; and (2) is
likely to incite or produce such action.
For sure, the freedom of speech is not absolute, but it is fundamentally antithetical to the
foundational principles of a democratic society if a statute impresses upon the mind of law
enforcers that the purpose of the freedom of speech and the exercise of civil and political
rights per se is to incite or produce imminent lawless action and that it is likely to produce such
action, as per Brandenburg. Therefore, as will be expounded below, so as to guard against any
chilling e ects on free speech, the Court clari es that the provisions on inciting to terrorism
(Section 9), as well as any possible speech-related terrorist crimes, such as proposal (Section
8), threat (Section 5), and the like, should only be considered as crimes if the speech satis es
the Brandenburg lest based on its nature and context.
The "Not Intended Clause" also fails the strict scrutiny test.
Parallel to vagueness and overbreadth analysis, the strict scrutiny test can additionally be used
to determine the validity of the "Not Intended Clause", being a government regulation of
speech. Thus, applying this test, the government has the burden of proving that the
regulation: (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.
Here, the government has not shown that said clause passes strict scrutiny. While there
appears to be a compelling state interest, such as to forestall possible terrorist activities in light
of the global e orts to combat terrorism, punishing speech intended "to cause death or serious
physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public
safety" is not the least restrictive means to achieve the same. To the Court, for speech to be
penalized it must pass the Brandenburg standard, which the "Not Intended Clause" completely
discounts. Furthermore, there are already provisions that subsume such standard, such as the
provision on Inciting to Terrorism. Thus, as it stands, the "Not Intended Clause" only blurs the
distinction between terroristic conduct and speech, and hence, is not narrowly tailored to
subserve the aforesaid State interest.
All told, the "Not Intended Clause" fails the void for vagueness, overbreadth, and strict scrutiny
tests, because it curtails, as well as obscures, not only certain kinds of protected speech but
the very freedom to speak itself. While Congress is constitutionally empowered to restrict
certain forms of speech to prevent or deter terrorism, it must do so in a reasonably clear and
non-abusive manner narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, so as not to sweep
unnecessarily and broadly towards the protected freedom of speech.
Considering the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the "Not Intended Clause" in Section
4's proviso impermissibly restrains freedom of speech or expression. With that in mind,
however, the Court need not strike down the entirety of the proviso. It is proper for the Court to
excise only so much of a statute as is necessary to save it from unconstitutionality. The Court
nds that only the "Not Intended Clause", i.e., "which are not intended to cause death or
serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to
public safety" needs striking down. What precedes it, the phrase "Provided, That, terrorism as
de ned in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial
or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights," is hereby retained
because it accurately re ects the legislative intent and a rms the Court's view on this issue.
Therefore, the Court strikes down the "Not Intended Clause" as unconstitutional and
categorically a rms that all individuals, in accordance with Section 4 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution, are free to protest, dissent, advocate, peaceably assemble to petition the
government for redress of grievances, or otherwise exercise their civil and political
rights, without fear of being prosecuted as terrorists under the ATA.
In this regard, the Court wishes to convey, as a nal point on Section 4, that terrorism is not
ordinarily the goal of protests and dissents. Such exercises of the freedom of speech are
protected, even if they might induce a condition of unrest or stir people to anger. Incitement
aside, intimidating the government or causing public unrest is not unlawful per se if the means
taken to cause such intimidation or unrest is through speech, discourse, or "expressive
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 conduct". The foundation of democracy, by design, is a populace that is permitted to in uence
or intimidate its government with words, even those that induce anger or create
dissatisfaction.315 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales,316 one of the amici curiae in this case, the
Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno said:
Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing
political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to o cial measures, and to take
refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. When atrophied,
the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well - if not more - to those who
question, who do not conform, who di er. The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom
are con ned not only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly
meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the
articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such
view induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate,
no less than for the thought that agrees with us. (Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Facial Challenge on Sections 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12
The delimited facial challenge as above-discussed likewise permits this Court to address the
challenge against the validity of Sections 5 (Threat to Commit Terrorism), 8 (Proposal to
Commit Terrorism), 9 (Inciting to Commit Terrorism) and 12 (Providing Material Support to
Terrorists) to the extent that they seek to penalize speech based on their content. Additionally,
the Court will address the objections against Section 6 (Planning, Training, Preparing, and
Facilitating the Commission of Terrorism) in relation to Section 3(k), as well as Section 10
(Recruitment to and Membership in a Terrorist Organization) in the same vein that they
purportedly a ect free speech as well as its cognate rights of academic freedom and freedom
of association.
At the onset, it is important to reiterate that the Constitution abhors prior restraints on
speech.317 It has been held time and again that the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves unconventional or unacceptable to the
majority.318 The prohibition against restriction on speech "may well include sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public o cials"319 and extends even to mere
abstract teaching x x x of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence.320 Accordingly, the Constitution will not permit proscription of
advocacy except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action pursuant to the Brandenburg standard.321
Also, it bears reiteration that any governmental action that restricts speech comes to this Court
carrying a heavy presumption against its constitutionality322 pursuant to the constitutional
command under Section 4, Article III that no law shall be passed abridging free speech,
expression, and their cognate rights. In such situations, and whenever appropriate and
necessary for the just disposition of the case, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness may be used for testing 'on their faces' statutes encroaching on free speech and its
cognate rights.
Threat to Commit terrorism, as penalized under Section 5, of the ATA is neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
Section 5 of the ATA provides:
Section 5. Threat to Commit Terrorism. - Any person who shall threaten to commit any of the
acts mentioned in Section 4 hereof shall su er the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years.
Its counterpart provision in the IRR is found in Rule 4.5 which states that:
There is threat to commit terrorism when an intent to commit terrorism as de ned in Section 4
of the Act is communicated by any means to another person or entity under circumstances
which indicate the credibility of the threat.
Petitioners argue that Section 5 is constitutionally problematic because it deviates from how
"threats" are understood in Philippine case law as in Reyes v. People,323 where the Court held
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 that a "threat" refers to "the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened
the belief that the threat would be carried into e ect"324 and is therefore impermissibly vague
and overbroad.
Petitioners' claim is untenable. According to Reyes,325 cited by petitioners themselves, a
statement becomes a threat when the speaker is successful in making the hearer or recipient
believe that the threat would be carried out. Since Reyes, the Court decided other seminal
cases discussing the circumstances when a statement becomes a "threat" as contemplated by
law. In U.S. v. Paguirigan,326 the Court said that a threat made in jest or in the heat of anger,
under circumstances which show that the intention to which the threat gave utterance was not
persisted in, is only a misdemeanor. While in Caluag v. People,327 the Court appreciated the
hostile events that occurred preceding the threat, as well as the acts of the accused
simultaneous to his utterance.
Based on the foregoing, the Court, pursuant to its duty to interpret the law, appears to have
consistently interpreted threat to refer only to those "credible" threat statements, the
determination of which shall be based on the circumstances under which the statements were
made. Notably, Rule 4.5 of the IRR appears to have adopted the "credible" threat standard
when it restricts the application of Section 5 only to communications made "under
circumstances which indicate the credibility of the threat" consistent with the foregoing judicial
interpretation. For these reasons, the Court nds that Section 5 is not impermissibly vague.
The Court is also not convinced that Section 5 su ers from overbreadth. As already explained,
the State, under Section 4, is not permitted to create a prima facie case of terrorism against
persons who engage in protests, dissents, advocacies, and other exercises of civil and political
rights. Consequently, when a statement is uttered in circumstances that would clearly qualify it
as political speech, it cannot be punished as a "threat" under Section 5, as illustrated in U.S. v.
Watts328 (Watts), which petitioners cite. In Watts, the question was whether the following
statements of therein petitioner Watts during a political debate at a small public gathering
constituted a "threat" under an American statute:
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft
classi cation as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not
going. If they ever make me carry a ri e the rst man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J
(referring to then US President Lyndon B. Johnson).329 (Emphasis supplied)
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Watts' statement was not a "threat" considering its
conditional nature and the context in which it was made, opining that it was "political
hyperbole" and a "kind of very crude o ensive method of stating political opposition to the
President."330 Proceeding from the Court's holding with regard to Section 4, an analysis
similar to Watts is proper under Section 5 of the ATA, so that even the crudest forms of political
speech should be di erentiated from true or "credible" threats of terrorism in order to be
punishable under Section 5. As thus circumscribed, Section 5 does not appear overbroad.
More signi cantly, in the interpretation and application of the provisions of Sections 5,
the Brandenburg standard, which the Court deems incorporated in its reading, should be
applied. Thus, statements or communication can only be penalized as threats when they
are: (1) directed to producing imminent terrorism; and (2) is likely to produce such action.
All told, as thus construed and circumscribed, Section 5 does not appear to be impermissibly
vague and overbroad so as to chill free speech and its cognate rights.
Participating "in the x x x training x x x in the commission of terrorism" under Section 6 is
neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
Section 6 of the ATA provides:
Section 6. Planning, Training, Preparing, and facilitating the Commission of Terrorism. - It shall
be unlawful for any person to participate in the planning, training, preparation and facilitation in
the commission of terrorism, possessing objects connected with the preparation for the
commission of terrorism, or collecting or making documents connected with the preparation of
terrorism. Any person found guilty of the provisions of this Act shall su er the penalty of life
imprisonment without the bene t of parole and the bene ts of Republic Act No. 10592.
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 "Training" under Sections 6 and 3 (k) of the ATA is argued to implicate academic freedom
speci cally guaranteed under Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution and more
broadly guaranteed under Section 4, Article III. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon.
Capulong,331 the Court said:
The essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom"
cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be
taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. x x x "Academic
freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty,
has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the
press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as
professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal
words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and
external interference or pressure. (Emphasis supplied)
Proceeding from the averments in the petitions, the Court deems that Section 6 is susceptible
to a facial challenge insofar as it penalizes "training", which refers to the "giving of instruction
or teaching" as provided under Section 3(k). Thus, in accordance with the identi ed delimited
parameters of the present permissible facial challenge, the Court passes upon Section 6 with
regard to "training" only and withholds judgment as regards the other punishable acts, i.e.,
"planning," "preparing," and "facilitating" terrorism.
To expound, for petitioners, "training" in Section 6 is vague or overly broad because even
though it is de ned under Section 3(k), the term "instruction" is nevertheless unde ned.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 252580, for example, point out that the ATA curtails the academic
freedom of professors who teach Marxism or Thomas Aquinas' philosophy on the justi cation
of war. They fear that under this provision, the study or re-enactment of Dr. Jose Rizal's El
Filibusterismo, a work which the Spanish colonial government had considered subversive,
might be considered as pretext for the state to arrest teachers and students.332
These arguments fail to impress. Section 3(k) de nes training as the "giving of instruction or
teaching designed to impart a speci c skill in relation to terrorism as de ned hereunder, as
opposed to general knowledge." Properly construed with this de nition, training may be
penalized under Section 6 only when: (1) the "training" is with the purpose of committing
terrorism; (2) the training is intentionally designed to impart a skill in relation to
terrorism; and (3) the skill imparted has speci c relation to a projected act of terrorism, not
mere general knowledge. Thus, in order to be punishable under Section 6, the transfer of
knowledge must be demonstrated to have been done knowingly and willfully with the speci c
aim of capacitating the trainee to commit an act of terrorism.
Accordingly, the foregoing construction should foreclose any interpretation that would include
"skill" as ordinarily and broadly understood, especially considering that the teaching of
"general knowledge", as in classroom instruction done for purely academic purposes and in
good faith, is expressly excluded from the de nition of training under Section 3(k). To the
Court's mind, the parameters found in Section 3(k) betrays a legislative intent to put a stop to
the knowing and deliberate transfer of speci c skills in connection with projected terrorist acts,
and not the imparting of knowledge in the general and broad sense.
Of course, it is not appropriate for the Court to describe at this time what "speci c skill" is as
juxtaposed to "general knowledge". Such a distinction is better made in an actual case with
proven facts. What is clear at this time is that an educator or trainer may not be convicted
under Section 6 if the State fails to prove that the "training" satis es the parameters outlined
above.
Moreover, in the interpretation and application of the provisions of Sections 6 in relation to
training, the Brandenburg standard is deemed incorporated. Thus, teaching or the giving of
instructions can only be penalized as training within the ambit of Section 6 when they
are: (1) directed to producing imminent terrorism; and (2) is likely to produce such action.
Accordingly, as construed under the lens of Brandenburg, Section 6 in relation to Section 3(k)
only pertains to "training" which is directed to produce the commission of terrorism and is
likely to produce such action. In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court said that "the mere
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 abstract teaching x x x of the moral propriety or even moral necessity; for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action."333 On this understanding of Section 6, the Court does not nd Section 6
impermissibly vague or overbroad so as to violate petitioners' academic freedom.
Proposal to Commit Terrorism under Section 8 of the ATA is neither unconstitutionally vague
nor overbroad.
Section 8 of the ATA provides:
Section 8. Proposal to Commit Terrorism. - Any person who proposes to commit terrorism as
de ned in section 4 hereof shall su er the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
The foregoing provision must be read together with the de nition provided in Section 3(g)
which states:
(g) Proposal to Commit Terrorism is committed when a person who has decided to commit any
of the crimes de ned and penalized under the provisions of this Act proposes its execution to
some other person or persons.
and Rule 4.8 of the IRR which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to propose to commit terrorism as de ned in Section 4 of the
Act.
There is proposal to commit terrorism when a person who decided to commit terrorism as
de ned in Section 4 of the Act proposes its execution to some other person or persons.
Prosecution for this crime shall not be a bar to prosecution for acts of terrorism de ned and
penalized under Section 4 of the Act.
Any such person found guilty therefor shall sutler the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years.
Petitioners argue that Section 8 is inconsistent with Section 3(g) because the former penalizes
"a person who proposes to commit terrorism as de ned in Section 4" only, whereas the latter
penalizes "a person who has decided to commit ANY of the crimes de ned and penalized
under the provisions of this Act [(and thus, not only Section 4)] and proposes its execution to
some other person or person." Because Section 3(g) is not only broader than Section 8 but
also includes the element of "deciding to commit", petitioners argue that Section 8 is
unconstitutionally vague.334 They also argue that Section 8 is overly broad because its scope
is unclear, and it does not consider the intent of the speaker.335
The Court nds that Section 8 is the controlling provision as it is what actually penalizes the act
of proposal. According to Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which has supplementary
application to special laws,336 conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only
in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. In this case, Section 8
penalizes proposal only when the crime being proposed are those that are de ned in Section 4.
It does not provide for a penalty for proposal of the other acts prohibited under the ATA. This
reading also appears to be the o cial understanding of the government because Rule 4.8 of
the IRR refers only to Section 4. Therefore, Section 3(g) should not be construed as expanding
the scope of the crime of proposal to all the other provisions of the ATA. A contrary
construction is not only unreasonable but would also contradict the statutory rule that all parts
of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that e ect may be given to each and every
part thereof, and that con icting intention in the same statute are never to be supposed or so
regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.337
This notwithstanding, Section 3(g) serves an important purpose in clarifying and delineating the
punishable speech covered by Section 8. As outlined above, Section 3 (g) provides that
proposal to commit terrorism, as penalized under Section 8, is committed when a person who
has decided to commit terrorism "proposes its execution to some other person or persons."
Notably, this de nition is virtually a copy of the de nition of "proposal" in Article 8 of the RPC.
Evidently, "deciding to commit" is not super uous. It is an element which the State must prove
in prosecuting cases under Section 8 of the ATA. Without this necessary element, the speech
does not equally fall within the Brandenburg standard - that is, that the same is directed to
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. Thus, without the
element of "deciding to commit" in Section 3(g), the concept of "proposal" in Section 8 would
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 indeed be overly broad. Of course, the Court cannot at this time speculate how the element of
"deciding to commit" would be proven in any given case. Courts can only apply its proper
construction with more detail in the context of an actual case. Nonetheless, for guidance,
su ce it to say that the Court does not agree with petitioners that Section 8 is vague and
overly broad.
Inciting to Commit Terrorism under Section 9 of the ATA is not facially unconstitutional.
Section 9 of the ATA provides:
Section 9. Inciting to Commit Terrorism. - Any person who, without taking any direct part in the
commission of terrorism, shall incite others to the execution of any of the acts speci ed in
Section 4 hereof by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other
representations tending to the same end, shall su er the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years.
In relation thereto, Rule 4.9 of the IRRs states:
Rule 4.9. Inciting to commit terrorism
It shall be unlawful for any person who, without taking any direct part in the commission of
terrorism, shall incite others to commit the execution of any of the acts speci ed as terrorism
as de ned in Section 4 of the Act.
There is incitement to commit terrorism as de ned in Section 4 of the Act when a person who
does not take any direct part in the commission of terrorism incites others to the commission
of the same in whatever form by means of:
i. speeches;
ii. proclamations;
iii. writings;
iv. emblems;
v. banners; or
vi. other representations;
and the incitement is done under circumstances that show reasonable probability of success in
inciting the commission of terrorism.
In determining the existence of reasonable probability that speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, banners or other representations would help ensure success in inciting the
commission of terrorism, the following shall be considered:
a. Context
Analysis of the context should place the speech, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners,
or other representations within the social and political context prevalent at the time the same
was made and/or disseminated;
b. Speaker/actor
The position or status in the society of the speaker or actor should be considered, speci cally
his or her standing in the context of the audience to whom the speech or act is directed;
c. Intent
What is required is advocacy or intent that others commit terrorism, rather than the mere
distribution or circulation of material;
d. Content and form
Content analysis includes the degree to which the speech or act was provocative and direct, as
well as the form, style, or nature of arguments deployed in the speech, or the balance struck
between the arguments deployed;
e. Extent of the speech or act
This includes such elements as the reach of the speech or act, its public nature, its magnitude,
the means of dissemination used and the size of its audience;
f. Causation
Direct causation between the speech or act and the incitement.
Any such person found guilty therefor shall su er the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years.
Petitioners contend that Section 9 fails to distinguish between legitimate dissent and terrorism
which leads to the curtailment of their right to freedom of speech. On the other hand, the OSG
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 insists that Section 9 deals with unprotected speech since it involves advocating imminent
lawless action which endangers national security.
The Court rules in favor of the government.
Without doubt, terrorism and communication that can directly and unmistakably lead to or aid
terrorist activities raise grave national security concerns that would justify government
regulation of speech. The State therefore has the right, nay, the duty, to prevent terrorist acts
which may result from incitement. As held in Dennis v. United States,338 the impending
overthrow of the government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest to
limit speech, for if the government cannot protect its very structure from armed attack, it must
follow that no subordinate value can be protected:
Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest
for the Government to limit speech. Indeed, Ibis is the ultimate value of any society, for if a
society cannot protect its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no
subordinate value can be protected. If, then, this interest may be protected, the literal problem
which is presented is what has been meant by the use of the phrase 'clear and present danger'
of the utterances bringing about the evil within the power of Congress to punish.
Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the
putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If the
government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its
members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the
circumstances permit, action by the government is required. The argument that there is no
need for Government to concern itself, for government is strong, it possesses ample powers to
put down a rebellion, it may defeat the revolution with ease needs no answer. For that is not
the question. Certainly, an attempt to overthrow the government by force, even though
doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is
su cient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which such attempts create both physically
and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the probability
of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt x x x We must therefore reject the
contention that success or probability of success is the criterion.339 (Emphases supplied)
Even Chavez v. Gonzales340 - one of the main cases that petitioners rely on to support their
claim - recognized that matters concerning national security in relation to the freedom of
speech are treated di erently.
The international community as well recognizes the need for States .to collectively act to
punish incitement to terrorism to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology to support their
acts.341 In UNSC Resolution 1624 (2005), the UNSC expressed its deep concern that
"incitement of terrorist acts x x x poses a serious and growing danger to the enjoyment of
human rights, threatens the social and economic development of all States, undermines global
stability and prosperity, and must be addressed urgently and proactively by the United Nations
and all States."342 This shows that the ght against the incitement of terrorist acts has been
given importance not only in the country but internationally as well.
Notably, aside from a compelling state interest, the strict scrutiny test, which applies to
content-based speech restrictions, requires the necessity and proportionality of the means
used to curtail the exercise of free speech rights. Under Section 9 of the ATA, inciting is
committed by any person who, without taking any direct part in the commission of terrorism,
shall incite others to the execution of the acts speci ed in Section 4. While the terms "inciting"
or "incitement" are not themselves de ned in the ATA, reference can be made to the Senate
deliberations which shows that Section 9 was intended to operate only within a narrow and
con ned area of speech where restrictions are permitted, and only within the con nes of the
intent-purposes parameters of Section 4.343
Senator Lacson: Kapag sinabi nating "inciting" directed against the general public, ito iyong
puwedeng mag-lead doon sa pag-commit ng terrorist acts. Pero kung wala namang call to
commit violence or to commit terrorist activities or terrorist acts, then hindi nainan po siguro
puwedeng masaklaw nitong batas.
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Senator Hontiveros: No problem, Mr. President. Paano po nalin susukatin iyong panganib?
How do we measure danger? How do we determine when the conduct, lalo na kung indirect
conduct, actually causes a danger of such acts being committed?
Senator Lacson: Well, it redounds to the violence that will be created. Babalik na naman tayo
roon sa intent at saka iyong purpose noong pag-i-incite to commit terrorist acts, Mr. President.
Senator Lacson: We will be guided by the existing jurisprudence in this regard and there are
many, Mr. President. Iyong Chavez vs. Raul Gonzales, marami po ito na puwede natin gawing
reference at the proper time.344 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, based on this legislative intent, statements may only be penalized under Section 9 if the
speaker clearly intended the hearers to perform any of the punishable acts and for the
purposes enumerated under Section 4.
The foregoing legislative characterization of incitement appears to re ect the international
understanding of "incitement" as "a direct call to engage in terrorism, with the intention that
this will promote terrorism, and in a context in which the call is directly causally responsible for
increasing the actual likelihood of a terrorist act occurrine."345 It also appears to heed the
United Nations Secretary General's recommendation for states to prosecute direct incitement
to terrorism only if it "directly encourages the commission of a crime, is intended to result in
criminal action, and is likely to result in criminal action" in order for states to comply with the
international protection of freedoms of expression.346 Moreover, they appear to incorporate
the imminence (i.e., directed to inciting imminent lawless action) and likelihood (i.e., likely to
incite such action) elements of Brandenburg.
Based on the foregoing construction, the Court thus nds that speech or statements can be
penalized as inciting under Section 9 only if they are: (1) direct and explicit - not merely vague,
abstract, equivocal - calls to engage in terrorism; (2) made with the intent to promote terrorism;
and (3) directly and causally responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of terrorist attacks.
To the Court's mind, these parameters have been largely incorporated in the detailed
guidelines found in Rule 4.9 of the IRR for the prosecution of incitement under Section 9, thus:
There is incitement to commit terrorism as de ned in Section 4 of the Act when a person who
does not take any direct part in the commission of terrorism incites others to the commission
of the same in whatever form by means of:
i. speeches;
ii. proclamations;
iii. writings;
iv. emblems;
v. banners; or
vi. other representations.
and the incitement is done under circumstances that show reasonable probability of success in
inciting the commission of terrorism.
In determining the existence of reasonable probability that speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, banners, or other representations would help ensure success in inciting the
commission of terrorism, the following shall be considered:
a. Context
Analysis of the context should place the speech, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners,
or other representations within the social and political context prevalent at the time the same
was made and/or disseminated;
b. Speaker/actor
The position or status in the society of the speaker or actor should be considered, speci cally
his or her standing in the context of the audience to whom the speech or act is directed;
c. Intent
What is required is advocacy or intent that others commit terrorism, rather than the mere
distribution or circulation of material;
d. Content and form
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 Content analysis includes the degree to which the speech or act was provocative and direct, as
well as the form, style, or nature of arguments deployed in the speech, or the balance
struck between the arguments deployed;
e. Extent of the speech or act
This includes such elements as the reach of the speech or act, its public nature, its magnitude,
the means of dissemination used and the size of its audience; and
f. Causation
Direct causation between the speech or act and the incitement.347 (Emphases supplied)
These guidelines are conspicuously similar to the Rabat Plan of Action which refers to an
internationally-recognized high threshold tor de ning restrictions on freedom of expression.
The six-part threshold test takes into consideration the following factors: (1) the social and
political context, (2) status of the speaker, (3) intent to incite the audience against a target
group, (4) content and form of the speech, (5) extent of its dissemination and (6) likelihood of
harm, including imminence.348
Together, the foregoing guidelines serve as an e ective safeguard which ensures that not all
forms of provocation or passionate advocacy or criticism against the Government shall be
penalized as incitement under the law. The context, speaker, intent, content and form, and the
extent of the speech or act shall all be considered to ensure that the incitement is not only
grave, but may very well be imminent. For example, when a humble teacher posts on social
media that he will give fty million pesos to the one who kills the President, he may not be
punished for inciting to commit terrorism in the absence of a showing that the statements
made were clearly directed to inciting an imminent act of terrorism and is likely to lead to
terrorism.349 The position of the speaker also appears not likely to in uence others to commit
terrorism.
Accordingly, the Court nds that, as construed, Section 9 is reasonably and narrowly drawn
and is the least restrictive means to achieve the declared compelling state purpose.
Membership under Section 10 is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
Another provision in the ATA of particular concern to the Court is Section 10, which de nes and
penalizes the crime of recruitment to, and membership in, a terrorist organization. The
provision, in full, provides:
Section 10. Recruitment to and Membership in a Terrorist Organization. - Any person who shall
recruit another to participate in, join, commit or support terrorism or a terrorist individual or any
terrorist organization, association or group of persons proscribed under Section 26 of this Act,
or designated by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist organization, or organized
for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall su er the penalty of life imprisonment without
the bene t of parole and the bene ts of Republic Act No. 10592.
The same penalty shall be imposed on any person who organizes or facilitates the travel of
individuals to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of
recruitment which may be committed through any of the following means:
(a) Recruiting another person to serve in any capacity in or with an armed force in a foreign
state, whether the armed force forms part of the armed forces of the government of that
foreign state or otherwise;
(b) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda for the purpose of recruiting persons to serve in
any capacity in or with such an armed force;
(c) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda containing any information relating to the place
at which or the manner in which persons may make applications to serve or obtain information
relating to service in any capacity in or with such armed force or relating to the manner in which
persons may travel to a foreign state for the purpose of serving in any capacity in or with such
armed force; or
(d) Performing any other act with the intention of facilitating or promoting the recruitment of
persons to serve in any capacity in or with such armed force.
Any person who shall voluntarily and knowingly join any organization, association or group of
persons knowing that such organization, association or group of persons is proscribed under
Section 26 of this Act, or designated by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist
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 organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall su er the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Petitioners argue that Section 10 should be nulli ed for being vague and overbroad. Petitioners
point out that the term "support" in the challenged provision has no statutory de nition and
could thus lead to an interpretation covering a wide range of acts, from mere sympathy to
actual ideological support, and even to formal armed support.350 They also criticize Section
10 for punishing "mere membership" in an organization "organized for the purpose of engaging
in terrorism." They claim that an accusation of membership is easy to fabricate and law
enforcers are free to interpret what groups are "organized for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism" as Section 10 does not require a prior judicial declaration for this purpose.351 They
also contend that Section 10 su ers from overbreadth because certain words or phrases in the
provision which include inter alia "in any capacity", "facilitating travel", "recruiting",
"advertisement", "propaganda", and "support" may cover legitimate forms of expression.352
The third paragraph of Section 10 is susceptible to a facial challenge.
As previously discussed, the Court may take cognizance of a facial challenge against the
constitutionality of statutes if its provisions involve or target free speech, expression, and its
cognate rights, such as freedom of association. The third paragraph of Section 10, which
punishes membership in a terrorist organization, is one such provision in the ATA, which the
Court nds proper to delve into.
As petitioners assert, Section 10 seems to punish mere membership. Preliminarily, the Court
recognizes that membership or the right to freely associate in any organization, association, or
group is but one of the many ways by which persons can exercise the right to speak and the
right to freely express themselves in order to advance their advocacies, beliefs, and ideas.
Hence, there is a manifest link between the exercise of the rights of free expression and
association which is "premised on the idea that an individual's [right to free speech and
expression] 'could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a
correlative freedom to engage in group e ort toward those ends were not also
guaranteed.'"353 As further explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees:354
According protection to collective e ort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in
preserving political and cultural diversity, and in shielding dissident expression from
suppression by the majority. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
The nexus between the freedom of speech and expression and the freedom of association has
been recognized by the Court as early as 1969 in Vera v. Hon. Arca355 (Vera). While the factual
circumstances in Vera are not on all fours with this case, the Court then declared:
x x x [W]hen there is an invasion of the preferred freedoms of belief, of expression as well as
the cognate rights to freedom of assembly and association, an a rmative response to a plea
for preliminary injunction would indeed be called for. The primacy of the freedom of the mind is
entitled to the highest respect. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This interrelation between speech and association, one of two distinct senses of the
constitutionally protected freedom of association, is identi ed in U.S. jurisprudence as
the freedom of expressive association.356 Adapted to the Philippine context, this is the right or
freedom to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities guaranteed and protected
under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution, i.e., speech, assembly, and petition for redress of
grievances.
With these in mind, the Court holds that the third paragraph of Section 10 is susceptible to a
facial challenge. As presented above, petitioners challenge the perceived chilling e ect that
Section 10 creates in the people's exercise of the right to association, which, in turn, gravely
a ects the exercise of the right to free speech and expression.
The prohibition to voluntarily and knowingly join proscribed and UNSC-designated
organizations are permissible restrictions on the freedom of association.
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 To be penalized under the third paragraph of Section 10, it is required that a person shall: one,
voluntarily and knowingly join an organization, association, or group; and two,
have knowledge that the organization, association, or group is (a) proscribed under Section 26
of the ATA, (b) designated by the UNSC, or (c) organized for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism. Based on this de nition, Section 10 punishes membership under three
instances: rst, when a person voluntarily and knowingly joins any organization, knowing that
such organization is proscribed under Section 26 of the ATA; second, when a person voluntarily
and knowingly joins any organization, knowing that such organization has been designated by
the UNSC as a terrorist organization; and third, when a person voluntarily and knowingly joins
any organization, knowing that such organization has been organized for the purpose of
engaging in terrorism.
The Court nds no impermissible vagueness in the rst and second instances. The Court
observes that under these two instances, persons are su ciently given fair notice of the
conduct to avoid, and law enforcers are not given unbridled discretion to determine who
should be prosecuted and penalized. Under the rst two instances, only those who voluntarily
and knowingly join an organization, association, or group, knowing that the said organization,
association, or group is a proscribed organization or has been designated by the UNSC, is in
violation of Section 10. The wording of the statute is plain enough to inform individuals what
conduct or act is prohibited, and what would make them criminally liable. Moreover, the
publication requirement for proscription and designation ensures that the status of the
organization, association, or group is readily ascertainable to the general public.
The Court also nds that penalizing membership under the rst two instances are not
overbroad. The restriction does not sweep unnecessarily and broadly towards protected
freedoms, because to reiterate, only those who voluntarily and knowingly join an organization,
association, or group despite knowing that the said organization, association, or group is a
proscribed organization or has been designated by the UNSC, may be penalized. Given these
parameters provided under the law, the Court is therefore not convinced that Section 10
invades the protected freedom of association, which remains sacrosanct only when its exercise
is for purposes not contrary to law. Section 8, Article III of the Constitution categorically states:
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.357 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the right to join, to associate, or to a liate oneself with a judicially proscribed
organization or an organization designated as a terrorist by the UNSC is, for all intents and
purposes, not constitutionally protected considering that these organizations have already
been determined, after appropriate proceedings, to be in violation of the ATA, R.A. No. 10168
or the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act, or the relevant international
instruments on terrorism - purposes that are clearly contrary to law. At the risk of repetition, it
should once more be noted that proscription and UNSC designation have a publication
requirement, ensuring that the status of an organization, association, or group as a terrorist is
readily ascertainable.
Mere membership is not penalized under the third paragraph of Section 10.
In this light, the argument that mere membership is punished by Section 10, fails. The
requirement under the provision is that a person shall voluntarily and knowingly join a judicially
proscribed or a UNSC designated organization, despite knowing the status or nature of the
organization or group as such. Section 10 unmistakably has a scienter element:358 the
o ender who sought to join an organization, association, or group has an awareness of the
status and nature of such organization, association, or group as judicially proscribed or UNSC-
designated, but he or she still knowingly and voluntarily joins anyway. Thus, the membership
penalized under Section 10 must be a knowing membership, as distinguished from
a nominal or per se membership.
The Senate deliberations underscored the importance of establishing the scienter element in
the prosecution of the o ense, as revealed in the following exchange:
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 Senator Drilon. For example, I am alleged to be a member of a proscribed organization and,
therefore, I am arrested and detained for 14 working days on the allegation that I am a member
of an organization which is proscribed, how do we guard against abuses?
Senator Lacson. That is a di erent matter, Mr. President. To arrest an alleged member of a
proscribed organization, it is incumbent upon the government to prove that he is really a
member before he can be arrested. Iyon naman pong warrantless arrest, iba naman po iyon.
Hindi dahil sa mayroong reasonable ground or mayroong ground iyong police o cer to arrest a
person just because he is reportedly a member or allegedly a member, hindi siya pupuwedeng
basta arestuhin. The government should prove that the person to be arrested is indeed a
member of that proscribed organization.
Senator Drilon. Not only he is a member, but he knowingly, under the measure, became a
member.
Senator Lacson. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. So that unless there is proof that he knowingly became a member, knowing that
it is a terrorist organization, he cannot be arrested.
Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. So, just for the record, it is not mere membership in the proscribe organization,
but it must be shown that he knowingly and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature of the
organization, joined it. In other words, it is not automatic that one who is a member of a
proscribed organization could be arrested.
Senator Lacson. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct. That is expressly provided under
Section 10.359 (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear from the quoted exchange that the challenged provision does not intend to
automatically punish members of a proscribed organization. Instead, what the law seeks to
criminalize is voluntarily joining an organization despite knowing it to be proscribed under
Section 26 of the ATA or designated by the UNSC.
Similarly illuminating on this point, despite the change in circumstances, is the Court's ruling in
the 1972 case People v. Hon. Ferrer360 (Ferrer). In Ferrer, one of the arguments in assailing the
Anti-Subversion Act is that the law punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts a liates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Communist Party of the
Philippines or of any other similar "subversive" organization, in derogation of the freedom of
expression and freedom of association. The Court ruled in this wise:
The requirement of knowing membership, as distinguished from nominal membership, has
been held as a su cient basis lor penalizing membership in a subversive organization. For, as
has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is accepted or retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged in an
unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membership with such knowledge makes
himself a party to the unlawful enterprise in which it is engaged. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted]361
Ferrer is instructive to the extent of clarifying when membership may be penalized. Since
Section 10 of the ATA similarly penalizes membership, the knowing membership requirement,
as distinguished from mere nominal membership, laid down in Ferrer should also be applied.
The requirement of a knowing membership in instances when membership in an organization is
penalized by statute has also been considered and discussed in U.S. jurisprudence. In Wieman
v. Updegra 362 (Weiman) the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the "[i]ndiscriminate
classi cation of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power." In
ruling that an Oklahoma loyalty oath law violated the First Amendment, the High Court
elucidated that:
This must be viewed as a holding that knowledge is not a factor under the Oklahoma statute.
We are thus brought to the question touched on in Garner, Adler, and Gerende: whether the
due process clause permits a state, in attempting to bar disloyal individuals from its employ, to
exclude persons solely on the basis of organizational membership, regardless of their
knowledge concerning the organizations to which they had belonged. For, under the statute
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 before us, the fact of membership alone disquali es. If the rule be expressed as a presumption
of disloyalty, it is a conclusive one.
But membership may be innocent. A state servant may have joined a proscribed organization
unaware of its activities and purposes. In recent years, many completely loyal persons have
severed organizational ties after learning for the rst time of the character of groups to which
they had belonged.
"They had joined, [but] did not know what it was; they were good, ne young men and women,
loyal Americans, but they had been trapped into it - because one of the great weaknesses of all
Americans, whether adult or youth, is to join something."
At the time of a liation, a group itself may be innocent, only later coming under the in uence of
those who would turn it toward illegitimate ends. Conversely, an organization formerly
subversive, and therefore designated as such, may have subsequently freed itself from the
in uences which originally led to its listing.
There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded from public
employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain is a deep one;
indeed, it has become a badge of infamy. x x x Yet, under the Oklahoma Act, the fact of
association alone determines disloyalty and disquali cation; it matters not whether association
existed innocently or knowingly. To thus inhibit individual freedom of movement is to sti e the
ow of democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources. We hold that the
distinction observed between the case at bar and Garner, Adler and Gerende is
decisive. Indiscriminate classi cation of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion
of arbitrary power. The oath o ends due process. (Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)363
Almost a decade after Wieman, the U.S. Supreme Court notably touched on the membership
clause of the Federal Smith Act in Scales v. United States364 (Scales), a ruling that was cited
in Ferrer. In Scales, the assailed statute penalized membership in any society, group, or
assembly of persons which teaches, advocates, or encourages the overthrow and destruction
of the government by force or violence. In upholding the membership clause and nding that
the statute requires active membership, the U.S. Supreme Court ratiocinated:
We nd hardly greater di culty in interpreting the membership clause to reach only "active"
members. We decline to attribute to Congress a purpose to punish nominal membership, even
though accompanied by "knowledge" and "intent," not merely because of the close
constitutional questions that such a purpose would raise, but also for two other reasons: it is
not to be lightly inferred that Congress intended to visit upon mere passive members the heavy
penalties imposed by the Smith Act. Nor can we assume that it was Congress' purpose to
allow the quality of the punishable membership to be measured solely by the varying standards
of that relationship as subjectively viewed by di erent organizations. It is more reasonable to
believe that Congress contemplated an objective standard xed by the law itself, thereby
assuring an evenhanded application of the statute.
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In an area of the criminal law which this Court has indicated more than once demands its
watchful scrutiny, these factors have weight and must be found to be overborne in a total
constitutional assessment of the statute. We think, however, they are duly met when the statute
is found to reach only "active" members having also a guilty knowledge and intent, and which
therefore prevents a conviction on what otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression
of sympathy with the alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any signi cant action in its
support or any commitment to undertake such action.
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It was settled in Dennis that the advocacy with which we are here concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and it was further established that a combination to promote
such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a political party, is not such
association as is protected by the First Amendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this
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 same forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees
of that Amendment.
If it is said that the mere existence of such an enactment tends to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights, in that it engenders an unhealthy fear that one may nd
himself unwittingly embroiled in criminal liability, the answer surely is that the statute provides
that a defendant must be proven to have knowledge of the proscribed advocacy before he may
be convicted. x x x If there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a group having
both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real danger that legitimate political
expression or association would be impaired, but the membership clause, as here construed,
does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with "the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." The clause does not make criminal all
association with an organization which has been shown to engage in illegal advocacy. There
must be clear proof that a defendant "speci cally intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the
organization] by resort to violence." Thus, the member for whom the organization is a vehicle
for the advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fall within the ban of the statute:
he lacks the requisite speci c intent "to bring about the overthrow of the government as
speedily as circumstances would permit." Such a person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps
merely optimistic, but he is not by this statute made a criminal. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted]365
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Scales declared that the membership clause of the
Smith Act, as then construed, did not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is
necessary to deal with "the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." This
declaration is pertinent for purposes of this discussion, because the Court, in nding that the
rst and second instances of membership penalized under Section 10 satis es the strict
scrutiny test, makes the same nding that the prohibitions contemplated under the rst and
second instances are so narrowly tailored and thus, are reasonable counterterrorism measures.
Penalizing membership under the rst two instances of Section 10 is a necessary means to
achieve a compelling state interest. Without doubt, the State has an inherent right of self-
preservation, which was emphasized in Ferrer:
That the Government has a right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition too plain
to require elaboration. Sell-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and
transcends every other value, "for if a society cannot protect its very structure from armed
internal attack, x x x no subordinate value can be protected". As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly
said in Dennis vs. United States:
"Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion
against dictatorial governments is without force where the existing structure of government
provides for peaceful and orderly change. We reject any principle of governmental helplessness
in the face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must
lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not within the power of Congress to prohibit
acts intended to overthrow the government by force and violence."366 [Citations omitted]
Moreover, as thoroughly explained in the preceding discussions, the State, to preserve itself
and protect its people from terrorism, needs to ensure that possible terrorist activities of
foreigners within the Philippine jurisdiction or against Philippine nationals abroad are
forestalled.
Therefore, as a reasonable counterterrorism measure, the State is justi ed in preventing
terrorist groups from forming and obtaining any opportunity to gain support
through knowing membership. Given the restrictive nature of the membership intended to be
punished under the rst and second instances of membership under Section 10, the Court
nds the same narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling State
purpose.
Furthermore, the rst instance of membership punished under Section 10, i.e., membership in
a proscribed organization, association or group of persons under Section 26, recognizes that
proscription involves court intervention and fair notice before an organization, association or
group of persons is outlawed. Knowingly joining despite the fact that it has been outlawed by
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 the court is precisely the evil sought to be prevented by the ATA. There is no comprehensible
justi cation to knowingly or intentionally join or maintain membership under this instance.
Thus, this is not an unreasonable restraint in the exercise of the right to association.
In the same vein, the second instance of membership punished under Section 10, i.e.,
membership in a designated terrorist organization, association or group of persons, is limited
only to those organizations, associations or groups designated under the rst mode of Section
25, through the automatic adoption of the designation or listing made by the UNSC. When the
third paragraph of Section 10 is taken together with the Court's analysis on Section 25, which
will be explained in full in later discussions, it is clear that the law seeks to punish the
reprehensible act of knowingly joining an internationally-recognized terrorist organization or
association. This is also a permissible restriction on the exercise of the right to association.
The requirement of knowing membership, to emphasize, is evident in the Senate deliberations,
Philippine jurisprudence, and even U.S. jurisprudence. The Court stresses once again that the
determination of the status of an organization of which the o ender is allegedly a member is
readily ascertainable in view of the publication requirement in proscription and designation.
Hence, the only thing to be determined under the rst two instances is whether the o ender
actually and consciously knew that the organization, association, or group he or she is joining
has been proscribed or has been designated by the UNSC as a terrorist, which in turn can be
ascertained from the circumstances surrounding the membership of the o ender as well as the
declaration of the status of an organization as a terrorist.
In all, the Court sees no reason to declare as unconstitutional the rst and second instances of
membership penalized under the third paragraph of Section 10.
With a vote of 6-9, the succeeding discussion in the ponencia on the issue of the
constitutionality of the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" in Section
10 had been overturned and is not re ective of the opinion of the majority of the members of
the Court. On this issue, the majority declared the subject phrase not unconstitutional. Readers
are cautioned to read this portion of the ponencia as it holds the opinion of only six (6)
members of the Court and not the controlling resolution on the issue. The controlling opinion
on this issue is found in the opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo.367
The phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" must be struck down for being
vague, overbroad, and for failing to meet the strict scrutiny test.
The Court rules di erently as regards the third instance of membership penalized under
Section 10, i.e., voluntarily and knowingly joining any organization, knowing that such
organization has been organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. The latter phrase
"organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" primarily renders the same
unconstitutional.
To expound, the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" under the third
instance is iinpermissibly vague. In the context of penalizing a person's alleged membership in
a terrorist organization, association, or group, there is nothing in the law which provides rules
or guidelines to determine and verify the nature of said organization, association, or group as
one "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism". Even the Senate deliberations on the
provision fail to provide guidance or standards for this purpose. Without any su cient or
discernible parameters, the third instance of membership penalized under Section 10 would
necessarily fail to accord persons fair notice of what conduct they should avoid, and would
give law enforcers unrestrained discretion in ascertaining that an organization, association, or
group was organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. The Court agrees with
petitioners that charges under this instance would be very easy to fabricate, since the lack of
standards may give law enforcers free rein in determining which groups are so-called
"organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism". This appears to be in stark contrast to the
rst and second instances, as discussed above (i.e., proscribed or designated terrorist groups),
in which information on the status and nature of an organization, association, or group, whether
judicially proscribed or designated by the UNSC, is readily ascertainable and available.
Furthermore, while the State remains to have a compelling interest in punishing membership in
groups organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, the Court nds that the assailed
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 phrase would unnecessarily overreach into innocent and protected membership. Since the
determination of the presence of the second element of the violation - the alleged member's
knowledge about the organization's status as a terrorist, i.e., that it was organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism - rests on undetermined and unprescribed parameters, it is
not far-fetched that a determination under the third instance will lead to an arbitrary nding of
membership. To be sure, there may be instances when the determination of the status or
nature can be easily had if in fact, the organization, association, or group has actually
committed or has overtly attempted to commit terrorism. But these instances do not rectify the
apparent aw in the provision which permits its unnecessary application and overreach into
protected associations. This may certainly, and unreasonably, restrain and chill the people's
exercise of the innocent exercise of the freedom of association in order to avoid being charged
under Section 10.
The Court, by the same token, nds that the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism" does not meet the second requisite of the strict scrutiny test. To the Court's mind,
the phrase is not narrowly tailored and fails to employ the least restrictive means to accomplish
the interest of preventing membership in terrorist organizations, associations or groups. Similar
to what has been stated above, there are no apparent standards or parameters provided in the
law to determine whether the organization, association, or group is indeed organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism. Without such standards or parameters, the public is left to
guess what degree or variant of membership may be punished, which can unjusti ably include
within its scope innocent and protected associations.
All told, the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" in Section 10 should
be struck down for violating the freedom of association.
Section 12 of the ATA, insofar as it penalizes the provision of "training" and "expert advice" as
material support, is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
Section 12 of the ATA provides:
Section 12. Providing Material Support to Terrorists. - Any person who provides material
support to any terrorist individual or terrorist organization, association or group of persons
committing any of the acts punishable under Section 4 hereof, knowing that such individual or
organization, association, or group of persons is committing or planning to commit such acts,
shall be liable as principal to any and all terrorist activities committed by said individuals or
organizations, in addition to other criminal liabilities he/she or they may have incurred in
relation thereto.
Meanwhile, Section 3(e) of the ATA considers "training" as "material support," viz.:
(e) Material Support shall refer to any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or nancial securities, nancial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identi cation,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one
or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation; (Emphasis supplied)
Again, "training" is de ned in Section 3(k) of the ATA as follows:
(k) Training shall refer to the giving of instruction or teaching designed to impart a speci c skill
in relation to terrorism as de ned hereunder, as opposed to general knowledge;
Consistent with the discussion on Section 6 of the ATA, the Court nds that Section 12 may be
subject to a facial challenge only insofar as it regulates certain speech acts. The Court nds
that Section 12 implicates freedom of speech only insofar as it regulates the provision of
"expert advice or assistance" and "training" as material support. Accordingly, the Court
withholds judgment on the constitutionality of providing other types of material support as
de ned in Section 3(e), without prejudice to future challenges when the proper facts arise.
Petitioners argue that Section 12 is overbroad because it does not specify whether the material
support should be given purposely to aid in the commission of terrorism.368
The Court is not convinced.
Per the discussion on Section 3(k) in relation to Section 6, the Court construes "training" under
Section 12 as referring only to that which is directed to produce the commission of terrorism
and is likely to produce such action. Concurrently, this interpretation should be made to apply
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 to "expert advice or assistance." Consistent with our interpretation of "training" under Section
6, the terms "training" and "expert advice or assistance" under Section 12 requires knowledge
on the part of the provider that the individual or organization, association, or group of persons
to which he provided such material support is committing or planning to commit an act of
terrorism. Without such knowledge, prosecution under Section 12 must necessarily fail.
Furthermore, in the interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 12 in relation to
training and expert advice or assistance as modes of providing material support,
the Brandenburg standard is deemed incorporated. Thus, training and expert advice or
assistance can only be penalized as material support within the ambit of Section 12 when they
are: (1) directed to producing imminent terrorism; and (2) is likely to produce such action. As
construed, this Court does not nd Section 12 impermissibly vague or overbroad so as to
violate petitioners' freedom of speech and academic freedom.
Designation and Proscription
At rst glance, terrorism may appear to share features with crimes against national security and
other political crimes already de ned under the RPC, e.g., treason, rebellion, sedition, and the
like. In the book Fresh Perspectives on the 'War on Terror,' terrorism was described as:
x x x [A]n attack on the state and its exclusive right to the legitimate use of violence. Unlike a
murderer or robber, the terrorist or assassin does not just kill: he claims a legitimacy, even a
lawfulness, in doing so. Such acts do not break the law, but seek to impose a new or higher
law.369 (Emphases supplied)
Thus, acts of terrorism are not only pursued to cause injury to people and property, but are
motivated by an underlying political objective that distinguishes it from the felonies and other
o enses already punished by law. Though objectives of terrorism may have changed over time,
certain purposes have remained constant: regime change, territorial change, policy change,
social control, and status quo maintenance.370
However, in recent times, acts of terrorism have been perpetrated not only by certain
individuals, but increasingly more, they have also been planned and executed by groups or
networks of terrorist groups. In response, there has been a need to develop special measures
speci cally designed to prevent terrorism committed by groups, two of which
are designation and proscription.
Designation under the ATA is provided for under Section 25, which states:
Section 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or
Associations. - Pursuant to our obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) No. 1373, the ATC shall automatically adopt the United Nations Security Council
Consolidated List of designated individuals, groups of persons, organizations, or associations
designated and/or identi ed as a terrorist, one who nances terrorism, or a terrorist
organization or group.
Request for designations by other jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions may be adopted
by the ATC after determination that the proposed designee meets the criteria for designation of
UNSCR No. 1373.
The ATC may designate an individual, group of persons, organization, or association, whether
domestic or foreign, upon a nding of probable cause that the individual, group of persons,
organization, or association commit, or attempt to commit, or conspire in the commission of
the acts de ned and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act.
The assets of the designated individual, group of persons, organization or association above-
mentioned shall be subject to the authority of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to
freeze pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 10168.
The designation shall be without prejudice to the proscription of terrorist organizations,
associations, or groups of persons under Section 26 of this Act.
Section 25 bestows on the ATC - an administrative body - the power to designate a person or
an organization as a terrorist, making the power and the process executive in nature. It
has three modes: rst, through the automatic adoption by the ATC of the designation or listing
made by the UNSC; second, through the ATC's approval of requests made by other
jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions to designate individuals or entities that meet the
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 criteria under UNSC Resolution No. 1373; and third, designation by the ATC itself, upon its own
nding of probable cause that the person or organization commits, or is attempting to commit,
or conspired in the commission of, the acts de ned and penalized under Sections 4 to 12 of
the ATA.
In addition to designation, Section 26 of the ATA reintroduced proscription, a function and
process that was previously present under Section 17 of the HSA.371 In contrast to
designation which is executive in nature, the process of proscription under the ATA
remains judicial in nature, by requiring its application to be led, this time, with the Court of
Appeals (CA), thus:
Section 26. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Associations, or Group of Persons. - Any
group of persons, organization, or association, which commits any of the acts de ned and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, or organized for the purpose
of engaging in terrorism shall, upon application of the DOJ before the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the group of persons,
organization or association, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed group of persons,
organization or association, by the said Court.
The application shall be led with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a preliminary order of
proscription. No application for proscription shall be led without the authority of the ATC upon
the recommendation of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA).
Unlike the HSA, however, the ATA augmented the proscription process by empowering the CA
to issue a preliminary order of proscription under Section 27, if probable cause exists that its
issuance is necessary to prevent the commission of terrorism. The ATA, in addition, also
authorized the consideration of requests to proscribe from foreign and supranational
jurisdictions, under Section 28. These two provisions state:
Section 27. Preliminary Order of Proscription. - Where the Court has determined that probable
cause exists on the basis of the veri ed application which is su cient in form and substance,
that the issuance of an order of proscription is necessary to prevent the commission of
terrorism, he/she shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from the ling of the application, issue a
preliminary order of proscription declaring that the respondent is a terrorist and an outlawed
organization or association within the meaning of Section 26 of this Act.
The court shall immediately commence and conduct continuous hearings, which should be
completed within six (6) months from the time the application has been led, to determine
whether:
(a) The preliminary order of proscription should be made permanent;
(b) A permanent order of proscription should be issued in case no preliminary order was
issued; or
(c) A preliminary order of proscription should be lifted. It shall be the burden of the applicant to
prove that the respondent is a terrorist and an outlawed organization or association within the
meaning of Section 26 of this Act before the court issues an order of proscription whether
preliminary or permanent.
The permanent order of proscription herein granted shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation. It shall be valid for a period of three (3) years after which, a review of such
order shall be made and if circumstances warrant, the same shall be lifted.
Section 28. Request to Proscribe from Foreign Jurisdictions and Supranational Jurisdictions. -
Consistent with the national interest, all requests for proscription made by another jurisdiction
or supranational jurisdiction shall be referred by the Department of Foreign A airs (DFA) to the
ATC to determine, with the assistance of the NICA, if proscription under Section 26 of this Act
is warranted. If the request for proscription is granted, the ATC shall correspondingly
commence proscription proceedings through DOJ.
Notably, a reading of Sections 25 to 28, in relation to the other provisions of the ATA, shows
that despite the di erentiation - designation being an executive function and process and
proscription a judicial one - both seem to have the same primary e ects: rst, an application
for surveillance of "a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization as provided in
Section 26" and between members of a designated person as de ned in Section 3(e) of R.A.
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 No. 10168372 may already be led with the CA by law enforcement agents or military
personnel under Section 16; second, the examination of records with banking and other
nancial institutions and the ex parte freezing of assets may be done by the AMLC under
Sections 35 and 36, on its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, upon the issuance of a
preliminary order of proscription or in case of designation; and third, there is criminal liability
under Section 10 for those who recruit others to participate in, join, or support, or for those
who become members of, organizations, associations, or groups proscribed under Section 26
or those designated by the UNSC.
The interplay between Sections 25 to 28 with the other provisions of the ATA, together with its
consequent e ects, forms the substantive arguments raised against designation and
proscription. Speci cally, petitioners seek to nullify Sections 25, 26, and 27 for their supposed
chilling e ect373 on the freedoms of speech, expression, assembly, association, and other
allied rights.374 They argue that a designation or proscription order operates as a prima
facie nding that terrorist acts had been committed, and that the designated or proscribed
persons are likely guilty thereof. This chilling e ect on the exercise of freedom of expression,
association, and other allied rights is allegedly aggravated by the fact that both designation
and proscription require publication in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby causing
irreparable damage and stigma. Petitioners further assert that the threat of being designated
and proscribed as a terrorist or a terrorist organization, association, or group - when taken
together with its consequences and the publication of the declaration or order in a newspaper
of a general circulation - would cow even the staunchest critics of any administration.375 This
threat or fear is allegedly compounded by the absence of any remedy or relief available for a
wrongful designation, the likelihood of which is very high. It is argued that these consequences
pose a lethal prior restraint on their exercise of freedom of expression and the right of
association.376
Similar processes adopted in other jurisdictions show that designation and proscription are
accepted preventive and extraordinary forms of counterterrorism measures.
At the outset, the Court notes that the challenged measures are not entirely novel and even,
hardly recent. The designation, proscription, listing, blacklisting, outlawing, banning, exclusion,
or sanction of individuals or organizations, and such other equivalent terminologies377 that
broadly refer to the set or series of legal instruments or powers which permit a government
agent to prohibit the presence of, or support for, an identi ed terrorist or terrorist organization
within its jurisdiction378 have already existed before the enactment of the ATA, and have been
adopted and operationalized in many other countries. The succeeding discussion will brie y
explore parallel processes adopted in other jurisdictions, which reinforces the intent of the ATA
to establish the nature of designation and proscription as preventive and extraordinary
counterterrorism measures.
The concept of designation may be traced to the U.S. as early as 1952 in the Immigration &
Nationality Act (INA), which was later amended by the Antiterrorism and E ective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA)379 and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act). In 1977, the U.S. also
enacted the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA),380 which authorized the U.S.
President to designate terrorists in times of armed hostilities, or when the U.S. is under attack
by a foreign country or by foreign nationals, or when there is an "unusual and extraordinary
threat." In its amended version, the IEEPA permits the President to block an entity's assets
during the pendency of an investigation. The authority in the IEEPA, in particular, was invoked
by US President George W. Bush when he issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 13224 on
September 23, 2001, in which he authorized the designation of 27 foreign individuals and
organizations as terrorists and ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to immediately block their
assets.
The concept of designation as a counterterrorism measure was reinforced following two
signi cant terrorist events during the 1990s: (1) the satin gas attack in the Tokyo subway
system by the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995; and (2) the detonation of a truck
lled with explosives near the Edward A. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy
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 McVeigh in April 1995. Prior to the September 11 attacks or 9/11, the attack in Oklahoma City
was considered the most destructive terrorist attack in the US as it resulted in the death of 168
people and injured several hundred more. Following these incidents, the US Congress enacted
the Antiterrorism and E ective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),381 which now provides the
mechanism and procedure to be observed in designating foreign terrorists.382 Under this law,
the requisites of designation are as follows:
Section 219. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) DESIGNATION. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - The Secretary is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization in accordance with this subsection if the Secretary nds that -
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as de ned in section 212(a)(3)(B)); and
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or
the national security of the United States. [Emphasis supplied]
The State Department, through the Secretary of State, was given the power, in coordination
with the Attorney General and the Treasury Department, to designate groups as "foreign
terrorist organizations" (FTOs).
Once a designation is made, the AEDPA provides mechanisms for review. Among others, it
establishes judicial review, as provided in Section 219 (b) of the AEDPA, which allows a
designated FTO to assail the same with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit not later than 30 days after publication of the designation. Thus, while it is the Secretary
of State who begins the process of designation of a purported FTO, courts are not prevented
from exercising the power of judicial review to determine the propriety of the subject
designation. Section 219 (b) of the AEDPA reads:
(b) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DESIGNATION. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - Not later than 30 days after publication of the designation in the Federal
Register, an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization may seek judicial review
of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
(2) BASIS OF REVIEW. - Review under this subsection shall be based solely upon the
administrative record, except that the Government may submit, for ex parte and in camera
review, classi ed information used in making the designation.
(3) SCOPE OF REVIEW. - The Court shall hold unlawful and set aside a designation the court
nds to be -
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; or
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right.
The IEEPA, on the other hand, does not provide an explicit standard for judicial review, but
safeguards are put in place to ensure proper checks and balances. In the exercise of the
powers granted to the U.S. President in the IEEPA, he shall immediately transmit to the
Congress a report specifying the following: (1) the circumstances which necessitate such
exercise of authority; (2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; (3) the
authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to
deal with those circumstances; (4) why the President believes such actions are necessary to
deal with those circumstances; and (5) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions
are to be taken and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries. Periodic
follow-up reports to the Congress are also required by the IEEPA at least once every six
months.
On the other hand, proscription as a counterterrorism measure can be seen as early as the
1970s in the U.K.'s Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974383 which was enacted to address the
terrorist incidents committed during the Northern Ireland con ict.384 The Act was originally
meant to be e ective for only six months as it was supposedly a temporary emergency
legislation; however, it was renewed annually by the U.K. Parliament up until 1989.385 Under
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 this Act, the government is allowed to "proscribe organizations concerned in terrorism," as well
to exercise the "power to exclude certain persons from x x x the U.K. in order to prevent acts
of terrorism."386
The current legal basis for proscription in the U.K. is now found in Part II of its Terrorism Act
2000. To note, several of those proscribed under the former law remain listed as proscribed
organizations under Schedule 2 of the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000.387 Under Sections 3 (3) and 3
(6) of thereof, the power to proscribe is exercised by the Secretary of State for the Home
Department by the issuance of an order, if he or she believes that an organization is
"concerned in terrorism", or should be treated as one already proscribed:388
3. Proscription.
(1) For the purposes of this Act an organisation is proscribed if -
(a) it is listed in Schedule 2, or
(b) it operates under the same name as an organisation listed in that Schedule.
(2) Subsection (1)(b) shall not apply in relation to an organisation listed in Schedule 2 if its entry
is the subject of a note in that Schedule.
(3) The Secretary of State may by order -
(a) add an organisation to Schedule 2;
(b) remove an organisation from that Schedule;
(c) amend that Schedule in some other way.
(4) The Secretary of State may exercise his power under subsection (3)(a) in respect of an
organisation only if he believes that it is concerned in terrorism.
xxxx
(6) Where the Secretary of State believes -
(a) that an organisation listed in Schedule 2 is operating wholly or partly under a name that is
not speci ed in that Schedule (whether as well as or instead of under the speci ed name), or
(b) that an organisation that is operating under a name that is not so speci ed is otherwise for
all practical purposes the same as an organisation so listed, he may, by order, provide that the
name that is not speci ed in that Schedule is to be treated as another name for the listed
organisation.
(7) Where an order under subsection (6) provides for a name to be treated as another name for
an organisation, this Act shall have e ect in relation to acts occurring while -
(a) the order is in force, and (b) the organisation continues to be listed in Schedule 2, as if the
organisation were listed in that Schedule under the other name, as well as under the name
speci ed in the Schedule.
(8) The Secretary of State may at any time by order revoke an order under subsection (6) or
otherwise provide for a name speci ed in such an order to cease to be treated as a name for a
particular organisation.
An organization is considered "concerned in terrorism" if it commits or participates in acts of
terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned
in terrorism,389 to wit:
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it -
(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism,
(b) prepares for terrorism,
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.
(5A) The cases in which an organisation promotes or encourages terrorism for the purposes of
subsection (5)(c) include any case in which activities of the organisation -
(a) include the unlawful glori cation of the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in
the future or generally) of acts of terrorism; or
(b) are carried out in a manner that ensures that the organisation is associated with statements
containing any such glori cation.
(5B) The glori cation of any conduct is unlawful for the purposes of subsection (5A) if there are
persons who may become aware of it who could reasonably be expected to inter that what is
being glori ed, is being glori ed as -
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 (a) conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances, or
(b) conduct that is illustrative of a type of conduct that should be so emulated.
(5C) In this section -
"glori cation" includes any form of praise or celebration, and cognate expressions are to be
construed accordingly;
"statement" includes a communication without words consisting of sounds or images or both.
Similar to a designation made in the U.S. under the AEDPA, the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000
provides for a review mechanism which allows the proscribed organization or a person a ected
by the organization's proscription to le an application for "deproscription" with the Secretary
of State for the Home Department,390 and a refusal thereof may be appealed to the three-
member panel called the Proscribed Organisations Appeal (POA) Commission.391 A further
appeal on questions of law may be brought to the courts, subject to the permission of the POA
Commission or the discretion of the court to which the appeal will be brought, if permission is
refused.392
In Southeast Asia, Singapore mostly takes the lead on proscription from the UN,393 as it
seems to adopt in toto394 the sanctions list of individuals and entities belonging to, or
associated with, the Taliban, ISIL (Da'esh), and Al-Qaeda, as maintained by the established
committees in accordance with UNSC Resolution No. 1267395 and UNSC Resolution No.
1988.396 The basis for the adoption, and hence proscription in Singapore, is its United Nations
Act of 2000,397 which was enacted to enable it to ful ll its obligations respecting Article 41 of
the UN Charter.398 The UNSC Resolutions 1267 and 1988 sanctions lists, in turn, are
expressly referenced and incorporated in Schedule 1 of Singapore's Terrorism (Suppression of
Financing) Act of 2003.399 While a study has observed that there appears to be no statute in
Singapore that speci cally provides for domestic listing or one that outlines a listing
mechanism,400 Section 38(a) of the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act empowers the
Minister for Home A airs of Singapore to amend, add to, or vary Schedule 1 by the issuance of
an order to be published in their Gazette,401 including the power to specify what other criminal
acts should be considered as a terrorist act -
Amendment of Schedules
38. The Minister may, by order published in the Gazette -
(a) amend, add to or vary the First Schedule; and
(b) amend the Second Schedule to specify any act or omission that is punishable under any
law that implements any treaty, convention or other international agreement to which
Singapore is a party as a terrorist act.
which means an act akin to proscription may be exercised by the Minister for Home A airs, an
executive o cer, without need to refer the matter to, or to seek the approval by, Singapore's
Parliament.402
From the foregoing, the Court observes that the nature of the designation and/or proscription
measures as understood in other jurisdictions bears strong similarities with the designation and
proscription measures instituted in the ATA. Firstly, the purpose animating these measures are
unambiguously directed towards the prevention or suppression of terrorism, which Section 2 of
the ATA has characterized as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and
to the welfare of the people. Secondly, despite having strong and vibrant democracies, the
legal frameworks of these three countries still found it necessary to accommodate such
extraordinary measures, owing to the continuously evolving nature of terrorism.
Relative thereto, the Court observes that the key powers, functions, or processes in these
statutes were all given to, and exercised by, an executive o cer of these governments.
Pertinently in this regard, one study has mentioned that "[t]here is a clear consensus across
Australia, the U.K., Canada, New Zealand[,] and the U.S. that the executive is the most
appropriate body to decide whether an organization satis es the de nition of a terrorist
organization" and thus, should be proscribed.403
While Congress has seen it wise for the ATA to delineate and distinguish the executive function
and process of designation from the judicial function and process of proscription, it is clear to
the Court that despite this ostensible distinction, both are preventive and extraordinary
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 counterterrorism measures in the same mold as that contemplated in the functions and
processes of the measures adopted in the U.S., U.K., and Singapore. The nature and e ects of
both measures, like their foreign counterparts, are borne of public necessity, and spring from
the same resolve to preserve national security and to protect the public and general welfare
from acts of terrorism.
Designation and proscription in the ATA are preventive measures enacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State.
The Court is mindful that terrorism has a global reach and is not con ned to national borders. It
is not restricted as to the time and place of actual hostilities nor does it automatically conclude
when acts of violence end. The Court is aware that the threat of terrorism today is
unprecedented and the use of modern weapons capable of mass destruction has made it
impossible to measure the extent of harm that may be caused. Hence, the government has
recognized the necessity to constantly develop counterterrorism measures that are responsive
to changing times and the developments in technology exploited by terrorists to advance their
ideologies and to sow terror. Consideration in forming policies is no longer limited to
addressing immediate threats to national security but now necessarily includes anticipating
future risks or catastrophes.
With the foregoing in mind, and in consideration of the context upon which other countries'
understanding of designation and proscription supported the intent of the ATA to make these
processes preventive and extraordinary counterterrorism measures, this Court nds that the
adoption or institution of both designation and proscription in the ATA must be viewed as
an exercise of poliec power by the State.
The exercise of police power is primarily vested in the legislature through its authority to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
cither with penalties or without, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
country and of the people.404 It has been described as the most essential, insistent, and the
least limitable of the three great governmental powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs.405 The very purpose of the State will be destroyed if it will be deprived, or will
allow itself to be deprived, of its competence to promote public safety and the general
welfare.406 Put another way, police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.407
Earlier cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and public
interest, or the power to enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote
public health, public morals, public safety, and the general welfare of each inhabitant.408 It has
also been said to be the power to preserve public order and to prevent o enses against the
State, as well as the power to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of
good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent con ict of rights. All these
depictions of police power underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and to
provide enough room for an e cient and exible response to conditions and circumstances,
thus assuring the greatest bene ts.409
Based on these characterizations, it cannot be denied that the institution of designation and
proscription in the ATA is an exercise of police power. Designation and proscription, as
preventive counterterrorism measures, are made necessary because of the pernicious and
widespread e ects of even one single terrorist act, which can happen anytime, anywhere. As
the Court has discussed before in as many words, terrorism is never just an ordinary crime and
a terrorist is never just an ordinary criminal - terrorism, very simply, is sui generis, and its
extraordinary nature demands extraordinary measures.
Having stemmed from the exercise of police power, the validity of executive designation and
judicial proscription must be judged on the basis of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process, which requires the concurrence of a lawful subject or purpose and a
lawful means or method.410 There is a lawful purpose when the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police
power.411 On the other hand, the means are said to be lawful when the methods employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
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 individuals.412 Only when these two requisites concur may the State be considered to have
properly exercised police power.413 However, considering that the exercise of police power
was assailed in the context of a free speech challenge, the Court shall analyze the validity of
the provisions on designation and proscription, more speci cally under strict scrutiny and
overbreadth standards.
The provisions on designation and proscription are susceptible to a facial challenge.
As petitioners allege, the results or the outcomes of being designated under Section 25 or
proscribed under Sections 26 to 28, when implemented in conjunction with the other
provisions of the ATA, have a signi cant impact on free speech and expression, and present
outright freedom of speech and expression restrictions. Though these are not exclusively
speech provisions per se, they claim that the chilling e ect created by the counterterrorism
measures introduced in the challenged provisions intimidates individuals or groups and causes
an atmosphere detrimental to the exercise of the freedom of expression.
In this accord, petitioners have thus laid a prima facie basis for the Court to treat Sections 25
to 28 on designation and proscription as appropriate subjects of a facial challenge relative to
the context of the actual facts presented in this case. These two extraordinary and preventive
measures, when implemented, a ect the ability of individuals to speak and to express
themselves, as it is alleged that these measures can be wielded in a manner as to invoke fear
of state action. Verily, the Court perceives that a looming threat of a potential designation or
proscription may indeed e ectively chill the exercise of free speech, expression, and their
cognate rights under the Constitution. It is also discernible that the prospect of being a victim
of an erroneous designation contributes to a pernicious chilling e ect. The claim that the ATC
under the current formulation of Section 25 can designate whosoever it deems has given
reason to be designated tends to intimidate everyone in their free exercise of constitutional
rights.
Since the implementation or e ects of designation and proscription have implications on the
exercise of free speech, expression, and their cognate rights, the Court shall determine the
validity of Sections 25 to 28 under a facial analysis lens. In doing so, however, the Court will
only utilize two of the three analytical tools (i.e., overbreadth and strict scrutiny, and not void for
vagueness) which, according to Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan and Spouses Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections as above-discussed, were developed for testing, on their faces,
statutes involving free speech and expression. This is because, with respect to void for
vagueness, the Court has found that none of petitioners squarely raised any issue as to the
ambiguity in the language or terminology in Sections 25 to 28. There being no claim that the
wording of Sections 25 to 28 fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is
prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly, then perforce the only tests that the
Court will employ are the overbreadth and strict scrutiny doctrines.
As have already been discussed, a law may be struck down as unconstitutional under the
overbreadth doctrine if it achieves a governmental purpose by means that are unnecessarily
broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Meanwhile, the strict scrutiny
standard is a two-part test under which a law or government act passes constitutional muster
only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or narrowly tailored to accomplish said interest. To note, a
perfunctory look at these two tests shows that the sweeping facet of the overbreadth doctrine
is substantially the same as the second requisite of strict scrutiny. The two are practically of the
same essence and import. Therefore, in order to determine whether Sections 25 to 28 sweeps
unnecessarily and broadly, and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms, the Court will
use strict scrutiny in relation to the overbreadth doctrine to ascertain if the means chosen by
the State are narrowly tailored to accomplish its compelling interest. It is within these
interrelated analytical tools and the facial analysis framework as herein delimited that the Court
shall now proceed to resolve the challenge on these provisions.
The rst mode of designation is a constitutionally acceptable counterterrorism measure under
Section 25.
The rst paragraph of Section 25, which contains the rst mode of designation, states:
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 Section 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or
Associations. - Pursuant to our obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) No. 1373, the ATC shall automatically adopt the United Nations Security Council
Consolidated List of designated individuals, groups of persons, organizations, or associations
designated and/or identi ed as a terrorist, one who nances terrorism, or a terrorist
organization or group. x x x
Using the tests identi ed in the immediately preceding discussion, the Court nds that the rst
mode of designation as provided under the rst paragraph of Section 25 is a legitimate
exercise of the State's police power.
Compelling state interest exists in enacting the rst mode of designation under Section 25.
There exists a compelling state interest in authorizing the automatic adoption of the UNSC
Consolidated List. The challenged provision is intended: (1) to forestall possible terrorist
activities of foreigners within the Philippine jurisdiction or against Philippine nationals
abroad; (2) to cooperate with global e orts against terrorist groups who are known to operate
across territorial borders; and (3) to comply with our international obligations under UNSC
Resolution No. 1373. Undeniably, law enforcement, national security, and public safety are all
compelling state interests As the Court earlier stated, acts of terrorism are not con ned to
national borders but rather, have a global reach. National security is a compelling state interest,
for as Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has declared with commendable foresight in his
dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion:414
The increasing incidence of international and transnational crimes, the development of new
technologies of death, and the speed and scale of improvement of communication are factors
which have virtually annihilated time and distance. They make more compelling the vindication
of our national interest to insure that the punishment of criminals should not be frustrated by
the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. This overriding national interest must be upheld as
against x x x weak constitutional claims x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
The rst mode of designation is but an implementation of the country's standing obligation
under international law to enforce anti-terrorism and related measures, and the Court is not
convinced that the automatic adoption by the ATC of the designation or listing made by the
UNSC is violative of the due process clause or an encroachment of judicial power. Further, the
adoption of the Consolidated List is in accord with the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed
in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, whereby the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.415 In this
regard, it is important to remember that UNSCR No. 1373 was issued by the UNSC as an act
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in response to "threats to international peace and
security caused by terrorist acts." Under the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has
committed to the preservation of international peace. As such, the adoption of the UNSCR No.
1373 nds basis in the Constitution.
While the ATA mentions only the country's obligations under UNSCR No. 1373, this reference
should be understood as re ecting the country's commitments under the UN Charter,
particularly under Articles 24 (1) and 25, Chapter V and Articles 48 and 49, Chapter VII thereof,
which provide:
Article24
1. In order to ensure prompt and e ective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on
the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
acts on their behalf;
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Article25
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter.
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Article48
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 1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security shall he taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by
some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in a ording mutual assistance in carrying out the
measures decided upon by the Security Council. (Emphases and underscoring supplied]
For the Court, these commitments lay down su cient bases in construing that the measures
adopted in UNSCR No. 1373, and other supplemental UNSCRs, are generally binding on all
member states.
Additionally, UNSCR No. 1373 speci cally cites two issuances that buttress its generally
binding nature. One is General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), adopted on October 24,
1970, and the other is UNSCR No. 1189, adopted by the UNSC on August 13, 1998.
General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), or the "Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations" (Declaration),416 a rmed the importance of the progressive
development and codi cation of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations
and cooperation among States. The Declaration likewise emphasized that its adoption "would
contribute to the strengthening of world peace and constitute a landmark in the development
of international law and of relations among States, in promoting the rule of law among nations,
and particularly in the universal application of the principles embodied in the UN
Charter."417 In addition to the principle stated in UNSCR No. 1373 that "every State has the
duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in another
state, or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission
of such acts," the Declaration likewise adopted the principle that States have the duty to
cooperate with one another in accordance with the UN Charter.418
The principles declared in United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2625 were
reiterated in UNSCR No. 1189 (1998), which rea rmed "the determination of the international
community to eliminate international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations", and stressed
the need to strengthen "international cooperation between States in order to adopt practical
and e ective measures to prevent, combat, and eliminate all forms of terrorism a ecting the
international community as a whole."419 UNSCR No. 1189 thereby called upon states "to
adopt, in accordance with international law and as a matter of priority, e ective and practical
measures for security cooperation, for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the
prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators."420
The foregoing principles are, not surprisingly, repeated in UNSCR No. 1373 as follows:
3. Calls upon all States to:
(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information,
especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsi ed
travel documents; tra c in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications
technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass
destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on
administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and
protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and
international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee
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 status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or
participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the
perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation
are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged
terrorists[.]421 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
While the Court is not prepared to state here that the practice and process of designation as a
counterterrorism measure has ripened to the status of customary international law, it is very
obvious from the foregoing and from other issuances emanating from the UN and its
organs422 that there is an underlying acknowledgment, rst, of the need to prevent, and the
duty of member States to prevent, terrorism; second, that cooperation between States is
necessary to suppress terrorism; and third, that member States should adopt e ective and
practical measures to prevent its commission. It is not lost on the Court that UNSCR No. 1373
uses such language to the e ect that the UNSC has decided that all States shall carry out the
actions and implement the policies enumerated therein, which is highly indicative of the
generally binding nature of the issuance.
The Court would also venture to say here that the automatic adoption by the ATC of the UNSC
Consolidated List is surely not an exercise of either judicial or quasi-judicial power, as it only
a rms the applicability of the sanctions under the relevant UNSC resolutions within Philippine
jurisdiction, as existing under Philippine law. In automatically adopting the designation
pursuant to UNSCR No. 1373, the ATC does not exercise any discretion to accept or deny the
listing, and it will not wield any power nor authority to determine the corresponding rights and
obligations423 of the designee. Instead, it merely con rms a nding already made at the level
of the UNSC, and a rms the applicability of sanctions existing in present laws. It is thus in this
perspective that the Court nds that the Congress, in enacting the rst mode of designation as
an acceptable counterterrorism measure, has a compelling state interest to achieve and only
implements the obligations the country has assumed as a member of the international
community.
The rst mode of designation is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means to achieve the
objective of the State. There are adequate guidelines in UNSCR No. 1373.
Even if a compelling state interest exists, a governmental action would not pass the strict
scrutiny test if the interest could be achieved in an alternative way that is equally e ective yet
without violating the freedom of expression and its allied rights. Here, it was not shown that
there is a less restrictive alternative to comply with the Suite's international responsibility
pursuant to UNSCR No. 1373 and related instruments to play an active role in preventing the
spread of the in uence of terrorists included in the Consolidated List. Neither was it proven that
the rst mode of designation imposes burdens more than necessary to achieve the State's
articulated interest.
The mechanism of automatic adoption of the UNSC Consolidated List is reasonable relative to
the underlying purpose of complying with the country's international obligations to cooperate
in the e orts to prevent terrorism. To reiterate, the rst mode of designation is e ectively made
not just by a domestic body but by the UNSC itself. Hence, it is necessary and reasonable in
light of the country's international obligations.
Furthermore, there are adequate standards and rigorous procedures for listing under UNSCR
Nos. 1373, 1989, and 2368, as well as under the guidelines of the Sanctions Committee which
require inter alia multilateral acceptance among member states for listing. Together, they
provide a su cient framework in the implementation and execution of the designation process
in the UN prior to the automatic adoption of the same by the ATC. Consistent with this nding,
the Court does not subscribe to the argument that the due process clause of the Constitution
is violated because UNSCR No. 1373 does not provide parameters for designation. Instead,
the Court nds that the rst mode of designation satis es the requirement that it must be
narrowly tailored and least restrictive.
To expound, a close reading of UNSCR No. 1373 shows that it does provide exhaustive factors
for designation or listing, as it states the following:
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 1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the nancing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by
their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other nancial assets or economic resources of persons
who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission
of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities,
including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
such persons and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any
funds, nancial assets or economic resources or nancial or other related services available,
directly or indirectly, for the bene t of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or
participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of
such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Retrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved
in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and
eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision
of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who nance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide
safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who nance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from their respective
territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the nancing, planning, preparation or
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that,
in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious
criminal o ences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly re ects the
seriousness of such terrorist acts;
(f) A ord one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal
investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the nancing or support of terrorist acts,
including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by e ective border controls and
controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures
for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel
documents[.] (Emphases supplied)
The foregoing criteria are not as express or clear-cut as those provided for in UNSCR Nos.
1989 (2011)424 and 2368 (2017),425 both of which explicitly enumerate the listing criteria
which the UNSC uses for its consolidated sanctions list, to wit:
Listing Criteria: Decides that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking
or entity is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida and therefore eligible for inclusion in the ISIL
(Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List include:
(a) Participating in the nancing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or
activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;
(b) Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to;
(c) Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell,
a liate, splinter group or derivative thereof[.]426
Nonetheless, this will not render the reference to only UNSCR No. 1373 in Section 25, or the
basis of designation under the same, as invalid. It can easily be seen that the speci c listing
criteria in UNSCR Nos. 1989 (2011) and 2368 (2017) merely summarized the exhaustive factors
given by UNSCR No. 1373.
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 It should even be emphasized at this point that the process adopted by the UNSC, prior to the
automatic adoption of the Consolidated List by the ATC, is a multilateral one, as it requires the
acceptance of all members of the Security Council ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions
Committee (Sanctions Committee).427 In the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of
its Work dated 05 September 2018 (Sanctions Committee Guidelines), the procedure for the
decision-making of the Sanctions Committee requires that:
(a) The Committee shall make decisions by consensus of its Members. If consensus cannot be
reached on a particular issue, including listing and delisting, the Chair should undertake such
further consultations as may facilitate agreement. If after these consultations consensus still
cannot be reached the matter may be submitted to the Security Council by the Member
concerned. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the special procedures
stipulated in paragraphs 62 and 69 of resolution 2368 (2017).
(b) Decisions will be taken by a written procedure. In such cases, the Chair will circulate to all
Members of the Committee the proposed decision of the Committee, and will request
Members of the Committee to indicate any objection they may have to the proposed decision
within ve full working days except as otherwise provided for in the Guidelines or a relevant
resolution, or, in urgent situations, such shorter period as the Chair shall determine.
Notably, the procedure for designation or listing under the Sanctions Committee Guidelines
provides:
6. Listing
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(g) When proposing names for inclusion on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List,
Member States should use the standard forms for listing available in all o cial languages on
the Committee's website and shall include as much relevant and speci c information as
possible on a proposed name, in particular su cient identifying information to allow for the
accurate and positive identi cation of the individual, group, undertaking or entity concerned by
competent authorities, and to the extent possible, information required by INTERPOL to issue a
Special Notice, including:
(i) For individuals: family name/surname, given names, other relevant names, date of birth,
place of birth, nationality/citizenship, gender, aliases, employment/occupation, State(s) of
residence, passport or travel document and national identi cation number, current and
previous addresses, current status before law enforcement authorities (e.g. wanted, detained,
convicted), location, photographs and other biometric data (where available and in accordance
with their national legislation);
(ii) For groups, undertakings or entities: name, registered name, short namc(s)/acronyms, and
other names by which it is known or was formerly known, address, headquarters, branches/
subsidiaries, organizational linkages, parent company, nature of business or activity, State(s) of
main activity, leadership/management, registration (incorporation) or other identi cation
number, status (e.g. in liquidation, terminated), website addresses.
The Monitoring Team shall be prepared to assist Member States in this regard.
(h) Member States shall provide a detailed statement of case in support of the proposed listing
that forms the basis or justi cation for the listing in accordance with the relevant resolutions,
including paragraph 51 of resolution 2368 (2017). The statement of case should provide as
much detail as possible on the basis(es) for listing, including but not limited to:
(1) speci c information demonstrating that the individual/entity meets the criteria for listing set
out in paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368 (2017);
(2) details of any connection with a currently listed individual or entity;
(3) information about any other relevant acts or activities of the individual/entity;
(4) the nature of the supporting evidence (e.g. intelligence, law enforcement, judicial, open
source information, admissions by subject, etc.);
(5) additional information or documents supporting the submission as well as information about
relevant court cases and proceedings. The statement of case shall be rclcasable, upon
request, except for the parts the designating State identi es as being con dential to the
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Committee, and may be used to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing described
in section 9 below.
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(p) Upon request of a Committee Member, listing requests may be placed on the Committee's
agenda for more detailed consideration. If deemed necessary, the Committee may request
additional background information from the Monitoring Team and/or the designating State(s).
Following consideration by (he Committee, the Chair shall circulate the listing request under the
written decision-making procedure as described in Sections 4 paragraph (b) and section 6
paragraph (n) above.
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9. Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing
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(b) When a new name is proposed for listing, the Monitoring Team shall immediately prepare, in
coordination with the relevant designating State(s), a draft narrative summary for the
Committee's consideration which shall be circulated together with the corresponding listing
request. The narrative summary shall be made accessible on the Committee's website on the
same day a name is added to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.
(c) Draft narrative summaries should be based on information provided by the designating
State(s), Committee members or the Monitoring Team, including the statement of case, the
standard form for listing, any other o cial information provided to the Committee or any other
relevant information publicly available from o cial sources.
(d) The narrative summary should include: the dale of listing; the basis(es) for listing according
to the relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council, i.e. speci c information
demonstrating that the individual or entity meets the criteria for listing set out in the relevant
resolutions; information about any acts or activities of the individual/entity indicating an
association with ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2368
(2017); the names and permanent reference numbers of other entries on the List associated
with the listed party; any other relevant information available at the date or after the date of
listing such as relevant court decisions and proceedings as provided by the designating
State(s) or other Member States concerned; the date(s) when the narrative summary was rst
made accessible on the Committee's website and when it was reviewed or updated.
(Underscoring in the original; citation omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the procedure for listing or designation pursuant to
UNSCR No. 1373 involves multilateral acceptance among member states. A decision to
designate or list a person or entity needs the consensus of the Sanctions Committee members.
Further consultation may be had to facilitate an agreement if no consensus can be reached,
and there is a possibility that the decision can be elevated to the Security Council proper. More
importantly, it also indicates that there must be an agreement as to whether the criteria for
designation or listing have been observed or complied with - criteria which are easily
discernible from UNSCR No. 1373 and its supplemental resolutions, and which are easily
obtainable as all these information are accessible to the general public. All things considered,
any determination to be made even before the ATC automatically adopts the designation is not
taken lightly.
Finally, the UNSC provides for a delisting process, the procedure for which is detailed in the
supplementing resolutions of UNSCR No. 1373. Signi cantly, Rule 6.9 of the ATA IRR
acknowledges that delisting under the rst mode of designation can be availed of in two
ways: (1) either through the government, the Philippines being a member State, via a delisting
request submitted to the Sanctions Committee; or (2) by the designees themselves, via a
delisting request submitted to the O ce of the Ombudsperson.428
At this point, and relative to the requisite of employing the least restrictive means, the Court
notes that petitioners lambast the supposed lack of prior notice and hearing that attends the
process of designation. Su ce it to say at this point, however, that this supposed lack of prior
notice and hearing is understandably justi ed by the exigent nature of terrorism, which is a
relatively new global phenomenon that must be met with commensurate e ective responses by
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 nation-States. It is not farfetched to see that the imposition of the notice and hearing
requirement prior to a designation will most likely eliminate a valuable opportunity for law
enforcement to prevent an evil that both the ATA and the country's international obligations
seek to avoid, in the guise of due process. Verily, this will ultimately frustrate the objectives of
the State and compromise its intelligence operations. The Court thus nds that this is a
permissible accommodation under the constitutional framework, for not only is it a realistic
approach, it also recognizes the inherent and compelling interest to protect its existence and
promote the public welfare.429 As aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
in her dissent in People v. Sapla430 (Sapla):
[e] ective law enforcement is a legitimate interest that is not less favored by the
law.431 (Emphasis in the original)
In any event, the due process requirement is satis ed by an opportunity to be heard -
designees will be subsequently noti ed of their designation in accordance with Rule 6.5 of the
IRR. Petitioners ought to be reminded that this will not be the rst time where the Court has
upheld the satisfaction of due process requirements through subsequent notice and hearing - a
case in point is the "Close Now, Hear Later Scheme" under Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, which
the Court upheld in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals.432 From this ruling, the Court has
recognized that there are very exceptional situations wherein public interest can take
precedence over the usual procedural due process rights of an individual, in line with the police
power of the State.
All told, the Court does not subscribe to petitioners' argument that the rst mode of
designation is unconstitutional. Instead, the Court nds that the this mode of designation
satis es the requirement that the means employed be narrowly tailored and are the least
restrictive. In this accord, it also satis es the overbreadth doctrine, which "decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms."433
The second and third modes of designation are constitutionally problematic, and must be
struck down.
In contrast to the rst mode, the second and third modes of designation, as provided under the
second and third paragraphs of Section 25, are constitutionally problematic.
While the State has established a compelling interest, the means employed under the second
mode of designation is not the least restrictive means to achieve such purpose.
The second mode of designation under Section 25 states:
Section 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or
Associations. - x x x
Request for designations by other jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions may be adopted
by the ATC after determination that the proposed designee meets the criteria for designation of
UNSCR No. 1373. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing mode of designation does not pass the strict scrutiny test and is equally
overbroad.
Same as the rst mode, there are underlying compelling State interests and purposes for
legislating the second mode of designation. These are: (1) to forestall possible terrorist
activities of foreigners within the Philippine jurisdiction or against Philippine nationals abroad to
prevent foreign terrorism, particularly against individuals not listed by the UNSC; and (2) to
foster inter-State reciprocity for the purpose of facilitating mutual assistance in the prevention
of terrorist activities.
However, the means employed are not the least restrictive nor narrowly tailored to achieve the
State's compelling interest. Under this second mode of designation, unbridled discretion is
given to the ATC in granting requests for designation based on its own determination. Likewise,
there appears to be no su cient standard that should be observed in granting or denying such
requests. The ATC is left to make its own determination based loosely on "the criteria for
designation of UNSCR No. 1373," without any further su cient parameters for its guidance.
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 This may therefore lead to a quid pro quo designation with the requesting jurisdiction at the
expense of the rights of a prospective designee.
Further, there are no proper procedural safeguards and remedies for an erroneous designation
in this respect. To compare, the rst mode of designation with the UNSC has a process for
delisting, the procedure for which is detailed in the supplementing resolutions of UNSCR No.
1373. As mentioned, Rule 6.9 of the ATA IRR acknowledges that delisting under the rst mode
of designation can be availed of in two ways. Moreover, there is no automatic review provision
applicable to designations made under the second mode similar to that provided for under
Section 26 (on proscription). In fact, the absence of a remedy is even more glaring when the
Court takes into consideration similar counterterrorism measures of other countries, as
mentioned above. This, despite the fact that proponents of the law have repeatedly invoked the
need to be at par with the rest of the international community in combating terrorism and
ful lling the country's duties under UNSCR No. 1373. They even mentioned the similarities in
the language used and the counterterrorism concepts introduced in foreign legislation to
support this narrative.
Again, in the U.S., there is an immediate relief or remedy available to designated individuals or
entities, since the AEDPA provides two mechanisms for review of a designation. The rst is
judicial review, as provided in Section 219 (b) as above-cited. While it is the Secretary of State
who begins the process of designation of a purported foreign terrorist organization therein,
courts are not prevented from exercising the power of judicial review to determine the propriety
of the subject designation. The second is through the intervention of the U.S. Congress under
Section 219 (a) (5) of the AEDPA, which allows the latter to revoke a designation made by the
State Department:
(5) REVOCATION BY ACT OF CONGRESS. - The Congress, by an Act of Congress, may block
or revoke a designation made under paragraph (1).
Accordingly, the designation procedure of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in the United
States under the AEDPA has features that permit the involvement of other branches of
government to a ord remedies in case of erroneous or wrongful designations and uphold the
principle of checks and balances. Although the Court notes that as of September 2020, neither
the U.S. Congress nor its courts have removed groups from the FTO list, these remedies exist
under the main law. These two avenues for review are integral components of the U.S. law that
sets it apart from the second as well as the third (as will be discussed below) modes of
designation introduced in the ATA. The review and revocation mechanisms therefore compel
the State Department to observe a higher standard given that the evidence against the subject
or designee must hold in court.
Also, it deserves reiteration that there are appeal procedures existing in the U.K. against a
proscription order issued by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, which go up to
the courts after two levels of appeal. Markedly, the second level of appeal is a Commission
established and dedicated for the purpose:
4 Deproscription: application.
(1) An application may be made to the Secretary of State For an order under section 3(3) or (8) -
(a) removing an organisation from Schedule 2, or
(b) providing for a name to cease to be treated as a name for an organisation listed in that
Schedule.
(2) An application may be made by -
(a) the organisation, or
(b) any person a ected by the organisation's proscription or by the treatment of the name as a
name for the organisation.
(3) The Secretary of State shall make regulations prescribing the procedure for applications
under this section.
(4) The regulations shall, in particular -
(a) require the Secretary of State to determine an application within a speci ed period of time,
and
(b) require an application to state the grounds on which it is made.
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 xxxx
6 Further appeal.
(1) A party to an appeal under section 5 which the Proscribed Organisations Appeal
Commission has determined may bring a further appeal on a question of law to -
(a) the Court of Appeal, if the rst appeal was heard in England and Wales,
(b) the Court of Session, if the rst appeal was heard in Scotland, or
(c) the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, if the rst appeal was heard in Northern Ireland.
(2) An appeal under subsection (1) may be brought only with the permission -
(a) of the Commission, or
(b) where the Commission refuses permission, of the court to which the appeal would be
brought.
(3) An order under section 5(4) shall not require the Secretary of State to take any action until
the nal determination or disposal of an appeal under this section (including any appeal to the
Supreme Court).
Considering all these existing procedures from other countries which the ATA may draw
inspiration from, any form of intervention, judicial or otherwise, is still not explicitly provided
therein. The Senate, the House of Representatives, or the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee constituted under Section 50 of the ATA cannot revoke a designation made by the
ATC. The utter lack of procedural safeguards and remedies for erroneous designation in the
second mode as well as in the third mode, which will be further discussed below, taints such
measures with arbitrariness relative to the State purpose sought to be achieved and is thus,
problematic.
The lack of a remedy aside, there exists other suitable alternatives which are far less intrusive
and potentially injurious to protected rights. These include the adoption of an internal watchlist
by law enforcement agencies or the maintenance of a database to monitor potential threats,
and judicial proscription under Section 26. As had been pointed out above and as will be
further dealt with below, the e ects of designation are practically the same as proscription.
Since this measure has the e ect of impermissibly chilling free speech and its cognate rights, it
should not be made through an executive body's determination that lacks proper standards
and safeguards.
In ne, for the reasons stated, the second mode of designation fails to pass strict scrutiny and
overbreadth and hence, is unconstitutional.
With a vote of 7-8, the succeeding discussion in the ponencia on the issue of the
constitutionality of the third mode of designation found in the third paragraph of Section 25 had
been overturned and is not re ective of the opinion of the majority of the members of the
Court. On this issue, the majority declared the subject phrase not unconstitutional. Readers are
cautioned to read this portion of the ponencia as it holds the opinion of only seven (7) members
of the Court and not the controlling resolution on the issue. The controlling opinion on this
issue is found in the opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo.434
The third mode of designation also fails to meet the strict scrutiny test and is overly broad.
The process for the third mode of designation is as follows:
Section 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or
Associations. —
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The ATC may designate an individual, group of persons, organization, or association, whether
domestic or foreign, upon a nding of probable cause that the individual, group of persons,
organization, or association commit, or attempt to commit, or conspire in the commission of
the acts de ned and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act. x x x
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
This process is highlighted in Rule 6.3 of the ATA's IRR which reads:
Rule 6.3. Domestic Designation by the ATC through a Determination of Probable Cause. -
Upon a nding of probable cause, the ATC may designate:
a. an individual, group of persons, entity, organization, or association, whether domestic or
foreign, who commit, or attempt to commit, or conspire or who participate in or facilitate the
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 commission of any of the acts de ned and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and
12 of the Act;
b. an entity owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such individual, group of persons,
entity, organization, or association under paragraph (a) of this Rule; and
c. a person or entity acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the individual, group of persons,
entity, organization, or association under paragraph (a) of this Rule.
For purposes of designation under Rule 6.2 and Rule 6.3 and for proposals for designation
under Rule 6.8, probable cause shall refer to a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances warranting a cautious person to believe that the proposed designce meets the
requirements for designation.
The ATC shall adopt mechanisms to collect or solicit information from relevant government
agencies and other sources in order to identity individuals, groups of persons, organizations, or
associations that, on the basis of probable cause, meet the criteria for designation under this
Rule. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Similar to the two previous modes of designation, there is a compelling state interest in
introducing the third mode of designation - that is, to aid the State in combating domestic
terrorism. However, same as the second mode of designation, the means employed by the
State are not narrowly drawn to meet such interest.
To explain, under the third mode, it is the ATC that makes an executive determination of
probable cause, and not a judicial court. Same as in the second mode of designation, however,
there are no proper procedural safeguards and remedies for an erroneous designation under
the third mode, thereby creating a chilling e ect on speech and its cognate rights and unduly
exposes innocent persons to erroneous designation with all its adverse consequences. The
nding in the discussion on the second mode that there exist other suitable alternatives which
are far less intrusive and potentially injurious to protected rights, such as the adoption of an
internal watchlist by law enforcement agencies and judicial proscription under Section 26,
similarly apply to the third mode of designation.
As argued by petitioners, another cause of concern in allowing this mode of designation is the
lack of discernible criteria in the statute by which the ATC may determine "probable cause to
designate". Note should be taken in this regard that the Court has di erentiated two kinds of
determination of probable cause in Mendoza v. People of the Philippines435 under the current
legal framework as follows:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as de ned by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such o cial has
the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be led in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge nds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
The di erence is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being led. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
The designation by the ATC per se does not lead to either of the "recognized" determinations
of probable cause. It does not result to the ling of an information in court (i.e., the main
function of executive determination of probable cause), nor does it give rise to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest (i.e., the main function of judicial determination of probable cause).
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 Designation is a peculiar and an extraordinary executive function not akin to these two
traditional determinations. As such, easily discernible standards for its implementation, similar
to that for the rst mode, should have been put in place, but there are none. Accordingly, there
is just reason to believe that the third mode confers carte blanche license on the ATC to
designate just about anyone that it deems to have met the requirements for designation,
dependent as it is on the ATC's own determination of what it deems as su cient probable
cause. In this regard, it is fairly apparent how this third mode of designation may cause a
chilling e ect on free speech as claimed by petitioners, consistent with the present delimited
facial analysis conducted by the Court in this case. As such, the third mode of designation
equally fails the strict scrutiny and overbreadth tests and, similar to the second mode, is
unconstitutional itself.
Designation and Claimed Violation of the Principle of Separation of Powers
Notably, aside from its primarily chilling e ect on speech for the reasons above explained,
there are also concerns raised by petitioners based on principle of separation of powers. As
earlier stated, despite designation being an executive function and process and proscription
being a judicial one, petitioners point out that the same e ects are triggered upon a nding by
either the ATC or the courts of probable cause: surveillance under Section 16 can then be
applied for, and the examination of records with banking and other nancial institutions and the
freezing of assets under Sections 35 and 36 may already be done by the AMLC. Thus,
petitioners decry how, in this sense, designation runs afoul of the separation of powers
principle.
However, it must be emphasized that a facial challenge under current jurisprudence is limited
to constitutional challenges premised on the freedom of speech, expression, and cognate
rights, and has yet to be particularly eshed out to tackle separation of powers claims. Thus, at
this point, the Court is hard-pressed to delve into the same.
This observation notwithstanding, the Court is impelled to point out that the argument of
petitioners on separation of powers appears will not a ect the declared constitutionality of the
rst mode because, as exhaustively discussed above, in this mode, the ATC will be merely
adopting the UNSC Consolidated List. Thus, the ATC does not exercise any form of legislative
or judicial power in such instance as the determination of designated persons or groups will be
done by the UNSC, a premier international body, itself, in conjunction with the Philippines' own
international commitments. In contrast, designation under the second and third modes, are to
be determined purely by the ATC, a national executive agency. As petitioners posit, the
consequences of designation overlap with proscription, which for its part must be based on a
judicial determination of probable cause in accordance with the Constitution. Hence,
petitioners' claim of separation of powers are only relevant to the second and third modes,
which, to be properly resolved, must be threshed out in the proper case. Practically speaking,
however, it is discerned that petitioners need not wait for this proper case to achieve the result
they desire since the second and third modes should already be struck down for its
abridgement of free speech rights due to its impermissible chilling e ect. As such, the issue on
the constitutionality of these second and third modes under a separation of powers argument
would have been rendered moot and academic by the time that the actual case concerning
separation of powers is elevated.
Clari cation on E ects of Designation (First Mode)
Considering that designation under the rst mode is a valid counterterrorism measure and
hence, constitutional, the Court nds it prudent, for the guidance of the bench, bar, and
public, to clarify the e ects that such designation should have once a listing made by the
UNSC and its Sanctions Committee is automatically adopted by the ATC.
The Court has noticed that that the OSG has persistently asserted that designation is only a
preliminary step to the freezing of the assets of a designee - which is a matter to be determined
in a separate proceeding with the AMLC at the helm.436 During the oral arguments, the OSG
assured that the only consequence of designation is the freezing of accounts, as revealed in
the following exchange:
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL GALANDINES:
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 Under Section 25, Your Honor, the designation would trigger the power of the AMLC to freeze
the assets of the person or the organization designated as a terrorist group, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARANDNG:
That's the only consequence?
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL GALANDINES:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARANDANG:
There is no other consequence arising from the designation? Are you sure of that?
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL GALANDINES:
Yes, Your Honor, the designation.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARANDANG:
We're not talking of how a person or an organization is designated as a terrorist, I just want to
know the e ects of designation, And you said, it is only freezing of assets. No other
consequences arising from the designation?
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL GALANDINES:
It is without prejudice to the eventual ling of an action for proscription.437
However, the Court nds the argument of the OSG on this point, inaccurate. It is clearly
apparent that when Section 25 is taken together with the other provisions of the ATA,
designation does not only give rise to freezing of assets under Section 36 of the ATA. It may
also lead to surveillance under Section 16 and the examination of records with banking and
other nancial institutions under Section 35. A further discussion on surveillance and
examination is perforce instructive.
Surveillance Order
As already mentioned, a careful analysis of the provisions of the ATA would show that
designation may trigger the ex parte application for a surveillance order to be issued by the CA
under Section 16. When granted, the surveillance order may authorize law enforcement agents
or military personnel to:
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secretly wiretap, overhear and listen to, intercept, screen, read, surveil, record or collect, with
the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic, mechanical or other equipment or device
or technology now known or may hereafter be known to science or with the use of any other
suitable ways and means for the above purposes, any private communications, conversation,
discussion/s, data, information, messages in whatever form, kind or nature, spoken or written
words (a) between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, as
provided in Section 26 of this Act; (b) between members of a designated person as de ned in
Section 3 (c) of Republic Act No. 10168; or (c) any person charged with or suspected of
committing any of the crimes de ned and penalized under the provisions of this Act
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
The surveillance order may also be issued against: (1) members of judicially proscribed
organizations or associations; (2) those designated under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 10168; and
(3) any person who is "suspected of committing any of the crimes de ned and penalized under
the" ATA. The Court notes that under the rst category, individuals of judicially proscribed
organizations or associations are indirectly designated due to their membership in those
outlawed terrorist organizations, and thus become potential subjects of an ex parte application
for surveillance order. Meanwhile, those designated pursuant to the ATC's automatic adoption
of the UNSC Consolidated List under Section 25 of the ATA, considering that it is the only
surviving provision herein declared as constitutional, can be, by process of logical elimination
with the other two categories, considered included in the third category.
AMLC Bank Inquiry, Investigation, and Freeze Order
Designation also prompts the AMLC's inquiry and investigation authority. Section 35 of the ATA
states:
Section 35. Anti-Money Laundering Council Authority to Investigate, Inquire into and Examine
Dank Deposits. - Upon the issuance by the court of a preliminary order of proscription or in
case of designation under Section 25 of this Act, the AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at
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 the request of the ATC, is hereby authorized to investigate: (a) any property or funds that are in
any way related to nancing of terrorism as de ned and penalized under Republic Act No.
10168, or violation of Sections 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act; and (b) property or funds of any
person or persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that such person or
persons are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating
the nancing of the aforementioned sections of this Act. x x x (Emphasis supplied; italics in the
original)
After designation under Section 25 or the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription under
Section 27, any property or funds that may be related to the nancing of terrorism under the
penalized acts in R.A. No. 10168 may be subject to investigation, upon the initiative of the
AMLC or at the request of the ATC.
Moreover, as conceded by the OSG, designation also causes the issuance by the AMLC of a
preventive freeze order in the rst paragraph of Section 36, and freeze orders under the third
paragraph of the same section. The relevant paragraphs of Sections 25 and 36 of the ATA
state:
Section 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or
Associations. -
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The assets of the designated individual, group of persons, organization or association above-
mentioned shall be subject to the authority of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to
freeze pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 10168.
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Section 36. Authority to Freeze. - Upon the issuance by the court of a preliminary order of
proscription or in case of designation under Section 25 of this Act, the AMLC, either upon its
own initiative or request of the ATC, is hereby authorized to issue an ex parte order to freeze
without delay: (a) any property or funds that are in any way related to nancing of terrorism as
de ned and penalized under Republic Act No. 10168, or any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act; and (b) property or funds of any person or persons in relation to
whom there is probable cause to believe that such person or persons are committing or
attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating the nancing of the
aforementioned sections of this Act.
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Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, the AMLC, consistent with the Philippines'
international obligations, shall be authorized to issue a freeze order with respect to property or
funds of a designated organization, association, group or any individual to comply with binding
terrorism-related resolutions, including UNSCR No. 1373 pursuant to Article 41 of the charter
of the UN. Said freeze order shall be e ective until the basis for the issuance thereof shall have
been lifted.
Section 36 authorizes the AMLC, upon its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, to
issue ex parte a freeze order on: (1) any property or funds related to nancing of terrorism
under R.A. No. 10168 or any violation of the punishable acts in the ATA; or (2) property or funds
of any person or persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe is committing
or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating the nance of the
punishable acts in the ATA. The freeze order is e ective for a period not to exceed 20 days and
may be extended for a period not to exceed six months upon order of the CA.
Bank Secrecy in Relation to Bank Inquiry and Freeze Orders Issued by the AMLC
In Republic v. Eugenio,438 the Court recognized that there is a right to privacy governing bank
accounts in the Philippines. In this case, it was explained that such right is statutory since it is
by virtue only of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955.439 Be that as it may, the Court expressed that
there is a disfavor towards construing statutory exceptions in such a manner that would
authorize unbridled discretion on the part of the government or of anyone seeking to inquire
into bank deposits by virtue of such exceptions. The Court stated that:
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 If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely con dential nature of bank deposits against
a rming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in
favor of the former.440
In Eugenio, the Court also di erentiated the purpose of a bank inquiry and a freeze order
issued by the AMLC:
A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving monetary instruments
or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as de ned in Section 3 (i) of the
AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or property would thus be inhibited from
utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded by
a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the
dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued.
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of
physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the
examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank
nancial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or
nancial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details
such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of
the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically
seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and
therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that would require
the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.441
Terrorism and Terrorism Financing as Exceptions to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Despite a recognition that the secrecy of bank deposits remains as the general rule, it can be
seen that for years, the legislature has carved out certain exceptions for the crime of terrorism.
As early as 2003, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended by R.A. No. 9194442 already
gave the AMLC the power to issue bank inquiry orders, without the need for prior issuance of a
court order, in relation to the crimes enumerated under Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12) of the
law, i.e. kidnapping for ransom; acts punished under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002; hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, as
de ned by the Revised Penal Codes, as amended, including those perpetrated by terrorists
against non-combatant persons and similar targets. Interestingly, this provision already
recognized terrorists acts as an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits even before the
passage of the HSA - the country's rst anti-terrorism statute - four years later.
By 2012, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended by R.A. No. 10167443 has explicitly
added terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism as de ned under the HSA to the crimes
where no court order is required for bank inquiries. More importantly, in the same year,
Congress passed R.A. No. 10168, or the "Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act
of 2012"444 which contains provisions almost identical to Sections 35 and 36 of the ATA.
Even in the latest amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 - R.A. No. 11521
passed on January 29, 2021 - terrorism as an exception to the rule on bank secrecy remains
unchanged.
From the genealogy of the AMLC's powers, the legislative intent to make terrorism an
exception to the general rule on bank secrecy is clear. Therefore, it behooves the Court to
respect the legislature's decision, especially since the rule on secrecy of bank deposits is
statutory.
As to freeze orders, the Court reiterates the points under Section 25 and rule that the freezing
of assets ex parte is a necessary implication of preventing the nancing of terrorist acts. Even
as recognized in Republic v. Eugenio:445
To make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account
holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could be
issued.446
The ex parte freeze order is a preventive measure because it arises from the ATC's order of
designation or the CA's preliminary order of proscription. Section 36 itself provides that the ex
parte freeze order shall only be e ective for 20 days and this period may only be extended for
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 up to six months upon order of the Court of Appeals.447 It is also worth pointing out that in the
2019 MER Report, the APG stated that the lack of UNSC Resolution No. 1373 designations,
along with a low number of assets and instrumentalities frozen, is not in line with the high risk
of terrorism nancing in the Philippines.448 Notably, due process is satis ed through
subsequent notice and hearing to be conducted when a person seeks judicial protection from
the Court of Appeals, as explicitly provided under Section 36.
Other Consequences of Designation
It can also be observed that a designation made under Section 25 may potentially a ect third
persons. First, it can lead to the prosecution of the donors or supporters of the designated
individual or organization, association, or groups of persons under Section 12 of the ATA for
providing material support or for giving material aid to a designated terrorist even if the
determination was only made by the ATC.449 Second, it can make bank o cials and bank
employees liable for refusing to allow the examination of bank records of designated persons,
groups, or organizations under Section 39.450
Considering the consequences of designation, the Court emphasizes that any power or
authority the ATC may exercise under Section 25 should thus be limited to con rming the
designation or listing made by the UNSC and its Sanctions Committee, as well as a rming the
applicability of the above-discussed sanctions under the ATA to the designee. Further, the
sanctions are to be understood as merely preventive in nature, and should not have penal or
criminal consequences. The ATC's function is thus narrowly interpreted to mean that the
designation ends with the declaration that a person or group is a terrorist, and no other
sanction or consequence may be imposed as a result of the exercise of this function. In this
regard, the Court holds that once an automatic adoption is duly made, any consequence of
that designation should, as it must, be reposed to the processes and implementation of other
agencies - the AMLC with regard to the propriety of the ex parte order for bank inquiry and/or
freeze order; the CA with regard to the surveillance and proscription; and the proper courts
with regard to the punishment for violations of the pertinent provisions of the law.
Proscription under Sections 26, 27, and 28 of the ATA is a valid exercise of police power and
passes the strict scrutiny test.
Sections 26, 27, & 28 of the ATA state:
Section 26. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Associations, or Group of Persons. - Any
group of persons, organization, or association, which commits any of the acts de ned and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, or organized for the purpose
of engaging in terrorism shall, upon application of the DOJ before the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the group of persons,
organization or association, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed group of persons,
organization or association, by the said Court.
The application shall be led with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a preliminary order of
proscription. No application for proscription shall be led without the authority of the ATC upon
the recommendation of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA).
Section 27. Preliminary Order of Proscription. - Where the Court has determined that probable
cause exists on the basis of the veri ed application which is su cient in form and substance,
that the issuance of an order of proscription is necessary to prevent the commission of
terrorism, he/she shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from the ling of the application, issue a
preliminary order of proscription declaring that the respondent is a terrorist and an outlawed
organization or association within the meaning of Section 26 of this Act.
The court shall immediately commence and conduct continuous hearings, which should be
completed within six (6) months from the time the application has been led, to determine
whether:
(a) The preliminary order of proscription should be made permanent;
(b) A permanent order of proscription should be issued in case no preliminary order was
issued; or
(c) A preliminary order of proscription should be lifted. It shall be the burden of the applicant to
prove that the respondent is a terrorist and an outlawed organization or association within the
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 meaning of Section 26 of this Act before the court issues an order of proscription whether
preliminary or permanent.
The permanent order of proscription herein granted shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation. It shall be valid for a period of three (3) years after which, a review of such
order shall be made and if circumstances warrant, the same shall be lifted.
Section 28. Request to Proscribe from Foreign Jurisdictions and Supranational Jurisdictions. -
Consistent with the national interest, all requests for proscription made by another jurisdiction
or supranational jurisdiction shall be referred by the Department of Foreign A airs (DFA) to the
ATC to determine, with the assistance of the NICA, if proscription under Section 26 of this Act
is warranted. If the request for proscription is granted, the ATC shall correspondingly
commence proscription proceedings through DOJ.
Petitioners argue that although judicial proscription in Section 26 involves a court suit, its
punitive sanctions turn it into a criminal action that requires compliance with the strict
requirements of chie process. They contend that the provisional declaration of respondent as a
proscribed entity under a preliminary order of proscription places a presumption of guilt against
respondent, easing the DOJ's burden of proof under paragraph (c) of Section 27. They also
point out that Sections 26 and 27 permit the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription
though respondent has yet to be informed of the application for proscription.451 In the context
of a facial analysis, petitioners urge the Court to nullify the assailed provisions due to the
chilling e ect of judicial proscription and the probable consequences it creates on the exercise
of freedom of speech and its cognate rights.
To reiterate, the counterterrorism measure of proscription was enacted in line with the State's
e orts to address the complex issue of terrorism in the country, especially since the most
egregious terrorist attacks recently made have been planned and carried out by groups. In
certain cases, several groups may even form a network where information and resources are
shared across jurisdictions. An attack carried out in the Philippines may have been planned by
a foreign group. Conversely, an attack to be carried out in a foreign state may be planned here
by a domestically grown group. On that basis, the state has as much a reason to impose limits
on the freedoms of a group as on the freedoms of an individual, even to the point of outlawing
that group altogether. There is, therefore, no question that there is a compelling State interest
or lawful purpose behind proscription. Likewise, in satisfaction of strict scrutiny and
overbreadth, proscription under Sections 26, 27, and 28 constitutes as a lawful means of
achieving the lawful State purpose considering that it provides for the least restrictive means
by which the freedom of association is regulated, as will be herein explained.
The procedure of proscription instituted under the ATA is a judicial process and is done based
on a determination of probable cause by the CA.
In the application for proscription, procedural due process is observed: the group of persons,
organization, or association intended to be judicially declared a terrorist is a orded fair notice,
as well as an open hearing. The CA's decision on the DOJ's veri ed petition for proscription is
likewise published in a newspaper of general circulation.
But even before a petition for proscription is brought before the CA, there are proper
procedural safeguards that the DOJ is required to observe to avoid an erroneous proscription.
Based on the language of Section 26, the DOJ, on its own, cannot apply for the proscription of
a group of persons, organization, or association. Section 26 speci cally requires that the
application for proscription shall be with "the authority of the ATC upon the recommendation of
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA)." Thus, even before an application is led
with the CA, the matter has already passed through three levels of investigation: rst, when the
DOJ asks for authority from the ATC to le the application; second, when the ATC asks the
NICA to give its recommendation to the request made by the DOJ; and nally, the necessary
executive determination to be made by the ATC before it gives its imprimatur to the DOJ to le
the application.
It is only after compliance with the foregoing steps that judicial intervention will come in.
Together, these steps provide layers of protection that may help prevent any arbitrary and
erroneous proscription of groups of persons, associations, or organizations as terrorists. In this
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 regard, these layers of protection ensure that the proscription mechanism under the ATA is
narrowly tailored and constitutes the least restrictive means to achieve the compelling State
interest.
Preliminary prescription orders are not unconstitutional.
Noticeably, the preliminary order of proscription is a feature not previously found in the HSA.
Section 27 provides that the CA shall issue a preliminary order of proscription within 72 hours
from the ling of the application, upon a nding of probable cause based solely on the
application of the DOJ to prevent the commission of terrorism. The Court nds that allowing
the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription would not cause the premature classi cation
of a group as a terrorist without the bene t of a judicial trial in violation of the prohibition on the
enactment of bills of attainder.
It is critical in resolving this issue to determine the nature and objective of a preliminary order of
proscription. Section 27 explicitly states that the order is to be issued by the CA and is meant
to prevent the commission of terrorism. In this context, it entails a judicial process that
recognizes the necessity for e ective counterterrorism measures. As discussed above, the
consequences of the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription are, as expressly provided,
the freezing of assets and/or bank inquiry or investigation by the AMLC pursuant to Sections
35 and 36 of the ATA. Considering the preliminary nature of the order of proscription under
Section 27, the consequences of this Order must be necessarily limited to these two. Any other
consequence should be subject to the more intricate processes and implementation of the
relevant government agencies and bodies.
Furthermore, it is well to note that the procedure for the issuance of a preliminary order of
proscription is subsumed in the application for proscription, for which the subject has already
been noti ed. In other words, an application for a preliminary order of proscription under
Section 27 is not a separate process from the application referred to in Section 26. This judicial
process with the CA will ensure temperance of abuse, as the ATA itself guarantees that
subjects of proscription should be given the opportunity to be heard.
The Court nds nothing constitutionally o ensive insofar as a textual examination of the
provisions on proscription is concerned. The language of Section 26 implies that notice and
hearing are a orded to those who may be proscribed under the ATA, and the process is
undoubtedly judicial in nature As such, the challenged provision appears to be reasonably
circumscribed to prevent an unnecessary encroachment of protected freedoms.
Needless to say, the Court's present ruling on the issues raised against the validity of Sections
26 to 28 under the delimited facial analysis should not foreclose future challenges against
judicial proscription where actual cases with extant facts are present. Indeed, judicial
proscription is such a powerful counterterrorism tool that the safeguards included therein may
not absolutely forestall abuse or misapplication. The courts should, therefore, not be precluded
from resolving issues a ecting the actual and practical operation of these provisions where the
Court can intelligently adjudicate the issues.452
On this score, the Court acknowledges that existing procedural rules may not be satisfactorily
appropriate for the process of proscription, if and when an application is led therefor. Hence,
the Court considers it an opportune time to formulate some guidelines to be observed in
applying for a proscription order under Section 26 to guide the bench, bar, and public. This is
consistent with the rule-making authority of the Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, which states:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
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(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simpli ed
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain e ective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.453 (Emphasis supplied)
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 Considering that proscription is a judicial process, the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, may promulgate the necessary procedural rules to govern such proceedings in the
future.
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the following principles shall be observed:
1. After an application for proscription is led by the DOJ, the authorizing Division of the CA
shall, within 24 hours, determine whether said application is su cient in form and substance.
An application shall be su cient in form if it complies with the following requisites:
a) it is veri ed or made under oath;
b) it is accompanied by the recommendation of the NICA and the authorization of the ATC;
c) it shows proof of service of the application to the group of persons, organization, or
association sought to be proscribed.
Meanwhile, an application shall be su cient in substance if:
a) it speci cally identi es the group of persons, organization, or association sought to be
proscribed, including the names and addresses of every member so known at the time the
application was made and the inclusive dates of their membership;
b) it provides a detailed speci cation of the reasons or grounds relied upon that show the
necessity for proscription; and
c) it states the commitment of the applicant to have the permanent order of proscription, if
granted, reviewed within six months prior to the expiration thereof.
Failure to comply with these requisites shall be su cient cause for the outright dismissal of the
application.
2. If the CA is satis ed that the application is su cient in form and substance, it shall
immediately commence and conduct continuous hearings, which should be completed within
six months from the time the application was led. Simultaneous with the commencement and
the conduct of the continuous hearings, the CA shall also determine whether there is probable
cause to issue a preliminary order of proscription, which should be made within 72 hours from
the ling of the application. If it decides to issue the same, the preliminary order of proscription
shall emphasize that only the AMLC's authority to freeze assets and to initiate a bank inquiry or
investigation pursuant to Sections 35 and 36 of the ATA shall result from its issuance.
3. Non-appearance of respondent group of persons, organization, or association, as long as
there is compliance with the publication of the preliminary order of proscription requirement
upon directive of the CA, shall not prevent the CA from proceeding with the proscription
hearings.
4. In-camera proceedings shall be adopted to ensure that sensitive and con dential
information a ecting national security will not be compromised without sacri cing the right to
due process of those subjected to judicial proscription proceedings.
5. During the hearing, the CA shall determine whether: (a) a preliminary order of proscription
should be made permanent; (b) whether a permanent order or proscription should be issued, if
no preliminary order of proscription was issued; or (c) whether a preliminary order of
proscription should be lifted. The applicant has the burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that a permanent order of proscription should issue.
6. From the issuance of a permanent order of proscription, the party aggrieved may appeal to
the Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising in the
appeal all pertinent questions of law and issues. The appeal shall not stay the order of
proscription unless the Court orders otherwise.
7. If the application is denied by the CA, no application shall be led against the same group of
persons, organization, or association within six months from the date of the denial. A
subsequent application must be grounded on new evidence that the applicant could not have
presented even in the exercise of due diligence or on substantially new circumstances.454
Similar to the Court's instruction in Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law O ces v.
Court of Appeals,455 the Court directs the CA once again to draft the factual procedural rules
based on the foregoing guidelines for submission to the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court and eventual approval and promulgation of the Court En Banc.
Detention without Judicial Warrant of Arrest under Section 29
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 Another contentious provision of the ATA is Section 29. The assailed provision states:
Section 29. Detention without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any law enforcement agent or military
personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the ATC has taken custody of a
person suspected of committing any of the acts de ned and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the
delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said suspected person to
the proper judicial authority within a period of fourteen (14) calendar days counted from the
moment the said suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken
into custody by the law enforcement agent or military personnel. The period of detention may
be extended to a maximum period of ten (10) calendar days if it is established that (1) further
detention of the person/s is necessary to preserve evidence related to terrorism or complete
the investigation; (2) further detention of the person/s is necessary to prevent the commission
of another terrorism; and (3) the investigation is being conducted properly and without delay.
Immediately after taking custody of a person suspected of committing terrorism or any
member of a group of persons, organization or association proscribed under Section 26 hereof,
the law enforcement agent or military personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court
nearest the place of apprehension or arrest of the following facts: (a) the time, date, and
manner of arrest; (b) the location or locations of the detained suspect/s and (c) the physical
and mental condition of the detained suspect/s. The law enforcement agent or military
personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the
written notice given to the judge.
The head of the detaining facility shall ensure that the detained suspect is informed of his/her
rights as a detainee and shall ensure access to the detainee by his/her counsel or agencies
and entities authorized by law to exercise visitorial powers over detention facilities.
The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be imposed upon the police or law
enforcement agent or military personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the
preceding paragraph. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Section 29 is implemented by the following pertinent provisions in Rule IX of the ATA IRR:
RULE 9.1. Authority from ATC in relation to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
Any law enforcement agent or military personnel who, having been duly authorized in writing by
the ATC under the circumstances provided for under paragraphs (a) to (e) of Rule 9.2, has
taken custody of a person suspected of committing any of the acts de ned and penalized
under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the Act shall, without incurring any criminal
liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, deliver said suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of fourteen
(14) calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or
military personnel. The period of detention may be extended to a maximum period of ten (10)
calendar days if it is established that (a) further detention of the person/s is necessary to
preserve the evidence related to terrorism or complete the investigation, (b) further detention of
the person is necessary to prevent the commission of another terrorism, and (c) the
investigation is being conducted properly and without delay.
The ATC shall issue a written authority in favor of the law enforcement o cer or military
personnel upon submission of a sworn statement stating the details of the person suspected of
committing acts of terrorism, and the relevant circumstances as basis for taking custody of
said person.
If the law enforcement agent or military personnel is not duly authorized in writing by the ATC,
he/she shall deliver the suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the periods
speci ed under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, provided that if the law enforcement
agent or military personnel is able to secure a written authority from the ATC prior to the lapse
of the periods speci ed under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the period provided
under paragraph (1) of this Rule shall apply.
RULE 9.2. Detention of a suspected person without warrant of arrest
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 A law enforcement o cer or military personnel may, without a warrant, arrest:
a. a suspect who has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit any of the
acts de ned and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 of the Act in the
presence of the arresting o cer;
b. a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting o cer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of any of the acts de ned and penalized under
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 of the Act, which has just been committed; and
c. a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving nal
judgment for or is temporarily con ned while his/her case for any of the acts de ned and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, or 12 of the Act is pending, or has escaped
while bring transferred from one con nement to another.
RULE 9.3. Immediate noti cation to the nearest court
Immediately after taking custody of the suspected person, the law enforcement agent or
military personnel shall, through personal service, notify in writing the judge of the trial court
nearest the place of apprehension or arrest of the following facts:
a. the time, date, and manner of arrest;
b. the exact location of the detained suspect; and
c. the physical and mental condition of the detained suspect.
For purposes of this rule, immediate noti cation shall mean a period not exceeding forty-eight
(48) hours from the time of the apprehension or arrest of the suspected person.
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RULE 9.5. Noti cation to the ATC and CHR
The law enforcement agent or military personnel shall furnish the ATC and the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) copies of the written noti cation given to the judge in such manner as
shall ensure receipt thereof within forty-eight (48) hours from the time of apprehension or arrest
of the suspected person.
The primary and substantive arguments raised by petitioners against Section 29 revolve around
its supposed violation of the principle of separation of powers and how it permits the ATC to
infringe on the exclusive powers of the judiciary by authorizing the issuance of warrants other
than by the courts.456 Petitioners maintain that the provision carves out an additional
exception to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, thereby expanding its scope and
encroaching on the Court's exclusive prerogative.457 They likewise assert that the assailed
provision does not actually contemplate a valid warrantless arrest,458 because the wording of
the provision requires the prior issuance of a written authority from the ATC to e ect a
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. For petitioners, the requirement for the ATC to
issue a written authority defeats the purpose of a warrantless arrest, which applies where the
o ender is caught in agrante delicto or after a hot pursuit and where time is of the
essence.459 Relative to these claims, petitioners also challenge Section 29 for allegedly
empowering the ATC to issue arrest orders upon mere "suspicion", thus substituting to a lower
legislatively-prescribed yardstick the strict standard of probable cause.460
Petitioners also assail the validity of the supposed inordinately long detention period under
Section 29. They insist that there is no factual justi cation to impose the 14- to 24-day period
of detention, as its only basis was simply a conjecture by police o cers when asked how long
a period is needed to prepare a strong case.461 For them, the supposed intent to provide law
enforcers additional time to prepare a "strong case" is not a valid reason to delay the delivery
of an accused to judicial authorities.462 Further, petitioners contend that the 14- to 24-day
period violates the 3-day limit for detentions without judicial charge under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution.463
Section 29 is susceptible to a facial challenge.
At this juncture, however, it should be stressed that the arguments against Section 29 shall be
passed upon by the Court insofar as they become relevant in determining whether or not the
said provision restrains or chills the exercise of the freedom of speech, expression, and their
cognate rights, consistent with the overall framework of a facial analysis as earlier exhaustively
discussed, and as petitioners themselves duly assert. To be sure, within the context of a facial
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 challenge, the Court gives particular attention to petitioners' claim that the ATA, in authorizing
the arbitrary arrest of mere suspects and their prolonged detention without judicial warrant or
intervention, infringes on the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association among other
constitutional rights.464 Petitioners contend in this regard that the ATA su ers a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity for being a prior restraint to protected
speech,465 in that "the threat of arrest without a judicial warrant and prolonged detention
would be more than chilling enough to sti e, suppress, if not totally snu out, any re, ame, or
even icker, of indignation or protest against government corruption, oppression, and
abuse."466 Petitioners also submit that the danger of being arrested without a judicial warrant
and the resulting prolonged detention has caused fear among staunch critics of the
government that their impassioned activism may result to being subjected to the
consequences of Section 29. To put it simply, petitioners aver that the threat of arrest creates a
"chilling e ect" on speech, expression, and its cognate rights.
The Court, from the immediately preceding arguments, nds su cient basis to proceed to a
facial analysis of Section 29. Similar to the nding on the e ects of designation and
proscription, petitioners have demonstrated a prima facie case as to the possible restraint and
chilling e ect that a warrantless arrest to be made under Section 29 may have on speech and
expression. Again, although Section 29 is not exclusively a speech provision per se, its
implementation - as petitioners themselves allege - has a signi cant impact in the exercise of
the freedom of speech and expression in that it intimidates individuals and groups in the
exercise of such rights. The belief of petitioners that the threat of an arrest without a judicial
warrant and that the resulting prolonged detention causes undue fear and disquiet even as to
those legitimately exercising their right to speak and express is seemingly sensible. The fear of
possible physical harm upon arrest and possible duress during prolonged detention may
indeed create an unwarranted and unjusti ed atmosphere that leads to a chilling of speech and
expression, if not duly passed upon by the Court.
Since the implementation and e ects of Section 29 have grave implications on the exercise of
free speech and expression, it is therefore a proper subject of a facial analysis using, once
again, the overbreadth doctrine and the strict scrutiny test. To reiterate, these two analytical
tools were developed for testing, on their faces, statutes involving free speech and expression
according to Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan467 and Spouses Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections.468 The third analytical tool, the void for vagueness doctrine, will not be utilized to
test the validity of Section 29 because petitioners have not su ciently presented any
demonstrable claim that the wording or text of the assailed provision is ambiguous, or that it
fails to specify what is prohibited or required to be done so that one may act accordingly.
Warrants of Arrest and Warrantless Arrests Under the Current Legal Framework
Before the Court proceeds to analyze the validity of Section 29, it is inclined, rstly, to provide a
brief overview of the doctrines and rules that have developed relating to the authority of judges
to issue warrants of arrest; and secondly, to discuss the conceptual underpinnings of the
recognized instances of valid warrantless arrests. The Court believes that both these
discussions are essential in order to properly frame the facial analysis of Section 29, as well as
to provide a theoretical demarcation point between the existing legal framework and the nature
of the arrest and detention envisioned as a counterterrorism measure under Section 29.
Warrants of Arrest
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution protects the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or a rmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The right protected in Section 2, Article III is guaranteed by the well-established rule, also
stated in the said provision, that only judges can issue warrants of arrest after a personal
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 determination that there is probable cause to arrest an individual. The rationale behind this rule
is the recognition that the Constitution protects the privacy and sanctity of the person, and the
right serves as an assurance against unlawful arrests and other illegal forms of restraint on a
person's physical liberty.469
An examination of the history of the Constitution's phraseology of the right protected under
Section 2, Article III would show a clear intention to limit the authority of issuing warrants of
arrests to the courts. Section 1 (3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution categorically stated that
only judges can issue warrants of arrest:
Section 1. x x x
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(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or a rmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A signi cant shift in this policy was introduced in the 1973 Constitution, wherein "such other
responsible o cer[s]" were also authorized to issue warrants of arrest:
Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not
be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible o cer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or a rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When asked which o cers were authorized by law to issue warrants, Delegate Rodolfo A. Ortiz
answered "that the provision contemplated the 'situation where the law may authorize the
scals to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.'"470 It was not until the most notable use
of this provision, however, did the danger of allowing other o cers authorized by law was
realized; for, this provision became the basis for the issuance of the notorious and the much-
abused Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSOs) by the Secretary of National Defense during
Martial Law.
More aware of the dangers of extending the power to issue warrants of arrest to executive
o cials, and having traumatically experienced its grievous implementation to the detriment of
fundamental rights, the framers of the 1987 Constitution decided to discard the phrase "or
such other responsible o cer as may be authorized by law" from the provision to be adopted
under the new Constitution. As remarked by former Associate Justice and Chairperson of the
Constitutional Commission Cecilia Muñoz-Palma:
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The Marcos provision that search warrants or warrants of arrest may be issued not only by a
judge but by any responsible o cer authorized by law is discarded. Never again will the Filipino
people be victims of the much-condemned presidential detention action or PDA or presidential
commitment orders, the PCOs, which desecrate the rights to life and liberty, for under the new
provision a search warrant or warrant of arrest may be issued only by a judge.471
Eminent constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. explained the intent to limit the authority to
issue search and arrest warrants to judges only during the deliberations for the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
The provision on Section 3 [now Section 2 reverts to the 1935 formula by eliminating the 1973
phrase "or such other responsible o cer as may be authorized by law," and also adds the
word PERSONALLY on line 18. In other words, warrants under this proposal can be issued only
by judges.472
That the Constitution only permits a judge to issue warrants of arrest - not an o cer of the
legislative or the executive department - is not an accident. It is corollary to the separation of
powers and the mandate under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution that no person should
be deprived of his property or liberty without due process of law. The Fourth Amendment of the
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 U.S. Constitution, on which Section 2, Article III of our Constitution is based, was borne out of
colonial America's experience with "writs of assistance" issued by the British authorities in
favor of revenue o cers, empowering them to search suspected places of smuggled goods
based only on their discretion. It has been described as "the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
was found in an English law book" since they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty o cer."473 It is because of this that the Court vigilantly guards against any attempt
to remove or reallocate the judiciary's exclusive power to issue warrants of arrest.
Jurisprudence under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions has time and again a rmed the rule that
only judges may issue search or arrest warrants. In Salazar v. Achacoso,474 the Court declared
paragraph (c), Article 38 of the Labor Code unconstitutional. The Court reiterated that the
Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may not issue search or arrest warrants.475 The Court
rea rmed the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may
issue warrants of arrest and search;
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a nal order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.476
Likewise, in Ponsica v. Ignalaga477 the Court emphatically declared that:
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations,
much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this
power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus o cio by the 1987 Constitution
which took e ect on February 2, 1987, the date of its rati cation by the Filipino people. x x
x478
Similarly, in the case Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals479 the
Court ruled that a prosecutor has no power to order an arrest under the Constitution. The Court
explained that:
x x x [T]he Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached
"judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his o ce
"is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to
issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his
own right, when lie is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree
No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.480 (Citation omitted)
Warrantless Arrests
As explained above, the general rule is that no arrest can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority.481 Warrantless arrests, however, have long been
allowed in certain instances as an exception to this rule. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules these
recognized instances:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace o cer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an o ense;
(b) When an o ense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving nal judgment or temporarily con ned while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one con nement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
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 While these are not the only instances under the Rules which allow valid warrantless
arrests,482 the enumeration in Section 5, Rule 113 is of particular interest because the
enumeration is substantially mirrored under Rule 9.2 of the IRR. More speci cally, the
warrantless arrests allowed under Section 5(a), or arrests in agrante delicto, and under
Section 5(b), or arrests in hot pursuit, are considered mainly in this case, in view of the peculiar
mechanics in the implementation of Section 29 of the ATA, as well as the allegations raised
against the said provision.
For Section 5(a) of Rule 113 to operate, two elements must concur: rst, the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, and second, such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting o cer.483 The Court follows in this regard the
long-standing rule that reliable information alone is not su cient to justify a warrantless arrest
under this mode.484
On the other hand, the application of Section 5(b) requires two elements: rst, that at the time
of the arrest, a crime or an o ense had in fact just been committed; and second, the arresting
o cer has probable cause to believe, based on his or her personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested had committed the crime or o ense.485 For this
mode of warrantless arrest, the Court has emphasized that it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime - a crime
must in fact or actually have been committed rst. That a crime has actually been committed is
an essential precondition, and it is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed.486 There is also a time element of "immediacy" required under Section 5(b), as
explained by the Court in Veridiano v. People487:
Rule 113, Section 5 (b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires
that an o ense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." That a
crime was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest
under Rule 113, Section 5 (b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the
crime is committed up to the point of arrest.
Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must
have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be
arrested committed it.488
Note that in both instances, the o cer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of
an o ense is absolutely required, the di erence being that under paragraph (a), the o cer
himself or herself witnesses the crime, while under paragraph (b), he or she knows for a fact
that a crime has just been committed.489
The personal knowledge required under Section 5 (b) goes into determining whether probable
cause exists for the warrantless arrest. As explained by the Court in Pestilos v.
Generoso490 (Pestilos):
xxxx
x x x [T]he arresting o cer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of feels or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. 'These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances
su ciently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace o cers making the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signi es a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances su ciently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the o ense with which he is charged, or an
actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. (Emphases and
citations omitted)
The probable cause requirement for warrantless arrests under the second mode had been
clari ed and highlighted in Sapla.491 Similar to the long-standing rule under the rst mode that
reliable information alone is not su cient to justify a warrantless arrest, Sapla instructed that
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 law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of con dential or tipped information, since a tip is
still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. Sapla stressed that a tip, no matter how reliable,
is not su cient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstances that
will arouse suspicion. The Court further explained that exclusive reliance on information tipped
by informants goes against the nature of probable cause, for a single hint hardly amounts to
the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable man to believe
that an o ense has been committed. Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa's ponencia ratiocinated that:
Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein, on
the sheer basis of an unveri ed information passed along by an alleged informant, the
authorities are given the unbridled license to [e ect warrantless arrests], even in the absence of
any overt circumstance that engenders a reasonable belief that an illegal activity is afoot.
This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in People v. Montilla. In holding that law and jurisprudence
require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches, former Chief Justice Panganiban
explained that allowing warrantless searches and seizures based on tipped information alone
places the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures in great
jeopardy:
x x x Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the
Makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police o cer as
a possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible arrest. This is
placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required to a rm under oath
their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless
arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct
searches without warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence
information only on the day or afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the
legal requisites for validly e ecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed, the
majority's ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures.
It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless
searches and seizures on the solitary basis of unveri ed, anonymous tips.
Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated
information to the police. Unscrupulous persons can e ortlessly take advantage of this and
easily harass and intimidate another by simply giving false information to the police, allowing
the latter to invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis of a
bogus tip.
On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the
in ltration of a citizen's vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely
claiming that raw intelligence was received, even if there really was no such information
received or if the information received was fabricated.
Simply stated, the citizen's sancti ed and heavily-protected right against unreasonable search
and seizure will be at the mercy of phony tips. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures will be rendered hollow and meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of
the Bill of Rights.492 (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Once a person is validly arrested without a warrant, Article 125 of the RPC will apply and his or
her detention should not exceed the periods indicated therein, as follows:
Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public o cer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall tail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
o enses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
o enses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes or o enses punishable by a ictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
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 In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
(As amended by EO No. 272, July 25, 1987. This EO No. 272 shall take e ect thirty (30) days
following its publication in the O cial Gazette).
So as to prevent any undue curtailment of an apprehended suspect's liberty, Article 125 of the
RPC renders the detaining o cer criminally liable if he does not deliver the detainee to the
proper judicial authorities within the given period.
Section 29, properly construed, does not provide for an "executive warrant of arrest" nor
warrantless arrest on mere suspicion.
Guided by the above discussion, there is an apparent need to clarify the meaning of Section 29
insofar as the parties insist on varying interpretations. On this point, the Court abides by the
principle that if a statute can be interpreted in two ways, one of which is constitutional and the
other is not, then the Court shall choose the constitutional interpretation. As long held by the
Court:
Every intendment of the law should lean towards its validity, not its invalidity. The judiciary, as
noted by Justice Douglas, should favor that interpretation of legislation which gives it the
greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality.493
Notably, it has also been stated that "laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation [and]
with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject";494 therefore, as much as possible, the
Constitution, existing rules and jurisprudence, should he read into every law to harmonize them
within the bounds of proper construction.
Accordingly, with these in mind, the Court's construction is that under Section 29, a person
may be arrested without a warrant by law enforcement o cers or military personnel for acts
de ned or penalized under Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA but only under any of the instances
contemplated in Rule 9.2, i.e., arrest in agrante delicto, arrest in hot pursuit, and arrest of
escapees, which mirrors Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Once arrested without a
warrant under those instances, a person may be detained for up to 14 days, provided that the
ATC issues a written authority in favor of the arresting o cer pursuant to Rule 9.1, upon
submission of a sworn statement stating the details of the person suspected of committing
acts of terrorism and the relevant circumstances as basis for taking custody of said person. If
the ATC does not issue the written authority, then the arresting o cer shall deliver the
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the periods speci ed under Article 125
of the RPC - the prevailing general rule. The extended detention period - which, as will be
explained in the ensuing discussions, is the crux of Section 29 - is therefore deemed as an
exception to Article 125 of the RPC based on Congress' own wisdom and policy determination
relative to the exigent and peculiar nature of terrorism and hence, requires, as a safeguard, the
written authorization of the ATC, an executive agency comprised of high-ranking national
security o cials.
In fact, it is palpable that the subject matter of Section 29 is really the extended detention
period, and not the grounds for warrantless arrest, which remains as those instances provided
by Section 5, Rule 113. A keen scrutiny of the wording of Section 29 would show that the
provision centers on Article 125 of the RPC, which pertains to the period of detention.
Consequently, Section 29 primarily evokes the exception to Article 125 by stating that the
apprehending/detaining o cer does not incur criminal liability for "delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the proper judicial authorities", provided that the written authorization of
the ATC for the purpose is rst secured, which henceforth, allows such delivery within the
extended period of 14 calendar days. Again, for ready reference, Section 29 reads:
The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any
law enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the
ATC has taken custody of a person suspected of committing any of the acts de ned and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without incurring any
criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities,
deliver said suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of fourteen (14)
calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has been apprehended or
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 arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or military personnel.
xxx
As a further safeguard, Section 29 provides that the arresting o cer is likewise duty-bound
under Rule 9.3 to immediately notify in writing, within a period not exceeding 48 hours, the
judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension of the details of such arrest. The ATC and
CHR must be furnished copies of the written noti cation given to the judge, which should be
received by the said agencies within the same 48-hour period, as provided in Rule 9.5. Section
29, as re ected in Rule 9.1, allows the extension of the detention period to a maximum period
of 10 calendar days if the grounds to allow the extension are established.
The written authorization of the ATC under Section 29 is not an executive warrant of arrest.
Based on the considerations stated above, it is therefore clear that the arrest and detention
contemplated in Section 29 does not divert from the rule that only a judge may issue a warrant
of arrest. This is con rmed by Rule 9.2 of the ATA IRR which, again as observed above,
replicates the enumeration in Section 5, Rule 113 relative to the crimes de ned under the
ATA. Without a doubt, when the circumstances for a warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule
113 or Rule 9.2 are not present, the government must apply for a warrant of arrest with the
proper court.
Therefore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the written authorization contemplated in
Section 29 does not substitute a warrant of arrest that only the courts may issue. On this score,
the OSG has stressed during the oral arguments that the written authorization in Section 29 is
not a judicial warrant, as revealed in the explanation of the government during the oral
arguments:
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL GALANDINES:
Your Honor, please, may we respectfully disagree. The law enforcers can arrest following...by
virtue of a valid warrantless arrest. The ATC will not have a...would have no participation in the
arrest. The participation of the ATC would conic after the arrest, the valid warrantless arrest has
already been e ected and then the ATC would now participate by allowing the detention for
more than three (3) days. Your Honor. Pero sa pag-aresto po, wala pong kukunin from the
ATC.495 (Underscoring and italics in the original)
The OSG's position is consistent with Section 45 of the ATA, which categorically states that the
ATC has not been granted any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority. A textual reading of
Section 29 in relation to Rule 9.1 of the IRR also supports this conclusion. The two provisions,
taken together, show that the ATC issues a written authorization to law enforcement agents
only to permit the extended detention of a person arrested after a valid warrantless arrest is
made under Rule 9.2.
To reiterate, the written authorization of the ATC is for the purpose of "deliver[ing] said
suspected person to the judicial authority within a period of fourteen (14) calendar days
counted from the moment the said suspected person has been apprehended or arrested,
detained, and taken into custody x x x". Thus, it can only be issued in favor of an o cer who
had already validly arrested a person with probable cause to believe that Sections 4 to 12 of
the ATA was violated. On a practical level, the ATC's written authorization is what determines
whether it is the periods of detention under Article 125 or Section 29 that are to be followed.
This is because the arresting o cer may not have all the information to make that
determination at that time. On the ground, the arresting o cer may lack the necessary
information (such as con dential intelligence reports) to actually determine that Sections 4 to
12 of the ATA was violated at the time of the warrantless arrest. In Pestilos,496 the Court
recognized that in a warrantless arrest, the arresting o cer, public prosecutor, and the judge
are all mandated to make their respective determination of probable cause within the spheres
of their respective functions, "its existence is in uenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstances within their possession." While they observe "the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules,
upon which they must determine probable cause." The foundation for their respective
determination of probable cause will vary because:
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 x x x [T]he arresting o cer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed
the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence
submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting o cer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or
available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.497 (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 5, Rule 113 nonetheless gives the o cer license to already arrest the o ender, since
the said provision allows warrantless arrests when an o ense was committed or being
committed in his presence or that he has probable cause to believe that an o ense has just
been committed, and that the person to be arrested has committed it based on the arresting
o cer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances. If, however, there is probable cause to
believe that the crime committed was no ordinary crime, but rather a terrorist act under
Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA, a written authorization may be issued by the ATC in order to detain
the suspect for a period longer than that which is allowed under Article 125 of the RPC.
Without such written authorization duly issued by the ATC itself, the general rule under Article
125 of the RPC operates. On this understanding, which the Court holds is the correct one, the
ATC's written authorization does not operate as a warrant of arrest.
To stress, when Section 29 is harmonized with the provisions of the 1RR, it is clear that the
contested written authority to be issued by the ATC is not in any way akin to a warrant of
arrest. To be operative, there must have been a prior valid warrantless arrest of an alleged
terrorist that was e ected pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court by the
arresting o cer applying for the written authority under Section 29. This conclusion is apparent
from the substantial similarity between Rule 9.2 and Section 5, Rule 113, though the former
may be narrower in scope as it applies only to o enses under the ATA. As discussed, Section
5, Rule 113 enumerates the long-recognized exceptions to the constitutional mandate requiring
the issuance of a judicial warrant for the arrest of individuals.
Under Section 29 and Rule 9.2, a person arrested without a warrant may be detained for up to
14 days if the ATC issues a written authorization in favor of the law enforcement o cer or
military personnel after the arrest is made. The issuance of the authorization after the arrest is
implied by the requirement under Rule 9.1 of the IRR for the arresting o cer to submit a sworn
statement stating the details of the person suspected of committing acts of terrorism and the
relevant circumstances as basis for taking custody of the said person without a judicial
warrant. If the ATC does not issue any written authorization, then the person arrested should be
delivered to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours as provided under Article 125,
considering that Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA are "crimes, or o enses punishable by a ictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent". Thus, there is no reason to believe that the "written
authorization" that the ATC can issue under Section 29 is equivalent to a warrant of arrest that
transgresses a function solely vested with the judiciary and may be abused by the executive to
chill free speech. The power to issue warrants of arrest remains with the courts, pursuant to
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The written authorization also cannot be likened to the feared ASSO that was used and abused
during the Martial Law era. There are marked di erences between the written authorization of
the ATC under Section 29 and the ASSO that framers of the Constitution intended to eradicate.
The notorious ASSO originated from General Order No. 2, s. 1972 wherein former President
Ferdinand Marcos ordered the Secretary of National Defense to "arrest or cause the arrest and
take into x x x custody x x x individuals named in the attached list and to hold them until
otherwise so ordered by me [the President] or by my duly designated representative." Me also
instructed the arrest of such "persons as may have committed crimes and o enses in
furtherance or on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with the crimes or insurrection
or rebellion, as well as persons who have committed crimes against national security and the
law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, title,
improper use of name, uniform and insignia, including persons guilty of crimes as public
o cers, as well as those persons who may have violated any decree or order promulgated by
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 me [the President] personally or promulgated upon my direction."498 This issuance was later
amended by General Order No. 60, s. 1977 and General Order No. 62, s. 1977, and was
incorporated in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1836.
In contrast, as explained, the written authority under Section 29 is not an authority to arrest a
person suspected of committing acts in violation of the ATA. Instead, there must rst be a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules. Therefore, unlike the ASSO, the
written authorization does not replace any warrant of arrest that only the courts may issue.
Furthermore, a careful analysis of the purpose of the written authorization in Section 29 reveals
that it actually serves as a safeguard to ensure that only individuals who are probably guilty of
committing acts punishable under the ATA may be subjected to prolonged detention under
Section 29. The pre-requisite of the ATC's written authorization for such prolonged detention
serves to spare individuals who may have committed felonies de ned under the RPC or
o enses made punishable by special penal laws from prolonged detention. As stressed by the
OSG, Section 29 provides protection to the detained person because the arresting o cer must
show proof that facts exist showing the propriety of the 14-day or extended 10-day detention
before it may be given e ect.499
Section 29 does not allow warrantless arrests based on mere suspicion; probable cause must
be observed.
Since Section 29 applies to warrantless arrests, the processes, requisites, and rigorous
standards applicable to such kind of arrests, as developed by rules and jurisprudence also
apply to Section 29. Among other things, these include the requirement of personal knowledge
and the existence of probable cause. Thus, it is important to clarify that, contrary to the
concerns of petitioners, Section 29 does not allow warrantless arrests for violations of the
relevant provisions of ATA based on mere suspicion. Once more, it is settled doctrine that in
construing a statute, the Constitution and existing laws and rules are harmonized rather than
having one considered repealed in favor of the other. Every statute must be so interpreted and
brought in accord with other statutes to form a uniform system of jurisprudence - interpretere
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi. If diverse statutes relate to the same thing,
they ought to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, as it is an established
rule of law that all acts in pan materia are to be taken together, as if they were one
law.500 Here, the conclusion that the standard to be observed in warrantless arrest under
Section 29 remains to be probable cause and not mere suspicion is made clear by Rule 9.2 of
the IRR which is patterned after Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules. At a glance, Rule
9.2 of the IRR and Section 5, Rule 113 appear almost identical in the sense that they both
utilize similar language in introducing the concepts of in agrante delicto, hot pursuit, and
arrest of escapees.
Noticeably, the person to be arrested in Section 5, Rule 113 is referred to as a "person," while
in Rule 9.2 of the IRR the individual to be arrested is referred to as a "suspect." However, it
does not follow that the two provisions are already di erent from each other. The use of the
word "suspect" in Section 29 cannot be taken to mean that the gauge of evidence has been
downgraded from probable cause to mere suspicion. The Court construes the use of the word
"suspect" in Section 29 as merely a description of the person who was arrested, and does not
alter the probable cause and personal knowledge requirements that must be complied with in
carrying out the warrantless arrest. This is consistent with the argument of the OSG501 - that
is, that the use of the term "suspected" in this case is merely a description of one who has
been arrested and detained after a valid warrantless arrest, and who is simply not yet been
"charged with" a violation of the ATA before the courts. Simply put, a "suspect" refers to one
who has yet to be charged in court, whereas one who is charged is called an "accused". This is
the only signi cance of the word "suspected," which describes the person validly arrested
without judicial warrant but who is not yet charged in court, as in fact, Section 29 contemplates
an extended detention period within which the person is still bound to be delivered to the
proper judicial authority.
Accordingly, any argument relating to the possibility of a "chilling e ect" upon protected
speech purportedly created by Section 29's use of the term "suspected" is without merit.
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 Section 29 and Rule 9.2 of the IRR does not modify the prevailing standards for warrantless
arrests and does not authorize the ATC to issue arrest warrants.
The Court further clari es that Section 29 must be construed in harmony with prevailing
standards for a warrantless arrest. Thus, in making the arrest, no violence or unnecessary force
shall be used, and any person to be arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is
necessary, as provided under Section 2, Rule 113 of the Rules. The arresting o cer must also
keep in mind the importance of Section 12(1), Article III502 of the Constitution, as the provision
guarantees that persons to be arrested have the right to be informed of their right to remain
silent, their right to have competent and independent counsel of their choice, and their right to
be provided with counsel if they cannot a ord the services of one. These Miranda rights, which
originated from the landmark ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,503 were
further elucidated in People v. Mahinay504 as follows:
It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or
indi erence the so-called Miranda rights which had become insu cient and which the Court
must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any; [e]very other warnings, information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes
may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence
of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot a ord the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means [either by] telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization [and] [i]t shall be the responsibility of the o cer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure[d] that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that
the waiver is void even if he insist[s] on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time
or stage ol the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced,
or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.505
The Court notes that the enumeration in Mahinay already covers, under numbers 1 and 6
thereof, Sections 8, Rule 113 of the Rules of court on the method of arrest to be followed by an
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 o cer without a warrant,506 as well as Section 14, Rule 113 on the right of an attorney or
relative to visit the person arrested.507 Additionally, Rule 3, Section 113508 also makes it the
duty of an o cer making the arrest, and hence a right on the part of the person arrested, to
deliver the person arrested to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.
Section 29 supplements Article 125 of the RPC and is the speci c rule applicable for o enses
penalized under the ATA.
Section 29 does not amend Article 125 of the RPC, but supplements it by providing an
exceptional rule with speci c application only in cases where: (1) there is probable cause to
believe that the crime committed is that which is punished under Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA;
and (2) a written authorization from the ATC is secured for the purpose. As explained above,
both requisites must be complied with; otherwise, the arresting o cer must observe the
periods provided under Article 125, RPC.
As correctly argued by the government, Section 29 does not repeal nor overhaul Article 125 of
the RPC. These provisions are not irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with each
other.509 Rather, the proper construction is to consider Article 125 as the general rule that also
applies to ATA-related o enses when the conditions under Section 29 are not met. The periods
under Section 29 will only become operative once the arresting o cer has secured a written
authorization from the ATC, in compliance with the requirements of Section 29.510
The foregoing interpretation also nds support when the Court detaches from the rst
paragraph of Section 29 any reference to the authorization to be issued by the ATC and its only
intended consequence, to wit:
The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any
law enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the
ATC has taken custody of a person suspected of committing any of the acts de ned and
penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without incurring any
criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities, deliver said suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of
fourteen (14) calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or
military personnel. x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Since Section 29 applies exclusively to persons validly arrested without a warrant for terrorism
and its related crimes under the ATA and written authorization is secured from the ATC, the 14-
day detention period under it should then be read as supplementing the periods provided
under Article 125 of the RPC. The Court holds that this is the proper interpretation of Section
29. As Section 29 itself declares, the 14-day detention period is applicable, Article 125 to the
contrary notwithstanding, provided that the above-stated requisites attend.
On this note, the argument raised that Section 29 is inconsistent with Article 125 of the RPC is
hence, unmeritorious. The fact that Article 125 preceded Section 29 by a signi cant number of
years is not a reason to view the validity or invalidity of Section 29 through the lens of Article
125, in the manner that the validity or invalidity of all statutes should be viewed through the
lens of the Constitution. Both Article 125 of the RPC and Section 29 of the ATA are penal
statutes which may be amended, modi ed, superseded, or supplemented by subsequent
statutes; and if there be any inconsistency between the two, it is well-settled that it is the duty
of the courts to harmonize them when the occasion calls. The Court nds no inconsistency in
this case.
Section 29 of the ATA passes strict scrutiny and is not overly broad.
Considering that Section 29 was introduced in the exercise of police power, its validity must be
determined within the context of the substantive due process clause, as have been discussed
earlier. This requires the concurrence of lawful purpose and lawful means. Further, in the facial
analysis of Section 29, the Court is guided by the parameters similarly observed in resolving
the challenges in other provisions of the ATA. As with the Court's discussion on designation
and proscription, the Court will test the validity of Section 29 through the doctrines of
overbreadth and strict scrutiny. As aforementioned, a law may be struck down as
unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine if it achieves a governmental purpose by
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 means that are unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms, while
the strict scrutiny standard is a two-part test under which a law or government act passes
constitutional muster only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest or narrowly tailored to accomplish said
interest.
The Court nds that Section 29 passes the strict scrutiny standard. It is clear that the state has
a compelling interest to detain individuals suspected of having committed terrorism. While
Article 125 of the RPC has general application, Congress did not think that it could be
e ectively applied in cases of terrorism. This is implicit in the fact that even the HSA had
provided for a 3-day maximum period in cases of terrorism instead of those set in Article 125
of the RPC. But as can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations, Congress thought that the 3-
day maximum period under the HSA was insu cient for purposes of: (1) gathering admissible
evidence for a prospective criminal action against the detainee;511 (2) disrupting the
transnational nature of terrorist operations, with Senator Dela Rosa citing his experiences with
Muhammad Reza, who was captured, released for lack of evidence, and then went on to join
ISIS in Iraq;512 (3) preventing the Philippines from becoming an "experiment lab" or "safe
haven" for terrorists;513 and (4) putting Philippine anti-terrorism legislation at par with those of
neighboring countries whose laws allow for pre-charge detention between 14 to 730 days,
extendible, in some cases, for an inde nite period of time.514
There is no question that inde nite detention without a judicial warrant would raise a serious
constitutional problem. "Freedom from imprisonment - from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint - lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process Clause]
protects."515 Section 29 of the ATA, however, does not allow for inde nite detention. It clearly
states that the initial detention is only up to a maximum of 14 days and only when the crime
involved is that which falls under Sections 4, 5, 7, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the ATA. This can
only be extended for a maximum of 10 days and cannot be repeated. In other words, the
absolute maximum that a person may be detained under Section 29 is 24 days. The question
then is whether Congress is constitutionally prohibited by the Due Process Clause, in relation
to Section 2, Article III, to legislate a period of detention longer than that which is set by Article
125 of the RPC in cases of terrorism. The Court holds that it is not.
It may be noted that the periods in Article 125 have undergone several revisions over time.
Article 202 of the Old Penal Code, on which Article 125 of the RPC is based, provided for a
maximum detention of 24 hours.516 Article 125 initially xed the maximum period to six hours.
It then underwent a series of revisions during the Martial Law period under former President
Marcos. On the supposition that "the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered
to the judicial authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
are on occasions inadequate to enable the government to le within the said periods the
criminal information against persons arrested for certain crimes against national security and
public order", he issued P.D. No. 1404, which set the periods as 'six hours, for crimes or
o enses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; nine hours, for crimes or o enses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or
o enses punishable by a ictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent', but allowing up to 30
days for crimes against national security and public order. Then came P.D. No. 1836 which
allowed inde nite detention until the President or his authorized representative orders release.
Two years after the formal lifting of Martial Law came P.D No. 1877, amended by P.D. No. 1877-
A, which allowed a "preventive detention action" for up to one year for "cases involving the
crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, and all other crimes or o enses
committed in furtherance thereof."
P.D. Nos. 1404, 1836, and 1877 were then repealed by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of
E.O. No. 59, Series of 1986 (dated November 7, 1986), e ectively causing a return to the
original provision of Article 125. Less than a year later, she issued E.O. No. 272, Series of 1987
(dated July 25, 1987) in the interest of public safety and order, amending Article 125 into its
present form as above-cited.
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 More recently, under Section 18 of the HSA, any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism had up to three days to deliver the latter to the proper judicial authority
without incurring criminal liability under Article 125 of the RPC. Clearly, it is within the
legislature's discretion to adjust the pre-charge detention periods based on perceived threats
to national security and/or public order at any given time in our country's history.
Petitioners maintain that the detention periods in Section 29 have no constitutional
justi cation.517 However, the Constitution is silent as to the exact maximum number of hours
that an arresting o cer can detain an individual before he is compelled by law to deliver him to
the courts.518 The three-day period in the last paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution is irrelevant to terrorism because it is applicable only in cases of invasion or
rebellion when the public safety requires it. The fth paragraph of Section 18 reiterates this by
stating that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or o enses inherent in, or directly connected with,
invasion. To add terrorism is not permitted by the text of the Constitution and would indirectly
extend the President's powers to call out the armed forces and suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners have not made out a case that terrorism is conceptually in the same class as
rebellion or invasion, which are scenarios of "open war". This is not unexpected, since
terrorism - a relatively modern global phenomenon - then may not have been as prevalent and
widespread at the time the 1987 Constitution was framed as compared to now. It must be
remembered that "rebellion" has an exact de nition under Article 134 of the RPC as the act of
rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of, among others,
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof. The intent of rebellion is categorically di erent from that provided
for under Section 4 of the ATA. Thus, a person may be in rebellion while not committing
terrorism and vice versa.
Petitioners, however, argue that giving law enforcement o cers 14 or 24 days to detain a
person without a judicial warrant for purposes of gathering evidence is absurd because they
ought to have had probable cause when they made the arrest.519 Further, they argue that the
prosecution is not precluded from requesting the trial court a reasonable continuance to
prepare its case while the accused remains in detention.520 Again, petitioners' argument fails
because it assumes that case building in terrorism cases is comparable to case building in
ordinary crimes. Based on Congress' nding521 and the experience in other jurisdictions, case
building in terrorism cases is fraught with unique di culties. In the UK, for example, the
Metropolitan Police Service - Anti-Terrorist Branch (now the Counter Terrorism Command),
justi ed a three-month pre-charge detention on the di culties unique to case building in
terrorism cases. These include the necessity of: making inquiries in other jurisdiction in cases
of global terrorism; establishing the true identity of terrorists, who usually use fake or stolen
identities; decrypting and analyzing data or communications; securing the services of
translators to assist with the interview process in cases of global terrorism; intensive forensic
investigations where there is chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear hazards; and
obtaining data from data service providers to show linkage between suspects and their
location at key times.522
That said, it is worth remembering that the prolonged detention period under Section 29 is not
only for gathering the necessary evidence. Congress also intended it to be a practical tool for
law enforcement to disrupt terrorism.523 In this day and age, terrorists have become more
clandestine and sophisticated in executing their attacks and the government is expected to
develop preventive approaches to adapt to, and to counter these threats. It must be
emphasized that the ATA was enacted with preventive intent. Section 2 of the ATA declared the
State policy of protecting life, liberty, and property from terrorism, and recognized that the ght
against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach that also encompasses political,
economic, and diplomatic measures alongside traditional military and legal methods of
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 combating the same. Consistent therefore with the other enforcement provisions of the ATA like
designation and proscription, Section 29 is a counterterrorism measure enacted as a response
to the ever-evolving problem of terrorism and should be seen as a measure that aims to
prevent and disrupt future terrorist acts. As explained by Senator Pan lo M. Lacson during the
Senate deliberations on the ATA:
SENATOR LACSON. Hindi na rin po natin pinapalitan iyong provision sa citizen's arrest in this
case. Kaya lamang, ang in-expand natin ay iyong period. In ordinary crimes, hindi puwede
iyong nasa planning stage, hindi naman niya ginawa, hindi naman siya nag-commit ng crime.
Pero dahil iyong tinatawag nating inchoate o ense, hindi pa nangyari, nasa simula pa lamang,
puwede na nating arestuhin because we want to be proactive because this is a new
phenomenon, Mr. President, which is global in nature, and we are trying to avoid for this
phenomenon to become a new normal. Kaya gusto nating bigyan ng special treatment dito sa
batas iyong ngipin ng law enforcement agencies natin to really implement the law on
terrorism.524 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 29 is one of many provisions in the ATA that recognizes, as some scholars observed,
the need for e ective strategies in counter-terrorism frameworks that aim to identify threats
and make interventions to prevent the devastating consequences of terrorism from actually
taking place.525 At its core, the Court nds that Section 29, in allowing prolonged detention
after a valid and lawful warrantless arrest, as herein construed, contributes to the disruption
and restriction of terrorist operations, and the eventual incapacitation of high-risk individuals,
which ultimately facilitates the fair and proper response of the State to the magnitude attendant
to the crime of terrorism. Therefore, it cannot be denied that Section 29 has been enacted in
the exercise of police power by the State, or that inherent and plenary power which enables the
State to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.526
In light of the above, it is clear to the Court that Section 29 satis es the the compelling state
interest requirement under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, the Court nds that the
second prong of strict scrutiny, i.e. least restrictive means, has also been complied with by
Section 29, if read in conjunction with Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the ATA, because: (1) it
only operates when the ATC issues a written authorization; (2) the detaining o cer incurs
criminal liability if he violates the detainee's rights; and (3) the custodial unit must diligently
record the circumstances of the detention.
To recapitulate, detention for up to 14 days cannot be done by the arresting o cer without the
written authorization of the ATC. In e ect, the ATC's written authorization is what narrows the
application of Section 29. This must be so because it is the ATC's function under Section 46 (d)
to "monitor the progress of the investigation and prosecution of all persons accused and/or
detained for any crime de ned and penalized under the [ATA]." Moreover, the ATC is expected
to be more knowledgeable of terrorist activities than the ordinary law enforcer because under
Section 46 (e), it must "establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems
on terrorism, terrorist activities, and counter terrorism operations." Had Congress not required
the ATC's written authorization, it would be up to any law enforcement o cer from any local
precinct or any military personnel to decide for himself that a detention of up to 14 or 24 days
is necessary. It is not farfetched to see how this power, when merely localized, may be abused
to serve personal or parochial interests. Worse, it could result in inordinate detention for crimes
not punished under the ATA. Consequently, without the involvement of the ATC - which again is
an executive agency comprised of high-ranking national security o cials -Section 29 would
have a broader scope and may result in inconsistent, if not, abusive application.
After an arrest has been made and the written authorization of the ATC is secured under
Section 29, there are safeguards that must be observed during the detention of suspected
terrorists. The Court is mindful that a detainee is practically under the mercy of the
government. Such a great imbalance between the power of the State and the individual is often
the breeding ground for abuses. In 2014, the UN Counter-Terrorism Task Force, under the
auspices of the UN Secretary General, published "Guiding Principles and
Guidelines"527 relating to detention in the context of countering terrorism. It recognized that
"[t]he implementation of counter-terrorism measures through the detention of persons leads to
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interference with individuals' full enjoyment of a wide range of civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights."528 In particular, detention may potentially violate, amongst others, the
right to personal liberty and the right to personal security and integrity.529 For these reasons,
the UN guidelines provide that:
1) In the implementation of counter-terrorism measures, no one shall be subject to unlawful or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty;
2) Persons detained or arrested on terrorism charges must be informed of the reasons for
arrest;
3) The circumstances of the arrest and detention must be recorded and communicated;
4) The detainee must have e ective access to legal counsel.
5) Detention awaiting trial should be an exception and should be as short as possible;
6) Detainees are entitled to the enjoyment of all human rights, subject to restriction that are
unavoidable in a closed environment; they must be treated with dignity and respect and not
subjected to torture or other forms of ill-treatment or punishment;
7) Secret and incommunicado detention may never be used;
8) The detention must be subject to e ective oversight and control by the judiciary and the
detainee must have access to independent complaints mechanism and to challenge the
legality of their detention, including by way of habeas corpus;
9) Detention for reasons of national security must in accordance with law and not arbitrary; and
10) Information obtained using torture shall be inadmissible as evidence. The detainee shall
have a right to claim remedies and reparation, including compensation, for the period
unlawfully or arbitrarily detained.530
It is worth emphasizing that while these are expressed as guidelines, they essentially
summarize what the due process clause would minimally require in the prolonged detention of
terrorist suspects. On this point, Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the ATA textually provide for
safeguards to shield the detainee from possible abuses while he is deprived of his liberty.
Section 30 reiterates the rights of a person under custody, which among others, include the
right to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and who must
have constant access to his client. Section 31 imposes criminal liability on any law
enforcement agent or military personnel who violates the rights of the person under custody.
Section 32 requires the maintenance of a logbook which records the circumstances of
detention, such records being a public document and made available to the detainee's lawyer
and his family or relative by consanguinity or a nity up to fourth civil degree. Meanwhile,
Section 33 reiterates the prohibition against coercion and torture in investigation and
interrogation and imposes the penalties provided for in R.A. 9745. It also provides that any
evidence obtained from the detainee through coercion or torture would be inadmissible in
evidence.
The Court also clari es that the writ of habeas corpus is available to a detainee under Section
29 and that the judiciary must be kept abreast with the details of the detention. This is implied
by the requirement in Section 29 that the law enforcement agent or military personnel notify in
writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest of the following facts:
(a) the time, date, and manner of arrest; (b) the location or locations of the detained suspect/s
and (c) the physical and mental condition of the detained suspect/s. And while the ATA
removed the entitlement under Section 50 of the HSA to the payment of P500,000.00 of
damages for each day of wrongful detention, the right of action of the detainee under Article
32(4) of the New Civil Code531 remains.
In sum, the ATA requires that certain conditions be complied with both prior to, during, and
after the detention of a suspected terrorist under Section 29. To the mind of the Court, these
conditions narrowly tailor the application of Section 29 in accordance with the "least restrictive"
prong of strict scrutiny. In this regard, it may thus be said that Section 29 is not overbroad as
well, as this government measure does not sweep unnecessarily and broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedom of speech.
On this latter point, the Court nally nds that Section 29 does not constitute a prior restraint or
subsequent punishment on the exercise of the freedom of speech, expression, and their
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 cognate rights. Again, it only operates when a person has been lawfully arrested without a
judicial warrant for violating Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA. The Court's discussion on Section 4
above made it clear that protests, advocacies, dissents, and other exercises of political and
civil rights are not terroristic conduct. The proper construction of Section 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12 has
also been clari ed. The operation of Section 29 in relation to such provisions does not result in
an impermissible chilling e ect. Concurrently, this Court is convinced that Section 29 is not
overly broad.
Perforce, under the auspices of this case and the reasoned constructions made by the Court
herein, Section 29 should not be struck down as invalid.
Extraterritorial Application of the ATA under Section 49, Implementing
Rules and Regulations under Section 54, and the Procedure Adopted in
Approving HB No. 6875
While this Court has earlier delimited the issues to be resolved under a facial analysis
framework, it recognizes other miscellaneous issues that - albeit not exclusively related to free
speech per se - nevertheless go into the intrinsic validity and operability of the entire ATA as a
whole. Due to such signi cant relation and if only to placate any doubts on the ATA's
implementation, the Court nds it prudent, at this nal juncture, to address the same but only
within the context of the facts presented in this case. In particular, these miscellaneous issues
are: (1) the allegations raised against the extraterritorial application of the ATA under Section
49; (2) the power of the ATC and the DOJ to promulgate rules and regulations under Section
54; and (3) the claims involving non-observance of the constitutional procedure in the
enactment of ATA, i.e., the act of the Executive certifying to the urgency of and the subsequent
act of the Legislative in passing the ATA into law. These three subjects will be treated below, in
seriatim.
Extraterritorial Application of the ATA under Section 49
Petitioners make much ado about the seeming e ect of the extraterritorial application of the
ATA under Section 49 on their right to freely associate under Section 8, Article III of the
Constitution.532 They maintain that Section 49 makes no distinction and expands the reach of
the ATA to any Filipino who commits acts penalized under the law outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, speci cally citing as an example those who may be prosecuted
by mere membership, a liation, or association with a certain designated group, absent any
overt criminal act and regardless when the act was committed or when the membership
commenced.533 Petitioners further claim that the extraterritorial application of the ATA
punishes people abroad for acts that may not even be illegal in their respective
countries.534 Relative thereto, petitioners contend that there is a "chilling e ect" on the right to
association because it would e ectively deter individuals from joining organizations so as to
avoid later being deemed a terrorist if the organization is designated.535
Section 49 of the ATA provides:
Section 49. Extraterritorial Application. - Subject to the provision of any treaty of which the
Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application,
the provisions of this Act shall apply:
(a) To a Filipino citizen or national who commits any of the acts de ned and penalized under
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines;
(b) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit any of the crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof inside the territorial limits of the
Philippines;
(c) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit any of the said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof on board Philippine ship or
Philippine airship;
(d) To individual persons who commit any of said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof
within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the
Philippine government in an o cial capacity;
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 (e) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof against Philippine citizens or persons of
Philippine descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the
crime; and
(f) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
In case of an individual who is neither a citizen or a national of the Philippines who commits
any of the crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction only when such individual enters or is
inside the territory of the Philippines: Provided, That, in the absence of any request for
extradition from the state where the crime was committed or the state where the individual is a
citizen or national, or the denial thereof, the ATC shall refer the case to the BI for deportation or
to the DOJ lor prosecution in the same manner as if the act constituting the o ense had been
committed in the Philippines.
The Court holds, however, that the constitutional challenge against Section 49 is not ripe for
adjudication. As stated in the beginning of this discourse, a question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse e ect on the individual challenging it
and thus, petitioners must show that they have sustained or are immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In this case, the Court sees
that the only bases for the supposed unconstitutionality of Section 49 are mere theoretical
abstractions of what may happen after a group or organization has been designated or
charged under the ATA. However, none of petitioners claim that their constitutional rights have
been under any credible or imminent threat of being violated because of the extraterritorial
application of the ATA. In fact, none of petitioners allege that they are foreigners, permanent
residents abroad, or are in any demonstrable situation that renders them susceptible to any
adverse e ects by virtue of the extraterritorial application of the ATA. Also, the Court has not
been made aware of any pending criminal prosecution based on Section 49 in relation to
designation under Section 25.
In any event, the supposed "chilling e ect" of Section 49 is more apparent than real. A plain
reading of Section 49 shows that it merely provides rules on how jurisdiction over the o ense
of terrorism is acquired. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the ATA having extraterritorial
application is not peculiar. Section 49 is not the rst time the country would extend the
application of a penal law to Filipino citizens, even for acts committed outside the country. The
enumeration in Article 2 of the RPC is a prime example where the application of a penal law is
made to extend outside the territorial limits of the country's jurisdiction. Another - more closely
worded to Section 49 - is Section 21 of R.A. No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act,
which extends the jurisdiction of the courts to any violation committed by a Filipino national
regardless of the place of commission.
It must as well be pointed out that Section 49 appears to simply re ect or embody the ve
traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes recognized in international
law,536 i.e., territorial, national, protective, universal, and passive personal. These are, in fact,
recognized doctrines in the realm of private international law, more commonly known as
"con ict of laws". To expound, the rst three, which confers jurisdiction based on the place
where the o ense is committed, based on the nationality of the o ender, and based on
whether the national interest is injured, are generally supported in customary law537 and are
already being applied in various Philippine statutes. Universal jurisdiction, which confers
authority unto the forum that obtains physical custody of the perpetrator of certain o enses
considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity, and passive personality jurisdiction,
which is based on the nationality of the victim, have been accepted in international law, but
apply only in special circumstances (universal jurisdiction)538 or in limited incidents (passive
personality jurisdiction). Notably, the Philippines adopts both under Section 17 of R.A. No.
9851 or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity. It is pertinent to state in this regard that Section 2 of the ATA
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 considers terrorism as not only a crime against the Filipino people, but also a crime against
humanity and the Law of Nations.
On this note, the Court further agrees with the OSG that Section 49 is a proactive
measure.539 Surely, no one can deny that the country has a broad interest to protect its
citizens and its vessels, wherever they may be, as well as its government and its embassies, in
the same way it has an interest to protect itself and its territory from terrorism even against
someone who is physically outside the territorial jurisdiction of the country. This Court
recognizes that these principles ow from the overarching interest of the State to ensure that
crimes do not remain unpunished - interest reipublicae ne male cia remaneant impunita. Any
act which has a deleterious e ect on the national security and public safety of the country
should be penalized, wherever the malefactor may be located. This notwithstanding, and
consistent with the preliminary consideration on ripeness as stated above, it should remain that
the constitutional validity or invalidity in the application of these principles remain to be tested
in the proper case that is ripe for adjudication.
The ATC and the DOJ's Power to Promulgate Implementing Rules and Regulations under
Section 54
Petitioners argue that the ATC and the DOJ has been unduly delegated with legislative power
by allowing it to promulgate rules and regulations to address the incompleteness of the ATA's
terms and insu ciency of its standards.540 Meanwhile, the OSG counters that the Constitution
recognizes exceptions to the rule on non-delegation of legislative power including delegation to
administrative bodies and that Section 54 constitutes a permissible delegation.541
Section 54 provides:
Section 54. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The ATC and the DOJ, with the active
participation of police and military institutions, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for
the e ective implementation of this Act within ninety (90) days after its e ectivity. They shall
also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to both Houses of Congress,
and all o cers and members of various law enforcement agencies.542 (Citations omitted)
At the onset, petitioners' apprehensions on the incompleteness of the ATA's terms and
insu ciency of its standards should already be addressed by the Court's extensive judicial
construction of the signi cant provisions of the ATA, which consequently delineates the extent
of the rule-making power that the DOJ and ATC may exercise. As case law instructs:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the con nes of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the e ect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative
body, as well as with respect to what elds are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules
and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of con ict between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail.543
Accordingly, the DOJ and ATC must ensure that the implementing rules and regulations
conform with the spirt of the law, as herein divined by the Court through its judicial
construction. To reiterate, administrative agencies "may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of con ict between a statute and [the IRR], the former must prevail."
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 Ultimately, however, it should be pointed out that the facial challenge in this case was directed
against the ATA's statutory provisions, and not the rules found in the IRR itself. As such, the
Court deems it prudent to refrain from passing judgment on the issue of undue delegation that
may be appropriately addressed through an actual case or controversy sharply demonstrating
how the ATC and DOJ have broadly construed the provisions of the ATA so as to showcase the
alleged incompleteness of the law and its kick of su cient standards.
Procedure in Approving HB No. 6875
Petitioners maintain that the House of Representatives transgressed the requirements under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution in enacting the ATA, speci cally that the
bill did not undergo three readings on separate days, and that no printed copies of the House
Bill in its nal form were distributed to the members of the House three days before its
passage. They also argue that the certi cation for the immediate enactment of the law did not
meet the "public calamity or emergency" exception. Finally, they question the lack of quorum
during the session and voting on HB No. 6875 because some members attended through
virtual platforms, in contravention of the physical attendance requirement.544
Meanwhile, the government insists that the Congress observed the requirements prescribed by
the Constitution in enacting the ATA and that it was not "railroaded".545 It argues that the
President's certi cation of the bill as urgent under the "public calamity or emergency"
exception dispenses with the requirements of printing, distribution, and going through three
readings on separate days.546 There was also no clear showing that the members of the
House of Representatives were deprived of the opportunity to study the bill or that their votes
were erroneously counted.547
The President's certi cation of the bill as urgent justi es non-compliance with the general
procedure for enacting laws.
Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution states:
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(2) No bill passed by either Mouse shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its nal form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certi es to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.548 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provision lays down the general procedure to be observed in enacting laws. This
general procedure requiring that the readings be made on three separate days and that the bill
be printed in its nal form and distributed three days before the third reading may, however, be
dispensed with when the President certi es a bill as urgent to meet a public calamity or
emergency.549
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance550 (Tolentino), the Court held that:
The su ciency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is
subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual
basis of presidential certi cation of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress,
certainly should elicit a di erent standard of review.551
Based on the foregoing, it can be surmised that the President's determination of the existence
of an "emergency" or "public calamity" is fundamentally dependent on the exigencies of each
circumstance.
In Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,552 the Court upheld the certi cation of the President
for the immediate enactment of R.A. No. 10153, a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections. In justifying the certi cation of the urgency of the bill, the Court
explained inter alia that:
x x x [W]hile the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the
President's certi cation by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent
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 exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.553 (Citation
omitted)
Therefore, the President's exercise of the power to issue such certi cation is one that should
be accorded with due deference. As such, the Court must refrain from intruding into such
matter through the exercise of its judicial power in the absence of grave abuse of discretion,
considering that the passage of laws is essentially an a air that falls within the purview of the
political branches of government.
In this case, President Rodrigo R. Duterte, through a letter dated June 1, 2020, certi ed the
necessity for the immediate enactment of HB No. 6875 "to address the urgent need to
strengthen the law on anti-terrorism and e ectively contain the menace of terrorist acts for the
preservation of national security and the promotion of general welfare."554
As the Court sees it, there is no grave abuse in deeming that the passage of a law to
su ciently address terrorism in the country falls within the public emergency exception. As
already emphasized, the constant threat of terrorism, as one of the biggest menaces to
national security, de nitely constitutes as an emergency which the State needs to address
immediately. Terrorism is not only an ever-present threat but one which brings about potential
devastating consequences that should be urgently attended to. Despite the HSA, it is
undisputed that the political branches of government both deemed, in their wisdom and
expertise, that the former law was not enough to adequately respond to the problem of
terrorism. Indeed, every passing day without an adequate counterterrorism framework is an
opportunity for a terror act. The potential extensive damage to the country and the prospect of
a wide-scale loss of life upon a terror act is indeed a matter of public safety and security which
is time-sensitive. The experience of law enforcers reveals the necessity of adopting urgent
measures to ll the gaps in the HSA. To demonstrate the gap in the HSA which lawmakers
perceive to be a hindrance to the e ective and timely apprehension and prosecution of
terrorists, the Court notes the experience of a lawmaker when he was still in the police force
wherein a known ISIS terrorist was arrested in Davao City but had to be released within 36
hours as the authorities did not have enough evidence to hold him further. Months later, the
same terrorist was caught in a video beheading hostages in Raqqa, Iraq.555
In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the determination of the President that
terrorism is an emergency in order to certify a bill as urgent, which Congress has not seen t to
controvert and has, in fact, accepted such certi cation as valid similar to the nding
in Tolentino, is something which the Court should not disturb. Additionally, the Court
recognizes the pressing need for the country to enact more e ective counter-measures against
terrorism and terrorism nancing, the lack of which has been repeatedly agged by
international evaluation groups to which the Philippines belong.
Perceived Irregularities in the Implementation of the Internal Rules of the House of
Representatives.
The Constitution a ords Congress due discretion in determining the appropriate rules in
conducting its proceedings. This authority is found in paragraph 3, Section 16, Article of VI of
the Constitution which states:
Section 16.
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(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
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In line with the foregoing authority granted to the House of Representatives, it has promulgated
its own internal rules. Among others, Sections 89 and 90 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives (18th Congress) states:
Section 89. Conduct of Sessions through Electronic Platforms. - In cases when the attendance
of Members in sessions becomes extremely di cult or impossible - such as on occasions of
natural calamities, pandemics, strikes, riots, and civil disturbances, whether fortuitous or not -
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 and there is urgent necessity to act on any measure, the Speaker, in consultation with the
Majority and Minority Leaders, may authorize the conduct of sessions through electronic
platforms like video conference, telecommunications and other computer online technologies.
Section 90. Attendance. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 74 hereof, Members shall,
as far as practicable, register their attendance by joining the virtual conference. This shall be
veri ed and authenticated by the Secretary General.
Members who are unable to join the virtual conference due to technical reasons or those who
are performing o cial tasks as authorized by the Speaker and subject to Section 71 hereof,
may register their attendance through mobile phones or other electronic accounts previously
registered with and veri ed by the Secretary General.
As aptly pointed out by the government, while voting on and approving bills through virtual
platforms may be unconventional, this is not prohibited by the internal rules of the House of
Representatives.556
Absent any palpable grave abuse of discretion, it is beyond the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction to scrutinize the internal procedures of Congress. This is consistent with the Court's
ruling in ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Ermita557 wherein it was declared that:
x x x [O]ne of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate
rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it
should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the
sole concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee
if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of
Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal
branch of government.558
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers and the Court's pronouncements
in ABAKADA Guro Party List, the Court does not nd it proper to strike down the internal rules
of the Mouse of Representatives allowing virtual hearings relative to quorum. Congress must
be given reasonable leeway to adapt to peculiar exigencies and employ available technological
means to continue the unimpeded performance of its functions. All in all, there is no grave
abuse of discretion committed on this score.
Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court's Resolution
The Court has arrived at clear conclusions on the issues of this case. However, various
approaches and views were expressed during the deliberations which necessarily resulted in
variance in the voting. Some members of the Court will expound on their individual opinions
and elucidate the particular approach or approaches they have taken in their respective
separate opinions.
The nine (9) critical questions identi ed as the core issues involved are the following:
1. Whether to grant due course to 35 out of 37 petitions;
2. Whether a facial challenge or an as applied challenge should be used in analyzing the ATA;
3. Whether the "Not Intended Clause" in the proviso of Section 4 is constitutional;
4. Whether the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" in the third
paragraph of Section 10 is constitutional;
5. Whether the rst mode of designation under Section 25 is constitutional;
6. Whether the second mode of designation under Section 25 is constitutional;
7. Whether the third mode of designation under Section 25 is constitutional;
8. Whether the provisions on proscription in Sections 26 to 28 are constitutional; and
9. Whether Section 29 on arrest and detention without judicial warrant is constitutional.
The votes of the members of the Court are summarized as follows:
1. With a vote of 8-7, eight (8) members of the Court, namely, Senior Associate Justice Perlas-
Bernabe, Justices Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Rosario, and
Dimaampao, voted in favor of granting due course to 35 out of 37 of the petitions. These
include the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613,
252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759,
252765, 252767, 252768, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984,
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 253018, 253100, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 (UDK No. 16714), and 253420.
The petition docketed as G.R. No. 253118 (Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Duterte) is
dismissed outright for lack of merit while the petition docketed as UDK No. 16663 (Yerbo v.
O ces of the Honorable Senate President and the Honorable Speaker of the House of
Representatives) is dismissed for being fundamentally awed both in form and substance.
Seven (7) members of the Court voted to grant due course only to the petitions in G.R. No.
252585, G.R. No. 252767, G.R. No. 252768, and G.R. No. 253242, namely, Chief Justice
Gcsmundo, Justices Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, and Marquez.
2. As to whether a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge should be used in analyzing the
ATA, eleven (11) members of the Court, namely, Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe,
Justices Leonen, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J.
Lopez, and Dimaampao, voted in favor of applying facial challenge but only with respect to
freedom of speech, expression, and cognate rights issues. The majority agrees that this facial
review does not preclude future challenges against any of the provisions on the basis of an
actual and as-applied case.
Justice Caguioa separately voted to apply facial challenge to all other fundamental freedoms
beyond freedom of speech. On this point, while Justice Leonen concurred with the ponencia,
he is of the opinion that there can be a facial examination based on other fundamental rights if
there is such imminence and [the constitutional violation] is so demonstrably and urgently
egregious that it outweighs a reasonable policy of deference.
Three (3) remaining members of the Court, namely, Chief Justice Gesmundo, Justice M. Lopez,
and Justice Marquez voted that the ATA cannot be subject to a facial challenge. On one hand,
Chief Justice Gesmundo, joined by Justice Marquez, submits that: (a) the ATA only penalizes
conducts which includes "speech integral to criminal conduct;" and (b) an as-applied challenge
does not foreclose the use of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth tests as tools of judicial
scrutiny. On the other hand, Justice M. Lopez submits that only an as-applied challenge
against the ATA is proper, it being a penal law.
3. As to Section 4 of the ATA, twelve (12) members of the Court, namely, Senior Associate
Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Justices Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier,
Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Dimaampao, voted to declare the "Not
Intended" clause in the said provision as unconstitutional.
Three (3) members of the Court, namely, Chief Justice Gesmundo, Justice M. Lopez, and
Justice Marquez voted that the entirety of Section 4 is not unconstitutional.
4. On the issue of whether the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" in
the last paragraph of Section 10 should be struck down as unconstitutional, the ponencia was
outvoted by a vote of 9-6 with nine (9) members of the Court, namely, Chief Justice Gesmundo,
Justices Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Marquez,
agreeing that Section 10 of the ATA is not unconstitutional.
Six (6) members of the Court, namely, Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Justices
Leonen, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Rosario, and Dimaampao, voted to strike down the subject
phrase for being unconstitutional.
5. Fourteen (14) members of the Court, namely, Chief Justice Gesmundo, Senior Associate
Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Justices Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Tnting,
Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, voted that
automatic adoption of the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List (1st mode of
designation) in the rst paragraph of Section 25 is not unconstitutional, with Justice Leonen as
the lone dissenter.
6. Nine (9) members of the Court, namely, Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Justices
Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Rosario, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao,
voted that requests for designation by other jurisdictions (2nd mode of designation) in the
second paragraph of Section 25 is unconstitutional.
Six (6) members of the Court, namely, the Chief Justice and Justices Inting, Zalameda, M.
Lopez, J. Lopez, and Marquez voted in favor of holding the provision not unconstitutional.
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 7. On the issue of whether the designation by the ATC upon a nding of probable cause (3rd
mode of designation) under Section 25 is constitutional, the ponencia was outvoted by a vote
of 8-7. Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, Chief Justice Gesmundo, Justices Hernando,
Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, and Marquez, voted that the third paragraph of
Section 25 is not unconstitutional.
Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Justices Leonen, Caguioa, Carandang Lazaro-Javier,
Rosario, and Dimaampao, voted to declare the third mode of designation unconstitutional.
8. The Court unanimously voted that Sections 26, 27, and 28 of the ATA on judicial proscription
are not unconstitutional.
9. Ten (10) members of the Court, namely, Chief Justice Gesmundo, Senior Associate Justice
Perlas-Bernabe, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Rosario,
Marquez, voted that Section 29, as construed in the ponencia, is not unconstitutional.
Three (3) members of the Court, namely, Justices Caguioa, Gaerlan, and Diamaampao voted
without quali cation that Section 29 is unconstitutional.
Justice Leonen is of the view that even with the framework of overbreadth, the extension
without warrant is unconstitutional relative to provisions which impact on freedom of
expression and cognate rights. Thus, Justice Leonen voted that Section 29 is unconstitutional
only in relation to Sections 5 and 8 of the ATA.
Justice J. Lopez voted that Section 29 is unconstitutional only with respect to the extended
detention without warrant.
A Final Note
Terrorism is no ordinary crime. As emphasized, terrorism is not con ned to a particular space
and time, and is often shrouded by uncertainty and invisibility. Unlike a typical war where
armed hostilities are clearly apparent, most terrorist activities, including training, nancing, and
other forms of preparation, involve months or even years of clandestine planning.
Terrorists have signi cantly improved their capabilities over time and expanded their vast
resources which include, inter alia, sophisticated training and the addition of weapons of mass
destruction in their arsenal. The pervasive problem of terrorism requires interventions that not
only punishes an act when it is done but also anticipates risks to disrupt and pre-empt a
terrorist act before irreversible harm is done, without sacri cing and undermining fundamental
freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights. As a result, there has been a noticeable shift in the
approach of the government in suppressing terrorism from criminalization to preventive or
precautionary. This has been seen in legislations such as the HSA, R.A. No. 10168, and more
recently, in the assailed law in the present petitions.
Bearing in mind the immense responsibility of the government to protect its people and defend
the State, the Court cannot simply disregard the realities on the ground and the complex
problem of terrorism not only in the Philippines but also across the globe. In striking a carefully
calibrated balance between what is constitutionally acceptable and what is not, the Court
needed to lean on a little practical wisdom, for as Justice Aharon Barak, President of the Israeli
Supreme Court puts it - the Constitution "is not a prescription for national suicide" and "human
rights are not a stage for national destruction."559 Nonetheless, this Court is ever mindful that
hand in hand with its obligation to give due regard to the inevitabilities of national security and
public safety, as well as the e ectiveness of law enforcement, is its constitutional mandate to
safeguard substantive democracy, as expressed in fundamental values and human
rights,560 and to temper the excesses of the other branches. The Court believes it has
faithfully exercised this responsibility in the case.
In the present petitions, this Court painstakingly demonstrated when judicial intervention may
be invoked through a facial challenge to assuage the fears of the people who feel threatened
by the potential chilling e ect of the enactment of a statute before an actual case is brought to
the court. Taking into consideration the permissible degree of judicial intervention in a facial
challenge, this Court outlined the extent of the power of the executive branch in this campaign
against terrorism and has struck down the following provisions of the law that have gone
beyond the boundaries set by the Constitution:
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1) The phrase in the proviso of Section 4 which states "which are not intended to cause death
or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create serious risk to
public safety";
2) The second mode of designation found in paragraph 2 of Section 25; and
3) As a necessary consequence, the corresponding reference/provisions relative to the
foregoing items in the IRR of R.A. No. 11479.
The Court has also directed the CA to immediately formulate the rules to be observed for
judicial proscription with the objective of upholding the rights of groups of persons,
associations or organizations which may be subjected to the proceedings under Sections 26
and 27 of the ATA.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623,
252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765,
252767, 252768, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018,
253100, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 (UDK No. 16714), and 253420 are GIVEN
DUE COURSE and PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Court declares the following provisions of Republic Act No. 11479 UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) The phrase in the proviso of Section 4 which states "which are not intended to cause death
or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create serious risk to
public safety;"
2) The second mode of designation found in paragraph 2 of Section 25; and
3) As a necessary consequence, the corresponding reference/provisions in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 11479 relative to the foregoing items.
Moreover, pursuant to the Court's rule-making power, the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to
prepare the rules that will govern judicial proscription proceedings under Sections 26 and 27 of
Republic Act No. 11479 based on the foregoing discussions for submission to the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules of Court and eventual approval and promulgation of the Court En
Banc.
The petitions in G.R. No. 253118 (Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Duterte) and UDK No.
16663 (Yerbo v. O ces of the Honorable Senate President and the Honorable Speaker of the
House of Representatives) are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C. J., Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hernando, and Rosario, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Leonen, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., See Separate Opinion.
Inting, J., See Separate Opinion.
Zalameda, J., See Separate Opinion.
M. Lopez, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Gaerlan, J., See Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
J. Lopez, J., See Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Dimaampao, J., See Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Marquez, J., I join the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of C. J. Gesmundo.
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