Jyc’25

UNSC :
BACKGROUND GUIDE
AGENDA:
State-Sponsored armed groups in foreign con icts:
Legitimacy of proxy warfare and regime changes
with special emphasis on the Middle East and
South Asia
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 THE EXECUTIVE
BOARD
CHAIRPERSON : Ahmed Ayaan

VICE CHAIRPERSON: Amaira Malhotra

RAPPORTEUR: Pavitt Singh Chowdhary

Letter from the Executive Board |
United Nations Security Council |
Jodhamal Youth Conclave 2025
Dear Delegates,

Greetings from the Executive Board of the United Nations Security Council at
Jodhamal Youth Conclave 2025.

It is with great anticipation and excitement that we welcome you to one of the most
dynamic and consequential simulations of global diplomacy. As members of the
UNSC, you will not merely participate — you will shape discourse, build narratives,
and confront the ethical dilemmas that haunt the modern geopolitical landscape.

Our agenda, “State-Sponsored Armed Groups in Foreign Conflicts: Legitimacy of

Proxy Warfare and Regime Changes with Special Emphasis on the Middle East and
South Asia,” demands more than knowledge — it demands introspection.
1. Can a proxy war ever be called legitimate — or is legitimacy a weapon in
itself?
2. Do regime changes, supported from afar, liberate or destabilize?
3. And who decides that?
As members of the UNSC, your role is not to answer these questions with rehearsed
facts but to interrogate the very frameworks through which international relations are
conducted. This committee will not be a stage for mere ideological posturing.Here,
you will confront complexity, contradiction, and uncomfortable truths.

We’re here to facilitate, challenge, and guide you through this intellectual
expedition.

See you in committee.

Warm regards,
Ahmed Ayaan | Chairperson
Amaira Malhotra | Vice Chairperson
Pavitt Singh Chowdhary | Rapporteur
United Nations Security Council, JYC’25
 TABLE OF CONTENTS:

I. Introduction to the United Nations Security Council

II. Executive summary and Introduction

III. Historical overview: Cold War to present

IV. Legitimacy, Sovereignty and Legality of proxies

V. Middle East- Regional Focus

VI. South Asia- Regional Focus

VII. Case study of key proxy con icts

VIII. Global Case studies of Proxy warfare beyond the middle east
and south asia

IX. Contemporary developments and emerging dynamics

X. Key international stakeholders positions

XI. UNSC actions and debates

XII. Guiding questions for delegates

XIII. Rules of procedure(ROP)

XIV. Bibliography/Further reading and resources

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 I. Introduction to the United
Nations Security Council
(UNSC)
“Peace does not simply happen. It is negotiated, built, and—when necessary—enforced.”

As we step into the chambers of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it is crucial to remind ourselves that this is no ordinary
committee. Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC is the principal organ tasked with maintaining
international peace and security—an ambition both noble and complex in today’s multipolar world. While various international bodies
discuss global challenges, the UNSC acts. Its resolutions carry the weight of international law, and its decisions shape the trajectory of
con icts, diplomacy, and global order itself. It is the global community’s last resort when peace is shattered and diplomacy fails. Its
decisions are not suggestions; they are mandates. Its resolutions, binding. Its failures, catastrophic.

• Mandate and Authority:

Established in the aftermath of World War II, the UNSC was designed to be humanity’s ultimate response to threats against peace. Its
responsibilities are vast yet precise:

• Imposing Sanctions: From targeted economic sanctions to arms embargoes, the UNSC can choke the lifeblood of states or groups threatening
peace.
• Authorizing Use of Force: The Council alone can grant legal legitimacy to military interventions under international law.
• Mandating Peacekeeping Missions: Deploying peacekeepers to con ict zones, with mandates ranging from monitoring cease res to
protecting civilians.
• Referring Cases to International Courts: The UNSC has the authority to refer individuals, groups, or states to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in the interest of justice.
• Establishing War Crimes Tribunals: As seen in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the UNSC can set up ad-hoc tribunals to prosecute
crimes against humanity.
• Counterterrorism: Through bodies like the 1267 Sanctions Committee, it curtails the global operations of terrorist groups.
• Overseeing Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), nuclear proliferation, and
chemical weapon use.

Unlike other UN bodies, the UNSC doesn’t just recommend—it decides. Its resolutions are legally binding under the UN Charter, meaning states are
obliged to comply.
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 II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
INTRODUCTION

Proxy warfare – where states use third-party armed groups

to ght foreign battles – has become a de ning feature of
21st-century con ict. Unlike the clear-cut inter-state wars
of the past, today’s wars often involve networks of state
and non-state actors, blurring front lines and sovereignty.
Great power competition and technological diffusion have
loosened states’ monopoly on force, enabling multiple
patrons to arm insurgents or militias abroad. As one
analysis notes, the use of external armed groups in Syria,
Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan and Ukraine has
“upended established international norms”. In practice,
this means that major powers (and regional rivals) can
pursue foreign policy goals – from regime change to
strategic deterrence – without direct invasion. For example,
“U.S.-backed Kurdish forces and Russian private
military contractors in Syria, Iranian-backed Houthi
rebels and UAE-supported militias in Yemen” illustrate
how proxy ghters now play an “outsized role” in states’
strategies.

This topic is especially urgent in the Middle East and South

Asia, where longstanding rivalries and weak states have
turned local con icts into proxy battlegrounds.
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Regional powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan frequently sponsor armed groups to advance their interests. The
humanitarian toll is enormous, and the line between legitimate support and unlawful intervention is hotly contested. UNSC
delegates must grapple with complex questions of sovereignty, international law (e.g. UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibiting
force), and human rights. This guide surveys the historical background of proxy warfare, examines key regional cases
(Syrian and Yemeni civil wars; the Afghan war; the Kashmir con ict), outlines the international legal framework, and
summarizes major stakeholders’ positions. By understanding the nuance and scale of proxy con icts in the Middle East and
South Asia, delegates can craft informed solutions to this multifaceted crisis.

• State Sponsorship and Regime

Change:
State sponsorship of armed groups
overlaps with efforts to in uence or
overthrow governments. Supporting
rebels or militias may aim at regime
change by destabilizing an adversary’s
government. However, such interventions
directly implicate core sovereignty norms.
Under the UN Charter, all states “shall
refrain…from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state”. Sponsoring a
proxy group that wages armed attacks
effectively violates that principle.

The Charter’s Article 2(1) explicitly af rms “sovereign equality”of states, underpinning the norm that one state may not
militarily intervene in another. Thus, proxy interventions are controversial: supporters argue they are a necessary alternative
to full-scale invasion or a defense against threats, while critics contend they breach international law and destabilize regions.
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• Modern Context:
Today’s proxy wars often play out along sectarian and regional rivalries. In the Middle East, the Sunni–Shia schism and
Arab–Persian rivalry have fueled shadow wars. For example, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described Syria’s
civil war as a “proxy war, with regional and international players arming one side or the other,” noting that Iran and
Hezbollah backed Assad while Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Western states supported rebel groups. In Yemen, Iran and
Saudi Arabia have traded support for opposing factions, turning Yemen into a “battleground” for in uence. Even in South
Asia, Pakistan and India have long used militant proxies to pursue their objectives in Kashmir. Yet, despite its prevalence,
there is little consensus or enforcement mechanism governing proxy warfare.

III. Historical Overview: Cold War to

Present

• Cold War Era:

Proxy wars peaked during the US–Soviet Cold War (1947–1991). The superpowers avoided direct con ict by backing
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sides in Third World battles. Notorious proxy con icts—Vietnam, Korea, Angola, Afghanistan, and others—caused
enormous loss of life. Indeed, estimates suggest roughly 20 million people died in Cold War proxy wars, with only ~1% of
those deaths occurring in Europe. For example, in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), the US backed anti-communist
forces while the USSR and China armed the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge. In Afghanistan (1979–1989), Pakistan’s
ISI (with US and Saudi funding) trained Mujahideen rebels against Soviet forces, in turn in uencing Pakistan’s later proxy
strategy. The CIA and KGB also fought via surrogates in Latin America, Africa and Asia. These proxy campaigns solidi ed
the model: state A sends arms, trainers, and funds to allied militias in State B’s con ict zone, shaping the outcome without
deploying conventional troops.
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• Post–Cold War Shifts:
After the Soviet Union collapsed, overt proxy wars
diminished brie y, but reemerged in new forms. The
1990s saw ethnic and sectarian wars (e.g. the Balkans)
with foreign patrons. Al-Qaeda’s rise and the 9/11
attacks led the US to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, where
each side elded local militias as proxies. For instance,
US forces co-opted Afghan warlords and formed local
police militias to ght the Taliban. In Iraq, Iraqis and
Iranians battled through Shia militias (e.g. Badr
Organization) supported by their respective sponsors.
These con icts blurred lines: states often both overtly
occupied and covertly armed factions.

• 21st Century Proliferation:

In the 2010s proxy warfare exploded in scale and
complexity. The Syrian civil war (since 2011) drew in
Russia and Iran on Assad’s side and the US, Turkey, and
Gulf states supporting various rebel coalitions. Each
patron used militias as proxies: Russia and Iran supplied
government forces, while the US funded select rebel
units. The Yemeni crisis (since 2014) became a proxy
showdown: Houthi rebels (Shi’a, backed by Iran) vs. a
Saudi-led Sunni coalition (supported by the US/UK). In
South Asia, Pakistan’s proxies (Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-
e-Mohammed, etc.) sustained a low-intensity insurgency
in Indian-administered Kashmir. The simple fact is:
“almost every con ict…features sponsorship”.
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Global arms suppliers (US, Russia, France, UK) are also top backers of proxy forces, and new armed groups have
proliferated. Contemporary proxy wars are marked by multi-sided battles, heavy civilian tolls, and a heavy reliance on
technology and media to amplify their impact. By understanding this historical continuum, delegates can see how today’s
proxy con icts are an extension of past patterns.

IV. Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and Legality

of Proxies

• Sovereignty and Non-Intervention:

At the core of international order is state sovereignty. The UN Charter enshrines sovereign equality and the ban on force
Proxy warfare inherently violates these norms by enabling an external state to use force via surrogates. Critics argue that
sponsoring insurgents is simply a “backdoor” intervention that “bleeds [the target state] by a thousand cuts”. Such
interventions bypass accountability – the sponsoring state can deny direct involvement while still shaping the con ict. In
effect, proxy warfare undermines sovereignty by weakening the target government’s authority. This raises dif cult
questions: Can a state ever legitimately aid an armed group abroad (e.g., in self-defense or to prevent genocide)? Or is
outside support inherently an illegal intrusion? Practitioners often justify proxies as cheaper, safer alternatives to invasion
or as tools of self-defense against terrorism. Yet from the standpoint of international law, assisting rebels is generally
treated as an act of intervention. Sovereignty and non-intervention remain the default legal and moral presumption – thus,
proxies operate in a gray zone without clear legitimacy.

• Legal Principles:
UN Charter: Article 2(4) expressly prohibits force against another state’s political independence. Any armed action that
“fails within the authority of the legitimate Government” of the target, as UN resolutions caution in Yemen, is a violation.
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 Only two narrow exceptions exist: self-defense (Art. 51) or Security Council authorization. Proxies rarely meet these tests. For
example, Saudi Arabia claims self-defense against Houthi cross-border attacks, but Iran’s support for Houthis is not formally
authorized by the UN.

• Customary Law & ICJ:

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has clari ed state responsibility for proxies. In Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the
Court held that a state violates international law if it uses force against another (or intervenes in its affairs) through proxies. The
ICJ found the US in breach of its obligations “not to use force” and “not to intervene” in Nicaragua by aiding the Contras.
However, the Court also set a high bar for attribution: only states exercising “effective control” over a group are liable for all its
acts. In practice, this means proving that a sponsor directed speci c operations is dif cult. Nonetheless, the general rule is clear:
nancing, training or equipping insurgents can itself violate the Charter’s prohibition on force.

• Law of State Responsibility:

The Articles on State Responsibility codify these principles. Article 16 makes a state responsible if it “aids or assists” another in
committing an internationally wrongful act, provided it does so with the required intent. (The classic Nicaragua “effective
control” standard applies for attributing speci c actions.) Importantly, the International Law Commission and commentary (e.g.
on the 2001 Draft Articles) recognize that even without full control, states may still incur responsibility under aid-and-assist
doctrines. In short, massive support of proxies—especially when knowing they commit war crimes—can trigger state liability.

• Geneva Conventions and IHL:

Even in internal con icts, international humanitarian law (IHL) binds both states and rebels. Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions requires parties “to respect and ensure respect” for IHL in all circumstances. By extension, a state sponsoring a
non-state actor must take due diligence to prevent that group from violating the laws of war.For example, if a proxy commits
atrocities or uses prohibited weapons, the sponsor may be complicit.
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The principles of distinction, proportionality, and humanity apply equally to rebels and to states backing them. While IHL is
often hard to enforce against proxies, the legal framework mandates it.

• Other Regimes:
Specialized legal regimes also touch on
proxies. The Arms Trade Treaty (2013)
prohibits transfers of weapons if the
exporter knows they will be used to
commit serious violations (e.g. war
crimes, human rights abuses). Thus,
knowingly arming a proxy likely
breaches the ATT. Counter-terrorism
resolutions (e.g. UNSCR 1373, 2178)
obligate states to disrupt nancing of
terrorist and extremist groups; these
can be construed to cover proxy
support. Human rights law (e.g.,
ICCPR, counter-terrorism conventions)
may impose obligations on sponsoring
states to prevent extrajudicial killings
and torture by their proxies. However,
enforcement mechanisms are weak, and
states rarely face consequences for
proxy abuses.
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 In summary, the international legal framework largely forbids the covert use of force through proxies. As Lawfare
authors observe, “appropriate obligations” (Charter, state responsibility, treaties) do exist, but “in practice they are
lacking enforcement mechanisms”. Thus while many legal sources prescribe accountability, proxied con icts often proceed
with impunity. The result is a norm-versus-practice gap that fuels debates over the legitimacy and control of proxies.

V. Middle East – Regional

Focus

The Greater Middle East (from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa) has become a
laboratory of proxy warfare. The collapse of strong states (Iraq, Libya, Yemen), sectarian divisions, and the Arab Spring
upheavals provided fertile ground. Major regional powers exploit these weaknesses: for instance, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Quds Force back Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon, to project power.
Saudi Arabia counters by supporting Sunni-aligned forces (e.g. Syrian rebels, the Yemeni government) to counter Iranian
in uence. Turkey, Israel, and the UAE also sponsor aligned groups, making the Middle East one of the most congested proxy
arenas.

• Syria (2011–present):
The Syrian Civil War has drawn in every major regional actor. President Assad’s regime is backed by Russia (airpower,
Special Forces, private military contractors) and Iran (IRGC units and Hezbollah ghters). Opposition rebels have been backed
variously by the U.S., Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others – from “moderate” Free Syrian Army factions to hardline
Islamist groups. Kurdish forces (the Syrian Democratic Forces) received U.S. air support against ISIS. This patchwork of
patrons has turned Syria into a proxy maze: as one scholar observes, the war involves “U.S.-backed Kurdish forces and
Russian private military security contractors in Syria, [and] Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and UAE-supported militias in
Yemen” – illustrating how foreign powers push con icts to decision via proxies.
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• Yemen (2014–present):
Yemen’s civil war is a proxy contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In 2014 the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels (a Zaydi Shia
movement) seized Sanaa and ousted the Saudi-backed government. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia formed an Arab coalition
(including UAE, Bahrain, etc.) and intervened militarily to restore the government. The coalition launched airstrikes and
blockades against the Houthis, with the U.S., UK and others providing intelligence and refueling. Iran is widely reported to
supply the Houthis with rockets and missiles. The result has been a devastating war: UN reports estimate hundreds of
thousands killed and a massive humanitarian crisis. The Saudi intervention, described as “Operation Decisive Storm,” has
been criticized for civilian casualties and potential violations of the UN Charter. Iran and Saudi Arabia each cast the war as
self-defense – Riyadh as defending the legitimate Yemeni government, Tehran as protecting its ally – but critics see it as a
classic proxy showdown.

• Iraq:
After the 2003 U.S. invasion and the 2011 withdrawal, Iraq became a theater for both external and internal proxies. Iran
wields in uence via Shia militias (Popular Mobilization Forces) that fought ISIS and often answer to the IRGC. The U.S.
maintained bases and supported Kurdish and Iraqi government forces against ISIS. Sunni Arab states accuse Iran of
meddling; Iran accuses the U.S. and Gulf states of fostering Sunni insurgents. Even sectarian violence (e.g. between Sunni
insurgents and Shia militias) can be seen as ampli ed by foreign sponsorship.

•Lebanon:
A key proxy junction. Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia/political party, is both a Lebanese faction and a proxy of Tehran.
It fought against Israel in 2006 and has deployed ghters to Syria in support of Assad. Israel, the U.S. and some Gulf states
consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, while Iran and its allies see it as a legitimate resistance force. Lebanon’s politics
are thus heavily in uenced by the Iran-Saudi rivalry (Hezbollah vs. Saudi-aligned Sunni parties).
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• Iran–Saudi Arabia Rivalry:
•
• Underpinning many Middle East con icts is the Iran–Saudi proxy struggle. Iran champions Shia groups (Hezbollah,
Iraqi Shia militias, Houthi rebels) to expand its regional “axisresistance”. Saudi Arabia leads Sunni counter-efforts: e.g.
funding Syrian rebel factions early in the civil war and leading the war in Yemen. Both frame their actions as defending
sectarian kin and national security. The rivalry has spread to other arenas (Bahrain, Afghanistan, Lebanon). Importantly,
both sides publicly emphasize legality: Riyadh stresses sovereignty and counter-terror, Tehran stresses support for
oppressed minorities. Yet neither side hesitates to label the other’s proxies as terrorists. This double standard
complicates diplomatic solutions.

•
VI. South Asia – Regional Focus

In South Asia, the legacy of Cold War and regional rivalries ensures heavy proxy involvement. Two ashpoints stand out:
Afghanistan and Kashmir, but India-Pakistan tensions more broadly also drive proxy strategies.

• Afghanistan:
For over four decades, Afghanistan has been a crucible of proxy warfare. During the 1980s Soviet occupation, the U.S. (with
Pakistan and Saudi backing) armed Afghan mujahideen against Soviet forces. After 9/11, the U.S.-led intervention toppled
the Taliban and occupied the country. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) then provided sanctuary and weapons to
surviving Taliban militants, seeing them as strategic depth against India. A Brookings study notes that Pakistan’s ISI had
“provided the Taliban…with hundreds of advisers…thousands of Pakistani Pashtuns…to man its infantry and small units”,
and that after 2001 “ISI support was critical to the survival and revival of the Taliban”. Iran, for its part, has also intervened
in western Afghanistan: it supported certain anti-Taliban Shiite factions (e.g. Hazara militias) and has at times reached
tactical understandings with the Taliban to protect its borders and in uence. Thus Afghanistan’s war has multiple external
sponsors: US/NATO and allied Afghan forces versus Taliban insurgents aided by Pakistan (and elements of Iran).
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 • Kashmir and India–Pakistan Dynamics:
The long-running Kashmir dispute is rife with proxy grievances. Pakistan has historically funneled resources and ghters into
Indian-administered Kashmir to pressure India. One analysis observes that Islamabad views “the liberation of Kashmir [as] a
sacred mission,” and developed militancy as a “proxy war” to “bleed India by a thousand cuts”. The Pakistani ISI even
repurposed arms from the Afghan con ict to arm Kashmiri insurgents. India, in turn, accuses Pakistan of “state-sponsored
terrorism” in Kashmir. New Delhi has largely eschewed a foreign proxy, but does assist Kashmiri security forces and would
likely deem any Indian expatriate or NGO involvement as lawful. The result is frequent cross-border are-ups: suicide attacks
or militant in ltrations in Indian Punjab/Jammu (Pakistan-linked groups) and Indian airstrikes or diplomatic action in
Pakistan.

• Pakistan’s Role:
Pakistan itself ghts insurgencies inspired
by Afghanistan/Pakistan geography (e.g.
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) and by
sectarian splits. Islamabad of cially
denies sponsoring terrorism abroad but
tacitly supports proxies in Kashmir and
Afghanistan. In Pakistani discourse, some
Kashmiri militants are framed as “freedom
ghters.” However, UN resolutions and
others label such non-state ghters as
terrorists if they commit violence.
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Overall, South Asia’s proxy wars are fueled by the India-Pakistan rivalry, the legacy of the Afghan wars, and overlapping
sectarian/ethnic af liations (e.g. India-Iran relations via some Shiite networks). The presence of nuclear weapons on both
India and Pakistan further raises the stakes, often making their proxy confrontations especially dangerous for regional
security.

VII. CASE STUDY OF KEY PROXY

CONFLICTS

Type to enter text • Case Study: Iran in Syria

Iran stands out as a major state sponsor
in the Syrian con ict. From early 2011,
Tehran viewed the Bashar al-Assad
regime as a linchpin of its regional “Axis
of Resistance” (linking Iran, Assad’s
Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon). Iran
committed extensive resources to
prevent Assad’s fall. According to
analysts, Iran conducted an “extensive,
expensive, and integrated effort to keep
[Assad] in power”. The IRGC’s Quds
Force provided arms, funds and training
to Syrian forces and allied militias. By
mid-2013 Iran even sent conventional
troops: a journalist reported that Iran
deployed a “ rst contingent of 4,000
Iranian Revolutionary Guard” soldiers to
bolster Assad.
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Iran also enlisted proxy ghters from across the region. The Lebanese Hezbollah militia was at the forefront: tens of thousands of Hezbollah ghters backed major Syrian offensives. ISW notes that
Iran also enlisted proxy ghters from across the region. The Lebanese Hezbollah militia was at the forefront: tens of
“Hezbollah took a direct combat role…as Assad lost control” in 2012 and later helped recapture key terrain. In addition, Iran armed and trained Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan and even
thousands
Pakistan of Harakat
(e.g. Iraq’s Hezbollah ghters backed
al-Nujaba, Afghanistan’s major
Fatemiyoun Syrian
Brigade) to ght inoffensives. ISW notes
Syria. Iran’s Revolutionary Guardsthat “Hezbollah
also advised took aloyalist
and co-commanded direct combat
forces. role…as
These efforts were
coordinated by Quds Force generals like Qasem Soleimani, who effectively led the coalition supporting Assad.
Assad lost control” in 2012 and later helped recapture key terrain. In addition, Iran armed and trained Shia militias from
Iraq, Afghanistan and even Pakistan (e.g. Iraq’s Harakat al-Nujaba, Afghanistan’s Fatemiyoun Brigade) to ght in Syria.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also advised and co-commanded loyalist forces. These efforts were coordinated by Quds Force
generals like Qasem Soleimani, who effectively led the coalition supporting Assad.

The human cost and scale of Iran’s intervention were high. Thousands of Iranian of cers and allied ghters have been killed
in Syria (the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates over 10,000) – including several high-ranking IRGC generals.
Economically, Iran poured billions into sustaining Assad. Politically, Iran’s involvement solidi ed its in uence in Syria: it
helped recapture Aleppo (2016) and other battlegrounds, preventing regime change. In February 2024, Iran even reopened
its embassy in Damascus, signaling con dence in Assad’s recovery.

• Impacts:
Iran’s proxy campaign succeeded in its primary goal: keeping Assad in power (for now). However, it entrenched sectarian
lines, contributed to Syria’s devastation, and prompted U.S. and Israeli countermeasures. For instance, U.S. forces in Syria
still clash periodically with Iran-backed militias. Israel continues to strike shipments and bases destined for Hezbollah.
Domestically in Iran, the heavy losses have fueled dissent among war-weary Iranians.

• Legal/Legitimacy Angle:
Tehran claims it was legally invited by Syria’s government to assist. From Iran’s perspective, it is supporting a legitimate
ally against foreign-backed insurgents. Critics, however, call it unlawful intervention. Under international law, Iran’s direct
military involvement could violate Syria’s sovereignty, though Assad’s consent complicates the issue.
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 If Assad had been illegitimate (e.g.
ousted by a UN resolution), Iran’s
actions would clearly breach the
Charter. In any case, Iran has not
been sanctioned by the UNSC for its
Syria role, due to Russia’s veto.
Nonetheless, Iran’s Syria intervention
illustrates how a state can use hybrid
forces (its own military plus proxies)
to pursue regime-change objectives
abroad.

• Case Study: Saudi-led Intervention in Yemen:

Yemen’s war (2014–present) has evolved into a regional proxy con ict. In 2014 the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah), a Zaydi-
Shia group from northern Yemen, seized the capital Sanaa and ousted President Hadi. The Houthis long opposed the Hadi
government and drew support from Iran. In early 2015, a Saudi-led coalition (including UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and others)
intervened at Hadi’s request to restore the recognized government. The Saudi rationale was twofold: counter Iran’s growing
in uence on its southern border and uphold the Gulf-backed order. The United States and United Kingdom provided logistical,
intelligence and arms support to the coalition.

Iran’s role has been signi cant but often denied. Tehran funneled weapons (missiles, anti-tank rockets, military advisors) to the
Houthis and allied Sunni rebels. UN and media investigations have found multiple Iranian arms shipments to Houthi territories.
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Saudis allege Iran provided advanced missiles,
drones, and training, deepening the con ict. In
turn, Saudi Arabia and its partners have supplied
the Yemeni government forces and sometimes
backed local militias (including supporting the
UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in the
south).

• Scale of Con ict:

Yemen has endured one of the world’s worst
humanitarian crises. By early 2022, UN estimates
put the total war death toll (including indirect
deaths from hunger and disease) at 377,000.
AirPower has dominated the war: the Saudi-led
coalition conducted over 24,000 airstrikes by
2022, often using US-made bombs. Battles on the
ground in Houthi-controlled mountains (e.g.
Saada, Hodeida, Marib) have caused widespread
casualties. Millions of Yemeni civilians are
displaced or starving, partly due to the blockade
and ghting.
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 In Yemen, the Iran–Saudi rivalry is explicit: the two states back opposing camps. Saudi Arabia frames its intervention as
protecting the legitimate government and combating Iranian-backed rebels. Iran portrays itself as supporting a popular
liberation movement. In practice, both sides’ involvement has deepened the war. As one observer put it, “Yemen has
become a pawn in a geopolitical chess match” between Riyadh and Tehran.

• International Response:
The UNSC has addressed Yemen under “Yemen’s affairs.” In April 2015 it adopted Resolution 2216, demanding the
Houthis withdraw from seized areas, hand over arms, and cease undermining the government. The resolution imposed
sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) on Houthi leaders and reiterated support for Yemen’s legitimate government.
However, the resolution did not call out Iran explicitly (though negotiators accused Iran of violating the arms embargo).
As the Saudi representative emphasized, 2216 was a “clear and rm signal…prepared to consider any additional
measures” needed. Over the years, the UN has also tried (so far unsuccessfully) to mediate cease res and peace talks. The
Security Council remains divided: many Western members have backed Saudi initiatives, while others (Russia, etc.) urge
peace without taking sides.The UNSC has addressed Yemen under “Yemen’s affairs.” In April 2015 it adopted Resolution
2216, demanding the Houthis withdraw from seized areas, hand over arms, and cease undermining the government. The
resolution imposed sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) on Houthi leaders and reiterated support for Yemen’s
legitimate government. However, the resolution did not call out Iran explicitly (though negotiators accused Iran of
violating the arms embargo). As the Saudi representative emphasized, 2216 was a “clear and rm signal…prepared to
consider any additional measures” needed. Over the years, the UN has also tried (so far unsuccessfully) to mediate
cease res and peace talks. The Security Council remains divided: many Western members have backed Saudi initiatives,
while others (Russia, etc.) urge peace without taking sides.

• Case Study: U.S. Engagement in Afghanistan:

Afghanistan has long been a theater of proxy con ict, and U.S. policy there exempli es state-sponsored militias. During
the 1980s Soviet–Afghan War, the CIA, with Pakistan’s ISI, armed Afghan Mujahideen against Moscow (this legacy later
furnished weapons and ghters to Kashmir proxies).
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After 2001, the U.S. again turned to Afghan proxies.
Initially, U.S. Special Forces and CIA paramilitaries
teamed up with anti-Taliban warlords (e.g. Hamid
Karzai’s faction and Northern Alliance militias) to topple
the Taliban regime. These alliances were crucial to the
rapid fall of Kabul in 2001.

Over the next decade, the U.S. formalized proxy forces.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program (established
circa 2010) created village militias armed by the CIA and
coalition forces to secure rural areas. Meanwhile, the CIA
funded and ran what critics call its own “army”: a network
of Afghan militias loyal to Pakistani or Western interests.
As Suhrke and de Lauri observe, “the CIA-supported
militias…originate in the 2001 invasion” and by the late
2010s “the CIA is still running local militias… in
operations against the Taliban and other Islamist
militants”. These groups were often outside government
control.
The use of proxies in Afghanistan had a mixed legacy.
They provided manpower that enabled U.S.
counterinsurgency with fewer American troops. However,
oversight was minimal. In practice, the militias
“reportedly have committed serious human rights abuses,
including numerous extrajudicial killings of civilians”.
Ethnic warlord allegiances fueled local feuds, corruption,
and reprisals against communities perceived as Taliban
supporters.
 This became a liability for US strategy: allied militias sometimes
pursued narrow agendas, undermining national reconciliation and
even ghting each other.

After 2014, U.S. reduced its troop presence but continued to rely on
such proxies, including contracting Afghan militias and maintain
U.S. special operations to train them. In 2020, during U.S.–Taliban
peace negotiations, the future of these proxy forces was contentious:
the U.S. insisted on keeping some militias as a hedge. Ultimately,
when U.S. forces withdrew in 2021, the Afghan government forces
and allied militias collapsed rapidly, demonstrating the limits of
relying on proxies without enduring political solutions.

• Case Study: Pakistan and Kashmir:

The Jammu and Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has
long been characterized by proxy warfare. Since the late 1980s,
Pakistan’s security establishment has supported Islamist militant
groups to ght Indian rule in Kashmir. Under "Operation Topac,"
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organized, trained and
armed Kashmiri insurgents using surplus weapons from the Afghan
war. This campaign aimed to "annex Kashmir by bleeding India by a
thousand cuts" as one analysis puts it. Militant out ts like Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT, founded 1986) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM, 2000)
received sanctuary, funding and training from Pakistan’s ISI and
af liated organizations.
India and international observers regard LeT and JeM as Pakistan’s proxies. For decades, LeT was “a favoured ward of the
Pakistani state,” with the ISI “supporting its operations through generous nancing and combat training”.
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 Both groups were behind high-pro le attacks (e.g. the 2008 Mumbai massacre by LeT) and are designated terrorist
organizations by the UN and many countries. India accuses Pakistan of denying of cial support while covertly directing
these groups into Kashmir and even India’s heartland. Pakistan, for its part, often labels Kashmiri militants as “freedom
ghters” resisting Indian rule.
The result has been a decades-long low-intensity con ict. Indian forces battle militants in ltrating from Pakistan, and
Pakistan (of cially) denies responsibility even as it condemns Indian human rights abuses. The proxy campaign has
prevented Kashmir’s integration and kept India-Pakistan relations on a hair trigger (e.g. 2019 Pulwama-Balakot). It also
strains Pakistan’s economy and invites international pressure: after the 2008 Mumbai attack, the US and UN sanctioned LeT
leaders. In sum, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy exempli es how state-supported militancy can internationalize a territorial
dispute.
State actor Supported Non-State Actors / Proxies Key conflicts/Regions
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Gaza
Iran Lebanese Hezbollah (Shi’a militia); Iraqi Shia militias
(e.g. Kata’ib Hezbollah); Syrian Government militias
(IRGC-backed); Houthi rebels (Yemen)

Gulf-backed Syrian rebel factions; Yemeni

Saudi Arabia /UAE Government forces (coalition) and allied Southern Yemen, Syria
Transitional Council (STC) separatists

United States Afghan militias (Northern Alliance, Afghan Local

Police); Iraqi militias and Sunni units (post-2003 Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria
Iraq); Syrian opposition groups (selected rebel
battalions)

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); Jaish-e-Mohammed; Hizbul Jammu & Kashmir (Indian-

Pakistan Mujahideen (Kashmir insurgents) administered)

Table: Major state sponsors and examples of the armed groups they back, by con ict arena.
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 VIII. Global Case Studies of Proxy
Warfare Beyond the Middle East and
South Asia

• Eastern Europe & Eurasia – Russia’s Role in Ukraine:

The war in eastern Ukraine has been widely portrayed as a proxy ght: the Kremlin backed the self-proclaimed Donetsk and
Luhansk People’s Republics with arms, ghters and even passports. Russia’s support violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity,
outing Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (ban on force against sovereignty). In 2022–25, private Russian mercenaries from the
Wagner Group spearheaded offensives (notablyType to enteroftext
the capture Bakhmut) under the guise of “volunteers,” blurring lines
between state and non-state action. The Kremlin’s recognition of Donetsk/Luhansk as independent (a replay of its 2014
moves in Georgia and Crimea) is also inconsistent with international law’s protection of existing borders. Critics note,
however, that calling Ukraine a mere “proxy war” can understate the agency of Ukrainians defending their country and
oversimplify a complex con ict.

• Legal and strategic questions:

Delegates should consider whether Russia’s backing of armed groups in Donbas constitutes unlawful aggression or internal
con ict. Does Russia’s claim of protecting Russian-speakers or ghting “terrorism” justify its actions (Article 51)? What if
any legal difference arises if weapons or personnel are supplied covertly? How do we attribute proxy actions to a state – must
the effective-control test (from the Nicaragua ICJ case) be met for responsibility? In Ukraine, Wagner ghters act openly and
coordinate with Russian forces, suggesting de facto state control. What loopholes in the UN Charter (e.g. collective self-
defense, invitations by a regime) are being invoked or abused? Finally, do Western arms shipments to Ukraine turn Kiev into
a reverse proxy of NATO?
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 • Africa – Proxy Dynamics in
Sudan, Mali, CAR, Libya:

In Africa, a web of foreign proxies has

fueled con icts and regime contests. In
Sudan’s 2023 civil war, rival generals
Burhan and Hemeti became patrons of
wider power struggles: Saudi Arabia
backs Burhan’s army, while the UAE
tacitly backs Hemeti’s Rapid Support
Forces (RSF). Russia’s Wagner Group
has been active in Sudan since 2017,
formally contracted in Darfur and now
allegedly guarding gold for Emirati
interests. Thus the UAE–Russia–RSF
triangle turned Sudan into a Gulf proxy
battleground.

In Mali, Wagner mercenaries fought Islamist rebels alongside the junta from 2021 to mid-2025. Even after Wagner’s public
withdrawal, a Kremlin-controlled “Africa Corps” replaced it, illustrating how Moscow maintains leverage through new fronts.
Central African Republic became another Wagner foothold: since 2018 Russian ghters have defended President Touadéra
against rebel groups and secured mining concessions (including a gold mine) for Wagner-linked rms. In Libya, foreign
intervention turned civil war into a proxy arena: Russia (via Wagner), the UAE and Egypt back General Haftar’s Libyan
National Army, while Turkey (with Syrian proxies) supports the Tripoli-based government. Despite UN embargoes, these
great powers funnel arms and mercenaries to shape Libya’s political outcome.

•Delegates
Legal and strategic questions:
should compare these African cases for patterns of in uence. Is Sudan’s war an internal power struggle or a Gulf-
led proxy war? When outside armies or jets intervene (e.g. Egypt aiding Burhan) is it collective defense or intervention? does
Wagner’s quasi-of cial role evade UN restrictions on mercenaries?
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How does Wagner’s quasi-of cial role evade UN restrictions on mercenaries? African governments often invite foreign
forces (e.g. Mali’s junta asking Wagner for help), creating murky legality. Yet such “invitations” occur under duress of coups
or foreign pressure: does Khartoum freely accept external aid? The split between Gulf and Russian goals shows great-power
rivalry shaping local con icts. Delegates should ask: can international law distinguish legitimate external support (on
invitation or self-defense) from illegitimate meddling? In CAR and Mali, Wagner’s open presence suggests state sponsorship;
how would the UN Charter apply if the African state seems complicit? Finally, how do economic incentives (mining deals in
Sudan, CAR) factor into sovereignty and accountability for war crimes committed by proxies?

•Contemporary
Latin America – Cold War and
Arenas:

Latin America offers classic and modern proxy

examples. During the Cold War, the U.S. covertly
trained and armed the Contras to overthrow
Nicaragua’s Sandinista government. In Nicaragua
v. United States (ICJ, 1986), the court found that
U.S. support for Contra rebels and mining of
harbors violated international law (breaching non-
intervention and sovereignty). The ICJ ruled the
U.S. “used force” against Nicaragua through its
proxies, a breach of customary law, though
enforcement was blocked by U.S. veto.
Conversely, Cuba in the 1960s–80s sponsored socialist movements abroad: sending troops and advisers to Angola,
Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and more. Havana’s “internationalism” was driven by ideology and Soviet ties, but it raised similar
issues of external in uence in sovereign states.

Today Venezuela under Maduro illustrates a new proxy network. Caracas has cultivated ties with Iran, Russia and allied
armed groups. U.S. analysts note the Maduro regime became a “sanctuary” for Hezbollah and Colombia’s ELN, allowing
them to exploit Venezuela’s permissive environment.
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 Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) has operated in Venezuela (using it as a base for drone production and arms
traf cking). Hezbollah maintains a nancial-terror network in Venezuela (and the tri-border area with Brazil/Paraguay).
These partnerships blur ideological and legal lines: Caracas receives military and economic support (oil-for-arms deals with
Tehran) while providing safe haven to non-state militants.

• Legal and strategic questions:

Delegates should ask how these examples compare. The ICJ’s condemnation of U.S. aid to Contras echoes today’s debate
over whether backing insurgents or “terrorist groups” abroad (like Hezbollah in Venezuela) violates sovereignty. Does aiding
rebel factions (Colombia’s FARC dissidents, ELN) from Venezuelan soil amount to aggression? Cuba’s historical role shows
smaller powers can be proxy patrons too. What distinguishes ideological solidarity from illicit intervention? Does the lack of
open warfare in Venezuela–Iran ties (which are often commercial or intelligence exchanges) change the legal calculus?
Finally, how does the intent to change regimes differ from, say, supplying humanitarian or defense aid? For instance, if one
great power brands its proxy “freedom ghters” and another deems them terrorists, who adjudicates under international law?
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 IX. Contemporary Developments and Emerging
Dynamics

🧩 PM Netanyahu’s Confession: Israel Arming

Anti Hamas Clans in Gaza:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly
admitted that Israel has taken steps to "activate" and
arm local Gaza clans opposed to Hamas—as part of his
government's counter Hamas strategy. He was quoted
saying: “We made use of clans in Gaza that are
opposed to Hamas… What’s wrong with that? … It
saves the lives of IDF soldiers.”

Netanyahu’s admission marks an inaugural of cial

acknowledgment of Israel engaging in proxy support
within Gaza—effectively, the rst time a state sponsor
has admitted arming a non state armed group in that
battle.

• Who Are These Groups?

1. The most prominent example: the Popular Forces, led by Yasser Abu Shabab, a tribal militia based in eastern Rafah.
2. Israeli coverage reports the group, operating with ~300 ghters, now wears uniforms, distributes aid, and secures
humanitarian convoys—apparently using Israeli weapons and tactical support
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 • Controversies & Consequences:
1. Critics argue these clans effectively serve as
paramilitary proxies, upped in arms to ght Hamas
as intermediate forces between Israeli troops and
civilian areas .
2. Humanitarian groups and Palestinians have voiced
concern: reports claim these groups have engaged in
looting aid convoys, and even opened re on civilians
—leading to roughly 127 deaths at aid distribution
points in Rafah
3. The UN has warned such tactics could marginalize
moderate actors, fuel chaos, and potentially provoke
civil con ict within Gaza .
4. Israeli opposition politicians have criticized the
strategy sharply. Yair Lapid labeled the militias “akin
to ISIS gangs,” while others warned that empowering
criminal organizations undermines security and
governance in Gaza

• Implications for Proxy Warfare Debate:

Legal Dimension: This development is a striking example
of state-sponsored proxy action that may contradict
international humanitarian and criminal law. Questions
arise over whether supplying weapons and support to non-
state militias orchestrates indirect involvement in
potential war crimes.
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 Political and Strategic Dimension: Prime Minister Netanyahu justi ed the support as a way to reduce IDF casualties.
However, this strategy re ects a shift toward asymmetric warfare tactics—empowering irregular forces to achieve military
objectives.
Humanitarian and Governance Dimension: Support for these clans has reportedly worsened the humanitarian crisis in
Gaza. Aid distribution has become insecure, and local administration is fragmenting further—posing new challenges for post-
con ict recovery.

🧩Middle East Escalation- Iran vs Israel:

1) Operation Rising Lion( 13 June-):

In a dramatic escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran, Operation “Rising Lion” marked a pivotal moment in Middle
Eastern geopolitics. Between June 13 and 15, 2025, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) executed a massive aerial offensive
involving approximately 200 warplanes, targeting over 100 critical Iranian military and nuclear facilities. Precision
strikes dismantled key strategic infrastructure:

A. Missile Launch Complexes (including Shahab, Dezful, and Sejjil systems)

B. Nuclear Facilities at Natanz and Isfahan
C. Air Defense Batteries
D. Leadership Targets, including senior IRGC commanders (e.g., Hossein Salami, Mohammad Bagheri) and ≈ eleven
prominent nuclear scientists (Reuters, 2025)
2) Regime Change Rhetoric Intensi es:
The unprecedented direct targeting of Iran’s strategic core has emboldened regime change rhetoric across Western and
Israeli spheres. Analysts interpret this not merely as a military con ict, but as the opening chapter of a wider geopolitical
reshaping of the Middle East.
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3) Proxy Retaliation and Destabilization:
Iran’s conventional military capacity may have been blunted, but its asymmetric warfare apparatus remains potent. Tehran
has begun retaliating via proxy networks:
A. Hezbollah (Lebanon)
B. Houthi Militias (Yemen)
C. Iraqi Shi’a Militias
Iran’s shrinking sphere of in uence—especially after Assad’s ouster in Syria—has left its proxies more isolated,
potentially driving them toward desperate retaliatory operations, notably in sensitive chokepoints like Yemen’s Red Sea
corridor.

4) Intellectual Perspectives: The Duality of State Sovereignty and Proxy Warfare:

The Israeli offensive exempli es a modern military strategy that blends conventional air supremacy with covert operations
and political warfare. Conversely, Iran’s response highlights the paradox of proxy warfare—though Iran may be militarily
weakened at home, its ability to wage asymmetric warfare abroad remains dangerously intact.
Key Questions for the Committee:
A. Where does international law stand regarding direct strikes on sovereign nations’ critical infrastructure in absence of
formal war declarations?
B. Should state-backed proxy retaliation be viewed as legitimate defense or as escalation?
C. How should the UNSC balance non-interference norms with responsibility to prevent humanitarian crises resulting
from broader regional wars?
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 X. Key International
Stakeholders’ Positions

• United States: The U.S. often condemns foreign proxies (e.g.

accusing Iran of fueling Middle East con icts) while
simultaneously using proxies itself. Of cially, American policy
stresses sovereignty and counters-terrorism. In practice, the U.S.
has long used proxy forces – for instance, it armed Afghan
mujahideen in the 1980s and the Syrian Democratic Forces in the
2010s. U.S. statements typically frame support as aiding “friendly
forces” against terrorists. When accused of double standards, U.S.
of cials argue they operate under international mandates or self-
defense (e.g. battling ISIS). However, critics point out that similar
logic could justify many interventions (e.g. Iraq 2003 was widely
seen as an illegal regime change). Overall, U.S. actions are
pragmatic: it opposes proxies when they threaten U.S. interests, but
uses them to achieve its own objectives.

• Russia: Moscow presents itself as a champion of sovereignty and a critic of Western “regime change.” It strongly
denounces U.S./NATO interventions (e.g. in Iraq, Libya) as illegal. At the same time, Russia actively arms and empowers
proxies to pursue its goals. Analysts note that Putin has “aligned even more closely with destabilizing anti-American
forces in the Middle East” as a deliberate strategy. In Syria, for example, Russia backed Iran’s Hezbollah and Syrian
militias to keep Assad in power (thus avoiding large Russian troop deployments). Russia also trains and equips proxies
beyond the Middle East (e.g. Libyan warlord Haftar, Eastern Ukraine separatists). The Kremlin views proxy warfare as a
cost-effective way to challenge the West. Russian of cials will often phrase their actions as invited support or legitimate
defense, but NATO and EU states accuse Russia of grossly violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and fueling global instability.
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 • China: Beijing of cially maintains a policy of non-interference. Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasize sovereignty and
territorial integrity, opposing what they call foreign “interference” in a state’s internal affairs. China has few known
proxy forces abroad, instead focusing on state-to-state ties. In Syria, China backed Russia diplomatically at the UN, but
its material involvement has been limited. In regional con icts (e.g. in Africa or Myanmar), China generally prefers
investment and diplomacy to military engagement. Nonetheless, China’s rhetoric on proxies is often about condemning
Western double standards: for instance, Chinese of cials have highlighted NATO’s Libya intervention or U.S. bases in
the region. On the subject of regime change, China has joined Russia in criticizing foreign-imposed regime changes as
dangerous precedents. China’s approach thus largely sidelines the proxy issue in favor of large-power consensus and
upholding international order (as China sees it).

• Iran: Tehran is one of the most proli c state sponsors of non-

state armed groups. The IRGC-Quds Force directs a vast
network of militias across the Middle East. Iran’s proxies
include Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Yemen’s
Houthis, and allied groups in Syria, Palestine and beyond. The
of cial Iranian line is that it supports “resistance movements”
against occupation or oppression (especially against Israel or
hostile Gulf states). Iran denies backing terrorism and argues its
proxies provide regional security. In practice, Iranian-backed
groups have attacked U.S. forces, Israel, and Arab governments.
Tehran’s strategy is pragmatic: proxies allow it to extend
in uence without open war. Iranian of cials will typically
highlight U.S. and Saudi double standards, noting how Western
states have armed rebels in Syria or funded extremists during
Afghanistan. But on the ground, Iranian proxies engage in
combat and politics far beyond Iran’s borders.
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 • Saudi Arabia: Riyadh’s proxy stance is largely de ned by countering Iran. Saudi Arabia positions itself as protecting
Arab order and Islamic solidarity. It portrays the Yemeni intervention as restoring a legitimate government against an
“Iranian coup.” Saudi of cials often publicly lament foreign meddling by Iran (or Turkey/Qatar) in the region. In Syria
and Yemen, Saudi Arabia openly funds and sometimes ghts alongside allied militias (e.g. certain Syrian rebel brigades,
Yemeni tribal forces). Saudi-backed media and diplomats describe these groups as liberation ghters. At the UN, Saudi
Arabia has focused on the threat of Iranian proxies (calling Houthi actions an “aggression”), while downplaying its own
coalition’s fallout. Critics, however, accuse Riyadh of arming extremist groups and ignoring humanitarian law. Overall,
Saudi policy on proxies is defensive and zero-sum: any expansion of Iranian-backed militias is framed as a threat,
justifying Saudi-backed resistance.

• India: India condemns foreign-sponsored militancy in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Of cially, New Delhi advocates non-
interference and peaceful resolution. India portrays the Pakistani in uence in Kashmir as cross-border terrorism. At the
UN, India has sought recognition of the Kashmir dispute as “core” and characterized militants there as Pakistan-
supported terrorists. India’s involvement in other countries’ con icts is limited; it contributed peacekeepers to UN
missions but generally avoids covert operations abroad. India’s proxy legacy is mainly historical (1971 Bangladesh
liberation, Sri Lankan Tamil cases). Today, Indian policy is reactive: it builds border security and houses exiled leaders
(e.g. Afghan, Tibetan), but denies any “state-sponsored” militias. India’s stance is that regime change or proxy
intervention is unacceptable. Yet it also points out global hypocrisy: why are some interventions labeled terrorism and
others liberation?

• Pakistan: Pakistan’s foreign policy has long included proxy warfare, though Islamabad of cially denies sponsoring
militants. It views proxies as an extension of its strategic depth, especially against India. In Kashmir, Pakistani leaders
have called militants “heroes of jihad” or “freedom ghters,” even as they condemn attacks within Pakistan (2014 trial of
Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi for Mumbai). Pakistani sources often accuse India of wanting to encircle Pakistan (e.g. in
Afghanistan), so support militancy as defensive. In the UNSC and UN forums, Pakistan will highlight human rights
issues in Kashmir and call out Indian actions, while de ecting questions about its own proxies. However, evidence and
leaked reports frequently contradict Pakistan’s denials (e.g. ISI captured documents from Ha z Saeed). Pakistan’s
of cial rhetoric is that it only ghts terrorism and does not export it – but it stops short of fully shutting down Kashmiri
insurgent camps.
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 XI. UNSC Actions and Debates

The UN Security Council has engaged proxy con icts unevenly, often constrained by great-power divisions:

• Yemen (2015–): As noted, the Council adopted Resolution 2216 under Chapter VII. This resolution “demanded that
all parties…end violence” and speci cally ordered the Houthis to relinquish arms seized from military installations. It
also imposed sanctions on Houthi leaders. The vote was 14-0 (Russia abstained). The resolution did not mention Iran by
name but clearly sided with the Yemeni government and its backers. Later, the Security Council periodically renewed a
partial arms embargo on Yemen. Some members, especially Russia and China, have urged humanitarian pauses and
criticized unilateral measures.
Syria (2011–): The Council passed many resolutions on Syria (chemical weapons bans, humanitarian access, support
for peace talks 2254, etc.), but never a resolution condemning foreign involvement. Russia and China vetoed multiple
draft resolutions that would have demanded cease res or punishment for Assad’s supporters. As a result, proxy aspects of
the Syrian war (e.g. Iranian and Russian support for Assad, vs. US/Saudi backing of rebels) remained outside Council
censure. Instead, the Council’s focus has been on counterterrorism (banning ISIS/Al-Qaeda, UNSCR 2178 on foreign
ghters) and humanitarian issues. (In 2023 the General Assembly did condemn proxy warfare in Ukraine and elsewhere,
but the Council was not involved.)

Afghanistan (2001–2021): Post-9/11, the UNSC unanimously authorized force against Al-Qaeda/Taliban (Res. 1368)
and endorsed the Karzai gov’t (Res. 1386). It later passed resolutions on terrorism nancing (2173), foreign ghters
(2178), and border security (2174). However, the Council did not issue any resolution speci cally on Pakistan’s support
for Taliban proxies or on CIA-backed Afghan militias. After the Taliban takeover in 2021, resolutions (e.g. 2593) urged
inclusive governance and humanitarian aid, but again avoided great-power confrontations.

Kashmir (1948–present): Kashmir was brie y on the Council’s agenda (UN Resolutions 47, 80 in 1948–49) calling
for a plebiscite and cease re, but discussions faded after 1971. Neither India nor Pakistan has put Kashmir back on the
Council, regarding it as a bilateral issue.
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In general, UNSC responses to proxy con icts have been ad hoc and politically driven. When proxies are labeled terrorism
(e.g. Sanctions Committees and Al-Qaeda lists), the Council mobilizes sanctions. But when proxies are entangled with a
patron’s security strategy, real action is rare. Regional members often block confrontation: e.g. Russia stopped any resolution
on Assad’s external backers; China and Russia shield Pakistan on Kashmir; and Western states often support the Saudis and
allies in Yemen. As a result, delegates will see that the UNSC debate is less about legal authority (the UN lacks a “proxy-
warfare” statute) and more about geopolitical alignments. Understanding past Council statements helps anticipate how
members will frame (or avoid) the issue.

XII. Guiding Questions for

Delegates
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Sovereignty vs. Intervention: Under what circumstances (if any) can a state legitimately support armed groups in
another country? How does Article 2(4) of the UN Charter guide this issue?

Self-Defense and Allies: Can a government invoke collective self-defense to justify proxy support (e.g. helping a
government ght rebels)? How should the UNSC assess claims that proxy warfare is being used as an act of self-
defense?

Humanitarian Justi cations: Does the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine allow or prohibit backing armed non-
state actors? When, if ever, could promoting regime change through proxies be justi ed by humanitarian concerns?

Accountability: What mechanisms exist to hold sponsoring states accountable for proxy-led abuses? Should the UN
develop new norms to address the grey zone of proxy warfare?

Double Standards: How can the international community address perceptions of double standards? Should the UNSC
condemn all states’ proxy interventions equally, or take a pragmatic approach focusing on outcomes?
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 Non-State Actors Legality: How do we de ne
“armed non-state actors” (e.g. insurgents, militias,
mercenaries) in international law? Are there accepted
legal distinctions between terrorists and freedom
ghters?

Regional Dynamics: In the Middle East and South

Asia speci cally, how have regional rivalries (Iran–
Saudi, India–Pakistan) shaped proxy con icts? What
regional security arrangements or con dence-building
measures could reduce reliance on proxies?

UN Role: What actions can or should the Security

Council take regarding proxy wars? Would it involve
sanctions, peacekeeping mandates, or legal
commissions? What are the limits imposed by veto
powers on addressing proxies?

Precedents and Solutions: What lessons can be drawn from past proxy con icts (e.g. Nicaragua, Cold War wars)? How
can the UN promote peaceful resolution without inadvertent encouragement of armed proxies?

These guiding questions are meant to stimulate debate on both the legality and political reality of proxy warfare. Delegates
should consider all perspectives – security concerns, legal norms, ethical implications – when crafting resolutions or policy
recommendations.
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 XIII. Rules Of Procedure
(ROP)
Roll Call and Attendance

• At the beginning of each session, a Roll Call is conducted.

• Delegates respond with:

1. "Present" – full participation in all proceedings.
2. "Present and Voting" – cannot abstain in substantive voting
Points and Motions

1. “Point of Information” - Ask a question to a speaker after their speech for clari cation or challenge.
2. “Point of Order” - Correct a procedural/factual mistake by the dais or other delegate
3. “Point of Parliamentary Inquiry” - Clarify rules of procedure
4. “Right of Reply” - Respond to a direct question from other delegate/dais
5. “Point of Personal Privilege” - Address a personal discomfort
Respond to a direct personal insult.

1. “Motion to set the agenda” - Establish the topic for debate.

2. “Motion for a Moderated Caucus” - Establish a structured and time-bound discussion on a sub topic
3. “Motion for an Unmoderated Caucus” - Informal lobbying and draft writing
4. “Motion to Introduce a Draft Resolution/Amendment” - Bring documents into formal debate
***while this rop provides a vague understanding of how MUNs work, a detailed explanation of the same
will be provided by the chairperson prior to the committee sessions.
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 XIV. Bibliography/Further Reading and
Sources

1) Votel, Michael K., et al., Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare (New America,
2019)d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.netd1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net.
2). Britannica, Proxy War, entries on proxy con icts and Cold War examples-britannica.combritannica.com.
3). Wikipedia, Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (key dates of foreign involvement)-en.wikipedia.orgen.wikipedia.org.
4). Wikipedia, Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war (details of coalition formation and actions)-
en.wikipedia.orgen.wikipedia.org.
Typeto
5). Walter, Brian, and Jeremy L. Wallace. “Time toGet
enter text
a Handle on America’s Conduct of Proxy Warfare.”
Lawfare(2019). An analytical article de ning modern proxy warfare, outlining its global prevalence (e.g. most 21st-century
con icts involve proxies) and summarizing international law constraints-lawfaremedia.org. Useful for introductions and legal
context.

6). Institute for the Study of War. “Iranian Strategy in Syria.” Washington Institute (2013). A detailed expert report on
Iran’s objectives and methods in Syria (IRGC deployments, militia recruitment, Hezbollah’s role)-
understandingwar.orgunderstandingwar.org. Essential for the Iran case study.
7). Council on Foreign Relations. “Con ict in Yemen and the Red Sea.” Global Con ict Tracker (March 2025). An up-to-
date overview of the Yemen war, its origins (Houthi takeover, coalition intervention), and key actors-cfr.orgcfr.org. Includes
timeline and analysis of the Iran–Saudi proxy struggle.
8). United Nations Security Council. Security Council Press Release SC/11859 (14 Apr 2015). Report on Resolution 2216.
Summarizes the Council’s call for all parties (esp. Houthis) to end violence and withdraw from seized area-spress.un.org.
Primary source for UNSC action in Yemen.
9). Haddad, Mohammed. “Yemen’s war explained in maps and charts.” Al Jazeera (Feb 2022). An interactive feature with
infographics on Yemen. Key gures cited: 377,000 estimated war deaths (UN)-aljazeera.com, over 24,000 coalition air
strikes-aljazeera.com, and note on Iranian support to Houthis-aljazeera.com. Useful visuals and statistics.
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10). Suhrke, Astri, and Antonio De Lauri. “The CIA’s ‘Army’: A Threat to Human Rights and an Obstacle to Peace in
Afghanistan” (Watson Institute, 2019). A research report documenting U.S. proxy militias in Afghanistan, noting they began
in 2001 and “are still running” two decades later-watson.brown.edu, and detailing their human rights abuses. Key source on
U.S. proxies in Afghanistan.
11). Guardian News. “What is Lashkar-e-Taiba and is it supported by Pakistan?” (2022). Overview of Lashkar-e-Taiba:
history, designation as a terrorist group, and Pakistan’s ties to it. Quotes security analysts con rming that LeT became a
“favoured ward” of Pakistan’s ISI and received generous training/ nancing-theguardian.com. Background for the Pakistan/
Kashmir case.
12). Columbia News. “How the U.S. supported rebels in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria” (2021). Interview with historian Erica
Gaston. States that “over the last two decades, the U.S. has supported a range of militias, rebels, and other armed groups in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria”-news.columbia.edu, and discusses the dangers of such programs. Context for U.S. proxy use.
13). International Court of Justice. “Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment of 1986.”
The ICJ’s landmark ruling holding that U.S. support for Nicaraguan Contras violated the prohibition on force. Key passages:
the US was “in breach of its obligations…not to use force…not to intervene…not to violate [Nicaragua’s] sovereignty-
en.wikipedia.org. Foundational legal precedent on proxy intervention.
14) Waxman, Matthew C. “Legal Limits on Military Assistance to Proxy Forces.” Just Security (2021). A legal analysis
discussing how international law attributes responsibility for aiding proxies. Highlights state responsibility (Articles 16
ARSIWA) and ICRC commentary. Useful for understanding attribution tests. (See especially discussion of Article 16 and
Geneva Common Article 1-justsecurity.org.)
15) Wilson Center – Wahba Institute. “Iran’s Islamist Proxies in the Middle East” (Ashley Lane, 2023). Summarizes Iran’s
network of over a dozen major militias (Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi and Syrian militias, Houthis, etc.) and the U.S. sanctions
targeting them. Contains a proxy-map graphic (not reproduced here) and statistics on funding (e.g. $700m/year to Hezbollah)-
wilsoncenter.org. Provides regional context on Iran’s proxy strategy.
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The End