CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the review of related literature as well as theoretical framework. The

content include political violence, The Impact of Violence and Insecurity on Electoral

Participation, the Impact of Violence and Insecurity on Electoral Participation, Causes of

political violence, The implications of political conflict and electoral violence on national

security, strategies to Mitigate Political Violence, and Theoretical Framework.

2.1 Conceptual Clarification

2.1.1 Political Violence

There are scholars who perceive violence in terms of the use of force against persons and

objects. For example, Corsini (1999) defines violence as the manifestation of hostility and

rage through physical force directed against persons or property. Degenaar’s view is that

violence is ‘the intentional application of extreme force against another person in such a way

that it is destructive of objects and physically injurious to animals and persons’ (2004). There

are also scholars who perceive violence as the illegitimate use of force. Electoral violence

therefore is a form of anomic participation in the political process (Elaigwu, 2006). In

furtherance of this position, Ilufoye, Ogundiya& Baba (2005) see electoral violence is a

limited aspect of political violence that is associated with the process of elections. They

reason that forms of political violence occur before, during and after elections. The term

electoral violence therefore can be construed to mean any act of violence perpetrated in the

course of political activities, including pre, during and post-election periods, and may include

any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at

polling stations, or use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process,

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or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with the electoral processes (cited

in Ladan, 2006). Fischer (2002) defines electoral violence as any random or organized act

that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat,

verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced “protection,”

blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination.

2.1.2 The Impact of Violence and Insecurity on Electoral Participation

The relevance of an election in democratic settings cannot be overemphasized. Election

contributes significantly to the democratic system of governance conducted through the

auspices of representative government. A periodic election ensures continuity in governance

by helping to resolve the challenge of leadership succession in a democratic setup. The

instrumentality of elections thus helps the citizenry to choose their representative in

government as well as hold them to account for their stewardship. Citizens’ participation in

the process of election instills a sense of self- esteem, political worth and usefulness to the

political system. The right to participate in an election and the power to refrain from doing so

can be an expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the political system or process of

election. Four conditions required for the conduct of free and fair elections were identified by

Mackenzie (1964) to include an autonomous judiciary; an honest, nonpartisan and competent

electoral management body; an established political party system and the acceptance of the

guiding electoral principles by the general political community. The electoral system is the

institutionalized provision that ensures that the conduct of elections meets the stipulated legal

requirements for electoral activities. These include the registration of voters and the

administration of the entire process of elections (Roberts, 1971). A country’s electoral system

performs these significant functions for ensuring the shaping and sustenance of the behaviour

of the citizenry in the political system (Okolo, 2002). The electoral process has been

categorized into three significant groupings; these includebefore the election activity (polling

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centre delimitation, registration of voters’, political party registration, the nomination of

candidates, the processes of campaigns, media activities, voter education, etc.); during the

election activity ( management of polling stations, secret balloting, ballot boxes, and ballot

papers, materials for the election, counting the votes, monitoring of elections, etc.); and after

the election activity (announcing the results, after election assessment, and disputes arising

from the conduct of the election (Sisk2008, UNDP 2009, Adoke 2011). To a great extent, the

level of a society’s culture of politics, participation, and governance are determinants of the

type of electoral conduct and contest in that society. However, whatever feat that is attained

would be dependent on how effective and efficient the electoral system is. Though regularly

conducted elections have increased the hope of achieving credibility, stability and democratic

consolidation, the trend of violent activities related to elections is a worrisome threat to these

expectations (Lindberg 2008; Campbell, 2010). Scholars the world over have initiated studies

to determine the nexus between violence and democratic engagement by appraising the

influence of violence on individual attitudes. Bergman (2006) averred that the rise of violent

activities poses a serious threat to the institutions of democracy worldwide.

According to (Nwolise 2007), electoral violence epitomizes any planned action that

encompasses physical, psychological, and structural threats directed at either to intimidate,

harm, blackmail or pressure a candidate for political office. This action could be before the

election, during the election or after. This action is directed at influencing and subverting the

otherwise fairness of the electoral process (Nwolise 2007). In terms of motivation, violence is

usually intended to influence the outcome of an election. The specific type of violence

employed can take a variety of forms, but it is temporally close to Election Day. The

perpetrators of violence are generally actors who have a vested interest in the election

outcome, such as members of the state security apparatus (police, military, etc.), militias that

are loyal to particular parties, and rank-and-file party supporters. For this subject, electoral

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violence can be “understood as a coercive force, directed towards electoral actors or objects

that occur in the context of electoral competition… [It] can occur before, during or after

elections and it can target a variety of actors, including candidates, activists, poll workers,

election observers, journalists and voters (Birch &Muchlinski forthcoming, in Taylor 2018, p.

8). Electoral violence has also been seen as any action that overtly threatens the physical and

psychological structure of the human being resulting in any form of damage or harm directed

at political events, electoral materials, and electoral actors including, the destruction of

property (IFES, 2011). From the foregoing, violence associated with electoral activities can

be construed as acts directed overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly to actors in the

electoral process aimed at undermining election processes. The objective of agents of

electoral violence is to influence the processes of elections unduly and to gain an advantage

over other political rivals or opponents.

2.1.3 Causes of political violence

i. Absence of a tolerant political culture: “The winner takes it all” modus operandi of

Nigeria cum “do or die” political affairs bread intolerance and ready to go out to get it

no matter the means. In such milieu, the deliberate intention and consequences of acts

of violence are premeditated in various ways- to either manipulate the whole process of

the election or to use manipulative means like coercion to induce voters to vote against

their will.

ii. Godfatherism and party politics: Some political parties are incapable of organizing

themselves in line with democratic requirements for electoral conduct. This challenge

introduces tension and hostilities into the electoral system practice as some political

elites regarded as godfathers take over control of the parties and influence their

decisions. These political godfathers influence the choice of party delegates who vote to

select leaders of the parties as well as candidates at the party’s primaries (Nkwede,

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 Ibeogu & Nwankwo, 2014). By controlling the delegates, the godfathers decide who

should become the party’s leaders as well who gets the nomination to contest for

elective positions.

iii. Sit-tight syndrome: In Africa and specifically Nigeria, Leaders enjoy the benefits of

governance and therefore are most times reluctant to leave the position. Violent

activities occur in situations where it is envisaged that there is the probability of

replacing the incumbent leadership of a state and where such incumbent is not ready to

relinquish power. This scenario could be as a result of the dominance of one party or

the attitude of intolerance of opposition.

iv. The nature of the electoral and party system: These are key factors that can exacerbate

or moderate the occurrence of violence in the process of an election since they directly

affect the character and political ideology of the party. The level to which these systems

are viewed as just, equitable, inclusive, and democratic may control or mitigate the

likelihood of eruption of violence.

v. The administration of elections by electoral bodies: Electoral management bodies play

significant roles in ensuring the effective management of elections and ensuring

credibility, fairness and success of elections. If such a body behaves in a manner that

cast doubts on the otherwise fairness and credibility of an election, the ensuing

reactions and discontents may result in conflict when election results are declared.

2.1.4 Incidence of Political Violence in Nigeria

Political violence has been endemic feature of many developing countries like Nigeria (Ogar

et al, 2018). It was a great achievement that Nigeria attained her independence with minimum

violence, but is worrisome that since after independence, political violence has reached a

dangerous dimension. It is imperative to note that political violence associated with election

and electoral processes in Nigeria commenced with the 1959 federal elections designed by

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British to facilitate the transition from colonial rule to independence (Ogundiya & Baba

2005). This problem worsened in the elections held immediately after independence in 1960s.

In Western Region, political violence popularly referred to as “Operation “Wete” were

recorded in 1964 to 1965 following both federal and regional elections as well as rift between

Awolowo and Akintola (Aver, Nnorom & Targba, 2013, p. 263).

There were also political violence in parts of Northern Region especially between the

supporters of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and supporters of other parties, mainly

the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and Action Group (Aver et al, 2013).

Another political violence that emerged after independence was the military coup of January

1966, where a group of young Nigerian army of officers seized power and assassinated the

then Prime Minister Tafawa Belawa, Amadu Bello and Ladoke Akintola Premiers of

Northern and Western regions respectively. This military coup led to political violence that

caused the Nigerian civil war 1966-70. Following a protracted military rule that lasted for

thirteen years, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime carried out a transistion programme and returned

the country to civil rule in 1979 (Alfa & Otaida 2012, p.46) The 1979 election witnessed

minimal cases of violence. According to Nwolise (2007) “the election was characterized by

violence at three stages pre-election, during the election and post election. In almost all the

states, the results were contested or disputed.” The major contending issue was that of 2/3 of

19 states which was resolved in favour of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, NPN presidential candidate

by the Supreme Court (Alfa & Otaida 2012:15).

The 1983 elections were not devoid of violence. The election was rigged in favour of ruling

party, the National Party of Nigeria, (NPN). This led to violent demonstrations in some parts

of the country. For example the landslide victory of the National Party of Nigeria NPN in

Oyo and Ondo States considered to be stronghold of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)

witnessed massive post-election violence. Several persons lost their lives and large scale

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destruction of property was recorded (Alemika 2011). The violent political activities in the

country contributed to the overthrow of Shagari’s regime on 31st December, 1983. In what

could have ushered in the third republic by Babangida designed in 1993, was however

aborted by the June 12 1993 annulled presidential election which created chaotic situation in

the country (Alfa & Otaida, 2012, p.46). The cancellation of the election led to massive

ethno-religious conflicts in the country. Babangida stepped down in August 1993 which led

to the formation of an interim government headed by Chief Shonekan. The interim

government was dismissed following “the palace coup” led by General Sani Abacha.

Abacha’s regime was beset with oppressive policies and assassination of his political

enemies. Chief among these was the murder of Mrs Kudirat Abiola, wife of the acclaimed

winner of the June 1993, presidential poll annulled by Babangida (Alfa & Otaida 2012, p.47).

Later Abacha died mysteriously in the process of trying to “transform himself into a civilian

President. General Abubakar who replaced Abacha supervised 1999 elections that ushered in

the Fourth Republic on May 29th 1999. There were high expectations that the nascent

democracy would help to reduce the menace of political violence in the country. It is

worrisome that since the return of civil rule, Nigeria has witnessed unprecedented level of

political violence which militates against economic and social transformation of the country.

For example, the introduction of Sharia law in Zamfara State which spread to other Northern

States led to massive killing of people from Southern Nigeria and their corpses were brought

back to their respective states. There were also reprisal attacks in some places such as

Okigwe, Owerri and Aba. In Kwara State, supporters of the governor and leading

gubernatorial candidate were involved in violent conflict which resulted in the killing of the

state party chairman in August 2002. Other prominent politicians that lost their lives due to

political violence include Chief Bola Ige of AD while serving as minister under PDP’s

government, Chief Harry Marshal, Vice Chairman of All Nigerian People Party, South-

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South, Asari Dikibo, Vice Chairman of PDP, South South, Luke Shigaba, Chairman of Bassa

Local Government Area, Kogi State (Osisioma, 2007). An unprecedented political violence

took place in Anambra State on 10th July 2003, when the former Governor of Anambra State

was kidnapped with the intention of forcing him out of power. This plot was executed by the

late Assistant Inspector General of Police Mr. Raphael Ige who later claimed he acted on the

basis of an “order from above” though the principal actors to such act remain unknown till

today (Adeleke, 2012).

Political violence associated with election was massive in 2007. There were violent political

activities in different parts of the country. According to Adele (2012, p.211): In River-State, a

police station was attacked and burnt by unknown assailants a night before the election date.

In Anambra and Rivers State voters were faced with intimidation and violence. In Ekiti State,

there was confrontation between PDP and Action Congress supporters and election results

were blatantly falsified in many areas. Violence was equally reported in Northern State of

Kastina where opposition supporters burnt down government building in protest as the

announcement that PDP had swept the state’s gubernatorial polls. Soldiers clash with angry

voters in Nasarawa State. In Oyo State, PDP thugs beat up opposition party officials and

hijacked ballot boxes. The declaration of 2011 presidential election result in which president

Goodluck Jonathan emerged as the winner led to violent demonstrations in northern parts of

country. The supporters of Congress of Progressive Change (CPC) unleashed violent protests

and destroyed properties worth of millions of naira. The house of the Vice President Namadi

Sambo was looted and raised and palaces of prominent traditional rulers in the North were

attacked (Alfa & Otaida 2012, p.48). The activities of Boko Haram in the Fourth Republic

have also a serious security threat to our country. The crisis is assuming a dangerous

dimension. The Boko Haram has unleashed grievous attacks on places of worship, media

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houses, markets, parks, telecommunication facilities etc in many northern states. In the

process, a lot of lives and properties worth millions of naira have been lost.

2.1.5 The implications of political conflict and electoral violence on national security

There abounds various implications of political conflicts and they include; i. Ethnic tension

and crisis: election is always characterized with the employment of ethnicity, superiority,

marginalization and secession discussion this therefore, could be triggered during election to

cause civil war and crisis. ii. Lives and property loss. The amount of property been lost or

damaged during election and the lives expounded to violence could increase if not properly

checked. In the 2015 election 100 lives were officially lost and in the 2019 election 150 lives

were being pronounced lost. (Datawrapper 2022) iii. False democracy: though election alone

does not make government work optimally, the amount of loyalty given to government who

get power illegally affects the peoples input into the government. The distrust the people have

in the government makes them lose faith in the government. iv. Overall development of the

country is affected: it has been noted that various elements employed during election to cause

crisis move further to carry out vices and operations on their own hereby causing havoc to the

state. v. Social interrelationship: the violence negates peaceful coexistence and reduce the

respect individuals have for each other Lives. In a society whereby lives can easily be taken,

crime escalation and vices will follow suit.

vi. Overall escalation of conflict: the tension during election crisis and violence could

instigate wider conflicts between or amongst various groups. The loser and the winner

conflict might escalate into full grown national crisis.

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2.1.6 Strategies to Mitigate Political Violence

2.1.6.1 Strengthening Institutions

Enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies to act impartially and effectively is

crucial to prevent and respond to political violence (Smith, 2004). This includes providing

law enforcement personnel with comprehensive training on human rights and conflict

resolution, as well as ensuring accountability mechanisms are in place to monitor abuses.

Judicial reforms are also essential, not only to ensure speedy and fair trials for perpetrators of

violence but to enhance the public's trust in the judicial system. This might involve the

appointment of more judges to reduce case backlogs, the enhancement of witness protection

programs, and increased access to legal aid for the underprivileged. Additionally,

international cooperation and capacity building can further strengthen institutions by sharing

best practices and supporting anti-corruption measures, thus building a stronger rule of law

(Johnson, 2008).

2.1.4.2 Promoting Economic Development

Economic disenfranchisement is a significant driver of political violence, and creating

economic opportunities can be an effective deterrent. This strategy focuses on providing

vocational training programs that are directly linked to the needs of the local and global

markets, thereby enhancing employability, particularly among the youth. Support for small

and medium enterprises (SMEs) is crucial as these are often major job creators. This can be

achieved through easier access to credit, business incubation centers, and subsidies for

technology upgrades that can make local businesses more competitive. Further initiatives

might include public-private partnerships to create jobs and stimulate economic growth,

particularly in underdeveloped areas prone to conflict. This approach not only provides

livelihoods but also ties economic growth directly to the stability of the region (Miller, 2010).

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2.1.4.3 Enhancing Social Cohesion

Mitigating political violence through enhanced social cohesion involves creating

environments where diverse communities can coexist peacefully. Programs that foster inter-

ethnic and inter-religious dialogue and understanding can play a pivotal role. These might

include community forums, cultural exchange programs, and collaborative projects involving

diverse groups to build mutual respect and understanding. Education campaigns can further

enhance this by incorporating curricula that emphasize the values of democracy, tolerance,

and peaceful coexistence, targeting schools, universities, and public media. Such campaigns

can be supported by local influencers and public figures to increase their reach and impact

(Higazi, 2011). Building on this foundation, governments can implement policies that ensure

equitable access to resources and services, thereby addressing some of the root grievances

that lead to conflict. Regular and structured engagements among community leaders can also

provide ongoing dialogue opportunities to preemptively resolve tensions (Thompson, 2015).

2.2 Theoretical framework

Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation (1980) expounds on political violence. The

centrality of the theory rest on the fact that frustration-aggression mechanism is analogous to

the law of gravity; men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its

source in proportion to the intensity of their frustration, just as objects are attracted to one

another in direct proportion to their relative masses (Dungan, 2004). According to the

theorist, the main cause of human capacity for violence is frustration- aggression mechanism.

This means that “unfulfilled expectations create relative deprivation gab between

expectations and capabilities” In other words, when someone or group of people have the

perception of their ability or right to something (goal), if prevented from attaining such goals,

the result is frustration which will in turn generate aggressive behaviour that will snowball to

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violence (Ojo, 2014). Therefore, in Nigeria if an individual or group of people is prevented

from achieving their expected goals like joining public office, it could lead to frustration and

aggressive behaviour which may result in political violence (Ogar et el, 2016). The

Frustration Aggression theory is accredited to Dollard and colleagues. The theory was

developed in 1939 when Dollard and colleagues published a monograph on aggression,

which later was known as the frustration-aggression theory.

2.2.1 Assumptions of the Theory

• Aggression is always the consequence of frustration

• The occurrence of aggressive actions always presumes the existence of frustration and

contra wise, and that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of

aggression.

• Frustration aggression reflects the reasons for electoral violence because men who

want to live beyond their social means do not accept their limitation in defeat this

results into violence as the last resort in order to live beyond their social means.

• Frustration and aggression comes into play when a certain aspirant is power hungry

and possibly realizes the indications that he/she may possibly lose to the rival, thereby

adopting vehemence for their own personal gains

2.2.2 Criticism of the Theory

Despite its extensive application, Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation faces several

criticisms. Firstly, the theory assumes a direct link between frustration and aggression which

oversimplifies the human psychological response to deprivation. Humans are capable of

exhibiting a range of responses to frustration beyond aggression, such as withdrawal,

depression, or non-violent activism (Bandura, 1973). The theory underestimates the role of

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mediation by individual psychological factors, cultural norms, and the effectiveness of the

governance systems in place which might dissipate or redirect aggressive impulses.

Furthermore, the theory can be criticized for its deterministic nature, implying that violence is

an inevitable response to deprivation. This overlooks the agency of individuals and

communities that might choose peaceful methods to resolve conflicts or address grievances.

It also fails to adequately account for instances where individuals or groups do not resort to

violence despite experiencing significant deprivation.

Moreover, the linear relationship proposed by the theory between frustration and aggression

does not sufficiently incorporate the role of ideological, ethnic, or religious motivations that

can significantly influence the nature and manifestation of political violence. These elements

can sometimes overshadow pure socio-economic frustrations.

2.2.3 Relevance to the Study of Political Violence in Gombe State

Despite these criticisms, Gurr’s theory remains highly relevant to the study of political

violence in Gombe State from 1999 to 2023. Gombe State, like many regions in Nigeria, has

experienced various forms of political violence, often influenced by unmet expectations and

perceived injustices. The theory provides a valuable framework for understanding the root

causes of such violence, particularly in contexts where economic disparities and political

exclusion are prevalent.

Applying Gurr’s theory, researchers can examine how the frustration-aggression link

manifests in the political context of Gombe State. For instance, the competition for scarce

resources and political power in the state might lead to heightened expectations and

subsequent frustrations when these expectations are thwarted. This framework can guide the

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analysis of specific incidents of political violence by looking at the antecedents in terms of

unfulfilled socio-political and economic expectations (Ogar et al., 2016).

Additionally, the theory can illuminate the pathways through which political leaders and

stakeholders might manipulate public perceptions and expectations, potentially inciting

violence for personal or group gain. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing

targeted interventions aimed at reducing political violence through more inclusive

governance and equitable distribution of resources.

In conclusion, while Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation has its limitations in explaining the

multi-dimensional nature of human behavior and the complex socio-political landscapes in

which political violence occurs, it nonetheless offers a robust starting point for analyzing the

phenomena within specific contexts like Gombe State. By integrating this theory with other

sociological and psychological frameworks, a more comprehensive understanding of the

causative factors behind political violence in the region can be achieved, paving the way for

effective mitigation strategies.

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