Introduction to Philosophy
Lecture 2
PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE –
CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM
Nihel Jhou
周先捷
Cartesian Skepticism - opening questions
2
How do you know that you are not dreaming right at this
moment? How do you know that the world you perceive
and understand is not just an illusion?
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
Cartesian Skepticism
3
Distinguish:
How do you know the way the world really is? (Epistemology)
What is the way the world really is? (Ontology)
Given that the world is in fact the way we believe it to be,
how can we justify our beliefs about the way the world
really is?
We are not questioning the truth of (our beliefs about) the world,
but our justification of our beliefs.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
Question 1
4
How do you know that you are not dreaming right at this
moment?
By knowing the distinction between being dreaming and being
awake?
Is it sufficient? What if we never woke up? What if we’re awake in
another level of dream?
Does this unlikely possibility impact our knowledge of being awake?
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
Question 2
5
If you don’t know that you are not dreaming right at this
moment, can you know that you have hands?
Are some knowledge more fundamental than others?
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The issues:
11
Does knowledge require completely certain and
indubitable belief / justification?
Do we have any justification that is so certain that our belief cannot
be false?
Are there foundations of knowledge? If so, what are
they?
Textbooks? Testimonies? Sensory experiences? Physics? Math?
Logic?
Do we have knowledge about the external world at all?
Cartesian skepticism
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
Theses in response to the issues
Descartes, “the 1st & 2nd Meditations”
12
Knowledge requires completely
certain and indubitable belief /
justification. (Infallibilism)
Knowledge is built upon certain
foundations. (Foundationalism)
We don’t have knowledge about
the external world. (Cartesian
skepticism)
But I know I exist as long as I René Descartes (1596 – 1650)
think.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
Methodological Skepticism:
seeking indubitable foundations of knowledge
13
Many beliefs we took to be true turn
out to be false, and hence beliefs built
upon them are doubtful.
We should withhold our assent no less
carefully from opinions that are not
completely certain and indubitable
than we would from those that are
patently false.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
More on Infallibilism
14
Knowledge, a belief with complete certainty: the
justification guarantees the truth.
Justification rules out possibilities where the belief is false.
If x+1=2, then x=1.
But a posteriori justification of empirical beliefs cannot be
deductive.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
More on Infallibilism
15
Knowledge, a belief with complete certainty: the
justification guarantees the truth.
Justification rules out possibilities where the belief is false.
Fact: I have hairs. Belief: ‘I have hairs.’ Evidence: seeing.
A possibility: I’m in Matrix and I don’t have hairs.
Were I in this possible world, I might still believe it.
So, were I in this possible world, I wouldn’t notice.
So there is no way to rule out this possibility.
So I don’t have knowledge.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The inaccuracy argument
16
Many beliefs we considered most true
are received either from the senses or
through the senses.
There are students in front of me.
However, senses are sometimes
deceptive.
Limitation (size & distance), illusion, &
hallucination.
Is there still something right?
I am wearing jeans.
A peripheral drift illusion by Paul Nasca
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The dream argument
17
There are no definitive signs by which I can distinguish being
awake from being asleep.
There are students in front of me.
Perhaps I am dreaming, and hence what I believe is false.
I am opening my eyes, moving my head, extending my hands, or even have
a body.
Therefore I am not justified in believing that I am now in a
classroom, even if this belief happens to be true.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
A response
18
Is there still something right?
Concrete things have size and color, 2+3=5, a square does not have
more than 4 sides.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The evil genius argument
19
1. Perhaps, there could be an evil
genius, supremely powerful
and clever, who is devoted to
deceiving me -- it could be
that earth, extended things,
2+3=5 shape, place, etc. are non-
existent, and 2+3 != 5, a
2+3=5
square has more than 4 sides,
2+3=5
2+3=5 etc.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The evil genius argument
20
2. My beliefs / experience would
stay the same with or without
an evil genius -- there is no
way to rule out the
counterfactual possibility.
2+3=5
2+3=5
Therefore I am not justified in
2+3=5
believing that 2+3=5, even if
2+3=5
this belief happens to be true.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
A brain in a vat: more questions
21
Olivia Walch
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
What cannot be deceived
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Is it then the case that I too do not exist?
An evil genius deceiving me? Then there is no doubt that
I exist, if he is deceiving me.
This pronouncement “I am, I exist” is necessarily true
every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The nature of “I”
23
What about thinking?
Thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me.
I am; I exist – for as long as I am thinking.
I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that
is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason. (It’s
not a brain.)
“Am I dreaming?”
“Is there Evil Genius?”
“Do I exist?” Note: my thoughts
may be wrong, but it’s
a fact that I am having
these thoughts
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
The world
24
In the 1st and 2nd meditations: we don’t yet have
knowledge about the external world. (Cartesian
skepticism)
In the 3rd and 4th meditations: there is a way of justifying
our knowledge about the external world. (It may not be
as successful as Descartes thought.)
Still, the world is less known than the mind.
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
Now Think
25
Given that there are necessary truths like 2+3=5, can the
evil genius really deceive us about them? Does Cartesian
skepticism really depend on such ability of the evil
genius?
IntroPhil - Lecture 2 (Nihel Jhou)
