United Nations S/2013/99*

Security Council Distr.: General

9 March 2013

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 10 (d) of resolution 2040 (2012), the Security Council requested

the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) to provide a
final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.
Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report dated 15 February 2013
received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).

* Reissued for technical reasons on 12 April 2013.

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Annex
Letter dated 15 February 2013 from the Panel of Experts on Libya
established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the
President of the Security Council

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to

Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the
report of the Panel prepared in accordance with paragraph 10 (d) of resolution 2040
(2012).

(Signed) Salim Raad

Coordinator
Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to
resolution 1973 (2011)
(Signed) Simon Dilloway
Expert
(Signed) Theodore Murphy
Expert
(Signed) Giovanna Perri
Expert
(Signed) Savannah de Tessières
Expert

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Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to

resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya

Contents
Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Mandate and appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
D. Political and security context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II. Implementation of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Challenges to countering weapons proliferation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Security and disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C. Transfers of military materiel to Libya during the revolution in support of the parties
to the conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
D. Transfers of materiel leaving Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
III. Travel ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
IV. Implementation of the asset freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A. General overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B. Monitoring the asset freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
C. Listed entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
D. Listed individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
E. Investigations in progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
F. Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
V. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A. Arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
B. Travel ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C. Assets freeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Annexes
I. Countries visited by the Panel during the mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
II. List of institutions and individuals consulted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
III. Panel official outgoing correspondence log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
IV. Level of responsiveness to requests for information from the Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

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V. Rebuttal from the State of Qatar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

VI. Export licence delivered by the Albanian authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
VII. Delivery verification certificate from the United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
VIII. End-user certificate Ukraine-United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
IX. Ayk Avia flight plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
X. Arms and ammunition from Libya confiscated by the Tunisian authorities in 2011 and 2012. . . 74
XI. Cases of violations of the arms embargo reported to the Panel by the Algerian authorities 75
between April 2011 and March 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
XII. Letfallah II registry certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
XIII. Arms and ammunition seized on board the Letfallah II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
XIV. Pictures of different types of materiel seized on board the Letfallah II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
XV. Guidance on the notification of exemptions to the asset freeze measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
XVI. Council of Minister’s Decision No. 34 of 2012, predicated on Law No. 87 of 1971 . . . . . . . . . 88
XVII. Saadi Qadhafi financial association chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
XVIII. False Malian identification and passport of Abdullah Al-Senussi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

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Summary
The final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1973 (2011), and extended pursuant to resolution 2040 (2012),
presents an analysis of the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution
1970 (2011), including the arms embargo and asset freeze, and the modifications
contained in subsequent resolutions — 1973 (2011), 2009 (2011), 2016 (2011) and
2040 (2012), respectively — for the period since its appointment on 18 April 2012
until the date of the present report. The report also outlines the Panel’s findings and
presents eight recommendations to the Security Council, the Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, the Government of Libya and
other Member States to improve the implementation of the relevant measures. The
Panel also seeks to highlight instances of non-compliance based on substantiated
data and information obtained.
The Panel’s assessment is based on information received from Member States,
relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties
during the period under review. The Panel also conducted several assessment trips to
Libya and the subregion during the period, where it met key stakeholders, including
the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. The Panel visited 15 countries and
travelled to Libya 10 times.
The consultations held with individuals, regional organizations and relevant
United Nations bodies, coupled with the information received from various Member
States, afforded the Panel the opportunity to obtain extensive information in
pursuance of its mandate, including on the evolution of the political and security
context in Libya and its impact on the subregion.

Implementation of the arms embargo

Some notable efforts notwithstanding, most of the challenges to the
implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo highlighted in the Panel’s
previous report persist today. Most Libyan stockpiles remain under the control of
non-State actors, while the State security sector, in particular with regard to border
control management, continues to be rebuilt.
In the past 12 months, the proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at
a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and,
potentially, the Horn of Africa. Cases of illicit transfers from Libya, both proven and
under investigation, include trafficking by land and sea to more than 12 countries.
Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts and enriching the
arsenals of a range of non-State actors in the region and beyond.
In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2009 (2011), a number of Member
States have notified the Committee of transfers of military materiel and other security-
related support to the Libyan authorities for security assistance. The Panel is, however,
concerned by the absence of any official procurement mechanism within Libya and by
the transfers of lethal materiel to end users whose identities remain unclear.
The Panel has continued to investigate cases of transfers of arms and
ammunition to Libya during the uprising and has secured additional evidence of
violations of the embargo during that period. The Panel is also investigating cases of
materiel that entered Libya in breach of the embargo more recently.

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Implementation of the asset freeze

In accordance with the provisions of resolution 2040 (2012), while maintaining
the asset freeze imposed by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), as modified by
resolution 2009 (2011), the Security Council directed the Committee, in consultation
with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining asset freeze
measures imposed by those resolutions with regard to the Libyan Investment
Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and to delist those entities as
soon as practical to ensure that their assets were made available to and for the benefit
of the people of Libya.
The focus of the Panel’s efforts regarding the asset freeze measures has been
directed towards the hidden assets of the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan
Africa Investment Portfolio and the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company and
towards the assets of the listed individuals, most of which are believed to be held
abroad in various names. A single body has now been created by the Government of
Libya to coordinate repatriation of such assets and is cooperating well with the
Panel.
In this regard, substantial information has been gathered regarding efforts by
certain designated individuals to negate the effects of the asset freeze measures by
the use of front companies and through accomplices in various Member States who
have been assisting them to that end. Further enquiries into these cases are
continuing with the assistance of a number of Member States.
Furthermore, the Panel continues to assist the Committee in gathering,
examining and analysing information regarding the implementation of the sanctions
measures, in particular incidents of non-compliance. In this regard, in terms of the
effective implementation of the asset freeze measures, one Member State has been
identified by the Panel as having failed to comply with the measures. Enquiries
continue into the implementation by other Member States that are strongly suspected
of similar failures.

Travel ban
The Panel continued to seek further details on all travel ban violations, with a
particular focus in this period on Saadi Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, the chief
of the Libyan Intelligence Service under the Qadhafi regime.

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I. Background
1. By resolution 1970 (2011), the Security Council expressed grave concern at
the situation in Libya, condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and
deplored the gross and systematic violation of human rights. Within that context, the
Council imposed specific measures on Libya, under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, including the arms embargo, which relates to arms and related
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, in
addition to the provision of armed mercenary personnel. The arms embargo covers
both arms entering and leaving Libya. The Council also imposed a travel ban and/or
an asset freeze on the individuals listed in the resolution. Furthermore, the Council
decided that the travel ban and the asset freeze were to apply to the individuals and
entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)
concerning Libya involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling or otherwise
directing the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya.
2. By resolution 1973 (2011), the Security Council strengthened the enforcement
of the arms embargo and expanded the scope of the asset freeze to include the
exercise of vigilance when doing business with Libyan entities, if States had
information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that such business could
contribute to violence and use of force against civilians. Additional individuals
subject to the travel ban and asset freeze were listed in the resolution, in addition to
five entities subject to the freeze. The Council decided that both measures were to
apply also to individuals and entities determined to have violated the provisions of
the previous resolution, in particular the provisions concerning the arms embargo.
The resolution also included the authorization to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. In addition, it included a no-fly zone
in the airspace of Libya and a ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.
3. On 24 June 2011, the Committee designated two additional individuals and
one additional entity subject to the targeted measures. By resolution 2009 (2011),
the Security Council introduced additional exceptions to the arms embargo and
removed two listed entities subject to the asset freeze, while allowing the four
remaining listed entities to be subjected to a partial asset freeze. It also lifted the
ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.
4. By resolution 2016 (2011), the Security Council terminated the authorization
related to the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone. On 16 December 2011, the
Committee removed the names of two entities previously subject to the asset freeze.
5. In resolution 2040 (2012), the Council directed the Committee, in consultation
with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining measures with
regard to the two listed entities — the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan
Africa Investment Portfolio — and decided that the Committee was, in consultation
with the Libyan authorities, to lift the designation of those entities as soon as
practical.
6. During the reporting period, the Committee approved two implementation
assistance notices, both relating to the arms embargo, and a notice concerning the
asset freeze was issued on 7 March 2012. The notices are available on the
Committee’s website.

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A. Mandate and appointment

7. By resolution 2040 (2012), the Security Council decided to extend and modify
the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)
for a period of one year, and with the number of experts reduced from eight to a
maximum of five, to carry out the following tasks: to assist the Committee in
carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011); to
gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations
bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the
implementation of the measures decided upon in resolution 1970 (2011), 1973
(2011) and 2009 (2011), in particular incidents of non-compliance; to make
recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, the Libyan authorities
or other States might consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;
and to provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days
after its appointment and a final report no later than 30 days prior to the termination
of its mandate with its findings and recommendations.
8. The Council also encouraged the Panel, while mindful of the responsibility of
the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to assist the Libyan
authorities to counter illicit proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all
types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and to secure and manage
Libya’s borders, to continue its investigations regarding sanctions non-compliance,
including illicit transfers of arms and related materiel to and from Libya and the
assets of individuals subject to the asset freeze established in resolutions 1970
(2011) and 1973 (2011) and modified in resolution 2009 (2011), and encouraged
UNSMIL and the Libyan authorities to support Panel investigatory work inside
Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to
weapons storage facilities, as appropriate.
9. While resolution 2040 (2012) was adopted on 12 March 2012, the experts were
reappointed only on 18 April. The delay in circulating the names of the nominated
individuals, together with the normal administrative processing time, effectively
reduced the Panel’s working period from 12 to 11 months. The Panel consists of two
arms experts, two finance experts and one regional expert.

B. Methodology

10. Following the renewal of its mandate, the Panel agreed on 18 April to adopt
the methodology set out below, consistent with its past approach.
11. The Panel is determined to ensure compliance with the standards
recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General
Issues of Sanctions in its report (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on
verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the
experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection
is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple,
independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a
higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations where
identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the
Panel will withhold identifying information and place the relevant evidence in
United Nations secure archives.

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12. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of

non-compliance by any party.
13. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will
endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any
information available in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their
review, comment and response within a specified deadline. To further uphold the
right of reply and in the interest of accuracy, the Panel will consider annexing to its
reports any rebuttals, with a summary and assessment of their credibility.
14. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any efforts to
undermine its impartiality and any attempts to create a perception of bias.

C. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations

15. Since its appointment on 18 April 2012, the Panel has undertaken 28 visits to
15 Member States in Africa, Europe and the Middle East, including 10 visits to
Libya (see annex I to the present report). During its visits to Libya, the Panel
travelled to Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. Towards the end of the reporting period,
the Panel faced restrictions on its movements outside Tripoli owing to logistical
difficulties and the degradation of the security situation in the country.
16. Within the region, the Panel travelled to Algeria, Chad, Egypt, the Niger,
Nigeria and Tunisia, where it met relevant representatives of national authorities,
foreign diplomatic missions, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations and civil society. During its visits to Ethiopia and Kenya, the Panel
participated in workshops on United Nations sanctions. The Panel also travelled to
Albania, Belgium, Israel, Lebanon, Malta and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, where it met the relevant authorities to obtain information in
furtherance of its mandate, including through on-site inspections (see annex II to the
present report).
17. The Panel travelled to New York on three occasions, during which it presented
its interim report to the Committee and participated in an open briefing organized by
the Chair of the Committee. While in New York, the Panel also met representatives
of the permanent missions to the United Nations of 22 Member States. The Panel
also travelled to Washington, D.C., where a meeting was held with the Libya teams
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and another with the
Department of State of the Government of the United States of America.
18. The Panel has sent 150 official communications since 18 April 2012 (see
annex III to the present report). The degree of responsiveness of Member States to
requests for information has varied, with some providing a comprehensive and
timely response, others less so and some not at all (see annex IV to the present
report).
19. The Panel has encountered delays in obtaining responses by some Member
States to its visit requests. The main reason given was a delay in communication and
decision-making within national institutions. The Panel appreciates that its long-
standing visit requests to Algeria and Chad received a positive response in the
current reporting period. The Panel looks forward to visiting Mali in the near future.
The Panel is grateful for the support provided by the Committee in expediting
responses to some of its requests.

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20. The Panel contacted several Member States to request their assistance in
tracing materiel found in Libya and elsewhere to better understand arms flows into
and out of the country. The Panel wishes to thank them for their cooperation, timely
responses and access to seized weapons and ammunition, in particular Belgium,
Egypt, Lebanon, Malta, Pakistan and Tunisia.
21. During the current mandate, the Panel maintained good cooperation with
UNSMIL and received valuable logistical support during its visits to Libya.

D. Political and security context

1. Overview
22. Elections held on 7 July 2012 marked a key milestone in the road map for the
transitional period. After an unsuccessful attempt at forming a government under the
Prime Minister, Mustafa Abushagur, early in October, the General National
Congress elected Ali Zeidan as Prime Minister on 14 October. The Government was
subsequently formed on 31 October.

2. Political context
23. Technical efforts to stem proscribed weapons flows rely upon the functionality
and reach of the Government. While technical support can bolster government
capacity, where the Government’s remit is fundamentally challenged or absent,
political action is required to expand the Government’s reach. Accordingly,
technical measures such as counter-proliferation must be built upon a solid political
foundation if they are to be effective.
24. To date, international support has been weighted towards technical assistance;
a form of aid more acceptable in the Libyan context. Continuing challenges to the
Government’s remit, however, highlight the importance of strengthening national
political processes in support of the Government.
25. Plans to establish a credible constitutional process, and national dialogue to
support it, afford an opportunity to expand the remit of the Government.
Transitional justice and reconciliation processes aim to address a second major
tension challenging that remit: that of elements associated with the former Qadhafi
regime resisting the current authority.

3. Arms proliferation
26. The post-conflict Libyan context poses a challenge in clearly designating
responsibility for arms proliferation. Proliferation traced to areas in which
autonomous brigades exert greater control than the Government could be seen as
absolving the Government, given its limited remit, of some responsibility.
Accordingly, assessing immediate responsibility is complicated by the need to
determine degrees of authority and effective control in the areas from which arms
flow.
27. Higher-level shortcomings in governance contribute to the vacuum of
governmental authority and control, however, as do decisions to accord priority to
other matters. This creates a second, more removed, criterion for assessing
responsibility in the overview of arms proliferation.

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4. Security sector
28. As the Libyan security sector is being rebuilt, its ad hoc and, at times,
overlapping structures reflect the need to cater to various Libyan regional and
political constituencies and the pre-existing brigades. As such, although State
security institutions are nominally national, for the moment many of the individual
security organs represent specific groups, regions or political affiliations. Given this
dynamic, it should be ensured that international security and disarmament assistance
support reaches the national security forces.

5. Security context
29. Three major conflict trends are present in Libya, each with a distinct impact on
arms proliferation.
30. Clashes between the Libyan minority ethnic groups and the majority ethnic
group on the Libyan periphery are underpinned in part by competition for resources.
Occurring in border areas where control of smuggling routes represents a key
livelihood, the end of oversight by the Qadhafi regime is occasioning renegotiation
of previous arrangements. The Tabu are seeking a greater share of the lucrative
smuggling routes in the south of Libya, while the Amazigh (related to but distinct
from the Tuareg) aspire to same in the east. The latest violence in southern Libya,
occurring on 20 and 21 September 2012, saw fighting between residents of the town
of Shati and armed brigades originating from Tripoli.
31. Fighting between government forces and former Qadhafi-aligned regions
continues. In a recurring cycle of fighting and temporary resolution, October 2012
witnessed a number of violent outbreaks in Bani Walid, a town associated with
former Qadhafi loyalists. This latest cycle of violence reached a temporary
denouement when, on 24 October, authorities declared that hostilities had ceased.
The flight to the Sahel of Tuareg and other minority ethnic group fighters, seen as
allies of the Qadhafi Government, was the result of fear of reprisals. While the
major exodus has already occurred, further threats against these groups may
occasion more population movements with the potential to further fuel instability in
the Sahel.
32. The situation in eastern Libya poses the most serious threat to stability and
arms proliferation. Fear of a return to Qadhafi-era marginalization creates an
environment hostile to the Government’s reach. Within this vacuum, some armed
groups with an Islamist orientation, transnational linkages and aspirations, and
external support have established a strong presence, the limited popular support
notwithstanding.
33. Initially maintaining a discreet profile, these armed groups have escalated their
attacks against international targets in the Benghazi region. Recent attempts by the
Government to reign in their activities have resulted in brazen reprisal killings
targeting senior representatives of government security forces.
34. While resistance by the autonomous brigades to subjugation under the
Government’s authority is a challenge throughout Libya, the threat posed by these
armed groups is of a higher order because of their transnational character. They may
attract international support in the form of fighters and material assistance or,
equally, be a source of support to ideologically aligned groups beyond Libya.

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35. Countering this threat carries urgency, given that the longer that it is left
unchecked the greater the possibility that the current hostile autonomous area will
solidify into a de facto State within the State.

6. Regional context
36. During the Panel’s missions to countries throughout the Sahel, government
interlocutors raised the impact of the changes in Libya on local security dynamics.
The increased availability of weapons has empowered a variety of non-State actors
in conflict with national authorities. A particular concern is that extremist armed
groups, being the best financed among the non-State actors, are well placed to
purchase weapons, thereby strengthening their positions. Increased cooperation
between these groups is another phenomenon often pointed out to the Panel.

7. Trafficking patterns
37. Transfers from Libya of more regular and significant quantities of arms and, at
times, fighters have developed towards two geographic areas: Egypt and the Sahel.
Beyond those two areas, notable but less regular transfers have occurred to, among
others, the Syrian Arab Republic (fighters and arms) and across the southern border
of Libya into Chad.
38. Driven by efforts to diversify supply routes and types of arms, linkages with
the Gaza Strip have been developed to eastern Libya and, to a lesser degree, the
Tripoli region. Transit occurs mostly by land, from the Benghazi region towards
Marsa Matruh, Egypt, and onward. Some trafficking also utilizes a sea route
originating from Benghazi.
39. Multiple sources indicate that the end destination for the majority of arms is
the Gaza Strip, but this is difficult to verify. It is also likely that a smaller proportion
of arms remain in the Sinai for use against the Government of Egypt by the low-level
insurgency in that region. The Egyptian authorities informed the Panel that arms also
dispersed throughout other parts of Egypt. While as yet unproven, it is possible that
hubs along this trafficking route may in the future serve as points for onward
transfers to other countries.
40. The exacerbating impact of the post-Qadhafi outpouring of arms and returning
fighters on the situation in Mali is well recognized. Current linkages to Libya
operate on two levels: a mixture of Tuareg and other Libyan minority ethnicities
fleeing the perceived hostile post-Qadhafi Libyan State and linkages between
radical armed groups centred in the east of Libya with transnational elements
affiliated to Al-Qaida operating in Mali.

II. Implementation of the arms embargo

A. Challenges to countering weapons proliferation

41. The efforts made by the Government of Libya and its security forces to
improve the security in the country notwithstanding, most of the challenges
pertaining to the containment of arms proliferation within and from Libya identified
in the Panel’s previous report persist today. Civilians and brigades remain in control
of most of the weapons in the country, while the lack of an effective security system

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remains one of the primary obstacles to securing military materiel and controlling
the borders. Consequently, and as the present report demonstrates, the proliferation
of weapons from Libya continues at an alarming rate.

1. Arms control
42. While a number of brigades have now joined the Libyan army or have links
with formal security forces, ranging from a reallocation of resources under a more
formal mandate or being assigned as auxiliaries in areas in which the national forces
have no presence, it appears that most brigades remain in control of their own
weapons.
43. Efforts by regular and non-State forces to control and manage weapons need
further development in order to reach a reasonable and secure level. While
international partners, including UNSMIL, are supporting crucial efforts to secure
weapons storage, these efforts are conducted only in certain parts of the country.
44. Several small-scale civilian disarmament initiatives were launched during the
reporting period, with limited results. The Government considers disarmament and
weapons control to be a high priority. The efforts of the authorities towards
regaining control of weapons arsenals notwithstanding, the results are limited and
the authorities have been slow in introducing control measures for civilian weapons
ownership.

2. Border control
45. Land border management remains the greatest challenge for the Government,
given that the borders are long and difficult to control and available capacity is
currently limited. During the Panel’s visits to the region, the authorities of the
neighbouring countries highlighted the need for the Government to step up its
efforts to control its border. Exchange visits between the Libyan authorities and
neighbouring countries are continuing, including a summit held in January 2013 in
Ghadames to tackle border control issues.
46. Within the Government, the responsibility for border control has been recently
transferred to the Chief of Staff of the armed forces. Various initiatives relating to
border control have been introduced with the support of international partners,
including the European Union.

B. Security and disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities

1. Ensuring responsible transfer

47. The Panel is concerned by the transfer of military materiel, in particular lethal
materiel, by Member States to end users whose identities are unclear and by the lack
of an official Libyan procurement body that would have oversight of military
transfers. This is of particular concern given the current fragmentation of the formal
security sector institutions and the existence of a range of parallel security
institutions that enjoy various degrees of cooperation with the formal sector.
48. In paragraph 13 of resolution 2009 (2011), the Security Council introduced
additional exemptions to the arms embargo, allowing the transfer of arms and
related materiel, including training and other support, for security and disarmament

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assistance to the Libyan authorities. Such transfers should be notified to the

Committee in advance.
49. Since the adoption of that resolution, various Member States have submitted
notifications (77 notifications from Member States and 1 from an international
organization) of transfers of military materiel and other related support to the
Libyan authorities, including training, military utility vehicles, communication
equipment and arms, such as air force, navy and army weapon systems and related
spare parts, materiel refurbishment and ammunition. To date, none of those
notifications have been blocked by the Committee.
50. To assist Member States in implementing the arms embargo on Libya and to
support the Committee in ensuring that transfers are intended solely for security and
disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities as provided for in paragraph 13 of
resolution 2009 (2011), the Panel drafted implementation assistance notice No. 2, 1
which was issued by the Committee on 25 July 2012. It provides a list of
information that Member States should include in their notifications, including the
precise end user, the exact quantity of items and a detailed list of equipment to be
provided, in addition to a note from the Libyan body responsible for dealing with
requests for support and dates of delivery. In November 2012, the Panel also gave a
briefing on the notice to Member States in New York, as part of the open briefing to
Member States by the Chair of the Committee.
51. The release of the notice notwithstanding, the Panel noted that the information
provided in the notifications was not standardized, including a lack of information
regarding the exact end user and the absence of a formal point of procurement
within the Libyan Administration. The Panel observed that some notifications were
based on demands for support signed by a range of Libyan representatives,
including military attachés of Libyan embassies and representatives of various
ministries, while other notifications simply mentioned “in support of the Libyan
authorities”, without reference to specific authorities.
52. While article 4 (11) of Law No. 11, adopted by the National Transitional
Council in 2012, provides that the Minister of Defence is responsible for military
procurement, the requests made by departments of the Ministry or the army have in
practice been signed by a range of actors other than the Minister. The Panel is
unaware of any similar decision for the Ministry of the Interior.
53. The Committee sought the views of the Libyan authorities in relation to the
standardization of the notification process in a letter dated 25 July 2012. The Panel
also raised the matter on several occasions during meetings with the relevant Libyan
authorities. While it appears that Libyan interlocutors share the concerns raised by
the Panel, no specific steps appear to have been taken to date to tackle the issue.

2. Facilitating security assistance

54. The Panel notes that many notifications relate to non-lethal equipment,
including unarmed vehicles, communication equipment, protective equipment and
training. The extensive number of notifications generates a significant amount of
work for the Committee members, which may undermine the focus required on the
more sensitive notifications relating to arms and ammunition. Various types of
__________________
1 Available from www.un.org/sc/committees/1970/pdf/implementation_assistance_notice_2.pdf.

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military-related equipment, including, for example, uniforms and vehicles, and

training have been delivered to the Libyan forces without notifications having first
been submitted, however.
55. The Panel therefore believes that notifications should apply only to weapons of
all kinds (small arms and light weapons including machine guns, man-portable air
defence systems, anti-tank guided weapons and rocket-propelled grenades — the
Panel can suggest a list to the Committee in due time) which, along with related
spare parts and ammunition, carry a high risk of misuse and diversion. Additional
checks into the end users and their actual weapons management capacity by
exporting Member States are therefore required.
56. Waiving the requirement to submit notifications for security assistance, aside
from weapons and ammunition, will not only facilitate the provision of necessary
security assistance but also ease monitoring obligations for the Libyan authorities
and the Committee to allow for a focus on weapons and ammunition.

C. Transfers of military materiel to Libya during the revolution in

support of the parties to the conflict

57. The Panel endeavoured to balance its investigation by looking into actions of
all relevant actors. At the conclusion of its current mandate, the Panel could secure
only limited information relating to potential sanctions violations committed by the
Qadhafi Government. The following section therefore reflects the information
available to the Panel and is not indicative of a judgement by the Panel that any
actors require greater attention than others.
58. The dearth of information on transfers to the Qadhafi Government is
accounted for by the difficulty in locating Libyan and international sources willing
to share information on such transfers, whereas anti-Qadhafi forces and their
supporters were more forthcoming with information on transfers.

1. Transfers of military-related materiel and provision of military personnel to the

anti-Qadhafi forces
59. The Panel continued to investigate the transfers of military materiel to Libya
described in its previous report (S/2012/163) and identified additional cases of
transfers, including breaches of the embargo, during the uprising.
60. A number of Member States delivered weapons and ammunition in support of
the revolutionaries, including through notifications of provision of arms and
ammunition. According to the Panel’s investigation, while Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates provided weapons and ammunition, they submitted notifications
under paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 (2011), pertaining to the provision of military
aircraft and humanitarian aid, and at no stage submitted notifications of any
transfers of arms or ammunition. The Panel contacted Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates to request further information regarding the transfers that they made and to
afford them an opportunity to inform the Committee and the Panel about the exact
nature of their deliveries. While Qatar denied that it had ever transferred any
materiel to the revolutionaries, the United Arab Emirates did not respond. The Panel
therefore considers that these States never intended to utilize the provisions of the

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sanctions regime to deliver arms and ammunition and therefore provided this
materiel to the Libyan opposition in breach of the arms embargo.
61. As highlighted in the Panel’s previous report, the deliveries of arms and
ammunition during the uprising in Libya were completed without any control
measures on the ground, resulting in the uncontrolled movement of materiel. Some
18 months after the end of the conflict, some of this materiel remains under the
control of non-State actors within Libya and has been found in seizures of military
materiel being trafficked out of Libya.

Transfers of military materiel involving Qatar

62. During its first mandate, the Panel was informed by the Libyan opposition
military authorities and confidential sources that Qatar was providing military
materiel to the revolutionary forces through the organization of a large number of
flights and the deliveries of a range of arms and ammunition (see S/2012/163,
paras. 91-102).
63. In February 2012, Qatar submitted a rebuttal to the Panel’s findings. It denied
that it had supplied the revolutionaries with arms and ammunition, explaining that
the authorities had sent a limited number of military personnel to Libya with limited
arms and ammunition for self-defence (see S/2012/163, annex V).
64. The Panel requested Qatar to provide information about the precise number of
troops that it had sent and the quantities and types of military materiel that it had
delivered to Libya. No information was provided to the Panel despite several
requests, including a letter sent by the Committee to Qatar in November 2012 in
which it requested the authorities to respond to the Panel’s request for detailed
information.
65. During its second mandate, the Panel continued to investigate the transfers of
materiel by Qatar to Libya. The Panel traced additional materiel delivered by Qatar
and secured a number of additional testimonies from Libyan and international
military sources, which the Panel is keen to protect, about the critical role that Qatar
played in delivering military materiel to the revolutionaries.
66. In the preparation of the present report, the Panel contacted Qatar regarding all
the below findings and requested the authorities to explain the support that they
provided to the opposition during the uprising. Qatar provided no further
information regarding the transfers and denied that it had provided military materiel
to the revolutionaries. Notwithstanding that rebuttal (see annex V to the present
report), the Panel stands by its findings that Qatar supplied arms and ammunition to
the opposition during the uprising in breach of the arms embargo.

Transfer of 7.62 x 51 mm ammunition

67. The Panel gathered evidence of the transfer to Libya of Pakistani-made
ammunition sold to Qatar in the 1980s, boxes of which have been found in different
locations in the north of Libya.
68. Markings on the boxes clearly indicate that the boxes were exported by
Pakistan to the Commander-in-Chief of the Qatar armed forces, Doha, Qatar (see
figure I).

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69. In response to a query from the Panel, the Pakistani authorities explained that
the Pakistan Ordnance Factories had supplied several million rounds of 7.62 x 51 mm
ammunition between 1981 and 1982 to Qatar and that some of that materiel must have
been re-exported to Libya in violation of obligations contained in the end-user
certificate signed by Qatar.
70. The Panel has evidence that some of the materiel is currently under the control
of Libyan non-State actors. During the Panel’s inspections abroad, this ammunition
was also found in illicit transfers of materiel from Libya to other countries,
including a transfer to Tunisia (see para. 121) and a shipment destined for the Syrian
opposition (see para. 171).

Figure I
Ammunition boxes exported by Pakistan to Qatar in the 1980s

Source: Panel of Experts, 2012.

Transfer of 12.7 x 99 mm ammunition

71. During the Panel’s inspection of the materiel seized on board the Letfallah II
coming from Libya (see para. 171), the Panel found a box of .50 ammunition that
was opened in front of the Panel and that clearly identifies the recipient as the Chief
of the armed forces of Qatar (see figure II).
72. The Panel has requested the Member State that manufactured the ammunition
to confirm that the ammunition was originally sent to Qatar and is awaiting a
response.

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Figure II
12.7 x 99 mm ammunition box seized on board the Letfallah II

Source: Panel of Experts, 2012.

Transfer of an assault rifle

73. The Panel requested the Belgian authorities to assist in tracing an FNC assault
rifle that was photographed in Libya in 2012. 2 The Belgian authorities responded
that the rifle (serial No. 025992) bore markings that resembled a rifle that was part
of an order exported to the Qatari armed forces in Doha around 1980.

Transfers of military materiel involving the United Arab Emirates

74. Following the adoption of resolution 1973 (2011), the United Arab Emirates
notified the Security Council on 21 March 2011 that it would take measures under
the authorizations conferred in paragraphs 4 and 8 of the resolution and submitted a
notification of provision of humanitarian aid. It then sent a second notification
regarding its contribution to military operations through the provision of military
aircraft. No notification was ever submitted regarding transfers of weapons and
ammunition.
75. Since its establishment, the Panel has contacted the United Arab Emirates on
several occasions to request information regarding specific transfers and details of
the quantity of military materiel and personnel sent to Libya during the uprising. A
visit to the United Arab Emirates in 2011 and a letter from the Committee sent in
November 2012 requesting the authorities to respond to the Panel’s communications
notwithstanding, the authorities have provided no information in this regard and
have failed to respond to the requests for information sent by the Panel.
76. The Panel continued to investigate the transfers of military materiel from the
United Arab Emirates to Libya as included in its previous report (S/2012/163) and
secured a body of evidence, as presented below.
__________________
2 See www.the-trigger.tumblr.com.

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Transfer of ammunition to Libya involving the United Arab Emirates, Armenia,

Albania and Ukraine
77. The Panel was informed that military materiel was transferred on 10, 11 and
12 September 2011 by an Armenian carrier from Tirana International Airport Nënë
Tereza in Albania to Benghazi, the imposition of the arms embargo notwithstanding.
78. The cargo included 800,000 12.7 x 108 mm rounds of ammunition originating
from Albanian surplus stocks, 3 of which the official owner and end user was the
armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (see annex VI to the present report).

Chain of contracts between trading entities

79. The chain of custody of this transfer implies that various actors were involved,
requiring a long investigation by the Panel to better understand the process. The
involvement of a number of intermediaries notwithstanding, the ammunition was
simply transferred from Albanian stocks and flown directly from Albania to Libya
(see figure III).

Figure III
Chain of exports of the ammunition

MEICO
(Military Export Import Company -
Albanian Ministry of Defence)

UKRINMASH
(subsidiary of Ukrainian State-
owned Ukrspecexport)

DG Arms Corporation
(facilitating agent)
Armenia

United Arab Emirates armed

forces/International Golden

__________________
3 While the Albanian authorities explained that they had no precise list of lot numbers, the
ammunition was mainly of Chinese origin, largely produced between the 1960s and the end of
the 1970s.

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80. From the investigation made by the Panel, it appears that the Military Export
Import Company (MEICO), 4 a public company operating under the authority of the
Ministry of Defence of Albania, was contacted, along with other companies in the
region, by DG Arms Corporation in July 2011. DG Arms Corporation is an
Armenian broker that was seeking to purchase surplus ammunition for the United
Arab Emirates.
81. MEICO preferred to sign a deal with a State entity rather than an independent
broker, which led to the involvement of UKRINMASH, a subsidiary of the Ukrainian
State-owned Ukrspecexport. 5 MEICO sold 800,000 rounds of 12.7 x 108 mm
ammunition to UKRINMASH, which, through the Armenian agent, subsequently
re-exported it to the United Arab Emirates armed forces/International Golden Group. 6
International Golden Group represented the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates
in the deal and signed the delivery verification certificate relating to the ammunition
on their behalf (see annex VII to the present report).
82. The Panel discovered that the 800,000 rounds were part of a larger deal
between UKRINMASH and the Government of the United Arab Emirates (through
the Armenian agent), including 2 million 12.7 x 108 mm rounds and 1,000 AK-47
assault rifles (see annex VIII to the present report). The Panel is continuing to
investigate the remaining 1.2 million rounds and the assault rifles.

Physical transfer and carrier

83. Flight permits were issued in accordance with an official request made by
MEICO in order to proceed with exports of military materiel through the airport on
the dates of 10, 11 and 12 September 2011 to Abu Dhabi International Airport. The
flight route changed, however, and the three flights delivered their cargo to
Benghazi (see annex IX to the present report).
84. The carrier, Ayk Avia, was brought into the transfer by the Armenian broker,
DG Arms Corporation. The ammunition was transferred by an IL-76 TD aircraft,
with registration No. EK 76599.
85. Ayk Avia is a company registered in Armenia. It has previously been involved
in a breach of the sanctions regime on Somalia, according to the Monitoring Group
on Somalia and Eritrea (see S/2011/433, annex 6.3, para. 15).
86. The Panel gathered information from both open and confidential sources that,
after the series of flights to Benghazi, the aircraft flew on to the Republic of
Moldova. From there, it operated two flights to Armenia on 13 and 14 September
2011 that were reported by the media to have transported surplus military materiel
and to have had political consequences in the Republic of Moldova. 7 Within
24 hours, the aircraft was registered under a new company called Skiva Air, based in
Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. The Panel contacted the Armenian and Moldovan
authorities to understand clearly the various legs of the aircraft’s flight path and the
__________________
4 See www.meico.gov.al.
5 See www.ukrspecexport.com/index/index/id/background/lang/eng.
6 International Golden Group is a private company based in Abu Dhabi that, among other things,
provides security and defence solutions to the security agencies of the United Arab Emirates.
7 “Moldova army chief sacked amid Libya arms shipment scandal”, 28 September 2011. Available
from http://news.monstersandcritics.com/africa/news/article_1665591.php/Moldova-army-chief-
sacked-amid-Libya-arms-shipment-scandal.

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type of activities in which the company was involved. While the Armenian
authorities provided information in response to several of the Panel’s questions, they
did not comment on that particular request. The Republic of Moldova has not yet
responded to the Panel’s request for information.
87. Paragraphs 88 to 93 below explain the involvement of several Member States
in this transfer.
88. The United Arab Emirates was the original end user of the ammunition and
organized its transfer to Benghazi in breach of the arms embargo. The Panel
contacted the United Arab Emirates regarding this transfer on several occasions but
received no response.
89. With regard to Armenia, the agent who brokered the deal and the company that
operated the flights in violation of the embargo are both registered in Armenia. The
Panel sent a request for information to the Armenian authorities, who provided the
registration documents of the two companies and acknowledged the transfer of
ammunition to Libya. The Panel will follow up in this regard.
90. Albania fully cooperated with the Panel. The Panel was able to visit Albania to
better understand the organization of the shipments and was provided with all the
requested information.
91. The Albanian authorities informed the Panel that they were unaware that the
flight plan had been amended by the carrier officially flying to the United Arab
Emirates and that the amendments had been made outside Albanian airspace. It was
brought to the Panel’s attention, however, that some departments of the Albanian
authorities were likely to have possessed sufficient information about those
amendments but failed to take appropriate action. Specifically, that information
includes a landing permission request received by the aviation authorities on
8 September 2011 for an aircraft whose purpose of landing is recorded as “charter
flt on sector LATI-DTTJ-HLLB” (Tirana-Zarzis-Benghazi). According to the
landing permission requested, the cargo to be loaded on to the aircraft was recorded
as a “dangerous cargo of UN 0300 1.4G”, thus clearly stating that the cargo was
military materiel. Furthermore, the flight plans were shared with the aviation
authorities before the first flight departed and clearly state that the aircraft was
bound for Benghazi (see annex IX to the present report). In total, three flights
loaded with the same cargo travelled the same flight path between Tirana and
Benghazi over three days without being questioned by the Albanian authorities.
92. In response to those observations, Albania sent a letter to the Panel in which
the authorities explained that the unilateral modification of the flight route by the
carrier failed to be noticed and prevented by the domestic and international air
traffic authorities. They explained that it was the result of human error and lack of
proper attention by individual agents of the air traffic authorities and that there was
no plan or decision by the Government to act in any way or approve any action
incompatible with the respective Security Council resolutions. Albania is currently
conducting an internal investigation to identify elements that failed to function in
this specific case.
93. With regard to Ukraine, the Panel contacted the Ukrainian authorities to
enquire about the fact that the ammunition that they ostensibly exported to the
United Arab Emirates was not transferred physically to the United Arab Emirates
but to Libya. Ukraine provided the Panel with the end-user certificate, which states

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that the goods will not be re-exported or handed over to third countries without the
prior consent of the empowered authorities of the Ukraine and the United Arab
Emirates. Ukraine did not comment on the fact that the materiel was never delivered
to the United Arab Emirates but to Libya.
94. Lastly, the three flights received deconfliction numbers from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the existence of the no-fly zone and the arms
embargo imposed by the Security Council in resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973
(2011) notwithstanding.
95. The Panel contacted NATO to enquire as to who had requested the
deconfliction number for the flights and the justification for granting it. NATO
explained that there was no basis to refuse deconfliction unless there was a specific
reason to believe that a given flight contained goods in violation of the embargo.
NATO did not provide information regarding who had requested the deconfliction.
96. According to documents provided to the Panel, the clearance was transmitted
to the Armenian company by the United Arab Emirates Air Force and Air Defence.
97. In its previous report, the Panel reported that 20 flights had delivered military
materiel to the revolutionaries during the uprising (S/2012/163, para. 95).

Other transfer(s) in breach of the embargo involving the United Arab Emirates
98. To better understand arms dynamics in and out of Libya, the Panel requested
several Member States that manufacture military materiel to trace materiel found in
Libya by the Panel and other sources, including media sources.2
99. In the first tracing request, an FN FAL assault rifle photographed in Libya in
2012 (serial No. 1514944) was identified by the Belgian manufacturer as being part
of an order that was delivered to the Emirate of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in
1979.
100. In the second tracing request, another FN FAL assault rifle photographed in
Libya in 2012 (serial No. 1731984) was identified as resembling a weapon delivered
to the Emirate of Dubai in an order dated 19 April 1991.

Transfers of military materiel to Libya involving the Sudan

101. Following up on its investigations into the transfers of military materiel made
by the Sudan during the uprising in violation of the arms embargo and reported in
its previous report (S/2012/163, para. 105), the Panel received evidence that
ammunition found in Libya, bearing markings that suggest it was produced in 2011,
might originate from the Sudan. The Panel recently initiated a tracing request to the
Government of the Sudan.

Transfer of an unmanned aerial vehicle by a Canadian company to the opposition

102. According to a press release dated 22 August 2011 by Aeryon Labs Inc., 8 a
company based in Ontario, Canada, a drone manufactured by the company was
transferred to the Libyan opposition in 2011 to help to acquire intelligence on
enemy positions and coordinate the resistance efforts. The press release states that
an Aeryon Scout Micro unmanned aerial vehicle was transferred to Misrata by boat
__________________
8 Available from www.aeryon.com/news/pressreleases/271-libyanrebels.html.

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from Malta under the supervision of a private security company based in Canada,
Zariba Security Corporation, and that a representative of that company trained
members of the Libyan opposition at the airport in Misrata.
103. The Panel sent a request for information to Canada in July 2012. In August
2012, Canada informed the Committee secretariat that the authorities were
conducting a criminal investigation into the case and therefore could not release
more information at that time. Before the publication of the present report, the Panel
again contacted the Canadian authorities and was told that the case remained under
investigation.

2. Transfers of military materiel in support of the Qadhafi forces

104. Since its previous report, the Panel has continued to follow up on several
cases, but has identified only attempts to transfer materiel in support of the Qadhafi
forces. The Panel has been investigating allegations of a possible transfer of
weapons to the Qadhafi regime in 2011. In this regard, the Panel wrote to the Libyan
authorities in November 2012 to enquire about two officers allegedly involved in
military procurement outside Libya. It is crucial to locate the officers, but no
response has yet been received.
105. Regarding the issue of foreign fighters, in July 2012, the Prosecutor General of
the Libyan army, Brigadier General Massoud Arhouma, informed the Panel that a
number of Eastern European fighters had been sentenced by a military tribunal for
acting as mercenaries in support of the previous regime during the revolution and
that a further number remained in Zintan awaiting trial.
106. He also referred to a number of foreign fighters from countries in Africa who
had been sentenced, noting that an unspecified number previously under arrest had
been released. During a meeting with representatives of the Prosecutor General’s
office in Tripoli in August 2012, the Panel was informed that the fighters were still
awaiting trial.
107. The Panel is following up in this regard and hopes to receive additional
information from the Libyan authorities regarding the evidence that they possess
against these individuals.

3. Transfers of military materiel to Libya since the end of the uprising in violation
of the arms embargo
108. While a vast range of arms and ammunition is available at low price on the
Libyan black market, some popular items available only in more limited supply,
including some small arms such as handguns and ammunition, appear to be quite
expensive. Illicit traders are likely to look to benefit from this financially.
109. The Panel is currently investigating a number of potential cases of violations
by sea and air relating to transfers of materiel to Libya. As most of these
investigations are continuing, the Panel is in a position to release its finding only
about the one completed case: an attempted transfer prevented by the Maltese
authorities.
110. On 14 August 2012, on the basis of intelligence received, the Maltese
authorities inspected a container in Malta registered as containing energy drinks and

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toiletries destined for Libya, but which turned out also to contain shotgun shells (see
figure IV).

Figure IV
Shotgun shells seized by Malta

Source: Panel of Experts, Malta, September 2012.

111. The Panel received full cooperation from the Maltese authorities and in
September 2012 was granted access to the seizure, which included 450 boxes
containing a total of 112,500 12-gauge shotgun shells made by Bornaghi, an Italian
company. Italy traced the materiel and confirmed that it was part of a legal export
made in April 2012 to a Maltese national, Michael Azzopardi, the owner of the Tal
Magru Gunshop, located in Rabat, Malta. 9 On 8 August 2012, the shop sold the
cartridges to Khalil Sadegh Harrus, a Libyan national who lives in Tripoli, Libya,
and who had previously shipped various types of goods from Malta to Libya. Each
shell cost Mr. Harrus €0.35 and, according to the investigation, he was expecting to
sell them on for 1 dinar each in Libya (approximately €0.60). Following the
examination of the materiel, the Panel submitted an inspection report to the
Committee. The buyer was charged with trafficking by the Maltese authorities.
Prosecutions of the other actors involved are continuing.

D. Transfers of materiel leaving Libya

112. Since the submission of the Panel’s previous report, in February 2012, the
proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread
into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa.
113. Since the uprising and the resulting collapse of the security apparatus,
including the loss of national control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of
any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant and
attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows from the country are
fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a
range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups.
__________________
9 See www.magrugunshop.com/Default.aspx.

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114. Cases, both proven and under investigation, of illicit transfers from Libya in
violation of the embargo cover more than 12 countries and include heavy and light
weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, small arms and related
ammunition and explosives and mines. While violations of the arms embargo appear
to have happened all along the Libyan land borders, the Panel has also gathered
clear evidence of transfers being made by sea. These cases, some of which remain
under investigation, have resulted in a much wider spread of Libyan military
materiel over the past 12 months compared with the Panel’s first reporting period.
115. The lack of political and security stability, the continuing absence of control
over stockpiles by the national authorities and delays in disarmament and weapons
collections encourage illicit trading and have generated considerable money-making
opportunities for traffickers. While small quantities of weapons or ammunition may
be sold by individuals, larger transfers require the involvement of the armed groups
that control the stockpiles and, on occasion, the consent of informal authorities.
116. While the evidence contained herein indicates that illicit trafficking from
Libya is continuous, fully understanding the evolution of the levels of flows out of
the country and quantifying this activity are extremely difficult. The main source of
evidence is the data communicated by States regarding seizures that they have
made, or serious detailed intelligence regarding un-intercepted transfers.
Information gathered by the Panel primarily reflects what is known by national
security sources from affected countries and what they are willing to share with the
Panel.
117. First, while some illicit transfers are intercepted, it is clear that some go
undetected. Second, while the Panel has generally received a satisfactory level of
cooperation from most States involved, some authorities have been less inclined to
share information. In addition, while some States have agreed to release some data,
they sometimes fail to provide any additional information regarding the
confiscations, including information about the identities of arrested traffickers or
local facilitators. Sharing this information is, however, critical to enabling the Panel
to understand cross-border dynamics and networks. Lastly, some authorities appear
to be reluctant to share information regarding some types of materiel, in particular
man-portable air defence systems.

1. Transfers across the western borders of Libya

118. The western borders of Libya, from Tunisia in the north to the Niger in the
south, were the focus points for illicit trafficking from Libya quite early on in the
uprising, with Algeria reporting its first seizure of weapons coming from Libya in
April 2011. The south-western borders of Libya were also particularly affected by
the surge of Tuareg combatants fleeing Libya to Mali when the regime began to fall
(see S/2011/163). While this period saw a particularly high flow of weapons out of
the country, weapons have continued to be transferred out of Libya. Notably, the
remote areas where Libya, the Niger and Algeria converge remain of significant
concern.
119. Regarding western borders, the Panel has secured evidence of transfers only by
land. While there is some low-level trafficking along the northern urban coastline
bordering Tunisia, the main concern remains with the more remote western borders,
which generally lack any kind of border control or institutional presence on the
Libyan side and have generally weak control measures on the side of its neighbours.

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Movements of weapons by traffickers in the south of Libya include the use of

caches to store materiel for future trade.
120. While southern Tunisia, southern Algeria and northern Niger serve as corridors
for the transportation of Libyan military materiel to destinations further afield such
as Mali, some materiel remains in-country for use by local groups or to be stored in
desert areas for future use and trade. These zones also serve as bases and transit
points for non-State armed groups, including terrorist groups and criminal and drug-
trafficking networks with links to the wider Sahel region.

Tunisia
121. The Tunisian authorities have deployed additional resources to control the
border with Libya and have seized weapons and ammunition coming from Libya on
several occasions. Since its establishment in 2011, the Panel has twice visited
Tunisia and received very good cooperation from the authorities.
122. Materiel. The Panel was granted access to some of the materiel seized by the
Tunisian authorities and identified numerous items as being similar to those viewed
in Libya, including rifles and ammunition (see figure V and annex X to the present
report). Since much of the materiel is old and is common throughout the region, the
Panel has focused on tracing items that are relatively new and specific to Libyan
arsenals. This includes an AK 103-2 assault rifle, which the Panel has requested the
Russian Federation to trace; the response is pending. The Panel also examined
rounds of ammunition, most of which correspond to ammunition documented by the
Panel in Libya (same manufacturer and years of production).

Figure V
Weapons inspected by the Panel in Tunisia

Source: Panel of Experts, Tunis, January 2013.

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123. In the northern border areas, two main checkpoints regulate the flow of people
and goods into and out of the country. The Customs authorities there have regularly
confiscated weapons and ammunition from individuals using them for self-
protection or from small “ant traders” (persons engaged in multiple shipments of
small quantities of arms) attempting to smuggle modest quantities across the border.
Operating border crossing points, in particular the main crossing point, Ra’s Ajdir,
has proved to be extremely complicated, however, given that the Libyan officials
remain members of brigades and their limited experience of border control and
management skills make collaboration difficult. For that reason, over the past year,
the Tunisian authorities have been forced regularly to close the checkpoints owing
to security concerns.
124. Trafficking dynamics differ in the south of the country. According to several
regional and international security agencies, the south of Tunisia has seen larger
convoys of traffickers, including those organized by groups affiliated to Al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb, attempting (and sometimes succeeding) to cross to Algeria and
possibly onward to Mali. The Tunisian army has intercepted and destroyed several
armed convoys since 2011, including one in June 2012 near Burj al-Khadra, to the
south, which was transporting materiel including a SA-7b man-portable air defence
system. The surveillance notwithstanding, trafficking continues. The President of
Tunisia explained in a television interview in January 2013 that Tunisia was turning
into a corridor for armaments between Libya and areas such as Mali. 10
125. Tunisia also faces considerable internal security challenges. Some materiel
brought in from Libya remains there, further fuelling those problems. The
authorities have discovered several caches over the past year, including along the
border with Algeria, possibly for onward transfer to Algeria. Only very recently, the
media reported a large seizure made by the authorities in the southern city of
Médenine. 11 The Panel will contact the authorities to discuss this matter further.

Algeria
126. Illicit trafficking from Libya into Algeria was reported by the Algerian
authorities very early on in the Libyan uprising. Since then, the Algerian authorities
have made several seizures in the centre of the country, but primarily in the south-
east in the provinces of Dillizi and Tamanrasset. Since 2012, the authorities have
reinforced their security surveillance of the Libyan and Malian border areas and
have noted a decrease in arms trafficking activity.
127. Routes. Information from the Algerian authorities and other security sources
suggests that the main entry points for illicit trade, including Libyan weapons, have
been around Ghat/Djanet (Anai Pass), Ghadames and through Tunisia. Some
materiel appears to have remained in Algerian territory, while other materiel
continues to be transferred further afield, including into Mali.

__________________
10 France 24, interview with Moncef Marzouki, 14 January 2013. Available from
www.france24.com/en/20130113-interview-moncef-marzouki-tunisian-revolution-ennahda-
human-rights-mali-francois-hollande.
11 “Tunisie: Médenine — deux dépôts d’armes démantelés”, La Presse (Tunis), 18 January 2013.
Available from http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201301180976.html.

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Materiel
128. Following several requests, the Panel was invited to visit Algeria in August
2012, when it was presented with detailed evidence relating to eight cases of
weapons being brought from Libya into Algerian territory between April 2011 and
March 2012. Since its visit, the Panel has received information regarding additional
seizures but has been unable to corroborate the information with the Algerian
authorities. The Panel is awaiting a response to letters sent in this regard in
November 2012 and January 2013. Table 1 provides a list of military materiel
originating from Libya seized by the Algerian authorities between April 2011 and
March 2012.

Table 1
Military materiel originating from Libya seized by the Algerian authorities
between April 2011 and March 2012
Materiel Quantity

Handguns 7
Sniper rifles 5
FAL assault rifles 5
AK-type assault rifles 103
Rocket-propelled grenades 3
General purpose machine guns 59
14.5-mm heavy machine guns 4
Ammunition for rifles and machine guns Not specified
PG-7 rockets 489
SNORA rockets 21
Explosives Not specified
Communication equipments Not specified
Accessories for weapons Not specified
Cars Not specified

Source: Algerian authorities.

129. During the mission, it was agreed to organize a follow-up visit to examine the
seized materiel. The Panel is awaiting a specific response in that regard, however.
While the Panel was provided with photographs (see figure VI) and a list of serial
numbers for weapons, the list does not contain sufficiently comprehensive data
elements to fully trace the materiel, given that either the weapons identification is
not sufficiently precise or the serial numbers are incorrectly recorded. No precise
information was given on confiscated small arms and machine gun ammunition,
which would be useful for identifying the origin of shipments. The Panel hopes to
be able to examine the materiel in the near future.

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Figure VI
Example of seizure made near Djanet, 3 January 2012

Source: Algerian authorities, January 2012.

130. The Panel was able only to initiate a tracing request for the SNORA aviation
rockets (RAK 022, 024 and 026) produced in the 1970s (see figure VII). The Panel
contacted Switzerland and was informed that SNORA rockets had been produced by a
Swiss company, Oerlikon-Bühler AG, in the 1970s in collaboration with an Italian
manufacturer, SNIA Viscosa SPA, but the rockets in question had been produced in
Italy and exported from there. The Panel sent a tracing request to Italy. The authorities
responded that, because the export had taken place in the 1970s or early 1980s, it was
difficult to locate the precise documentation. Italy is still conducting the necessary
research and will provide the Panel with the information as soon as it is available.

Figure VII
SNORA rockets seized by the Algerian authorities

Source: Algerian authorities, In Amenas, 22 February 2012.

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Traffickers and modus operandi

131. According to the Algerian authorities, some of their small-scale seizures
indicate that trafficking by petty criminals is taking place from Libya, while other
military operations against convoys and caches indicate that organized terrorist and
criminal networks are engaged in trafficking (see annex XI to the present report).
132. According to the Algerian authorities, seizures of small arms, including
handguns, Kalashnikov-type rifles and explosives, were made in Ghardaia in July
2011 from terrorist elements linked to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, whose group launched
the attack against the Tiguentourine gas plant in In Amenas that led to the hostage
crisis in January 2013.
133. The Panel reported on Belmokhtar in its previous report in relation to his claim
of having acquired weapons from Libya at the end of 2011 (S/2012/163, para. 144).
According to regional and international security sources, Belmokhtar spent some
time in Libya in 2011. The Panel is currently unable to comment on media reports
that militants involved in the In Amenas attack and their weapons had come from
Libya. As mentioned above, evidence shows that traffickers coming out of Libya
have used the border near In Amenas to smuggle materiel into Algeria in the past
(see annex XI to the present report).
134. Lastly, from what the Panel has been able to establish through examination of
media sources, 12 some of the weapons and ammunition used by the terrorists during
the hostage crisis bear strong similarities to materiel present in Libya. The Panel is
waiting to examine the materiel to formulate more specific conclusions, however.
The Panel has contacted the Algerian authorities about this matter and hopes to
obtain a response soon.

Niger
135. Since its establishment, the Panel has visited the Niger twice and received full
cooperation from the security authorities, who shared data with the Panel.
136. The Niger in particular was exposed to illicit trafficking of arms and
explosives from Libya in 2011. The Panel documented several detailed cases of
breaches of the embargo involving weapons intercepted by the authorities of the
Niger in 2011 (see S/2012/163).
137. The Niger suffers from the various collateral effects of conflict and terrorist
activities in neighbouring countries, including Mali and Nigeria, in particular in
terms of weapons and money trafficking and the passage of terrorist elements
through its territory or conducting attacks on its soil. The Panel is also currently
investigating allegations of transfers of arms from Libya to Nigeria through the
Niger (see para. 153).
138. In 2012, the authorities of the Niger made fewer seizures. They believe that
trafficking is occurring on a smaller scale than in 2011. According to the office of
the Chief of Staff of the army, in the nine months preceding the last visit of the
Panel at the end of September 2012, more than 180 weapons and an unspecified
amount of ammunition were seized by the army, mainly in the northern part of the
country and originating primarily from Libya. It has not yet been possible for the
__________________
12 See, for example, www.youtube.com/watch?v=38ZlnI19vlY.

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Panel to inspect the materiel, which is kept in the north of the country owing to
security and logistical challenges.
139. Since the Panel’s visit, the authorities have confiscated additional materiel
from Libya allegedly on its way to Mali. The Panel is continuing its enquiries and it
is therefore currently unable to release further information.
140. Lastly, the Panel has also obtained information regarding the collection of
weapons organized by the national commission for the collection and control of
illicit weapons in 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. Pictures shared with the Panel
of arms surrendered voluntarily by civilians in various parts of the Niger showed
certain materiel that almost certainly originated in Libya, including specific types of
assault rifles and anti-vehicle landmines. As confirmed by the commission’s own
experts, however, this materiel may have entered the country via materiel support
sent by Qadhafi to groups in the Niger in the past.
141. This case exemplifies the difficulty faced by the Panel on several occasions in
the course of its investigations, in particular in countries in Africa: while some
materiel is quite clearly from Libyan stocks, it is impossible for the Panel to confirm
whether it reached the country in breach of the arms embargo unless the Panel
receives precise information about the chain of transfers, which is generally not
gathered during, for example, civilian disarmament.

Mali
142. Although the Panel visited Mali during its first mandate, it was unable to visit
the country during its second mandate, several requests made to the Malian
authorities in 2012 and a letter sent by the Committee in November 2012 in support
of the Panel’s request notwithstanding. The Permanent Mission of Mali to the
United Nations explained to the Committee that the letter had been transferred to the
relevant authorities, but the Panel has received no further response to date.
143. The Panel reported in 2012 on the significant flows of fighters and weapons to
Mali during the Libyan uprising, in particular towards the end of the Qadhafi
regime, and their impact on the crisis in Mali (see S/2012/163). Since then, and
primarily because of the extreme deterioration of the security situation in northern
Mali and the lack of information coming from the area, it has been difficult for the
Panel to precisely assess the evolution of trafficking dynamics between Libya and
Mali.
144. During the Libyan uprising, a number of convoys of combatants and weapons
were moving from Libya to Mali through southern Algeria and northern Niger,
sometimes alternating between the two. Seizures made in areas situated between
Libya and Mali indicate that some flows have continued to pass through those
regions during the current mandate. In the past 12 months, the Niger and Algeria
have continued to intercept transfers allegedly on their way to Mali (see paras. 139
and 126, respectively).
145. Information gathered from regional and international security agencies, in
addition to Malian representatives of non-State armed groups, indicates that armed
groups in the north have continued to develop their arsenals over the past 12 months
in various ways, including through the seizure of Malian national stocks, the
purchase of materiel abroad or illicit transfers from neighbouring countries. While
all sources indicate that Libya continues to be a significant source of weapons and

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ammunition, it appears that groups are also sourcing materiel from other countries,
including some in North and West Africa.
146. Videos placed on the Internet by armed groups, and media images of weaponry
used by such groups (in particular since the armed intervention began in 2013),
show similarities with weaponry documented by the Panel in Libya. Without very
detailed pictures or physical inspection of the weapons, however, it has not been
possible to confirm this.
147. The Panel again recently submitted a request to Mali for access to the materiel
seized during the current military operation. The Panel contacted the Malian and
French authorities to stress the significance of the seizures in terms of informing the
process of identifying and mapping the arms procurement dynamics of armed
groups.

2. Transfers towards the south of Libya

148. During the current mandate, the Panel initiated new investigations regarding
allegations of illicit transfers from Libya to countries in Africa and hopes to be able
to develop those cases further in the future.

Chad
149. In 2011, the Panel received information regarding arms and ammunition that
might have arrived in Chad in violation of the Libyan embargo. The Panel therefore
requested to visit Chad, but had to wait more than a year before being granted
access.
150. According to the Chadian authorities and international security sources on the
ground, weapons and ammunition were seized particularly, but not only, after the
fall of the Qadhafi regime and included small arms and light weapons and related
ammunition, including anti-tank weapons and mines. The Panel’s request for access
to or a list of the materiel did not receive a positive response.
151. The Panel received information from confidential sources that around 30 man-
portable air defence systems from Libya were bought back in various batches in the
north from Tebu traffickers around June 2012. The existence of those systems was
acknowledged by a representative of the Ministry of Defence of Chad, but no
additional details were provided.
152. Some of those systems were transported to N’Djamena, where they were
shown to security representatives. The Panel is continuing to seek additional
information regarding the chain of transfer of this materiel and has requested the
Chadian authorities to provide further information regarding the materiel and to
grant access to the Panel. The Panel is still awaiting a response, however.

Nigeria
153. Some materiel may also have been transported from Libya through the Niger
on to Nigeria, which the Panel visited in July 2012. The Nigerian authorities told the
Panel that they had no evidence of Libyan materiel entering Nigeria or falling into
the hands of Boko Haram.

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154. The Panel contacted the authorities again in November 2012 and requested
information regarding a media report in which it was claimed that the Lagos state
police had seized arms and ammunition from criminals who had declared during
interrogation that the materiel had been purchased in the Niger but originally
transferred from Libya. The Panel also requested to examine the confiscated
materiel but, follow-up notwithstanding, Nigeria has not yet replied to the Panel’s
request.

Somalia
155. The Panel received evidence relating to the presence in Somalia of various
types of ammunition that originated from Libya. In collaboration with the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, the Panel is currently seeking to
understand the chain of custody of the transfer or transfers and is unable to release
additional information at this stage.

3. Transfers towards the east of Libya

156. New trends of illicit arms trafficking have asserted themselves during the past
mandate particularly towards the Levant, including transfers by both land and sea.
157. Egypt is facing an increasing challenge in terms of proliferation from Libya
and, while the flows of military materiel in the country present a threat to its
internal security, in particular given materiel acquisition by armed groups in the
Sinai area, the country also appears to serve as a corridor for further onward
proliferation in the region, including into the Gaza Strip.
158. The Syrian Arab Republic has presented a prominent destination for some
Libyan fighters and Libyan military materiel. Transfers have been organized under
the supervision, or with the consent, of a range of actors in Libya and the Syrian
Arab Republic and in countries neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic.

Egypt
159. During its first visit to Egypt, in 2011, the Panel was informed about the
dynamics of an ant trade coming out of Libya. In January 2012, the Egyptian
authorities provided the Panel with data regarding the number of weapons and the
amount of ammunition originating from Libya that they had confiscated since the
imposition of the embargo (see S/2012/163, para. 117).
160. Since the beginning of 2012, flows of Libyan weapons into Egypt appear to
have increased significantly. Since January 2012, several significant cases of
seizures have been reported in the media. 13 In May 2012, the Panel sent a letter to
the Egyptian authorities to obtain further information. The number of seizures has
increased and weapons originating from Libya have been seized in all parts of the
country.

__________________
13 See, for example, Reuters, “Egypt seizes anti-tank, anti-aircraft rockets in Sinai”, 4 January
2013. Available from www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-egypt-sinai-weapons-
idUSBRE9030HU20130104.

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161. The Panel visited Cairo again on 16 January 2013, where it met the
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and
the Ministry of Defence. During the visit, the Egyptian authorities displayed very
good cooperation with the Panel, the necessary judicial confidentiality requirements
notwithstanding. A comprehensive list of seized weapons and ammunition from
Libya was shared with the Panel, which gave a good indication of the size and type
of the ammunition and arms seized. Since the imposition of the arms embargo, the
Egyptian authorities have seized hundreds of small, light and heavy weapons
systems, hundreds of rounds of ammunition for heavy weapons systems and
hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for small arms and machine guns
(upon request of the Egyptian authorities, the detailed list will not be published).
162. The Egyptian authorities also showed pictures of the arms and ammunition
seized, which the Panel knows to be widely available in Libya. They are unable to
disclose further information about the seizures and the individuals involved until the
judiciary has concluded its investigations.
163. Trafficking patterns from Libya to Egypt include transfers by land along the
northern coastal area but also across the countries’ southern borders. Trafficking is
also operated by boat, primarily from Benghazi and Tobruk in Libya on to Marsa
Matruh in Egypt, from where military materiel is transported by road to various
parts of the country, including to the Sinai area.
164. Traffickers have been identified by regional security sources as including
Libyan, Egyptian and, possibly, Palestinian nationals. The Panel was informed by
representatives of the security forces in Benghazi that in 2012 several Egyptians had
been arrested while attempting to smuggle arms.
165. While trafficking from Libya to Egypt represents a challenge primarily for
Egypt’s internal security, in particular in relation to armed groups in the Sinai, some
of the materiel appears to have crossed Egypt to further destinations, including the
Gaza Strip.

Gaza Strip
166. Libyan stocks present an opportunity for armed groups in the Gaza Strip to
diversify their source of arms supplies. According to international and regional
security sources, trafficking through Egypt has allowed such groups to purchase new
materiel, including items to which they did not previously have access, such as more
modern assault rifles and new anti-tank weapons systems. While the Panel is
investigating this issue, the impossibility to conduct research on the ground is an
obstacle.
167. In October 2012, the Al-Quds Brigades organized a military parade in Gaza in
which they displayed some of their military materiel, including recent
acquisitions, 14 of which two assault rifles — a Belgian-made F2000 and a Russian-
made AK 103 — drew the attention of the Panel. Those rifles are quite specific to
Libyan arsenals and to see the two models together is even more unusual. 15 The
__________________
14 See http://saraya.ps/index.php?act=Show&id=24082.
15 AK 103-2 assault rifles are available in large numbers in Libya. While the rifle spotted in the
hands of the Al-Quds Brigades is clearly identified as an AK-103, the Panel cannot confirm that
it is an AK 103-2. Regarding the F2000 assault rifle, it should be noted that only a few hundred
of this model were delivered to Libya.

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Panel requested Belgium and the Russian Federation to support the investigation by
giving an opinion on the country from which the rifles are likely to have been
re-exported and to provide the Panel with a list of the countries to which similar
rifles have been transferred. Both countries responded that the information available
was insufficient to reach any satisfactory conclusions. 16

Transfers towards the Syrian Arab Republic

168. The Syrian Arab Republic has presented a prominent destination for Libyan
fighters. A number of them have joined brigades as individuals or through networks
to support the Syrian opposition. While it is not the mandate of the Panel to analyse
the movements of combatants outside Libya, military materiel has also been sent out
from Libya to the Syrian Arab Republic through networks and routes passing
through either Turkey or northern Lebanon.
169. Since the Panel was unable to visit the Syrian Arab Republic, much of the
analysis in the present section is based on information shared by international
security agencies, including those of Member States from the region, and other
international sources on the ground, in addition to Libyan fighters in the Syrian
Arab Republic. The Panel also completed an analysis of arms shipments seized on
their way to the Syrian Arab Republic.
170. Transfers of military materiel have been organized from various locations in
Libya, including Misrata and Benghazi. The significant size of some shipments and
the logistics involved suggest that representatives of the Libyan local authorities
might have at least been aware of the transfers, if not actually directly involved.

Materiel confiscated in Lebanon: the case of the Letfallah II

171. On 27 April 2012, the Lebanese authorities seized a shipment of arms and
ammunition on board the Letfallah II (see figure VIII), which had been hailed by the
Lebanese navy around Tripoli, Lebanon. According to media reports, 17 the materiel
originated from Libya and was in three containers. The reports further claimed that
the materiel was destined for the opposition forces in the Syrian Arab Republic.

__________________
16 In its response to the Panel, Belgium also mentioned that there were apparently airsoft guns on
the market that were visually identical to an F2000 assault rifle.
17 “Syria arms ship impounded, crew held for questioning”, Daily Star, 28 April 2012. Available
from www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Apr-28/171738-ship-suspected-of-carrying-
syria-arms-impounded.ashx#axzz20lodtWoI.

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Figure VIII
Letfallah II

Source: Panel of Experts, 2012.

172. According to the ship’s certificate of registry issued by the Sierra Leone
International Ship Registry (see annex XII to the present report), valid until 19 July
2012, the ship is registered in Freetown and is owned by Khafaji Shipping Co. SA.
According to its website, 18 this company is based in Tartus, Syrian Arab Republic.
The owner of the company is a Syrian citizen named Mohamad Khafaji.
173. The Panel contacted Mr. Khafaji to discuss the issue and to better understand
the details of the transfer. Mr. Khafaji explained that he had been contacted by a
Libya-based shipping agent, who had put him in touch with a Lebanese national
who wanted to ship 12 containers from Misrata to Tripoli, Lebanon. The ship
arrived in Khoms, Libya, from Greece on 28 March 2012 and docked in Misrata on
4 April. It remained in the port for several days as it was waiting to be provided with
the cargo. Ultimately, only three containers were provided. The containers were
sealed in Misrata and were still sealed when they were seized by the Lebanese
authorities. The owner of the ship said that the staff of the company had never had
the opportunity to see the content of the containers and did not actually know the
real nature of the cargo. After Misrata, the ship headed to Gulluk, Turkey, then to
Alexandria, Egypt, and lastly to Tripoli, Lebanon.
174. Maritime traffic information made available to the Panel (Lloyd’s List
Intelligence vessel report of 30 May 2012) confirms the above information. The ship
left Misrata, Libya, on a date prior to 11 a.m. on 14 April 2012. It later stopped in
Gulluk, Turkey, from 14 to 16 April and Alexandria, Egypt, from 21 to 24 April,
before being apprehended on 27 April by the Lebanese authorities at the port of
Tripoli, Lebanon.
175. The Panel requested the Turkish and Egyptian authorities to confirm that the
Letfallah II had docked in their ports in April 2012, to share information about the
__________________
18 See http://khafaji-maritime.com/about-us.html.

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cargo that was unloaded from and loaded on to the ship during those stopovers and
to provide copies of relevant cargo documents. Egypt explained that the ship had
arrived in Alexandria on 21 April from Gulluk, loaded with construction material. It
had departed Alexandria on 24 April, heading to Tripoli, Lebanon. As far as the
Egyptian authorities were aware, there were no weapons on board the ship. While
the Turkey has not responded to the Panel, it sent a letter to the Secretary-General
and the President of the Security Council on 11 May in which it denied that the ship
had docked in any Turkish ports (A/66/803-S/2012/316).
176. Following a response from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic
dated 11 June 2012 to a letter from the Committee that included a range of
information regarding the case, the Panel wrote to the Permanent Mission on
5 October 2012 to request further information and the contact details of individuals
mentioned in the letter. No response has been received.
177. On 5 June 2012, the Permanent Mission of Libya sent a letter to the
Committee in which it stated that Libya had no information on the Letfallah II
shipment.
178. The Panel wrote to the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to request further
details about the seizure and photographs of the materiel seized. During its visit to
Lebanon in July 2012, the Panel met representatives of the Ministry of Defence and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the issue. By letter dated 17 July 2012, the
Permanent Mission of Lebanon provided the Panel with a list of the materiel
confiscated from the Letfallah II. The Government of Lebanon kindly agreed to the
request of the Panel to inspect the materiel. The Panel travelled to Lebanon to
inspect the materiel on 28 and 29 December 2012 in two locations in Lebanon (see
figure IX). Following its inspection, the Panel can confirm that the shipment
consisted of Libyan arms and ammunition that were transferred to the Letfallah II in
breach of the arms embargo. The arms and ammunition inspected are consistent with
the arms and ammunition found in Libya. After its inspection, the Panel sent a letter
to Lebanon on 3 January 2013 to further enquire about the investigation, to which
no response has yet been received. Among the arms inspected by the Panel,
advanced weapons systems and components were found, including SA-24 short
range surface-to-air missiles and SA-7b man-portable air defence systems, anti-tank
guided missiles (Metis-M, Konkurs-M and MILAN) and various types of small,
light and heavy weapons and ammunition (see annexes XIII and XIV to the present
report).
179. To identify the chain of transfers of the various types of items found on board
the Letfallah II, the Panel sent several tracing requests. The Panel contacted the
Russian Federation and requested the authorities to confirm the original end user of
two SA-24 short range surface-to-air missiles and several recently produced
anti-tank missiles. The Panel is awaiting a response. The Panel contacted France
regarding a number of SNEB rockets found on board the ship. France responded that
the rockets had been exported to Libya in 1977. The Panel also requested the French
authorities to provide information relating to two MILAN anti-tank guided missiles
and to confirm to which country the items had originally been transferred. France
responded in February 2013 that the anti-tank missiles had been produced in France
and exported to various countries, but not to Libya. France did not disclose to which
country the missiles had been originally exported. The Panel will investigate further.

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Figure IX
General view of the ammunition seized on board the Letfallah II

Source: Panel of Experts, 2013.

180. While most of the materiel is in good condition, the inspection showed that
some arms and ammunition shipped were damaged or missing components, which
would render them inoperative as complete systems usable by armed groups in the
Syrian Arab Republic (e.g. SA-7b man-portable air defence systems without
batteries, open boxes, broken weapons, ammunition without compatible arms). The
Panel concludes that this materiel was not prepared and shipped by experienced or
qualified personnel, or that it was done in haste.
181. During the inspection of the materiel, the Panel found the logo of a Libyan
charity named “The Knight Suleiman Israh”, based in Misrata, on several boxes of
new communication materiel, including radios. While the materiel contained in the
cargo bears strong similarities to materiel belonging to brigades in Misrata, it is not
impossible that the arms and ammunition had been collected from several locations
in Libya.
182. The Panel is continuing to investigate the context in which this shipment was
prepared and the individuals and groups involved in this case.

Case of Al Entisar
183. In September 2012, it was reported in the Times that a Libyan ship carrying the
largest consignment of weapons for the Syrian Arab Republic since the uprising had
docked in Turkey and that some of the 400 tons of materiel had been transferred to
the Syrian opposition. 19
184. According to information provided by the Turkish authorities, the ship,
Al Entisar, is a fishing boat registered in Libya (International Maritime Organization
No. 8904044), which sailed from Benghazi to Iskenderun, Turkey, where it docked
on 25 August 2012. It returned to Benghazi on 3 September.
185. The Panel contacted the Turkish authorities to ask about the ship and its cargo
and was informed that, since the boat was carrying humanitarian cargo, in the
__________________
19 Sheera Frenkel, “Syrian rebels squabble over weapons as biggest shipload arrives from Libya”,
Times, 14 September 2012.

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absence of any reasonable ground to suspect otherwise, no inspection was conducted

by the port authorities.
186. The authorities provided the Panel with the cargo manifest, which included
food, clothes and medical supplies. The loading port was Benghazi, the exporter the
national committee for the support and relief of displaced people, a relief
organization based in Benghazi, and the consignee the IHH Humanitarian Relief
Foundation, an Islamic relief organization based in Turkey.
187. In February 2013, the Panel spoke to the head of the Benghazi-based relief
organization, who organized the shipment. He confirmed that the cargo had been
loaded on to Al Entisar and had consisted of humanitarian goods, denying that any
weapons had been on board.
188. The Panel spoke to a range of sources regarding the issue, including Libyan
fighters in the Syrian Arab Republic and international security sources, and is
continuing its investigation to secure additional concrete evidence.

Assault rifles found in the Syrian Arab Republic potentially coming from Libya
189. Given that it has not been possible for the Panel to visit the Syrian Arab
Republic, the Panel sought to gather as much information as possible on potential
materiel coming from Libya from secondary and primary sources, including
specialized media sources and journalists on the ground.
190. The Panel contacted several arms manufacturing countries to request their
assistance in tracing materiel identified in the hands of the Syrian opposition that
they may have produced.
191. The Panel contacted the Russian Federation with such a request regarding an
AK 103 assault rifle that may have been transferred from Libya. In the absence of
any serial numbers, however, no tangible conclusion could be reached.
192. The Panel also contacted the Belgian authorities to trace a number of FN FAL
assault rifles photographed in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2012 in the hands of rebel
fighters who claimed that the rifles had been sent from Libya. The results of the
tracing indicate that none of the rifles were originally exported to the Syrian Arab
Republic and that one was actually part of the same order as a rifle found in Libya
and traced by the Panel.

III. Travel ban

193. By paragraph 15 of resolution 1970 (2011), the Security Council imposed a
travel ban on individuals designated by the Council or the Committee, with
exceptions pursuant to paragraph 16 of the same resolution. A number of Qadhafi
family members and inner circle allies are subject to the travel ban. The updated list
published by the Committee on 2 April 2012 contains the names of 20 individuals
(5 subject solely to the travel ban and 15 to the travel ban plus the asset freeze).
194. Since the Panel’s previous report, the request on 6 July 2012 by Saadi Qadhafi
for a waiver of the travel ban so that he could relocate to South Africa was placed on
hold within the Committee on 18 July. The request remains on hold.

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195. On 23 November 2012, the Panel wrote to Algeria to enquire as to media

reports indicating that all Qadhafi family members residing in Algeria at that time
and subject to the travel ban had departed the country. A response from Algeria
remains pending.
196. Abdullah Al-Senussi, the chief of the Libyan Intelligence Service under the
Qadhafi Government, travelled from Morocco to Mauritania and was arrested in
Nouakchott on 17 March 2012. Subsequently, he was transferred to Libya by the
Mauritanian authorities on 5 September.
197. The travel to another country by any listed person would constitute a violation
of the travel ban. The transfer of Abdullah Al-Senussi does not, however, constitute
a violation, given that he is being returned to Libya as his country of nationality.

IV. Implementation of the asset freeze

A. General overview

198. Since the adoption of the initial resolutions concerning Libya in 2011, the
economic situation has changed dramatically. Hydrocarbons long dominated the
Libyan economy, and continue to do so, but the destruction of the infrastructure and
production facilities during the conflict of 2011 continued to seriously affect the
economy, even after the delisting of most of the national financial entities following
the adoption of resolution 2009 (2011). According to research conducted by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 2012, some improvements were
expected in that year, but the weaknesses in implementation of accounting rules, in
addition to the frequent change of key government personnel, have prevented
effective development in this area. 20
199. According to the Libyan authorities, there is no lack of liquidity or funds. The
income from the part of the oil industry that is now functioning is more than
adequate to provide sufficient resources to run the country. There is a broad view
that the assets currently subject to the asset freeze measures abroad are not
adversely affecting the national budget capabilities. The Libyan authorities report
that, in 2012, they spent only a proportion of the available budget. 21 Indeed, those in
the Government concerned with the recovery of assets rightfully belonging to the
Libyan people view the continued application of the asset freeze as a useful means
of ensuring that assets, once identified, can be safely held pending eventual
repatriation to Libya.
200. Lack of skills, coupled with a lack of responsibility on the part of the
workforce, born of the malaise of the previous Administration over a long period,
continued to hinder an effective discharge of functions, especially within the public
sector. In addition, excessive bureaucracy, coupled with high levels of corruption at
all levels, makes effective working and communication extremely difficult. These

__________________
20 International Monetary Fund, Libya beyond the Revolution: Challenges and Opportunities
(Washington, D.C., 2012). Available from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2012/1201mcd.pdf.
21 Michael Cousins, “2013 budget set at LD 66 BN”, Libya Herald, 10 February 2013. Available
from www.libyaherald.com/2013/02/10/2013-budget-set-at-ld-66-bn.

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points have been raised by senior interlocutors within the public financial sector and
have also been noted in the Libyan press. 22

B. Monitoring the asset freeze

201. In paragraph 9 of resolution 2040 (2012), the Security Council directed the
Committee to continuously review the remaining asset freeze measures imposed by
resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), as modified by resolution 2009 (2011),
with regard to the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment
Portfolio, and decided to delist those entities as soon as practicable to ensure that
their assets were made available to and for the benefit of the people of Libya.
202. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 2009 (2011) have been interpreted by the
Committee to mean that the asset freeze measures do not apply to any subsidiaries
of the listed entities. The measures now apply only to the listed individuals and to
the assets of the aforementioned listed entities that were, or should have been,
frozen outside Libya as from 16 September 2011. In this regard, an implementation
assistance notice was issued on 7 March 2012. 23
203. The focus of the Panel’s efforts regarding the asset freeze has therefore been
directed towards, on the one hand, the hidden assets of the Libyan Investment
Authority, the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and the Libyan Arab Foreign
Investment Company and, on the other, the assets of the listed individuals, much of
which are believed to be abroad held in various names. With regard to the assets of
the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio, the
Panel has been working closely with the Libyan authorities and civil society actors
to attempt to assist in identifying the hidden assets rightfully belonging to the
Libyan people.
204. The Panel is also mindful of the Council’s intention, as expressed in
paragraph 18 of resolution 1970 (2011), to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to
paragraph 17 will at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the
people of Libya. The Panel also continues to monitor the implementation of the
asset freeze measures by Member States and therefore continues to seek the
cooperation of Member States with its investigations.
205. It must be emphasized that, although subsidiaries are not covered by the
sanctions regime, they should prevent any funds, financial assets or economic
resources from being made available to or for the benefit of the listed individuals or
entities.
206. In this context, in February 2013, the Government of Libya blocked the
unfreezing of the assets of a subsidiary of the Libyan Investment Authority in Malta.
The reasons for this are unknown at this stage, but it is purely a national decision of
the Libyan authorities.
207. In 2012, the Government created an asset recovery committee (see para. 233)
to coordinate the national effort to locate, identify and seek to recover Libyan assets
illegally held by designated persons and other Libyan nationals abroad. The Panel
__________________
22 “Libya’s investment needs 2013”, Libya Herald, November 2012. Available from
www.libyaherald.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Libya-Herald-supplement-Nov2012.pdf.
23 Available from www.un.org/sc/committees/1970/notices.shtml.

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has established excellent relations with the Asset Recovery Committee and looks
forward to continuing the cooperation.
208. In addition to the Asset Recovery Committee, the Panel has maintained
cooperation and discussions with a range of individuals and organizations
throughout its current mandate. These include representatives of relevant Libyan
ministries and chief executive officers of public authorities (the Ministry of Finance,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Planning,
the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Libyan Investment Authority, the
Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio and the Central Bank of Libya), civil society
representatives and international organizations (the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund).

Exemptions to the asset freeze

209. The exemptions mechanism outlined in resolutions concerning Libya remains
in place. Member States may submit requests or notifications to the Committee
should they wish to use any of the exemptions listed therein. Table 2 contains a
summary of exemptions on the subject of the asset freeze approved by or processed
through the Committee up to 28 January 2013.

Table 2
Exemption notificationsa

Number of
notifications Amount
Reference received (United States dollars)

Invoking paragraph 19 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011) 46 537 503 869

Invoking paragraph 19 (b) of resolution 1970 (2011) 50 15 416 031 755
Invoking paragraph 19 (c) of resolution 1970 (2011) 2 6 202 903
Invoking paragraph 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) 45 184 312 371
Invoking paragraph 16 of resolution 2009 (2011) 16 3 691 259 824

Total 159 19 835 310 722

a
Unofficial figures.

210. The Panel continued to provide guidance to a number of Member States

regarding the implementation of the asset freeze measures and, in particular, in
relation to applications for exemptions, where appropriate. In that regard, the Panel
prepared an extract of the relevant provisions of the various resolutions to assist
Member States in the preparation of such applications (see annex XV to the present
report).
211. The Panel has observed that some Member States have issued statements in
which they have declared an intention to unfreeze assets of the remaining Libyan
listed entities, namely the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa
Investment Portfolio.
212. In some cases, it has become apparent that such announcements in the media
were made as a result of a misunderstanding by journalists of the term “unfreezing”.
In those cases, the reports refer to decisions of national courts to release specific

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assets from seizure provisions in those States for reasons other than the asset freeze
measures imposed by resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) and modified by
resolution 2009 (2011). In accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, if such
assets were on a country’s territory before 16 September 2011, they should also be
subject to the asset freeze measures, meaning that the release from seizure in no way
affects their frozen status.
213. It should be noted that both “seizure” and “freezing” can be applied to the
same asset, whether at the same time or otherwise. It is suggested that Member
States, when making statements to the media, make it clear whether they are
releasing assets from seizure or unfreezing them from the asset freeze measures
under the sanctions regime.

C. Listed entities

1. Libyan Investment Authority

214. The Libyan Investment Authority is the national sovereign wealth fund with a
broad mandate to invest in foreign and domestic assets. It was set up in 2006 with
some $40 billion in capital to manage the country’s oil revenue and create other
national income streams. It also functions as a stabilization fund and a domestic
economic development fund. Figure X shows hydrocarbon industry subsidiaries of
the Authority.
215. Assets of the various subsidiaries were transferred to the Authority’s control.
They include the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio, the Oil Reserve Fund, the
Long-term Investment Portfolio, the Economic and Social Development Fund, the
Libya Finance Investment Company, the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company
and the Oil Investment Company. It is strongly held within the current management
of the Libyan Investment Authority that all three listed entities became a source of
enrichment for associates of Qadhafi, causing mismanagement of investments and
poor returns.
216. It is further held that the opaque nature of the ownership structure of the
subsidiary hierarchy was also a deliberate move by the former regime to facilitate
the laundering of funds embezzled from the State to personal assets abroad. The
Panel continues to be vigilant in this area with a view to identifying any instances in
which the assets of such companies have been, or are being, diverted for the benefit
of designated individuals.

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Figure X
Hydrocarbon industry subsidiaries of the Libyan Investment Authority

Source: Jan Willem van Gelder and Petra Spaargaren, “Investments of Middle East and North African
governments in the Netherlands”, research paper prepared for RTL Nieuws, 9 March 2011. Available from
http://media.rtl.nl/media/actueel/rtlnieuws/2011/rapportprofundo.pdf.

217. The Panel’s relationship with the management of the Libyan Investment
Authority is good and it appears that the governance issues are being addressed, in
particular with regard to corruption. There remains a disconnect between the
management and the relevant government departments, but it is expected that this
will improve with the hoped-for increased governmental stability. The Panel also
provided the Authority with the Committee’s guidelines, specifically pointing out
the relevant sections on the exemption request procedure.
218. The sovereign wealth fund of the Qadhafi regime was made up of cash and
investments held in some of the world’s most sophisticated financial institutions.
Table 3 shows a summary of assets as at 2010. No further information on current
values has been forthcoming from the Authority.

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Table 3
Assets of the Libyan Investment Authority
(billions of United States dollars)

Net assets

Cash and deposits (most of them held in the Central Bank of Libya) 22
Subsidiaries 16.8
Equity 6
Other assets 4.2
Alternatives 3.8
Bonds 3.2

Total 56

Source: “Libya’s assets”, Washington Post, 25 May 2011. Available from www.washingtonpost.com/
world/libyas-assets/2011/05/25/AGCOyWBH_graphic.html.

2. Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio

219. The Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio is wholly owned by the Libyan
Investment Authority. It was set up in February 2006 with a $5 billion capital
investment fund created by the Government of Libya. It provides direct general
investments in various sectors, mainly within Africa. In addition to the initial
capital, the assets and liabilities of other companies have been transferred to the
Portfolio (see figure XI).
220. In the course of its current mandate, the Panel has established a good
relationship with the Chief Executive Officer of the Portfolio and has begun
working with his team to assist the Portfolio to lawfully return frozen assets to, and
for the benefit of, the people of Libya pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1970
(2011). The Chief Executive Officer was appointed in September 2011 and is
successfully managing 39 of 40 litigation cases. He is extremely confident about the
future of the company, although the management is working to establish how many
subsidiaries are owned by the Portfolio. He also expressed concern that profits from
some of the subsidiaries might be made available to persons designated under the
relevant resolutions.

Maintenance of ownership
221. The Panel’s attention has been drawn to a situation where some Member States
are apparently endeavouring to confiscate Libyan assets, or to sell them, without
reference to the legal Libyan owners.
222. This appears to be the case in Zambia. In June 2010, a majority stake in the
Zambia Telecommunications Company, or Zamtel, the leading telecommunications
company in Zambia, was sold to LAP Green Network, a subsidiary of the Libyan
Africa Investment Portfolio. In November 2011, the newly elected Government of
Zambia launched an inquiry into the sale of Zamtel on the grounds that it was
suspected that the company had been sold fraudulently by the previous Government.
According to the Minister of Justice, Sebastian Zulu, the Government decided to

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reverse the contract and take back the 75 per cent shares sold to LAP Green Network
because of fraud and many other irregularities that accompanied the contract. 24
223. The Panel wrote to the Government of Zambia to request more details,
specifically referring to paragraph 18 of resolution 1970 (2011), and received a
reply in September 2012. The Government stated that, in accordance with the Lands
Acquisition Act, it had compulsorily acquired the 75 per cent of Zamtel shares held
by LAP Green Networks because the Libyan entities had allegedly breached
national law by corrupt connivance between the Libyan investor and some
government officials. LAP Green Networks was entitled to receive compensation.
Because the Government lost money as a result of the acquisition from LAP Green
Networks, and the fact that, upon acquisition, LAP Green Networks decided to
challenge the decision in the Zambian High Court, the decision has been postponed.
224. The Panel will further enquire into this issue.

Figure XI
Chart of the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio

LAIP

Sahel Oil Libya LAP Holding LAAICO Afriqiyah

Investments and Airlines
Trade Bank

LAP Swiss LAP Green

Network

3. Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company

225. The Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company was originally listed as an alter
ego of the Libyan Investment Authority. The Panel’s enquiries have established that
it is actually a subsidiary of, and predecessor to, the Authority. In addition, the
Government of Lebanon, in a note verbale dated 15 June 2012 and received on
20 June, noted this situation and requested clarification, given that funds of the
Company were frozen in a bank in Beirut. The Government wished to know whether
the funds should remain frozen as assets of a listed entity or be released as assets of
a subsidiary. The Panel wrote to the Committee on 22 June 2012 stating that it was
satisfied that the Company was a separate entity, supported by the very existence of
a bank account in the North Africa Commercial Bank in Beirut. Although a
subsidiary, it is currently named in the list of designated entities and information,
currently under investigation, has been received that strongly suggests that assets of
the Company, which should be frozen, are currently being abused. The Panel
considers that the Company should remain listed alongside the Authority. This letter
__________________
24 “Repossession of 75 percent shares in Zamtel from LapGreen Networks of Libya is non-negotiable —
Justice Minister”, Lusaka Times, 17 January 2012. Available from www.lusakatimes.com/2012/01/
17/repossession-75-percent-shares-zamtel-lapgreen-networks-libya-nonnegotiablejustice-minister.

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caused the Committee to write to the Permanent Mission of Libya to seek

clarification of the status of the Company. The response is awaited.
226. The Panel is endeavouring to obtain a definitive organization chart of the total
assets of the Company. Meanwhile, information publicly available indicates that the
companies shown in figure XII are, among others, subsidiaries, associates or
affiliates of the Company (up to 19 May 2009).
227. Information has also been received from more than one source that a
construction project owned by the Company in a Member State is the subject of
financial misbehaviour by parties concerned in its management. This raises a
number of issues with regard to the implementation of the asset freeze and also to
the matter of diversion of Libyan-owned funds. At this stage, insufficient detail has
been gleaned to institute a meaningful enquiry, but efforts to rectify this are in hand.

Figure XII
Chart of the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company

LAFICO

Name Al Baroque Investment Lafico Algeria Holding Lafico Sudan (Sudan)

Limited (UK) (Algeria)

Holding Al Manara Palace Lafico Tunisia (Tunisia) Libya Investment Company

Hotel (Morocco) (Egypt)

Arabian Company for Meger Tower Hotel Oya for Real Estate and
Agriculture Projects (Egypt) (Morocco) Touristic Inv. Co. (Egypt)

Arabian Company for Corinthia Group (Malta) Sudan Libya Misr for Agric. and
Tourist Projects (Egypt) Industrial Investments (Egypt)

Great Bourj Al Fateh Solazur Hotel - Tanja Société El Wifack Leasing

(Sudan) (Morocco) (Tunisia)

Ashton Limited (UK) Libyan Arab Maltese Le Meridien Amman

Holding (Jordan)
l
International Company for International Hotel Pak-Libya Holding Company
Investment Services (Egypt) Investments plc Malta (Pakistan)

Arab Yemen Libyan Holding Arabian Company for NLI Hotels (UK)
Company (Yemen) Pharmaceuticals Industries
(Jordan )

Source: www.zawya.com/cm/profile.cfm/cid965539/Libyan%20Arab%20Foreign%20Investment%
20Company (8 February 2012).

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D. Listed individuals

228. Identifying and addressing key vulnerabilities within the current Libyan
financial framework and discussing some of the obstacles to the recovery of stolen
assets is crucial, especially because it is believed that assets stolen by corrupt
officials under the previous regime have been hidden and integrated into the global
financial network in a manner that has not raised suspicion.
229. It is strongly suspected that certain listed individuals are receiving or have
received funds in the form of cash or valuables and also that hidden assets
controlled by some listed individuals are held in false names or through front
companies.
230. This is demonstrated by the decision of the High Court in London earlier in
2012 in a case brought by the Government of Libya concerning a house worth
around £8 million in Hampstead, London. The house was owned by a shipping
company called Capitana Seas Ltd., registered in the British Virgin Islands. The
High Court held that the company was owned by a listed individual, Saadi Qadhafi,
and awarded the house to the Government of Libya. It is strongly suspected that
there are likely to be many similar hidden assets around the world that should be
frozen pending court action.
231. The lawyer in the United Kingdom who handled the case has been contacted
by the Panel and information beneficial to both parties has been exchanged with a
view to identifying further hidden assets. Further cooperation is planned.
232. Until June 2012, a number of individuals and groups were, or purported to be,
engaged in efforts to recover Libyan assets hidden abroad. The information received
from such sources by the Panel was variable and its reliability doubtful. The
situation has become simplified since 2 June 2012, with the formation of a single
national agency to perform this function, the Asset Recovery Committee.

Asset Recovery Committee

233. The Asset Recovery Committee was formed with the purpose of identifying,
with a view to recovering, assets of Libya, both frozen by other Member States and
where hidden in other countries by Libyan nationals and entities. Hidden assets are
those hidden by designated individuals and are therefore within the remit of the
Panel. The Asset Recovery Committee was formed by virtue of Decision No. 34 of
2012 of the Council of Ministers, predicated on Law No. 87 of 1971 (see annex XVI
to the present report).
234. The Asset Recovery Committee is led by the President of the Litigation
Department of the Ministry of Justice and also includes representatives of the
Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Ministry of Finance,
the Ministry of the Interior and the Attorney General’s Office.
235. The primary method by which it hopes to achieve its aims is through the
engagement of a foreign asset recovery company, which has already achieved some
success in this area. The Asset Recovery Committee has instructed the company to
release to the Panel any information that it obtains in respect of assets shown to
belong to designated individuals so that steps can be taken to remind Member States
to freeze those assets in accordance with their obligations. This would safeguard the

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assets pending an eventual attempt by the Government of Libya to recover them by

legal process.
236. In furtherance of the anticipated legal recovery actions, a delegation of senior
officials from the Asset Recovery Committee travelled to the United Kingdom,
where they received awareness training in methods of making asset recovery
requests to other countries via mutual assistance treaties.

Further designations by Libya and by other Member States

237. In addition to seeking the assets of those already designated by the United
Nations, the Asset Recovery Committee is also endeavouring to identify Libyan
nationals who are suspected of possessing or controlling assets stolen from the
Libyan State, with a view to identifying and recovering those assets through the
courts of the countries in which they are located.
238. Furthermore, assuming that sufficient evidence is forthcoming and that the
proposal to the Committee is approved, designation of further individuals shown to
be in unlawful possession of Libyan funds would have the same effect of protecting
any such assets from removal and further concealment. Following any such
designation, the matter would fall within the remit of the Panel.
239. All other Member States are encouraged to consider proposing to the
Committee the designation under the asset freeze measures of any individuals or
entities who may be engaged in controlling, retaining or otherwise assisting in the
movement or concealment of assets belonging to primary designated entities or
individuals. The freezing of the assets of such entities or individuals would once
again protect any relevant assets from further concealment or flight.
240. A number of potential designees have been identified during the course of the
Panel’s investigations and are further discussed in the investigations section below.

E. Investigations in progress

Saadi Qadhafi
241. Saadi Qadhafi, one of the sons of Muamar Qadhafi and a person designated
under both the travel ban and asset freeze measures, is currently resident in the
Niger, having fled there from Libya following the fall of the previous regime.
During its visit to Niamey, the Panel was informed by the authority in charge of the
protection of Saadi Qadhafi that he was living in a house provided by the
Government and that the Government also provided him with basic needs and with
an Internet connection. The latter facility was removed, however, when he made a
provocative online declaration about returning to Libya, which also resulted in the
confiscation of his telephones. The Panel was informed that he is now married to a
woman from the Niger.
242. Furthermore, the authorities were aware that Saadi Qadhafi had sought to
contact authorities in South Africa and Uganda to discuss his potential transfer to
those countries. The Panel also gathered preliminary information about a case under
investigation in the Niger involving a person suspected to be the intermediary
between Saadi Qadhafi and the person who manages his financial affairs. The Panel
met also representatives of the Financial Intelligence Unit of the Niger. The Unit

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works only on cases when specifically instructed to do so by the authorities. The

Ministry of Finance requested it to provide information in response to the Panel’s
first request regarding a person allegedly used by Saadi Qadhafi to perform business
activities. During the meeting, the Unit provided some details. Although it was
stated that the investigation had been completed, the Panel has received no further
response from the Government. The Panel subsequently wrote several letters to the
Niger to gather further information but no response has been provided to date.
243. Indications were present from an early stage that Saadi Qadhafi had access to
and control of considerable funds that were concealed and not frozen as required by
the asset freeze measures.
244. Exhaustive enquiries have corroborated those indications and an extensive
network of companies, bank accounts and facilitators has been identified across a
number of Member States. This network has provided Saadi Qadhafi with access to
funds in contravention of the resolutions and involved a number of persons and
companies in violation of those resolutions.
245. Enquiries are continuing in various Member States to obtain evidence to
further support the considerable body of evidence already in the possession of the
Panel. In particular, one individual, Dalene Sanders, a South African citizen living
in the United Republic of Tanzania, was shown to be closely linked to Saadi
Qadhafi and to his financial affairs. The involvement of her bank accounts and
companies with Saadi Qadhafi’s finances is under further detailed investigation.
246. Furthermore, the results of enquiries already made give details of companies
owned by Saadi Qadhafi. The Member State in which the companies are registered has
been requested to confirm whether they have already been frozen, with a request to do
so if they have not been. A partially anonymized association chart (see annex XVII to
the present report) has been prepared to illustrate the extent of the system created by
Saadi Qadhafi and his confederates to enable his funds to remain available to him.
247. Information has also been received concerning two other individuals who can
be shown to be close associates of Saadi Qadhafi and who are strongly suspected of
being involved in assisting his financial affairs in contravention of the asset freeze
measures. Enquiries about them are continuing.
248. The Panel has contacted all countries with companies or bank accounts within
their jurisdiction relating to the designated individual for further information and
appreciates all responses and invitations to visit received to date.

Abdullah Al-Senussi
249. Abdullah Al-Senussi, the chief of the Libyan Intelligence Service under the
previous regime, is subject to the travel ban and asset freeze measures. He is
currently in custody in Libya awaiting trial, while also facing charges by the
International Criminal Court, which has requested his surrender to The Hague.
250. An exemption notification has been made by a Member State to allow a law
firm representing the interests of Abdullah Al-Senussi to accept funds from him to
pay for legal fees in connection with the proceedings relating to the Court’s request
for surrender. The Panel has requested the Member State to provide details of the
source of the funds, apparently from an unknown second Member State, and awaits
an exemption notification from that State in connection with the transfer out of that

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Member State. It should be noted that no negative decision was taken by the
Committee during the statutory period and that the notification has thus successfully
passed through the Committee. Nevertheless, the Panel remains concerned about the
source of the funds, which should be frozen, and the lack of notification from
wherever they are located. Further enquiries are in hand.
251. During the course of its mandate, the Panel became aware that Abdullah
Al-Senussi had been living in Morocco under an assumed name, without the
knowledge of the Moroccan authorities. This came to light when he was arrested on
arrival in Mauritania, travelling on a false Malian passport in the assumed name
detailed below.
252. Enquiries were made of Morocco, which provided the following information
(see annex XVIII to the present report):

Passport details:
Malian passport No.: B0515260
Name: Abdoullah Ould Ahmed

Date and place of birth: 1948, Anefif (Kidal) Mali

Date and place of issue: 10 Jan. 2012, Bamako (Mali)
Date of expiry: 10 Jan. 2017

Identity document:
Malian identification No.: 073/SPICRE
Name: Abdoullah Ould Ahmed
Date and place of birth: 1948, Anefif (Kidal) Mali
Date and place of issue: 6 Dec. 2011, Essouck (Mali).

253. Abdullah Al-Senussi had been residing in Casablanca, Morocco, using that
name, with a Libyan associate, Abderrahman El-Fitouri. During his stay, he visited
clinics for medical treatment, accompanied by a young man, purporting to be his
son, who gave the first name of Abdessalam. The man has been identified as
Abdoussalam Ould Oumar, who was born on 24 August 1978. He holds a Malian
passport, issued in Bamako, bearing the number B515262 (two numbers higher than
the false passport used by Abdullah Al-Senussi, which suggests that both passports
may be from an illegally acquired batch). According to the Moroccan authorities,
Abdullah Al-Senussi’s host was a suspected drug trafficker under investigation by
the police and Abdullah Al-Senussi left the country for Mauritania when the
investigation seemed likely to result in the residence being visited by the police.
254. Upon receipt of this information, the Panel made further enquiry of Morocco
to establish how Abdullah Al-Senussi had paid for treatment at the aforementioned
clinics and to ascertain whether any bank accounts had been opened in Morocco in
the name of the false identity, Abdoullah Ould Ahmed, wherein assets may be
located that should be frozen under the asset freeze measures. The Panel also

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expressed interest in visiting Morocco in order to make more immediate local

enquiries. Although a reminder letter was sent, no reply has been received to that
particular request. Further enquiries are in preparation in relation to the additional
names mentioned herein.
255. The Panel is of the opinion that there is a strong possibility that this identity
could have been used to open bank accounts in other Member States and that it
would therefore be helpful if the identity could be added to Abdullah Al-Senussi’s
designation as an alias.

Al-Unood Al-Senussi
256. According to several media reports, including an article published on
8 October 2012 in the Tripoli Post, 25 Al-Unood Al-Senussi, daughter of Abdullah
Al-Senussi and niece of Muamar Qadhafi’s wife, Safia Farkash al-Barassi, also a
designated individual, was arrested on 6 October 2012 in Tripoli, having entered the
country using a false Libyan passport. The reports also mentioned that she was in
possession of a large amount of cash in United States dollars. The circumstances of
the arrest give rise to suspicion that the cash is part of the hidden assets of her
father, Abdullah Al-Senussi, the designated individual.
257. A letter was sent to Libya requesting further details of the cash and the
investigation on 12 October 2012, but no reply has been received.

Mutassim Qadhafi
258. Information has been received by the Panel from more than one source that a
company in Tunisia may have been acting on behalf of an individual designated
under the asset freeze measures, Mutassim Qadhafi. The Tunisian authorities are
currently assisting the Panel with its enquiries and company documentation
provided by them shows that the owners of the company are a Moroccan national
and a Libyan national. They also provided company details and copies of company
bank statements. These are extensive and disclose the involvement of a company
from another Member State. Morocco has provided further details of its national
mentioned above. Detailed analysis will be performed on the above-mentioned
information to establish whether there are any assets linked to designated
individuals.

Further names related to individuals designated by the Committee

259. The Tripoli Post has reported that the Government of Switzerland has frozen
assets linked to Muammar Qadhafi in the amount of 100 million Swiss francs. 26 The
Panel requested further details from the Government, including how the assets are
linked to Qadhafi, where they were discovered and in what form they were held in
Switzerland. The Swiss authorities have confirmed that assets of a number of
people, including two designated under the asset freeze measures, have been frozen
and provided the Panel with confidential information that will need further
investigation. Further cooperation with Switzerland is therefore planned.
__________________
25 “Daughter of Gaddafi spy chief arrested in Libya”, Tripoli Post, 8 October 2012. Available from
www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=9273.
26 “Swiss holding $millions in blocked Gaddafi assets”, Tripoli Post, 16 October 2012. Available
from www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=9327.

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F. Findings

1. Chad
260. The Panel visited Chad in December 2012 and met representatives of the
Ministry of Finance and the relevant authorities in charge of monitoring and
implementing the proper application of the asset freeze.
261. In particular, the Panel met the chief of the National Financial Investigation
Agency and the representative of the Chadian branch of the Bank of Central African
States.
262. During the visit, it was explained that the banking system and financial
institutions were generally regulated by the Central African Economic and Monetary
Community, part of the Bank of Central African States, and the regional supervisory
authority, the Central African Banking Commission, also part of the Bank of Central
African States. The latter, in accordance with Regulation No. 01/03 of the Central
African Economic and Monetary Community, has jurisdiction over issues
concerning anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.
263. During the visit, the Panel sought information relating to the implementation
of the asset freeze measures, specifically to understand the effectiveness of
implementation by the Chadian authorities.
264. In particular, the Panel requested:
(a) The methodology used by the Chadian authorities to inform banks and
other financial institutions of the restrictions placed upon Libyan individuals and
entities listed under the relevant Security Council resolutions;
(b) The procedure in place to identify and freeze assets belonging to such
individuals and entities pursuant to the relevant paragraphs of resolution 1970
(2011);
(c) With regard to suspicious transactions reports, to know how such reports
are reviewed and evaluated;
(d) A list of assets frozen since the adoption of the relevant Security Council
resolutions regarding Libya.
265. The Chadian authorities responded as follows:
(a) The Central African Banking Commission is the supervisory authority
responsible for monitoring the financial system in several countries in Central
Africa, including Chad. The headquarters are in Cameroon and the branch in Chad
has no role in implementing the asset freeze measures. The Chadian authorities
stated that, to their knowledge, no list of individuals and entities listed by the
Committee had been circulated by the Commission;
(b) The National Financial Investigation Agency explained to the Panel that
it had a procedure in place to combat the financing of terrorism, specifically
referring to the Al-Qaida Sanctions List and the list established pursuant to
resolution 1988 (2011), and confirmed that at the time of the Panel’s visit it was not
aware of the list maintained by the Committee. They were aware, however, that the
Hotel Kempinski in N’Djamena and the Banque Commerciale du Chari were owned
by the previous Libyan regime;

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(c) The National Financial Investigation Agency explained to the Panel that
any suspicious transaction report should be passed to it by the financial sector to be
analysed, but that no such report relating to Libyan listed individuals or entities had
been received from the financial sector;
(d) The Chadian authorities are not in possession of any list of frozen Libyan
assets.
266. On the basis of the responses above, it appears that there is no effective
mechanism for the identification or freezing of any assets belonging to designated
entities or persons. Furthermore, and consequently, no such assets have been
identified or frozen. As the authorities were not in possession of the list of
designated entities and persons, it was not possible for them to comply with the
requirements of the asset freeze measures.
267. Furthermore, although they were aware of assets owned by the previous
Libyan regime, the authorities have taken no measures to freeze them. In particular,
during the visit, it was clear that the Chadian authorities were aware that the
Qaddafi regime owned the Hotel Kempinski, through the Libyan Arab Foreign
Investment Company, and the Banque Commerciale du Chari, which is 50 per cent
owned by the Libyan Foreign Bank (now delisted, but previously listed under the
terms of the original asset freeze measures).
268. Furthermore, a branch of the Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’investissement
et le commerce is located in N’Djamena. The bank was established by a treaty
signed by the leaders of member countries on 4 February 1998 in Tripoli. The
bank’s authorized capital is 250 million euros, entirely provided by shareholder
States, including Libya, which is the major shareholder with 45 per cent of the
capital. 27 At the time of the Panel’s visit, no action had been taken since the
commencement of the asset freeze measures to prevent funds from being made
available to designated individuals or entities. From the evidence, the Panel
concludes that Chad has failed to comply with the asset freeze measures.
269. The Panel, in order to corroborate this information, sent a letter to the Deputy
Secretary General of the Central African Banking Commission, in which it
explained the importance of receiving details of any assets completely or partially
owned by persons and/or entities inscribed on the consolidated list. The Panel has
been trying unsuccessfully to contact the Bank of Central African States since July
2012 and the Commission since December 2012. No responses have yet been
received.
270. The Panel sent a letter to the Government of Chad on 23 January 2013 to offer
the opportunity to rebut the above assertions, but no response has been received.
271. From the above evidence, the Panel concludes that Chad is not implementing
the asset freeze measures and is therefore in breach of resolution 1970 (2011).

2. Other Member States supervised by the Central African Banking Commission

272. The findings in relation to the lack of implementation by Chad of the asset
freeze measures above, in part owing to the failure of the Central African Banking
Commission to provide the necessary information, give rise to concerns about the
__________________
27 See www.bsicnet.com/spip.php?article27.

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situation in the other countries in the region whose banking operations are also
supervised by the Commission: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
273. While it is suspected that assets of the previous regime may be held in many
countries of the region, no specific information concerning such assets has been
received by the Panel in relation to those States. Only Gabon has submitted an
implementation report to the Committee concerning the asset freeze measures. That
report, while stating that no designated entity or individual was shown as an account
holder in Gabon, gave no details of any measures taken to identify assets of such
entities or individuals. It is therefore not possible at this stage to comment on the
current situation or on the compliance or otherwise with the asset freeze measures of
those States, apart from Chad.
274. Nevertheless, given the example of Chad, the Panel considers that further
enquiries should be made of those States in respect of both compliance and potential
hidden assets of designated entities and individuals.

3. Central Bank of West African States

275. The Central Bank of West African States serves several countries in West
Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, the Niger, Senegal
and Togo.
276. With regard to those Member States, only Togo has submitted an
implementation report, in which it states that it has complied with the procedures as
instructed by the Bank, but does not provide details of what those procedures are.
277. Benin provided information in respect of assets owned by an entity
subsequently delisted by virtue of being a subsidiary of the Libyan Investment
Authority in line with resolution 2009 (2011), but failed to respond to a follow-up
enquiry.
278. During the Panel’s visit to the Niger in 2012, the Niger cooperated with regard
to the investigation into the finances of designated individual Saadi Qadhafi,
currently resident in Niamey, although promised copies of relevant documents are
yet to be received. No information has been received in respect of implementation.
The Financial Intelligence Unit in the Niger was unaware of the list of individuals
and entities subject to the travel ban and asset freeze measures. The Panel provided
it with an updated list during its visit.
279. There is an apparent lack of implementation of the asset freeze measures by
the Niger, but enquiries are in hand to establish the true position before commenting
further.
280. An initial letter sent to the Central Bank of West African States was later found
to have failed to arrive and a subsequent letter dated 17 July 2012 has to date not
elicited a response. In the light of the foregoing, and in consequence of the findings
concerning the Bank of Central African States and the Central African Banking
Commission, the Panel considers that further enquiries are also required in respect
of the implementation of the asset freeze measures by countries supervised for
banking operations by the Central Bank of West African States.

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4. Related matters
281. Information has been received by the Panel that certain other Member States
have not implemented the asset freeze measures owing to a lack of national
legislation enabling them so to do. Enquiries have been instituted in the form of
letters to the relevant States but, to date, no meaningful response has been received.
Further enquiries will need to be undertaken to establish the true position, especially
given that at least one of the Member States is strongly suspected of having
considerable relevant assets on its territory.

V. Recommendations
A. Arms embargo

Government of Libya
282. The Panel of Experts addresses the following recommendations to the
Government of Libya:
(a) Urgently assign a focal point structure through which all security
assistance procurement should be channelled;
(b) Ensure the use of end-user certificates for security equipment procured.
The end user of the firearms categories should assume responsibility for receiving,
storing, recording and distributing the equipment.

Security Council
283. The Panel of Experts addresses the following recommendations to the Security
Council:
(a) Remove the need for exemption notifications for certain types of security
assistance, including training, military equipment (excluding weapons and
ammunition and explosives), related maintenance, spare parts, protective equipment
and other non-lethal items;
(b) Impose tighter monitoring obligations on weapons, mines and explosives,
related ammunition and spare parts (should this recommendation be accepted, the
Panel can advise on its implementation, if required).

B. Travel ban

284. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Committee conclude an agreement
with the International Criminal Police Organization on the issuing of International
Criminal Police Organization-Security Council special notices in relation to listed
individuals.

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C. Assets freeze

To the Committee
285. The Panel of Experts addresses the following recommendations to the
Committee:
(a) Maintain the Libyan Investment Authority, including the Libyan Arab
Foreign Investment Company, and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio listed
until such time as clear and transparent governance is established across all the
holdings of both companies;
(b) Add the identity used by Abdullah Al-Senussi while in Morocco to the
designation as an alias as follows:

Malian passport No.: B0515260

Name: Abdoullah Ould Ahmed

Date and place of birth: 1948, Anefif (Kidal) Mali
Date and place of issue: 10 Jan. 2012, Bamako (Mali)
Date of expiry: 10 Jan. 2017

Malian identification No.: 073/SPICRE

Name: Abdoullah Ould Ahmed

Date and place of birth: 1948, Anefif (Kidal) Mali

Date and place of issue: 6 Dec. 2011, Essouck (Mali).

To Member States
286. The Panel of Experts recommends that Member States give due consideration
to the submission of designation proposals to the Committee relating to entities or
individuals who are found to have been assisting in any way with the finances of
entities or individuals already designated under the asset freeze measures and to the
submission of proposals concerning entities or individuals who are found to be in
possession of assets of any kind that have been illegally appropriated from the
Libyan people, and held outside Libyan territory.

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Annex I
Countries visited by the Panel during the mandate
Country Arrival Departure

United States 07/05/12 13/05/12

Kenya 21/05/12 24/05/12
Libya 28/05/12 31/05/12
Libya 04/06/12 12/06/12
United Kingdom 20/06/12 n/a
Libya 24/06/12 27/06/12
Nigeria 01/07/12 04/07/12
Lebanon 11/07/12 19/07/12
United States 22/07/12 28/07/12
Algeria 06/08/12 09/08/12
Libya 27/08/12 29/08/12
Niger 03/09/12 06/09/12
Libya 11/09/12 14/09/12
United Kingdom 21/09/12 n/a
Libya 08/10/12 12/10/12
United Kingdom 19/10/12 n/a
Libya/Ethiopia 21/10/12 01/11/12
Libya 13/11/12 22/11/12
United States 25/11/12 05/12/12
Chad 09/12/12 11/12/12
Albania 17/12/12 19/12/12
Lebanon 28/12/12 29/12/12
Belgium 07/01/13 09/01/13
Tunisia 15/01/12 17/01/12
Libya/Egypt 13/01/12 17/01/12
Libya 20/01/13 24/01/13
Israel 28/01/13 29/01/13
United Kingdom 30/01/13 n/a

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Annex II
List of institutions and individuals consulted
This list excludes certain individuals, organizations or entities whom the Panel
met, in order to maintain the confidentiality of the source or sources and not to
impede the ongoing investigations of the Panel.

Libya
Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Planning, Libyan Mine
Action Centre, Central Bank of Libya, Libyan Investment Authority, internal security
forces, Supreme Security Committee, border security group of experts, Special Adviser
to the Deputy Prime Minister, Warrior’s Commission, Asset Recovery Committee

Organizations: UNSMIL, demining operators, World Bank representatives, International Organization

for Migration
Diplomatic missions: United Kingdom, France, Egypt, United States

Albania
Government: Military Export Import Company (MEICO), civil aviation authority and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Algeria
Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Special Adviser to the President, security agency

Belgium
Private sector: FN Herstal

Chad
Government: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Staff particulier for the
President, Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Intelligence
Unit, Bank of Central African States, Central Bank
Multilateral Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, United Nations Development
organizations: Programme

Egypt
Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence

Ethiopia
Workshop: Attended an arms export seminar

Kenya
Workshop: Members of the Panel participated in a workshop in Nairobi on: “Implementing
Sanctions: Prospects and Problems”

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Lebanon
Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Special Investigation
Commission at the Central Bank of Lebanon

Niger
Government: National Security Adviser, security services, immigration officials, Minister of the
Interior
Multilateral Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, Economic Community of West
organizations: African States, United Nations Development Programme

Nigeria
Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State security services, National Security Adviser, Minister
of the Interior
Multilateral United Nations Resident Coordinator, Economic Community of West African States
organizations:

Tunisia
Government: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United Kingdom
Non-governmental Global Witness, British Bankers Association
organizations:

United States
Permanent missions: Albania, Algeria, Australia, Belarus, Chad, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, Israel, Libya,
Luxembourg, Niger, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States
Multilateral International Monetary Fund and World Bank Libya Team
organizations:

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Annex III
Panel official outgoing correspondence log
2012
No. Country About Sent on
29 Albania Arms embargo 30/04/12
30 Belgium Arms embargo 30/04/12
31 Lebanon Arms embargo 30/04/12
32 Qatar Arms embargo 30/04/12
33 Chair Panel letter to Lebanon regarding arms embargo 10/05/12
34 Central Bank of Libya Visit 11/05/12
35 Egypt Arms embargo 14/05/12
36 Libya Visas 14/05/12
37 Libya Visit 15/05/12
38 Libya Visit 18/05/12
39 Egypt Arms embargo 29/05/12
40 Syrian Arab Republic Arms embargo 29/05/12
41 Nigeria Visit 31/05/12
42 Algeria Visit 31/05/12
43 Chad Visit 04/06/12
44 Morocco Travel ban 06/06/12
45 Niger Visit 11/06/12
46 Libya Visit 11/06/12
47 Central Bank of Libya Meeting 13/06/12
48 Turkey Arms embargo 14/06/12
49 Lebanon Arms embargo 18/06/12
50 Nigeria Visit 18/06/12
51 Lebanon Visit 21/06/12
52 Chair Committee letter to Lebanon regarding the Libyan Arab 22/06/12
Foreign Investment Company
53 Chair Draft implementation assistance notice on arms embargo 26/06/12
54 United States Asset freeze 27/06/12
54 Mauritania Travel ban 06/07/12
(duplicated reference
number)
55 Pakistan Arms embargo 10/07/12
56 Canada Arms embargo 10/07/12
57 Poland Arms embargo 10/07/12
58 Niger Travel ban and asset freeze 12/07/12
59 Chad Meeting 12/07/12
60 Zambia Asset freeze 13/07/12
61 Central Bank of West African Asset freeze 18/07/12
States
63 Niger Asset freeze 18/07/12
64 Lebanon Arms embargo 23/07/12
64 Chair Double numbered 23/07/12
65 Libya Visit/meeting 24/07/12

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66 Algeria Visit/meeting 31/07/12

67 Algeria R-Visit/meeting 01/08/12
68 Chad Visit/meeting 02/08/12
69 Mali (double numbered as Travel ban/asset freeze 06/08/12
OC.68)
70 Algeria Visit/meeting 13/08/12
71 Morocco Visit/meeting 13/08/12
72 Belgium Arms embargo 13/08/12
73 Mali Visit/meeting 22/08/12
74 Albania Visit/meeting 27/08/12
75 Niger Visit/meeting
76 Libya Arms embargo 04/09/12
77 Chair Visit/meeting-Chad 04/09/12
78 Malta Arms embargo 05/09/12
79 Qatar Arms embargo 05/09/12
80 Mali Visit/meeting
81 Niger Asset freeze 12/09/12
82 Chair Implementation assistance notice 17/09/12
83 Egypt Visit/meeting 25/09/12
84 France Visit/meeting 25/09/12
85 Chair Arms embargo/implementation assistance notice 26/09/12
86 Albania Visit/meeting 27/09/12
87 Morocco Visit/meeting 28/09/12
88 Chair Report 28/09/12
89 Switzerland Arms embargo 02/10/12
90 Syrian Arab Republic Letfallah II 05/10/12
91 France Visit/meeting 05/10/12
92 Malta Arms embargo 05/10/12
93 Pakistan Arms embargo 05/10/12
94 Italy Arms embargo 05/10/12
95 Tunisia Visit/meeting 10/10/12
96 Libya Asset freeze 12/10/12
97 Algeria Asset freeze 12/10/12
98 Chair Requesting assistance 18/10/12
99 Tunisia Visit/meeting 16/10/12
100 France Arms embargo 16/10/12
101 Mali Visit/meeting 22/10/12
102 Switzerland Asset freeze 22/10/12
103 South Africa Asset freeze 22/10/12
104 Uganda Asset freeze 22/10/12
105 Turkey Arms embargo 24/10/12
106 Israel Arms embargo 24/10/12
107 Qatar Arms embargo 24/10/12
108 Jordan Arms embargo 24/10/12
109 Chair Requesting assistance 25/10/12
110 Niger Asset freeze 25/10/12
111 Turkey Arms embargo 01/11/12
112 Canada Asset freeze 12/11/12

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113 Albania Visit/meeting 06/11/12

114 Greece Arms embargo 07/11/12
115 Italy Arms embargo 06/11/12
116 Egypt Asset freeze 12/11/12
117 Belgium Arms embargo 12/11/12
118 Russian Federation Arms embargo 14/11/12
119 Chad Visit/meeting 16/11/12
120 Libya Arms embargo 26/11/12
121 Algeria Asset freeze 23/11/12
122 Mauritius Visit/meeting 23/11/12
123 United Republic of Tanzania Asset freeze 23/11/12
124 Nigeria Arms embargo 24/11/12
125 Algeria Arms embargo 26/11/12
126 Algeria Arms embargo 26/11/12
127 Chair Facilitating response 03/12/12
128 Chad Visit/meeting 05/12/12
129 Egypt Visit/meeting 05/12/12
130 Lebanon Arms embargo/visit 12/12/12
131 Morocco Arms embargo/visit 11/12/12
132 Israel Arms embargo/visit 12/12/12
133 Tunisia Visit/meeting 13/12/12
134 France Arms embargo 18/12/12
135 Chad Arms embargo 18/12/12
136 Algeria Arms embargo/visit 18/12/12
137 Armenia Arms embargo 21/12/12
138 Republic of Moldova Flight information 21/12/12
139 North Atlantic Treaty Flight information 21/12/12
Organization
140 United Arab Emirates Arms embargo 21/12/12
141 Ukraine Arms embargo 21/12/12
142 Qatar Arms embargo 27/12/12
143 United Arab Emirates Arms embargo 27/12/12
144 Saudi Arabia Arms embargo 27/12/12
145 Tunisia Visit/meeting 26/12/12
146 Central African Banking Asset freeze 27/12/12
Commission

2013
No. Country About Sent on
1 Russian Federation Arms embargo 03/01/13
2 Egypt Visit/meeting 03/01/13
3 Lebanon Arms embargo 03/01/13
4 Israel Visit/meeting 07/01/13
5 Niger Request for response to enquiries 09/01/13
6 United Republic of Tanzania Asset freeze 10/01/13
7 Pakistan Arms embargo 11/01/13
8 France Arms embargo 11/01/13
9 Belgium Arms embargo 14/01/13

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10 Canada Arms embargo 16/01/13

11 United States Arms embargo 16/01/13
12 Ukraine Arms embargo 16/01/13
13 Albania Arms embargo 16/01/13
14 United Arab Emirates Arms embargo 16/01/13
15 Tunisia Arms embargo 17/01/13
16 Russian Federation Arms embargo 17/01/13
17 Romania Arms embargo 17/01/13
18 South Africa Asset freeze 23/01/13
19 United Republic of Tanzania Asset freeze 21/01/13
20 Mauritius Asset freeze 23/01/13
21 Switzerland Asset freeze 23/01/13
22 Mali Travel ban 23/01/13
23 Mauritania Travel ban 23/01/13
24 Algeria Arms embargo 24/01/13
25 Chad Asset freeze 23/01/13
26 France Arms embargo 24/01/13
27 Libya Arms embargo 28/01/13
28 Libya Asset freeze 31/01/13
29 Mali Visit/meeting 04/02/13
30 Sudan Arms embargo 04/02/13

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Annex IV
Level of responsiveness to requests for information from
the Panel
Country/organization Number of Requested Information No answer
letters sent information partially
fully supplied supplied
Albania 2 2
Algeria 5 2 1 2
Armenia 1 1
Bank of Central 2 2
African States
Belgium 4 3 1a
Canada 3 1 2a
Central African 1 1
Banking Commission
Central Bank of West 1 1
African States
Chad 1 1
Egypt 3 3
France 6 2 4
Greece 1 1
Italy 2 1 1
Jordan 1 1
Lebanon 3 2 1a
Libya 7 2 5
Mali 2 2
Malta 1 1
Mauritania 2 2
Mauritius 2 2
Morocco 2 2
Niger 5 5
Nigeria 1 1
North Atlantic Treaty 1 1
Organization
Pakistan 3 2 1
Poland 1 1
Qatar 4 2 1 1
Republic of Moldova 1 1
Russian Federation 3 1 1/1a
Romania 1 1
Saudi Arabia 1 1
South Africa 2 2a
Switzerland 3 1 2
Syrian Arab Republic 2 1 1
Tunisia 3 2 1
Turkey 3 2 1

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Uganda 1 1
Ukraine 2 2
United Arab Emirates 3 3
United Republic of 3 3
Tanzania
United States 2 1 1a
Zambia 1 1
a
Member State indicated that a response was forthcoming.

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Annex V
Rebuttal from the State of Qatar

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Annex VI
Export licence delivered by the Albanian authorities

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Annex VII
Delivery verification certificate from the United
Arab Emirates

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Annex VIII
End-user certificate Ukraine-United Arab Emirates

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Annex IX
Ayk Avia flight plans

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Annex X
Arms and ammunition from Libya confiscated by the
Tunisian authorities in 2011 and 2012
Materiel 2011 2012 Total
Arms
Handguns 4 12 16
Assault rifles 20 19 39
Hunting rifles - 7 7
PKM - 1 1
12.7 Heavy Machine 1 1 2
Guns
RPG 3 4 7
Mortar 60 mm 1 1 2
SA-7b 1 1
Ammunition
5.56x45 108 2804 2912
.25 ACP 1 49 50
9mm 122 718 840
7.65mm 3 146 149
Other handguns 75 1079 1154
ammunition
12 gauge 56 483 539
16 gauge - 302 302
5.7x28mm - 4 4
7.62x39mm 1486 11645 13131
7.62X51mm 448 515 963
7.62x54mmR 71 5790 5861
12.7x99mm 4 11 15
12.7x108mm 1 594 595
14.5x114mm 9 318 327
Grenades - 11 11
PG rockets 55 36 91
Other ammunition 145 150 295
Other materiel
spare parts, fuses,
binoculars, bayonets,
chargers
Source: List provided by the Tunisian authorities, January 2013.

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Annex XI
Cases of violations of the arms embargo reported to the
Panel by the Algerian authorities between April 2011 and
March 2012
Date Location Materiel Contextual information
11/04/2011 Arms 2 vehicles – Not intercepted.
Materiel served in a terrorist attack
against a military position
04/07/2011 Ghardaia 4 AK rifles, 2 handguns, Interception – Materiel brought
explosives and back from Libya by a terrorist cell
ammunition, arms close to Mokhtar Belmokhtar
accessories
20/07/2011 Adrar 3 handguns Arms destined for Al-Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb
21/10/2011 Anai Pass 1 machine gun, 5 AK
rifles, 1 handgun,
ammunition
07/11/2011 Anai Pass 1 machine gun, 5 sniper Convoy of 10 vehicles
rifles, 12 AK rifles,
1 handgun, ammunition
04/12/2011 El Oued Arms shipment Group linked to Tarek Ibn Zyad
group, charged with establishing
arms trafficking network from
Libya. Intercepted. Not the first
time that they attempted to traffic
weapons to Algeria
03/01/2012 Anai Pass 4 heavy machine guns, 4 vehicles intercepted – several
4 RPG, 57 general purpose arrests of different nationalities
machine guns, 82 AK from the region
rifles, 5 FAL assault rifles,
489 PG 7 rockets,
ammunition
22/02/2012 In Amenas 21 SNORA rockets and
home-made launcher
Source: Algerian authorities.

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Annex XII
Letfallah II registry certificate

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Annex XIII
Arms and ammunition seized on board the Letfallah II
Type of items Quantity
Weapon systems
Kalachnikov type assault rifles 23
FN FALs 14
Dragunov sniper rifles 3
BKTa 13
12.7mm heavy machine gun 1
14.5mm heavy machine guns - twin barrel 2
RPG 24
Antitank recoilless rifles 4 (+ 4 bases)
120 mm mortar 1
82 mm mortar 1
60 mm mortar 1

Ammunition
Rocket 130mm 11
Tank rounds 115 and 125mm 6
SA-24 Igla-S 2
SA-7b 10 (+ 1 gripstock and 6 batteries)
Anti-tank missiles 23 (Including 2 MILAN, 5 KONKURS-M,
3 METIS-M, 1 MALUTKA)
7.62x39, 7.62x51, 7,62x54mmR 378 274
12.7mm 165 960
14.5mm 22 450
23 mm 6285
57mm rockets 758
68mm rockets 201
Different types of artillery rounds 18
PG rockets 1640
Other rockets 9
Recoilless rifle rounds 73mm 483
Recoilless rifle rounds 106mm HEAT 24
107mm Katyosha 9
Different types of mortar rounds 528
Defensive and offensive hand grenades 786
Different types of rifle grenades 319

Mines and explosives

Anti-tank mines 8
Semtex H 40kg
400 g TNT blocks 4

Other items
Sights, magazines, cleaning kits, spare parts for
weapons, military uniforms, helmets, gas masks,
communication equipment (71 radios),
propulsive charges for rockets and fuses.
Source: Lebanese authorities, 2012.
a
Term used in Lebanon to define a general-purpose machine gun.

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Annex XIV
Pictures of different types of materiel seized on board the
Letfallah II

12.7 mm ammunition

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107 mm rockets

130 mm rocket

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Anti-vehicle mines

FN FALs

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MAG machine guns

SA 24 Igla-S

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SA-7b and SA-24 and various ATGM

SNEB rockets

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SNORA rockets (RAK 022)

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Annex XV
Guidance on the notification of exemptions to the asset
freeze measures
This guidance contains information aimed at assisting Member States in the implementation of the asset freeze
imposed on certain Libyan individuals and entities as listed by the Security Council or its Committee, and focuses
particularly on the provisions for exemptions as described in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
The United Nations monitors reported sanctions violations and determines appropriate actions to take in response.
The principal body mandated to monitor implementation of measures imposed in Security Council resolutions
1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) and modified by resolution 2009(2011), and to examine and take appropriate action
on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance is the Security Council's Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). The Panel of Experts assists the Committee in carrying out its mandate
through gathering, examining and analysing information from Member States and other interested parties
regarding the implementation of the sanctions and in particular, incidents of non-compliance (Security Council
resolution 2040, paragraph 10b). The Panel comprises impartial, independent individuals with relevant technical
expertise.
The Panel would like to remind Member States of the provisions of the relevant resolutions, and that frozen assets
of designated entities/individuals can only be unfrozen in the following circumstances:
1. If the entity(ies) or individual(s) are removed from the list of designated entities and individuals by a
decision of the Council or its Committee (updated list available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1970/pdf/List%20of%20Individuals%20and%20Entities.pdf). In this
case, Member States have to immediately release assets belonging to such de-listed entities and or
individuals that have been frozen in their territory without any further communication from the Council
or from the Committee. Member States can no longer invoke UN provisions.
2. If the provisions of paragraphs 19 to 21 of resolution 1970 (2011), which describe the relevant exemption
procedures, are properly adhered to. Member States will recall these provisions, which are copied below
for ease of reference:
19. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above do not apply to funds, other financial
assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:
(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage,
medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or
exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred
expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or
fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or
maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after
notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where
appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the
absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such
notification.
Member States submit an exemption application to the Committee, which should include, at minimum,
the following:
1. the purpose for which the authorisation is intended to be granted;
2. the name of the bank that holds the frozen assets concerned;
3. the amount to be unfrozen;
4. The name and bank details of the recipient.

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5. the request should come from the owner of the frozen assets or from his/her legal
representative (designated individuals/entities retain ownership of the assets even though
subject to the asset freeze measure);
If no objection comes from the Committee within 5 working days, Member States can proceed and release
concerned funds.
(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been
notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by
the Committee.
In this case Member States have to submit an application to the Committee which should include at
minimum the same information indicated above. MS can proceed and release concerned funds only after
having received a written authorisation from the Committee.
(c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the
funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or
judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present
resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17
above, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee.
Member States must notify the Committee of the intention to authorise the use of frozen assets to
honour judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment. Notification should include, at minimum:
• Date of the lien or judgment and, where possible, a copy of it;
• Name of the listed individual or entity whose funds will be used;
• The assurance that such money will be not used for the benefit of a listed entity and/or individual.
Designated persons and entities may request, through the relevant Member State, an authorisation to use
their frozen assets, for example to satisfy a creditor, but cannot invoke the freezing measures as an
excuse for defaulting.
20. Decides that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph 17 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments
due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those
accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other
earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen.
Member States may deposit interest due to frozen accounts without submitting any request to the
Committee. As long as MS provide that such earnings will be deposited into a frozen account they do
not breach any sanction. Therefore, for instance, interest from a frozen bank account can be put into the
same frozen account.
21. Decides that the measures in paragraph 17 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity
from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or
entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or
indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and after
notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such
payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or
economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization.
Member States must notify the Committee of the intention to authorise the use of frozen assets to
honour contracts entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, 10 working days prior to
such authorisation. Notification should include, at minimum:
• Date of the contract and, where possible, a copy of it;
• Name of the listed individual or entity whose funds will be used;
• The assurance that such money will be not used for the benefit of a listed entity and/or individual.

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In such cases, designated persons and entities may request, through the relevant Member State, an
authorisation to use their frozen assets, for example to satisfy a creditor, but cannot invoke the freezing
measures as an excuse for defaulting.
3. If the provisions of paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 2009 (2011), which describe the relevant
exemption procedures, are properly adhered to. In this case, Member States must submit to the
Committee their decision to unfreeze assets belonging to listed individuals or entities, specifically
referring to the exemption they intend to apply, by mentioning the paragraph of the relevant resolutions,
and as long as the Committee does not object to the notification, or approves the request, depending on
the category of the exemptions concerned.
Member States will recall these provisions, which are copied below for ease of reference:
15. Decides to modify the measures imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) and
paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011) with respect to […]* the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), and
the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP) as follows:
(a) funds, other financial assets and economic resources outside of Libya of the entities mentioned in
this paragraph above that are frozen as of the date of this resolution pursuant to measures imposed in
paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011) shall remain frozen by
States unless subject to an exemption as set out in paragraphs 19, 20 or 21 of that resolution or
paragraph 16 below.

Member States must keep frozen the assets of listed entities and individuals that have been frozen in their
territory before the date of resolution 2009 (2011), 16 September 2011. However, Member States may
submit an exemption request to the Committee pursuant to the above-explained provisions stated in
resolution 1970 (2011) paragraphs 19 to 21, and still valid, or pursuant to paragraph 16 below.
(b) except as provided in (a), […] the LIA, and the LAIP shall otherwise no longer be subject to the
measures imposed in paragraphs 17 of resolution 1970 (2011), including that States are no longer
required to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made
available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit
of these entities.
Member States may resume commercial activities with the LIA and the LAIP and such new business is no
longer subject to the assets freezing measures. With regard to subsidiaries, as has previously been notified
(see IAN #1), they are no longer subject to the asset freeze. However, if Member States suspect or have
reasonable grounds to suspect that these assets may be used by or for the benefit of listed individuals,
they should continue to freeze them pursuant to the relevant UN resolutions (paragraph 17 of resolution
1970 (2011) and paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011)).
16. Decides that in addition to the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 1970 (2011), the measures
imposed by paragraph 17 of that resolution, as modified by paragraph 15 above and paragraph 19 of
resolution 1973 (2011), do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources of […] the
LIA and the LAIP provided that:

[* The Central bank of Libya and the Libyan Foreign Bank, which are also cited in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution
2009 (2011), were delisted by the Committee on 16 December 2011 and are therefore no longer subject to the Asset
freeze measures]

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(a) a Member State has provided notice to the Committee of its intent to authorize access to funds,
other financial assets, or economic resources, for one or more of the following purposes and in the
absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such a notification:
(i) humanitarian needs;
(ii) fuel, electricity and water for strictly civilian uses;
(iii) resuming Libyan production and sale of hydrocarbons;
(iv) establishing, operating, or strengthening institutions of civilian government and civilian public
infrastructure; or
(v) facilitating the resumption of banking sector operations, including to support or facilitate
international trade with Libya;
(b) a Member State has notified the Committee that those funds, other financial assets or economic
resources shall not be made available to or for the benefit of the individuals subject to the measures
imposed in paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) or paragraph 19 of resolution 1973 (2011);
(c) the Member State has consulted in advance with the Libyan authorities about the use of such funds,
other financial assets, or economic resources; and
(d) the Member State has shared with the Libyan authorities the notification submitted pursuant to this
paragraph and the Libyan authorities have not objected within five working days to the release of such
funds, other financial assets, or economic resources.
Member States must comply with all of these points, and must notify the Committee of their intention to
release frozen assets by application that should include, at minimum:
• the purpose for which the authorisation application has been made;
• the name of the bank that holds the frozen asset;
• the amount to be unfrozen;
• an assurance that such money will be not used by any listed entity and/or individual;
• evidence that the Libyan authorities agreed the purpose of the authorisation, for example a
confirmation letter from the Libyan Government.
If no objection is made by the Committee within 5 working days, Member States can proceed and release
the assets.

Any enquiries or information regarding the contents of this guidance Notice should be directed to the Panel of
Experts who may be contacted through the Committee secretariat at: [email protected].

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Annex XVI
Council of Minister’s Decision No. 34 of 2012, predicated on
Law No. 87 of 1971
(Unofficial translations)

Law number 87 for the year 1971 regarding the Government Cases Department

In the name of the people,

Revolutionary Command Council,
after perusal of the Judiciary Act Law number 29 for the year 1962 and its amended laws.
and the Commercial and Civil Procedures Act,
and Advocacy Law number 8 for the year 1965, and its amended laws,
law number 86 for the year 1971 to establish the Supreme Council of Judicial Authorities,
and based on what has been presented by the Minister of Justice and approved by the Cabinet,
we issue the following law:

Article (1)
Government Cases Department is a stand-alone department , subordinate to the Ministry of
Justice, and is regulated based on the provisions of this law and considered a judicial authority.

Article (2)
The Government Cases Department is constituted from head of the Department, secretary, and a sufficient
number of assisting counsels, and attorneys according to the attached table.

Article (3)
It is permissible to establish sections related to the Government Cases Department. A decision from the Minister
of Justice, based on the suggestion of the Head of the Department, is issued to establish such sections and its
jurisdictions.

Article (4)
The Cases Department acts on behalf of the government and public organisations and institutions in the lawsuits
filed by or against them in courts of various types and grades, and other authorities with jurisdiction bestowed by
law, and in all other legal procedures.

The Department may act on behalf of companies or establishments where the state owns all or a majority of their
capital and other institutions that fall under the state’s administration in suits filed by or against them. This is
followed by a decision issued by the Minister of Justice with the approval of the afore-mentioned company,
establishment, or body.

The Head of the Department may entrust the counsels in the aforementioned public institutions, establishments or
companies to undertake all or some cases filed by or against these bodies or to handle some of their related
procedures.

Article (5)
No reconciliation may be carried out in a suit proceeded by the Government Cases Department, except after its
opinion is taken, while this Department may suggest a reconciliation to the relevant authority in the cases it
undertakes.

Article (6)
The Government Cases Department may give its justified opinion to the management body not to file or carry out
any suit or appeal if it sees no benefit from filing or carrying them out.

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The management body may not overlook that opinion, except with the decision of the competent minister.

Article (7)
The documents of suits, appeals, verdicts, and all legal paperwork related to the government and public
establishments, institutions and other bodies, which the Department acts on behalf of according to the statues of
this law, may be sent to the Department or its relevant section and copies thereof are given to the latter, hence the
Department is to inform the relevant bodies of the suits, appeals, verdicts, and mentioned documents.

Article (8)
The ministries, public institutions and other bodies are to inform the Government Cases
Department of all the documents and data related to the lawsuits filed by or against them with no delay. The
Cases Department has the right to request representatives from the ministries, institutions, and other bodies, to
present its needed clarifications.

The Cases Department must inform the relevant body of the verdict issued in any suit filed by or against it.

Article (9)
The Head of the Government Cases Department acts on behalf of the administration in all its communication with
the official authorities and others, and supervises all the work of the Department, its members and employees. In
this capacity, he may take procedures and issue orders that guarantee the proper functioning. He may also give
Deputy of the Department some of his capacities, and the Deputy acts on behalf of the Head of the Department in
the latter's absence.

Article (10)
The Section's Chief, under the supervision of the Head of the Department, carries out all the technical and
administrative work in the jurisdiction of his relevant section, and is responsible before the Head of the
Department for the proper functioning, and submits to him a report every six months on the section's work
including the processed cases, the cases requested to be filed, and the resolved cases. The report is also to include
all the chief's comments and suggestions.

Article (11)
While keeping in mind the provisions of this law, the regulations for hiring, promotions, bonuses, evaluations,
transfers, delegation, discipline, termination, and retirement apply to the Head of the Government Cases
Department, deputy, counsels, assistant counsels, and attorneys, that apply to those employed by the Public
Prosecution in the equivalent jobs. The Supreme Council of Judicial Authorities is responsible for these affairs
for the members of the attorney general.

Article (12)
Transfers may occur between members of judiciary and Public Prosecution and the members of the Government
Cases Department in the same way of appointment is carried out for the jobs being transferred to.

Article (13)
The Government Cases Department members are subordinate to their senior officials upon their official ranking
and finally to the Minister of Justice.

Article (14)
The Minister of Justice and the Head of the Government Cases Department have the right to warn the
Department's non-counsels members, should any failure in their responsibilities occurs. In turn, they have the
right to object before the Supreme Council of Judiciary Authorities within sixty days after the warning.

Article (15)
The work of the members of the Government Cases Department is to be overseen (searched) as deemed proper by
the decision of the Minister's of Justice, after taking the opinion of the Supreme Council of Judiciary Bodies.

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Article (16)
The appointment of work place, transfer, and designation of members of the Government
Cases Department, from the Department to its sections or from the sections to the
Department, is to be taken by a decision issued by the Minister of Justice after consulting with the Head of the
Department.

The allowance of annual leaves for the members of the Department is to be decided the Head of the Department.

Article (17)
Adequate number of administrative employees and clerks is to be added to the Government Cases Department,
and they are to be subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law and the regulations issued therein. The Head
of the Department shall have the responsibilities towards them as stated by this law and set for the head of any
authority.

Article (18)
The administrative employees and clerks at the Government Cases Department have the right to view suit files in
court and copy the data of documents and papers included therein, commissioned by the Head of the Department
or the relevant section manager.

Article (19)
Non-Libyans who have all other employment requirements may be hired in technical posts in the Government
Cases Department with contracts that include determined salaries, work conditions, and duration.

Article (20)
The current members of the Government Cases Department are to be hired in the new posts according to the
attached table along with a decision made by the Prime Minister issued upon the suggestion of the Minister of
Justice within three months from the effective date of this law.

Hiring of each of them shall be according to the post where his salary falls into within the limit of its grade. If the
salary falls into more than one hiring grade, then the employment shall be upon the lowest grade.

Each of them is to maintain his current salary and all determined benefits. If any of their salaries does not match
the determined salary grade in the grade where he is hired within, hence he shall be given a bonus that lifts his
salary to match that grade, while this said bonus shall have no effect on the subsequent determined annual bonus.

Those who are not hired according to the first paragraph are to be transferred to other posts at the Ministry of
Justice or other ministries according to a decision made by the Prime Minister.

Article (21)
Any text that violates the provisions of this law is to be abolished.

Article (22)
The Minister of Justice shall apply this law, and it comes into effect on the day it is published in the official
gazette.

Revolutionary Command Council – Colonel-Muammar al-Qadhafi\Prime Minister

Mohamed Ali Al-Gedi, Minister of justice
Issued on Ramadan 11th, 1391, corresponding to October 30th, 1971.

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Council of Minister Decision No. 34 for the year 2012 to form a committee and specify
its authorities

The Council of Ministers

(Listing the relevant statutes and regulations)

Decided

Article (1)
Form a committee composed as follows:
1. President of the Litigation Department President
2. President of the foreign disputes section in the Litigation Department Member
3. Attorney general office Member
4. Representative of the Central Bank of Libya Member
5. Representative of the Ministry of Finance Member
6. Representative of the Ministry of Interior Member
7. Representative of the Libyan Investment Enterprise Member

Article (2)
The committee formed by virtue of the previous article will have the authority to take all necessary actions and
arrangements to have knowledge of the Libyan assets smuggled abroad, and for this it has the authority to do the
following:
1. Identify the Libyan assets smuggled abroad or that were invested in projects or shell investment portfolios with
the intent to smuggle them, whether they were fixed or moveable, and collect the documents showing them.
2. Uncover the disguise of these assets and their means of concealment, their places and movements and
understand the rights related thereto and the different facets of their possession.
3. Suggest a temporary ban on the movement of the assets, their transfer, enjoyment, usage or right of usufruct
and that by causing the issuance of expedited or temporary orders by the relevant authorities domestically or
abroad.
4. Transfer the suspicious criminal activities to the attorney general office.
5. Suggest the necessary actions that would guarantee the repatriation of the smuggled assets according to the
procedures provided for in the law, in the executed conventions and international treaties.
6. Suggest the initiation of lawsuits before the relevant courts when necessary.

Article (3)
The committee may request from the relevant authorities to provide it with any documents, contracts, files
relating to investment projects and the funding of projects and the development projects that were executed under
the previous regime.

Article (4)
The committee may seek the assistance of whomever it deems necessary from international and local experts to
complete its tasks and it has to complete these tasks within a period not exceeding two months from the entry into
effect of this decision and to submit a detailed report of its activities to the Council of Ministers.

Article (5)
This decision is effective upon its issuance and must be applied by the relevant parties.

The Council of Ministers

6/2/2012

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Annex XVII
Saadi Qadhafi financial association chart

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Annex XVIII
False Malian identification and passport of Abdullah
Al-Senussi

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