Detect dependency source redirection - #383

Summary

Add deterministic HIGH SC10 findings when package-manager configuration adds or replaces a dependency source, or when a dynamic destination cannot be resolved safely from simple local assignments.

The analyzer covers npm, Yarn, pip, Poetry, Maven, and Cargo across direct config files, commands/environment variables, generated heredoc configs, and actionable shell fences. It never executes configuration or contacts a registry.

Root cause

Existing generic patterns could notice credential/configuration-adjacent text but did not model package-source changes as dependency trust-boundary changes. A non-default registry or index could therefore affect dependency resolution without a dedicated rule, operation, scope, destination status, or package-manager evidence.

BEFORE behavior

For a published regression case that generates npm and Yarn configuration through a shell script:

• no dependency-source-specific finding was emitted;
• the destination and add/replace operation were absent from evidence;
• only generic findings contributed to the result;
• result: 46 / MEDIUM / CAUTION.

AFTER behavior

The same case now emits two deterministic SC10 HIGH findings:

The destination is resolved through a same-file literal assignment and carried as structured, credential-safe evidence. The resulting combined assessment is 95 / CRITICAL / DO_NOT_INSTALL.

Supported surfaces

Commands in executable scripts and shell-language Markdown fences are actionable. Explanatory prose, comments, unrelated uses of the word “registry,” and non-shell fences do not create SC10 findings.

Deterministic decision model

• Built-in canonical public defaults do not produce SC10 when left unchanged.
• A noncanonical replacement is HIGH.
• An additional source is HIGH.
• A destination that remains dynamic after simple same-file literal resolution is HIGH with status unresolved.
• Every other resolved destination is treated uniformly; there are no organization allowlists, DNS checks, network calls, or reputation judgments.
• SC10 survives optional LLM meta-analysis. Existing explicit, user-selected baseline behavior is unchanged.

Evidence and credential safety

Each finding includes:

• ecosystem;
• add/replace operation;
• configuration surface;
• global or scoped reach;
• redacted destination;
• resolved/unresolved status.

URL userinfo and sensitive query values are removed from SC10 findings. Report-level defense in depth applies the same redaction to every finding field and evidence string in terminal, JSON, Markdown, and SARIF output.

Validation

• Dependency-source and report-redaction suite: 24 passed.
• Supply-chain, meta-analysis, and reporting regression suites: 231 passed.
• Full suite on the combined stack: 2,226 passed, 13 skipped, 38 deselected, 4 xfailed.
• Source distribution and wheel build passed; both new analyzer modules are present in the wheel.
• Focused mypy, changed-file Ruff formatting/lint, and git diff --check passed.

Review order

This PR is intentionally stacked on the nested-artifact PR so each change remains reviewable. After the first PR merges, this PR can be retargeted to main; its own commit contains only SC10, credential redaction, tests, and documentation.

Out of scope

• Registry reputation, ownership, reachability, or vulnerability lookup.
• Executing package-manager commands or configuration.
• User-managed trusted-host allowlists.