AD-A235 149

The "a"I "proued wa the paew an those of6

di
thor
sado not aemsady reflet the views of the
Dewaranmme of Defuseo =,ay of its qagU. Thi
document may not be mreusd (or open pubLicadon gate
it has been deaed by die appmpnista militasy wvice or
gwdtmneat Bracy.

OF TANK AND INFANTRY:

LESSONS OF'
HEAVY-LIGHT INTEGRATION LEARNED, FORGOTTEN AND RELEARNED

BY

COLONEL JOHM M4. HUTCHESON

United States Army

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Lessons of Heavy-Light Integration Learned, Forgotten and Relearned

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19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

Thi, is a plea to our Army senior leaders, the MACOM commanders, Corps and Division
commanders, and school commandants to force the integration of tank and non-mechanized
infantry. This document reviews our current infantry force structure with regard to the
Third World threat; traces the evolution of that structure from World War II to the present;
consolidates a significant number of lessons learned in tank and infantry cooperation in
World War II, Korea and Panama; and reports the National Traiting Center heavy-light
experience of the last two years. The author undertook this study in the belief that the
U.S. Army as it emerged from World War II and Korea had the ability to function as a tankinfantry team across its force structure and that the difficulties units experience today
at the National Training Center in the mixing of heavy and light forces are not new but a
function of the failure to operationalize the experience of World War II.
Today, minimal
integrated, tank-infantry training is occurring across the active force because of geographic
separation of forces, branch parochialism, and leader orientation. In essence, the only
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continuation of block 19:

significant mixed force training which is occurring in our Army is on an infrequent basis
at the National Training Center (NTC). Of 28 rotations in fiscal years 1989 and 1990,
only eight integrated light infantry, despite messages from the NTC commander urging
increases. This integration was in most cases not along the lines of habitual association
or war plans. The FORSCOM exercise schedule for FY91 is similar, with eleven rotations
unfinanced. This study was initiated prior to Operation Desert Shield and completed before
the onset of Operation Desert Storm.

USAWC MILITARY

STUDIES

PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the

author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Departnent of Defense or any of its agencies.
This document may not be released for open publication

until it has been cleared by the appropriate militarv

service or government agency.

OF TANK AND INFANTRY:
LESSONS OF HEAVY-LIGHT INTEGRATION
LEARNED. FORGOTTEN AND RELEARNED

AN

INDIVIDUAL

STUDY

PROJECT

by

Colonel John M. Hutcheson

United States Army
Professor Morten J. Luvaas
Project Advisor

STATMer A -- Pproved fo
SSTR!I3MON
zel~sel distribution Is unlaitedw/

U.S. Army War Collpg.

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

John

TITLE:

Of Tank and
integration

FORMAT:

Individual

DATE:

5 April

M.

Hutcheson,

Colonel,

United

States

Army

Infantry:
Lessons of Heavy-Light
Learned, Forgotten and Relearned
Study

1991

Project

PAGES:

151

CLASSIFICATION:

Uncl.

This is a plea to our Army senior leaders, the MACOM

commanders, Corps and Division commanders, and school commandants
to force the integration of tank and non-mechanized infantry.
This document reviews our current infantry force structure with
regard to the Third World threat; traces the evolution of that
structure from World War II to the present; consolidates a
significant number of lessons learned in tank and infantry
cooperation in World War II, Korea and Panama; and reports the
National Training Center heavy-light experience of the last two
years.
The author undertook this study in the belief that the
U.S. Army as it emerged from World War II and Korea had the
ability to function as a tank-infantry team across its force
structure and that the difficulties units experience today at the
National Training Center in the mixing of heavy and light forces
are not new but a function of the failure to operationalize the
experience of World War I!.
Today, minimal integrated, tankinfantry training is occurring across the active force because of
geographic separation of forces, branch parochialism, and leader

orientation.

In essence,

the

only significant

mixed force

training which is occurring in our Army is on an infrequent basis

at the National Training Center (NTC).
Of 28 rotations in fiscal
years 1989 and 1990, only eight integrated light infantry,
despite messages from the NTC commander urging increases.
This
integration was in most cases not along the lines of habitual
association or war plans.
The FORSCOM exercise schedule for FY91
is similar, with eleven rotations unfinanced.
This study was
initiated prior to Operation Desert Shield and completed before
the onset of Operation Desert Storm.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IntroductionI

Chapter
1.

The NTC Experience............7

2.

The Evolution of

3.

Force Structure

4.

Lesson Learning..............39

5.

The Tank-Infantry Experience

of World War II.............42

6.

Tank-Mounted Infantry..........53

7.

Tank-Infantry Communications.......57

8.

The Tank-Infantry Experience

since World War II............59

9.

The Psychological Aspect.........61

Operational

29

History.........32

10.

The Combat Service Support

Experience................64

11.

Doctrine.................70

12.

Leader

Development............74

Conclusion....................77
Annexes

Theory

and Appendices..............82

Endnotes.......................129
Bibliography..................137

iii

Infantry, cavalry, and artillery cannot do

without one another; they should therefore
quartered so as to give mutual aid in case
surprise.1
Napoleon's

Maxims,

be
of

XLVII

INTRODUCTION

Force
There has

structure
been

configured.
U.S.

Armor

is

an ebb

In

School

is

to

the

midAs

to

the

rethink

as

how

after

need

for

on

interest

Army should
Just

Desert

today.

be

Cause,

"Armor Support

conventional

to

the
Light

Shield

there

heavy forces

for

high-intensity battlefield.

power

projection strategy and

retain

in

Crist,

armies

possess

some

ratio

former

light

forces

and

forward-deployed

more

than

heavy.

tanks,

General

at

least

will
George

B.

12 Third World

long-range missiles,

and

focused on mid-intensity,

and

Light missions
forces

1,000

forces

restructure, we

CINC, CENTCOM, noted that

weapons.

light

the

of Operation

away from reliance on

chemical

topic of

Operation

conference
advent

the

to

we move

toward a

our

flow
1990,

hosted

Now, with

clamor

and

January,

Infantry."
a

unde.-standably a

are

are

actually

troop

listed

for

those

regions:

Nearly all Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(JSCP) missions (for non mechanized forces to
include the light divisions) reflect
employment in Europe, Southwest Asia or
Northwest Asia in a mid to high intensity
conflict.3
Therefore,
light

General

forces

and

Crist

touches

sets

forth

the need

on the deployability

for both heavy and

issue:

A mix of light and heavy projection forces

(must) be retained in the U.S. active
structure.
The light components would be
trained and organized to operate flexibly and
at short notice anywhere in the world.
They
should be able to move rapidly and sustain
themselves once they reach the target area.
The heavy components should provide the
backup combat staying-power in the event that
deterrence fails or a given conflict
intensifies.
They, too, should be capable of
deploying rapidly.'
General Edwin H.

Burba,

Jr.,

the FORSCOM commander, believes

the optimum structure for the new contingency corps would be

airborne division, an air assault division, a
two heavy divisions, 5
quickly to
of

light division and

corps that would be

stabilize situations on a global basis.

1990 calls

light

an all-active

for

an

inserted

The Army Plan

"maintaining an appropriate mix of heavy and

forces that are modernized and capable of

effective

interoperability with forces of allied or other friendly

nations."6
Whatever the optimum force structure may be,
that

in a period of

diminishing resources we will lose heavy

divisions from our structure.

(40+

the facts are

We have significant

non-mechanized infantry battalions

light forces

in our active structure),

and we have the ability to transport and put them in harm's way
in short order.

Light forces are not designed

to high-intensity warfare, yet they may be,

necessity, so utilized.

Consider that

the

of

for sustained midsituational

82nd Airborne Division

Ready Brigade closed in Saudi Arabia on 7 August

1990,

yet the

lead tank battalion of the 24th Infantry Division did not arrive
in theater until

27 August 1990.

fortunate as we were at the

Another time we might not be as

commencement of Operation Desert

2

Shield.

Combat could occur on the

forces would be committed

The truth
an operational

is the

light divisions were

not

This

created to

to our own hemisphere and the Pacific

(without augmentation) to our 1980's

is our force structure and

to a mid-intensity war, we will use

it.

fulfill

low-intensity conflict;

capability, and give the Army a larger share of

budget. 7

Light and hea.y

together.

requirement but to address

they are germaine

role, match up

front end.

in that

air lift

the defense

if someone
However,

invites us

it will

be used

in a way for which it was not operationally designed and may not
have

been trained.

in the

year 2000,

Until we can restructure based on the threat

in a multi-polar world, we must

train and

prepare our non-mechanized infantry to operate with heavy

augmentation and
even the

vice versa.

It has to be augmented to survive--

82nd Airborne, the heaviest of

infantry divisions,

the non-mechanized

requires augmentation.

Senator Sam Nunn succinctly summarizes the situation:

In general, Army light forces are rapidly
deployable but lack sufficient firepower,
sustainability and ground mobility; and in
recent years Marine Corps forces have allowed
their increase in equipment to outstrip their
already inadequate amphibious lift.$
To

insure the survival

of light forces

requires augmentation

by heavy forces or the integration of light forces with heavy.

So,

the volatility of the world today, constrained sealift and

the

rapidity with which light forces can be inserted

that when we wage war at the operational

requires

level, we "mix" forces.

The vernacular of

today describes this

blending as

"heavy/light"

or "light/heavy."
The combining of mechanized or armored forces with nonmechanized infantry has

come to be

Center and among our units as

jungle),
that

after their

maneuver.
infantry"

mean foot
This

forms of

in common

they are all

defend using the principles of

The

fire

foot
and

they are a "tank-

terms "light,"

"non-mezhanized" ard
this document and simply

soldiers.
paper will briefly review how the
but

Kinzer said in 1981

the real

stri

issue is train-

as commander of 2nd Bn,

ture has changed

g.

As BG Joseph

503d Infantry:

"It's what you do with what you've got."

At

first

it might seem that

heavy/light operations are an

adaptation to deal with a force structure dilemma, but

the

prevalent wisdom to intermix these forces has its historical

basis

is

opposed to an armor or mechanized

are used interchangeably in

since World War II,

W.

the battlefield,

team or task force as

or "heavy-

(mountain, arctic,

When they operate with armor,

task force.

"infantry"

light

The one thing they all have

insertion to

soldiers who attack or

team or

There are multiple

airborne, air assault,

and standard.

the National Training

"mixed force operations"

light/light-heavy integration."
infantry:

known at

in World War

II.

In the heavy armored division there was

always a shortage of infantry.
Often
battalions from infantry divisions were
motorized and attached to the division to
overcome this shortage.
The principal
disadvantages to this was that attached
battalions did not have the training or
4

experience of fighting with tanks and

personnel of tank-infantry teams were not
familiar with each other.
The latter was
found to be an important factor in gauging
over-all efficiency of a combined team.
Whenever possible it was found best to join
up the same tank and infantry units together
in training and in combat.
Not only would
staff sections function better but lower unit
commanders and individual tank crews and
infantry squads became acquainted and gained
confidence in each other.
Units gained
objectives as a team and not as individual
arms. 9
A 1947 Monograph, The Armor School

Over
of

time,

however,

integrating

has

faded,

the

National

company

and

at

objective

our

heavy and
the

WWII

Training

the

irstitutional

NTC

light

can only

(personal

infantry battalions,

when

the

infantry

Our

infantry

current

heavy forces
are

just

now

forces

combat.

brigade

strength

of

level

Actual

in

as

scenarios

provided by
mixed

the

force

NTC,

Our

on

at

Bradley

the

are available

writing,
NTC

to

finds

first
for

light

offset
in WWII.

light

published
in draft

field

mixed

large-scale
the

Division

and

mixing

forces

credible opposing
the

and

annexes

training of mixed

operations

written

sense business of

exception of
the

level

average

they were

CONUS

common

maneuver

With

the

address,

(especially against

non-existent.

at

the

this

used at

beginning to

is almost

experience

As

posture

business

a mechanized division of

sho-tfalls

field manuals,

The

infantrymen

geographically separated.

to

the

not been

the

have been

1,000 soldiers

ramp.' 0

in

operational

1990.
35

In

the

could

in

dismount

stationing

appendices
for

(NTC)

roughiy

the

battalions have

mechanized

manuals

drop

at

above

experience).

five

Bradleys

forces

summary

Center

experience

at

force)

forces
operational
Ready

Brigade
the

(DRB)

of

Iraqi Army.

have not

an army, with sc-e notable

we are to

them, with no

together,

operations

to execute with

training, after they are

ths

is clear that

institutionalize

exceptions, we

that

terrain,

and American

threat,

interest

in a mid-

to high-intensity

accepcing unnecessary risk by augmenting

-ffset against
it

against

some skill.

employ light forces

conflict, are we not

The only

type of

deployability, force structure,

we be able

If

As

focused on the

strategic
demand

the 82nd might well have been in combat

in combat

risk is training.

in

theater?

when we do train

we have either failed to

the practical lessons of

the

our past.

capture or

Combat is undeniably a hazardous occupation.

The hazard, however, can be reduced by means
of thorough and realistic training, the
provision of supporting services, the
continual refinement of tactical doctrine,
and the development of more efficient weapons
and equipment. 11

Chapter 1
THE NTC EXPERIENCE
During the stateside maneuvers of
Catlett

1939-1941 General George

Marshall observed:
The present maneuvers are the closest
peacetime approximation to actual fighting
conditions that have ever been undertaken in
this country.
But what is of the greatest
importance, the mistakes and failures will
not imperil the nation or cost the lives of
men. . . . The maneuvers also constitute a
field laboratory to accept or discard new
methods of applying fundamental tactical
principles.12

Today, the NTC provides even more of a combat approximation.

is the

field

experience.
II,

laboratory of the present

It

is also

since "unlearned,"

where units gain

the crucible where lessons of World War

become evident;

"rediscovered" by each successive unit

the Combined Arms Lessons
schools, and

It

and lessons are

(despite the efforts of

Learned Center. the respective branch

the Operations Group of the NTC).

One division commander asserted:

I believe doctrine is being made every day at
the NTC because you've got a tremendous
evaluation process out there and they will be
the first people to discover the weaknesses
in our current tactical doctrine.
And, they
7

paso chose on in the form of the after-action

reviews to all the units.
So, I think you're
ahead of published doctrine if you're
actively involved in the NTC. 1 3
The NTC experience

is,

where we are as an army

therefore,

central to

a true

assessment

of

in training with regard to mixed-force

(tank-infantry) operations.
The purpose of
capabilities of
report

this paper

the NTC experience

mixed-force training as

in light of our army's history

The intent

to
in

is to make the case for

a low-overhead, high-pay-off investment

can be implemented in

not only at

to be a primer on

the respective heavy or light forces but

mixed-force operations.

that

is not

the short

training centers

but

and at corps and division level.

term and should be pursued

in the FORSCOM Exercise Schedule

NTC observations in

are based on the author's firsthand experience as

this paper

the battalion

task force senior trainer and observer/controller for nonmechanized

infantry in both force-on-force and

live fire

operations during the period 1988-1990.

Heavy-Light Scenarios at the NTC

An NTC heavy/light

scenario is seen as

a part of a larger,

mid-intensity scenario in which both heavy and

are participating.

The task organization

light divisions

is structured based on

a reasonable approximation of the assets a light

infantry

division might send with a light battalion when it

is attached to

a heavy brigade and conversely, the assets a heavy brigade might

logically send with an armored or mechanized battalion tasked to
operate in support

of a light brigade.
8

The

situation presumes

operations in multiple
active force
At the
rotations of

theaters

structure of
beginning of

period 1987-1989.

the

parent headquarters.

virtually the

the U.S. Army has

fiscal

mixed forces

the

so that

at

year 1990,

the NTC.

In one a light
In

the

entire

been committed.
there had been

Eight of

12

those occurred

infantry brigade

in

served as

remainder, a heavy brigade of

two balanced mechanized/armor task forces was the base force with
a non-meciianized infantry battalion attached.
A typical mixed-force rotation at
mechanized or light

the NTC will find the non-

battalion operating

with a heavy battalion

brigade headquarters in

for the

task force under the command of a heavy

force-on-force operations while the

second heavy battalion operates separately

second five-day increment will
live

first five days

in live

The

find these same two task forces

fire under a brigade headquarters resourced by

trainers while the second heavy battalion is

maneuvers with the parent brigade.
entire

fire.

the NTC

in force-on-force

In the final four days, the

troop list operates together in force-on-force under the

rotational brigade headquarters.

Light Infantry as a Force Multiplier

It was recognized that the armored division,
internally, required more infantry in
proportion to tanks and, externally, would
usually operate in closer proximity to
infantry divisions than had been supposed.
There was . . . an increasing rapprochment
1
between tanks and infantry. '
General

McNair, 1942

in

The
force

consensus

today is that

a light

can make a significant contribution

infantry battalion

to the generated combat

power of

the heavy brigade, but that there is a bill to

terms

offsetting the

of

differential.

firepower,

pay in

survivability, and mobility

If properly employed with heavy forces, the

battalion can be an effective battlefield shaper.

the

enemy to address multiple threats,

force to maintain a higher OPTEMPO.

does not have to dismount the

task

light

It can force

and it enables the heavy

The heavy brigade task force

lead mechanized battalion

task

force to breach if a light battalion has attacked the night

prior, cleared the
emplacements

obstacles, and eliminated the anti-tank

that were covering the obstacle belts.

The light

battalion can destroy the enemy, unhinge him, and force his
repositioning, all under cover of darkness.
There are,
SOPs,

style of

of course, coordination issues

to be resolved:

operations, organization, communications, and fire

planning.

These usually begin to take shape toward the end of a

rotation.

However, there is a mobility differential which

requires

augmentation of the light units with transportation

assets, as
functions.

do the MEDEVAC, supply/resupply, and maintenance

Some of these differentials are structural, while

others can be offset by training which enables

comprehend the nature of the other

in terms of capabilities,

limitations, optimum employment, and support

It is

important to understand that the

in mixed force maneuvers

at

the brigade

level

each force to

requirements.
experience

to date

has seen a prevalent tendency to operate

in a manner that employs the light infantry

10

and the mechanized/armored elements

sequentially.

organization chosen by the rotational brigade

which in

the offense will see

and then

the heavy force

degree this

the

The task

is usually pure,

light infantry move at

night

after beginning morning twilight.

is a function of

the extreme openness of

To a

two-thirds

of the NTC's maneuver space and scenarios which weight the

accomplishment of heavy force training objectives
movement to

contact.

such as

There is also the matter of the extreme

mobility/survivability differential and a concern for safety of

foot

soldiers born of

unfamiliarity that drives,

to a degree,

this tendency to apply one force and then the other.

This

tendency is not unique to our history, but

it would have been

unusual at

far as

the division

level and below as

tank-infantry

operations of World War II were concerned:

For the final dash into Rome, the corps
attached Task Force Howze, a two-battalion,
armor-heavy task force commanded by COL
Hamilton Howze, to the First Special Services
Force to form a spearhead for the corps
advance.
The corps order directed Task Force
Howze to lead the advance by day and the FSSF
by night.
BG Frederick (commanding the
FSSF), however, later said that these orders
were silly.
Instead, as the senior
commander, he used armor and infantry
together--in a coordinated, continuous
advance.1S
The Germans

also held very strong views on the subject.

General Hermann Balck asserts:

The idea of separate assignments for tanks
and infantry was a sin against the essence of
tactics:
the cooperative employment of all
arms against a single point rather than using
one arm here and another over there. 1 6
1

The Operations Group at the NTC works hard to offset this

tendency in scenarios and has had the most success in live fire,
where by virtue of being the brigade headquarters they can
dictate the task organization and arrange situations that
encourage if not demand low-level integration.
For ease of presentation, what follows is a report of NTC
observations in the operating systems format.

The seven

operating systems have been so overused in our journals that they

have almost eclipsed the principles of war, but they are useful
for addressing in a coherent fashion the essential elements of
combat operations.

Not every operating system is addressed.

Intelli ence
Light and heavy forces have different intelligence
requirements as to priorities and level of detail.

The 101st

Airborne Division (AASLT) needs explicit detail on enemy ADA

locations.

A heavy battalion force is concerned with SA4's,

SPIGOT, and anti-tank in general.

A light scout may be

unconcerned about the belts of wire and mines because he can walk

around them, yet these same mines or obstacles in a trafficable

wadi may be a war stopper for Team Alpha Mech.

The light

infantry element

it

needs near A-1

intelligence as

cannot react

to move another 5 kilometers in an attack with 30 minutes

remaining until sunrise.

If the intelligence is not firm, then

the risk is that a light force may search, on foot, vast areas
trying to find the enemy, increasing its vulnerability to direct
and indirect fires.

For this

reason

12

light infantry must orient

on

the

enemy

on specific

terrain

combat power and contribute

effort.

Missions

to

seize

terrain allow the light

in order

to the

to

effectively mass

higher headquarters

terrain and

destroy enemy

cffensive

on

that

force to move directly to a clearly

defined objective, secure

it,

destroy the

enemy and conduct

survivability/countermobility operations.
The
light

timing of

task force

reconnaissance

is critical as well.

sunrise to

the cover of darkness

link up, support,

scouts must

the

is to be employed in an offensive operation

tomorrow, then it may foot move 20 kilometers tonight

atack under

If

then get

in order to

and be on the objective at

and pass a heavy force.

out early and cannot wait

The

light

for the

consolidated brigade reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

In

short,

lines

for

the

light and heavy forces

troop leading procedures.

faster.

are on two different time

The brigade S2 must analyze

The brigade FSO must work quicker to target

the S2's

template.
It is not

unusual

for heavy forces

but known minefields and obstacles, or

to wander into unreported

for the light forces

committed against an improperly templated objective that

shallow.

Nor is

it unusual

to see air assault

overfly templated enemy air defenses.

Light

frequently tasked to observe targets that

mobility and observation.

of these

flight routes

In

that

scouts are

exceed their range of

to benefit the light infantry.

negatives can and do improve over the

of a rotation.

is too

Intelligence products and related fire

plans are generated too late

All

to be

intelligence as
13

in all

course

the operating

systems,

it

is

complete

understanding

other--they

not

must

enough
of

actually

for

each

force

simply

the

capabilities

and

to

acquire

limitations

of

the

train together.

Maneuver
There

are

operations
Second,

to

routes,

move

task

is

with the

its

to

the task
control

is

very

is

essential

In one

is

isolated

by

Combat

and
in

force-on-force

battle at

the

The

was

at a

compounded

mass

in

that

effort

in

the

separate

the

force

is

to breach and
route with
provides
albeit

brigade

three separate

instance

less

than

1:1
light

company

company

each

both the

Mass

column.

closed
NTC,

same

their

still be massed,

In

14

the

occur.

heavy

dug-in, motorized rifle

ratio of

and

on

along one

battalion

terrain and distance.

attacked

its

power can

light

the

to

a heavy-light

four march serials

in

assigned the

in

and move

However, movement
to

decision as

engagements

not achieved,

careful

battalion

stealth to

battalion

battalion
error

rely on

into three

the

critical.

combat power

their

and unsuccessful

each against

objectives

light

is

mass

successful

with the

headquarters

as

be

mixed-force

Third, a

before

that piecemeal

and dispersion.
quickly

First,

tendency to disperse

place

broken

To

to mass

forces

about

difficult.

getting the

force

objective.

force

be made

to

system.

is made.

result

then attritted

as

maneuver

light

there

the decisive

points

requires

Because

movement,

not

organize

battalion

often

the

mission

assault

place.

at

the

of

task

brigade
heavy

under

key

synchronization

analysis
how

three

the

without

light
success.

battalion

and

the

heavy brigade

failed to mass.

The brigade task force was

defeated piecemeal.
In another battle a heavy brigade commander sent a light
task force
not to

against two

separate and exclusive objectives

telegraph where he would make

company to

the main effort.

so as

The

the south attacked a dug-in enemy without armor

support at a ratio of

1:1

and was defeated.

The battalion(-)

in

the north was attritted by artillery fire enroute and attacked

the main objective, where the brigade(-) planned to penetrate,
with only a reinforced company.

This

brigade did not reach its

objective.
Synchronization of

two divergent forces like

heavy and light

is very difficult when they operate separately, as

norm over time

at

the NTC, and attempt to arrive and mass at

same time and place.

light

has been the

It requires

forces time on the

the

careful time lining to give the

objective under the cover of darkness

and to insure the heavy forces arrive to take advantage of any

success

the foot

infantry may have had.

NTC a light battalion, under

In one engagement at

the

cover of darkness, forced the

repositioning of an opposing force motorized rifle company that

was covering a major obstacle by fire.

However, the heavy force

had experienced difficulty in uncoiling the assembly area and

arrived late by over an hour.

In the interim the

simply repositioned some three kilometers

opposing force

to a different vantage

point from which they could cover the obstacle.

The

light

battalion had by then been attritted, had exhausted most ot

15

its

anti-tank weapons,
the

and was unable to

reach the enemy again before

heavy battalion arrived and was destroyed

in the

fire sack.

METT-T
In the break out toward Rome the FSSF took on
a combined arms structure, with tank
destroyer, tank, and armored reconnaissance
units.
Its task organization changed
frequently (inter-mixing tank and infantry)
depending on the factors of mission, enemy,
troops available, and terrain.1 7
This difficulty in achieving synchronization in both the
offense and

the defense has led to

a "separate sand box"

mentality where heavy brigade commanders

problem by using the
offensively and
defense.

light

infantry as

in a separate

There is

if it- accomplishes

sector of

at

the NTC solve the

a separate

"diversion"

the battlefield on the

nothing wrong with a separate sector approach

the brigade commander's

intent.

If the METT-T mnemonic dictates no cross-task organizing,

then by all means employ the forces separately.

The example of

MG Manteuffel and the Grossdeutschland division in

Targul
With

Frumos in Rumania in

1944 supports

ideal terrain and over 30 days

that

to prepare

and synchronize, he attached no armor to the

all

in reserve.

The total Soviet

200 armored fighting vehicles.

tanks

destroyed. 1 1

course of

infantry but held it

losses were over 350 tanks and

German losses were less

in the experience of

Separate Tank Battalion in WW II:

16

action.

the battlefield

Certainly it can be carried to

extreme, which can be seen

the battle of

the

than ten

the other
709th

The 709th Tank Battalion, in supporting the

8th Division, normally is allotted down to
the point where one platoon is attached to
each infantry battalion.
This attachment is
continued regardless of terrain or mission
when in combat.
Tank companies are not
employed tactically as such.
The battalion
commander feels that considerable opportunity
for support between tank platoons is lost and
that in many cases tanks are not used in mass
at the decisive point to support the major
effort.19
However,

there

are times to

platoon with a light

Lake Pass,"
on the

put a mechanized team or a tank

task force.

Consider the NTC battle of

where a light battalion had been employed separately

flank of a heavy brigade with only its

four M220 heavy anti-tank

support.

At

graphics

(TOW) guns and without

to facilitate the commitment

the

destroyed

tank or Bradley

The OPFOR's main

light battalion.

of a reserve to

the

regimental attack was

light
thrown

Some 40 enemy vehicles were

in the pass by direct fire and mines, but

echelon motorized rifle battalion was able

intact

organic dragons and

the brigade level there was no contingency plan or

battalion sector.
against

"Red

the

second

to break through

and overrun the brigade support area.

One tank platoon

integrated into the defense either forward or to the rear of the

pass would have had a telling effect on the second echelon.
OPFOR commander's
of

tanks

The

decision criteria was triggered by the absence

in the sector.

Why do heavy force brigade commanders

infantry as

regard non-mechanized

something to be deployed separately (separate

sandbox) when they clearly embrace the concept of

integration within the mechanized forces of

17

combined arms

their own unit?

The

entire

integration
The

NTC

at

lowest

level

experience

is one

of

common

force-on-force
emplacements
fighting

to

vignette

sustain

vehicles
is

terrain

feature

for

range

and

and

tanks

an

(IFV)

is

in

an

the

for

in

attack,

to

rule,
of

the

not

and

the

this

infantry

exception.

elementary

heavy force

task

assembly area.
a

rugged

a BMP with

ineffective

gun

infantry

edge of

acquired by

in

from machine

capable

using the

be

tank

casualties
night

combat

battalion

for

infantry unsupported

fully

platoon,

attritted until
in

the

significant

remain

infantry

as

argues

rediscovery

in a defile while

Another

IFVs

our army

the

principle.

off

history of

stand-

when there

aL-

force.

Fire Support
The
that

fire

there

control

assault

when

was

substitutes
The

was

planning

In

one

that

force brigade
of

be

the

objective,

friendly artillery

and

was

another

the

battalion was

the
over

objective.
broken

The

ground at

so

1 to

18

NTC

fire

fires

of

the

forces

battalion was
The
forces

the brigade
The

to

ineffective.

given only one hour

foot

In
to

soldiers

1-1/2 kilometers

could

infantry

casualties

that

and

is more

friendly

to bear.

is

plan

strongpoint.

that

combat

problem is

rate of

sustained

rendered

inherent

infantry

clear

artillery

to quit

engagement

the

assaulted

its

the

especially where

"raid"

area

detailed

clearance of

battle

the objective

preponderance

unable

and

to

relearned at

solid,

heavy-light operations,

heavy

the

often

for a

inappropriate mission

the

bring

in

lesson most

sequentially.

an

intent

are no

measures.

difficult

given

support

per

clear
move

hour.

and after commitment they may have a significant number of

wounded to care

for.

Once troops have advanced toward an

objective, they should never withdraw in
favor of an artillery barrage, as ground once
given is almost impossible to regain. 2 0
North Africa,

The dilemma
the

enemy will

perceived by heavy brigade

simply button up, back

and call artillery on his

not bear
some at

that out,
the

FSO with the

such as

NTC,

is to give

is that

History, however, does

solution, successfully

exercised by

control and clearance of

light battalion.

PSCL, RFL,

commanders

into his fighting position

own position.

and the

1943

fires to the

He can effectively use measures

and no-fire areas to

avoid a "separate

sandbox" artillery fight.

When asked

this problem, COL James H.

Dyson, a battery commander and forward

observer with the

to give some

insight

to

2nd Armored Division, reported his World War II

experience:
We would send forward observers with
engineers to control and clear fires on the
I believe the observers with the
obstacles.
infantry could do the same thing in the
situation you describe.
In World War II we
had spotter planes in the Artillery.
They
were gone when I deployed a group to Vietnam.
Infantry certainly has to dig in and be quick
about it.
The Russians were great
21
They learned from us.
artillerymen.
The role of

the

infantry remains to get

where the heavy force wants to penetrate at

on the objective
least two

hours

before sunrise in order to kill the armored vehicles and force

their reposiLioning so that they are denied fighting from
19

prepared

positions.

heavy

force,

might

be

seizing

and

the

evacuates

infantry
the

Then

its

supported

objective

infantry digs
wounded.

by fully

together

at

in,

The

links up

with

the

optimum, however,

night-capable

IFVs

and

tanks

night.

Mobility
Our

NTC

experience

very effective
way

at

and support

with

handtools

carried.

If

extended
cannot

emplacements
certainly
rule

the

heavy
combat
given

sections of

obstacles
of
all.

the

well

and

It

is

heavy

infantry can

first

belt

must

be

forces;

"bangelore"
in

but

it

then the

better used

to

fire.

and mark it
prepared

to

to

to

is

open

all

that

done

an

infantry

issault

simply

the

Infantry

can

standard, but

breach in

the

have been

belts over

kilometers,

by

certainly be

clearing

torpedo

successive

the obstacles

NTC

the

tendency not

light battalions

the

foot

stride

as

with

forward.

elements.
to

are

several

covering

open

the

engineers
them;

it

assault of

heavy force

engineers
At

and

distance

breach

that

penetrating, breaching and

the

the

says

If

light

(who had

therefore,

success would be

the

extends

the

task-organize
to

mission to

battalion,
the

to

real

commen

obstacle

well

for

as
was

no heavy

to

breach)

to

a heavy brigade's

with wheeled

2U

support as

the

breach a major obstacle

capability

critical

undertaken

it was

combat

between

vehicles

to

and

accompany

shovels.

Countermobility
The degree
is a direct
density of

to which

function of

light
the

infantry can shape the

terrain, time

engineer equipment.

available, and the

Operations at the NTC

reinforce what we knew in World War

our

battlefield

II.

simply

The difference

is that

non-mechanized infantry divisions have a significantly

reduced density of

engineer equipment and barrier haul

capability.

engineer equipment will not properly dig in

Light

tanks or even TOWs

tank ditch, so
obstacle

standard.

it takes

company

level

101st have

engineer platoon.

line haul

provide the assets

to make that happen.

be

in the

The

the NTC where this

cut a

for

the way forward to

The direct support

long haul

five 5-ton dump trucks

not

can lay 3,000-5,000

that comes all

business.

organic to

The 82nd
the DS

light divisions have only pioneer tools.

The heavy brigade has to offset

at

JD550 backhoe will

A light battalion

engineer platoon cannot

and the

The

the heavy force must

construction.

mines, but
rifle

to

this.

There have been instances

was successfully done and occasions where

the materiel was simply not hauled far enough forward.

Survivability
The haul
materials

to

requirement

for Class

The

have the

The

construct field fortifications and overhead cover

are not normally stocked as

IV.

TV are extensive.

part

of a mechanized brigade's Class

light battalion, as with Class V mines, simply does not

haul capability.

This has to be offset

21

by the

heavy

brigade and its parent division.

capability of a battalion of
reposition in time to

The

significant anti-armor

the 82nd Airborne

Division can

thicken the battlefield for a brigade

commander if emplaced mounted.

However, digging it in may mean

not digging in a tank elsewhere, because the heavy commander must

decrement his own survivability to provide the blade

time.

NBC
Light

forces have

learned in

the heat of the NTC desert

degrade the military-oriented protective

posture

heavy work periods

soldiers who move

in the defense.

MOPP with real weight ammo

the MOPP

loads, as

they do at

(MOPP) during

the NTC,

in

render

suit unserviceable and sustain excessive heat

casualties.
MOPP II

Foot

to

Instead,

level

in

they have

learned in

the assault position.

decontamination where a light unit

structure, by a DS

real shortfall

supported, under the

is

in

light

and no personnel decontamination

Again, the decrement has to be offset by the

brigade with its

trailers,

The

chemical platoon equipped with three senaders,

55-gallon water blivets,

capability.

is

the offense to go to a

fire-fighting equipment,

heavy

1,000-gallon water

and other expedient equipment.

Combat Service Support

There
our

is a significant difference in

light divisions today und the

World War

II.

22

the self-sufficiency of

standard infantry divisions

of

At the NTC combat

stopper.

trucks

be the war

Success has eluded more than one heavy brigade

commander for
numbers

service support has proven to

lack of

the

transport to move

required and at the

to move

time needed.

the combat elements of

there are none organic

foot soldiers

It requires

20 five-ton

a light battalion,

save the two designed to move

in the

and

the field

kitchen.
In

a heavy battalion the supply system is supply point

distribution, while in a
distribution.
of vehicles
evident.

If there are shortfalls

is such that

When the

immediately.

light battalion the system is pinpoint

light

a systemic

in the heavy,

the density

problem may not be

"push" system does not work,

When we mix the two

forces, we have

readily
it is felt

learned at

the

NTC that a conscious plan is required to reconcile the

difference.

When each attempts to work his own system

exclusively, things begin to come apart.

battalion attached to a heavy brigade,
must adjust

to push supplies.

It

If

it is a light

then the heavy brigade

requires seven five-ton trucks

daily to sustain the LOGPAC function, linehaul of Class IV and V,

and troop

lift as

required.

Problems arise at

the NTC because

units do not train together, which is the only way that each can
really
to

learn how to operate with the other.

learn to anticipate and the

If the operation

light brigade

light force to requisition.

requires support

headquarters, then CSS

to a

to heavy forces OPCON to a

is even more exacerbated.

Whatever we intend to

"plug in"

especially at

level--must be modular,
23

brigade

The heavy force has

light division base-tailored, and self-

sustaining

or come

attachment

if

the

1990

the

Forward

divisible

Support
and

was

not

necessary
is

not

rotation

to

the NTC,

Battalion

Before

prepared
prepared

is

obviously

not

corps

with more

light

support

unit

a forward

entity.

structured or
it

parent

light/heavy

arrangement,

COSCOM

the

with the

were

to
to

significant

present.

Shield

repair
repair

permit

geographically present.

This

support battalion
Desert

to

the
any

the

ITV,

is

I Corps

divisions

than heavy,

move

to

of

ad hoc

designed

heavy equipment.

As we

an

XVIII Airborne
and

problem.

portions

was

not

In

as

Corps

is

not

In

Europe

a "contingency"

this must

be

addressed.
A

final

evacuation.
had

area

that

Light

requires

battalions

simulation

infantry).
station
assets

The

to

(30%

the

mechanized

problem appeared

battalion aid

on a mission

basis

has

Obviously, offensive
forces

are

NTC over

argues

that

in

offensive

opportunity, after
heavy

commits

force

his

chemicals.

must

proven

and

to

exploit.
fires

From

infantry

in

vs.

link

The

period

force-on-force
43%

light

from company

aid

ambulance

viable.

Control
involving

control.

light force

of medical

a two-year

rate

the

that

Augmentation of

operations,

reserve,
the

be

operations

the more difficult

is

infantry

to

station.

Command

the

at

comparatively higher died-of-wounds

exercise

of

augmentation

there
has

had

these divergent

The
is

NTC
a

some

experience

50-minute
success,

window closes when

FASCAM, or

employs

perspective,
24

the

window
which
OPPOR

non-persistent

link-up

is

paramount

especially

if the assault was made unsupported by heavy direct

fire platforms.
at

Once the

risk and needs

light

force is

on an objective,

the light

force

without benefit of
load of

is

to be quickly reinforced by the heavy force.

The Pe'ey counterattatk comes quickly 9fter the

and

it

is then defending

loss of

terrain,

from hasty positions

mines and obstacles, with a diminished basic

anti-tank weapons and against a heavily armored

The command and control function

force.

is critical.

All infantry commanders will thoroughly

realize their personal responsibility for the
coordinations, communication, and control of
the tanks attached to their units in combat.
There have been instances in the past where
complete cooperation between the tanks and
the infantry during combat did not exist.
This has inevitably been caused by the
failure on the part of the infantry commander
to sit down with the tank commander concerned
and thoroughly familiarize the tank commander
with his plan of attack and to assure himself
that the means of communications control were
set up and tested prior to the jump-off.
The
infantry commander 4aust know that the tank
commander understands the infantry plan, and
he must understand the tank commander's plan
to support him.
Unless this understanding is
complete, the attack will inevitably bog down
before objectives can be reached and
organized.22
This does not come from an after-action report at
Instead,

it is a memorandum distributed to platoon

corps commander in combat

The

lesson here,

as

in Italy in
this WW II

synchronization is both a process

command responsibility.
solution that allows
is often

the NTC.

the best.

level by a

1944.

commander realized,

and a result.

It

is that

is also a

The plan must be kept simple.

The 80%

flexibility with a clear mission statement

Common CEOI

information, graphics and

25

terminology

allow inter-operability and contribute significantly

to mission success.
maneuver,

The

plans,

fire support and

coordinated.

combat service

Decision points and phase

must be designated.
articulated,

graphics,

events

Second only to a simple plan, well

is a quality rehearsal

elements of

support all must be

lines to trigger

conducted early with the

brigade commander and brigade operations

the

and matrices for

combat

officer leading and all

power represented.

Mixed-force operations

especially require precise control measures, link-up and passage

instructions and have the best

chance for

success when they are

executed following a simple, well-rehearsed plan.

of

these

types of

The difficulty

operation can only be comprehended

in

largescale mixed-force operations against a credible opposing

force,

whether at the NTC or elsewhere.

Live Fire and the NTC

As mentioned, the NTC provides

the brigade headquarters

the heavy and the light battalion in the live fire phase of
rotation.

As

for
a

such the brigade operations orders and accompanying

task organization are prepared by the live fire trainers of the

Operations Group.

A typical offensive operation may find a tank

heavy team OPCON to a

light battalion for the

seizure of a strong point, then platoons of

from the

light

reduction and

anti-armor detached

force to augment the heavy force after it has

linked up and passed through and a light rifle company attached

to

the heavy battalion for a subsequent air assault

a flank threat

to eliminate

once the heavy force has reached and occupied

26

its

final

objective.

The opportunity is

battalions to achieve

thus provided

to the

true tank-infantry integration at as

low a

level as mission analysis dictates.

In one

scenario

the

light battalion moves at night

assault positions and then, supported by its organic

heavy mortars

of

weapons, the

the armor or mechanized battalion, DS artillery,

and tank direct fire,

with service ordnance.
arms

to

it breaches and reduces a strong point,

All the elements to produce

integration are present

in these scenarios.

all

true combined

The underscored

problem remains synchronization, which is only achieved through

such realistic training opportunities.
Another scenario finds the

infantry

clearing a series

of

deep defiles over a six-kilometer route after an all-night foot

movement of some

12 kilometers.

There are no trucks and on more

than one occasion in this scenario, tank-infantry teams have

evolved on an unplanned, unrehearsed basis with soldiers moving
as tank-mounted infantry, dismounting and protecting the tanks as
required.

This

is the level of

integration we need

to achieve

in

training, but we can only do it if we deliberately set out to

make it happen.
exercises at

The battalion task forces who undergo these

the NTC are possibly the best

infantry integration.
is that

The problem for the

in our Army at

readiness of our force

they are the exception in our Army's current

So what was our World War II experience in

operations?

What was the evolution of tactical

the U.S. Army enter

into that war structured as

caused changes in that force structure?

27

tank-

Did we

situation.

"mixed force"
theory that saw
it was?

What

really learn in

the

sense of operationalizing our combat experience?

follows is an attempt
by

checking the

to address

those questions

What

in the hooe that

"back azimuth," we can gain some sensing

we should go or at

least do not want

28

to go again.

of where

Chapter 2
EVOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL THEORY
Arguments and counterarguments about the
superiority of infantry and tanks, or vice
versa, are essentially futile, for the two
arms are complementary and the real problem
is not to decide between them but to
effectively combine them together.2 3
World War

I gave

rise to the view that

infantry support weapon.

across no man's
guns.

decision"
the

to get

men

the German

brought armor to the forefront as the

"arm of

The United States Army entered the war with

in 1940.

thought

tank was

land, and it was logically armed with machine

Heinz Guderian, architect of

General

"blitzkreig,"

purpose of the

The

armor was but an

that armor was an independent

exploitation only.

With the

force to be used for

rise in numbers and effectiveness of

Tanks were

anti-tank weapons, this faded away.

less able to

defend themselves and needed to be closely supported by infantry.

To keep up with the tanks,

we went

to half-tracks.

In total,

some 16 armored divisions with "armored infantry" were fielded,

2
yet we fielded 67 divisions of regular or foot infantry.

(Armored infantry was transported

hence

its name.

It was

in armored half-track vehicles,

found only in the

regiment had three battalions of three

platoons
B.

armored division.

The

companies with three

to the company.]
H. Liddell

Hart and J.

F. C.

Fuller,

theorists in England between World War

opinions with regard
precedence

to the

I and

to tanks and infantry.

the leading military

II, had differing
Hart,

though giving

tank, always stressed the need for

29

infantry as

an

integral

part
of

part of

the mechanized force;

whereas for

the most

Fuller relegated infantry to a strictly subordinate role 2'

protecting lines

of communication and fixed bases.

General George H.
organization:

Patton believed

armor was prominent

supporting weapon in the

it was simply a matter of

in the armor division and a

infantry division.

In an infantry division the purpose of

supporting weapons--primarily tanks--is to
get the infantry forward.
In an armored
division, the purpose of the infantry is to
break the tanks loose. 2 6
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel

saw it

in yet another light:

The Infantry serves to occupy and hold

positions designed to prevent the enemy from
particular operations or to force him into
other ones.
Once this object has been
achiEved, the Infantry must be able to get
away quickly to occupy positions elsewhere. 27
The motorized infantry of Rommel was well

equipped with 88s

and 50s and thus

so strong in anti-tank weapons that they could

serve as a pivot

point around which armor units

could operate. 2'

Panzer grenadiers were motorized infantry who followed closely

and dismounted to move into action on foot whenever
encountered hostile fire. 2 9

they

In the defense the panzer division

held key points with their infantry and counterattacked with

their tanks.
As

the war

progressed, the combination of different arms

smaller groups made cooperation far more intimate and quicker.

Infantry assumed the role of an active partner alternately
leading or following based on the

30

terrain and situation.

in

We ended World War II with our armored divisions

spearheading attacks on

all

fronts against

enemy.

Armor was the arm of decision.

we have

forgotten that

attached

Over time,

unfortunately,

infantry divisions with their

tank battalions who slugged it out

narrow corridors

and preserved those

that permitted such famous drives as

2nd Armored Division.

in the

it was the

a disintegrating

It is also

that of

important to remember

the

that even

exploitation it was not the mobility differential between

tank and infantry that was the final limitation but the business
of

logistics:
The average speed of Third Army after the
breakout from Normandy was 15 miles a day.
At its best, it covered 30 miles in one day.
The speed and range of modern transport had
been cancelled out by the huge consumption of
30
modern armies.

By the end of

the War, the sequential

employment of

tanks and

then infantry was superseded by closer cooperation between arms

in smaller tactical
outside

groupings.

The

retention of

tank units

the armored division for use with infantry was practiced

31
by both Soviet and U.S. armies.

31

Chapter

FORCE STRUCTURE HISTORY

Before
light tanks

1939 the

infantry division included a company of

in its table of organization and eqaipment.

In July

1940 armor was removed from the divisions and did not come
as an organic element until after

back

the war.

All tank destroyers, all aircraft guns except

the simple cal. 50 machine gun, and all tanks
not in armored divisions or mechanized
cavalry were pooled in non-divisional
battalions . . . for attachment to divisions
as needed.
Lieutenant General Leslie J.
McNair* was the architect and advocate of
3 2
this concept.
Lieutenant General

J.

L. Devers,

Force, was not an advocate of pooling.

then Chief of the Armored

He believed that the

occasional attachment of non-organic units

produce

poor combined arms

teamwork.

Early in WW II,

to divisions would

training and poor battlefield

he wrote to General George Catlett

Marshall that:
Economy of force is not gained by having a
lot of units in a reserve pool where they
train individually, knowing little or nothing
of the units they are going to fight with.
It is much better to make them a part of a
division or corps, even to wearing of the

General McNair became head of Army Ground Forces in 1942 and

was in charge of all unit training and organization for the U.S.
He had great latitude to design and restructure
Army in WW II.
forces.
He was highly regarded for both his organizational and
field abilities.
He was killed in the Normandy invasion.

32

same shoulder patch.

If they are needed
elsewhere in an emergency, they can be
withdrawn easily from the division or corps
Economy
and attached where they are needed.
of force and unity of command go together.
You get little of either if you get a lot of
Team play
attached units at the last moment.
33
comes with practice.
In World War II we had separate
of

for

the support

infantry (non-mechanized) as distinct from armored-infantry

(half tracks).
but attached
throughout

Separate

Initially there were only 28

the European campaign.

divisions in the

separate tank battalions for 42

theater.3

and to

the division.

infantry

These were designated General

The GHQ designation meant the

Headquarters.
separate

tank battalions were assigned to armies

to an infantry division and operated with it

medium and two light

of

tank forces

tank unit was

remain under control of the general headquarters

In

practice, medium companies were usually

attached to each regiment.

As a rule habitual

followed for SOPs and to facilitate

the regiment was out of the

line.

association was

rest and maintenance whenever

The battalion headquarters

tended to become an administrative unit and advisory section

only.

The separate

battalions were

tank battalions and separate armored

identical to those

were created by the

1943

in armored divisions and

The

administratively self contained.

infantry

separate tank battalions

reorganizption which saw tank battalions

withdrawn from each of the 14 armored divisions and the divisions

reorganized.

These added to a significant

mobilized, produced a number of

equivalent to

the number of

number already

separate tank battalions roughly

infantry divisions.
33

Thus by the end

of

1 9 4j,

in

the non-divisional

54 battalions of armor were

Ther
supi,--,rt

even

the

a portion ot

combat power of

Forc!s

the

One concern was

study of

1946

nd 65

vo-rp initially not

structure.
ol

pool. 3

in armored divisions

enough

separate tank battalions

infantry divisions

to

in the total

that the result would be a degrading

the armored divisions.

An Army Ground

reporteA that:

All experience ot, maneuvers ani combat shows

that failure to provide each infantry
division with an organic separate tank
b.ittalion has lead to dispersion of tank
batt.ii.ons 'n the armored division for
support of infantry divisions, thus tending
to defeat the principle for maximum
employment of tanks en masse with the armored
divisions so currently stressed in our
tactical doctrines. 3 6
General

Patton sa-i the necessity for the

realized

the

separate battalions but

inherent flexibility:

There must be a careful differentiation

between armored divisions and GHQ tank
battalions; both are necessary.
The GHQ tank
battalions are used primarily for the purpose
of supporting infantry, so that the integrity
of the armored division is not destroyed.
The present homogeneity of the battalions,
however, makes iL possible to add GHQ
battalions to armored divis;ons when the
circumstances demand additional armored
force. 3

Reports
combat was
combat

from theaters

indicated that the

to attach a tank battalion to the

division and

that

commanders were practically unanimous in urging that

armored unit be made an integral

that,

normal procedure in

in

training as well as

the same units.

Only then,

part of the division

"to

the

the end

fighting, a division might work with

they held, could the necessary
34

teamwork between tank,

dleveloped."

infantry, and artillery units be

To do that,

of course, required the

number of GHQ battalions in the

believed we were not

appropriate

structure, and General McNair

adequately resourced:

It is believed that our 1943 troop basis has

entirely too many armored divisions,
considering their proper tactical employment,
and too few GHQ tank battalions.
It is
particularly important that the latter be
available in quantities to permit all
infantry divisions to work with them freely
and frequently.
Such training has been
impracticable in the past and probably will
This matter was brought up in
be so in 1943.
connection with consideration of the 1943
troop basis, but the view presented by this
headquarters was not favored by the War
Department. 3
With the

successful employment of German anti-tank guns and

mines from 1941

infantry in
General

to

1943, and with a five-fold increase in

the German armored division from 1940 to 1942,

Devers suggested "armorizing" infantry to move infantry

divisions

in carriers

divisions.

like the armored infantry of

armored

General McNair proposed the temporary expedient of a

pool

of

25 separate armored infantry battalions and on 28 January

1943

set forth that:

We need large armored units to exploit the
success of our infantry.
We need small
armored units also, in order to assist the
infantry locally.
The Russians appear to
have devoted their armor largely to the
latter principle, influenced undoubtedly by
the fact that until recently they have been
40
on the defensive strategically.
Army Ground Forces

by AGP Plan

3, 26

proposed changes

February 1945.41

tank battalion as an organic part of

35

in the

infantry regiment

The plan asked for

the

a medium

infantry division.

At

the end of
combat
the
of

the war,

leaders

there was

an almost unanimous

that units which habitually had to be attached

infantry division, such as armor,

greater esprit

SOPs,

opinion of

should be organic

to

because

de corps and teamwork, better understanding of

and an increase

in morale of

the

attached units.

42

The General Board recommended a tank regiment

for each infantry division which would
habitually operate with one battalion in
direct support of each assault regiment.
The
battalion in support of a reserve regiment
4 3
would serve as a division reserve.
After World War

II the Army was of

downsized in a short period of time to

separate

course demobilized and

a record

low.

The

tank battalions were methodically deactivated.

The TOE

for an infantry division in 1950 in Korea did provide for a tank

battalion organic
regiment.

to the

(Annex A,

division and a tank company

Appendix 3)

in each

This was only one-third of

the

structure recommended at the end of World War II and was roughly

the WW II ratio.
8th U.S. Army,

General

Matthew B. Ridgeway, commander of

reported that all of the 8th Army's four infantry

divisions were missing the tank companies which were

the

infantry regiments.

retained

the

Only the

1st Cavalry Division had

its organic medium tank battalion.'4

By 1952

structure still retained a tank company organic

regiment with four platoons of
The closest we come to
for structure was

in

authorized

five tanks each.'

the

to each infantry
5

implementing the WW II

1954 with two tank battalions

recommendation
in the

airborne division directly under division headquarters.

companies were attached to regiments and rifle battalions
36

Their
but

could

be

implemented
opposed to
had

in

1956.

the

three

seen us

through

regiment

but

lost

organic

the

or habitually
Pentomic

Existing

1961

the

of

around
the

battle

companies.

of

the

came

the

The

This

infantry

the

advent

phase

in

At

of

of

resulted

Assault,

war

saw reorganizations whereby

the

fell

out

of

in

squadrons

and

troops.

Airborne,

the

82nd Airborne,

the

in

retained

The

their
its

M551

of

remains

had

been

personnel

modernized as

The

and

the

Army entered

advent

the

organic
favor of

of

general

With the

nature of

cavalry

retained

had armor.

air

tank battalion

Vietnam era,

armor,

battalion.

organic

After the

stationed separately

the

the

the

Infantry Division,

corps which

Sheridan*

Sheridan

the

9th

returned without

respective

M551

end
the

and were georgraphically

units

At

structure

therefore,

Army Division)

juncture

this

look

that

"mechanized" division.

the Vietnam War.

division's

in

as

which

than

the M113 armored

the

same

smaller

infantry,

Europe were

this

groups"

Division

divisions.

fielding of

was

"battle

group was

(Reorganization Objectives

brought

infantry divisions

five

tank battalions

llth Cavalry Air

the

Division

Triangular

a battalion.

armored.

unit

"Pentomic"

built

infantry divisions

ground

mobility,

II.

than

most

ROAD

mechanized and
its

was

associated with

The
of

The

regiments

armor

division

carrier.

It

WW

larger

deactivation of

concept

in mass. 4 6

employed

and other

their
from

Only

RVN

those
the

creation

only air-droppable

101st

82nd
of

armored

Its weight is 37,500 pounds,

platform in our force structure.
the limit wartime load for the C141 aircraft.
It requires the
downloading of some armament and basic load to meet this
constraint.
37

mechanized infantry divisions,

the

standard infantry division had

been relegated to a secondary role.

In the

1980's we

fielded the

light divisions.

Today they in

conjunction with our other non-mechanized infantry divisions

comprise over one-third of
(not standard

the

Historically light

infantry) divisions have not done well when

deployed without
(today

our active army.

heavy augmentation.

The

10th Light Division

10th Mountain) at a strength of 14,000 men was

committed to

the Mediterranean theater for

of

the Italian peninsula.

combat up

the

With its

last four months

lack of

organic

heavy fire power and insufficient tank augmentation, it

brutally for

its short period in combat,

4,954 wounded."'

organize with our

"suffered

992 killed in action and

Today we have no separate armor units to

infantry.

To use our non-mechanized

task

infantry

requires augmentation, and to do that we must now do the very

thing General

Patton cautioned against, which was to degrade our

armored/mechanized divisions
foot

in order to provide armor support

infantry.

38

to

Chapter

LESSON LEARNING
By April 1951, the Eighth Army had again
proved Erwin Rommell's assertion that
American troops knew less but learned faster
than any fighting men he had opposed.
Americans had learned, and learned well.
The
tragedy of American arms, however, is that
having an imperfect sense of history,
Americans sometimes forget as quickly as they

learn

.4

A "lesson" is an observation or experience

resulting in new knowledge and "learn" means
to gain knowledge. 4
A "lesson" becomes "learned" when it is
incorporated into operational procedures
manuals.30
It

was

learned"
lesson

General

in

the

Marshall who

American

learning

and,

peacetime maneuvers
laboratory."
learning:
when we

structure
The

thanks
as

There

that

our
we

war

three

evalaation, and

procedures,
have

its

to Marshall's

really
very

term

and

elements

and

with

used
doctrinal

to

application.

our manuals,

"lessons

familiar

direction,

an experience-processing

German army was

operationalize

"The Army became

are, however,

collection,

change

army.

popularized the

and

our

lesson
It

is

only

force

"learned."
careful

experience,

to garner and

especially early

then
in

the war:

The German army, for one, was quick to

evaluate its experiences in the campaign that
crushed Poland in 1939, from which it drew
lessons and made adjustments in organization,
5 2
weapons, tactics and techniques.
At

the

conclusion

command directed

of

the

Polish

subordinate

campaign, the

commands

39

"in

the

German

army high

interest

of

the

whole army to
in both the

collect as

soon as possible the combat experiences

tactical and technical spheres,"'5 3 to dessiminate

these experiences widely among the troops, and to use them as

basis

for the

in its
use

training of

the

replacement army.

lessons learned analysis of

its studies to support

doctrine.

The German army

the Polish campaign did not

existing doctrine but to

improve

After action reports beginning at battalion

continuing up to

the

level and

army became more critical of troop performance,

training and doctrine.

"The higher the headquarters, the more

demanding and dissatisfied were commanders with operational

54
performance."''

The Germans were out

the German high command of WWI

capabilities of the front
In the Oberkommand'
read that

to avoid the mistakes of

in overestimating the ability and

line troops. 5 5
les

Heeres reports from Poland, one can

infantry fire discipline was unsatisfactory and

"the

cooperation between weapons and branches had been inadequate.

cooperation between
sucessful." 5' 6
the

infantry and armor had not always been

In the U.S. Army the observer boards collated

Infantry School

in particular published in real

combat experience and returned it to the

caveat that it was
became doctrine

not "doctrine."

time the

field, albeit with a

In point of fact,

though, it

if it worked.

The American tendency to underrate the enemy,

arising perhaps from an inflated national ego
cultivated by eager commanders, was
accompanied at first by an inability on the
battlefield to learn from the experience of
others.5?

40

and

Did the U.S.

War II?

We did

the separate
learned, we

Army learn the tank-infantry

in the short term, as we reacted and organized

tank battalions.
really did not;

recommendations of
Theater, in
structure. 5 8

But

in the sense the Germans

for we failed to

the General Board, U.S.

implement the

Forces

European

1946 to change for the long term our Army's

Today the Combined Arms Lessons Learned

Fort Leavenworth is

tasked like

cell at

the Board of Observers in

theaters of operation to collate

experiences.

lessons of World

the

and report the Training Center

However, because we will not change our structure,

remain geographically separate as heavy and light forces, and are

only slowly bringing back references
consigned to

"rediscover" the

in our manuals, we are

lessons each time we operate

together.

41

Chapter 5
WHAT WERE THOSE LESSONS?
THE TANK-INFANTRY EXPERIENCE OF WWII

Cooperation does not work on the battlefield;

someone must be in charge.
MG Orlando Ward
September 1945

During the co-rse of the attack, the

supporting tanks were called upon to approach
the position under attack.
Infantrymen lying
by the road attempted to hand-signal the
approaching tanks that the road was mined a
short distance beyond.
The tanks did not
stop for the signal and the first tank was
disabled.
Later on the tank men explained
that they had interpreted the hand-warning of
the infantrymen as cheering them on.
This is
an excellent lesson and teaches the necessity
for preplanning with attached units down to
the minute detail prior to the attack.' 0
Italy, 1944

The World War II experience was the genesis of

cooperation.
parents

Necessity and operational

tank-infantry

experience were truly the

of invention as field commanders embraced what worked and

disregarded that which did not.

The realization

infantry units must work together developed after

commitment of American units in North Africa.

that tank and

the

initial

The need for

specialized training to insure teamwork generated a flood of

interest and

requests from the

units entered combat. 6

began to be generated

in combat

In

field for more training before

1944, a great amount of information

interviews,

42

reports of observers,

and reports by field

experience was

commanders.

end of

the war this

reflected in the Board of Observers Reports,

articles, unit histories,

School

By the

and field manuals.

Armor and Infantry

Monographs immediately following the war were excellent.

It is from these
were drawn.

sources that

the following combat

These experiences

experiences

abound, and a few from each major

theater are offered for perspective.

Others

are excerpted at

Annex B.
In WWII the
believed that

infantry divisions in the Pacific

they needed tank, anti-tank, anti-aircraft

additional engineer support

they were heavily engaged. 6 2
provided, the

and in Europe

in virtually every
Where armor

and

circumstance when

support was not

results were grim:

Walk with the rifle company commanders, who

in January 1944 tackled those fortified
houses at Anzio with rifle grenades as their
only direct fire and without the help of the
assault guns they should have had. 6 3
On Omaha Beach American

infantry were disembarked from

landing craft

to attack fortifications with flamethrowers and

demolitions.

It was done without armor.

Moulins it was completely futile.

In the

At Vierville and Les

end infantry and armor

arrived through trial and error at workable attack tactics, but

it took time and

lives. 6'

The fact that infantry cannot cross open

beach as to close with fortifications was
obviously not a remote or fine detail.
Yet
the best pre-invasion training plans did not
provide for them (tank-infantry
coordination). 6 s

43

Before
need tanks

1944

it was generally felt

habitually and that

massed armored action.

numbers,
threat.

tanks

This, of course,

first was at
offset the

should be held apart

When enemy tanks assembled in

tank destroyers would be

66

that infantry would not

large

concentrated to counter

changed through experience.

Kasserine Pass.

for

the
Our

There was a sincere effort to

experience factor before combat.

GHQ had established

the Desert Training Center in California and Arizona early in

1942 to place troops
live and fight

in a primitive environm

t where they would

under simulated battle conditi ns.

the units who would fight at Kasserine Pass,

Division and the
Blumenson reports

the

Unfortunately,
Ist Armored

34th Division, were already in Ireland.

that the 1st Armored Division

in its

Martin

five

months in Ireland before deployment to North Africa trained on

small

unit

integration:

and gunnery.

"The stress was on small unit

training

The work improved tank-artillery cooperation, but

tank-infantry and air-ground cooperation remained weak. " 67

At Kasserine Pass, in
Division lost

98

tanks,

two days of battle the 1st Armored

57 half-tracks, and 29 artillery pieces.

Two battalions of the 168th Infantry sustained losses of

men. 66

In

the whole of the battle II Corps

half-tracks, 208 artillery pieces,

lost

300 killed,

183 tanks,

104

3,000 wounded, and

3,000 missing. 6 9
Units were dispersed and employed in small
elements instead of massing as an integrated
entity.
Kasserine Pass was the catalyst for
integration.
By the late summer of 1943,
Army authorities agreed that combined-arms
training had never been satisfactory.
Infantry and armored officers had had

44

2,200

inadequate training in each other's

operations. . . . Until late in 1943,
armored and infantry divisions were unable to
train together. 7 0
The British provide some
tank and foot
same

of the best

infantry successfully

theater.

tactical examples of

employed together

In the breakout at Tobruk, the

in this

19th Battalion of

the 4th New Zealand Brigade and the 44th Royal Tank Regiment made
a night attack.
At a walking pace with the infantry company
commanders walking alongside the tanks of the
troop leaders who had been detailed to
support them.
The tanks carried pinhead
taillights which acted as guides for the
infantry following.
There was no preliminary
bombardment and the first the Axis defenders
knew of the operation was the arrival of the
leading Matildas in their positions.
Tracks
squealing, engines rumbling just above tick-

over, the dark shapes pressed on slowly to

the rear, spattering the ground ahead with
machine gun fire.
The defenders simply
melted away and 45 minutes after they had
crossed the start-line the crews of the
leading tanks were shaking hands with the men
of the Essex. . . . The cost of this
brilliantly conceived action was one
infantryman wounded. 71
While a tactical

level

concern, the business of

tank-

infantry cooperation can be a major obstacle to the operational

art.

General Bernard Montgomery, as Commander, British Forces,

North Africa, realized this in

1942-1943 and made

the cooperation

of arms a top priority.

With inexorble determination he (General
Montgomery) began eliminating the heresies
which had bedeviled the army for more than a
year, replacing them with a strict orthodoxy
the canon of which was sustained co-operation
It was clear in
between arms at every level.
the coming battle that the infantry would
play a more important role than ever before.
It would be they who protected the

45

mineclearing sappers as they worked, and it

would be they who fought to secure the
breaches in the enemy defenses through which
the armoured formations were to pass.
The
infantry, therefore, must have the maximum
assistance possible, including their own
specialist armoured support.
Brigadier Richards, employed by Montgomery in
an advisory capacity in the campaign in
North-West Europe and his opinion highly
valued, had taken over 23rd Armoured Brigade
shortly after the Ruweisat debacle.
He
proposed that the brigade should become an
independent formation specializing in
infantry support, its regiments living and
training with the infantry divisions with
whom they were to fight.
Montgomery agreed
and added a fourth regiment, 8RTR, to its
establishment, giving it a tank strength in
excess of 200.
In addition to training for
the usual daylight infantry/tank attack,
Richards was ordered to work out suitable
tactics for night attacks.
These consisted
of infantry leading with the tanks following
close behind.
When the objective had been
taken the tanks remained with the infantry to
break up the inevitable counter-attack and
did not leave until the latter's 6 pounder
anti-tank guns had been brought forward and
dug in.
During the weeks that followed the
method was carefully rehearsed with 1st South
African Division, 2nd New Zealand, 4th
Indian, 9th Australian and MG Douglas
Wimberley's newly arrived 51st Highland
Division.
The sustained contact broke down
many of the prejudices held by the infantry
and developed a mutual understanding of the
problems faced by each arm.
If, for example,
the infantry were held up by machine gun
posts, the tanks would deal with them; if the
tanks were held up by an anti-tank gun, it
72
would be eliminated by the infantry.
This

lengthy extract

Montgomery's

not only attests

to General

farsightedness and willingness to

innovate, but to

the degree to which he understood the value of training.

proof

was had

in the

coming months and especially

46

The

in the opening

phase of

the Second Battle of Alamein.

Lightfoot, and it is

This was Operation

reported that General

Rommel

was shaken by the volume and flexibility of

the tremendous artillery fire and depressed
by the carefully rehearsed infantry/tank
tactics which were steadily gnawing their way
into his positions.
The storming parties, he
later wrote, were accompanied by tanks which
acted as mobile artillery, and forced their
way into the tren:hes at the point of a
bayonet.
Everything went methodically and
7 3
according to a drill.
Another

excellent example of

in the break out attempt

A,

tank/infantry cooperation was

from Tobruk in a night attack by Company

2nd York and Lancaster Regiment, with 4th Royal Tank Regiment.
The plan of attack was to subject the enemy
position to a heavy artillery concentration
for an hour.
During this time A company was
to advance, under cover of darkness, as close
as possible and then, the moment the guns
lifted, go into the assault.
Meanwhile the
tanks, using the same start line but on a
different timing owing to their greater
speed, were to assault simultaneously on the
right.
All went like clockw~rk.
A Company's
leading wave got within 50 yards of the
strongpoint and, the moment the guns lifted,
the roar of the tanks coming up right on time
was heard.
The attack caught the enemy with
his head still down and large numbers fell to
the bayonet and Tommy-gun.
During this the
tanks put down a withering fire on the back
regions which effectively kept down that of
74
the enemy.
In the

Italian theater, which was even more conducive

terrain-wise to mixed force operations, the

to learn
tanks

and relearn the

need for the

U.S. Army continued

closest cooperation between

and foot infantry.

Tanks must be met with tanks, with tank
But the tanks must
destroyers back of them.
either be attached to the infantry regiment
or there must be extremely close cooperation

47

between the infantry and tank commanders.

When our regiment was hard pressed, tanks
were sent up to support us.
They stopped
about 1,000 yards back of our front line and
started firing, but it was area firing which
did no good.
If they had been under our
command we would have ordered them forward
where they could have done us some gooe. 7 5
The

learning continued all

which was functional

operational
Some of

and saved lives became

procedure for a unit,

the best

experience is
separate

the way to Rome and,

accounts of

the standard

regiment, division or

tank

found in the unit

again, that

corps.

and infantry operational

histories and reports of

the

tank battalions.

LTC Joseph G.

Felber,

commander of

the 753rd Tank Battalion,

saw action in Sicily, at

Anzio, Rome,

Prance.

continuous action with infantry for

His unit was

in

days without relief, much of

the

time in mountain fighting.

reported that while either tank or

remained

Lar enough from

Piombini, and Southern

infantry might

the infantry so that

concentration on the tanks would not strike

this
the

lead,

the

ridges and the tanks fired smoke

to assist

the

infantry assaults when

?6

This

type of

operational discovery learning went nn

at

the

every level

lowest

as

the need for the

subsequent drive

in every

closest cooperation

level was discovered and rediscovered.

breakout from Anzio and the

to

infantry took the

located

and at

In

positioned on

a gun was

unit

tanks

infantry.

shots were difficult

discover even after they opened fire and so

He

an artillery

very mountainous terrain, enemy anti-tank guns

flank and sitcd for "key hole"

266

to Rome,

In the
the 3d

Infantry Division made a main attack to Cisterna while the First

48

Special
with

Service

three

Force

regiments

destroyers,

advanced

(FSSF),

joint US-Canadian

task-organized with armor

on

the

infantry

and

unit,

tank

right.

The men advanced more rapidly than their

supporting armor.
Consequently, a German
counterattack of infantry and twelve Mark VI
tanks forced the FSSP
to fall back.
Faulty
coordination (or execution) with the attached
tank and tank destroyer units caused part of
7
the problem.?
MG

Robert

in

1949

T.

Frederick, Commander

reported

tank-infantry
In

France

beachheads but

infantry
in

the

that

at

training
the

continued

clearing of
ran

in

as

first

the

While nothing

the

Bocage

combinations
The most

breakout.

instituted
necessity.*

the Overlord
The

value

of

tank and

all arms was underscored

Normandy where

infantry

80%:

new was
of

on

country of

of weapons, special
advance

interviewed

a matter of

stop

well as that of

high as

FSSF, w1'en

theater as

the

in

the

opportunity he

learning did not

cooperation as

casualties

the

of

developed

formations

arms

through this

were

as

to

developed

unique type of

effective method

the

use

and
to

terrain.

of attack proved

to

be by combined action of infantry, artillery,

tanks and engineers with some tanks equipped
with dozer blades . ...
This type of
fighting brought out the importance and
necessity of perfect teamwork and cooperation
of the various combined arms. 7 9
Once
made,

the

the

and with

During

the

realization of
the

separate

period

the

need

for that

tank battalions

9-22 May the

Ist Armored Division that

FSSF

cooperation was

providing

conducted exercises

were widely emulated

theater.

49

the

in the

with

structure, the U.S.

Army

really came

Siegfried line,

fought

across Europe.

(See Annex C,

tank-infantry
pillboxes

through the

into

its

Infantry-Tank Cooperation)

in the Siegfried Line.

The common practice was to

assault

In this way

teams. 8 0

infantry.

join

These

assault teams consisting of a section of

an infantry platoon minus,

throwers.

The

in attacking the

a medium tank company and a company of foot

tanks,

it broke the

Hurtgen forest, and pressed

teams were very successful

would be broken to

.n as

and an engineer team with flame

the tank-infantry company fielded six

The 741st Tank Battalion reported

journals of September

in their

1944 that:

(the) tanks approached and fired into the

embrasures of the pillbox at close range
while the engineers, with the infantry
platoon, placed charges and the infantry
closed in to capture those who came out once
the smoke cleared. 81
The forming of tank-infantry teams with foot
not

limited to

the

separate tank battalions and the standard

infantry divisions but was common practice to

of operations.

infantry was

As Colonel

James H.

Division recalled (Annex D, App.

Dyson of

the overall

theater

the 2nd Armored

1):

I will tell you that there was great effort

expended in establishing the tank-infantry
It was
We had to have each other.
team.
common practice to attach straight leg
infantry to armored units.
They rode (on
tanks) and/or walked.
It was tough on the
infantry, but it worked well.
It has to be
We never fought without straight
that way.
2
leg infantry.'
COL Dyson offered a battle example
which he personally witnessed:

50

of foot

infantry and armor

CCA, 2nd Armored Division, was trying to get

through at St. Lo on the St. Lo to Paris
The U.S. Air Force (Army Air Corps)
Road.
bombed the 30th or 31st Division (American),
which had been leading, until it was combat
The 4th Battalion 22nd Infantry
ineffective.
(foot) was attached by combat command "A"
(CCA) to the 66th Tank Regiment and given the
mission to take the lead and break through.
I was with the 66th as a forward observer.
Our commander believed battery commanders
We attacked
were the best forward observers.
at night with the infantry riding the tanks.
The infantry were trying to protect the
I was with the lead tank company
tanks.
commander and had my head out so I could see.
The infantry were shooting down off the tanks
and even bayonetting the German infantry as
we crossed through hedges and bomb craters.
We were able to break through, expand the
break, and let Gen. Patton's army come
through.S3
The World War
are made

II

experience is

over and over.

Perhaps it

editor of

Infantry Journal

Day +310,

the

The editor

real

exhaustive.

The

same points

is best summarized by the

in July 1945 when he wrote that by D-

secrets of success

lay

in three principals:

1)

Tankers must know what the

wants them to do.

Infantry

2)

Infantry must know what the tanks can

and cannot do.

3)

A mutual understanding and an attitude

of full cooperation must exist between
both.

then goes on to describe combat occurrences that could

easily have been extracts today from after action review

tapes

at the NTC:
Lack of understanding of mutual problems has
led to heavy and unnecessary losses in both
personnel and materiel. . . . An Infantry
battalion commander is positive that the
attack area is cleared of hostile ground AT
guns and, without Infantry support, sends his
supporting tank company to annihilation under

51

video

the direct fire of concealed 88s.

A tank
company commander is promised covering smoke
for his movement by an open road flanked by
mine fields, losing the bulk of his company
because the request for smoke was not put
through.
Infantry commanders have failed to
understand that tanks require time for
maintenance and refueling; they have left
tank units exposed and isolated under direct
fire.
On the other side is the tank-unit commander
who neglects physical time and space factors
and fails to have his tanks in position to
There is the tank-unit
support the attack.
commander who neglects to provide for the
available artillery and engineer support of
And there is the
his part of the operation.
tank-unit commander who does not appreciate
the physical limitations of the Doughboy in
hard going--and fails in his primary mission
by running away from the Infantry.' 5

52

Chapter

TANK-MOUNTED INFANTRY
As a result of
out of
for

the migration of

the separate

the infantry division structure (Annex E),

combat

infrequently used today, even at

mounted infantry team.

separation of

Over time the

tank battalions
one technique

the NTC,

is the

gradual geographic

tank and foot infantry has generated an overconcern

with safety that

is apparent

task organize

the NTC, in small unit leader reluctance

at

mount soldiers on tanks

in

or move together

task force commanders

in an ass

Yet there were operational experiences

from tanks used simply as

with infantry mounted as
In
was

in how brigade

ilt,

cautionary statements in draft doctrinal manuals

forces.

tank-

a means of

and even

about mixing

in WWII

transport to

to

ranging

actual assaults

a matter of SOP.

1944 the Russian method of operation with massed armor

to have the

tanks penetrate deeply and then to halt and bring

up the greatest possible number of infantry during the

Since German counterattacks were
separated from the

with tank-mounted infantry.0 6

Armored Division went

launched while the infantry were

the Russians began in 1945

tanks,

night.

Combat Command "A"

so far as to

of

to assault
the 7th

publish a training memorandum

(Annex F, App. 2) making the movement of infantry on tanks

standard operating procedure, not
but employing tank-mounted
memorandum was published

simply as

a means of

troop lift

infantry as a striking force.

in February

out from Normandy.87

53

1945,

This

well after the break

This practice was prevalent

in other divisions as

CCA, 2d Armored Division, and the 22nd

where tanks were

in the

When necessary the

regular infantry

Force

infantry fought

fight covered by tank fire.

on foot

In the

"moppers up."8

Lanham, CO, 22nd Infantry, explained to

Observer in

in a

third wave
Colonel

an Army Ground

1944 how this worked:

We ride eight men on a medium tank and six on

a light tank, all on the rear deck.
It only
takes ten minutes to train them. Therefore,
we button up these tanks, get time fire from
the artillery on them, and follow with the
tanks carrying the men.
The artillery
observer rides with the leading wave and
controls the fire setting his fuses a little
high.
To insure control of tanks by the
infantry battalion commander and the tank
commander I put them both in the same tank.
The infantry battalion commander has his SCR300 radio which he hangs on the outside of
the tank and works directly with that part of
his battalion which follows, in trucks or on
foot.
Infantry company commanders can talk
to tank platoon commanders by telephones hung
on the back of tanks.
We fought this way
with CCA 2nd Armored Division for eight days
and nights in the sector, between St. Gilles
and Marigny and the foot soldiers who were in
this fight love this scheme.
It does,
however, have one disadvantage in that it
does not capitalize on the full strength of
the normal infantry regiment since it fails
to utilize the heavy weapons company, the
cannon company, the anti-tank company, and
the anti-tank platoons of the battalion
headquarters company.
It employs only the
rifle companies of a normal infantry
regiment.
We are going to try to utilize the
heavy weapons company by riding it on
tanks.89

54

the

infantry to protect them from

there were more infantry on tanks as

Charles T.

Infantry devised a system

first wave with no infantry while

second tank wave had tank-mounted

anti-armor.

well.

COL Charles H. Coates,

an Army Ground Force Observer,

reported seven advantages to the

employment of

tank-mounted

infantry:
(1)
German machine guns are always sighted
for grazing fire about two feet off the
ground.
So if you've got the infantrymen up
and behind the tank turret they are above
this grazing fire and are protected from the
front and partially from the flanks.
(2)
Men riding the tanks are moving targets.
They move at irregular and unpredictable
speeds and follow a changing course.
(3)
From any distance at all it is hard to
pick up infantry on tanks particularly if you
stick branches and camouflage on the tanks.
Sometimes I haven't been able to see
doughboys on tanks from 100 yards.
(4)
The Germans are trained to get into
their holes when tanks roll over them and
shoot at the following infantry.
Instead our
infantry is riding on top of them and can
even get off and in their holes.
(5)
The Germans do not lay mortar fire on
tanks but they do in the fields.
The
doughboys are up above the spray of the
German mortar ground burst.
(6)
The doughboys get much better
observation.
They are blind on the ground
but can see much more when up on the tanks.
(7)

There is

the psychological effect of

looking down on your adversary.

The more common method was to simply ride tank-mounted to
contact

(Annex F, App. 3-4).

These practical operational

techniques were reported not simply by observers and

infantry publications but by the armor community.
extract

from the Cavalry Journal in

1945:

In a rapidly moving situation, when the

infantry cannot maintain contact with the

55

in the

Consider this

enemy, the reconnaissance troop, logically,

can best perform this mission.
By riding 8
or 10 infantrymen "pig-a-back," a
reconnaissance platoon gives to the following
infantry first hand information whenever it
is stopped temporarily by enemy action.
By the same token, no time is lost by the
infantry main body in becoming disposed for
action, because the mounted point has the
situation "diagnosed," and reduction of the
enemy interference is materially quickened.
Cooperation cannot be overstressed.
Passing
of information both friendly and enemy, to
commanders, dispels the fog of the unknown
and makes it possible to keep the enemy
continuously off balance. 9
The close
the

integration of tank-mounted

7th Armored Division, the

the European theater

Korea.

infantry practiced by

2nd Armored Division, and most of

in WW II was,

however, lost by the

time of

Consider this after-action report from the Korean War:

More than once it happened during this
campaign that the infantry showed suspicion
of mounting tanks; once they were mounted,
they overcrowded the entire tank to an extent
where the efficiency of tanks and crews was
greatly reduced.
The next problem was to
make them dismount at the proper time when
hostile artillery, mortar, or small arms
fires land.4 in Lhe aL,.
The majority kept
hugging the tanks; the few who did dismount
crawled underneath the tanks, eliminating
maneuverability.
This faulty procedure was
caused through lack of instructions from
junior officers and non commissioned officers
9 2
and resulted in considerable casualties.

The

techniques had been captured to a degree

Operations
included

Divisions Information Bulletins

in a simple

Tanks with Infantry,

not

in the World War II

(Annex P, App.

5) and

training circular (FM 17-36, Employment

7 February 1944).

of

However, units simply did

train in the technique and again with the passage of the

separate

tank battalions

from the structure, the

lost.
56

technique was

Chapter 7
TANK-INFANTRY COMMUNICATIONS
When
Europe

the separate

tank battalions

in 1944 and close

expedients to modification in
assembly line.

battery.' 3

Colonel

field in

integration became a practical matter,

communications became a concern.

on the

reached the

Units progressed from field

the theater, and finally to

The first field expedients drained the

Charles H. Karlstad, CO, CCA,

Division, pointed out that

the

14th Armored

lack of infantry tank communiction

equipment was making operations especially difficult.

exterior mounted telephones

for the

for a few improvised ones.

This

essential

No

tanks were available except

equipment was considered

4
for village fighting.9

Units were unanimous in their appreciation of

effectiveness of

the

telephone mounted on the

Their complaints were simply that

the

back of the

Units

tank.

not all tanks had been equipped

with the phones and they had not been informed or trained
use.9

changes

in

in the European theater put considerable effort

into the business of communications within the tank-infantry

team:
The 743d and 747th Tank Battalions having
worked for a considerable length of time with
the infantry divisions which they are
supporting have developed excellent tankinfantry team work and their relations with
the division staff appear to be superior to
that of any similar unit visited to date.
At
the time of the visit the 747th was engaged
in training exercises with the 29,:h Infantry
Division units, the purpose of which was to
increase tank-infantry teamwork and
particularly to acquaint small infantry units

57

its

with the capabilities

familiarize the small
the outside telephone
tank-infantry liaison

and limitations and to

infantry commander with
and other means of
and communication. 9 6

Today we don't have a phone on the MI or MlA1.

(Annex P, App.

1),

phone really was

tanks

COL James H.

in World War

When interviewed

Dyson was asked how important the

II and was told our main battle

today do not have phones.

He responded:

Well, as soon as you get in a heavy fight,

I'll tell you what you'll do.
You'll be
running field-expedient phones up onto the
tank and into the turret.
You can't be
crawling up on the tank's deck once under
97
That doesn't work.
fire.

58

Chapter

THE TANK-INFANTRY EXPERIENCE

SINCE WORLD WAR II
There are nevertheless many fundamental
lessons we have learned in Korea, or more
often relearned, that will apply regardless
of the type of terrain or operation.
Therefore, we can profit greatly from
analyzing our deficiencies in Korean combat
and placing appropriate stress on those
subjects in training.
Many of these
deficiences are not peculiar to Korea--they
can be found in historical studies from World
War I and World War II.
We are still making
the same mistakes that are 35 years old. 9 S
The U.S.
time

of

had some separate

the Korean conflict,

dividend"
Smith of

Army still

in
the

tank battalions by

but we had taken the

training as well as
24th Division went

the

"peace

force structure.

Task Force

into combat against North Korean

infantry and armor without supporting armor.

Because it was impossible for infantry
regiments stationed in postage-stamp
garrisons like Camp Wood to train with their
organic tank companies, the tanks were
eliminated from the table of organization."'
Further,
live

the 21st Infantry Regiment had never maneuvered with

artillery and had no experience with tanks.' 0 0

the business of tank and

achieved the
in

level we had

We

learned

infantry all over again but never

in World War II.

While we used armor

cavalry operations and in the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, that

a mid-intensity

was not,

during U.S. ground force involvement,

war

saw the use of heavy forces by the enemy on a regular

that

59

basis.

By contrast

experience of

which failed.

1973 Arab-Israeli War provides

an

some magnitude.

It accentuates
association.

the

the need for

Consider the
It was

attempt to

seize and clear Suez City

a tank and infantry operation of

had not worked together.

Self-Defense Force

training and habitual

General Avraham Adan of

reports on the

the

units that
Israeli

infantry that:

Neither their equipment nor their vehicles,

neither their training nor their inclination
fitted them for armored action . . . the
faulty cooperation between these two elements
only detracted from the effectiveness of the
forces.101
Later when the Israelis were
Suez Canal and north of

the Great

five to six miles

Bitter Lake,

forced its way into Kantara but was ousted.

Brigade mounted a full
infantry and was

an armored column

The

190th Armored

counterattack without close supporting

routed with heavy casualties.

division actually lost

across the

two tank battalions to

10 2

General Adan's

Egyptian infantry

Ion ground that had little vegetation, no built up areas

concealment, and the soil was

poor for entrenching.

was only reversed by the addition of

infantry." 10

In Operation Just Cause, Panama, December

for

His defeat

1989,

the

82nd

Airborne effected close cooperation with their organic armor.

The equivalent of a tank company was placed OPCON to infantry
battalions as

required.

These were

further OPCON to infantry

platoons

and squads as a section of

two to

infantry

then

protected them, rode on

deck,

lived with the

talked on the

tanks,

four tanks.

The

exterior phone and evacuated casualties

60

the
on

the back deck.

their fire by

The

infantry protected the

identifying targets

by building, floor and window

or designating by "watch my tracer."

operation was to train for MOUT as
conduct frequent unit battle
fire"

exercises. 1

The hindsight from this

tank-infantry teams and to

drills of

tank and infantry

in "live

0 4

Our experience as
the past 45

tanks and directed

years.

The

an army

is,

if one thing,

consistent over

lessons are learned and relearned and the

same process will continue whenever and wherever tanks and foot
infantry find each other.

It

is oaly offset where we have a

commitment to train and do so with a purpose.

61

Chapter

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT

Men will
hostile
riflemen
may not

not hold their positions when

tanks get in behind them while enemy
are crowding them in front.
This
fit our theories, but it is a

fact. 105

Anzio Beachhead,
To what extent does
element

the addition of

1944

armor to an

infantry

affect the psychological outlook of soldiers?

add a dimension?
actions.

The

Here are five

first was

Dces

it

short excerpts from combat

in the Hurtgen Forest

in World War

II.

While clearing the road fLom Finkenbur to

Lammersdorf on 15 September 1944, -ompany A,
39th Infantry, without tank support, was held
up trying to secure an important road
junction.
The arrival of two tanks to
support the infantry caused the enemy to
withdraw with ut further fighting.1 0'
The second

concerned the 82nd Airborne Division on the Rhine.

describing the fight

for the Nijmegen bridgehead, General

In

James

Gavin, Commander, 82nd Airborne Division, records how the

paratroopers
Guards

of

the

504th greeting the

on the north shore were "so

actually kissed the

tanks of the Grenadier

enthusiastic

that one of

leading British tank" and how the

cleared the Germans from roof top to

roof

505th then

top supported by

tanks.107

The third comes

commander of

from a General Board

interview with the

a tank destroyer group:

The appearance and the knowledge that selfpropelled tank destroyers were at hand was a
major reason that the infantry attained
success and victory.
Often many men die or

62

them

suffer to take important objectives and

others will die or suffer to retain them if
the inspiration furnished by the presence of
the self-propelled tank destroyer is known.
*
*
An infantryman has his fortitude well
tested, and the mere presence of selfpropelled tank-destroyers in his immediate
vicinity gives a tremendous shot of courage
to the committed infantryman. 1 06
The

fourth

Division when
the

Korean

it was

War.

to

support

The

that

was

The

holding a

38-mile

commanders

in

by the

which

the

Cavalry
of

Taegu

providing

close

hill dominating

noted

had

1st

sector north

70th Tank Battalion was

supporting armor

aggressive manner

experienced

"retaking" a

infantry

Taegu highway.
effect

incident

that

on our

"the

the

Waegwan-

psychological

infantry was

enemy was

in

engaged

shown by

the

and

defeated."109
The
years

fifth

reflects

the

experiences

in

Operation

Just

observations

by

LTC

Grazioplene, Commander,

73d

Armor,

It

the 82nd

later,

James

Cause.

of

is

Airborne,

45

taken from
3d

Battalion

82nd Airborne Division:

The presence of the M551 Sheridans raised the
morale of friendly forces and Panamanian
civilians.
They had an extreme psychological
effect on enemy forces and looters.
Once
Sheridans moved into an area, after an
initial engagement with the M551Al's, enemy
forces generally refused to fire or snipe at
convoys or positions in the vicinity of the
Sheridans.110

There

are numerous

is a dimension
armor

and

that

examples
directly

from

all

affects

infantry.

63

theaters

that

the

of

will

suggest

units,

there

both

Chapter
THE

COMBAT SERVICE

10

SUPPORT EXPERIENCE

There is nothing new in all this.

The only
newness probably lies in attention to things
that are old, but still true.
MG Leland S.
CG, 30th Inf
A

study

of

the

leadership wrestled
foot

infantry

service
in

with

in mixed

support,

structure

World War

to

the

the

Hobbs
Div, 1945

II

experience

same

issue of

force operations

"light"

today's

as

divisions of

divisions.

One

reveals

that

the

sustainability

for

we do

combat

that

now.

In

day were

study on

this

similar

subject

reports:
The light forces have no sustainment
capability and lack sufficient organic
firepower.
These are the same reasons why
General MacArthur did not want light forces
in his theater during World War II.
They
would have required too mary of his assets to
make them a via .e fighting force.
The
concept of pooling assets at corps instead of
making an element a viable fighting force has
been a continual debate since World War
ll.111
Historical
corps

Habitual

as

II

showed

that

needed to weight

association was

pooling assets

the main

established

effort

by corps

at
did

elements

divisions.112
Today's

It

World War

and providing them

not work.
with

reports of

has

been

deployed

to

concept of
called the
a

corps

"round-up"

theater would

augmentation of

plugs

artillery,

be
air

is

no different

concept.

than

WWII.

Light divisions

supported with additional

defense,

64

engineers

and

service

support units.
best phrased

Again, the

in this

training issue arises

and

is perhaps

excerpt from Janes Military Review:

How effective "round-up" will be in practice

is uncertain.
The light infantry divisions
would certainly have to train with their
proposed augmentation force in peacetime if
1 3
they are to cooperate effectively in war.1
The crux of

the problem, of course, is

happening.

The light divisions were canvassed on this

for the Commandant of the

The

divisions

that training

Infantry School in
.

is not
subject

1986:

. indicated uneasiness

about the system because they do not know who

the "plugs" are, where they are located, how
long it will take them to get there, and in
the case of CSS assets who has control over
11 4
them when they arrive.
This

report has already set

forth the functional

sustainability, mobility and survivability of

light forces as

they are being reckoned with today at the NTC.

mobility or

transportation affects

areas of

The aspect

of

sustainability as well.

transportation structure today finds that

only lift one battalion with a surge of

The

a light division can

all

its assets.

Significant organic assets are consumed in self-sustainment.

This was

the case for the

"light" divisions of WWII:

their reduced organic transport,

"Because of

they could not properly supply

themselves."115
The standard
different, and

infantry division of WWII, however, was

it was by no means

infantry were motorized.

could move
loads,

All elements but the

With its organic trucks

in short bounds by

moving the

immobile.

the division

shuttling its trucks, dumping their

infantry, and returning for their organic

65

loads.

"It

could move

personnel and equipment at

with six QM truck companies

trucks." 1
101st,

16

as

Today's

opposed to

capability.
their

incremental

infantry divisions,
"light"

They do have

"light"

phasing out

the impact

2nd ID,

divisions have nowhere

counterparts.

time

2-1/2 ton

e.g.,

significantly more

82nd,

and

near this

capability than

There has been a conscious,

of organic

transportation since WWII.

of

each operating 48

the same

infantry division

Here, for example,

of the shift to

is a capsulization

the "Triangular Division":

Although the battle group requires

considerable supporting transportation for
all types of operations, it does have a
limited amount of organic transportation.
Besides the combat and command vehicles
throughout the battle group, there are five
2-1/2 ton trucks with 1-1/2 ton trailers (in
the Headquarters Company) for transporting
mess equipment, company individual rolls and
reserve rations.
Each truck does the job of
two in the Triangular Division.
The rifle company has four 1/4 ton trucks and
four 3/4s.
The loss of the 2-1/2-ton truck
makes the company dependent on battle group
for transporting individual rolls, chemical
kits, demolition sets, armorers tools, wire
cutters, panel sets and equipment which is
not used every day.1 1 7
In the shift
(124),

the

from regiment

infantry had 66%

(371 vehicles)

to battle group

fewer vehicles and the battle group

became 37% mobile with its organic vehicles.

By using all of

the

transportation battalion's

organic 2-1/2 ton trucks

(80)

armored personnel carriers

(114),

could be made

100%

mobile. 1

pentomic

18

two battle groups

The conviction in the

infantry division was

and

switch from triangular to

that we could do more with less as

66

the

transportation was more

functional

and utilization was more

centralized.
Today's non-mechanized infantry units are dependent for
their
is

transport not

on battalions but division and corps.

a serious operational

VII U.S.
recent

decrement.

Corps After Action Report

Here

i's an excerpt

This

from the

to the USAEUR Commander for a

Reforger:
During Certain Challenge 88, the LIB (light
infantry brigade) required a significant
percentage of 2nd COSCOM's fleet of five ton
cargo trucks as troop transportation during
the deployment phase.
In order to support
the LIB, all five ton cargo trucks asigned to
the 4th Transportation Battalion (previously
directed for turn in), as well as 20 organic
mission vehicles from 2nd COSCOM units were
required.
The diversion of a large amount of
transportation assets reduced 2nd COSCOM's
ability to move supplies and repair parts
forward to VII Corps MSCs and its own units
from which the organic five tons had been
obtained.

19

In most NTC mixed-force rotations the necessary support for

light

forces

is generated by similar ad hoc arrangements within

the host he.vy division.

The question as to what
been

Corps plugs are perceived as

a panacea.

extent they really exist may not have

satisfactorily examined.
The fact

operations

that

the task organization for heavy-light

is on an ad hoc basis leads one to believe

qupport structure may limit the extent

that third of
way of

that our

to which we can utilize

our combat structure that is not mechanized.

example,

By

if we task organize a heavy brigade OPCON to a

light division, the heavy brigade

takes its Forward Support

Battalion (FSB) and some of the main support battalion, plus ASL;

67

but

if we place a heavy battalion subordinate to a light brigade,

then we have to
that were not

subdivide the brigade FSB and other

designed to be fractured.

resources

Corps plugs

can

facilitate a limited contingency operation but do not

support a theater where multiple
attached to heavy divisions

exist to

light brigades have been

(e.g.,

infantry transport), much

!ess

support a theater where a heavy brigade falls in on a light

division.
We need to see if

force structure will support

operations where multiple divisions are mixed.

deploy those units
rotations.
corps,

in support

Arguably,

then perhaps

CSS limitations
service

of combat

corps plugs

further argue

support should be modular,

by organization to support
necessary support to permit

We then need to

training center

if the XVIII Corps

all the

large scale

is to be our contingency
need to be active.

that corps plugs of combat

tailored and self-sufficient

light forces or come with the

attachment

if the parent unit

is not

geographically present.
The

combat service

support aspects of

all our contingency

plans entailing the integration of mixed forces need to be

examined at corps and division

level.

SOPs setting forth all

classes of supply and services, maintenance, medical,

transport
light

should be

laid out for generic

and

force mixes both heavy-

and light-heavy along the

lines of known contingency plans.

in this regard are

occurring at brigade level by the

few brigade commanders who havc

led a taiAed-force rotation to the

Most

efforts

National Training Center.

This effort, however,

68

should be more

formalized and methodical

at

corps

with planning guidance and SOPs

level.

69

issued

Chapter

11

DOCTRINE
In its ultimate relationship to the human
understanding, this central idea or
"doctrine" is nothing else than common-sense,
i.e. action adapted to circumstances. 1 2 0
J. F.

C. Fuller

Dr. Williamson Murray has suggested that military

organizations have attempted to
they tend to extract
their

learn from experience but that

from those experiences only what supports

preconceived notions.

He posits

that existing doctrine may

actually become a barrier to adaptation and improvement.

time

paradigms develop.

employ foot
the

An example would be the

infantry and armor separately.

"state of nature,"

by omission;

and then

it de facto becomes

Since

November 1988,

addressing task organization says:

. heavy and

below brigade level." 1

effort draft

tendency to
that has

it becomes the doctrine de juris.

point, FM

22

Over

been

the doctrine, albeit

illustrate the

occasions

12 1

To

100-15, Corps Operations, dated 15

On

rare

light forces may be task organized

A de facto illustration is the first

of FM 71-1-2-3, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,

which has omitted mixed-force operations.

Reviewing the doctrinal manuals of the WWII era gives an
insight as

to how "common sense action was adapted to

circumstance."

There is one mention of tanks in the

Infantry Field Manual,

1942

and they are mentioned as operating

separately to provide supporting fires.

70

12 3

(Annex G, App.

1-2)

By

1944 this

same

integration of

level manual devotes

and infantry.' 2 4

tanks

Tanks with Infantry, 7 February

year.

1944,

In both manuals, specific

had evolved over the

course of

as tactically sound today as

manuals.

several

FM 17-36,

the close

Employment

techniques are discussed which

These are excellent and

1944 but have fallen

from our

(Select pages are extracted and republished at

App. 3-4.)

of

was published the same

the war.

in

pages to

Annex G,

Even the 1944 manuals, however, lack the specificity

desired in the

view of

some WWII division commanders.

Ward, quoted in Infantry Journal

in

1945,

MG Orlando

said:

I am afraid we are leaving to happenstance

the necessary team play on the battlefield
between the infantry and the armor.
We
certainly must put in our text clear-cut
means and methods for this cooperation.
Much
126
is left to inspiration.
In
infantry
1.

1952 the

Infantry School

taught five methods 1 2

of

tank-

team attack (non-mechanized infantry):

Tanks accompany and operate with the

infantry at

the

same speed.
2.

Tanks

initially support by

fire and then move forward

rapidly to join the infantry for the

3.

Tanks

assault.

initially support by fire and then move forward

rapidly to pass

through and precede

the

infantry on the

objective.
4.

Tanks and

infantry converge on the objective from

different directions.
5.

Tanks

support the infantry by overhead fire

71

alone.

In
some

1953

basic

Infantry

tank-infantry
infantry.

mechanized
(Annex G,

the

App. 6)

School

and

the

team doctrine

They had set

that were

Armor

for

forth

taught for the

the

next

Infantry

2.

Infantry and tanks on converging axes.

3.

Tanks

a number of
WWII were

agreed

attack

with

on

non-

methods 1

three simple

1.

These methods

School

several years:

and tanks on the same axis.

support by fire only.

could be combined and

fitted to the

techniques surviving from the combat

situation, and
experience of

integrated.

Significant, practical experience from WWII was captured

Infantry and Armor Advanced Course student monographs

in

in the

period between WWII and Korea.

On an exploitation combat commands
marched in from one to sometimes three
columns.
Each column was organized into a
tank-infantry team usually not less than
battalion strength.
Many of the actions in
an exploitation were advance guard actions.
The point was generally made up of a section
of medinm tanks.
The advance party was
composed of a medium tank platoon with a
platoon of infantry mounted on the backs of
the tanks.
The remainder of the infantry
with the advance guard rode in their vehicles
in the support element.
On long marches the
infantry riding the tanks was rotated to rest
them.
Their half-tracks followed at the rear
of the main body.
This shortened the column
and made the infantry immediately available
should they be needed.
The infantry in the
main body usually moved mounted in their
vehicles.129
Yet

these were largely

1950's as

28

the structure

ignored

in the field manuals of

changed.

72

Then the U.S.

the

late

Army becamt-

focused on jungle warfare and

assault

the age of the helicopter as an

vehicle arrived.

The Cavalry, Armor, and Infantry

(1945-51)

detail

integration.

the need and the

The report of

journals of

"how to"

of

the period

tank and

infantry

the General Board of WWII advocates

organizational

structures that

infantry.

some 45 years after what should have been our

Yet

formally

integrate tank and

doctrinal bedrock experience, we have migrated to a geographical

and operational

separation of

tank and

infantry.

True, we have

mechanized infantry and armor divisions where integration occurs;

but we have seven infantry divisions where the majority of
soldiers

are unfamiliar with armor and

efforts to

the officers,

rotate assignments from heavy to

are not experienced at

the operational

the

despite

light tracks,

integration of

the

largely
forces.

Today we are beginning to readdress mixed-force operations

in our doctrine.

The August 1990 draft of

FM 7-30 devotes

Appendix C to the subject and is on target with its

language:

The purpose of employing heavy and light

forces together is to capitalize on the
unique characteristics of each while
offsetting the limitations of the other.
Employed together as a "mixed force," based
on a sound METT analysis, their mutual combat
effectiveness can be exponential.
To
accomplish this, commanders must understand
the capabilities and limitations of each
force.
They must be able to apply the
principles of war to light-heavy operations
and synchronize the efforts of all combat,
combat-support and CSS units.
Some other excellent efforts have been made
heavy-light

and light-heavy operations.

to address

But our geographic

separation and the reality that our heavy and light

73

forces

will generally not read each other's manuals

leaves us short of where we need to be unless
we force the issue at the respective schools
and centers and not solely at the officer
level.
We can make some progress with our
manuals and are off to a good start, but the
pay-off is secondary compared to the benefit
to be had from full scale maneuver and mixedforce live fire.

74

In no other profession are the penalties for

employing untrained personnel so appalling or
so irrev, cable as in the military.
Douglas MacArthur
General, U.S. Army

Chapter

12

LEADER DEVELOPMENT
It has been noted in this campaign that many
non commission-4 officers of branches other
ti an armor have little or no knowledge of the
use of tanks.
During times of confusion or
whoii their officers became casualties, it was
up to their NCO's to assume command of a
small unit.
Due to their ignorance of basic
tactics of other branches of the service,
combined operations of this kind were
sometimes unsuccessful and resulted in heavy
casualties.
Korea, 1950
The situation described above was not unique to Korea but
was
rule

characteristic of
in all

Vietnam as well.

theaz-rs by the early

Unfamiliarity was the

1970's.

Consider the

experience of an armor company commander in Europe

in

19,1:

I reported to the Infantry battalion

commander the evening before the test (Army
Training Test/EXEVAL) with no prior
experience in working with an infantry unit.
Although I was familiar with the doctrine of
Infantry employment, I lacked the knowledge
and experience which results from actual
experience.
As the test concluded, I learned
that my platoon leaders who were attached to
the Infantry companies encountered problems
similar to my own.
As a tank company commander in Germany, I
worked with the Infantry only once a year,
and then only for a few short days in the
This is clearly not enough time to
field.

75

develop and maintain proficiency

commanding combined arms teams.

in

A year later I found myself in Vietnam

assigned as a straight leg Infantry company
commander, trying to recall everything I had
1 3 1
learned about Infantry tactics.
Granted

this

division,
officer

but

it

Europe

20

could as

describing

light-heavy
Desert

was

his

years

ago

easily

be

experience

Shield

the

at

contingency rotation

or

the

the

opportunity to

101st

setting

report
NTC

that

between

92nd or

and the

of

in

was

combat

arms

a heavy-light

following an
and

a heavy

the

24th

or

exercise

in

Mechanized

Division.
There

is

cooperation

and understanding by

fertilization
mixed-force
exchanges
infantry

clear

during officer

scenarios

beyond
schools

the

in

our

one

progress

schools

at

schools

could be

good

toward mutual

leader development.

officer of

would be

make

the

every

level

Cross
and

initiated.

other brancli

initiatives.

increased

As

MG

at

Foley

Faculty
armot

and

points

out:
In Vietnam, armor officers often found
Lhemselves in the posit:on of S3 of a light
infantry battalion.
Cross fertilization is
worth the effort and we need to do it now,
during peacetime.132
Yet

another

Development
commanders

oppoLI-unitv

Course
go

(TCDG)

is

facto doctrine

Finally, we
can

ensure

development

o:tr Tactical

at

throu.h a mixed-forces
through a

de

ia

taught

commanders go
another

is

need

seperate

to

integration of

of

Commanders

Leavenworth.
scenario,

track without

Light

but

force

heavy

integration.

This

separation.

look beyond
forces

courses.

76

in

the
our

officer

tier

non commissi

to

how we
officer

CONCLUSION
Units and headquarters that will fight
together in teams, task forces, or larger
units should train together routinely.
FM 100-5
Mixed-force operations
forces
more

comprise over one-third of

than

active

50%

of

non-mechanized battalions
in our reserve

divergent

forces

joining occurs.

The CFE

structure.

reduces the

force and

The're are

some 40

non-mechanized

Whenever we can bring these

learns

The problem is the

The geographic

Non-mechanized

active component

in CONUS and five

together, everyone

especially commanders.

light units

the

the future contingency corps.

divisions

this

are a viable concept.

exponentially-infrequency with which

separation of heavy and

chance to conduct mixed-force training.

restationing plan may offer an opportunity to gain some

ground.
solution,

Our
but

schools and doctrinal manuals offer a partial

there

is no substitute for

Infantry may need armor more today

World War II.

Consider

training.
than at any time since

the observation of General William E.

Depuy:
Spaced, laminated and even more exotic
concepts for armor protection have reached a
point where many of the smaller anti-armor
weapons have been rendered largely
ineffective, at least against the frontal
This
armor turrets of the most modern tanks.
fact has profound implications for light
infantry which is so heavily dependent on
those same smaller weapons, and our new antitank weapon, "AWSM," will weigh 45 pounds and
13 3
is not yet fielded.

77

On
foot

other

the

side,
not

infantry, has

James

Dyson

was

asked

today,

with armor

how

infantry fights

radically changed
to

after

envision
the

the

advent

and why

since World War

of

employment

of

the

Bradley

needs

armor

II.

foot

COL

infantry

and Cavalry

Fighting Vehicles:
Well, threat artillery is more versatile and
weapons more lethal.
But I don't think that
much has changed in principle.
The infantry
cannot effectively fight out of a fighting
They can't see enemy infantry any
vehicle.
You need
more than a tank can that way.
infantry to keep the enemy away from the
tank.
The Panzer Faust was as much a threat
1 3
4
then as the Sagger is today.
The
and

need

infantry

for

training

and

infantry's

the

tank an

employ

close

two be

to

restore

greatest

successful

together.

If

the

the

force

is

to

have

is

any utility at

properly

of

the

7th

ID wrote

that

augmented and

might
trained
in

fight

and win

General

Burba

subscribes

spectrum of

that

"when properly augmented,

(to)

forces,

the

suggest

tank,

or

decision

is

to

be

(to)

accurately

with habitually

to

conflict:

78

the

the

mission of
fight

the

and win

in

History and current NTC

more

a mid

required if

all.

a mid to high intensity conflict." 1 35

experience

future

in universal terrain against a heavy enemy,

LTC Jim Montana

light division

tank

operations

especially in the desert, then beefing up is in fact

the

of

in our

mobility to

lost

support weapon,

employed

light forces

is

integration

Whether you consider the tank preeminent

function

infantry

the

achieve

(mixed-force operations)

"contingency corps."

require

to

to

high

need

restated:

"When

associated heavy

intensity

to mix

conflict."

forces

across

Our Desert Shield and NTC experiences verify

that heavy forces predominate in open terrain
where light units execute complementary
missions.
In addition, we would need armor
and mechanized forces augmented with light or
dismounted infantry to deal with a heavy
enemy force in mixed or restrictive terrain.
We can conclude, therefore, that under most
circumstances our contingency forces should
comprise a mixture of heavy and light
units .136

But
1990,

is this

armor and the extent

training was occurring

Assistant Commandant of
for all

in the

force.

It was

Reforger may

4th ID Mechanized and 6th ID Light at

training going

exceptions

such as

Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site

1st Brigade, 4th ID,

and the annual Team Spirit

the

include a light

is generally no real mixed-force

on other than at the NTC (with some notable

The most

BG Taylor,

represented.

that while the occasional

in preparation for the

tank-

Foley was outbriefed after three days.

2nd Infantry Division was not

battalion, there

to which significant

the Armor School and Center, was present

sessions, and MG

consensus

to gain an

for how non-mechanized infantry divisions visualized

employment of

infantry

The

On 27 Flebruary

the U.S. Army Armor School hosted a conference

appreciation
the

insight being operationalized?

NTC rotation

in

1990)

in Korea.

important recommendation which emerged, therefore,

was that all

rotations to training centers include mixed-force

operations.

It

was outbriefed that while the obstacles of

geographical separation of
this sinale proposal,
units to

train.

forces

and constrained dollars

if adopted, would provide an

137

79

remain,

impetus to

Even in our heavy divisions

the

level

of training of

combined arms with dismounted infantry is not a "T"

It

is at

best a "P"

Tankers have

is

if not a "U"

Table VIII, Tables

virtually no time

trained.

(untrained).

so organized their gunnery programs

Tables I-VII,
there

(practice),

for

with TCQC,

IX-XII, and wing man drills

left for

that

training with dismounted

infantry, and Bradley gunnery exacerbates

it on the

infantry

side.
What would a light brigade

in a mid-intensity conflict look

like once it had sufficient augmentation of armor, combat support

and "plugs" of
different

combat service

support?

It might not be too

in appearance than a Marine Amphibious Brigade

A MAB has organic armor, a light

armored

(MAB).

vehicle company, a

reconnaissance company, anti-armor, and an engineer company.

Most

important,

it has a brigade service

with 30 days of supply, 1 3 8

"light

armor regimentf1

3 9

I am not

support group

a great advocatF

(BSSG)
of

the

but I am absolutely convinced of

the

combat advantage any armor element would bring simply because

would be

organic to the division and afford the

Obviously, as we build down we are not

such an abhorrent

thought?

it

separation?

does not

contradict the World War II

training as the

venues

the curriculum of

but why is that

it a de facto doctrine?

leaves doctrine,

experience.

80

It

important.

30

certainly

So if we do not

leader development,

to address the problem.

our schools are

restructure

a branch paradigm born of

years of

restructure, that

Is

Is

chance to train.

going to

the Army and create separate tank battalions;

it

and

Our manuals
However, the

and

techniques that

save

lives emerge only when the units are mixed

and maneuver together.

The

FORSCOM Exercise Schedule and

FORSCOM Commanders Training Guidance are

"the

the

vehicles" to make

it happen!
Addressing the direction for
"We must

FORSCOM, General Burba wrote,

continue to create and train tailored

heavy-light organizations on a regular basis."

fact,
In

however,

the last

it has not

two years at

heavy-light and one was

light-heavy and
14

In point of

happened with anything like

the NTC, of 28

light-heavy.

regularity.

rotations only 8 were

A significant

volume of

literature has been published on heavy-light operations, the

capabilities and
potential to
operation.

employ them together

There

actual maneuver
If

limitations of the

the reason

is,

respective

forces,

and the

in various theaters of

however, very

experiences because

little being written about

it simply is not happening.

we do not train our tank and non-mechanized

soldiers

together is

role

foot infantry, then we have forgotten our history.

for

we believe that there

that we believe there

is a role,

that foot

is operationally no

infantry will remain a

significant part of the force structure, and

that

is

train together,

in fact the way we will fight,

let's do it now.

81

If

then let's

combined arms
and

ANNEXES

ANNEX A - Tables of Organization and Equipment

Appendix I - Recommended TO&E, Infantry Division,
1 December 1945
Appendix 2 - Recommended TO&E, Tank Regiment, Infantry
Division, 1 December 1945
Appendix 3 - TO&E, Infantry Division, "Triangular"
Korean War

ANNEX B - The World War

II Verdict

ANNEX C - Infantry-Tank Cooperation

Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix

ANNEX D

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Letter to Editor, 1945

Infantry-Tank Attack Check List
On Bougainville (photo)
On the Move, France (photo)
On Okinawa (photo)
Combat in Cities, Germany (photo)
Combat in Cities, Germany (photo)
Infantry-Tank Advance, Germany (photo)

- Interviews

1 - Colonel James H. Dyson, U.S. Army (Ret.),

2nd Armored Division
Appendix 2 - Dr. C. P. Roland, Major, U.S. Army (Ret.),
99th Infantry Division

Appendix

ANNEX E - Divisional Assignments

to Infantry Divisions,

of Separate Tank Battalions

1944-1962

ANNEX F - Tank-Mounted Infantry

Appendix 1 - Soviet Infantry (photo)
Appendix 2 - Tank-Mounted Infantry SOP, 7th Armored
Division, 1945
Appendix 3 - 6th Armor and 35th Infantry (photo) Advance to Luxembourg
Appendix 4 - 3d Armor and 9th Division Cross tne
Siegfried Line (photo)
Appendix 5 - Operations Division Information Bulletin
(photo and text)

82

ANNEX G

- Doctrine

Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix

1
2
3
4
5
6

Extract FM 7-20, 1942

Extract FM 7-40, 1942
Extract FM 7-20, 1944
Extract FM 7-40, 1950
Five Methods of Employment, Tank and Infantry
Three Methods of Employment, Tank and
Infantry

83

Annex A, Appendix I
Recommended TO&E of Tank Regiment,
Infantry Division, 1 Dec 1945

El.

CI

Cz

C:)r

u-i-

Lt~

00

0~
C..'

~OLJ
'0L

0)0

4-4

Annex A, Appendix 2
Recommended TO&E of Tank Regiment,
Infantry Division, 1 Dec 1945

CaC

LU7

7J

I-

CO
R

85

-'M-3

*.

65

-r

Annex A, Appendix 3
TO&E, Infantry Division

"Triangular"

War

-Korean

0O

-j-

000

oC
00

0
00

ICI

CO

Source:

Ney, Virgil, Evolution of U.S. Army

CiioiG-d-'115 3 9 -1968.
Combat Operations Research Group Memo.
CORG-M-365.
Fort Belvoir, VA:
Combat Dev. Cmd., 1969.
86

ANNEX B
THE WORLD WAR II
The

Italian Campaixn

VERDICT

"The infantry had not moved fifty feet

before a man was blown up by a mine
(anti-personnel).
By the time the
Infantry had moved 300 yards, followed
by the two tanks, four more men had been
injured by mines
.
the tanks then
led the way and by picking infantry
avenues of approach were able to assist
the infantry by running over the antipersonnel mines and clearing a path
S.the infantry followed in the
tracks."141

The Anzio Beachhead

"You cannot let tanks pass over your

infantry.
The Germans follow their
tanks so closely that men cannot crouch
in their foxholes, let the tanks pass
over, and then get up and fight the
German infantry.
They are shot or
bayoneted while still crouched in their
(You must have armor.)"142
foxholes.

In the Reductions
of METZ

"Infantrymen and tankers had extreme

confidence in one-another and knew each
other's capabilities.
One would not
advance without the other.
This was the
direct result of prior training and use.
The success of the operation indicates
that all troops should include tankinfantry exercises in unit training in
order to afford small unit tank and
infantry commanders an opportunity to
become familiar with tank-infantry
operations."143

In the Reduction
of METZ

"In the fighting for METZ in World War

II, the 735th Tank Battalion was employed in a manner which violated all
the tenets of armored doctrine.
(Terrain precluded the employment of
armor as a weapon of mass and mobility.)
The 735th was a separate tank battalion
and during the reduction of METZ were
accompanied in several battles by 5th
Infantry Division soldiers riding on the
tanks to contact, in some by preceding
the infantry, at other times by moving
in conjunction with the infantry, and on
occasion by supporting fire from the
flank."144

87

The Hurtgen

Forest

"Unsupported infantry attacks lacked

shock effect.
Even at the lowest level
it took combined arms.
As an example,
in the Hurtgen Forest in reducing a
single pillbox, "Company E, 39th
Infantry, used a TD and a tank to fire
at the openings, a squad of infantry, a
half squad of engineers using poling
charges and a squad of flame throwers
5
and white phosphorous smoke."14
"The final effort of the 9th Division in
the Hurtgen Forest was the attack of the
39th and 60th Regiments on Germeter in
October 1944.
The advance to contact
was made with tank-mounted infantry.
1st Platoon, Company C, 746th Tank
Battalion led the 1st Battalion, 39th
Infantry, with infantry mounted until
they received anti-tank gunfire.
The 3d
Battalion, 39th Infantry, transported
two companies on five tanks and four
tank destroyers.
B Company, 1st
Battalion, 47th Infantry, moved the same
way."146

In the Reichswald
Porpst

The rules and principles of cooperation

were adopted to suit the limited
visibility and restricted maneuver:
"Infantry preceded the tanks in all
advances, moving 30 yards ahead to avoid
falling trees.
Masked lighting was used
at night.
The infantry advanced yards
at a time and signaled with red flashlights.
Tank and infantry commanders
kept close together.
Each infantry
company wore some distinguishing mark
and the infantry provided flank
147
protection day and night."

On Makin

LTC John F. McDonough, Commander, 2nd

Battalion, 165th Infantry, reported that
on 21 December 1943, following the
assault on Makin in the Central Pacific,
"it took us the better part of a day to
make them (the tanks) understand just
how we wanted them to work," which
involved "going up to each tank
individually, right on the front line,
and telling them what you wanted
done.

When

this

was

straightened

out, the tanks contributed greatly to

the accomplishment of the mission."14
88

On Saipan

"The 27th

Infantry Division as part

of

V Corps was clearing the northern neck

of Saipan on 6 July 1944 and was unable

to advance due to its inability to

integrate tank and infantry assets.
The
105th Regiment, organic to the 27th. had
requested tank support on 5 July but no
tanks arrived when the attack began on 6
July.
When two platoons of tanks
arrived, they were unable to find anyone
who could direct them to the command
post of the 3d Battalion, 105th
Infantry.
On linking up with Company L,
one tank platoon drove into Harakiri
Gulch without infantry.
The third tank
was disabled by enemy infantry with
magnetic mines.
The tanks withdrew and
no further advance was attempted.
In
the 2nd Battalion, 105th Infantry,
sector an infantry commander made no
attempt to maneuver using the fire
support of the tanks and as the tank
radio was not working, the tanks were
unable to talk to the infantry.
At
nightfall the tanks withdrew to a
service park.
On the morning of 7 July
the 105th Infantry regiment lost over
900 casualties out of 1,100 assigned.
The 27th Division was relieved from the
front.
Prior to Saipan the division
reported it had conducted tank infantry
training in the Marianas and that both
tank and infantry had learned the value
of mutual support, protection, and communications."149

Market Garden

For examples of German employment of

combined arms we can look to Market
Garden, September 1944, when self propelled guns stopped the 82nd 400 yards
short at the Nijmegen Bridge.
At
Arnheim, one battalion and one company
of the British division reached the
bridge but were halted by attacks
strongly supported by armor and were
virtually annihilated.
Pour battalions
were reduced to 200 men for the lack of
a substsntial U.S. anti-tank capability
and a timely link up with the heavy
force.
89

The

Bottom Line

"So long as it .as possible to keep the

same tank battalion and infantry
tnd so long as
division togetheL
commander casualtieb permitted the same
unit commanders to work together, the
understanding and team play increased
When it became necessary to
rapidly.
shift a given tank battalion to the
support of another division, or when
cooperating unit commanders became
casualties, much of this understanding
and teamplay was lost and a new combination had to start from scratch."'' 0

90

ANNEX C
APPENDIX 1
INFANTRY-TANK COOPERATION
The
in

1945

tank-infantry
in

To

journals,

the

Editors

(foot)

team was

a subject

reports,

and even

letters

of

The

Infantry

to

often addressed
the

editor:

Journal:

There is no question but what the outstanding

lesson of this war, tactically speaking of course,
the fact that infantry must have tank support, and
tanks cannot operate without infantry.

is
that

As a former member of the Armored Force staff and

for the past year and a half as chief of the armored
section of an army group, I have tried to do everything
possible to implement the infantry-tank team.
This was
not so hard to do in armored divisions, for the tanks
of such a division, the artillery, and the armored
infantry were built into a compact team from scratch.
But it was very hard for a while to put over the
necessity for tank support of the infantry division by
the separate tank battalions.
But this condition changed.
The selling period
over.
The infantry wants and demands tank support.
All armored division commanders have been asking for
more infantry for their divisions.

is

It is not impossible that our postwar army will

see the infantry division with at least one and
possibly two tank battalions as an organic part of the
division.
The results of battle have certainly shown
this to be highly desirable.
COLONEL.
*

Maybe

Source:
D.C., p.

something

Editor, The
62.

like

that will

Infantry

Journal,

91

happen
August

sooner.
1945,

Washington,

ANNEX C
APPENDIX 2
INFANTRY-TANK ATTACK CHECKLIST
Here
Infantry

is

a simple matrixed checklist devised by the

in European combat

in

9th

1945:

INFANTRY-TANK ATTACK-Check List for Unit Comminders

DO YOU KNOW THE ANSWERS
TO THE THREE BIG CUESTIONS
-

1) WHERE MUST THE TANKS

GO?

(2) WHEN MUST THE TANKS BE

THERE?

13) HOW CAN THE TANKS GET

THERE WITH MINIMUM
LOSSES?

Source:

REMEMBER

THESE POINTS

CAN YOU AN:WfR THESE?

NOW CAN YOU ANSWER

THE BIG THREE?

IIl Most effective execution resuits from the sudden appearance of tanks In the
enemy rear areas, CP installtions, artillery positions,
Infantry In the open, an d at
close MG and cannon range.
(2) If conditions are unfavorable for the above, tanks can
support by:
MG fire up to 500 yards
Cannon fire up to visibilIty, and
Indirect fire up to 7,000
yards.
(3) Tanks do not have to be
with the infantry to support
by fire.

(If What is our Infantry-ArIlllery plan?

12) Where Is the enemy?
13) What are targets for tanks?
141 From what positions or
routes of approach could
tanks make most effective
use of their fire power
against these targets?
15) What alternate posltons or
r-utes of approach could
'anks use and still render
Some support?

fit Infantry commander deter.

mines where he wants tank
fire placed.
I2) Tank commander determines
If It Is possible to place tank
fire where the Infantry requests.
131 Tank commander determines
where the lanks must go.

(I) Timing is the principal facfor in co~fdi"notng the attack of the tanks with the
lnfantry-Artillery plan. It
should give both the Infantry and armor the fullest advantage of friendly artillery.
121 Proper timing is essential
for surprise,
131 Do not neglect physical time
and space factors. Sometimes It may be Impossible
for tonk, to provide support.

1) What are the time factors

In the Infantry plan?
121 In the artillery plan?
13) In plans of adjacent units?
(4) How will the need for Infantry protection for tanks affect the timing?
15) Can time be used. so as to
gain surprise?

Ill Tank enemies ore: Impossable terrain, high-velocity,

direct-fire guns, mines, and
Infantry AT weapons.
12) Getting tanks Into favorable
support positions will pfrbably mean dealing with one
or more of these tank onemles.
13) Tanks moving Into support
positions require the greatet assistance and coiperotien from other arms. Help
them and they will help
you.
(4) A knocked-out tank In an
otherwise favorable firing
position con render no support.

IIl In getting tanks to support

positions without losses. can
you use tiny of the followIng:
0 Covered routes
0 Smoke, darkness
Fire, movement, and overwatching by tanks.
Air, ground, mop, and
photo reconnaissance
0 Artillery protection
0 Infantry prolection
) Engineer assistance
Alternate routes and pasitions
(21 Has sufficient time been allowed for the reconnolssonce Qnd selecton of
routes and positions, and to
physically execute the move?

D.C.:

(1) Tankers must know what the

Infantry wants them to do.

(21 Infantry must know what

the tanks can and cannot
do.

(I) Infantry-Artillery-Tank cammanders confer.

121 Infantry cormmander deter.
mines when tank support Is
desired,
131 Tank commander decides
whether time space factors
permit.

13) A m-ul
u~dersionding,
an attitude of full cogperotlion must exist between
both.

14) Enough time must be allowed to properly mount

the attack.

Editor, The Infantry Journal,

Washington,

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
TANK SUCCESS

July 1945,

p.

92

10.

III Infantry-Artillery-Engineers,
determine how they can as.
sist tank advance.
12) Tank commander determines
routes and positions.
(3) Effective tank support has
begun.
is

"Tanks and

A skillful, vigorous, and dotermined execution by all.

Doughboys,"

:APPED1'

1-1 I

Iy

3
COO
Q(1 D

k>

Atank goes for-ward in action on Bougainville, Pacific Theater. Infantrvmen

follow in its cover. Soldiers are relying on the tanks' suppression and
fighting as a team. Ma~rch 1944.
Source:
U..Army Signal Corps, 189099-S, Action Series Collection, U.S.
Arm,; Military Hiistory Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

ANNEX C
APPENDIX 4
INF'\NTRY-TANK COOPERATION

All,

On the Move, France 1944

Source:
Editor, Infantry Journal, "Tanks and Doughboys," Washington, D.C.,
July 1945, p. 8.

34

AIN NEX C

APPENDIX 5
TANK -INFANTRY COOP ERAT ION

515

amy

BilitaryonH

irnstia

te

C7arll

95

BaracsPA

ANNEX B
APPENDIX 6
TANK-INFANTRY COOPERATION

J I

'7

Infantry-Armor assault into Andernach, Germany. A sniper has been located

upper left.
Note: MOUT facilities constructed in CONUS in the last 10 years will not
support the weight of armor (e.g. Fort Bragg, NC).

Source Photo:
U.S. Army Signal Corps 202333, Photographer CPT R. F. Downs,
Action Series Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, PA.

96

ANNEX C
APPENDIX 7
TANK-INFANTRY COOPERATION

-.,

~per

Soldiers of 55th Infantry Regiment and 22nd Tank Battalion move through
smokefilled streets of Weinberg, Germany, 22 April 1945, with U.S. Third
Army.

Source:
U.S. Army Signal Corps 205298, Action Series Collection, 11th Armored
Division, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

97

ANNEX C
APPENDIX 8
TANK-INFANTRY COOPERATION

1.

N-4

,Fil

Infantry and armor of CCB, 6th Armored Division,

advance into Oberdorla, Germany.

Source:
ETO HQ 45 30293 4 April, U.S. Army Signal Corps, Photographer PVT T. R.
Romero, 166 William J. Givens Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, FA.

98

ANNEX D
APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW, COLONEL JAMES H.
COL James

H.

Dyson (Ret.)

served as Chief

Field Force, Republic of Vietnam.

commanded

two batteries,

groups, one

significant

in Beaufort,

conducted at
Q:

Staff,

career he

wrote

of 1947.

the early 1960's,

This

the 2nd

the modern

an historical note,

South Carolina.

2nd

two artillery

the National Defense Act

taught at the Army War College in

resides

31-year

the evolution of

COL Dyson, as

sections of

of

In World War II he served with

Armored Division and witnessed

team.

In his

two battalions, and

in Vietnam.

combined arms

DYSON

and he

He
now

interview was

Beaufort on 22 December 1990.

What was

your experience

in

the integration of

tank and

infantry in World War II?

A:

"I

Be-lin.

served with the

the ground.

Q:

Benning to

I commanded Battery A/14th Field Artillery Battalion.

We were the first

on

2nd Armored Division from Fort

troops

in Berlin.

We were just

Can you cite

The division had 18,UO0 men

an unstoppable force."

a battle example

of foot

infantry and armor

which you personally witnessed?

A:

"Yes.

at St.

Lo on

Air Corps)
been

the

St.

Lo to

Paris Road.

(foot) was

today.

(Army

You can just

The 4th Br*talion

attached by combat command

99

get through

(American), which had

ineffective.

what CNN would do with that

Infantry

trying to

The U.S. Air Force

bombed the 30th or 31st Division

leading, until it was combat

imagine
22nd

CCA, 2nd Armored Division, was

"A"

(CCA)

to

the

66th Tank Regiment and given

break through.

I was with the

the mission

to

the best

observers.

We attacked at

tanks.

Infantry were trying to protect the

"I was with the

out

so

tanks

I could see.

expand the

The

forward

infantry riding the

tanks.

German infantry as we

and bomb craters.

the

Our

Infantry were shooting down off t

Patton's army come

great effort

tank-infantry team.

To what extent was

crosse

We were able to break thro

tell you that there was

establishing

lead and

lead tank company commander and had my head

break, and let General

"I will

Q:

night with the

and even bayonetting the

through hedges

the

66th as a forward observer.

commander believed battery commanders were

The

take

through.

expended

We had to have

in

each other."

the mixing of non-mechanized or standard

infantry regiments with armor common to

the overall

theater of

operations?
A:

"It

was common practice

armored units.
Infantry, but

They

rode and/or walked.

it worked well.

fought without straight

Q:
the

to attach straight

It

It was

hiss to be that

from armored

way.

We

never

infantry to M113's,

Infantry Fighting Vehicle, but we have

in the force

tough on the

leg infantry."

Today we have evolved

divisions

leg infantry to

structure.

to

five non-mechanized

Can you help me envision their

employment today?
A:

"Well,

lethal.
The
They

But

infantry

threat

artillery is more versatile and weapons more

don't think

that much has

cannot effectively

changed in principle.

fight out of a fighting vehicle.

can't see enemy infantry any more than a tank can that way.

100

You

need infantry

_)nzer
The

faust

Tigers.
Q:

A:

They would

the

"Well,

ride,
the

soon as

do.

tank and

You'll be

into the

all over

phone on the

tank.

the Sagger
their

The

is today.

tanks,

as did

the

infantry with the

jump down and stay

close."

tank?

We don't

We have

in a heavy fight,

have

fire.

You can't
That

be

the

using foot

final

assault.

the

Can

at

up onto

the NTC who

infantry on the
The

objective
concern is

barriers would preclude

commander from massing his

support of his

you

doesn't work."

main heavy force assault.

infantry on the objective or

heavy brigade

tell

crawling up on the

seen some heavy brigade commanders

ahead of

I'll

running field-expedient phones

turret.

expressed concern about

the

then as

a platoon of

you get

tank's deck once under

night

from the

new main battle tank.

as

what you'll

Q:

infantry

There was a squad to

How important was

phone on

enemy away

as much a threat

Russians always had

Germans.

the

was

to keep the

artillery fire

you give

at
that
the

in

some insight

to

this

perceived problem?
A:

"We would send

and clear fires

the

on

forward observers with engineers

the obstacles.

infantry could do

describe.

Infantry

the same thing

In World War

Artillery.

They were

certainly has

II we

in the

control

the observers with

situation

had spotter planes in

you

the

gone when I deployed a group to Vietnam.

to dig

in and be quick about

Russians were great artillerymen.

forward observer I could put
artillery on a target.

I believe

to

in

They

learned from us.

as much as

The
As

30 battalions of

I once directed a corps

101

it.

"time on target"

on a German
forward

slope.

Q:

What

A:

"Well,

us

infantry regiment

before

There were

about

transport

they had

the

some

SP and rode

that

I observed digging in on

few survivors."
for

the infantry?

trucks, but
the

they usually paired up with

tanks when they were attached."

102

ANNEX D
APPENDIX 2
INTERVIEW, DR.
Dr.

C.

Q:

What

A:

"At

P.

Roland served with

experience did
that start

of

had never been on one.

commander,
in

Louisiana we had

the 99th Infantry Division.

the war, we

I was a platoon

We were on

I remember

made a combined

We held

infantry and

the Texas

tanks and

leader, a rifle company

Europe as a battalion S3.

tanks attached.

across.

the war?

had no training with tanks.

side.

On maneuver

particularly the

this in defense of the Sabine River

Texas/Louisiana).
bridgehead

P. ROLAND

you have with armor before

and deployed to

integration of

C.

(border of

Opponents got a

infantry in

reserve and

tank attack and destroyed the

bridgehead."
Q:

What about tank destroyers?

A:

"There was

destroyer.
weapons
ditch

little difference between a tank and

We used the tank destroyer with 90mm as

like the Germans did with 88's.

in

a tank
support

We were pinned

in a

the Remagen Bridgehead and were saved by a tank

destroyer."
Q:

What experience did you have with armored

A:

"An officer came

to our

command post

supposed to move through your lines

your objective?'
miles
had

(we

HiA pulled out

were used to

and said,

at 0600.'

Of

they rode on
103

'We're

I said,

'What's

little map at a scale of

these huge maps with

infantry on their tanks.

organic infantry and

this

infantry?

low scales).

50

They

course, the armored division had

tanks as well."

Q:

What was the mobility at battalion level?

A:

"According to my memory, each company had its

jeeps.

On two occasions

I remember big moves.

Dormagen to Remagen, about

30 miles.

moved

Orders

One was from

We were about

picnic, wine and cheese, a reception by the

Dormagen.

2-1/2 ton and

to have

a big

inhabitants of

came from Corps to move--a big truck convoy

the division--ad hoc

that night to Remagen.

Corps directed

that and furnished the transport.

"The second was when
moved 30-40 miles
northwest

to the

to force

the kitchen trucks

the breakout at Rer -en

forward side

the Germans to
(I per

occurred.

We

of the Ruhr pocket,

surrender.

company) were

Shuttle moves with

improvised."

Q:

What observations could you offer on combined arms?

A:

"Infantry alone cannot take any position--the automatic

is

too devastating.

and get

They have to have heavy mortar and artillery

in position to call

we would get tanks or

fire

the fires.

tank destroyers

Infantry drove off other infantry and

If

the terrain permitted,

into position to support.

let our armor pass.

defense, if we could put enough fire on German

infantry off, we could stop them.
buttoned up and blind."

104

They did not

tanks to

In the

run their

like to move

ANNEX E

DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF TANK BATTALIONS

702
748
749
91

DATES
1943-45
1950-57
1943-45
1950-57
1943-45
1950-57
1945-50
1945-50
1945-50
1950-57

6th Inf

92

1950-59

1946-57
1946-57
1949-50
1950-57
1950-57

7th Armd

40
17
31
95
94

1943-45
1943-present
1943-present
1950-58
1950-62

72

1948-57

7th Inf

77
73

1949-51
1951-57

7
32
33
86
709

1947-57
1947-57
1947-57
1948-53
1953-57

73
751

1948
1948

100

DATES
1944-46
1948-57
1944-46
1948-57
1944-46
1948-57
1951-57

Ist Cav

71
70

1949-50
1951-57

Ist Inf

63

1948-57

2d Arrnd

66
67
64
29
57

2d Inf

DIV
I st Armd

TANK BN
1
4
13

3d Armd

3d inf

73
64

DIV
6th Armd

68
69

8th Armd

8th Inf

1949-50
1950-57

9th Armd

37
508
704

1943-46
1943-46
1953-57
1943-46
1953-57
1953-57

4th Int

40

1948-57

9th Inf

5th Armd

10
17
34
81
80

1943-57
1943
1943-57
1943-62
1948-57

10th Armd

85
759

1948-53
1953-57

8
35

4th Armd

5th In(

Source:

Sawicki, James A.

TANK BN
15

18
36
80
736
601
603
41
2
14
19
605
607
656
811
61
3
II
21
609
612
648
654

1943-present
1943-present
1943-45
1945-53
1953-present
1953-present
1950-57
1943-51
1943-51
1943-51
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present
1948-57
1943-51
1943-51
1943-51
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present

Tank Battalions of the U.S. Army, 1944-1962,

Wyvern Publications.

105

DIV
21 st Armd

TANK BN
50
51
52
809

DATES
1943-52
1943-52
1943-52
1949-52

1943-45
1943-45
1943-45
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present

22d Armd

53
54
55
308

1943-52
1943-52
1943-52
1949-52

23d Inf

714

1954-56

23
43
714
706
827

1943-present
1943-present
1944-45
1953-57
1953-present

24th Inf

78
6

1949-51
1951-58

25th Inf

79
)5
39

1949-51
1951
1951-57

24
45
46
350
715
736
738

1943-52
1943-52
1943-52
1949-52
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present

26th Inf

.26

1949-59

27th Armd

127
205
208
274

1955-59
1955-59
1955-59
1955-59

48
25
47
691
725
821

1943-51
1943-53
1943-present
1953-present
1953-present
1953-present

27th Inf

127

1949-55

28th Inf

628

1949-55

29th Inf

197

1949-59

30th Armd

173

1954-59

174
175
176

1954-59
1954-59
1954-59

30th Inf

130
130

1949-54
1954-59

31st Inf

198

1949-59

32d Inf

132

1949-59

lnf

121

1949-54

121
106

1954
1954-59

195

1949-59

TANK BN
62

DATES
1948-57

Ilth Abn

76
710

1950-57
1950-58

1 th Arrnd

22
41
42
741
818
823

DIV
10th Inf

12th Armd

13th Armd

14th Armd

16th Armd

16
26
5

1943-53
1943-53
1943-63

18th Armd

28
30
29

1943
1943-50
1943-52

38
39
49

1943-52
1943-52
1943-52

9
20
27

1943-46
1943-53
1943-53

19th Armd

20th Armd

33d

34th Inf

106

TANK BN
113
114

DATES
1946-59
1946-59

215
644

1946-59
1946-59

51st In!

263

1949-59

63d In!

350

1952-59

69th Inf

893

1954-56

70th inf

703

1952-,59

71st inf

723

1954-56

1949-54

75th Inf

744

1952-present

803

1949-59

76th In!

376
740

1949-52
1952-59

42d Inf

142
142

1949-50
1950-59

77th Inf

377
819

1949-52
1952-59

43d Inf

143

1949-59
78th In!

44th Inf

106

1949-54

378
766

1949-52
1952-59

45th Inf

245

1949-59

79th Inf

46th inf

246

1949-59

379
716
813

1949-52
1952
1952-59

47th Inf

194

1949-59

80th In!

610

1952-59

48th Armd

162
163
190
187

1955-59
1955-59
1955-59
1955-59

81st inf

381
726

1949-52
1952-59

82d Abn

714
44

1950-54
1950-57

83d Inf

814
778

1949-52
1952-54

84th Inf

808

1952-59

85th Inf

385
749

1949-52
1952-59

87th Inf

387
812

1949-52
1952-59

89th inf

389

1949-59

DIV
35th In!

TANK BN
135

DATES
1949-59

36th Inf

136

1949-59

37th Inf

137

1949-59

38th Inf

138

39th Inf

206

40th Armd

133
134
139
140

1954-59
1954-59
1954-59
1954-59

40th Inf

140

41st Inf

48th Inf
49th Armd

49th In(

190
145
146
147
155
156
157
249
149

DIV
50th Armd

1949-59
1949-59

1949-55

1946-52
1946-52
1946-52
1952-59
1952-59
1952-59
1949-59
1949-59

107

DIV
90th In!

TANK BN
351
737

DATES
1949-52
1952-59

91st lnt

391
767

1949-52
1952-59

94th Inf

394
762

1949-52
1952-59

95th In!

395
735

1949-52
1952-59

96th In!

396
24

1949-52
1952

98th In!

398
817

1949-52
1952-59

100th Abn

303
400

1950-52
1950-52

100th In!

824

1952-59

101st Abn

42
65

1950-57
1950-57

102d In!

402
705

1949-52
1952-59

103d In!

403
781

1949-52
1952-59

104th In!

324
718

1949-52
1952-59

108th In!

602

1952-59

108

ANNEX F
APPENDIX I
TANK-MOUNTED INFANTRY

Soviet units cross the Manchurian border (probably 39th Army)

.... . . .

....
.. . ....
--

... '....
.
. .

Source: Glantz, David M., LTC, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational
Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Leavenworth Papers No. 8, Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute, June 1953, p. 17.

109

ANNEX F
APPENDIX 2
TANK-MOUNTED INFANTRY
HL2D.JRT~s caUoT COII&,aVD 1W,
71-H JU DIV.
O 257, U S.y
9 Fubruury .1915

LR............7)
-. I!-LOL'r I

1 17rRY

I
SPXI.L INSTRUCTIOS
The following muthoda of amploymwnt of troops winl ta rani.rlly fol.operations of this conmrd. Tha cross cointry nobl' v., firv
pow,:r, and protuction of tho terLL will bo Q13loyrud to the M07-truim
:,ansportIng thu Izitantrymer *.,itb tt.4 Eruct.-zt duFruu of safuty, across fir
;t zon-is
to 3 point wh..ru hit con clcos-, in the best poasiblu physics'- condi:
"i1t
.nis oppon~nt.
1.

owud in futur.

2. Thi's Trninirg Lior-rndus -A11 ta made the subject of spucial schools

for Officz;rs. It ::all be utilized in thu instruction of all Non-colcousslonud
Cff11cZ.:s erd soldi.,rs of tris conzsaod; in chelk-talks, In d
t~
c.
thu Freund, 2nd in troinirg sod tuists in tao Mi.~d.
3.
Cornend..rs will utilizi thfsu muthods,
ciret ostancujs, in battle.

or ve'riations as roquir.ed by

II

1. Ttis corriar.d will normall,,' o?orato in Infartry--tonk Tesk Forc-.s, which

witll fruquurtiy mploy Tank-L'ounted Izfantry Torms as striking forces.
2. 2xtinsivci usj will b.o redo of Teok-Lounted Izrfentr; for thu following
raons:
a. Tho Iniantry cs= bw carried rapidl,., with tht, frup.tust dugrbe of
saf, ty, end without fntigut;, to assault renku of the uneamy. Thb riflemer. on
foot can, at b,.st, evarepu only one mile en hour. Oa a tank~ ht, is carriod into thc. Corrnn djfcn..s at fivu milci pcsr hour.. Constsqu-3LtlY ho is tXoauosd to
enemy~ fire fi7t, tio lonrer if he 13 On foot. Furttharmora, lyin'C bcnind the
turrbt, he is absolutoly sefu from frontal f Irt, and lCas wxosud to f lanking
fix,) then if h. wari, on foot. (KotQ: Grman Lxchin~j -gunurs s~ldom kirc during a tank attnck.) Lastly, t.o arrivus at th. onwmy duf~nSC3 frush, ratbur
than worn out by tho ux..rtlons ruquir.d ir a normal fid~encQ on foot.
b.

Thu tanks provide sup..ior firi. support durini- th. ::dvance. .s

attack 1.3 lcumchAd, all tank w.apons aze fired ot all locatud or
iruas of rusistsncoi to:
(1)
Thickon aupportine artillery, mortar, end fixed macbino

soor. 3s th
probebl.
CanD fires.

(2)
B3*et the anromy dovz and koep hma down. By opuning such
firus at orncb, hostile eatitan guns and tanks L-rc "dren-m' into firS.n( at inoffoctive rsnros, and ;r.Qm positions aru prumoturoly ruvrialtod which zacy be
sil.~nc4 by :onc~ntrotud firos from wuapcc3 of cll calibur. Othjr supportinLE
fir... nust lift, but task firti contlausia aftr
tho Infantry dismounts to fiebt
on foot.

Source:
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board, Report of Observers ETO
1944-45. Vol. V, AGE Rpt. No. 1120, Tactjq's, Organization and Equipment,
7th Armored Division Training Memo #7. 19ashington: Army Ground Forces,
I February 1945, p. 1-7.
110

III # 7 Hq,

CCA (Cont'4d)

c.
Tho Infantry provides cl~ose soeurit- for tba tank durine tho
att',ck. '7hilo on thu tan~k, riflbron facing tbo flanks and ruar will Immudjatoly lisposo of bazooka or-g'onndb MOL.
Thuy eru imo~dintly avail'jblu to
start flanking oportiuy.s against Ltensiv.j nntitark dafensos or to ,u-qh
through and a.)curo rninriiolds. On rinzimg cn objoctivu, they cin prornptly
t-~ko cvor thu dofons. -3nd pormit the tanks to a.ek defilade in support.
Tho
szimnu mun who ride th, tonk can providi Its infantry outpost at night.

1. The Inftntry-Tank Team will normilly bo th.. Rifle Pictoon tr~..n6porc.ad by tho Tank Platoon.
2. ThcRiflo Plntocn rmiy bi trosn-pc-tod by tho rollowiru m.taiods,

Tank #1
*Sgt Sqd Ldr
~3RifIas (R)
2 Rifls (Hq)

Ton? #1
*Plot U~r
Sgt Sqd Idr (Hq)
4 R1ifi~c (Hq)

T~nk #5

T-au. #2

6 Rifl.-s (R)

Cp1 .sst
ZRiflus

[J

S U.D

DRI-M

(R)
(R)

Tnnk #3
n-Ft Sqd Ldr

Riflu
1,C R)

DGM

Ronin und,;r covar 4urine rtt~ck. Uov~j forwnrd on ordcr with. squad
oquipmor.t. 1,Iny 'ilso c~rry bodding rolls of teak crows if roer ducks of t~nIls
m~ust bo clco-rod.
ME

Loodur lying in centor cin obsorvo and talk to tmnk cosunaad;r.

Oth.r iton thr.i to a uiilw. Ono of tho Infnntrymon may m':n the
50 C,3libor mrchinu Cgun.
IForm bmse of fire or follow -ttrck to ifford immadicto support

or quick organizetion of daftnao.

'1J

7 On.

C1- (C.nt'd)

b. Light '.uchinc, Gurn,-r

'lrd Rif1lurvai In rs r,1t:

Th..iik
#4

TzP:fr

*St Sq1 Ldr CRi)

3 RI1-

*Pit

Ldr

Se't Sqd L1r (10)

(R)

1 GU7.-rr (?M)
IC-:rlzj(1-G
Th.iik 5
*CPl ..Sst (R)
6 1111
1,s (R)

TPrk #2
*?1- t St
CPI .. zst (R)
3 1,if].,.s (R)
I Gunn,.r (!C,)
1! rri ,r
(It)
Tont #3
6 Rif L;

(R)

SLJL.D

R.main undar cov~r dturnLr

%ittick. )iovo forward on ordxs carrying
bulky equipmc~nt of --csnult squads. Lay cairry boddinC rolls, terp, or rjitious
of tank crqr:@ If ruor dcks of t~nka must b4~ cl.anrijd.
M:Lo~dc~r lyine in cunter can obsurvu and t~lk to tankc commnriur.
Oth~.r imn thr..a to r aido. Ono of thw lnf.atrymau ay Cin thui
50 celibar mwsaimG Lmn. Zxtro 12Dlufition in quitity for thu
light anchicu Cuns may bQ carriod jnsid. thci tork.
Form bnmu of fire or follow attoick for imm.diatu support.
a*;

Hflf..trzcks followiie Thinks In .hBseult.

In tho ovant thst torri is favornbloo, lafantry may oporrnto with

tacks in approach march end a3salt as follow:
-5

112

TM # 7 H1.,

C,. (COrnt'd)

CPZX .T:01;S
1.
bobli,

i ,l
ro-d :-.arcq 4,in opposition is poseibl. but r.ot proDu-rng
form ticuluz c.! T'nk nnd Irf::ttry wuts alt .. rn,'t1r.E- 19 follows:
C.

-. t-rn:ti.r by corari~s

-..

dzminstrmti,7-

onrch.

b. .,dturLtirv by pl toors -whucn thu torrain ir4 t:cticcl situotiori d.firit.ly pr~.scrib.~ thct o~ typo cf wvlpon sflould bu cxplo'Y.d in
thr, londine pl~.tooni.
c. .atoarnrtir. by vbhicls - in the noraril sicu~ition, vibun the
hootile situ~ ti n is vzI.:uc -r.d tha turro-in uiifnriili',r. This form-tion lunads
It
itself' to imodito cc-ibinod ^ttn.ci cr dutE.Dsu, mountad nr disnountcd.
surpriso of any flort.
riffords tbij burt Lautl yrotuctier ,irs

whoru tj:inks nru vulnurnblu to

2.
In morirc tinupli woods ur vil'srs,
bcs tJ.lu t'nk-huntint. t~ams, kirva c 12l'Jftr-.cI folow -3-ch tcsnk ur M-lunt riflathe 50 crlibur mchino Funs anid Inflitry BDmSU
muo on t,-r.L ducks. by fiir.
eln~sccverzing fir., LT by thu vory prsanci ci'thu rifle
'rms to th.
troops, suc'. d.fll~s nL;i ho pessd by t-ni~s -with littla opposition.
3. Th. doastructluwi cf hostild akirrashzr3, thiu attack vf Crthworks
in th, vp~n, or Fla it, tck of i tprp~t cf opportunity, suchi as -. r~cuntjd colwn=, n.y ho bust accuiplIshod by th, IrSoxtry ridlnCj in -hrlftrlcks b,!iind
tiiuTanks. Tkisa beittrlcks efford n girx.'!t dool of prctctioca fi-r well
o'rns fire !!l -shall Eplint~rs, Ps wull :is t, rpid rio-rns of trirsport-ton.
Vuhlculnr Waspcns muo-t La manned tnd firine. .,11 cLt.or p,.rscnn.l tLiut be
knoAiog cn avat cuahiona, cinpioying p r.anil W apons on terrots (,f opporrunity rr to thickan th, cov~.rin( tirria.
4. Tho ttt7.ek of c wcods shculd bt. rmd. dith riflino iscurt~d or, 7Tunks,
thio littcr firio~' IC fu.r troi bursts. Smok. may bu fir~.d by Thi.o t) biunk..t th.j cntitrnk do1\.ns. In th.. nQor ddge of th. woods. Fifl~.ifn should
not disr4ount until ,u ttu hostii position, wit~in thi woods, unl.;S3 ttj
Tin
is di~nbl..J. .. ftor tho first hcstilu pcsliti-Dii is ovur:-un, tu zldvainc,
iE ccntinu.d, g.rer:2Ly in a Itnv of plntoon cr suction cc.1ur.'ui, with riflomwn ncting as edvenctj Cuurd, flcnkirs, and ruer gucrd.
5. In thb atteck ef - sall villcga, yhLoru it is tuz.cttud tiizt re-sisteonco will bj ww.k, cnd a strcrig possibility of countarattack: ~xists, riflThu ettEcV shLuld b~.
m .n and mz'ciiinuj Funnors shoo~d br, ncuntud cm Tnk.
lnunchtud pu-rpundiculnr. t,) thuj luaFg axis of thu villagu, so that tho erostTrnks Shuuld '.pprch
,)st nuitbur of hous.G ord ant,)rud at the sn-mj tim.a.
rapidly, firine 13 .nd JIP for d.uatructivi ind aokd uffuct, cach cc-ncc.ztrSting on iiminntint. criy .jnozy in tv.u edjacunt prud~ai~natud housas t. its
position
front. On ruochitg cno of th~ao housjs, it movwa to &. protuciAj
whoro it can firu '-rturd und oornar, OLd bo~ins shelling thl, hIuuss onth
appogitL. sidi of th, strait. ..a soon as thu Trink hnltz, thu rifr-mn should
disnount, throw groiz.rdus, end untcur thu flousu via thu nwarost oponing - profurnbly a shall-hol.. M-chia u cnurs and tanks support tho furth~r atteak
of th'i riflamufl, *nd are disp~..ad without dalay to bruak up probnblo countarattack. Othuxl componurnts of tho riflu plstocD nmoVU furw'ird ropidly whu.,i fire
'a maskcid.
6. In itt-ekiiz -jmoxtunsivo town r city, thu primsary roquiro.nt will b*
othiur
n mmas cf riflu..n. Thir..for.d, rifljmon clunu should bw mwint~d on tan].a.
CipuCt3 Cf th ittnck cr. carriod cut tis In the ittsck of a 8MG1l village.
7. Tho attr.ok of a strongly fortifiud position Is 4ispuciolizod operation
in which Infantr'y mountedc Tanks cannot E,.zermnlly bu umployid to EidVeta7.J
S. In all cea.,m where thc, Tank is stcolpd ty tax-rain cr hostile action,
the tr'nsportud Irfrrntry will diumount, and procood on the MissiOn On foot.t

113

# " 11,,
?'Tpicbl-.E,

CC.. (Cct'd)
Thc, nbcv.. tjr it T-isk Force Ccrn-'nders h !vo thr~.u suporato
tc bu gclvod by tnlr~u tct~illy diffurint Lv-s of thu li:fantryBy ardor of Colcocil TRIPL.T:

/s/
/t/

OFFICL.L:o

Is!

Ltx~ C~. Crorls~n

S-3.

-7-

114

Th~.c.oru T. Kli.g
VLCD~i% 1. 1%ING
Lt. (.ol, Inf,

ANNEX F
APPENDIX 3
TANK-MOUNTED INFANTRY

?"N-

--

/--'

,-

Making themselves at home on top of this Medium Tank of the 68th

Tank Battalion, 6th Armored Division, are members of the 134th
Regiment, 35th Infantry Division, on their way to Luxembourg.

Source:
ETO HQ 45, 10527, 26 January, U.S. Army Signal Corps, Photographer PFC
Joseph W. Lapine, William J. Givens Collection, Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, PA.

115

ANNEX F
APPENDIX 4
TANK-MOUNTED INFANTRY

30-

. . ..

--

39th Infantry, 9th Division, with 3o Armored Divi.sion,

,ounted
11

and afoot,

pass through a break in the Siegfried Line nearRoetgen, Germany,

15 September 1944.

Source:
U.S. Army Signal Corps, 194023-S, Action Series Collection, U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

116

ANN EX F
APPENDIX 5
TtVF'-MOL'NTED INFANIRY

R~fsrRICI'B

IV - TRANSPORTING INFANTRY ON TANXS

Where it is desirable for infantry to ride

the rear decks of medium tanks an arrangement

of ropes can be fastened to existing hooks and

hinges as shown In the accompanying llustrations.
With this simple addition, using 3/4-n. rope, the
medium tank can carry six armed infantrymen be-

hind the turret, even over rough terrain.

The idea is presented In a booklet entitled

"Infantry-TankTeams" published by the Armored
School and containing a series of exercises for
RESTRICTED
school and Instruction purposes.

.
.

Source: U.S. War Department, Operations Division Information Bulletin, Vol. II,
No. 6, 29 July 1944; Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff,
p. 5-6.

117

ANNEX G
APPENDIX 1
The 1942 version of the Infantry Field Manual has only one mention of tanks,
and they are operating separately from infantry.

137

INFANTRY

FIELD MANUAL

t.

and antitank weapons which have survived preparatory fires

and by firing in defense of tanks threatened by hostile infantry. Hostile antitank weapons are fired on as soon as
they are revealed by flashes or movement.
(3) The tanks usually precede the leading infantry units
and attack in two or more echelons. The leading echelon "
penetrates the hostile forward positions and attacks the
hostile light artillery. The rear echelon dominates the hostile forward areas, dcstroys remaining automatic weapons,
and is available to break up counterattacks.
(4) It is essential that the leading rifle companies arrive
on the objective close behind the rear tank echelon.
(a) Where the line of departure is within 600 yards of

""
*-.

the hostile position, the leading rifle companies support the

attack by fire and advance as soon as the rear tank echelon
reaches the hostile position. Supporting weapons are advanced by echelon in order to maintain
fire supthe
echelon follows
port of the tank attack; the leading continuous
riflemen as closely as possible.
(b) When the line of departure Is beyond 600 yards from
the hostile position and the tank formation does not have
great depth, the infantry advances rapidly and occupies
successive Intermediate objectives not more than 600 yards
apart. 7"he advance to each successive objective is Initiated
as soon as it is reached by the rear tank echelon. Heavy
weapons support the attack and displace In the same manner
as outlined In (a) above.
(c) When the line of departure is beyond 600 yards from
the hostile position and the tank dispositions are deep enough
to cover the entire area between them, the infantry supports the leading echelon of tanks by fire and then advances
rapidly close behind the last tank elements. Supporting
weapons, while displacing, are prepared for immediate
employment.
(5) For further details, see FM 7-40 and 17-10.
c. Location of commander.-During the attack the battalon commander spends much of his time at successive Lbservation posts or with his subordinate units. he Is seldom
at his command post. He keeps his executive officer, who normally remains at the command post, informed of his location.
100

118

'

(
:.

-A
%

,V,,;EX G
APPENDIX 2
The

1942 Reoimental Level Manual

r

177-178

likewise did not address close integration.

INFANTRY

FrELD MANUAL

supply of ammunition to the platoons. (For the capabilities

and employment of chemical troops In support of infantry,
see FM 7-5.)
d. Tanks.-(1) One or more battalions of tanks may be
attached to an infantry regiment for an attack. Ordinarily
they are employed as a unit under the direct control of the
regimental commander. Their objectives coincide In general
with those of the regiment.
(2) Tank units support foot troops by(a) Neutralizing or destroying hostile automatic weapons
likely to hold up the advance of foot troops.
(b) Making passages through wire or other obstacles for
use of foot troops.
(c) Maintaining neutralization of hostile resistance by attack In depth until arrival of foot troops on the objective.
(d) Neutralizing or destroying hostile reserve and artillery
formations in the battle area.
(e) Destroying or disorganizing hostile command, communications, and supply installations in the battle area.
(1) Breaking up hostile counterattacks.
(3) The regimental commander acquaints the tank unit
commander with the situation and plan, and receives the tank
officer's recommendations after this officer has made a reconnaissance. The regimental attack order prescribes objectives
for the tanks and necessary details for coordination and
cooperation between the infantry and tanks and any other
attached supporting arms. The orders should provide for close
support of the tanks by attached artillery. They should also
provide for action by infantry heavy weapons against hostile
antitank guns.
E 178. SzcuarrY.-a. Flank.-(1) If a regiment Is on an exposed flank, the regimental commander may provide for the
security of that flank by(a) Disposing his reserve on that flank (when such disposition Is otherwise suitable for the execution of the plan
of maneuver) and making it responsible for flank security.
(b) Assigning flank security as a mission of the battalion
on that flank.
(c) Detailing a flank security detachment.
(2) Protection of an interior flank Is partially provided
by the presence of the adjacent unit. However, the regi-

108

119

ANNEX G
APPENDIX 3
By 1944 tank-infantry operations occupy significant space in the Infantry Manual.

187-188

136-137
h. Aviation. Aviation normally operates against enemy
jectives that are beyond the immediate interest of infa
battalion commanders. However, in a combined air-gro
effort (see FM 100-20), friendly aviation may, when co
tions demand, be assigned targets close to the infantry f
lines or contact zone. Such targets must be readily identi
from the air, and controlled by phase lines or bomb sa1f.
lines which are set up and rigidly adhered to by both gro.u
and air units. When air power is thus applied in thq
talion zone of action, the battalion commander adapts
plans to profit by the air effort. Aviation does not operab
rt, nor by attachment.
in dic

power may still be used. Surprise is sometimes gained by

using relatively unfavorable, yet passable, terrain. It must
be borne in mind that tanks attract enemy observation by
their size, the dust they raise, and the noise they make.
d. Tanks assist the attack of infantry by destroying or
neutralizing hostile automatic weapons, reserves, counterattacking troops, artillery, communication and supply installations, barbed wire and similar obstacles, and by dominating objectives-that is, tanks that have arrived on an objective in advance of the infantry move to defilade positions and
cover the objective by fire, and at the same time protect each
other from hostile antitank measures--until the infantry's
attacking echelon arrives And ia Drenared to defend the position.

The inclusion of tanks in an operation affe

137.'
both the plan of maneuver and the plan of supporting firs
infantry assists tanks by destroying or neutralizing hos. Am.
arni
teams, locating
and
.ile
antitank weapons
a. A part
tankofbattalion
gon
an
btcesezn
eoigmne
n
te tank-hunting
aninfantry
infantry ba
it may inmay
turnbebeattached
attachedtotoan
ment:
removing mines and other tank obstacles, seizing groune
talion or be directed to sutport its attack. When attach
comaner
thetan ecoes

secil

saffoffcer

an

the
tank commander becomesa specialstaffofficer, and
vises the infantry commander of his tanks' capabilities
makes appropriate tactical recommendations.

~m

from which tanks may attack, locating defiladed routes of

advance for tanks, or taking over an objective which the

tanks have captured or are dominathag. Tanks are capable

of capturing and briefly dominating an objective, but not of
holding it for a considerable time and organizing it; they.
b. Part of an infantry battalion may be attached to a ta
should be replaced on the objective by infantry as soon as
battalion for local security and groundholding purposes, p
possible, and always before nightfall, and ordered back to a
ticularly on distant missions; in such a case, the infant 1
rallying point for reorganization and servicing.
commander becomes a special staff officer of the tank conm
f. Unity of command should be clearly prescribed in ormander. The attached infantry is moved by trucks who
available; h-'e-er- i
neVessary for them to travel OR ders; command must be assigned to the leader of the unit
ihe tanks. A tank company can carry 75 to 100 infantryme1;
charged with the primary mission.
six men can ride on the rear deck of a medium tank, an
g. For furtner deails, see FMs 7-40 and 17-36.
fo-ur onalighttank. In -rear areas more men can ride, wh.
Before deciding on
138. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION.
rope hand holds are provfded. (See FM 17-36.) The infsi
the supply and evacuation details of his plan, the battalion
fnk Znh
s a
empl e
liit toth
try dismount
commander considers the recommendations of the battalion
c. The chief limitations on the employment of tanks al
S-4 for the location of the battalion ammunition supply point
unsuitable terrain, i.e., heavy woods and stumps, steep asy
and route of ammunition advance, and the recommendations
rocky slopes, deep water courses, and soft ground, especiaUl
of
and enemy wor
by adverse weather
are
affected
as
these
batThis dictates thorough reconnaissance. (See par. 133.) Evethe
Thoug uictae t rhrecnnain limits
sthance
Sever
s)
talion
station. For further details, see chapters 4 and 6
n
Maid -0
and shoe)
the maneuverand
though unsuitable terrain
and FM 7-30.
fill
action of tanks, their cannon and machine-gun
-

4
11213

120

142-143

142

Under such circumstances, it will be well to launch the attack

with both infantry and tanks in the leading wave. The infantry-tanks-together disposition promotes flexibility, as thfe
commander can rapidly regroup and redispose elements to
meet changes in the combat situation. Unity of command in
the composite waves may be effected by attaching a portion
of a tank company to each rifle company In the attacking
echelon. Conditions which may call for infantry-tanks-to.
gether initially in the leading wave. include close terrain,
limited visibility, woods traversable by tanks, mopping-up
operations, and night attacks. (See FM 17-36.)
143. CONDUCTING THE ATTACK. During the attack the
battalion commander spends much of his time at successive
observation posts or with his subordinate units; he is seldom
at his command post. He keeps his executive officer, who normally remains at the command post, informed of his location.
He must be able to communicate promptly with his command
post, all company commanders, and supporting or attached
units. When at an observation post, he usually communicates
with the command post by telephone, radio, and messengers.
In addition to personal reconnaissance, he keeps himself in.
formed of the situation by personal observation and by
information received from his intelligence personnel and from
subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. He requires frequent
combat reports, Including special reports upon the capture
of an objective or when a rifle company commits its support
also negative reports, when appropriate. Whenever necessary,
the battalion commander details a liaison officer to secure
information from an adjacent battalion. Frequent visits to
the attacking companies by the battalion commander a
members of his staff, particularly during critical periods
their action, promote teamwor'k, coordination of effort,
confidenie. During such visits full information of the s
tion is exchanged. The battalion commander influences
action by shifting the fires of his heavy weapons and th
of any attacked weapons; by requesting that fires of sup
ing cannon company weapons, artillery, chemical or o
units either be shifted or render additional assistance; by
ranging for mutual assistance between his attacking
adja
panics and for cooperative action between them and

I42. LAUNCHING THE ATTACK. a. With combat team

mpport. (1) The attack begins when the leading elements of
mmpanies in the attacking echelon cross the line of departm. The battalion commander coordinates the forward movement of his units from the assembly area to insure that the
lading rifle company elements cross the line of departure at
the prescribed hour and that his supporting weapons occupy
their initial positions in time to support the rifle elements.
He also insures that the movement of the antitank platoon
from firing position area(s) which were occupied to protect
the battalion assembly area to firing position area(s) for the
attack provides uninterrupted protection for the attacking
echelon during its movement to its attack positions.
(2) The heavy weapons commence firing in accordance
with the battalion plan of supporting fires. The attacking
echelon crosses the line of departure in deployed formation;
lading rifle units continue their deployed advance until
forced to return the hostile fire. The supporting artillery,
cannon company, heavy weapons, and chemical mortars are
relied upon initially to gain fire superiority. Rifle fire is
opened at ranges greater than 500 yards only when other
available fife support is inadequate; it is conserved for use
at ranges where riflemen can exert maximum effect,
b. Witlh tank support. In infantry-tank action, there are
three Initial attack dispositions: infantry-leading, tanks-leadIng, and infantry-tanks-together. Infantry leads. Initially
then reconnaissance has revealed hostile antitank strength
or when the terrain in the direction of desired use is unsuitable for tank.i; in this case the tanks support the attack by
fire, generally from hull defilade positions. Tanks lead ltally, when suitable terrain Is available, fn launching an
attack against a hostile position having little antitank
strength in terms of antitank guns, tank destroyers, antitank mines and other obstacles, or when these have been
oeutralized; in this case, elements of the Infantry battalion
follow within supporting distance and aid the tanks by fire
and maneuver. Often the conditions in these two eases
will exist in part only, or It can be foreseen that one case or
the other will exist at the very outset of the attack only.
117

121

14

143-145

wire and other obstacles. They are held together, not by any
rigid or static formation, but by identity of mission and
unity of command. The commander moves each component
in that portion of the zone where it can best accomplish its
mission; not necessarily by the same routes, but always keep-Ing tanks and infantry wthin mutual supporting distances.
The presence of antitank mine fields may be first indicated
by the loss of one or more tanks. The tank unit should at
once be withdrawn to defilade or hull defiiade positions,
from which it can support the infantry, while the latter
proceeds, protected, by necessary fires and smoke screenIng, to breach the mine field and mark lanes for che passage
of the tanks. Engineers, if available, are attached when extensive mir.*-lifting operations are foreseen. Tanks may partlcipate by pushing into position.and discharging demolition
snakes. The enemy's defense of his mine fields may, at times

of influencing the action must not be permitted to obsc

the importance of maintaining the momentum of the dvad
0 It should be committed without hesitation whenever the:
tacking echelon can no longer advance or the situation off
an opportunty to expedite the capture of a battalion obj
tive through its employment as a maneuvering unit.
battalion commander prescribes its objective and usually'
direction of attack. If possible he prescribes its departure pj
sition. He informs other units of the battalion of its conta
plated action and shifts supporting fires, as necessary, toj
sist it. The regimental commander is notified as soon as
decision to commit the battalion reserve has been reached
d. Us of tank.. In infantry-tank action, when
I
leads, the tanks support the attack initially by
infant
lpactihle tanks suppo the
acinheirialy blfire. If It
impracticable to use them in their primary role of maneuve
shock action, and direct fire tasks, they may be employed ' h eefctvsmksrencaotbmitiedfreth
when effective smoke screens cannot be maintained, force the
the artillery, in which case the latt
reinforce the firesf of
t wirequisite firing
f
attacker to await darkness in order to breach the fields.
data. For these r.
furnishes them withi the
inforcing fires, ammunition requirements must be antid.
pated, so that the normal loads need not be expended. Wha
tanks lead, that is, when the attacking echelon consists a4
tanks only, the provisions of FM 17-33 apply, and the infantrj
supports the attack by fire and maneuver. Artillery time
fire (aii bursts of high explosive shell, fragments of which
are harmless to tank armor) frequently showers the tanks
as they advance to the objective; when such time fire is used,
following infantry is obliged to keep a minimum distance o
300 yards from the tanks. However, when the time fire lifts,
the infantry must be ready to advance rapidly to the obje*
tive, seize it and prepare to continue the attack. The tanks
having reached the objective, dominate it pending the o
rival of the infantry. When infantry and tanks are togethe
in the leading wave, the commander regroups and redisposs
them freely as conditions dictate. Some of the infantry way
lead' in rough terrain, pathfinding for the tanks or recon
noitering for antitank weapons, mines, and tank-hunting
teams; the tank component of the leading wave may push,
ahead to wipe out hostile automatic weapons or bunkers tha
are holding up the Infantry, or to make paths through barl
126

122

144. SECURITY. Security measures planned on the initiation of the attack (see par. 135h) are continued in force or
modified according to the progress of the attack.
145. ASSAULT. a. In the attack, hostile resistance Is frequently reduced by a series of local assaults delivered at different times by rifle companies or platoons. (See FM 7-10.)
b. When the entire battalion is held up in front of a hostile position that cannot be outflanked, the battalion commander arranges for a prepared and coordinated assault by
his attacking echelon, supported by the regimental cannon
company, the artillery, and his heavy weapons. He either
fixes a time for lifting of supporting fires and delivery of the
assault, or employs a prearranged signal for this purpose.
When supporting fires are lifted, the attacking echelon delivers assault fire, and closes with hand grenade and bayonet
Assault fire comprises rifle, automatic rifle, and carbine fires
from kneeling or standing positions when the degree of fire
superiority makes this possible, coupled with swift advance
between shots. Supporting fires lift to targets on the flanks
and in rear. (See FM 7-15.)
127

218
218. TANKS. a. In the sustained defense, tanks can be used

218-219

with the infantry battalion in close support of the main line

i-

or resistance and for counterattack, the support of the latterM7#

being their primary mission. The number of tanks employed
depends upon the terrain, the extent of the front held, the
enemy situation, and the availability of tank units. Tanks
should ordinarily be employed as a unit, if the terrain is
suitable. If the terrain is unsuitable for the employment in;,mass of an entire tank battalion, tank companies or platoons may be attached to infantry 'battalions or companies. The
wider the frontage assigned to a front-line infantry unit in
defense, the greater the need for a strong and mobile reserve.
Terrain containing many natural tank obstacles may make
it necessary to use tanks in small rather than large groups.
The infantry battalion commander usually attaches avail-,o
able tanks to the reserve for counterattack. Exceptionally
they may be attached to front-line companies for direct fire
missions. Tanks may be assigned a secondary mission of
reinforcing the fires of the field artillery. For tanks so used,
ammunition must be provided and its replacement foreseen,
so that the tanks when committed for counterattack will
still have their organic loads of ammunition.
b. The tanks supporting the main line of resistance by direct fire initially occupy defiladed positions, from which
they may readily move to hull defilade firing positions. If
time is available, firing positions are prepared. These firing
positions should be located on the flanks of the platoon
areas, outside of the protective wire. (See fig. 11.) Each
tank must have one or morealternate or supplementary firing positions. Defiladed routes to the rear for withdrawal are
essential. If the enemy reaches assaulting distance the tanks
can execute local counterattacks in front of the defending'
infantry.
Infantry.
c. The counterattack may be launched to eject an enemy
who has succeeded in penetrating the position or to destroy
the enemy while he is forming for an attack. (See fig.
12.) The principal advantage to the defender of this latter
type of employment of tanks is to gain time by disorganizing and disrupting the enemy before he can eoordinate and launch:;

4
\.\
A

"

SUPPLMENTARY
POSITION

Figure

Direct
Di.
fire PoitiOn for tank.

his attacXL Tanks ill make this type of counterattack alone

[~Forreceive
the use
of tanks fires
in counterattack
withinaty
e
and
supporting
from the infantry
and artillery.
[ar the (
t).a
ar. 2256(2).]
- infantry, see
219. FIRE PLAN. a. The battalion fire plan seeks to take
the enemy under fire from the time he enters the zone
of surveillance of the combat outpost, hold him under an in.

202
a

203

123

ANNEX G
APPENDIX 4
In 1950, despite the accumulated experience of the war, the regimental level
manual still did not address close integration.

the regimental tank company to other units of his

regiment. This plan has the advantage of forming a
strong force, balanced in fighting structure. Most
frequently it is employed in the exploitation phase
when the regiment is attacking in a column of battalions and it is desirable to have a strong mobile
force at the head of the regiment. It may be employed also when the regiment is attacking with battalions abreast and one portion of the regimental
zone is more favorable for tank employment than the
remainder of the zone.
f. If one tank battalion is attached, the regimental
commander may also employ the tank battalion, less
one company, with one infantry battalion; the remaining tank company with another infantry battalion; and the regimental tank company with the
remaining infantry battalion. This plan has the advantage of providing strong tank support to each
infantry battalion, and it-..
y be used when the regiment is attacking with battalions abreast against
determined resistance.
g. If two tank battalions are attached to the regiment, the commander usually employs each of the
tank battalions with an infantry battalion and attaches the regimental tank company to the remaining infantry battalion. (For a detailed discussion
of the employment of the tank battalion, see FMf
17-33.) Command of the balanced infantry-tank
team is established by attaching one of the units
(tank or infantry) to the other unit which has the
primary role in the attack.

142

124

ANNEX G
APPENDIX 5
DOCTRINE
Five methods of employment of tank and infantry:
THEY CAN WORK TOGETHER.both friendly and enemy troopsgiving us more confidence while
scaring the hell out of them.
"This method can be employed
when the objective is clearly defined. There should be suitable firing positions for the tanks. The ter-

terrific fire power and the shock

action. Let me run through them
briefly:
TANKS ACCOMPANY AND
OPERATE WITH THE INFANTRY
AT THE SAME SPEED
"This is the method that Don was
referring to. The tanks rnd the
Infantry cross the line of departure
together, move to the assault position and assault together. Using
this technique, control and mutual
support is simplified. There is a
favorable psychological effect on
friendly troops having the tanks
alongside of them. But the fire
power and mobility of the tanks are
not employed to the utmost because
they are restricted to the rate of
movement of the Infantry. So, this
method will be used when control is
difficult and visibility poor, such as
in close terrain, woods, built-up
areas or at night or in heavy rain
or fog.
TANKS INITIALLY SUPPORT
BY FIRE AND THEN MOVE'
FORWARD RAPIDLY TO JOIN
ANAT
Fby
THE ASSAULT
"In this method, the tanks take
up firing positions at or near the
line of departure. The Infantry follows the best route to the tentative
assault position, and when they deploy for the assault, the tanks join
them and they assault together. In
this method the tank's fire power,
maneuverability and shock action
are fully employed. You have accurate fire supporting the Infantry
as they move to the Assault Position. In the assault, the tank fire
is available when other supporting
fire has lifted. Again we have that
powerful psychological effect on

rain must be suitable for the rapid

displacement of the tanks. And this
isimportant -time must be available for the necessary coordination
between the tanks and Infantry.
You want to avoid having the Infantry wait at the assault position
for the tanks. It would be equally
foolish for the tanks to wait there
for the Infantry. Timing must be
exact and communications must be
maintained to allow for constant
contact between the two units.
TANKS INITIALLY SUPPORT BY
FIRE AND THEN MOVE FORWARD RAPIDLY TO PASS
THROUGH AND PRECEDE THE
INFANTRY ON TO THE
OBJECTIVE
"In this method, the tanks again
take up firing positions at or near
the line of departure. They cover
fire the movement of the Infantry until it reaches an area well
away from the objective. Then,
supported by air burst or time artillery fire on the objective, the
tanks overrun It and are joined by
the Infantry who mop-up and reorganize. The characteristics of this
type of an attack are the same as
the one just covered. But this
should be considered before using
this type of an"attack -the enemy
should have hastily prepared de-'
fensive positions with little or n
overhead cover so that he is stisceptible to time fire. He should be
weak in tank defense.-S6 we can
attack this way when the enemy is

Phillips, Alfred, "They Can Work Together,"

Source:
October 1952, pp. 33-37.
125

Infantry Fhool Quarterly,

36

INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY

on the run and hasn't had the time

to set up elaborate defenses.
TANKS AND INFANTRY
CONVERGE ON THE OBJECTIVE
FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS
"Here the tanks and Infantry
might cross the line of departure
at different locations and at different times. Using different routes,
and different assault positions, they
meet on the objective and reorganize together. In this type of an
attack, you use the speed and maneuverability of the tanks to the
utmost. There is a certain amount
of surprise achieved on the enemy
when you hit him from different
directions. But here are some weaknesses to this type of an attack. First
of all, the Infantry does not have
the supporting fire of the tanks
either when they move from the
line of departure to the assault position, or in the assault. The tanks
are extremely vulnerable to antitank weapons as they maneuver
over terrain not cleared by the Infantry or terrain where the Infantry cannot cover their movement,
By separating the tanks and Infantry, control is difficult. So, you use
this method when the terrain is
such that it is better to temporarily
split the team. Say, you have
swamps that the Infantry can negotiate and find good cover and
open terrain nearby that would be
a preferable route for the tanks,
And remember, here again the closest coordination must be made,
and constant contact .between units
maintained,
TANKS SUPPORT THE
INFANTRY BY OVERHEAD
FIRE ALONE
"This is another method that we

126

can use. Here, the tanks take up

firing positions at or near the line
of departure and cover by fire the
movement of the Infantry to the
assault position, and in its assault
until its fires are masked. Using
this method we take advantage of
only one of the three basic capabilities of the tank, its fire power. This
method should only be employed
when there is a tank obstacle in our
zone that forbids the tanks being
employed any other way. Should
such a situation exist, plans must
be made before the attack for the
movement of the tanks through the
zone of adjacent units so the tanks
can rejoin your unit as soon as possible. This requires coordination
with the commander of the bordering unit or with the next higher
commander.
"Now, in presenting these five
basic methods for employing an
Infantry-tank team, that doesn't
mean that only one can be selected
for an attack and followed through
all the way. Again, the situation or
the terrain might dictate modifying
the method selected. It often happens that the tanks move forward
by bounds to cover the movement
of the Infantry to the assault position, and then join it in the assault.
Or when we are in pursuit of a
rapidly retreating enemy, you can
have the Infantry actually ride on
the tanks to permit maximum
speed in movement. The only thing
to consider in letting Infantry ride
on tanks is that they are extremely
vulnerable to enemy fire out on the
tank's decks, and the traverse of
the tank's cannon is restricted until
the Infantry men jump off."
Pieper paused to take another sip
of his beer. Tanker Tom, who had
been nodding his head in agreement

THEY CAN WORK TOGETHER!

at all that Pieper had said, then
added this,
"All that you say makes an awful lot of sense. But if the rifle
company commander is the leader
of the Infantry-tank team you describe, he will have to remember
that tanks require daily maintenance. He will have to give the
tanks an opportunity to refuel and
resupply. After the objective is
taken and reorganization completed, the tanks should be withdrawn a few tanks at a time, or
section echelon, to an area where
resupply can be made."
Don the Infantryman then added
his bit,
"If all this is going to work in
combat, the tanks and Infantry
should be trained in these team
tactics here in the States. Each
rifleman should be shown how to
designate targets with his rifle by
actually firing at a location and

37

then having the tank clobber it

with its gun. Or, have the target
designated over the phone mounted
on the back of each tank. Using the
direction that the gun is pointing as
12 o'clock, the rifleman can use the
clock system to point out the target.
By running attacks together, we
can work out a smooth running
infantry-tank team."
Joe the Vet then moved up to our
beaming trio. This air of mutual
esteem and accord was new to him.
Polishing the space before them, he
said,
"All right, you guys, either drink
up or shut up. It's getting late. Besides, who's interested in the Infantry-tank team? Now, take the
Air Force. Let me tell you about
that run over the Ploesti oil fields.
There I was..."
"Three beers," interrupted Pieper, "and you told us about Ploesti
before."

A fool can profit by his own experience but I prefer to profit from the
experience of others.
Bitivarch

127

ANNEX G
APPENDIX 6
DOCTRINE
Three methods of tank-infantry assault:
Infantry and Tanks Attack on
Infantry and Tanks Attack on
the Same Axis. This method should
Converging Axes. This is the b-st
be used when there is only one
methods of attack, since it capiavenue of approach to the objectalizes on surprise and makes the
tive, and when the tanks have firing
enemy fight in two directions. It is
positions along that approach and
also the most difficult method to
maneuver room so that they can
coordinate. The rifle company comjoin the Infantry in the attack.
mander must have good communications with the tank platoon leadWith good visibility and fields of
fire, the tanks can support the Iner.
fir,
teheankn-commander
cn sppot
This method can be used when
fantry by fire and then join the Inthere are two approaches to the
fantry in the assault. When the
objective, at least one being a good
enemy has little overhead cover, a
approach for tanks and one a good
good technique is for the tanks to
pass through the Infantry and lead
approach for Infantry. If one axis
the assault under cover of airburst
is used exclusively by tanks and
artillery fire. Both of these technithe other exclusively by Infa'intry,
ques give maximum speed, fire
mutual support will be partly lost
power and shock action.
for a while. The tanks can support
When visibility and fields of fire
the riflemen until they move to the
Wen istiicttank and
nfie fre
assault position. At this time, both
are restricted, tanks and Infantry
the Infantry and tanks converge on
-hruld advance together. When
the common objective so that they
practicable, tanks should lead. This
arrive on the objective simultanetechnique is easy to co Jrol andously; or the tanks can arrive first,
mutual support is simplified. The
with overhead artillery fire being
tanks' fire power and shock action
used until the Infantry arrives.
is utilized but the speed of the attack is held down to the rate of the
When both avenues of approach
Infantry.
are good, tanks and Infantry can
be used on both axes. One axis may
be predominantly tnks while the

Tanks Support by Fire Only. This

is the least desirable method of the
three and should be used only when
the other two are completely impractical. Though the tanks can
effectively support the Infantry for
a time by fire alone, their shock
action and a part of their fire
power will inevitably
be lost.
The
of the team
should
arrange for the tanks to join the
Infantry on the objective as soon
as possible.
This method must be used when
the tanks cannot cross the terrain
or when certain obstacles cannot
be cleared until the objective is
taken. An example of this is where
there are anti-tank mine fields that
are covered by fire from the objective. In river crossings, the Infantry may have to first eliminate
enemy direct fire at the crossing
site before the tanks can be brought
over by bridge or ferry.

other is predominantly Infantry.

This technique may be difficult to
coordinate, but it will give the
maximum surprise.

Source:
Clark, Lyman, "Infantry and Tanks, Inc.,"
October 1953, pp. 104-107.

128

Infantry School Quarterly,

ENDNOTES

1.

General

2.
General
Changing World,"

Burnod, Napoleon's Maxims,

p.

87.

George B. Crist, "A U.S. Military

Strategic Review, Winter 1990, p.

Strategy for a
16.

3.
Major Godwin, "Discrepancy in Light Infantry Missions
and CSA Directives," The Infantry Conference Booklet, 1987.
4.

Crist,

pp.

19-20.

5.
General Edwin H. Burba, Implementing National Military
StrateAy, lecture, 16 January 1991.

2007,

6.
Department of the Army, The Army Plan
March 1990, p. 14.

(TAP).

FY1992-

7.
Major William B. Caldwell, IV, Not Enough to Get There,
The Case of Light Infantry, SAMS
Not Heavy Enough to Win:
Monograph, 4 December 1987.
8.
Senator Sam Nunn, "A New Military Strategy," The
Congressional Record - Senate, April 18, 1990, p. 4453.
9.
Henry S. Hastings, Employment of Armored Infantry,
Monograph, Armor Officer's Advanced Course, p. 4.

Light

10.
Howard G. Crowell, Jr., and Jared L. Bates, "HeavyConnection:
Division," Infantry, July-August, 1984, p.

1953,

11.
p.

Secretary of the
115.

18.

Army's Semiannual Report, January-June

12.
General George Catlett Marshall, The Papers of George
Catlett Marshall, from a speech at Milwaukee, WI, September 1941,
pp. 606-607.
13.
U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Division Command. 1986, p. 27.

14.
Forces,
15.
Brixade,

Experiences

in

Rilard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor - A History of Mechanized

pp.

2-323.

Robert H.
p. 58.

Adleman and George Walton, The

Devil's

16.
General Herman Balck, "Translation of Taped
Conversation with General Herman Balck, 13 April 1979,"
17.
Scott R.
Infantry, p. 200.

p.

13.

McMichael, A Historical Perspective on Light

129

18.
Military Operations Research Unit, Operation Goodwood,
tour booklet.
19.
November

Colonel
1944, p.

George W.
App. A-i.

20.
Roland Anderson,
Division, North Africa, 26

Coolidge, AGF

Report No.

135th Infantry Regiment

Mar-1l Apr 43, p. 133.

385,

27

34th Tank

21.
Colonel James H. Dyson, "With the 2nd Armored
from Benning to Berlin," interview, 22 December 1990.

Division

22.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board.
Report of
Observers:
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Vol. V.
Paper
prepared by Major General Harmon, Cdr VI Corps, 1 April 1944,
disseminated to platoon level in Italy, p. A-147-IC.
23.
24.
Infantry,

Ogcrkiewicz,
Department of
1953, p. 48.

p.

385.

the

Army, Army Lineage

Book, Vol.

II.

25.
Brian Bond and Martin Alexander, "Liddell Hart and
DeGaulle:
The Doctrine of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense,"
in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Peter Paret, p. 601.
26.
General George Patton, "Infantry Division Conference.
Bad Nauheim, GE, 20 Nov 1945," in Organization, Equipment, and
Tactical Employment of the Infantry Division, Report 15 of the
General Board, ETO, 1946, by BG A. Kibler and BG H. N. Hartness.
27.

General Erwin Rommel,

The Rommel

Papers, p.

201.

28.
William L. Roberts, "Employment of Armored Infantry of
an Armored Division," Military Review, Vol. 23, May 1943, p. 36.
29.
Tactics,"

Richard M. Orgorkiewicz, "The Evolution of Armored

Military Review XXXVII, February 1958, p. 35.

30.

John A.

31.

Orgorkiewicz, p.

English, On Infantry,

p. xxvii.

37.

32.
Dr. Robert R. Palmer, Reorganization of
for Combat, Study No. 8, p. 18.

Ground Troops

33.
Palmer, Reorganization of Ground Troops for CombatStudy No. 8. Memorandum of LTG J. L. Devers, Chief of the Armored
Force, 1 Nov 1942, p. 19.
34.
BG J. A. Holley and LTC S. G. Fries, Organization,
Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Separate Tank Battalions.
ATO,
1946, p. 4.
Study 50 of the General Board, E

130

35.
Holley and
Section 1946.

Force

Pries,

Combat

Study No.

3, AGF,

36.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board.
Command & Center AGF Study No. 27, p. 47.

37.
Journal,

Historical

The Armored

General George Patton, in "Tanks in Sicily,"

May-June 1944, by W. B. Goddard, p. 8.

38.
U.S. Army Ground
Combat Units, p. 468.

Cavalry

Forces, The Organization of Ground

39.
General Leslie J. McNair, in Reorganization of Ground
Troops for Combat, Study No. 8, by Robert R. Palmer, p. 36.
40.

Ibid.,

41.

U.S. Army Ground

p.

34-35.
Forces, p.

462.

42.
BG G. A. Kibler and BG H. N. Hartness, Organization,
Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Infantry Division.
Report 15 of the General Board, ETO, p. 1.
43.
BG J. A. Holley and LTC S. G. Fries, Organization,
Equipment and Tactical Employment of Separate Tank Battalions.
Study 50 of the General Board, ETO, P. 9.
44.

General Matthew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War,

45.
Alfred Phillips, "They Can Work Together,"
School Quarterly, October 1957, p. 33.

p.

34.

Infantry

46.
John Burney, "Armor and Airborne at Arnheim,"
Mar-Apr 1955, pp. 36-37.

Armor,

47.
Scott R. McMichael, A Historical Perspective on the
Light Divisions, CSI No. 6, p. 13.
48.
T. R.
Unpreparedness,

Fehrenbach, This Kind of War:

p. 18.

49.
Dennis J. Vetock, Lessons Learned:
Army Lesson Learning, p. 2.
50.

Ibid.

51.

Ibid.,

A Study in

A History of U.S.

pp. 57-58.

52.
S. L. Lewis, Forgotten
Policy, 1918-1941, p. 56.

Legions:

German Army Infantry

53.
Williamson Murray, "The German Response
Poland," Armed Forces and Society 2, Winter 1980,

131

to Victory in
p. 287.

54.

Ibid.

55.

Ibid.

56.

Ibid.,

p.

287

-288 .

57.
Drew Middleton, "The Battle for North Africa,"
Times Magazine, 7 November 1982, p. 48.
58.
59.
Journal,

Kibler and Hartness, p.

New York

1.

MG Orlando Ward, "The Tank-Infantry Section,"

September 1945, p. 8.

Infantry

60.
U.S. Army Ground Force Observer Board, Report of
Observers, Mediterranean Theater, Vol. V, 5th Army on the Carano
Road East of Fosso Della Pedata, Italy, 1944, p. A-144-2.
61.
U.S. Army Armored School, A Critical Analysis of
History of Armor in World War II, 1953, p. 13.
62.
Jonathan M. House,
Military Review, p. 45.

1945,

63.
p.

65.

"Designing the Light Division,"

Roy Moore, "Why Not Tanks,"

18.

64.
C. R. Cawthon,
December 1958, p. 34.

the

Infantry Journal, March

"Plan beyond the Assault,"

Army,

Ibid.

66.
Dr. Robert R. Palmer, Reorganization of Ground Troops
for Combat, Combat Study No. 8, p. 18.
67.
Charles E. Heller and William A.
First Battles, 1776-1965, p. 234.
68.

Ibid.,

p.

251-252.

69.

Ibid.,

p.

261.

70.

Ibid.,

p.

264.

71.

Bryan Perrett, Desert Warfare, p.

72.

Ibid.,

p.

154-156.

73.

Ibid.,

p.

161.

74.

Ibid.,

p.

127-128.

132

Stofft, America's

128.

75.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Report of Observers.
Mediterranean. Vol. V. Report No. 147, p. 11.
AGF Report
76.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board ETO.
1000, 31 May 1945, Separate Tank Battalions, p. 1.

No.

77.

McMichael, p.

78.
MG Robert T.
7 January 1949, p. 2.

p.

198.
Frederick, Interview at

79.

Kibler and Hartness, p.

80.

Hastings, p.

81.

Holley and Fries,

82.

Dyson, p.

83.

Ibid.

84.

"Tanks and Doughboys,"

85.

Ibid.

the Pentagon.

14.

8.
p.

7.

1.

Infantry Journal,

July 1945,

9.

86.
Department of the Army, Historical Study, Russian
Combat Methods, p. 46.
87.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observers Board, Vol.
Report No. 1120, pp. 1-7.

V.

88.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observers Board, Vol.
Report No. 191.

II.

89.

Ibid.

90.

Ibid.

91.
William M. M. Cutler, "Cooperation with the Infantry,"
The Cavalry Journal, Jan-Feb 1945, p. 28.
92.
William Bell,
Nov-Dec 1950, p. 19.

"The First Five Months,"

Armor, Vol.

59,

93.

Holley and Fries, p.

6.

94.

U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board.

AGF Report No.

95.

U.S.

Army Ground Forces Observer Board.

AGF Report No.

693.

385,

p. 14.
96.

Ibid.,

p.

10.

133

97.

Dyson.

98.

OCAFF Training

99.

Heller

and

100.

Ibid.

101.

Avraham

Bulletin No.

Stofft,

103.
RUSI

1953,

p.

910.

273.

(Bren) Adan,

102.
Elizabeth Monroe
Papers, The October War.

War,"

p.

1,

and

On

the

A.

H.

Banks

of

the

Suez,

Farrah-Hockley,

General Frederick Kroesen, "The Ultimate

Journal, 12 December 1980, p. 63.

p.

430.

Adelphi

Weapon

of

104.
LTC James Grazioplene, Operation Just Cause
Observations, a lecture, 27 February-I March 1990.
105.
U.S.
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Army
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106.
Carey
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107.

A.
p.

MG James

Ground
V. AGF

Forces Observer
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Clark, Armor
27.

in

Gavin,

Berlin,

On

to

the

Board.
p. 11.

Hurtgen

p.

Forest:

181.

108.
J. D. Balmer, L. Compton, and P. B. Bell, Study of
Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Tank
Destroyer Units, Study 60 of the General Board, p. 18.

29

109.

OCAFF, Notes

110.

Grazioplene.

111.

Caldwell,

112.

Palmer,

113.
October

p.

p.

"Role of
1988, p.

on

Combat

in

Korea,

16 April

1952.

15.

37.

U.S. Light
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Infantry,"

Janes

Defense

Weekly,

114.
Major Benjamin Harvey, Feedback from Visits and
Conversations with the United States Army Light Divisions,
115.
1968,

p.

Virgil Ney,

the U.S.

Army

Division,

Palmer,

117.

Vern G.
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p.

41.

Tosh and James B. Hobson, "Ground Mobility:

Division," Infantry, July 1957, pp. 38-39.

134

2.

1939-

49.

116.

Pentomic

Evolution of

p.

118.

Ibid.,

p.

36.

119.
LTG Ronald L. Watts, VII Corps After Action Report,
Light Infantry Employment in the European Environment, Reforger
88, November 18, 1988, p. 17.
120.
J. F. C. Fuller, "The Foundations of the Science of
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121.

Murray, p.

122.
Department
15 November 1988, Ch.

285.
of the Army, Corps Operations, FM
5, pp. 47-50; Ch. 6, pp. 36-39.

123.
War Department, Infantry Field Manual:
Battalion, FM 7-20, 28 September 1942.

100-15,

Rifle

124.
War Department, Infantry Battalion War Department
Field Manual, FM 7-20, 1 October 1944.

FM

125.
17-36,

War Department,
7 February 1944.

Employment of Tanks with

126.

Ward, p.

127.

Phillips, pp. 35-36.

9.

128.
Lyman H. Clark, "Infantry and Tanks,"
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129.

Hastings.

130.

Bell,

p.

Infantry,

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19.

131.
Patrick Donaldson,
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"Combined Arms Training,"

Armor,

132.
MG Thomas G. Foley, Armor Support to Light Forces,
Memorandum, 23 April 1990, p. 1.
133.
General William E. Depuy, "The Light Infantry,
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37.
134.

p.

Dyson.

135.
LTC Jim Montano, Operational Employment
Infantry Divisions, Fort Ord, CA, 6 July 1987.

of Light

136.
General Edwin H. Burba, "FORSCOM in a Changing Era:
Gulf Crisis Demonstrates the Need for Contingency Force
Versatility," Army Green Book, October 1990, pp. 50-51.

135

137.
LTC John M. Hutcheson, Armor Support to Light Forces
6 March 1990.
Conference, 27 February-I March 1990.
138.
U.S. Marine Corps, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force,
Operational Handbook 2, pp. 5-23.
139.
the Light
140.

147,

Richard Saunders, "Light Armor:

Infantry Division," pp. 78-85.
Burba, p.

52.

141.
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer
Mediterranean Theater, pp. A132-3.
142.

Ibid.,

p.

Necessary Addition to

Board, AGF Report No.

13.

Armor School and Center, 735th Tar

143.
Reduction of METZ, p. 13.
144.

Ibid.,

p.

59.

145.

Clark. p.

24.

146.

Clark, p. 20-22.

3attalion in

the

COL H. R. Emery, "Armored Support in Forest Country,"

147.
Military Review, February 1951, p. 94.
148.
U.S. War Department, General Staff, Operations
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1944, p. 2.
149.
U.S. Army C&GSC, "No Margin for Error,"
Actions since 1939, pp. 16-4 to 16-6.
150.
p.

"Tanks and Doughboys,"

9.

136

Infantry Journal,

Combined Arms

July

1945,

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