A-1 Appendix A to

COG/60 – WP/07

ICAO Crisis Management Framework

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

ICAO 12th Air Navigation Conference (AN-Conf/12) in Montréal in 2012

issued recommendation 4/8 “Crisis Coordination Arrangements and
Contingency Plans” stating that ICAO should consider how crisis
coordination arrangements for potentially disruptive events, similar to that
used for volcanic eruptions, could be established on a regional basis; and
also the regional offices continue to support the development,
promulgation, maintenance of contingency plans, including the holding of
practical exercises, in preparedness for potentially disruptive events,
including those events that may adversely impact aviation safety.

Consequently, the EANPG took an initiative to establish a standardised

crisis management framework based on a common concept for the
management of crisis situations affecting aviation within the EUR Region,
regardless of the type. This concept will include crisis coordination
arrangements and crisis management principles, a non-exhaustive list of
possible threat types, the four different phases of escalation of crisis and
the requirement for pan/intra-regional coordination. It will take account of
crisis management arrangements that exist in a number of States at
national and regional level and without prejudice to the existing States’
and EU arrangements. The concept could also be considered by other
ICAO Regions, especially in areas where the ICAO Planning and
Implementation Regional Groups (PIRGs) established Regional
Contingency Plans.

A comprehensive framework for crisis management has been established

in a part of the EUR region in the context of the EU Single European Sky
policy through the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)
supported by the Network Manager, based on EC Regulation 677/2011.

At the global level ICAO has established an internal Emergency and

Incident Response (EIR) Process to coordinate the flow of information
between ICAO headquarters and other interested parties within the
aviation industry and, where appropriate, United Nations (UN)
headquarters. The EIR process is of a strategic nature and was not
established to assume control over the operational management of
incidents.
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1.2 Scope and objectives

This crisis management framework covers the ICAO EUR region. It

supports crisis management arrangements at the national (e.g. State),
sub-regional (e.g. EACCC scope), and regional level (e.g. EUR Region).

The framework:
 is built on EACCC arrangements and experience,
 aims to be in line with global ICAO provisions and be used as a basis
for pan/intra-regional cooperation,
 is built on existing national and international crisis management
arrangements in the EUR Region,
 aims to propose guidance for States - to help States in enhancing the
level of preparedness to threat scenarios,
 aims to harmonise crisis management approach across the whole
European Region.

1.3 Principles

The following principles apply:

 Arrangements intend to address crisis management in an all-hazard-

approach and including all relevant stakeholders.
 Without prejudice to a State’s sovereignty and for those States subject
to the EU framework for crisis management, a coordination mechanism
should be established to improve communication flows and facilitate
harmonised decision making across the network in order to manage
the impact effectively.
 The response to the crisis should be proportionate to the type of
threat, its extent, and circumstances; for instance, it would be worth
exploring where else the safety risk assessment methodology (SRA)
could be applied more widely.
 Data/information sets and sources to support crisis management
arrangements should be identified.
 Communication policy should be established to ensure that sharing of
consistent information is coordinated.
 Procedure should be established for crisis escalation, recovery, and
return to normal.
 Post-crisis evaluation procedures should be established.
 Arrangements should address principles related to decision making in
crisis events (e.g. Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) approach in volcanic
ash events).
 Arrangements should include the civil/military coordination and
cooperation aspects.
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 Arrangements should also cover scenarios where more than one

United Nations Agency is involved in the crisis management.

1.4 Document maintenance

This document has been developed by the CRISIS Management

Framework Working Group under the auspices of EANPG COG and has
been adopted by EANPG following a recommendation by the COG. The
document is published as an ICAO EUR Document on the ICAO EUR/NAT
Office website.

The core document will be kept under regular review by the EANPG COG
and will be updated as required. The Secretariat of the ICAO EUR/NAT
Regional Office will maintain Annexes.

CHAPTER 2 - ATM CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS

2.1 Crisis Management Phases

This chapter covers phases in ATM Crisis Management that may be
applied on a national, sub regional, or regional level, in case of a
disruptive event.

2.1.1 Pre-alert
Information is received on an event, which may lead to a
possible major disruption to ATM, requiring activation of the
crisis management arrangements.

2.1.2 Disruption
Major ATM disruption that impacts the ATM operations and
which may escalate to a crisis.

2.1.3 Crisis
State of inability to provide air navigation service at required
level resulting in a major loss of capacity, or a major
imbalance between capacity and demand, or a major failure in
the information flow following an unusual and unforeseen
situation.

2.1.4 Recovery
In the recovery phase, the operation will go back to normal,
and an evaluation of the impact will be finalised.
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2.2 Preparation

2.2.1 Building Procedures

The following steps should be considered:

 Establishing contacts covering:

o Crisis Management Staff
o Information Sources
 Defining operational instructions covering:
o Roles
o Responsibilities
o Initiation of procedures
o Actions
 Making available tools in support of crisis management:
o Tele/video-conferencing
o Contingency plans
o Information resources
 Library of information on crisis topics
 Web portal – sites

2.2.2 Allocating Resources

The following resources should be allocated:

 Budget
 People
o Crisis Management staff
o Support Staff
 Facilities
o Crisis rooms
o Equipment (PCs, TV, cabinets, tables, chairs, etc.)
o Communication Facilities (telephones, etc.)

2.2.3 Building Partnerships

Building partnerships with relevant stakeholders at national,

regional and beyond national and regional boundaries is an
essential step in the preparation for an effective crisis
management.

2.2.3.1 National Network

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At the national level consideration should be given to

establishing partnerships should be established with:

a) Relevant stakeholders (non-exhaustive list)

o Aircraft operators (both commercial and non-
commercial) including operators of State aircraft
o Air Navigation Service Providers at aerodromes, in the
Terminal Areas and in the Area Control Centres,
o Airport operators,
o Military,
o Appropriate Ministries,
o Civil Aviation Authority and/or appropriate National
(Supervisory) Authorities
o etc.

b) Knowledge centres/Agencies

Knowledge centres/Agencies should be supporting

national aviation crisis management with expertise in
their specific field.

2.2.3.2 Regional Network

In addition to partnerships established at the national level,

consideration should be given to building partnerships at the
regional level involving:

a) Relevant stakeholders (non-exhaustive list)

o Air Navigation Service Providers at aerodromes, in the

Terminal Areas and in the Area Control Centres,
o Aircraft operators,
o Airport operators,
o Civil Aviation Authorities and/or National Supervisory
Authorities
o EACCC,
o EASA,
o EU Council of Ministers,
o European Commission,
o ICAO EUR/NAT Regional Office,
o International organisations, e.g. IATA, ACI, CANSO,
etc.
o Main ATM Centre (MATMC),
o Military,
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o Network Manager (NM),

o etc.

b) Knowledge centres/Agencies

Knowledge centres/Agencies should be supporting

aviation crisis management with expertise in their
specific field, for example (non-exhaustive list):
o EC Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)
managed by DG ECHO with its expertise in
management of events requirement humanitarian aid
or involving civil protection activities,
o Manufacturing industry
o Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAAC) in London and
Toulouse in the event of volcanic ash episodes,
o Other United Nations Agencies (e.g. World Health
Organisation, International Atomic Energy Agency,
etc.) which have a responsibility to deal with crisis
management,
o etc.

c) Crisis Focal Points

A network of Aviation Crisis State Focal Points has been

established in the framework of EACCC.

States in the EUR region outside the EACCC context

should consider establishing the appropriate liaison at
the national level to serve as the focal point in aviation
crisis management.

c1. EACCC model

Role of EACCC Crisis Focal Points includes the following:

In broad terms, the State Focal Point is the individual(s) who will act as the
conduit between the NM/EACCC and his/her State. Patently that individual needs
to be suitably senior to command authority, and suitably experienced (in aviation
preferably, but in Crisis Management if not) to engage at short notice – and
likely without time to have received comprehensive briefing on the issue – with
the EACCC.

It is undeniable that such an individual will not have all the answers to hand, but
should have developed a national sub-structure of appropriate initial points of
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contact able to provide timely and accurate information into the EACCC decision-
making process.

There is no definitive qualification for individuals in this position, but as a starting

point, they should consider that in the times of crisis they should:

 Ensure that the NM/EACCC is notified of major disruptions and crises in

his/her own State, or region;
 Share known and forecast information with the NM/EACCC;
 Understand his/her national position (e.g. in respect of safety risk
assessment in volcanic ash events);
 Ensure that conclusions of the assessment of the network impact of
actions generated at the national level are shared with the NM/EACCC;
 Provide a link with internal structure at the national level and, where
appropriate coordinate response and mitigating actions at the national
level in accordance with national procedures;
 Participate to the teleconferences of the EACCC;
 Be available for contact by NM/EACCC;
 Liaise with other, non-aviation, modes of transport at the national level in
accordance with national procedures;
 Provide a link to enable consistent messaging in media lines at the
national level.

Furthermore, as the work of the NM and the EACCC moves along in times of
'non-crisis', the State Focal Point should:

 Provide feedback to the NM in its follow up of actions/lessons learned

from previous crises and exercises;
 Be aware of measures to be taken at the national level in the event of a
crisis;
 Contribute to, and when required participate in, NM/EACCC organised
exercises;
 Contribute to, and when required participate in, NM/EACCC organised
workshops on procedures, tools and communication;
 Establish and maintain relations with relevant expert organisations at the
national level (e.g. nuclear experts), that could provide information
sources/portals;
 Establish and maintain relations with military at the national level;
 Ensure the EACCC has up-to-date contact details;
 Develop an informal national network for consultation on potential next
major disruption/crisis.

c2. Others
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This paragraph will be amended with input provided by States outside the
NM/EACCC area and be updated in later editions.

2.2.3.3 Inter-Regional Network

As crisis often spills over the boundaries of States or
Regions, in addition to partnerships established at the
national and regional level, it is essential to establish close
cooperation with key stakeholders beyond the boundaries of
the Region, in this particular case beyond ICAO EUR Region.

a) Relevant stakeholders
Relevant aviation stakeholders outside ICAO EUR
Region include, for example (non-exhaustive list):
o FAA and NAV Canada in North America,
o ISAVIA in Iceland,
o adjacent ICAO Regional Offices (mainly ASIA/PAC,
MID and AFI), ASECNA in Africa, etc.

b) Knowledge centres/Agencies
Knowledge centres/Agencies outside ICAO EUR
Region include, for example (non-exhaustive list):
o in USA: NOAA, NASA, etc.
o Other United Nations Agencies (e.g. World Health
Organisation, etc.)
o etc.

2.2.4 Exercises/Training

Exercises should be seen as part of the continuous

enhancement process, in order to identify gaps and address
areas for improvement of the crisis management process. All
involved stakeholders should be up to date with the crisis
management procedures and their responsibilities.

Training and exercise programme in support of crisis

management should be established covering, i.a.:
o Procedures
o Communication, internal and external
o Tools

2.3 Response Process

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2.3.1 Information Gathering

The availability of accurate, timely and consistent data is critical
to effective crisis management. To this effect procedures shall
be established in order to allow for the appropriate flow of
information relating to the crisis from all possible sources to
sustain the crisis management activities.

Information may be gathered from, i.a.:

o Industry/ATM stakeholders
o Knowledge Centres
o Subject matter experts

2.3.2 Communication

Communication in support of crisis management should be

established at:
o Crisis management operational level
o General public level.

Harmonised information dissemination needs to be ensured.

2.3.3 Decision Making

2.3.3.1 National perspective

National crisis management arrangements should ensure that

proper coordination of (mitigating) measures can be carried
out among the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, appropriate
mechanisms should be established at a national level in
support of decision making involving the State Focal Point.
This is relevant in establishing an appropriate response, such
as impact assessments, relevant legal framework information,
operational data gathering, activation of contingency plans,
etc.

2.3.3.2 Coordination on international level

(harmonisation)

In times of crisis, when impact of the network involves several

states, an appropriate coordination mechanism should be
established to facilitate information exchange involving the
relevant State Focal Points. This will assist states in the crisis
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response measures, and provide them with relevant

information to ensure harmonised decision making.

2.4 Evaluation
2.4.1 Lessons Learned
Lessons learned evaluation should be carried out for any crisis
event.

2.4.2 Action Plan

Outputs of the evaluation should be incorporated into an
action plan with appropriate monitoring and follow up.

CHAPTER 3 - SCENARIO ANALYSIS

This chapter includes a number of scenarios that may lead to an aviation crisis.
Each scenario contains a generic description, impact analysis, and decision
making principles.

‘Impact analysis’ describes possible impact in terms of safety, capacity, cost and
environment on:
 aircraft
 airspace
 aerodrome
 flight operations
 ANSP
 persons
 cargo

‘Decision making principles’ provide guidance on aviation or non-aviation

stakeholders’ response in managing the crisis.

1. Floods
a. Description
Flooding which may impact airport and/or ATC service
infrastructure, directly as well as indirectly, i.e. access, power
supplies, telecom, etc.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aerodrome (s)
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
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Impact on flight operations

 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access, communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State (non-aviation) authorities, airport authority and/or
ANSP decide on the airport unavailability for flight operations
or reduced capacity
 State (non-aviation) authority and/or ANSP decide on air
navigation service provision limitation (airspace unavailability
or reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

2. Earthquake
a. Description
Earthquakes which may impact airport or ATC service
infrastructure, directly as well as indirectly, i.e. access, power
supplies, telecom, etc.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
 damage of aircraft on ground
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight diversion
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 flight re-scheduling
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 passenger handling
 ground personnel health
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State (non-aviation) authorities, airport authority and/or
ANSP decide on the airport unavailability for flight operations
or reduced capacity
 State (non-aviation) authorities and/or ANSP decide on air
navigation service provision limitation (airspace unavailability
or reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

3. Volcanic Ash
a. Description
Volcanic ash dispersion contaminating parts of airspace and
possibly covering airports.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
- immediate safety of an aircraft:
 "the malfunction or failure of one or more engines leading
not only to reduction, or complete loss, of thrust but also to
failures of electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic systems.
Volcanic ash contains particles whose melting point is below
modern turbine engine burner temperature; these then fuse
in the turbine section reducing the throat area and efficiency
leading to engine surge and possibly flame-out;"
 the blockage of pitot and static sensors resulting in
unreliable airspeed indications and erroneous warnings;
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 windscreens can be rendered partially or completely opaque;

and
 contamination of cabin air requiring Flight crew use of
oxygen masks.

- the longer term safety and costs affecting the operation of

aircraft:
 the erosion of external aircraft components;
 reduced electronic cooling efficiency and, since volcanic ash
readily absorbs water, potential short circuits leading to a
wide range of aircraft system failures and/or anomalous
behaviour;
 flight crew manoeuvring for volcanic cloud avoidance may
potentially conflict with other aircraft in the vicinity;
 deposits of volcanic ash on a runway resulting in a
degradation of braking performance, especially if the
volcanic ash is wet; in extreme cases, this can lead to
runway closure; and
 the aircraft ventilation and pressurization systems can
become heavily contaminated. In particular, cleaning or
replacement may be required in response to air cycle
machine contamination and abrasion to rotating
components, ozone converter contamination and air filter
congestion.
 contamination

Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
(due to volcanic ash deposits on aerodrome surfaces: runway,
taxiways, apron)
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re routing
 flight diversion
 flight re-scheduling
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 ATCOs workload
Impact on persons
 flight crew health
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 flight crew workload

 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel health
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 Aircraft Operators will make flight operational decisions
based on SRA/SMS approach in accordance with their
SRA/SMS qualifications granted by their national authorities.
 State authorities may close airspace in the immediate vicinity
of the volcano

4. Nuclear Event
a. Description
Nuclear accident resulting in nuclear emissions (e.g. nuclear
powerplant) impacting flight operations in the EUR region.

b. Impact analysis

Impact on aircraft
 contamination
Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity (e.g. due to decontamination)
 infrastructure: access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: access
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
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 flight crew health

 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock health
 goods contamination

c. Support to decision making

 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. health authorities) may
decide on the airport unavailability for flight operations
 State authorities, airport authority and/or ANSP decide on
the airport’s reduced capacity
 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. health authorities) may
make a decision impacting air navigation service provision
ability (resulting in airspace unavailability or reduced
capacity for flight operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

5. Armed Conflict
a. Description
Part of airspace is not available for civil traffic, special corridors
may be established.

b. Impact analysis

Impact on aircraft
 immediate safety of an aircraft: an aircraft may be targeted
 damage: an aircraft may get damaged
Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity (due to military restrictions)
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity (e.g. due to military ops)
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
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 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State authorities, airport authority and/or ANSP may decide
on the airport’s reduced capacity
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may decide on the
airport unavailability for flight operations
 State authorities and/or ANSP may decide on air navigation
service provision limitation (airspace/ATS route unavailability
or reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may make a decision
impacting air navigation service provision ability (resulting in
airspace unavailability or reduced capacity for flight
operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

6. Hazardous Chemicals Event

a. Description
An accident/incident resulting in emissions of hazardous chemicals
(e.g. chemical powerplant) impacting flight operations.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
- immediate safety of an aircraft:
 windscreens can be rendered partially or completely opaque
 reduced visibility
 contamination of cabin air requiring flight crew use of
oxygen masks.
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- the longer term safety and costs affecting the operation of

aircraft:
 flight crew manoeuvring for area of severe smoke emission
avoidance may potentially conflict with other aircraft in the
vicinity;
 the aircraft ventilation and pressurization systems can
become heavily contaminated.
 contamination by chemical spills.

Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity (e.g. due to inspections required)
 infrastructure: access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: access
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock health
 goods contamination (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. environmental & health
authorities) may decide on the airport unavailability for flight
operations
 State authorities, airport authority and/or ANSP decide on
the airport’s reduced capacity
 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. environmental & health
authorities) may make a decision impacting air navigation
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service provision ability (resulting in airspace unavailability or

reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

7. Fire
a. Description
Fire(s) with substantial smoke production impacting flight
operations.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
- immediate safety of an aircraft:
 reduced visibility due to smoke
 smoke contamination affecting cabin air requiring flight crew
use of oxygen masks.

- the longer term safety and costs affecting the operation of

aircraft:
 the aircraft ventilation and pressurization systems can
become heavily contaminated.

Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: access
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
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 ground personnel workload

 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock health
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Support to decision making

 State (non-aviation) authorities, airport authorities and/or
ANSP may decide on reduced capacity or on the airport
unavailability for flight operations
 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. environmental & health
authorities) and/or ANSP may decide on air navigation
service provision limitation (resulting in airspace
unavailability or reduced capacity for flight operations )
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

8. Security Incident
a. Description
Major security incident, or threat of, resulting in airspace and/or
airport(s) unavailability for civil traffic.

b. Impact analysis

Impact on aircraft
 immediate safety of an aircraft
 damage: an aircraft may get damaged
Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
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 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Support to decision making

 State authorities, airport authority and/or ANSP may decide
on the airport’s reduced capacity
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may decide on the
airport unavailability for flight operations
 State authorities and/or ANSP may decide on air navigation
service provision limitation (airspace/ATS route unavailability
or reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may make a decision
impacting air navigation service provision ability (resulting in
airspace unavailability or reduced capacity for flight
operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

9. Airborne spread of diseases / pandemic

a. Description
Cessation or reduction of civil air traffic from/to certain
destinations, following an outbreak of communicable disease(s) in a
specific region.

b. Impact analysis

Impact on aircraft
 contamination of an aircraft
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops, entirely, or only for
flights from certain destinations
 reduced capacity (e.g. due to quarantine)
 infrastructure: access
Impact on flight operations
 A-21 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs availability and/or workload
 infrastructure: access
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making

 State (non-aviation) authorities (e.g. health authorities)

and/or ANSP may decide on the airport unavailability for
flight operations
 State authorities, airport authorities and/or ANPS may decide
on airport’s reduced capacity
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may make a decision
impacting air navigation service provision ability (resulting in
airspace unavailability or reduced capacity for flight
operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

10. Major Failure of Pan European Function

a. Description
Major failure of a pan European flow management function - for
example, Network Manager Operations Centre (NMOC)

b. Impact analysis
Impact on airspace
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 reduced capacity
 A-22 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

Impact on flight operations

 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
Impact on persons
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Support to decision making

 Airport authorities will adapt to contingency arrangements
 ANSPs will adapt to contingency arrangements
 Aircraft Operators will adapt to contingency arrangements

11. Industrial action

a. Description
Strike affecting ATM service provision and/or causing disruption
to flight operations.

b. Impact analysis

Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload and/or unavailability
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
 communications
Impact on persons
 A-23 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

 flight crew workload

 passengers handling
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State authorities, airport authorities and/or ANSP may decide
on the airport unavailability for flight operations or reduced
capacity
 State authorities and/or ANSP may decide on air navigation
service provision limitation (resulting in airspace
unavailability or reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM

12. Cyber attack

a. Description
A large scale cyber attack resulting in denial of air navigation
service; attack on any infrastructure on aircraft, airport, ANSP and
infrastructure, directly as well as indirectly, i.e. access, power
supplies, telecom, etc.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
 immediate safety of an aircraft: if aircraft equipment
impacted
Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 A-24 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

 infrastructure: building, equipment, access

 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may decide on the
airport unavailability for flight operations
 State authorities, airport authorities and ANSP may decide
on the airport’s reduced capacity
 State authority and/or ANSP may decide on air navigation
service provision limitation (resulting in airspace
unavailability or reduced capacity for flight operations)
 Appropriate (non-aviation) authorities may make a decision
impacting air navigation service provision ability (resulting in
airspace unavailability or reduced capacity for flight
operations)
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM and any additional
instructions issued by responsible authorities

13. Heavy Meteorological Situation

a. Description
Heavy meteorological conditions, for example thunderstorms,
snow, ice; may impact airspace, airport, aircraft operator or ATC
services (infrastructure), directly as well as indirectly, i.e. access,
power supplies, telecom, etc.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
 immediate safety of an aircraft: if aircraft directly impacted
 damage: aircraft may get damaged
Impact on airspace
 airspace unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome (s)
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 A-25 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

 reduced capacity
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload and/or unavailability
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State authorities (non-aviation and aviation), airport
authorities and/or ANSP may decide on the airport
unavailability for flight operations or reduced capacity
 ANSP may decide on air navigation service provision
limitation (resulting in airspace unavailability or reduced
capacity for flight operations)
 Aircraft Operators will make flight ops decisions based on
the available MET information

14. Threats from Space

14.1 Space Debris & Meteorites

a. Description
Space debris and meteorites may impact aircraft, airport, flight
operations or ATC service(s) (infrastructure), directly as well as
indirectly.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
 A-26 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

 immediate safety of an aircraft: accident of an aircraft hit by

space debris or meteorite
 damage: aircraft may get damaged
Impact on airspace
 airspace impact assessment currently lacks timely
predictability and accuracy
Impact on aerodrome(s)
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-routeing (tactical)
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: building, equipment, access
 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
 ground personnel health
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State authorities (non-aviation and aviation), airport
authorities and/or ANSP may decide on the airport
unavailability for flight operations or reduced capacity
 Airspace impact assessment currently lacks timely
predictability and accuracy
 Aircraft Operators will follow NOTAM

14.2 Space Weather

a. Description
 A-27 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

Solar activity impacting satellite navigation, HF, ground

infrastructure (e.g. power supply) and leading to increased
radiation.

b. Impact analysis
Impact on aircraft
 immediate safety of an aircraft: if satellite navigation or HF
impacted
Impact on airspace
 reduced capacity
Impact on aerodrome(s)
 reduced capacity if satellite navigation impacted
 infrastructure: equipment
Impact on flight operations
 flight re-routeing
 flight diversion
 flight delay
Impact on ANSP
 people: ATCOs workload
 infrastructure: equipment
 communications
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 flight crew health
 passenger health
 passenger handling
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State authorities (non-aviation and aviation), airport
authorities and/or ANSP may decide on the airport reduced
capacity
 Aircraft Operators will make flight operations decisions based
on the available space weather information

15. Shortage of Fuel

a. Description
Shortage of fuel supply.

b. Impact analysis
 A-28 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

Impact on aerodrome(s)
 aerodrome unavailable for flight ops
 reduced capacity
Impact on flight operations
 flight cancellation
 flight re-scheduling
 flight diversion
Impact on persons
 flight crew workload
 passenger handling
 ground personnel workload
Impact on cargo
 live stock
 goods (including dangerous goods)

c. Decision making
 State authorities (non-aviation and aviation), airport
authorities and/or ANSP may decide on the airport
unavailability for flight operations or reduced capacity
 Aircraft Operators will make flight operations decisions based
on the available fuel information
 A-29 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

Annex 1 – Impact Overview

 A-30 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

Annex 2 – Acronyms

ACI Airport Council International

AFI ICAO African Region
AIREP’s Air Report
AN Air Navigation
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
ASECNA The Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and
Madagascar
ASIA/PAC ICAO Asia and Pacific Region
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCO Air Traffic Controller
ATM Air Traffic Management
CANSO Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation
COG EANPG Program Coordination Group
DG-ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
EACCC European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell
EANPG European Air Navigation Planning Group
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EIR Emergency and Incident Response
ERCC European Emergency Response Coordination Centre
EU European Union
EUR ICAO European Region
EVITA European Crisis Visualisation Interactive Tool for ATFCM
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IATA International Airline Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
MET Meteorological
MID ICAO Middle East Region
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAV Canada Navigation CanadA
NM Network Manager
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOP Portal Network Operation Portal
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
SRA Safety Risk Methodology
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
VAAC Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres
WHO World Health Organization
 A-31 Appendix A to
COG/60 – WP/07

Annex 3 – Bibliography

1. EACCC Rules of Procedure (available on request from

EUROCONTROL/Network Manager)
2. EC Regulation 677/2011 (COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 677/2011
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of air traffic
management (ATM) network functions -
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/doc/2012_10
_24_regeu677_2011_oj_l185.pdf )
3. ICAO Doc 7300 , Convention on International Civil Aviation
4. ICAO Annex 6, Aircraft Operations and related Guidance Material
5. ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services and related Guidance Material
6. ICAO Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigations and Tools
7. ICAO Annex 15, Aeronautical information Services
8. ICAO Annex 17 Aviation Security and related Guidance Material, Tools and
Processes
9. ICAO Annex 19 Safety Management and related Guidance Material, Tools
and Processes
10. NATO AC/52 (EAPC)D(2013)0005, Annex 1, NATO Airborne Early Warning
and Control (NAEW&C) considerations regarding the Air Traffic
Management (ATM) system in conflict and crisis situations

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