Challenges for the New Peacekeepers

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace
and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in
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of the Institute.

Governing Board
Professor Daniel Tarschys, Chairman (Sweden)
Sir Brian Urquhart, Vice-Chairman (United Kingdom)
Dr Oscar Arias Sánchez (Costa Rica)
Dr Ryukichi Imai (Japan)
Professor Catherine Kelleher (United States)
Dr Marjatta Rautio (Finland)
Dr Lothar Rühl (Germany)
The Director

Director
Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland)

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

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Challenges for the New
Peacekeepers
SIPRI Research Report No. 12

Trevor Findlay

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1996
 Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
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Findlay, Trevor.
Challenges for the new peacekeepers/ Trevor Findlay
—(SIPRI research report; no. 12) Includes index

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ISBN 0–19–829199-X (pbk.)

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Contents

Preface viii
Acronyms x
1. The new peacekeeping and the new peacekeepers 1
Trevor Findlay
I. Introduction 1
II. The new peacekeepers 2
III. The new peacekeeping 12
IV. Challenges for the new peacekeepers 14
V. Conclusion 31
Table 1.1. First-time participants in UN peacekeeping and 4
observer missions since 1989
Table 1.2. First-time participants in non-UN peacekeeping and 6
observer missions since 1989
2. Germany 32
Hans-Georg Ehrhart
I. Introduction 32
II. The legacy of German history 32
III. The incremental approach of the new Germany 34
IV. Somalia: a turning-point 36
V. The Constitutional Court’s decision 39
VI. The political parties 41
VII. The armed forces 45
VIII. German society 48
IX. Facing the peacekeeping challenge 50
3. Japan 52
Takao Takahara
I. Introduction 52
II. Constitutional and historical restraints 53
III. The Cambodian experience 56
IV. Prospects 61
Appendix 3A. The ‘pacifist clauses’ of the Constitution of Japan 67
vi C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

4. Russia 68
Dmitriy Trenin
I. Introduction 68
II. The legal and policy framework 75
III. The management of peacekeeping 77
IV. Russian peacekeeping and the international 82
community
V. Conclusion 84
5. The United States 85
Donald C. F. Daniel
I. Introduction 85
II. Competing foreign policy tendencies 86
III. Ambivalence towards the UN 88
IV. President Clinton and foreign policy 89
V. Congress and public opinion 91
VI. Peacekeeping and public opinion 93
VII. Summary of PDD 25 95
VIII. Conclusion 97
6. Other new and emerging peacekeepers 99
Angela Kane
I. Introduction 99
II. China: strict observance of Charter principles 99
III. France: strong political engagement 101
IV. Europe: Spain leads the way 103
V. Asia: diversity 105
VI. Latin America: prospects for involvement 111
VII. Africa: a continent in need of peacekeepers 115
VIII. Conclusion 119
7. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 121
Jerzy M. Nowak
I. A glance at the recent past 121
II. OSCE instruments for conflict prevention, 123
management and resolution
III. The OSCE’s peacekeeping doctrine 128
 C ONTENTS vii

IV. The OSCE conflict management and peacekeeping 131

infrastructure
V. New challenges for the OSCE peacekeepers 133
VI. Cooperation and division of labour with other 138
institutions
VII. Conclusion 140
8. NATO 142
Steven R. Rader
I. Introduction 142
II. NATO’s formal acknowledgement of a new mission 143
III. Alliance strengths 144
IV. NATO support of the UN in the former Yugoslavia 145
V. NATO’s conceptual approach to peacekeeping 152
VI. NATO’s experience of the new challenges 154
VII. Summary 157
About the contributors 159
Index 161
Preface
This volume differs from the increasingly familiar literature on peace-
keeping in its emphasis on the challenges faced by individual nations
which have, since the end of the cold war, begun to participate in
peacekeeping operations for the first time. Without their contributions
many of the new, expanded, ‘muscular’ variety of operations would
be impossible. In particular this study focuses on the political and
constitutional challenges which some of the most important of these
‘new peacekeepers’—Germany, Japan, Russia and the USA—have
faced and will continue to face in becoming involved in peace-
keeping. Attention is also given to two international organizations—
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—which are,
respectively, actual and potential new peacekeepers.
One of the findings of this volume is that the effectiveness of peace-
keeping activities will be determined not only by the new norms,
procedures and institutions but first of all by the determination of
states and their government policies—those of both small and
medium-sized countries and the great powers.
The chapters in this volume all derive from papers presented at a
conference held in Bonn on 21–22 April 1994 on ‘Challenges for the
New Peacekeepers’, jointly organized by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
SIPRI is grateful to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for funding and
helping arrange that event. Dr Erfried Adam, head of the Develop-
ment Policy Project Group at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, worked
above and beyond the call of duty to organize the meeting. This
volume is the second produced by SIPRI’s Project on Peacekeeping
and Regional Security, which was established in 1993. Its editor is
Dr Trevor Findlay, the Leader of this Project, whose work and com-
mitment to producing this book deserve great credit. Special thanks
go to the authors of the chapters for their diligence in producing high-
quality work to tight deadlines. Olga Hardardóttir and Anneli
Berntsson, Research Assistants with the Project, assisted with the
research for the volume, and Eve Johansson contributed her
considerable editorial skills.
 P R EF AC E ix

The following analyses of the policies and experiences of the ‘new

peacekeepers’ will, it is hoped, not only be of academic interest but
will also make a contribution to the burgeoning international effort to
scrutinize the entire peacekeeping enterprise with a view to improving
and refining it.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld

Director of SIPRI
October 1995
Acronyms

AHG Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping

(NACC)
AIFV Armoured infantry fighting vehicle
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ARRC Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
(NATO)
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
AWACS Airborne warning and control system
BHC Bosnia–Herzegovina Command (UNPROFOR)
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIO Chairman-in-Office (OSCE)
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CPC Conflict Prevention Centre (OSCE)
CSBM Confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DMZ Demilitarized zone
EC European Community
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group (in Liberia)
ECOWAS Economic Organization of West African States
ECR Electronic combat and reconnaissance aircraft
EU European Union
FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional
(Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front,
El Salvador)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FSC Forum for Security Co-operation (OSCE)
GDR German Democratic Republic
HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)
HLPG High Level Planning Group (OSCE)
MD Military District (Russia)
MFO Multinational Force and Observers (in Sinai)
MICIVIH Mission Civile Internationale en Haiti (International
Civilian Mission to Haiti)
MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
 AC R ONYM S xi

MIOB Mission Internationale d’Observation au Burundi

(International Observation Mission in Burundi)
MND Multinational division
MNF Multinational Force in Haiti
MOD Ministry of Defence (Russia)
MRD Motorized Rifle Division (Russia)
NAC North Atlantic Council
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE)
ONUC Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (UN
Organization in the Congo)
ONUCA Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Centro-
américa (UN Observer Mission in Central America)
ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL Misión de las Nacionas Unidas en El Salvador
(UN Observer Mission in El Salvador)
ONUVEH UN Mission to Verify the Election in Haiti
ONUVEN Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para la
Verificación de las Elecciones en Nicaragua (UN
Verification Mission for the Nicaraguan Elections)
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDD Presidential Decision Directive (USA)
PFP Partnership for Peace
RENAMO Résistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican
National Resistance)
ROE Rules of engagement
RRF Rapid Reaction Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SAM Sanctions Assistance Mission (OSCE)
SDF Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SOP Standing operating procedures
SPPKF South Pacific Peacekeeping Force
UAR United Arab Republic
UNAMIC UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM UN Angola Verification Mission
xii C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

UNCRO UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia

UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force (in Syria)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEF UN Emergency Force (in Israel and Egypt)
UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP UN Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIPOM UN India–Pakistan Observation Mission
UNITAF Unified Task Force (in Somalia)
UNITAR UN Institute for Training and Research
UNMIH UN Mission in Haiti
UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOGIL UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSA UN Observer Mission in South Africa
UNOMUR UN Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda
UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia
UNPF UN Peace Forces (incorporates after March 1995
UNPROFOR, UNCRO and UNPREDEP)
UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment Force (in Macedonia)
UNPROFOR UN Protection Force (in the former Yugoslavia
1992–March 1995; from March 1995 in Bosnia and
Herzegovina)
UNSCOM UN Special Commission on Iraq
UNSF UN Security Force (in Irian Jaya)
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization
UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG UN Transition Assistance Group (in Namibia)
UNTEA UN Transitional Executive Authority (in Irian Jaya)
UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization (in Egypt/Israel/
Lebanon/Syria)
UNV UN Volunteers
UNYOM UN Yemen Observation Mission
URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
(Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)
WEU Western European Union
1. The new peacekeepers and the new
peacekeeping
Trevor Findlay

I. Introduction
Peacekeeping is a child of the cold war, born of the United Nations’
frustration at its inability to enforce the peace as envisaged in its
Charter and its desire to do more to affect the course of international
armed conflict than simply mediating and conciliating from a dis-
tance. Neither mentioned by name nor given a specific legal basis in
the UN Charter, peacekeeping evolved pragmatically in response to
the limited room for manœuvre afforded the UN by the East–West
conflict. Peacekeeping is ‘in many respects a reversal of the use of
military personnel foreseen in the Charter . . . Its practitioners have no
enemies, are not there to win and can use force only in self-defence.
Its effectiveness depends on voluntary cooperation’.1 In 1988 the UN
peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. With a
long list of successes to its credit, peacekeeping is arguably the UN’s
finest invention.
As a product of its time, however, peacekeeping was bound to
change once the cold war ended. Since 1989 it has cast off its cold
war shackles and vastly extended both the range and the pace of its
activities. No longer confined to quietly monitoring borders, as in
Kashmir since 1949, or conducting somewhat more delicate conflict
management tasks, as in Lebanon since 1978, UN peacekeepers are
now engaged in complex nation-building exercises that have stretched
the limits of both the theory and practice of peacekeeping. As a New
Zealand peacekeeper has put it, ‘the days of turning up equipped with
only good intentions, blue berets and a cut lunch are over’.2
The end of the cold war has also introduced scores of new players
to peacekeeping. For many of these ‘new peacekeepers’ there are
great challenges in participating for the first time, not just because

1 WEU document 1366, 1993, cited in Roos, J. G., ‘The perils of peacekeeping’, Armed
Forces Journal International, Dec. 1993, p. 13.
2 ‘New Zealand in the Security Council 1993–94’, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Information Bulletin, no. 52 (Mar. 1995), p. 31.
2 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

they are new to peacekeeping but because of the dramatic changes

that peacekeeping has undergone.
This chapter aims first to determine who the new peacekeepers are.
Second, it analyses the nature of the ‘new peacekeeping’ that has
emerged since 1989. Third, it examines the challenges that the new
peacekeeping poses to the new peacekeepers and how they have
affected their participation and performance.

II. The new peacekeepers

UN peacekeeping traditionally relied on a handful of states to provide
the bulk of the personnel required. These were mostly medium-sized
developed states, principally Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, and larger
developing states like India and Pakistan. A handful of smaller devel-
oping states, particularly Fiji, Ghana, Nepal and Senegal, were also
prominent. However, beginning with the deployment of UNTAG 3 in
Namibia between April 1989 and March 1990, a period during which
the cold war is widely considered to have ended, there has been an
enormous increase in the number of states involved in UN peacekeep-
ing. In 1988, before UNTAG, only 26 countries were involved. By
November 1994 there were 76.4
The main reason for the increasing involvement has been increased
need. With the end of the cold war more of the world’s armed con-
flicts became ripe for negotiated settlements as client states lost their
superpower mentors and the Security Council achieved a new unity in
actively seeking such settlements. The end of the cold war also
unleashed new conflicts in the Balkan states and several of the former
Soviet republics. The conflict resolution tool of choice in almost all
cases has been peacekeeping or some variant thereof: more peace-
keeping operations have been established since 1989 than in the
previous 45 years of the UN’s history. While in 1988 the UN operated
just 5 peacekeeping missions, by its peak year of 1993 it had 18.5
3 The full titles of UN and other peacekeeping operations are not spelled out in each
chapter. The reader is referred to the list of acronyms at the front of the book.
4 UN Press Release, SG/SM/95/52, 3 Mar. 1995, p. 2; and UN, United Nations Peace-
keeping Information Notes, DPI713067Rev. 4, United Nations, Feb. 1995, pp. 239–42.
5 UN, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN document A/50/60, S/1995/1,
3 Jan. 1995; and UN, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, Background Note (United
Nations Information Centre for the Nordic Countries: Copenhagen, Oct. 1993).
 INTR ODUC TION 3

Other international organizations have also increasingly launched

peacekeeping operations. Depending on how one classifies them, the
number of non-UN peacekeeping missions has increased from one in
1988 (the MFO in Sinai) to at least six. More peacekeeping personnel
have been deployed abroad than at any time in history. In 1988 the
UN had only 9950 troops in the field; by 1993 it had a record 80 000.6
At the end of July 1995, approximately 65 000 military personnel
were deployed in 16 UN peacekeeping operations.7 The numbers of
civilian police and other civilian personnel have also increased sub-
stantially. As of the end of July 1995 the UN had 1700 civilian police
in the field (an increase from 35 in 1988) and 6000 civilian personnel
(from 1500 in 1988).

Who are the new peacekeepers?

For the purposes of this volume the new peacekeepers are broadly
defined as those states which since 1989 have participated in a UN
peacekeeping mission for the first time in their history. Forty-nine
states fall into this category (see table 1.1). Hence more than half of
the current approximately 80 UN peacekeeping contributors are
‘new’. All new contributors of troops, military observers or civilian
police are listed, whatever the size or character of their contribution.
Countries which have only contributed civilian personnel other than
police are not included. Although some of the challenges facing civil-
ian personnel in peacekeeping missions are considered, in this volume
the emphasis is on military involvement. A peacekeeping mission has
been taken to be one listed by the UN as such8 and mandated
implicitly or explicitly under Chapter VI of the UN Charter relating to
the peaceful settlement of disputes, although they may also contain
some elements of peace enforcement as in the cases of UNPROFOR
and UNOSOM II.9
6 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (note 5); and United Nations Peace-keeping
Operations (note 5).
7 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, UN document
A/50/1, 22 Aug. 1995, p. 81; and Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (note 5).
8 See the United Nations Peacekeeping Information Notes series published by the
Department of Peace-keeping Operations in New York.
9 This volume does not consider ‘pure’ peace enforcement missions authorizable by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter relating to peace enforcement which
are clearly not peacekeeping. Such missions may be conducted by forces under the UN flag,
as in Korea in the early 1950s, or by a non-UN multilateral force or single state authorized to
act by the Security Council, as in the case of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991.
4 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Table 1.1. First-time participants in UN peacekeeping and observer

missions since 1989 1

Country First mission Year

Albania UNOMIG 1994

Algeria UNAMIC 1991
Barbados UNTAG 1989
Botswana ONUMOZ 1993
Brunei Darussalam UNTAC 1992
Bulgaria UNTAC 1992
Cameroon UNTAC 1992
Cape Verde ONUMOZ 1993
Chad UNAMIR 1994
China UNTAG 1989
Congo UNAVEM I 1989
Costa Rica UNTAG 1989
Cuba UNOMIG 1994
Czechoslovakia2 UNAVEM I 1989
Czech Republic 2 UNPROFOR 1993
Djibouti UNMIH 1994
Egypt3 UNTAG 1989
El Salvador MINURSO 1995
Estonia UNPROFOR 1995
Germany4 UNAMIC 1991
FRG4 UNTAG 1989
GDR4 UNTAG 1989
Greece UNTAG 1989
Guatemala UNMIH 1994
Guinea Bissau UNAVEM II 1991
Guyana UNTAG 1989
Honduras MINURSO 1991
Jamaica UNTAG 1989
Japan UNTAC 1992
Jordan UNAVEM I 1989
Korea, South UNOSOM II 1993
Kuwait UNOSOM II 1993
Lithuania UNPROFOR 1994
Luxembourg UNPROFOR 1992
Malawi UNAMIR 1993
Mali5 UNAMIR 1993
Namibia UNTAC 1992
Niger UNAMIR 1994
Romania UNIKOM 1991
Russian Federation UNIKOM 1991
 INTR ODUC TION 5

Country First mission Year

Saudi Arabia UNOSOM II 1993

Singapore UNTAG 1989
Slovakia2 UNPROFOR 1993
Spain UNAVEM I 1989
Switzerland UNTAG 1989
Togo UNTAG 1989
Trinidad and Tobago UNTAG 1989
Uganda UNOSOM II 1993
Ukraine UNPROFOR 1992
United Arab Emirates UNOSOM I 1993
USA6 UNIKOM 1991
Zimbabwe UNAVEM II 1991
1 Only missions listed by the UN as peacekeeping missions are included.
2 On 31 Dec. 1992 Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
3 Participated in ONUC 1960–61 as the United Arab Republic.
4 The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic

merged into one state in 1990.

5 Participated in ONUC in 1960 as a part of the Federation of Mali (now Mali and

Senegal). Senegal participated for the first time as an independent state in UNEF II
in 1974.
6 The USA was involved in 2 earlier missions, UNTSO (1948 to date) and

UNMOGIP (1949–54).

An additional 21 states are listed in table 1.2. These are states which
have never been involved in a UN mission, even during the post-cold
war years, but which have contributed for the first time to a non-UN
peacekeeping mission since 1989. Missions established by Russia, in
cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or
trilaterally with other former Soviet republics, have been taken into
account, although their ‘peacekeeping’ character is doubtful because
of their unconventional operating procedures, especially their willing-
ness to use force, the predominance of Russian forces and the extent
of Russian involvement in the conflicts themselves.10 They are of
interest here primarily because of the involvement of several new
former Soviet republics among the peacekeepers and their exposure to
at least some of the norms and procedures of traditional peacekeeping.

10 Russian political parlance does not differentiate between peacekeeping, peacemaking

and peace enforcement. The term used in Russia (mirotvorchestvo), directly translated, means
‘peace creation’; this could cover a very broad range of activities, from political mediation to
combat operations aimed at ‘imposing peace’.
6 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Table 1.2. First-time participants in non-UN peacekeeping and observer

missions since 1989 1

Country First mission Year

Antigua and Barbuda MNF 1994

Armenia OSCE Skopje2 1992
Bahamas MNF 1994
Belize MNF 1994
Benin MNF 1994
Dominica MNF 1994
Gambia ECOMOG 1990
Georgia South Ossetia3 1992
Grenada MNF 1994
Israel MNF 1994
Kazakhstan CIS Tajikistan4 1993
Kyrgyzstan CIS Tajikistan 1993
Mauritania Opération Turquoise 1994
Moldova Moldova Joint Force5 1992
St Kitts and Nevis MNF 1994
St Lucia MNF 1994
St Vincent and Grenadines MNF 1994
Tanzania ECOMOG 1994
Tonga SPPKF 1994
Uzbekistan CIS Tajikistan 1993
Vanuatu SPPKF 1994
1
Only countries which have never participated in UN missions. In addition to
states, 3 non-state actors (South Ossetia and North Ossetia in Georgia and the
Trans-Dniester region in Moldova) are involved in Russian-led peacekeeping
operations in former Soviet republics.
2 OSCE Spillover Mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
3 South Ossetia Joint Force in Georgia.
4 CIS Tajikistan Buffer Force in Tajikistan (Afghan border).
5 Moldova Joint Force in Moldova (Trans-Dniester).

There are some complications in determining exactly who is a new

peacekeeper. Some states which are listed here as ‘new’ participated
previously as different entities: Egypt contributed to ONUC as one
half of the United Arab Republic (UAR), along with Syria; Russia is
included as a new nation although the Soviet Union participated in a
limited number of peacekeeping missions in the Middle East with a
tiny number of observers;11 the new nations that emerged from the
11 In addition to helping airlift food at the beginning of the Congo operation.
 INTR ODUC TION 7

former Soviet Union are considered to be new peacekeepers, as are

the unified Germany (although the two former German states had
brief experience in UNTAG), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (even
though Czechoslovakia participated as a unified state in UNAVEM I
in Angola).
Finally, the USA is also considered a new peacekeeper for the pur-
poses of this volume—despite the fact that it assisted with some UN
peacekeeping missions during the cold war12—because its pre-1989
role was relatively minor, it did not provide ground troops and, most
importantly, because it has played such a crucial role in the subse-
quent new peacekeeping.

Motivations for participation

The motivations of the new peacekeepers probably differ little from

those of the old, although a higher proportion of newcomers may be
participating because of outside pressure, either from their allies or
from the UN Secretary-General or Secretariat or some other inter-
national organization. For instance, many of the Caribbean states (and
Israel) which participated in the MNF in Haiti and thereafter in
UNMIH, were pressured to participate by the USA in order to lend a
multilateral character to a US-dominated mission. A similar process
occurred in assembling the forces for UNITAF. Russia pressured
fellow CIS members to join it in peacekeeping in Tajikistan.
Still, many states volunteer willingly. Although much is made of
so-called peacekeeping fatigue, so keen have states been to participate
in some of the ‘safer’ missions that a number of such missions have
been ‘over-subscribed’. More states were willing to volunteer troops
for UNAVEM II and UNMIH, for instance, than could be accommo-
dated.13
Motives are invariably mixed. Altruism is one factor. Some of the
‘old’ peacekeepers like Canada, Norway and Sweden have regarded
participation in peacekeeping as the quintessence of good inter-

12 The USA has contributed aircraft, military observers, pilots, radio operators and
mediators to UNTSO and provided military observers and aircraft to UNMOGIP in its early
years. US experience with other UN operations during the cold war was restricted to provid-
ing airlift and technical support. US experience with non-UN peacekeeping included the
highly successful and in some respects unprecedented mission in Sinai, the MFO.
13 Statement by Dr Emilio Cardenas, Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations, 25th
Vienna Seminar, International Peace Academy, Vienna, 4 Mar. 1995.
8 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

national citizenship. This may indeed have been a primary motivation

in the days when peacekeeping was a relatively unpublicized back-
water of international activity, but altruism is today more likely to be
outweighed by other factors. Peacekeeping has acquired a certain
cachet and participation is seen as enhancing national prestige and
independence. Such factors appear especially important to the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw
Pact members whose foreign policies were essentially subordinated to
that of the Soviet state for 40 years. Public opinion may, of course,
still steel the altruism of governments and cause them to act, par-
ticularly in humanitarian crises, as in the case of Somalia.
For states which expect to be favoured candidates for permanent
membership of the Security Council (if and when it is expanded), par-
ticipation in peacekeeping has become a sine qua non. All the most
widely touted candidates—Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Nigeria and Pakistan—are now important contributors. Others hope
their participation will increase their influence on the course of inter-
national events generally and more specifically in the areas in which
peacekeeping operations are deployed. New Zealand’s contribution to
UNPROFOR during its term as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council was at least partly inspired by a desire to enhance its
credibility and influence in Council debates on the situation in the
former Yugoslavia.
Some new peacekeepers, like Spain, see peacekeeping as contribut-
ing, inchoately, to their national security.14 Others see a more direct
link. The members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN),15 all of which participated in UNTAC in Cambodia, saw
that operation as being decidedly in their national security interests.
Some new peacekeepers may even view participation in peacekeep-
ing as a down payment for the day when they themselves will need
the assistance of the international community. This may be one of the
principal motivations of the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, which live in the shadow of Russia. The Baltic states also
undoubtedly see participation in peacekeeping as demonstrating their
ability to contribute to the purposes of the NATO alliance in which

14 Ordóñez, F. F., ‘Introduccion’, Misiones de Paz Militares Españoles en el mundo

1979–1991 [Spanish peace missions throughout the world 1979–1991], (Ministerio de
Defensa: Madrid, 1991), p. 9.
15 ASEAN was formed in 1968 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984 and Viet Nam in 1995.
 INTR ODUC TION 9

they ardently hope for membership. For others, such as Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Namibia, South Korea and Zimbabwe,
participation in peacekeeping is a way of repaying a debt for the
peacekeeping operations of which they have been beneficiaries in the
past.
States in which the military is not entirely under civilian control,
such as Argentina, may view peacekeeping as a means both of keep-
ing their armed forces occupied outside the country rather than med-
dling in domestic affairs and of helping to rehabilitate them after an
authoritarian era in which their integrity and professionalism were
compromised. As Argentina’s Defence Minister, Oscar Camilión, has
diplomatically expressed it, Argentina’s participation in peacekeeping
‘not only gives members of the armed forces a deep feeling of profes-
sional pride, but also an international outlook which is very much
helping to consolidate the military as a pillar of the constitutional sys-
tem’.16
A less edifying motivation for some of the new peacekeepers from
the developing world may be a desire to profit from the reimburse-
ments for the costs of troop contributions (over and above those they
would have incurred if their forces had remained home). This is not
confined to the new peacekeepers: Fiji’s involvement in peacekeeping
since 1978 has reportedly been a ‘significant source of foreign
exchange’. 17 Some poorer states can indeed make a profit on such
transactions, but the UN is usually so slow in paying and the amount
so relatively niggardly that this cannot be a sole motivating factor.
Even Fiji has threatened to quit peacekeeping unless it is ‘reimbursed’
more promptly.
The armed forces of some countries may also benefit by receiving
equipment from better-equipped force contributors during peacekeep-
ing operations, as happened in UNOSOM II in Somalia. In Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Germany is supplying protective vehicles to the
Pakistani contingent, while the Jordanians are receiving US assist-
ance.18
Perhaps most important to all contributing militaries, whether from
rich or poor countries, is the invaluable overseas experience that
peacekeeping operations provide them in peacetime and the training
16 Camilión, O., ‘Argentina’, Defence and Security Review 1995, p. 15.
17 Scobell, A., ‘Politics, professionalism and peacekeeping: an analysis of the 1987
military coup in Fiji’, Comparative Politics, vol. 26, no. 2 (Jan. 1994), p. 190.
18 International Defense Review, vol. 27, no. 11 (1994), p. 10.
10 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

and contacts with other military forces that may ensue. Some military
establishments may not, however, favour excessive involvement in
peacekeeping, either in general or in relation to particular missions.
Many will take the view of the Australian military, which is that
peacekeeping is a useful exercise, affording operational and training
benefits, but that if over-emphasized it risks detracting from the
nation’s own defence needs.19
In some cases it will not be the military (or only the military) that
seeks a national role in peacekeeping but the foreign ministry, perhaps
prodded by its mission to the UN in New York, in turn perhaps pres-
sured by a UN Secretary-General and Secretariat desperately seeking
contributors. The Secretary-General’s attempts since 1993 to ensure
the credibility of the new UN Standby Forces Arrangement by
sending a military delegation to as many member states as possible to
plead for and organize pledges of contributions may also have
increased the number of actual participants in peacekeeping.

Categories of new peacekeepers

Several categories of new peacekeepers are discernible. The first, per-

haps surprisingly, comprises three of the five permanent members of
the Security Council—China, Russia and the USA. All the five per-
manent members of the Security Council had largely forgone involve-
ment during the cold war because of the danger that their rivalries
would be injected into the very conflicts from which peacekeeping
was designed to isolate them. France and the UK were partial excep-
tions.20 In contrast, China completely abjured participation in peace-
keeping during the cold war, involving itself for the first time in 1989
in UNTAG. Since the end of the cold war both Russia and the USA
have participated in several UN missions. Russia has even provided
ground troops, as in UNPROFOR, and organized and taken the pre-
ponderant role in peacekeeping operations on its troubled periphery.

19 Cheeseman, G., ‘Defence and the UN: the two-edged sword’, Unity (Canberra), June
1995, p. 8.
20 France participated in UNIFIL in Lebanon, the UK in UNFICYP in Cyprus. Both also
participated extensively in non-UN missions and gained experience relevant to peacekeeping
in numerous situations during the decline of their respective colonial empires. Britain’s
experience in Malaya, Zimbabwe and Northern Ireland foreshadowed much of today’s
complex multi-purpose UN missions. France’s role in francophone Africa since decoloniza-
tion has been intermittently that of peacekeeper between warring factions competing to
control its former colonies.
 INTR ODUC TION 11

The USA has dominated major non-UN (but UN-authorized) mis-

sions—UNITAF in Somalia and the MNF in Haiti. By 1995 it was
also participating in a range of regular UN peacekeeping operations,
including UNTSO, UNIKOM, MINURSO, UNPROFOR (in Croatia
and Macedonia), UNMIH and UNOMIG.21 Its preference continues to
be to provide support services rather than ground troops.
A second group of new peacekeepers comprises countries that were
previously unacceptable because of their association with one of the
cold war blocs or because of other political sensitivities: these include
Bulgaria, Cuba, Israel, Romania, South Korea and Spain. 22 A third
group comprises the defeated World War II allies, called the ‘enemy
states’ in the UN Charter.23 Germany and Japan, moving finally to
assume all the rights and responsibilities of international citizenship,
have begun incrementally to participate in peacekeeping. (Italy has
participated in peacekeeping operations for some time, mostly by
providing observers or air transport.24 ) A fourth category of new
peacekeepers includes newly independent states such as Estonia,
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Namibia and Ukraine, which never had the
opportunity to participate before. A final group includes a wide vari-
ety of states which are participating for the first time simply because
the current need for peacekeeping forces is so great. These include
Brunei, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Guyana, Luxembourg, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Switzerland and Uganda. While their contributions may
seem inconsequential compared to those of larger states, they broaden
the support base for UN peacekeeping and the range of experience
and capabilities available for future missions.
International organizations besides the UN are also becoming
involved as new peacekeepers, as sponsors and organizers of peace-
keeping missions, or at the very least as developers of peacekeeping
doctrine for missions to be employed in the future: these include the
European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) and the CIS.25
21 Holt, V. K. Briefing Book on Peacekeeping: The US Role in United Nations Peace
Operations, 2nd edn (Council for a Livable World Education Fund: Washington, DC, 1995),
p. 12.
22 United Nations Peacekeeping Information Notes, DPI713067Rev. 4 (note 4), p. 241.
23 Charter of the United Nations, Article 53.2.
24 Including UNEF I, UNTSO, UNOGIL, UNYOM, UNIPOM, ONUC, UNFICYP and
UNIFIL.
25 See also chapters 4, 7 and 8 in this volume.
12 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

III. The new peacekeeping

In its broadest sense peacekeeping is the deployment of UN or other
multilateral personnel in the field as a tool of conflict prevention,
management or resolution. Attempts at defining peacekeeping more
specifically have always been bedevilled by the peculiar nature of the
beast. Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter, it has never
been guided by established theory or doctrine, the term was invented
long after praxis had begun and improvisation has characterized its
evolution ever since.
The UN has traditionally defined a peacekeeping operation as one
‘involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers,
undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security in areas of conflict’.26 Despite the some-
what heady language of the latter part of this definition the early
generation of peacekeeping operations were mostly little more than ad
hoc holding operations designed to freeze in place erstwhile combat-
ants and their lines of control until a peaceful solution to a conflict
presented itself. Prime examples are the border-monitoring operations
in Kashmir (UNMOGIP) and the Middle East (UNTSO). The three
traditional key characteristics of such missions were: (a) the consent
of all the parties to the presence and activities of the mission; (b) the
impartiality of the peacekeepers in their relationship with the parties;
and (c) minimum use of force, only as a last resort and only in self-
defence or to defend the carrying out of the mission. Such missions
have mostly been established explicitly or implicitly under Chapter VI
of the UN Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes.
After 1989 there evolved quite rapidly, although haphazardly and
piecemeal, what has been widely recognized as a new form of peace-
keeping, variously called second-generation, muscular, extended,
wider, advanced, broader, protected, aggravated or enforced.27 This
new peacekeeping has been characterized by a comprehensive, even
holistic, proactive approach to seeking peaceful settlements and an
increasing willingness on the part of the UN to breach rigid interpre-
tations of the right of states to non-interference in their internal
26 UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 2nd edn (United
Nations: New York, 1990), p. 4.
27 For arguments that dispute the novelty of the new peacekeeping, see James, A., ‘Is there
a second generation of peacekeeping?’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 1, no. 4 (Sep./Nov.
1994), pp. 110–13.
 INTR ODUC TION 13

affairs. The holding operation of yesteryear has been superseded by

the multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire
peace process. Where peacekeepers once studiously avoided tackling
the root causes of armed conflict in favour of containment and
de-escalation, they are now mandated to seek just and lasting
solutions.
Moreover, peacekeepers today are most likely to be confronted by
intra-state wars, a type of conflict in which the UN has traditionally
not become involved (with the significant exceptions of the Congo,
Cyprus and Lebanon). Of the 5 peacekeeping operations deployed in
early 1988, only 1 was in a situation of intra-state conflict.28 Of the
21 operations established since then only 8 have related to interstate
wars, whereas 13 have related to intra-state conflicts. (Some of the
latter, notably in the former Yugoslavia, also have interstate dimen-
sions.) Of the 11 operations established since January 1992, all but
2 relate to intra-state wars.
Many of these new operations have been characterized by the ero-
sion or even the absence of consent of the parties to the presence and
activities of UN forces. Since the end of the cold war the Security
Council has been willing to override a strict interpretation of the con-
sent rule because of the political or strategic importance of a particu-
lar conflict, the scale of the threat it poses to international security, a
calculation that the conflict is ripe for settlement despite the absence
of appropriate levels of consent, or the need to be seen to be acting in
a crisis. In some cases the new peacekeeping has been accompanied
by a greater propensity to use force.
Some peacekeeping missions have even had peace enforcement
elements authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter grafted
onto them, as in the case of UNOSOM II and UNPROFOR. On occa-
sions a non-UN multinational force has been authorized by the
Security Council essentially to conduct a peacekeeping operation, but
under a Chapter VII mandate, as in the case of Opération Turquoise
by France in Rwanda and the MNF in Haiti.
The newness of the new peacekeeping should not be exaggerated.
At least three missions before the end of the cold war—ONUC in the
Congo, UNSF/UNTEA in Irian Jaya and UNIFIL in Lebanon—pres-
aged the type of missions that would come after it.

28 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (note 5) p. 3.

14 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

IV. Challenges for the new peacekeepers

The consequences of involvement in the new peacekeeping for states
participating for the first time are immense. Political and constitu-
tional complexities may delay, constrain or rule out their participa-
tion; the military or other personnel being offered may not be trained
or equipped for peacekeeping; governments may not wish to accept
UN command and control of their forces; public opinion may not
countenance casualties or tolerate the subtleties, ambiguities and frus-
trations of peacekeeping; and, for a variety of reasons, the new
peacekeepers on the ground may not shape up.
Lacking the experience and training of the ‘old’ peacekeepers, the
newcomers have been thrown into the peacekeeping enterprise just as
its boundaries have been widened, its content vastly expanded and
some of its previous norms and assumptions called into question. In a
sense all participants in the new peacekeeping are new peacekeepers
since they are encountering a largely unfamiliar type of undertaking.
The new peacekeepers have had to learn all the lessons of peacekeep-
ing immediately. Since the traditional ethos of peacekeeping arguably
remains the bedrock on which the new peacekeeping also operates
this gives the old peacekeepers a decided advantage. This was most
evident in Somalia, where unfamiliarity with or scepticism about the
traditional approach to peacekeeping, particularly among US per-
sonnel, was one of the factors which drew UNOSOM II into peace
enforcement operations for which it was not prepared.29 The report of
the UN Commission of Enquiry into the débâcle in Mogadishu in
1993 recommended, as a consequence, that all future UN missions
include experienced peacekeepers.30
The new peacekeepers are, at least in theory, expected to carry out
the same tasks as the more experienced. However, particular UN force
commanders may assign new peacekeepers less demanding tasks,
either at the request of their government, because of operational con-
siderations or because it is known that the troops are unable to carry

29 For details, see Claesson, P. and Findlay, T., ‘Case studies on peacekeeping:
UNOSOM II, UNTAC and UNPROFOR’, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 1994), appendix 1B, pp. 62–66.
30 UN, Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to
casualties among them, New York, 24 Feb. 1994, appended to UN, Note by the Secretary-
General, UN document S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, p. 48.
 INTR ODUC TION 15

out more arduous assignments. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces

(SDF) contingent in UNTAC, for instance, was not assigned to dan-
gerous areas because of constitutional restrictions on its use of force
in self-defence. This is not to imply that all the new peacekeepers are
less capable as military forces than the old. Even the well-equipped
and trained military of a highly developed country like Japan can
flounder when confronted with the intricacies and subtleties of the
new peacekeeping. In Cambodia Japanese troops reportedly experi-
enced ‘initial confusion and a lengthy shakedown period’. 31
Some of the specific difficulties that the new peacekeepers have
encountered will be considered in the following sections.

The decision to participate

For many of the new peacekeepers the decision to participate in the

first place can be far from uncomplicated and may involve the most
sensitive and contested of political and constitutional issues, as in the
German and Japanese cases. Even after extensive national debates, the
problems will recur, especially if peacekeeping missions encounter
fragile or deteriorating consent of the parties and ‘mission creep’ into
peace enforcement results. Even old peacekeepers encounter such
problems. The legislation under which Finnish peacekeepers are
dispatched is ill adapted to the new peacekeeping in that it clearly
excludes involvement in any type of peace enforcement.32
Even if there are no constitutional barriers, the new peacekeeping
states may have difficulty rousing sufficient political support for dis-
patching troops halfway around the world to an unknown conflict. In
dispatching the MNF to Haiti in 1994 the US Government struggled
to convince public opinion and Congress of the rightness of the cause.

Pre-deployment briefing, training and preparation

The new peacekeepers, at least until very recently, joined the peace-
keeping enterprise at a time when the UN was severely overstretched.
The UN Secretariat has been faced with maintaining up to 18 mis-
sions in the field simultaneously, as well as preparing for new

31 Kim, A. H. N., ‘Japan and peacekeeping operations’, Military Review, Apr. 1994, p. 28.
32 Lintula, P., ‘Finnish participation in peace-keeping operations’, International Peace-
keeping, Feb./May 1995, p. 44.
16 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

missions. In these circumstances there has been no time for strategic

planning or training of contributing forces and little advice or assis-
tance from the Secretariat in New York for the new contributors.
Once the offer of a national contribution has been accepted, the new
peacekeepers have been almost entirely on their own. This resulted,
for instance, in civilian police arriving in Cambodia and Mozambique
without the requisite language capabilities (English or French), driv-
ing skills or even police experience. Some contributors, like Ukraine,
had barely established independent military forces before they were
dispatched to participate in a very specialized form of military activ-
ity, requiring skills that can be the antithesis of those inculcated into
military personnel. On the civilian side it has also been difficult to
find personnel with the requisite qualifications and experience for the
new peacekeeping tasks. In Cambodia UNTAC had great problems
recruiting qualified, experienced international personnel to help
monitor, control and supervise the workings of the State of Cambodia
Government, as required under the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, and no
time to train them itself.
Some last-minute pre-deployment training has been provided by the
old peacekeepers (for instance, the Bulgarian battalion was given a
month’s training by Sweden before being dispatched to Cambodia)
but it was often rushed and inadequate. The Bulgarian Parliament, in
examining the failure of the Bulgarian contingent to perform well in
Cambodia, concluded that the reasons were, along with the Khmer
Rouge’s ‘negative attitude towards East Europeans’, language diffi-
culties and a lack of ‘serious training’.33 Little had apparently changed
from the ‘cottage industry’ days of peacekeeping, when pre-
deployment briefings were imparted by the Secretariat’s tiny staff in a
personalized, home-spun fashion and training was non-existent. Since
the traditional operations tended to have simpler mandates, were
much smaller and involved far fewer different nationalities and almost
exclusively military personnel, this approach was adequate. In today’s
peacekeeping environment this is clearly insufficient.
In several cases of the ‘old peacekeeping’ the UN used experienced
peacekeepers from existing operations as a core group around which a
new mission would be built. In establishing UNIFIL in 1978 military

33 Behar, N., ‘Bulgarian peacekeeping prospects: new experience and new dilemmas’,
Paper presented to the SIPRI/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Workshop on ‘Challenges for the New
Peacekeepers’, Bonn, 21–22 Apr. 1994, pp. 5–6, unpublished manuscript.
 INTR ODUC TION 17

personnel from UNTSO, UNDOF and UNEF II were transferred to

Lebanon until they could be replaced by a permanent force.34 New
missions established since the end of the cold war have had to be built
from the ground up, being so numerous and large that the use of per-
sonnel from existing missions has been impractical.

In the field I: growing complexity and danger

Upon arrival in the field the new peacekeepers have had to face
increasing complexity in conditions that test the mettle of even the
best-trained troops and civilian personnel. Some of the complexity
has been planned, the result of ambitious peace-building operations as
in El Salvador, Namibia and Cambodia. In other cases it evolved ran-
domly and unexpectedly. In Bosnia and Herzegovina complexity
came with deteriorating battlefield conditions, forcing ever more
ingenious techniques on UNPROFOR to achieve delivery of humani-
tarian aid and inducing the Security Council to adopt over 100 resolu-
tions and statements in its forlorn attempt to protect UN safe areas,
dampen the conflict and achieve a lasting cease-fire and settlement.35
As UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has noted, ‘peace-
keeping has to be reinvented every day’.36
While not every post-cold war peacekeeping mission has included
all of the following, the expanded repertoire of UN peacekeeping
operations in 1993, for example, included: (a) election observation
(Eritrea and Liberia) and organization (Cambodia); (b) humanitarian
assistance and securing safe conditions for its delivery (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Somalia, Kurdish areas of Iraq); (c) observation and
separation of combatants along a more or less demarcated boundary
(Croatia, Kuwait–Iraq); (d) disarmament of military and paramilitary
forces (Cambodia, Somalia and El Salvador); (e) promotion and pro-
tection of human rights (Cambodia and El Salvador); (f) mine clear-
ance, training and mine awareness (Afghanistan and Cambodia);
(g) military and police training (Cambodia and Haiti); (h) boundary

34 Ghali, M., ‘United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’, ed. W. J. Durch, The Evolution
of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (Henry L. Stimson Center:
Washington, DC, 1993), p. 189.
35 Akashi, Y., ‘The role of the United Nations in the Balkans’, IBRU Boundary and
Security Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 2 (summer 1995), p. 45.
36 UN, Report on the work of the Organization, Sep. 1993, UN document A/48/1 (advance
version), p. 101.
18 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

demarcation (Kuwait–Iraq border); (i) civil administration (Cam-

bodia); (j) provision of assistance to and repatriation of refugees (the
former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia); (k) reconstruction and
development (Cambodia and Somalia); and (l) maintenance of law
and order (Cambodia and Somalia). Steven Ratner describes second-
generation UN missions as combining the three roles of administrator,
mediator and guarantor.37
Such complexity has troubled even experienced peacekeepers. As
Canadian Major-General John MacInnis has noted, ‘It is the aspect of
complexity that poses challenges unthought of by peacekeepers only a
few short years ago’.38 In traditional peacekeeping operations, the
observation of a cease-fire line or other boundary was the principal
purpose of the mission, towards which all other activities could be
directed. In the multi-purpose missions of today not only may the
peacekeeper be faced with several objectives, but some of them may
be in conflict with each other. In Cambodia it was alleged by human
rights groups that the pursuit of human rights violators was subord-
inated to the goal of holding an election. In Somalia the goal of a
peaceful settlement was subordinated to the quest for justice against
those responsible for killing UN troops.
Such complexity has been compounded by the failings of the UN in
planning and managing peacekeeping operations, both at UN head-
quarters and in the field. The UN Secretariat was caught unprepared
for the vast expansion in the number and complexity of new missions
since 1989. The ad hoc, amateurish, almost casual methods of the past
simply could not keep pace, resulting in disorganization, mismanage-
ment and waste. While such characteristics had always been present
to some extent in UN operations, the scale and complexity of the new
missions magnified the consequences. In simple border patrol opera-
tions where there was a peace to keep, it mattered little if administra-
tion was lax and late. In operations where the UN itself was running
elections, overseeing governmental functions and protecting human
rights it mattered a great deal. The new peacekeepers were thus
thrown on to their own resources in ways undreamed of in the old
peacekeeping.

37 Ratner, S.,
The New UN Peacekeeping (Macmillan: London, 1995), pp. 44, 50.
38 MacInnis, J. A., ‘Peacekeeping and post-modern conflict: a soldier’s view’, Medi-
terranean Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2 (spring 1995), p. 29.
 INTR ODUC TION 19

An arduous new role in which peacekeepers have become involved

for the first time is the delivery of humanitarian aid and the manage-
ment of huge refugee movements—sometimes in the midst of con-
tinuing armed conflict in which civilian populations themselves have
become targets of the fighting. As a British colonel with extensive
experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina has noted: ‘It wasn’t a task the
British Army had done before . . . we were effectively sitting in the
middle of somebody else’s war’ while trying to ensure the delivery of
humanitarian aid.39 While at home military forces are often called
upon to assist national authorities in disaster relief, few forces have
the experience or training to handle the sheer volume of humanitarian
relief supplies to millions of starving people during a civil conflict, as
in Somalia, or the mass movement of terrified refugees, as in Rwanda,
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In some cases, as in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, civilians may be hostile to the presence of the peace-
keepers, or alternatively, so dependent on them as to threaten to use
obstructionist tactics or violence against them if they attempt to
depart. Although the best militaries are well disciplined, organized
and resourceful, few of the new peacekeepers will have the flexibility
and sensitivity (not to mention training and equipment) for handling
in a foreign environment such delicate situations as crowd control or
intercommunal violence. While atrocities do occur in war, few mili-
tary personnel are likely to be well prepared for witnessing, as impar-
tial bystanders, massive human rights violations such as massacres of
innocent civilians or for the accompanying sense of helplessness at
being unable to do anything to stop them.40
Complexity is also introduced into the new peacekeeping by the
multinational nature of the mission. UNTAC, the most international
of any mission to date, along with its advance mission, UNAMIC,
involved 34 nationalities among its military contingents and
32 among its civilian police. UNTAC’s personnel in total were drawn
from over 100 countries.41 UNIFIL, in contrast, in all its 17 years had
no more than 14 participating countries, most of which were experi-

39 Duncan, A. D. (Col), ‘Operating in Bosnia’, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin,

vol. 2, no. 3 (Oct. 1994), p. 47.
40 British units in Bosnia and Herzegovina have psychiatric nurses available to help their
troops cope with such experiences and their services are increasingly utilized. See Duncan
(note 39), p. 56. Many of the new peacekeepers, however, have no such support systems.
41 Findlay, T., Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report
no. 9 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), p. 27.
20 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

enced old peacekeepers.42 New peacekeeping operations are therefore

faced with multiple problems arising from a greater mix of capability,
procedure, equipment, language, custom and ethos.
While in its older peacekeeping operations the UN could afford to
be more selective in securing a judicious mix of capabilities and
nationalities, today, when peacekeepers are in short supply for par-
ticular missions, there can be little choice but for the UN to accept
whatever is offered. This has brought with it an inevitable lowering of
standards. Sometimes the UN has been forced knowingly to accept
contingents which were far from optimal in their training, experience
or equipment. As the Secretary-General himself has lamented, ‘You
have to accept second-best and if not second-best you have to accept
third-best’ in the new peacekeeping.43 In some cases corruption,
human rights violations and loutish behaviour have distinguished such
forces, rather than their contribution to peace. The deployment of
such troops necessitates greater ability and adaptability on the part of
each component and national contingent and heightened diplomatic
skills on the part of the head of mission and the force commander. An
added complication is that UN commanders do not have disciplinary
authority over the foreign forces under their command and must rely
on the goodwill of each contingent commander to enforce discipline.
The Secretary-General has also been obliged to accept contributions
from the great powers and from states which have a direct interest in
the outcome of the conflict, which was not the case in most missions
during the old era of peacekeeping. This is most notable in the former
Yugoslavia, where Germany, Russia, Turkey, the USA and Muslim
states such as Malaysia have biases towards or against parties to the
conflict. Such older missions as UNIFIL and UNFICYP involved
former colonial powers with at least a residual interest in the conflict,
France and Britain respectively, but their presence was less problem-
atic since they were acceptable to all the parties concerned and
provided the UN with indispensable local knowledge and specialized
capabilities. Today the involvement of the permanent members of the
Security Council raises the profile of most missions, increases their
political sensitivity, encourages greater press attention and heightens

42 UN, The Blue Helmets (note 26), pp. 427–28.

43 Dowden, R., ‘Boutros-Ghali accepts UN’s limitations’, The Independent, 27 Oct. 1994,
p. 13.
 INTR ODUC TION 21

expectations—perhaps offsetting the advantages of greater force

capability, stronger political backing and heightened prestige.
A further complication in the new peacekeeping is a diminution of
what Sashi Tharoor calls its ‘United Nations-ness’.44 Whereas peace-
keeping missions during the cold war era were exclusively UN affairs,
today the UN must share responsibilities in the field with regional
organizations, as in Georgia where the CIS and OSCE are also operat-
ing, or, more problematically with a military alliance, as in the former
Yugoslavia. The complexity of the ‘dual-key’ system for deciding
when to use NATO air power in Bosnia and Herzegovina in further-
ance of UN objectives was unprecedented in the history of UN peace-
keeping. Similarly complex are arrangements in which the UN hands
over authority and jurisdiction to a non-UN multilateral force, as in
Somalia when UNOSOM I gave way to UNITAF, or when it takes
over authority and jurisdiction from such a force, as at the end of
UNITAF’s mission and subsequently in Haiti. In the case of Iraq,
UNIKOM was required to cooperate with and establish a peacekeep-
ing operation on the border of a state which had been defeated in war
by a UN-authorized coalition force. The new peacekeepers are thus
required to coexist and cooperate with other entities in ways unheard
of in the old peacekeeping—where the UN was usually the only
player and perceived as benign by all sides.
Complexity is also introduced by the increasing civilianization of
peacekeeping. There has been a civilian element in some traditional
UN operations but they were present to administer operations rather
than to participate in them.45 Since the end of the cold war there have
been several UN operations with large civilian components which
have played an integral role in the peacekeeping mission and have
sometimes been its raison d’être. This is true of the missions in
Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia and
Western Sahara. The addition of such substantial civilian components
has de-emphasized the military character of peacekeeping, rendering
the military component just one among many. Paradoxically it has
also increased the range of tasks the military is called upon to per-
form, especially cooperative activities with civilian components, such
as protection of and assistance with electoral activities. UNTAC was

44 Tharoor, S., ‘Peacekeeping: principles, problems, prospects’, Naval War College

Review, vol. 47, no. 2 (spring 1994), p. 4.
45 Significant exceptions were ONUC and UNTEA.
22 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

the epitome of this trend.46 It had seven components, only one of

which was military. Other components had equally important roles
and employed thousands of people. Alone, the Electoral Component’s
62 000 employees, both local and international staff, dwarfed the mili-
tary presence and a 3600-strong Civilian Police Component was also
present. In addition there were several UN agencies such as the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) or the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other foreign non-governmental
organizations dealing with aid or human rights issues interacted with
UNTAC. The local and international press were ubiquitous and influ-
ential, comprising yet another civilian element with which the new
peacekeepers must increasingly deal.
Finally, complexity is increased because of the nature of the intra-
state conflicts in which peacekeepers find themselves. Such conflicts
usually involve multiple parties, the territory held by each party may
be unclear and subject to rapid change, rogue elements within factions
may adopt independent positions and take independent action and
outside states may be involved in supporting one side or other. Civil
wars are often literally life or death struggles in which the alternative
to total control of state power is political or physical oblivion. The
forces involved are also often better armed than in the past47 and small
ragtag armies may have more firepower than that available to the
peacekeepers, even those from developed countries.
All these considerations make the new peacekeeping not only more
complex but considerably more dangerous than the old. UN military
casualties rose tenfold between 1991 and 1994, although the number
of personnel deployed increased only eightfold.48 Of the 33 fatalities
between January 1992 and December 1993, ‘16 were killed in areas
where no government authorities existed de facto or where such
authorities were unable to maintain order and hence to discharge their
responsibilities by protecting persons within their jurisdic-
tion . . . 29 suffered from gunshot wounds, and there are grounds to
believe that at least 6 were deliberately executed’.49 In 1993 there
were 11 fatalities among civilian peacekeeping staff.

46 For detailed information on UNTAC, see Findlay (note 41), pp. 144–47.
47 Martin, L., ‘Peacekeeping as a growth industry’, National Interest, summer 1993, p. 7.
48 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, UN document
A/49/1, 2 Sep. 1994, p. 58. It should be noted that the majority of casualties in peacekeeping
missions are not caused by hostile fire. Road accidents account for a large proportion.
49 UN, Note by the Secretary-General, UN document A/AC.242/1, 25 Mar. 1994.
 INTR ODUC TION 23

One consequence of these trends is an increase in ‘the normal ten-

dency of contingents to seek guidance from their own capitals’.50 This
was seen at its worst in Somalia, where the Italians most famously,
but also other contingents, sought instructions from home and then
refused to act in accordance with the UN commander’s directives. As
experienced peacekeepers the Italians should have known better and
their contingent commander was withdrawn at UN request. As Iqbal
Riza notes, ‘The anxieties of troop contributing countries for the
safety of their troops are fully understandable, but it is evident that
interference in operations only increases the danger to the personnel
of the operation as a whole’.51 In Cambodia Japanese Government
concern over retaining tight control of its troops meant that every
task, request or order had to be referred to Tokyo for clearance.52
A further consequence is disaffection at home with the peacekeep-
ing mission, particularly in these days of rapid communication and
saturation television coverage. Fatalities among the peacekeepers can
trigger demands for withdrawal, debate about the nature of peace-
keeping and calls for accountability. The reaction to the deaths of
several Belgians in Rwanda was a case in point. Although Bulgarian
opinion and the Bulgarian Parliament had been unanimous in support-
ing the dispatch of troops to Cambodia, the deaths of several of them
brought strong pressure for their withdrawal. 53 Actual withdrawal is
rare but does happen. New peacekeepers Tanzania and Uganda have
withdrawn from ECOMOG in Liberia.54 The best known withdrawal
was that of the USA, followed by most of its Western allies, from
Somalia after the killing of several of its troops in 1993 in Mogadishu.
A third consequence of the testing new environment is that it shows
up more starkly the differences in the capabilities of different contin-
gents. The better-equipped and trained troops, usually from Western
states, are better able to defend themselves and to carry out other
aspects of the new peacekeeping, whereas the less capable are both
more vulnerable and less self-reliant. This mattered less in the less
taxing environment of the old peacekeeping but in the new peace-
50 Weiss, T. G., ‘UN security forces in support of humane values’, Proceedings of the 88th
Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, 6–9 Apr. 1994 (American Society of
International Law: New York, [1994]), p. 333.
51 Riza, S. I., ‘Parameters of UN peace-keeping’, RUSI Journal, vol. 140, no. 3 (June
1995), p. 19.
52 Kim, A. H. N., ‘Japan and peacekeeping operations’, Military Review, Apr. 1991, p. 28.
53 Behar (note 33), p. 4.
54 International Peacekeeping News, Mar. 1995, p. 4.
24 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

keeping it can strain relations between contingents, jeopardize the

integrity of the force and even imperil aspects of the mission.

In the field II: challenges to traditional peacekeeping norms

Among the challenges that the new peacekeepers must cope with in
second-generation missions are those that stretch to the limit the tra-
ditional peacekeeping norms relating to consent, impartiality and the
use of force.

Consent of the parties

Consent may be shaky at the outset of a peacekeeping mission, per-
haps because the parties have been inveigled against their will into a
peace process or into agreeing to a UN presence, or it may degrade
during a mission either because of the activities of the mission or
because of factors beyond its control. In the worst case this leads to
organized violence against peacekeepers. No UN peacekeeping
deployment has yet been greeted with armed force (although the
original deployment of UNMIH to Haiti sailed away after local thugs
brandished weapons at them from the quay) or had to fight its way out
(although fire was exchanged with Somalis during the withdrawal of
UNOSOM II). During their deployment, however, many of the post-
cold war peacekeeping operations have come under fire from one or
more of the local belligerents. This can restrict forces’ movements,
complicate their tasks, especially those of the more vulnerable
civilian components, and give the UN presence a garrison appearance
and mentality.55 Such an environment may undermine the morale of
the mission and trigger calls for its withdrawal.
The principal challenge for peacekeepers in these circumstances is
to attempt to establish or re-establish credibility and trust. The first
requirement is to engage in persistent and painstaking negotiation
with the parties. Since consent is weak, all manner of matters, from
humanitarian aid convoy routes to the location of UN observer posts,
must be negotiated and in many instances repeatedly renegotiated.
The new peacekeepers also need to engage much more actively in so-
called ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns to win over the civilian popula-

55 This occurred during the first UN mission to Somalia, UNOSOM I, where 500 Pakistani
peacekeepers huddled for months at Mogadishu airport, afraid to venture out.
 INTR ODUC TION 25

tion and in ‘civil information’ campaigns designed to explain their

presence. Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, the UNTAC force
commander, claims that the success of his mission was due to its abil-
ity to ‘forge an alliance’ with the Cambodian people against those
parties seeking to undermine the peace process and hence to conduct a
free and fair election and democratic transfer of power.56
In circumstances of doubtful or eroding consent the military com-
ponent also needs to be better trained and equipped to defend itself
and its mission (including the usually substantial civilian presence)
and be at a higher stage of readiness and alert than in a situation of
assured consent. The standard of such elements as communications
and command and control also needs to be higher. UN command and
control arrangements have traditionally been complicated by language
problems, incompatible equipment and procedures, the lack of
common training and staff structures and the need for geographical
balance among participating states. They also suffer from multiple
chains of command both in the theatre and between the military and
civilian sides of the UN.
An enhanced military capability may, depending on circumstances
and the local culture, afford peacekeepers more authority and prestige.
As Colonel Alistair Duncan has noted of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
‘Very sadly the rule of the gun is what matters . . . the man with the
AK-47 is a big man. I had clout because with 56 Warriors [a tracked
infantry combat vehicle] I was considered to be the most powerful
man in Central Bosnia’.57 New peacekeepers from poorer, developing
states will be more vulnerable in such situations unless provided with
adequate protective equipment.
The most feared scenario is a complete loss of consent. This is most
likely to occur after the UN has attempted punitive or retaliatory
action against one of the parties as a result of non-cooperation or vio-
lation of agreements or international law. Following the NATO bom-
bing of Bosnian Serb ammunition dumps near Pale in June 1995, after
the Serbs refused to return heavy weapons seized from UN collection
points, the Bosnian Serb leadership declared that all agreements with
the UN were null and void, thereby explicitly withdrawing consent for
the presence and activities of UNPROFOR. This was followed by the
56 Sanderson, J. M. (Lt-Gen.), ‘A review of peacekeeping operations’, Paper presented to
the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) XVIII Conference, Dacca, Jan. 1994,
p. 14.
57 Duncan (note 39), p. 54.
26 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

taking hostage of hundreds of UNPROFOR observers and troops.

Such situations clearly place a peacekeeping mission in an impossible
situation: with consent withdrawn the very vulnerability that is a con-
dition of peacekeeping forces’ succeeding permits their capture and
use as political pawns.
When consent breaks down altogether the stark choices for the
peacekeepers are then to withdraw, soldier on or convert to peace
enforcement. While the transition from consent-based peacekeeping
to consent-less peace enforcement is difficult, it is not impossible, as
demonstrated by UNPROFOR in August 1995. It must, however, be
well planned, be deliberate (rather than the result of ‘mission creep’)
and be accompanied by the necessary changes in capability, mandate
and commitment of force.

Impartiality
A second key tenet of traditional peacekeeping under challenge is the
maintenance of an impartial, non-discriminatory stance towards all
the parties to a conflict. Abandonment of impartiality, whether delib-
erate or inadvertent, runs the risk of turning the peacekeeping force
into an enemy of one or more of the parties. Safeguarding the impar-
tiality of the mission will be a constant preoccupation in situations
where consent is fragile and will require some fine judgement on the
part of the mission commander. A traditional UN border monitoring
operation can proceed with its duties relatively unaffected by internal
instability within a state, but a peacekeeping force in the midst of an
intra-state conflict is invariably caught up in events and may through
its actions pivotally affect their outcome. 58 For instance, if only one
party is breaking a cease-fire, impartiality is virtually impossible
because UN forces may have to adopt defensive measures to protect
themselves against that party. Even though a warring party has
brought discrimination on itself it will accuse the UN of bias. The
preferred situation may be that in Cambodia, where all parties accused
the UN of partiality.
For the new peacekeepers the implications of the doctrine of impar-
tiality include a need for greater care, awareness and sophistication in
dealing with the parties. The new peacekeepers’ roles of administra-
tor, arbitrator and enforcer as well as keeper of the peace require
58 James, A., ‘A review of UN peacekeeping’, Internationale Spectator, vol. 18, no. 11
(Nov. 1993), p. 632.
 INTR ODUC TION 27

special training in diplomacy, conflict resolution, mediation and other

fuctions, which is not normally imparted to military personnel or even
most civilian personnel recruited to UN missions.

Use of force
One of the main bones of contention between the old and new peace-
keepers has been their differing attitudes to the use of military force.
Traditionalists favoured persisting with the ‘Scandinavian model’ of
strict adherence to the tried and true principles of peacekeeping,
patient persuasion and negotiation and the minimum use of force,
even in self-defence. Britain, relatively new to peacekeeping, recom-
mended a ‘wider peacekeeping’ that was more robust but which
basically retained the traditional peacekeeping ethos and practices.
Some of the new peacekeepers, most notably the USA, supported by
France, and even developing states like Malaysia on various occasions
advocated greater use of force.
Greater use of force runs the risk of transforming a UN mission
from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, either suddenly or through
mission creep. As well as being dangerous to the forces on the
ground, such a development is also fundamentally unfair to those
nations which have contributed in good faith to what they supposed
was a peacekeeping mission, and especially unfair to smaller con-
tributors which usually have no say in such transformations unless
they happen to be non-permanent members of the Security Council at
the time. The withdrawal of their contingents may be not only politi-
cally embarrassing to effect but also physically impossible without the
assistance of more powerful states. The fate of the Bangladeshi con-
tingent trapped in Bihac in early 1995 is one example. Not only were
they poorly equipped to defend themselves, being armed only with
rifles, but they had not anticipated being in a situation of virtual all-
out war in which withdrawal was impossible. In Somalia an even
worse situation occurred when the Western states largely abandoned
the UN mission to the non-Western contingents such as Egypt, India,
Pakistan and Zimbabwe. While some of the contingents left behind
were experienced old peacekeepers, the spectacle of the more techno-
logically sophisticated and militarily capable states forsaking the
mission after having led it into peace enforcement did nothing to
promote enthusiasm for the new peacekeeping and made it more diffi-
cult to recruit contributors for future missions such as that in Rwanda.
28 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

After the Somalia débâcle a consensus appeared to emerge among

the UN, major troop contributors like the UK and the USA and new
and old peacekeepers alike that, apart from self-defence or defence of
the mission, military force can only be used for enforcement purposes,
if at all, at a low tactical level, if a peacekeeping mission is not to be
fatally jeopardized. It is now recognized that peace enforcement
operations require a vastly different array of forces, command and
control arrangements, military doctrine and political underpinning.
The US Army’s field manual on peace operations now advises that:
The proper use of force is critical in a peace operation. The use of force to
attain a short-term tactical success could lead to a long-term strategic failure.
The use of force may affect other aspects of the operation. The use of force
may attract a response in kind, heighten tension, polarize public opinion
against the operation and participants, foreclose negotiating opportunities,
prejudice the perceived impartiality of the peace operation force, and esca-
late the overall level of violence . . . In [peacekeeping], commanders should
regard the use of force as a last resort.59

The UN Commission of Enquiry into the events in Mogadishu

recommended that the UN ‘refrain from undertaking further peace
enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states’,60 but that if
peace enforcement was nevertheless undertaken the mandate of the
force ‘should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force
should be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies
have been exhausted’. Increased use of preventive diplomacy, peace
building and emergency assistance was recommended.
UNPROFOR’s at times surreal relationship with all the warring
parties in the former Yugoslavia combined an enforcement role (with
the assistance of NATO) with consent-based humanitarian activities, a
mix that ultimately proved untenable. It produced a confusing opera-
tional environment for the new peacekeepers, where consent was
present one day and not the next, in one situation and not another.
However, the handling of the joint NATO/UNPROFOR peace
enforcement bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in August

59 US Department of the Army Headquarters, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100–23,

Dec. 1994, pp. 33–34.
60 UN, Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to
casualties among them, New York, 24 Feb. 1994, appended to UN, Note by the Secretary-
General, 1 June 1994 (note 30), p. 48.
 INTR ODUC TION 29

1995, preceded by the deployment of a well-equipped Rapid Reaction

Force and the withdrawal of peacekeepers to safe positions, indicated
that the lessons of Somalia had been belatedly learned.
Even if the new peacekeepers avoid being drawn into peace
enforcement, the chances of them being required to use force, if only
in self-defence and defence of their mission, are higher than they were
in the old peacekeeping.
Even when force is strictly limited to self-defence and not extended
to the defence of the mission there may be ambiguities. Rules of
engagement (ROEs) may lack detail, change over time or vary
between national contingents. For instance, the right to self-defence
may or may not, in the interpretation of a particular commander,
include the right to a pre-emptive attack if peacekeepers believe a
strike against them is imminent. In Cambodia, for example, the Dutch
and French battalions were using completely different ROEs from
those of the Bangladeshis, Bulgarians and Indonesians. This runs the
risk of factional forces playing off one battalion against another,
taking advantage of the less robust. A similar problem occurred in
Somalia, where the Italians were much more willing than US forces to
negotiate rather than respond aggressively to provocation. Even the
best ROEs will not cover all situations.
The peacekeeper’s right to protect the peace process is also ambig-
uous and potentially open-ended. In regard to Rwanda it was argued
by some that UNAMIR’s forces should have positioned themselves
between the Hutu killers and their victims and that any use of force
which resulted could have been justified on the grounds of ‘defending
the mission’. Others regard the protection of populations in danger as
going beyond protecting the mission unless specified in the mission
mandate.

Financial implications

The boom in peacekeeping since the end of the cold war has plunged
the UN into debt. Financial support for peacekeeping operations has
lagged behind political support despite the fact that assessed contri-
butions are a legal obligation of member states.61 As of 31 May 1995

61 The funding for all but 2 peacekeeping operations, UNTSO and UNMOGIP, comes
from special assessments of member states, rather than from the UN regular budget. A third
mission, UNFICYP, is partly funded by voluntary contributions.
30 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

outstanding assessments to the UN for peacekeeping amounted to

$1.03 billion.62 This has affected the new peacekeepers in two ways.
First, the UN has found it increasingly difficult to reimburse con-
tributors for their peacekeeping costs. By the end of 1995 it is esti-
mated that unpaid reimbursements to troop contributors and payments
for contingent-owned equipment are likely to reach $1 billion. 63
Essentially this is an enforced loan to the UN from member states.
Like Tunisia, several new peacekeepers have expressed difficulties
about their future participation unless they are compensated more
readily and in full.
In the old peacekeeping there were also financial difficulties at
times and reimbursement was not always prompt, but most of the
participants were wealthy developed states which were able to absorb
costs. Today the sums involved are far greater and the majority of the
new peacekeepers are less well endowed developing states which
have been encouraged to contribute to peacekeeping to spread the
international burden. Without significant reforms in this area the UN
will be unable to sustain the goodwill of the new peacekeepers, espe-
cially those from the developing world.
Second, the ballooning peacekeeping bill has thrown an additional
financial burden on states because their assessed contributions have
also increased. Even New Zealand, a relatively wealthy contributor,
has seen its peacekeeping assessment rise from $1 million per year in
the 1980s to $16 million in 1995.64 For the largest financial contribu-
tor, the USA, the burden has become so great that it is unilaterally
dropping its level of support from about 30 per cent to 25 per cent
from October 1995 onwards. While in some cases there may be a
balance between what a particular state owes the UN and what the
UN owes it, the position for others, particularly those which pay their
UN dues in full and on time and are then not reimbursed for their
substantial peacekeeping contributions, will be inequitable.

62 UN, Press Release DH/1889, 9 May 1995, p. 4.

63 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, UN document
A/50/1 (note 7), p. 21.
64 ‘New Zealand in the Security Council 1993–94’ (note 2), p. 13.
 INTR ODUC TION 31

V. Conclusion
With several of the largest and most ambitious post-cold war missions
now ended (notably those in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique
and Somalia) and no major ones on the horizon, the heyday of peace-
keeping may have already passed. The UN, with a mixed record of
success and failure and plagued by staggering financial deficits, is
facing a period of consolidation and reconsideration of its peacekeep-
ing activities.
None the less peacekeeping has sufficiently proved its worth when
done properly to have confirmed its place as a primary tool of conflict
prevention, management and resolution in certain circumstances. It is
therefore likely to remain in the UN repertoire for the foreseeable
future. There are enough unattended conflicts in Africa and the former
Soviet republics alone to keep peacekeepers occupied well into the
next century. The UN is undertaking a serious effort to reform its
peacekeeping capabilities both at UN headquarters and in the field.
The Department of Peace-keeping Operations has been reorganized
and expanded, a Situation Room now operates 24 hours a day, and a
Standby Forces Arrangement has been initiated. Better planning,
training, command and control arrangements and management are in
prospect. However, financial constraints and problems attendant on
wider systemic reform of the UN will continue to be limiting factors.65
Even if major developments occur, such as the UN establishing its
own rapid reaction force or other type of military capability, the world
body and other international organizations which engage in peace-
keeping will still need the contribution of the new peacekeepers.
While the UN should be strongly enjoined and assisted to improve its
own capacities further, the enhancement and augmentation of national
efforts, particularly those of the new peacekeepers, will be just as
important to the future of the new peacekeeping.

65 For an annual account of UN peacekeeping gnerally and of reform efforts in particular,

see Findlay, T., ‘Multinational conflict prevention, management and resolution’, SIPRI Year-
book 1994 (note 29), pp. 13–80; Findlay, T., ‘Armed conflict prevention, management and
resolution’, SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), pp. 37–116; and Findlay, T., ‘Armed conflict pre-
vention, management and resolution’, SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996, forthcoming).
2. Germany
Hans-Georg Ehrhart

I. Introduction
As a major economic power and reunified sovereign state, Germany
would seem at first glance to have no problem in contributing to UN
peacekeeping operations. The evolution of Germany as a new peace-
keeper has, however, to be set in the wider context of a restructuring
of the international environment and a difficult, multi-layered domes-
tic debate.1 In this chapter emphasis is placed on the internal German
debate because its outcome will influence not only the future inter-
national role of the new Germany but also its political identity. After a
historical glance at the relationship between the ‘old’ Germany—
comprising the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)—and the UN, more recent pol-
itical developments in the new united Germany are analysed on the
levels of government, the political parties, the military and society. It
will be argued that, although opinion on the future role of Germany is
in transition at all levels of society, the new Germany still has a long
way to go in overcoming various internal obstacles to a significantly
stronger engagement in UN missions. This learning process will be
considerably influenced both by its own experience as a new peace-
keeper and by the evolution of multilateral thinking about the entire
concept of peacekeeping.

II. The legacy of German history

The relationship between Germany and the UN was determined by
the former’s role in World War II and in the cold war. The immediate
motivation for founding the UN was the Allied effort against Ger-
many and the other Axis powers and the need for a new and peaceful
world order.

1 See, for example, Kühne, W. (ed.), Blauhelme in einer turbulenten Welt [Blue helmets in
a turbulent world] (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 1993) (in German); and Ehrhart, H.-G. and
Ehrhart, W., ‘L’Allemagne et l’ONU’ [Germany and the United Nations], Politique
Étrangère, no. 3 (1993), pp. 673–85 (in French).
 GER M ANY 33

This situation is illustrated by the ‘enemy state’ clauses. In accor-

dance with Article 53.2 of the UN Charter, the term ‘enemy state’
applied to any state which during World War II was an enemy of any
signatory of the Charter. These clauses finally became de facto obso-
lete with the signing of the treaty of 12 August 1970 between the FRG
and the USSR on the inviolability of the existing borders in Europe
and the acceptance of the two German states as members of the
United Nations in 1973.
The division of Germany also constituted a special factor. The two
German states could only become members of the UN by agreement
with the permanent members of the Security Council and with one
another. In the 1950s and 1960s the FRG had insisted, with support
from the Western Allies, on the sole right to represent Germany. It
was the Ostpolitik of the former Chancellor of the FRG, Willy Brandt,
and the political modus vivendi established in the Treaty on Basic
Relations concluded in 1972 between the FRG and GDR which paved
the way for UN membership for both. In connection with the Treaty
the two German states agreed in an exchange of letters of 8 November
1972 that they would apply for UN membership at about the same
time.
Once UN membership had been achieved, the ‘German Question’
was no longer an issue at the UN and the ‘Berlin Question’ became no
more of an issue than the question of Germany’s division. For the
GDR, the Treaty on Basic Relations codified the existence of two
states in Germany. For the Federal Republic, the UN was not an
appropriate forum for dealing with the German Question. Both attrib-
uted greater importance to the question of European security than to
German unity. As a result, both restricted themselves to presenting
their policy on the issue in the general debate held by the General
Assembly each year. In this regard the UN did not play as important a
role for the two German states as did their respective alliances and the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).2
The GDR did not involve itself in UN peacekeeping activities
except for sending a small group of police monitors to UNTAG in
Namibia in 1989. Following the example of the USSR, it refused to

2 Bruns, W., Die Uneinigen in den Vereinten Nationen, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
DDR in der UNO [The disunited in the United Nations: the FRG and the GDR in the UN]
(Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik: Cologne, 1980) (in German). On 1 Jan. 1995 the CSCE
became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
34 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

pay its share of the costs.3 Before gaining UN membership, the FRG
provided voluntary financial contributions to UNFICYP in 1967. In
the 1970s it supported the UN ‘blue helmets’ in monitoring the cease-
fire between Israel and Egypt in 1973 (UNEF II) and in Lebanon in
1978 (UNIFIL) by providing equipment and transport; and in 1989 it
became involved in UN peacekeeping missions in UNTAG and in
Central America (ONUCA), this time involving the deployment of
civilian personnel.
Hence, while the FRG became indirectly engaged in UN peacekeep-
ing missions, it did not cross the threshold of involving military per-
sonnel.

III. The incremental approach of the new Germany

Since unification Germany has faced the challenge of redefining its
political priorities and goals in a rapidly evolving security environ-
ment. With the UN now perceived as an important decision-making
body on security issues, Germany has been increasingly involved in
UN peace missions, not all of them involving peacekeeping as tradi-
tionally understood. Whereas support for MINURSO and UNMIH in
Haiti involved civilian personnel, in other cases German military per-
sonnel were involved for the first time, initially in the framework of
humanitarian measures but then also in connection with military
activities.4
1. In spring 1991 Germany supplied food, emergency shelter and
field hospitals to Kurdish refugees in eastern Turkey and western Iran
on the basis of Security Council Resolution 688. With nearly 2000
soldiers involved, this was at the time the largest humanitarian
mission ever undertaken by the Bundeswehr.
2. After Operation Desert Storm in 1991 the government responded
to a request of the USA and the UN to support the international mine-
clearing action in the Persian Gulf. Approximately 2700 German
troops were involved, of whom more than 700 were conscripts.
3. Since August 1991 Germany has assigned one diplomat from the
Foreign Ministry, nine experts from the Defence Ministry and nearly
3 The Soviet Union changed its position in 1987. See Gorbachev, M., Pravda, 17 Sep.
1987 (in Russian), excerpted in Europa-Archiv, no. 24 (1987), pp. D 656–62 (in German).
4 For the official record see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1994 [White
Book 1994] (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: Bonn, 1994), pp. 70–74.
 GER M ANY 35

50 soldiers, airmen and ground personnel to UNSCOM. The official

interpretation is that this is not a special military operation, but a
disarmament-related mission.
4. In November 1991 Germany provided six doctors and nine
Federal Armed Forces paramedics for UNAMIC. In April 1992 the
government assigned approximately 150 Federal Armed Forces physi-
cians and paramedics as well as 75 Federal Border Guard officials to
UNTAC. This was the first time that members of the German armed
forces were involved in a UN peacekeeping mission. Shortly before
the scheduled end of the UNTAC mission in November 1993 they
suffered their first casualty.
5. Between August 1992 and March 1993 the German Air Force
flew 655 flights which transported about 6000 tons of humanitarian
relief supplies to Somalia. In December 1992 the government offered
to provide the UN with supply and transport exclusively for use in
‘pacified areas’ of Somalia. These flights in support of UNOSOM I
were considered to be humanitarian, not military.
6. Thus far, for constitutional and historical reasons, Germany has
not contributed military ground personnel to UNPROFOR.5 However,
it is involved in monitoring the economic embargo against the rump
Yugoslav state (Serbia and Montenegro) in the Adriatic (since June
1992) and on the Danube (since April 1993), in monitoring the no-fly
zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina (since October 1992) and in the
international airlift there (since July 1992). These missions are
interpreted by the government as humanitarian rather than military.
7. On 2 April 1993 the government decided not to withdraw Ger-
man fire control officers from the multinational crew of the NATO
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) squadron whose
command and control systems were about to be used to assist the
military enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina
authorized by the UN Security Council. Hence, since April 1993, with
the tentative approval of the Federal Constitutional Court,6 German
soldiers have been officially involved in a military enforcement
mission for the first time since World War II.

5 During World War II Germany, together with Italy, invaded Yugoslavia, annexed parts
of Slovenia, occupied parts of Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and installed in the rest of
Yugoslavia the fascist Ustasha regime of Croatia as a satellite state of Nazi Germany.
6 See section V in this chapter.
36 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

IV. Somalia: a turning-point

At the end of April 1993, in response to a request by UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the German Government decided to
make available an armed forces contingent consisting of 1640 men for
transport, logistic and engineering work in connection with
UNOSOM II in Somalia. The government insisted that the German
forces be stationed in a pacified area and not be used in a combat role.
The Security Council tailored Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993
accordingly. Part A of the resolution mentions humanitarian tasks
such as protection of the distribution of relief supplies, repatriation of
refugees and support of economic reconstruction, while part B allows
enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This made
it possible for the German Government to interpret the participation
of a Bundeswehr battalion in UNOSOM II as being part of a peace-
keeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, even though
UNOSOM as a whole could be interpreted as a peace enforcement
operation.7 The government was driven by two motives. First, it
wanted to present the German public with a fait accompli. Second, to
back its campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council it
wished to demonstrate Germany’s political willingness and military
capability to participate in any kind of international activity auth-
orized by the Council.8
At the end of July 1993 the main German contingent arrived in
Belet Uen. Only three months later Defence Minister Volker Rühe
announced that Germany’s contingent might be gradually withdrawn
by April 1994.9 Officially this was ascribed to the diversion of the
Indian contingent, which was to have been supported by the German
transport unit and which never arrived in Belet Uen. The real reason
was the withdrawal of US and most other Western forces following
the tragic failure of UNOSOM’s US-dominated policy, which led to
scores of UN casualties, including 18 American deaths. Following the
US lead the last German soldier left Somalia on 28 February 1994.
The first major out-of-area mission of the German armed forces
since World War II began not only on the shaky basis of an unclear
7 Nass, M., ‘Blauhelme für Anfänger’ [Blue helmets for beginners], Die Zeit, 23 Apr. 1993
(in German).
8 Wagner, W., ‘Abenteuer Somalia’ [The Somalia adventure], Europa-Archiv, no. 6
(1994), pp. 151–60 (in German).
9 ‘Germany may quit Somalia by April’, International Herald Tribune, 18 Oct. 1993.
 GER M ANY 37

UN mandate but also amid a major domestic political controversy in

Germany over its future role in international conflict management. 10
At the end of the 1970s there had already been a brief controversy
over the involvement of the German armed forces in UN peace
missions. Advocates of German involvement based their arguments
on Germany’s increased weight in foreign policy matters, its reputa-
tion and its greater share of responsibility for resolving international
conflicts. The Foreign Ministry took a negative stance on consti-
tutional grounds,11 referring to Article 87a of the German Constitution
of 1949, according to which armed forces are to be built up ‘for
defence purposes’ and ‘may only be used to the extent explicitly per-
mitted’ by the constitution. In addition to the political arguments they
presented, the advocates of involvement also cited Article 24 of the
constitution, which permits Germany to ‘enter a system of mutual
collective security for the purpose of preserving peace’. In 1982 the
Federal Security Council12 reaffirmed that the constitution forbids out-
of-area use of German forces. During the Persian Gulf War (1990–91)
Germany supported the international coalition against Iraq with con-
siderable financial, logistical, medical and military assistance, but
officially without military personnel in the war zone.13 This was done
on the basis that the operation had been authorized by the UN Secur-
ity Council. The government has thus followed a step-by-step
approach, extending the German engagement in practice while offi-
cially defending the need to amend the constitution.
In 1991 Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared in a
statement to the 46th session of the UN General Assembly that a
united Germany would assume all rights and obligations under the
UN Charter, including collective security measures, ‘also with our
armed forces. We want to change our constitution for this purpose’.14

10 Kennan, G. F., ‘Into Somalia: a dreadful error of American policy’, International

Herald Tribune, 1 Oct. 1993; and Bertram, B., ‘Weg mit Schaden?’ [Journey with damage?],
Die Zeit, 19 Nov. 1993 (in German).
11 Deutscher Bundestag, Protokolle, no. 12/151, p. 12937 (B).
12 The Federal Security Council is a special cabinet committee responsible for security
matters, comprising the Chancellor and the Ministers of Defence, Justice, Foreign Affairs, the
Interior, the Economy and Finance.
13 The Ministry of Defence indirectly confirmed reports alleging that German soldiers
were involved in AWACS missions in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. See ‘AWACs-
Besatzung im Golf-Krieg’ [AWACS crew in the Gulf War], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 Jan.
1993 (in German).
14 Speech by Foreign Minister Genscher to the 46th session of the UN General Assembly,
25 Sep. 1991. See Vereinte Nationen, no. 5 (1991), pp. 168–71 (in German).
38 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Speaking to the same forum a year later, the new Foreign Minister,
Klaus Kinkel, called for the establishment of an effective system of
collective security within the UN and CSCE frameworks. He affirmed
Germany’s intention to create the constitutional prerequisites ‘for our
armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations for
peacekeeping and peace-restoring missions after approval by the
Bundestag’. Kinkel said that Germany did not want a gap to develop
between its verbal commitment to peace and human rights and its
active commitment. He also made an initial reference to the question
of a permanent seat for Germany on the UN Security Council by stat-
ing that Germany would not take the initiative, but would state its
claim if and when specific plans were to be made to change the
composition of the Security Council.15 Nine months later the govern-
ment, responding to an official question of the Secretary-General,
declared its preparedness to assume the responsibilities of permanent
membership of the Security Council. 16 Although Germany was backed
in principle by the five permanent members, France, the UK and the
USA (Germany’s closest allies) emphasized that new members would
be expected to play an active role in global security activities.17
The UN Secretary-General tried several times to seek German com-
mitment to greater international engagement, while being fully aware
of the complicated internal situation of the new Germany. In an inter-
view given to a German weekly he rejected explicitly any question of
Germany providing soldiers for UN enforcement missions, emphasiz-
ing that UN activities comprise other tasks and that it is the preroga-
tive of each country to decide what it offers the UN.18 During a visit
to Bonn in April 1994 he argued in favour of the creation of a UN
stand-by peacekeeping force, the German share of which should not

15 Speech by Foreign Minister Kinkel to the 47th session of the UN General Assembly,
23 Sep. 1992. See Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bulletin, no. 101
(25 Sep. 1992), pp. 1949–53 (in German).
16 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 July 1993 (in German). See also ‘Farewell to the
Genscher era’ [interview with Klaus Kinkel], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 May 1993; and Press
and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bulletin, no. 79 (30 Sep. 1993),
pp. 913–17 (in German).
17 For the text of the statements, see Europa-Archiv, no. 19 (1993), pp. D385–87,
D390–93 (in German).
18 ‘Die Hand am Drücker’ [The hand on the trigger], Die Woche, 17 Feb. 1994 (in
German).
 GER M ANY 39

exceed 1 per cent of its armed forces, approximately 3000 troops.19

Hence the Secretary-General as well as Germany’s closest allies
increased the pressure on Germany to resolve its internal debate on its
future international role and responsibilities.

V. The Constitutional Court’s decision

On the juridical level the internal debate was closed by the ruling of
the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994.20 It declared constitu-
tional the participation of Germany in all kinds of crisis and peace
operations, including peace enforcement, subject to the consent of a
majority of the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag. At a special
session on 22 July 1994 the latter gave ex post facto approval to the
participation of the Bundeswehr in the UN-mandated NATO and
Western European Union (WEU) missions in the former Yugoslavia.
While emphasizing that the promise given to the UN General
Assembly in 1991 by his predecessor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, had
been kept, Foreign Minister Kinkel pledged continuing respect for the
post-war German culture of restraint. 21 He specifically mentioned
Germany’s prudence regarding the use of military means, which was
a product of the lessons of German history, the need for priority to be
given to conflict prevention and the fact that the Bundeswehr was not
yet prepared for participating in international peace missions in
distant areas. Cautioning that Germany’s partners should not make
excessive demands on it and that each case had to be studied care-
fully, Kinkel formulated principles and questions which will be of
importance in future German decision making:

1. German participation in international peace missions must be in

accordance with international law.
2. Germany will never engage in peace missions alone, but only in
multilateral operations, primarily in the framework of existing inter-
national institutions such as the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the WEU.

19 ‘Boutros-Ghali: Die Vereinten Nationen brauchen jederzeit verfügbare Streitkräfte’

[Boutros-Ghali: The United Nations need standby forces], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
11 Apr. 1994 (in German).
20 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvE 3/92, 2 BvE 5/93, 2 BvE 7/93, 2 BvE 8/93, pro-
nounced on 12 July 1994 (in German).
21 Kinkel, K. ‘Peacekeeping missions: Germany can now play its part’, NATO Review,
vol. 42, no. 5 (Oct. 1994), pp. 3–7.
40 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

3. The following questions must be answered in a satisfactory way.

Is there a clear mandate? Is the proposed military action sensibly
embedded in a comprehensive political conception of conflict resolu-
tion? Is there a reasonable likelihood of the mission succeeding? Is
there a reasonable balance between the goal sought and the potential
losses that might be incurred? Are there clear criteria for assessing
success so that the mission can be terminated in a timely fashion? Do
contingency plans exist in case it is not as successful as hoped?
4. The more probable combat missions are, the more compelling
must be the reasons for German participation.
5. In addition to parliamentary approval and an assessment of the
risks and possible consequences of a military mission out-of-area, an
all-party consensus should be sought.
6. German participation should not have an escalatory effect on the
conflict, which could be the case in areas where special animosities
still exist because of German occupation during World War II: ‘For
this reason the Federal Government rejects the direct participation of
German troops in peace missions in the former Yugoslavia’.22
Following the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, which
widened the German foreign policy options from a legal point of
view, decisions on actual participation now lie with the politicians.
The criteria defined by the Foreign Minister underline Germany’s still
cautious approach. None the less, events such as NATO’s request in
December 1994 for German Tornado aircraft 23 to participate in the
NATO operation in the former Yugoslavia, the request some days
later for a German contribution in case NATO was required to protect
UNPROFOR’s withdrawal,24 and the debate on the extent and nature
of Germany’s support for the new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in
22 Kinkel (note 21), p. 7.
23 Electronic combat and reconnaissance aircraft (ECRs). At first, the Federal Government
avoided a decision by declaring the NATO request ‘informal’. See Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 8 Dec. 1994 (in German).
24 In this case the government publicly pursued a delaying tactic, giving assurances that
Germany would make a contribution while cautioning that a concrete decision would have to
be taken in each situation. See ‘Die SPD zu Gesprächen über einen deutschen Beitrag bereit’
[SPD ready for talks on a German contribution], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 Dec.
1994 (in German). At the same time the Defence Ministry compiled a list for NATO con-
tingency planning which earmarked 70 officers for the UN/NATO headquarters in Kieseljak
near Sarajevo, maritime transport and mine clearing capacities, Tornado ECRs, additional
Transall airlift capacities and army logistics and paramedic units. See Junacker, M., ‘Bonner
Plan: 70 deutsche Uffiziere nach Bosnien’ [The Bonn plan: 70 German officers to Bosnia],
Welt am Sonntag, 18 Dec. 1994 (in German).
 GER M ANY 41

Bosnia and Herzegovina all indicate that Germany will be confronted

with growing demands for its participation in peace operations.
In the latter case, the government gave approval on 26 June 1995 to
the Bundeswehr protecting and supporting the RRF by providing air
transport capacity for the transport of peacekeeping forces outside the
borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by dispatching paramedics to
Croatia and staff personnel to the international headquarters in Italy
and Croatia and by participating in NATO’s close air support activ-
ities.25 Following this decision, approved by the Bundestag with the
votes of the ruling parties and with 45 votes of the opposition just four
days later, the Bundeswehr for the first time was officially deployed
in a combat theatre.26 The fact that the government restricted the
mission of the Tornados—apart from contingency planning for a com-
plete withdrawal of UNPROFOR and UNCRO—to the protection of
the RRF, its insistence that it is their task to enforce the no-fly zone
and its refusal to commit ground forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina all
demonstrate its continuing caution.27
Thus the political debate in Germany over its role in the building of
a new security order has only just begun.

VI. The political parties

While there is broad consensus in the Bundestag that Germany should
not stand aside while the UN assumes growing global burdens, there
has been a dispute at the constitutional level as to whether or not the

25 Germany has provided 500 paramedics, 8 Tornado ECRs to neutralize Bosnian Serb
missiles, 6 Tornado ECRs for infrared reconnaissance, 2 Breguet Atlantic reconnaissance
planes, 12 Transall transport planes and 1000 staff and logistic personnel. See ‘Der Bonner
Regierungsbeschluss zur Unterstützung der Blauhelm-Soldaten in Bosnien’ [The Bonn
government decision to support the blue helmets in Bosnia], Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 June
1995 (in German).
26 ‘Bundestag stimmt Einsatz von Tornados zu’ [Bundestag approves mission of
Tornados], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1–2 July 1995 (in German).
27 As early as Dec. 1994 the UN Secretary-General had assured Chancellor Helmut Kohl
that German Tornados would not be requested for use in implementing existing UN
mandates. This restriction is monitored by a German Air Force General in Italy who
examines every request for German Tornados to check its compatability with the 2 approved
missions, i.e., the protection of the RRF and of a complete withdrawal of the ‘blue helmets’.
See Kornelius, S., ‘Eingreifstruppe bringt Bonn in ein Dilemma’ [Reaction Force puts Bonn
in a dilemma], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 June 1995 (in German); and ‘Die Abstimmung über
den Bosnien-Einsatz wird zur Zerreißprobe für die SPD’ [The vote on the Bosnia mission is
becoming a tension test for the SPD], Frankfurter Allgeimeine Zeitung, 26 June 1995 (in
German).
42 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

constitution permits out-of-area use of German forces and at the

political level as to priorities and basic objectives. The controversy
was dominated by differences between the governing parties—the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union
(CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)—on the one hand, and
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on the other, not least because the
votes of the largest opposition party were needed for an amendment to
the constitution, for which a two-thirds majority is necessary.
The dispute was further complicated by the fact that the government
was creating a fait accompli before political agreement had been
achieved by declaring all the missions it approved humanitarian, since
all major parties had agreed that such missions were covered by the
constitution. Since what was disputed was the dividing line between
humanitarian and non-humanitarian missions, the opposition sus-
pected the government of using false labelling tactics for the purpose
of getting the armed forces and the public accustomed to out-of-area
missions. On the other hand, the government could not simply ignore
constitutional reservations, since the FDP, which is part of the
government coalition and provides the government with its foreign
minister, considered an amendment to the constitution to be neces-
sary.28
The ruling coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP was therefore unable to
agree on a draft bill until January 1993. In this bill they not only
advocated involvement of the German armed forces in UN peacekeep-
ing and peace enforcement missions, provided this was approved by a
majority in the Bundestag, but also the use of the German military
without a UN mandate. The latter provision is subject to the con-
ditions that a case of ‘emergency assistance’, as defined in Article 51
of the UN Charter, be involved, that the assistance be provided in a
multilateral framework and that parliamentary approval be given with
a two-thirds majority.29 As both political camps lacked the necessary
28 The dispute between the coalition partners about the involvement of German military
personnel in AWACS flights over Bosnia led to a strange compromise. The CDU-dominated
government retained the German soldiers in the AWACS while the FDP and SPD filed a
complaint against the mission with the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court refused to
order a withdrawal, but noted that a decision had not yet been made in the main proceedings.
In the case of another petition for an interim injunction filed by the SPD against the partici-
pation of a German battalion in UNOSOM II, the Court decided that the involvement of the
Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions required the prior approval of a majority of the parlia-
ment. This ruling, too, was in force until the Court’s final decision on the constitutional issue
in July 1994.
29 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/4107, 13 Jan. 1993 (in German).
 GER M ANY 43

two-thirds majority, the bills languished in the parliamentary com-

mittee after their first reading in the Bundestag. Unable to find a com-
promise, the political parties waited for the ruling of the Federal
Constitutional Court.
In the summer of 1992 the SPD had already introduced a bill pro-
posing an amendment to the constitution with the objective of ensur-
ing German involvement in UN peacekeeping activities. Enforcement
missions were not permitted under the bill.30 At a special party con-
ference held in Bonn some months later it was decided, in the light of
experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, that German
involvement in peacekeeping operations could include the armed pro-
tection of relief convoys and protection zones, provided their defen-
sive, de-escalatory and humanitarian aspects were respected.31 This
position was confirmed at the party conference in November 1993.32
Some leading Social Democrats attempted to go further in proposing
an amendment which would provide for German involvement in col-
lective enforcement actions, on the condition that the UN undergo
reform so that it is not just a mandate-granting institution but is also
given supreme command and control. This did not receive support in
the party.33
In the debate at the end of 1994 ton a possible greater German
military contribution in Bosnia and Herzegovina he party leader,
Rudolf Scharping, stressing the primacy of UNPROFOR’s humani-
tarian mission, claimed that there was no need for such a decision,
thus using the same delaying tactics as the Chancellor.34 A letter from
Scharping to members of the parliamentary group of the SPD, in
which he stressed that the participation of the Bundeswehr in the
event of UN withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina was an
alliance obligation, provoked a harsh negative reaction from the
SPD’s left wing.35 Six months later, Scharping issued a statement in

30 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/2895, 23 June 1992 (in German).

31 Minutes of the Special Party Conference, Bonn, 16–17 Nov. 1992, p. 413 (in German).
32 SPD, Parteitag Wiesbaden, 16–19 Nov. 1993: Perspektiven einer neuen Außen- und
Sicherheitspolitik [Prospects of a new foreign and security policy], p. 17 (in German).
33 The SPD parliamentary group submitted a comprehensive motion on UN reform. See
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/1719, 4 Dec. 1991 (in German).
34 ‘SPD zu Gesprächen über einen deutschen Beitrag bereit’ (note 24); and ‘Scharping
nennt Diskussion über Bosnien hypothetisch’ [Scharping calls discussion on Bosnia
hypothetical], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 Jan. 1995 (in German).
35 Lafontaine, O., deputy leader of the SPD, ‘Die neuen Kreuzritter’ [The new crusaders],
Der Spiegel, 2 Jan. 1995, pp. 21–22 (in German); and interview with Heidemarie Wieczorek-
Zeul, Der Spiegel, 9 Jan. 1995, p. 16 (in German).
44 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

the name of the SPD executive board stressing the need to strengthen
the security of UNPROFOR by a multilateral force and approving
logistical support by the German Bundswehr ‘only for a clear UN
peacekeeping mission under UN command’ while objecting to any
mission by German ground forces and combat aircraft. 36 Nevertheless,
at least 40 members of the SPD parliamentary group voted in favour
of the government decision.37 Thus, the SPD is still facing tensions
within its own ranks on this issue.
As for the other parties in the Bundestag, Alliance 90/the Greens
and the former communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) all
reject the idea of combat missions under the UN flag. PDS policy
would limit the tasks of the German armed forces to national defence,
while the Greens, although advocating in their 1994 federal election
platform the long-term goal of abolishing both NATO and the
Bundeswehr, restrict their conditional support to traditional peace-
keeping.38
German politicians use a variety of sometimes superficial argu-
ments to back their respective positions, many of which are motivated
purely by tactical considerations. The proponents of greater military
engagement refer, for example, to the need for Germany to regain full
sovereignty and again become a ‘normal’ state, Germany’s growing
international responsibility, its image, the expectations of other coun-
tries, the future of NATO and the dangers of Germany pursuing a
separate foreign policy. Its opponents stress the historical legacy of
Germany, the danger of a re-nationalization and re-militarization of
German foreign policy, the inefficacy of military means in ensuring
peace and the necessity of Germany contributing to a ‘civilizing pro-
cess’ by peaceful means.
Although some of these arguments partly make sense, they all miss
the crux of the matter. What does it mean to become a normal state?
What kind of greater responsibility is to be assumed? Which image
should the country work for and for what reasons? When is a separate
course dangerous and when is it legitimate? Does not Germany’s
36 Presseservice der SPD, Mitteilung an die Presse, 276/95, 12 June 1995 (in German).
37 Of 655 MPs, 386 approved the decision of the government, 258 were against and 11
abstained. The ruling parties have 341 seats; thus at least 45 MPs of the SPD and the Greens
backed the decision of the government. See ‘Germans vote to send unit and planes’, Inter-
national Herald Tribune, 1–2 July 1995.
38 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bundestagswahlprogramm [Bundestag election programme]
(Bornheim, 1994), pp. 6 ff. (in German). See also the interview with the leader of the parlia-
mentary group of the Greens, Joschka Fischer, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 Jan. 1995 (in German).
 GER M ANY 45

difficult historical legacy demand greater German involvement in UN

missions? Could not a far-reaching commitment to international insti-
tutions like the OSCE or the UN be an effective strategy to prevent
the danger of re-nationalization and re-militarization? Is an inter-
national civilizing process possible without the option of enforcing
the observance of international law? The last question leads to the
core of the debate between ‘realists’ and ‘institutionalists’.39 For real-
ists the national interest and freedom of manœuvre come first. The
institutionalists primarily seek collective security within international
organizations in order to reduce the danger that the UN will be used
for purely national purposes.

VII. The armed forces

The Bundeswehr is undergoing a complicated process of restructuring
which will restrict its participation in UN missions for the rest of the
1990s. Since unification Germany has had to tackle three structural
problems in relation to its armed forces: (a) the merging of two
armies; (b) the implementation of NATO force structure guidelines
following the promulgation in 1991 of the alliance’s new Strategic
Concept; and (c) preparations for out-of-area missions.40 Since the
promulgation of Defence Planning Guidelines for the Bundeswehr in
November 199241 and the Defence White Book in April 1994,42 the
main tasks of the Bundeswehr are flexible crisis and conflict man-
agement in an extended geographical environment, peace missions
and humanitarian assistance. These are tasks for which the Bundes-
wehr is neither trained nor equipped. They require multinational,
readily available, highly mobile and flexible components available for
deployment in both the whole of the NATO area and globally. Equip-
ment must be adapted and improved and priority given to logistics,

39 Ehrhart, H.-G., ‘Zehn Thesen zur Rolle der UNO in Friedensprozessen’ [Ten theses on
the role of the UN in peace processes], Sicherheit und Frieden, no. 4 (1992), pp. 214–15 (in
German).
40 Correspondingly, the structure of the Bundeswehr is being adapted, and will in future
consist of 3 branches: crisis reaction forces, which are immediately available, main defence
forces, which are largely dependent upon mobilization, and a basic military organization,
which will form the basis of the armed forces.
41 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien [Defence
policy guidelines] (Bonn, 26 Nov. 1992) (in German).
42 Weißbuch 1994 (note 4), p. 41–45.
46 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

command, control and communication capacities, transport facilities

and intelligence.
Given that each year in the 1990s Germany will have to transfer to
the eastern part of the country 150–200 billion DM and that the
defence budget is already shrinking, the process of restructuring the
Bundeswehr will be very difficult to pursue according to schedule and
will leave little room for UN missions. 43 However, the Bundeswehr is
continuing to prepare for such operations. 44 In view of the more dan-
gerous environment in which peacekeeping operations are currently
being deployed, only military units ready for action will be assigned.
Until recently the common assumption was that only light-armoured
forces were suited for this kind of mission. Correspondingly two of
the five existing light-armoured brigades should become units for UN
missions. Bearing in mind the necessity of rotation, Germany will not
be capable of making available more than two battalions for the rest
of the 1990s.45
This goal has meanwhile been replaced by a more flexible but also
more obscure approach. The Bundeswehr’s crisis reaction forces,
which comprise mostly mechanized brigades and whose main task is
the defence of Germany and its allies against aggression as well as
multilateral crisis management in the framework of NATO or the
WEU, are now also supposed to be ready for UN missions. While the
air force and the navy already have the military capacity to participate
in ‘robust’ peacekeeping operations, the ground forces’ light brigades
are as yet only able to be used in traditional peacekeeping. Even such
engagements have turned out to be problematic. In the case of
43 According to the permanent secretary of the German Defence Ministry, Gen. Hans
Schönbohm (Retd), the defence budget was reduced by 18% in real terms between 1989 and
1993 and will fall by a further 25% in 1995. See ‘Besorgt um deutsche Rüstung’ [Worried
about German armaments], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 Apr. 1994 (in German).
44 For example, in 1994 the infantry college of the German Army in Hammelburg also
became a centre for UN training. In Jan. 1995 a new command and control centre was estab-
lished in the Ministry of Defence for commanding German contingents operating abroad
under a UN mandate and to enable Germany to become a ‘lead nation’. See ‘Bonn will
Führungsrolle bei UNO-Missionen’ [Bonn claims lead role in UN mission], Die Welt,
19 Nov. 1994 (in German); Feldmeyer, K., ‘Die Schwierige Normalität’ [Difficult normality],
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 Jan. 1995 (in German); and Bundesministerium der
Verteidigung, Ressort konzept zur Anpassung der Streitkräftestrukturen, der Territorialen
Wehrverwaltung und der Stationierung [Departmental concept of the adaptation of the
structure of the armed forces, the administration of defence and stationing of forces], 15 Mar.
1995, pp. 3 ff. (in German).
45 Two battalions for UN missions will be established within Airborne Brigade 25 and
Ranger Brigade 23. See Albert, B., ‘Krisenreaktionskräfte des Heeres’ [Crisis reaction forces
in the army], Wehrtechnik, no. 2 (1994), pp. 6–8 (in German).
 GER M ANY 47

Somalia the German battalion had to be formed using soldiers

detached from more than 380 offices and units. While they did a
commendable job in a very delicate mission and gained valuable
experience in operating in an unfamiliar environment, they were also
fortunate not to be drawn into a combat situation requiring a high
degree of unit cohesion and combat skill.
Because of a lack of political and strategic clarity, the Bundeswehr
faces an identity crisis. As Defence Minister Rühe put it, ‘Germany is
encircled with friends’. This calls into question the legitimacy of
Germany’s armed forces: for what political purpose will Germany
have to maintain what kind of army? The official answer has been
that: (a) there are new risks and new tasks; and (b) the 1990 Treaty on
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany stipulates that Ger-
many must reduce its army to 370 000 soldiers by 1995. 46 It is now
obvious that the Bundeswehr will be further reduced for budgetary
and organizational reasons. Rumours suggest targets from 325 000 to
as low as 200 000. In his 1994 report to the Bundestag, the parliamen-
tary commissioner for the armed forces criticized the negative effects
of volatile and unsteady plans on the self-confidence and motivation
of soldiers.47 In April 1994 Defence Minister Rühe made public the
main conceptual guidelines of his budget cuts which necessitate a
reduction of the armed forces to 340 000 and a further reduction of
the period of conscription from 12 to 10 months.48 This provoked a
clash with the defence specialists of his own party as well as with the
Foreign Minister. 49 In October 1994, the coalition partner of the
CDU/CSU revealed new plans from the Defence Ministry indicating a
further reduction to 325 000.50
The lack of financial resources necessitates new political guidelines
since the problems of the German Army are growing. First, there will
46 For the text, see Vertrag über eine abschliessende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland
vom 12 Sep. 1990 [Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of 12 Sep.
1990], Europa-Archiv no. 19 (1990), pp. 509–14 (in German); or Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany, SIPRI Yearbook 1991: Arms Control and Disarmament
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991), pp. 611–14.
47 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6950, 8 Mar. 1994 (in German).
48 The Conceptual Guidelines were published 3 months later. See BW–aktuell, 28 July
1994, 2 Aug. 1994 and 4 Aug. 1994 (in German)
49 The SPD favours a Bundeswehr of 300 000 men. See Diskussionsentwurf Regierungs-
programm 1994 [Discussion draft of the government programme1994] (Bonn, 1994), p. 32
(in German).
50 Inacker, M., ‘Die FDP stellt Bundeswehr-Umfang und Wehrpflicht-Dauer in Frage’
[The FDP calls the size of the Bundeswehr and the length of national service into question],
Welt am Sonntag, 30 Oct. 1994 (in German).
48 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

inevitably be the problem of a two-class army if the shrinking means

at the disposal of the Defence Minister are concentrated on the Ger-
man crisis reaction forces. Second, a further reduction will lead to the
problem of inequity in conscription which again provokes the very
delicate question of whether or not Germany should maintain a con-
script or professional army.51 The latter would be better suited for out-
of-area missions, but it is extremely costly and incompatible with the
‘citizen in uniform’ ideal which inspires Germany’s conscript army
and which legitimizes military forces solely for defending the country
against an aggressor. The guiding principle is ‘being able to fight in
order not to be forced to fight’. However, new tasks arising from
Germany’s new international obligations may require another image
oriented according to ‘the real conditions of war, danger and human
misery’.52 Hence, the Bundeswehr is torn between old ideals and new
tasks in the search for its identity, the outcome of which will have
effects on Germany’s future military role.

VIII. German society

The debate within German society about the future contribution of
Germany to UN crisis management and conflict resolution is to a
great extent influenced by the lessons of Germany’s belligerent past.
One of these lessons is a certain disdain for traditional power politics
and the use of military force. Germans have learned to accept the
latter only for self-defence and in the framework of a defensive
alliance. They have become used to having a minor status in NATO
and being protected in return. Hence Germany has become a prosper-
ous and influential civilian power.53
As a conscript army the Bundeswehr is part of German society.
Consequently it reflects the values, problems and deficiencies of that
society, which on the one hand is undergoing a difficult integration
process after the formal unification of two separate states and on the
51 Following the Conceptual Guidelines (see note 48), the 50 000-strong crisis reaction
forces will comprise mostly professionals and contracted soldiers. Conscripts can serve in
these forces on a voluntary and extended basis for 12–23 months. They are indispensable for
the functioning of the crisis reaction forces because they are intended to make up roughly
one-third of total strength, but it is not clear if there will be enough volunteers.
52 Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (note 41), p. 33.
53 Ehrhart, H.-G., The New Germany in a Changing Environment (Queen’s University:
Kingston, Ont., 1994); and Maull, H. W., ‘Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers’,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 5 (winter 1990/91), pp. 91–106.
 GER M ANY 49

other is a post-modern civil society characterized by individualism,

internationalization and interdependence. Finally German society is
democratic, and any kind of international involvement needs the
support of the electorate. This is especially true of future military
engagements.
Even if the value of public opinion polls is questionable, they give
an impression of the general trend of opinion. One significant revela-
tion of German opinion polls is declining comprehension of the future
tasks of the Bundeswehr. The younger generation especially is less
imbued with a sense of military service. The percentage of conscien-
tious objectors has risen steadily from 14 per cent in 1988 to 30 per
cent in 1993. 54 Doubts seem to be growing, moreover, in society as a
whole. The proportion of those who think that the defence budget
ought to be further reduced has grown steadily from 12 per cent in
1978 to 65 per cent in 1992.55 While the need for national defence is
not called into question by over 90 per cent of the population, polls
indicate at least five other interesting trends. First, attitudes on
Germany’s future international role are shifting from a reserved
stance toward greater approval of a more active role (from 48 per cent
in 1990 to 62 per cent in 1992).56 Second, it does not follow from this
that there is support for greater military involvement of the Bundes-
wehr abroad. While participation in traditional UN peacekeeping or
humanitarian assistance missions is usually approved of by more than
50 per cent and 90 per cent respectively, support for enforcement
actions is only 12–26 per cent.57 A poll within the Bundeswehr shows
that 68 per cent of draftees (89 per cent of professionals) are in favour
of German participation in peacekeeping operations in Europe, 56 per
cent approve of peacekeeping operations outside Europe (79 per cent
of professionals) and 57 per cent approve of German participation in
54 Deutscher Bundestag (note 47), pp. 18–20.
55 Hoffmann, H.-V., Demoskopisches Meinungsbild in Deutschland zur Sicherheits- und
Verteidigungspolitik 1992 [Opinion poll in Germany on security and defence policy]
(Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und Kommunikation: Waldbröl, 1993), p. 29 (in
German).
56 Wulf, D., Deutschland im Wandel: Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Studie [Germany in
change: results of a representative survey] (unpublished, 1993. In German).
57 SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Presse-Mitteilung 1090, 7 May 1993 (in German), in which 4
polls conducted by different institutes between Dec. 1992 and Apr. 1993 are compared. In a
poll conducted after the Muslim defeat in Bihac, 36% were in favour of sending German jet
fighters to Bosnia, while 54% were against. See Die Woche, 9 Dec. 1994. This result was
confirmed 6 months later, when 55% of Germans polled opposed sending Tornados to
Bosnia. See ‘Bonn bites the Balkan bullet but still ducks Bosnia’, International Herald
Tribune, 27 June 1995.
50 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

UN military activities.58 Third, there is far greater resistance in the

eastern part of Germany to any kind of international military engage-
ment. Fourth, political setbacks to the dispatch of some types of
German contributions to peacekeeping missions indicate that there is
not yet a stable consensus on Germany’s role in this kind of inter-
national engagement.59 Fifth, Germans expect a lot of the UN. For
94 per cent the main task of the UN is the establishment of a world-
wide peaceful order. While 51 per cent think that national armed
forces should be substituted by the UN in the long run, 41 per cent are
in favour of the UN seeking a monopoly on the use of military force. 60

IX. Facing the peacekeeping challenge

On the one hand, Germany is assuming a greater role in the UN, as is
evidenced by its election to the UN Security Council for 1995–96 and
by the appointment of two Germans as top UN officials.61 On the
other hand, the support of the German Government for UN peace-
keeping seems not to be without its limits; hence, for intance, its
negative response to the UN Secretary-General’s request for a Ger-
man stand-by peacekeeping contingent.62 Public reaction in Germany
to the events in Somalia indicated rapidly declining public support for
an incoherent UN mission. In principle Germany could participate
58 Hoffmann (note 55), pp. 232 ff. Unfortunately the terms ‘peacekeeping operations’ and
‘UN military activities’ are not specified.
59 For example, during the Persian Gulf War support for participation of the Bundeswehr
in peacekeeping operations dropped to 24%. At the beginning of 1993 a similar decline was
measured. See Hoffmann, O., Deutsche Blauhelme bei UN-Missionen [German blue helmets
on UN missions] (MVG-Verlag: Munich 1993), pp. 77–79 (in German).
60 Hecker, G., ‘Im Aufwind’ [On the up], Information für die Truppe, no. 4 (1994),
pp. 16–17 (in German).
61 Gen. Manfred Eisele has been appointed Assistant Secretary-General heading the Office
of Planning and Support in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. The diplomat Karl-
Theodor Paschke has been appointed UN Inspector-General.
62 A major political dispute erupted between the Foreign Ministry, which approved
German stand-by forces, and the Defence Ministry, which objected and—with the backing of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl—finally won. See ‘Heftiger Kampf um Einsatzliste’ [Fierce quarrel
over standby list], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 Jan. 1995 (in German); ‘Bundesregierung
verweigert Ghali konkrete Zusagen’ [Federal government refuses Ghali concrete commit-
ments], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 Jan. 1995; and ‘Butros Ghali wirbt für Einsatztruppe’
[Boutros-Ghali canvassing for reaction force], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 Jan. 1995 (in
German). The Defence Minister’s reported reluctance to provide any support for the UN
resulted from a cabinet resolution of summer 1993 stipulating that all costs of German mis-
sions abroad must be paid from the Defence Ministry budget, which had already been deeply
cut. See Förster, M. and Knopfdruck, P., ‘Internationale Blamage?’ [International shame?],
Behörden-Spiegel, Feb. 1995, p. 10 (in German).
 GER M ANY 51

today in all kinds of UN activity. However, it still has to go through a

long learning process. While peacekeeping operations have a reason-
ably good chance of gaining wide acceptance, this will be jeopardized
by confusing them with enforcement actions, which may result in
military escalation. This is not to say that military enforcement should
necessarily be opposed, but that its terms and tasks have to be as clear
as possible.63 However, no matter whether the UN or the OSCE is
involved, the main goal for international relations that is acceptable in
a democratic society such as Germany’s is the gradual construction of
a comprehensive collective security system which permits a transition
from the law of the strongest to the strength of law. This should be the
standard of Germany’s international engagement, providing both a
goal consistent with its basic values and a yardstick for decisions
about whether or not to become involved in armed conflicts.

63 Ehrhart, H.-G. and Klingenburg, K., ‘Was ist Peacekeeping?’ [What is peacekeeping?],
Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, no. 15 (1994) (in
German).
3. Japan
Takao Takahara

I. Introduction
The Japanese are the quintessential newcomers to UN peacekeeping.
The deployment of 27 civilians to Namibia in October 1989 as part of
UNTAG was the first instance of participation by Japan. In February
1990, although it was not officially classified by the UN as a peace-
keeping operation, six civilians joined ONUVEN, which oversaw the
Nicaraguan elections. In both these cases those sent were exclusively
civilians. The dispatch of Japanese military personnel was at that time
unthinkable, mainly because of constitutional constraints.
In September 1992, under a new law (Law on Cooperation in UN
Peacekeeping and Other Operations) which had been enacted in
August after bitter controversy, some 600 troops of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) were deployed to Cambodia as part of the
Military Component of UNTAC. In addition 41 Japanese civilians
joined the Electoral Component and 75 police officers were attached
to the Civilian Police Component. Participation in UNTAC has so far
been the largest and most widely publicized instance of Japanese
involvement in UN peacekeeping. In September 1992 three civilians
took part in UNAVEM II. After May 1993, 53 SDF personnel also
participated in ONUMOZ, 48 of them in Movement Control and 5 as
staff officers of the Military Component. In March 1994, 15 Japanese
civilians joined the electoral division of ONUSAL to oversee the
elections in El Salvador. From October to November 1994, 15
Japanese civilians supported the work of ONUMOZ during the
Mozambican elections.
What has been controversial on all these occasions is the dispatch
overseas of personnel of the Japanese military. Japan’s unwillingness
to use its military force in international peace operations has been
criticized as a cowardly reluctance to endanger the lives of its
citizens. This reluctance must be understood in its historical and
constitutional context.
 J AP AN 53

II. Constitutional and historical restraints

In Japan, as in Germany, the question of military participation in
international peacekeeping arouses domestic debate concerning the
constitutionality of such action. The relevant clauses of the Japanese
Constitution of 1947 are its Preamble and Article 9.1
At first sight these clauses appear to disarm Japan totally, as was
explained by the government at the introduction of the draft constitu-
tion to the Diet in 1946. A majority of constitutional scholars in
Japan—around 80 per cent—also subscribe to the view that Article 9
prohibits the maintenance by Japan of any significant military force.2
Accordingly, there are strong doubts about the very constitutionality
of Japan’s military forces. The issue has caused one of the most
significant rifts between the progressive opposition parties and the
governing Conservatives in post-war Japanese politics.
The ‘pacifist clauses’ of the constitution are so sweeping that they
might seem to have been imposed on the Japanese against their will.
In 1947 when the new democratic constitution was enacted, Japan
was totally disarmed and still under the occupation of Allied forces
following World War II. The key to understanding the situation is to
distinguish the general public’s attitude from government policy.
While the government was generally lukewarm about the imposed
constitutional reform, the general public welcomed and strongly sup-
ported the new constitution, including the pacifist clauses. Opinion
polls taken in May 1946 showed 85 per cent of respondents support-
ing the draft constitution, with 70 per cent believing that Article 9 was
necessary and only 2 per cent thinking otherwise.3 Since then roughly
70 per cent have consistently shown support for the pacifist clauses.
To the government and a large proportion of politicians, total
demilitarization was an anomaly which should be corrected in due
course. As cold war confrontation became the dominant framework of
international politics, the remilitarization of Japan as a bulwark
against communism became a goal of the USA. This change logically
should have brought about abolition of Article 9. In the 1950s the
ruling Conservatives actually tried to revise the constitution, mainly in
order to make rearmament legal. However, popular support for the
1 Both are reproduced in appendix 3A of this chapter.
2 Norimoto-Tsuneoka, S. et al., The Constitution of Japan (Kashiwa Shobo: Tokyo, 1993),
p. 140.
3 Norimoto-Tsuneoka (note 2), p, 6.
54 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

‘Peace Constitution’ was impossible to override. In a series of elec-

tions the Conservatives failed to gain the required two-thirds majority
in the Diet, where leftist opposition parties represented the popular
voice on this issue. According to opinion polls, even if the revisionist
Conservatives had overridden the opposition in the Diet it seemed
unlikely that the amendment would have been supported by a simple
majority in the referendum that was required to follow.
The reasons behind public opposition to revision of the constitution
are twofold. First, the attempt to revise the constitution was seen as a
reactionary move by the old politicians to erode the political and
social reforms achieved under the years of occupation. Revisionists of
the constitution also argued for restriction of basic rights by empha-
sizing the duties of citizens and restoration of the status of the
Emperor, whose role was depoliticized by the constitution. In the
political struggles in post-war Japan, retaining the constitution thus
also meant adhering to the newly installed post-war democracy.
Second, the pacifism symbolized in those clauses meant more to the
impoverished post-war generation than just the disarmament imposed
by the occupation forces. It was seen as a precious lesson from the
experience of the devastation of modern total war, helping to ensure
that Japan would never tread that path again. The image of a New
Japan, reborn from the ashes to be a peaceful, non-militarist nation,
became a matter of national identity for a significant proportion of the
post-war Japanese. This allergy towards anything with a ‘smell of
gunpowder’ is strengthened by occasional glimpses of the remnants of
militarism in Japanese society.
There is a third factor which has worked as an obstacle to the
revision of the pacifist constitution. For the Allies, one of the major
reasons for disarming the Japanese and for stationing the US military
on Japanese soil was to placate the fears of neighbouring countries by
corking the spectre of Japanese militarism in the pacifist bottle once
and for all. Protests from Asian nations which experienced Japanese
occupation could not be overlooked by the revisionists (however
insensitive they have otherwise been). There was therefore a tacit alli-
ance between concerned Asian neighbours and the Japanese people
against the revival of Japanese militarism. All these factors played a
significant part in the debate over the dispatch of SDF personnel to
the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992–93.
 J AP AN 55

Unlike Germany, post-war Japan did not achieve a constitutional

consensus on rearmament; until recently the leftist opposition parties
held to their basic stand that the SDF were unconstitutional. The
revisionists were confronted with the reality that amendment of the
pacifist clauses was impossible. Reconciliation of the constitution
with another reality, ongoing Japanese rearmament, was made by
reinterpretation of these clauses, namely to read Article 9 as meaning
that Japan is allowed to maintain armed forces so long as they are
strictly limited to self-defence. Starting with the premise that the right
of self-defence is not forsworn by the first paragraph of Article 9,
successive governments have read the second paragraph as implying
that the maintenance of certain forces for self-defence is permitted.
Hence the name Self-Defense Forces and the fact that the SDF lack
certain characteristics of normal military forces.4 The government also
explains that the constitution limits the right of self-defence to
‘individual self-defence’, meaning that the right of ‘collective self-
defence’ stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter is restricted under
the present constitution. For this reason the US–Japanese military
arrangements are legally constructed not so much as an alliance but
rather as a base leasing arrangement. 5
Under this reinterpretation of Article 9 the accumulation of consti-
tutional faits accomplis has continued to the present, creating a mili-
tary force with a budget matching those of the world’s major military
powers. Efforts to establish legal consistency have been made by the
bureaucracy. Appeals to the traditional legal interpretation of Article 9
have been the tactic of the opposition in their efforts to mobilize pub-
lic concern over the incremental enlargement of the sphere of consti-
tutionality.6 Reflecting public concern, the SDF impose certain
restrictions on themselves with respect to equipment and activities.7
They have on the whole kept a low profile and been careful not to
appear to resemble the Imperial Army or Navy of the pre-war militar
4 For example, it has no military court.
5 The US–Japanese 1954 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and the 1960 Treaty of
Mutual Co-operation and Security have been explained to the Japanese not as a part of
regional security system in the Western Pacific but as a guarantee by the USA to protect
Japan in the case of an attack in return for providing military bases.
6 For a succinct description of the role of legal norms in the issue of Japanese remilitariza-
tion, see Katzenstein, P. J. and Okawara, N., Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms
and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Cornell University East Asia Program: Ithaca,
N.Y., 1993), pp. 118–37.
7 For example, long-range bombers and aircraft-carriers are perceived to exceed the limits
of self-defence.
56 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

ist Japan. In winning public support, the SDF’s commitment to

disaster relief has proved to be one of its most successful efforts, to
the extent that many Japanese see the SDF as useful primarily for
disaster relief and only secondarily for the defence of the country.
Thus the SDF have never been involved in military action; not a
single person has been the casualty of military action by the SDF
since their establishment.
Opinion polls show that the majority of the public have accepted the
existence of the SDF, especially since the 1970s. However, support
has been passive and conditional on the benign character of the SDF.
At the end of the cold war no political force was ready to take the
initiative to revisit the issue in response to the radically changed inter-
national environment. The whole issue of military participation in UN
peacekeeping thus remains a challenge to the old frame of
reference—the ‘peace issue’ or ‘rearmament issue’ of the cold war
days—and demands from the Japanese a huge learning exercise. In
this context the Cambodian experience was a true milestone.

III. The Cambodian experience

As early as 1946 the Imperial Diet, when debating the pacifist clauses
of the draft constitution, took up the question of Japan taking part in
UN forces. With Japan under occupation and not yet a member of the
new international organization, the question was dismissed as unreal-
istic. Later the official government position was that as long as a UN
operation did not involve the use of force the constitution did not pro-
hibit the SDF from participating. However, since the existing legis-
lation on the SDF did not stipulate such participation, it is understood
that at present the SDF could not participate in these activities.8
The dispatch of SDF personnel to UNTAC, their first overseas
deployment, was made possible by new legislation, the Law on Coop-
eration in UN Peacekeeping and Other Operations (called the ‘PKO
bill’ in the Japanese media). This legislation was the outcome of a
long and bitter controversy which followed the submission of the bill
to the Diet in September 1991. It passed the Diet in June 1992, over-
coming fierce opposition from the two leftist opposition parties. The
public was divided over this issue. A poll conducted just before the
passage of the law indicated that 41.6 per cent of respondents
8 Official position expressed by the Japanese Cabinet, 28 Oct. 1980.
 J AP AN 57

favoured SDF participation in UN peacekeeping, while 36.9 per cent

were against. When asked about the constitutionality of the dispatch,
50.3 per cent thought that it was problematic while 28.2 per cent
thought otherwise.9
In order to gain support for the bill from the centrist opposition par-
ties, the government accepted several binding restrictions. This was
also necessary to respond to a certain scepticism within branches of
the government such as the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. In accord-
ance with the traditional notion of UN peacekeeping, the 1992 law
restricts Japanese participation in peacekeeping to cases where agree-
ment on a cease-fire among conflicting parties exists and the neutral-
ity of UN forces is sustained. In addition, states surrounding the host
state must all accept Japanese participation. The law also stipulates
that once these conditions cease to exist, the Japanese must be
promptly withdrawn.
Other compromises included ‘freezing’ SDF participation in certain
common peacekeeping activities, such as monitoring the cessation of
armed conflict or demobilization of armed forces, stationing and
patrol in buffer zones, inspecting the movement of arms, collecting
abandoned weapons and assisting exchange of prisoners of war—until
further legislative action is taken.
The reason for such restrictions is the question of the constitution-
ality of the use of armed force by the SDF: whether, in the case of an
attack by hostile groups, organized use of force by the SDF to defend
themselves would constitute a violation of the pacifist clauses of the
constitution. The judgement of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau was
that it would be. In their view organized military action which
involves use of arms is constitutional only for the defence of Japan,
and a peacekeeping mission could not be counted as such.
The 600 SDF personnel dispatched to Cambodia did not therefore
participate in the Military Component of UNTAC as an infantry
battalion, but joined as engineers and repaired roads and bridges. The
participation of the SDF as an organization in UNTAC’s military
observer group was also interpreted as illegal: eight Japanese officers
who joined the military observer group went as individuals, formally
separated from the engineering battalion.
Efforts were thus made to limit the SDF’s activities to missions
where the use of arms seemed unlikely. However, what would have
9 Asahi Shimbun, 12 June 1992.
58 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

happened if the SDF had been attacked? The law stipulates that troops
may only bear ‘small-sized weapons’. Accordingly in Cambodia they
were equipped with pistols and rifles which were to be used only in
cases where the life and security of the individual soldier were endan-
gered. The government also explained that the SDF would not be
placed under the operational command of UNTAC, meaning that they
would retain the right to independent command and could not be
forced into military action.
These restrictions were later criticized as being remote from reali-
ties in the field. Disciplined, organized action with regard to the use
of arms was precisely what was required in order to keep hostilities in
Cambodia to a minimum. During the debate over the PKO bill, the
government tried to evade the problem by contending that the SDF
would only be sent to situations where violent incidents were
unlikely.
This was the background to the reported excessive concern of the
Japanese in Cambodia about their own safety. Apparently Japan’s
wish to keep the SDF in a relatively safe district was heeded and in
September 1992 the engineering battalion established its camp in the
relatively calm province of Takeo to the south of Phnom Penh.
Playing down the inherent dangers of the Cambodia operation, as
the government appeared to have done in order to soothe sceptics dur-
ing the Diet debates, resulted in a severe backlash when actual casual-
ties occurred. A Japanese UN Volunteer was killed with a Cambodian
interpreter in April 1993 in the more dangerous province of Kompong
Thom. Early in May a group of Japanese civilian police officers was
attacked in the north-western province of Banteay Meanchey. One
police officer was killed and four others injured. These incidents
aroused much emotion in Japan.
Even without these incidents, as the Cambodian election in May
1993 approached and one of the parties to the Paris Peace Accords,
the Khmer Rouge, withdrew its cooperation, the possibility of with-
drawal from UNTAC was raised publicly in Japan. One of the condi-
tions of Japanese participation—accord between all parties in the
region—seemed to have eroded. This point was also raised within the
government, especially after the Japanese fatality in May.
The government was in a difficult position. It was criticized for not
listening to earlier warnings from Japanese personnel in Cambodia
that the situation was quite different from the way it was explained
 J AP AN 59

before they left Japan. In particular the police allocated to the

UNTAC Police Component had problems. They had been told that
their mission was to supervise and control the local police force and
were unprepared to actually police a region where local police did not
exist. Unlike the SDF they were stationed in the more unstable
regions where they faced problems caused by the withdrawal of the
Khmer Rouge from the peace process. One of their lodgings was
attacked by rockets and burned as early as January 1993, fortunately
in their absence.
To many in Japan it seemed as if the government was deliberately
deceiving the public in order to evade straightforward debate on the
constitutional question. Sympathy focused on the two Japanese killed,
who were viewed not only as having sacrificed their lives to the cause
of bringing peace to Cambodia but also as being victims of govern-
ment mismanagement or, as some saw it, dishonesty. The criticism
was all the stronger because it reminded people of the practices of the
former Imperial Army and Navy, which paid little regard to the lives
of their personnel. Some commentators warned of the danger of
making the victims heroes who were faithful to their duties to the
state.
The government, forced to take action, requested UNTAC to relo-
cate the Japanese police to safer areas, but this self-interested plea
was necessarily rejected by UNTAC. Japan did not decide to
withdraw, however, and a team of civilians was sent soon after the
second incident in May to join the Electoral Component of UNTAC
to assist in the polling process. The number of team members was
reduced from 53 to 41 after the Japanese deaths.
The tragic incidents in Cambodia did have an educational effect on
the Japanese public. The victims were not SDF personnel, and this
fact drew more attention to the non-military aspect of peacekeeping.
In the heated debates over the dispatch of the SDF, the whole picture
of the UNTAC mission, which included important civilian elements
such as the Human Rights and Repatriation Components, had been
under-reported. The effect on the younger generation of this more
balanced account of UNTAC’s role was encouraging, as shown for
example in the increase in the number of applicants for places among
the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers.1 0 An initiative of

10 Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) is a Japanese version of the Peace

Corps. About 1000 persons accepted twice a year. The number of applicants used to fluctuate
60 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Mr Takehito Nakata, the father of the dead UN Volunteer, to establish

a fund for UN Volunteers was also warmly received.
This refocusing on the non-military aspects of peacekeeping reson-
ated with the thinking already prevalent among the Japanese people.
The question ‘Does it really have to be the SDF?’ had been often
raised. While recognizing a need to participate in UNTAC, people
had been wondering whether it was in fact by sending the military
that Japan could contribute best. Such doubts were strengthened as
news reports showed the engineering battalion in action rebuilding
roads and bridges. If the place is safe, some argued, why send the
SDF instead of construction workers?
Although many questions raised during the debates stemmed from
ignorance of UNTAC and of requirements in the field, their basic
orientation was fairly clear. An opinion poll conducted immediately
after the passage of the 1992 law on peacekeeping was indicative. To
the question ‘How should Japan contribute to international society?’,
respondents were asked to choose as many as they liked from a list of
options. The top choice was ‘by providing personnel for disaster relief
and helping refugees’ (60.4 per cent). Then came ‘efforts to preserve
the global environment’ (59.2 per cent) followed by ‘economic assist-
ance to other countries’ (43.4 per cent). Well down the list appeared
‘participation in peacekeeping operations’ (23.9 per cent), with
‘political leadership’ (18.5 per cent) falling behind that.11 The results
reflect the ‘honourable allergy’12 of the Japanese public towards the
military and use of force. On the other hand, the non-military image
of the SDF mission in Cambodia worked positively towards accep-
tance of its use overseas. Television images of the SDF engineer
battalion coincided with that of the familiar SDF at work in disaster
relief. In the same vein, an amendment of the International Relief
Force Bill, which now included the SDF as participants in any
Japanese relief force to be dispatched overseas at the request of
affected countries, was introduced at the same time as the PKO bill
and encountered relatively few objections.
Overexposure of the SDF in news reports on Japanese participation
in UNTAC did, however, reflect public concern over the constitu-
tional issue. The handling of the issue by the government streng-
around 3500 each time, but increased until in Nov. 1994 it exceeded 6300, more than half of
them women.
11 Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 June 1992.
12 New York Times editorial, 2 June 1992.
 J AP AN 61

thened the impression that the priority was to make the use of the SDF
overseas a fait accompli. This was understandable in the context of
the post-war struggle over the rearmament issue.
One argument used by sceptics in their campaign against the
deployment of the SDF overseas was Japan’s neighbours’ fear of a
possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. The notorious reluctance
of the Japanese Government to make reparations to the victims of war
crimes was referred to in the same vein, as the sceptics questioned
whether Japan was morally qualified to send its military overseas. In a
sense the ‘apologies’ expressed by successive cabinets after the fall of
the conservative Liberal Democrats in August 1993 could be seen as a
cynical tactic to ease the dispatch of the Japanese military abroad.
The difficulty that opponents of SDF deployment had was in com-
ing up with a clear alternative. Non-military assistance was discussed
but no concrete political initiative taken to launch a creative new pro-
ject along those lines. The SDF, on the other hand, had behaved well
during their mission, persevering under the critical gaze of many
Japanese journalists. Their discipline was also apparently satisfactory.
Thanks to the success of UNTAC, the SDF personnel returned from
Cambodia to a warm welcome in September 1993.

IV. Prospects
The issue of military participation in peacekeeping was one of the
major issues in Japan during 1992 and the summer of 1993. The
introduction and passage of the much-debated PKO bill, the dispatch
of the SDF to Cambodia and Mozambique, and the deaths of the UN
Volunteer and civilian police officer all received ample press cover-
age. Since the Cambodia operation ended, however, the issue has
attracted less public attention; headlines have been devoted to the
political revolution shaking Japan. Press coverage of the return of
SDF troops from the successful operation in Mozambique in January
1995 was minimal. This does not mean that the problems have dis-
appeared.
First, the ongoing political turmoil is itself closely related to the
issue of the constitutionality of the SDF. The totally incompatible atti-
tudes of the Conservatives and the Progressives on the constitution-
ality of the SDF has impeded positive change in government for
decades. The Social Democratic Party of Japan, which had long been
62 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

the champion of constitutional pacifism, decided to shelve the issue in

August 1993, which made it possible to form a coalition government
under Morihiro Hosokawa. It did, however, sustain its minimalist
attitude towards the dispatch of the SDF to participate in UN peace-
keeping, while conservative parties in the Hosokawa coalition took
more activist positions on this issue. This was the background to the
government’s reluctance to dispatch troops to Macedonia in January
1994. The Macedonian case was problematic, being a preventive
deployment, a type not mentioned explicitly in the PKO bill, and the
situation seemed too unpredictable to judge whether it would meet the
bill’s other conditions. If pursued, the Macedonian deployment issue
could have destabilized the frail coalition in the midst of a struggle in
the Diet over electoral reform.
The Social Democrats took a big step in July 1994 when Tomiichi
Murayama, their chairman and Prime Minister, declared the SDF
constitutional under certain conditions, overriding protests from the
pacifist wing of the party. On 20 July Murayama stated in the plenary
session of the lower house that he believed that the SDF, so long as
they limit their actions strictly to self-defence and use the minimum
force required, could be recognized as constitutional.
After some hesitation, in August Murayama also dispatched the
SDF to Zaire to take part in the Rwandan refugee relief operation
from September to December. This was in response to a request from
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (a Japanese, Mrs Sadako
Ogata) and was not part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda.
The ‘humanitarian international relief operations’ clause of the PKO
bill was applied for the first time. Among some 260 ground troops
sent to Camp Goma in Zaire, just under half were professionals in
relief activities such as doctors and sanitary workers; others were
there to guard and maintain facilities for the SDF personnel. In addi-
tion, 118 air personnel, most of whom were stationed in Nairobi, took
part in transport duties and assistance for international relief activities.
There was great scepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of
sending the SDF to a refugee camp for just three months. There were
also anxieties over whether SDF personnel might be put in a situation
where the single machine-gun which they brought with them had to
be used. Fortunately, no serious incident occurred.
In November 1994, Murayama’s coalition government passed an
amendment to the SDF legislation to enable the overseas dispatch of
 J AP AN 63

SDF transport planes for the purpose of airlifting Japanese nationals

when their lives are threatened in a local conflict. These ground-
breaking steps were taken partly in an effort to sustain the peculiar
coalition between the prime adversaries of the cold war days, the
Socialists and the Liberal Democrats. At the time of writing it is
uncertain how voters will react to these developments. With the pub-
lic still divided over the constitutionality of the SDF and its activities,
however, the issue can be expected to remain one of the major factors
dividing the political forces in the course of Japan’s continuing politi-
cal transformation.
Second, in mid-1995 there was a review of the controversial peace-
keeping law, as stipulated in the legislation. The foremost issue was
whether or not to ‘unfreeze’ the restricted activities of the SDF. Some
politicians indicated their preference for this step.13 Although they
were a small minority, other prominent politicians argued for a new
construction on the constitutional question, beginning with the prem-
ise that any SDF force dispatched should be placed completely under
UN command. Hence the use of force would not be an act of the
Japanese state and would not violate the constitution, making it
logical to unfreeze the restraints on the SDF’s peacekeeping activities.
The majority of politicians were at that stage cautious about unfreez-
ing, reflecting the continuing split in public opinion.14
Third, the Defense Agency has started a reassessment of the
National Defense Program Outline of 1976, which has served as the
doctrine for Japanese defence policy. This will probably result in a
reorientation and restructuring of the SDF, including a revised policy
towards peacekeeping. At present, participation in UN peacekeeping
is only a side-job for the SDF. Some believe it could become the best
rationale for retaining the SDF after the cold war, although the recent
focus on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities might give new life to the
SDF’s traditional self-defence role. It was expected that major points

13 For example, the Chief Secretary of the centrist Komeito (Clean Government Party)
announced this idea as early as in Mar. 1993. See Asahi Shimbun, 29 Mar. 1993.
14 A poll conducted among some 300 government officials indicated that 24% believed
that the restraints should be removed immediately, while 25% were for retaining them. The
majority, 46%, thought that they should be removed at some time in the future but that now
was not the time to do so. See Asahi Shimbun, 3 Apr. 1994. According to another opinion
poll, only 13% were for immediate removal, 48% thought that restrictions should remain for
a few more years and 23% were against any future removal of such restraints. See Yomiuri
Shimbun, 9 June 1994.
64 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

of the overall review would be formalized by late 1995 in order to be

reflected in the 1996 budget.15
Fourth, in a longer-term perspective, a consistent posture on peace-
keeping will have to be determined if Japan is to seek new security
arrangements in its region. Since the end of the cold war, moves have
gradually begun to establish comprehensive regional security forums
in the Asia–Pacific region such as ARF (the ASEAN Regional
Forum).16 Giving new meaning to the current US–Japanese security
arrangements is also on the agenda. Peacekeeping would provide
possible areas of regional cooperation, such as joint training or estab-
lishing facilities for such training. For the SDF, peacekeeping could
become a way of joining in regional military cooperation while con-
tinuing to refrain from participating in collective self-defence arrange-
ments.
Finally, the issue is also seen to be linked with the quest of Japan
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Foreign Ministry
officials are known to be particularly keen on this, nor do the public
dislike an idea which generates national pride. There is, however, sig-
nificant scepticism among the public as to whether Japan really is
ready to assume the necessary obligations. Besides a need to increase
its diplomatic capacity (the Japanese diplomatic corps is relatively
small compared with those of Western nations), concern is focused on
the possibility of Japan being required to fulfil military obligations as
peace operations become increasingly important in the work of the
Security Council.
Although reassurance has been given by the UN Secretary-General
that permanent membership of the Council does not necessarily entail
military duties, political voices within some of the present permanent
member states, including elements in the US Senate, have explicitly
called on Japan to assume military obligations if it is to become a
permanent member. For some politicians who would like Japan to
become a ‘normal state’, this accords with their agenda: international
obligations will pressure Japan to relinquish its post-war pacifism.
But will the Japanese public agree to scrap the long-held symbol of a
reborn pacific Japan?

15 Yomiuri Shimbun, 31 Dec. 1994.

16 ASEAN is composed of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The ARF includes the 7 ASEAN states plus Australia,
Canada, China, the European Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, Laos, New Zealand, Papua
New Guinea, Russia and the USA.
 J AP AN 65

The popularity among the Japanese of the idea of Japan becoming a

permanent member of the Security Council is strongly linked with the
view that this would not be achieved on the basis of Japan’s military
might (the self-declared non-nuclear status of Japan being symbolic in
that respect). It would show nations seeking military prowess that
there can be different paths to attaining an honoured place in inter-
national society. Relatively low support in Japan for acquiring perma-
nent membership compared with the levels of support in other candi-
date countries seems to reflect anxieties on the part of the Japanese
public about being forced into military involvement.17
On UN peacekeeping itself, the public is still split over SDF partici-
pation. According to an opinion poll taken in March 1994, those who
believe that the participation of the SDF in UN peacekeeping is con-
stitutionally problematic constituted 44.8 per cent of the total, while
45.8 per cent answered otherwise. The former group had declined
from 55.9 per cent when the same question was asked in June 1992 at
the time of the passage of the 1992 peacekeeping law, while the latter
group had grown from 34 per cent at that time.18 Although there is
general approval of the Cambodian experience, it is restrained.19
The puzzle is not yet solved. On the one hand, strong sentiment is
evident among the public towards Japan remaining a strictly civilian
power. Aversion to anything military and scepticism about the true
motives of the government when it enthusiastically promotes military
matters are both ingrained in the psyche of many post-war Japanese as
a lesson learned the hard way by their parents and grandparents.20 On
the other hand, there is broad agreement on the desirability of Japan
17 While 55% of American, 62% of British and 73% of German respondents believe that
Japan and Germany should become permanent members of the Security Council, 51% of
Japanese respondents agree with the idea. See Asahi Shimbun, 2 Apr. 1994. Another opinion
poll conducted by the Foreign Ministry showed that 53% of respondents were for permanent
membership, 32% did not know and only 15% were against. However, of those who
responded positively, 39% were against any military involvement including in peacekeeping
operations. See Asahi Shimbun, 5 June 1994.
18 Yomiuri Shimbun, 31 Mar. 1994.
19 Polls taken after the successful elections in Cambodia show restrained approval of SDF
participation in UNTAC, with remaining scepticism. When asked whether the dispatch of
troops was good or not, 46% answered affirmatively and 33% negatively. See Asahi
Shimbun, 2 June 1993. Given a choice among 4 alternatives, namely ‘strongly approve’,
‘somewhat approve’, ‘somewhat disapprove’ and ‘totally disapprove’ of SDF participation,
one poll showed the respective figures of 14.2%, 47.9%, 27.4% and 8.0%. See Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 16 June 1993. Another poll with the same options showed 14.9%, 40.6%, 31.8%
and 8.1%, respectively. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 July 1993.
20 In contrast to the situation in some other countries, it is unthinkable for a political leader
in Japan to gain public support by propounding the use of force overseas.
66 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

contributing to international peace efforts, not only by providing

financial help but also by human participation. This would be in total
accord with the principles stated in the Preamble of the constitution.
If Japan is to commit itself to international cooperative efforts, the
commitment should be stable and credible. In order to keep the com-
mitment credible, stable public support is essential. The Japanese
Government is still struggling to win public confidence on this issue.
It will have to convince the people both that it is different from the
post-war constitutional revisionists, who were atavistic nationalists,
and that it is not hiding something from them. It will also have to con-
vince Japan’s neighbours of the peaceful intentions of Japan. From
the perspective of the people this will mean strengthening democratic
control over security issues, along with significant arms reduction and
the devising of creative non-military ways to contribute to inter-
national efforts towards peace. New political initiatives to fill such
gaps are yet to come.
Appendix 3A. The ‘pacifist clauses’ of
the Constitution of Japan
Preamble
We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in
the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our pos-
terity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of
liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be
visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do pro-
claim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish
this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority of
which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the
representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the
people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Consti-
tution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances,
and rescripts in conflict herewith.
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply con-
scious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have deter-
mined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith
of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored
place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and
the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all
time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the
right to live in peace, free from fear and want.
We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of
political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incum-
bent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify
their sovereign relationship with other nations.
We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these
high ideals and purposes with all our resources.
...
Article 9
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
4. Russia
Dmitriy Trenin

I. Introduction
The collapse of the rigid communist system and the resulting disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union have revealed enormous potential for con-
flict in an area formerly known for its strict totalitarian discipline.
Under Stalin, the main architect of the multinational Soviet state, of
the 160 or so ethnic groups which had their homeland in Central
Eurasia 54 received varying degrees of largely nominal, but in all
cases territorially based, autonomy. This preference for territorial over
cultural autonomy had dramatic consequences. Between 1985 (the
beginning of perestroika) and 1993, some 60 conflicts erupted
between ethnic groups, of which 32 led to violence and 8 degenerated
into what could be described as wars.1 They were mainly wars over
territory. Casualties (killed and missing) numbered 800 in 1991 but
over 50 000 in 1992 in Tajikistan alone.2 The refugee population in
1992 has been conservatively estimated at 1.5 million in the Trans-
caucasus and about half that number in Tajikistan. There have been
no wars so far between the Soviet successor states (although Armenia
and Azerbaijan have come close) and not everywhere have the
emerging tensions spiralled out of control. There was no inter-ethnic
violence in 35 national–territorial units; 9 other areas were success-
fully ‘pacified’ before 1989.3 Contrary to what most Soviets, includ-
ing the political élite, believed until the mid-1980s, the ‘nationalities
issue’ had been merely frozen rather than resolved by communism.
In the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union a vast security
vacuum appeared. Instability spread. Of all the successor states, only
the Russian Federation was capable, in principle, of acting to preserve
or restore peace within the former Soviet Union. From late 1991 to
early 1992, however, the Russian leadership was more interested in
withdrawing from the burdensome Soviet empire than in pacifying its
1 Alaev, E., Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 16 July 1993 (in Russian).
2 Payin, E. (member of the Presidential Council), ‘Mozhet li Rossiya byt mirotvortsem?’
[Can Russia become a peacekeeper?], Izvestia, 29 Sep. 1993 (in Russian).
3 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28 Aug. 1993. National–territorial units are those subjects of the
Russian Federation with an ethnic reference, such as Tatarstan and Chechnya. There are in
total 89 subjects of the Federation.
 R US S IA 69

troublesome parts. Disengagement remained the main theme. Russian

troops left Nagorno-Karabakh in early 1992 and even before that had
evacuated South Ossetia in Georgia. They were ordered to take a
passive role in the rest of Georgia and in Tajikistan, which were fast
becoming ungovernable, and to cut short an operation against
Chechen separatists in the northern Caucasus almost before it began.
Ethnic conflicts were viewed by the authorities and by the general
public not as an invitation for urgent action, such as some form of
peacekeeping, but rather as a compelling reason to ‘bring the boys
home’.
Russia had had very limited previous experience with peace-
keeping. Although Soviet military observers served in UNTSO in
Egypt and Syria as early as 1973, there were only a few dozen of
them, all officers. Their presence was largely symbolic and had no
impact on Soviet military thinking. It was only in 1991 that Soviet/
Russian participation in UN peacekeeping was broadened to include
observers on the Iraq–Kuwait border, in Western Sahara, Cambodia
and Mozambique, and for the first time in 1992 ground troops in the
former Yugoslavia. Hence, as Russian military officers admitted, in
establishing a peacekeeping capability for the former Soviet Union
they had to proceed very much by trial and error.4
The development of a conceptual framework followed, rather than
preceded, Russian peacekeeping operations. Flight from the ‘imperial
legacy’ was quickly rejected as impractical. Unlike the classical Euro-
pean empires, the Soviet Union’s territory was contiguous with its
conquests. Borders between the Russian metropolitan area and the
periphery were non-existent or blurred. Redeploying divisions and
whole armies to Russia from these territories while the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe was still incomplete
proved difficult or impossible. Some Russian garrisons, suddenly in
the middle of a war zone, became isolated fortresses, their arms
depots often ransacked and individual soldiers rendered targets for
local warring factions. In many cases, the ethnic Russian population
and other groups in the areas of conflict looked to the Russian Army
as their only protector. Left without precise instructions and disori-
ented, some commanders started to act on their own. It was in these
circumstances that more active Russian intervention finally occurred.

4 See, for instance, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 1993 (in Russian).

70 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

There are four distinct kinds of operation currently lumped together

under the name ‘Russian peacekeeping’:

1. Traditional peacekeeping. This follows a cease-fire agreement

and involves cease-fire monitoring. It is successful in military terms if
disengagement is achieved, hostilities are stopped and further blood-
shed is prevented. Political stalemate puts the whole attempt at
conflict settlement in jeopardy. Examples are South Ossetia and the
Trans-Dniester region.
2. Peace enforcement or low-intensity conflict. Here there is no
cease-fire agreement and hostilities continue, with Russian forces sup-
porting one side against the other. There is a danger of Russia being
dragged into conflicts from which it will have difficulty in extricating
itself. Tajikistan is a clear example.
3. Uncoordinated actions by Russian forces which find themselves
in a war zone. Abkhazia and Tajikistan before late 1992 are examples.
4. Internal peacekeeping. Military operations are carried out in the
territory of the Russian Federation during a state of emergency. North
Ossetia/Ingushetia is an example.

The first kind of operation is open to international cooperation. The

more cooperation, the better, not least for Russia. The second kind
should be examined most closely. At a minimum, they should be
recognized as something very different from traditional peacekeeping
either on the UN or on the Russian models. The third should not be
permitted to assume an independent dynamic. The fourth requires a
most careful national strategy, for the future of the Russian Federation
may be at stake.
Characteristically, Russia has preferred to talk and act in terms of
‘creating’, that is restoring or imposing, peace rather than simply
keeping it. The Russian word mirotvorchestvo means, literally, peace
creation. Russian political parlance does not distinguish between
peacekeeping and peacemaking; the exact Russian equivalent of
peacekeeping is an unwieldy phrase very rarely used. The drafters of
the bill on peace operations in the Russian Parliament found it diffi-
cult to define what a peacekeeping operation is and how it differs
from operations to restore or enforce peace.5 This absence of a legal

5 This chapter follows SIPRI usage and employs the term ‘peacekeeping’ except where
operations to restore or enforce peace are clearly meant. On the bill, which became law in
June 1995, see section II below.
 R US S IA 71

definition allowed General Yevgeniy Podkolzin, Commander of the

Russian Airborne Forces, to refer to the Chechnya operation begun in
late 1994 as ‘peacemaking’.
There has always been more to Russian peacekeeping than restoring
order where chaos was threatening or preventing the spread of
violence once it had broken out. Stopping bloodshed and protecting
human lives were put into a broader context. The concept of national
interest, gradually accepted during 1992–93 by the bulk of the Rus-
sian political class, proceeded from the central premise of Russia’s
continued great-power status or derzhava.
Raw geopolitics was thus rediscovered after years of an official
‘class approach’ and a brief interlude of preaching ‘universal human
values’. As a dominant power in Eurasia and the largest successor
state of the Soviet Union, Russia was proclaimed to have vital inter-
ests and ‘special rights’ in the former Soviet republics. It became
commonplace to refer to the ‘unique geopolitical/geo-strategic space’
of the former Soviet Union or to the ‘near abroad’. Russia’s positions
there, in the official view, were not to be abandoned.6
A domino theory (Tajikistan destabilizing Uzbekistan and splitting
Kazakhstan and, finally, taking Islamic fundamentalism to the banks
of the Volga River) became accepted wisdom in Russian Government
circles. Destabilization in the Russian northern Caucasus was feared if
the Russian Federation withdrew from the Transcaucasus, with the
ensuing chaos likely to be exploited by the neighbouring regional
powers, both of them Russia’s traditional rivals. Thus, despite the
formal separation of the republics, Russia was finding it increasingly
difficult to stay aloof from developments within its new neighbouring
states—because, the government said, of its multifaceted links with
them—while protesting at the same time that its involvement should
not be viewed as an attempt to exclude the newly independent states
from the sphere of international relations.7
Most Russian statesmen see no other way of building stability than
active Russian diplomatic, economic and military involvement. It
seems clear to them that conflicts, inevitable as part of the nation-
building process, ‘make necessary the presence and participation of
Russian military peacekeeping contingents for preventing and over-
6 Interview with Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Izvestia, 8 Oct. 1993 (in Russian).
7 Kozyrev, A., ‘Rossiya fakticheski v odinochku nesyot bremya realnogo mirotvorchestva
v konfliktakh po perimetru svoikh granits’ [Russia is carrying the burdens of peacekeeping in
conflicts on its borders alone], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 Sep. 1993 (in Russian).
72 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

coming crisis situations’.8 Claims for a ‘special Russian role in the

post-Soviet space’ are matched by a sense of responsibility as the
successor state of both the Tsarist Empire and the communist Soviet
Union.9 To this Russian diplomacy would add a kind of mission
civilisatrice—upholding the values of the OSCE, including those
relating to minority rights.10
Restoring a measure of stability along the periphery of the new
Russian borders (which with the exception of those with the Baltic
states are mostly borders in name only) has become a major security
problem. As every student of Russian history knows, the absence of
‘natural’ borders has always been a salient factor of Russian history,
driving territorial expansion ‘for strategic reasons’. With the western
approaches perceived, after the end of the cold war, as being rela-
tively secure, and the Far Eastern frontier unchanged, it is the south-
ern border, from the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea to the steppes of the
southern Urals and southern Siberia, which has become the main con-
cern. Full transparency of borders with the war-torn Caucasus and
Central Asia has aggravated the inevitable spillover effect (weapon
proliferation, the spread of crime, terrorism and epidemics), but
closing the borders would cost more than Russia could afford.11
Increasingly it is the approximately 25 million ethnic Russians and
4 million other people with roots in the Russian Federation, including
such ‘divided groups’ as the Ossets (in Russia and Georgia) and the
Lezgins (in Russia and Azerbaijan), which are cited as a powerful
reason for Russian involvement. The 90 000-strong Russian commun-
ity suffered heavily during the conflict in Abkhazia; roughly half of
the once 300 000-strong ethnic Russian population of Tajikistan has
fled the horrors of civil war.
Altogether, the dissolution of the Soviet Union left some 70 million
people outside their republics of origin. Many of these are returning to
the ‘metropolitan republic’, Russia. In 1992–93 the Russian Federa-

8 Kharchenko, D. K. (Lt-Gen.), ‘The experience of the Russian armed forces in peace-

keeping operations in the areas of local conflicts’, Report presented to the Military Com-
mittee of the 39th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Athens, 30 Sep.
1993, p. 2.
9 Piskunov, A. (member of the State Duma), ‘Rossiya i mirotvorchestvo: Doklad na
seminare Severoatlanticheskoy Assamblei “Teoriya i praktika podderzhaniya mira”’ [Russia
and peackeeping: Report to the Seminar of the North Atlantic Assembly on Theory and
Practice in Peacekeeping], London, 23 Feb. 1994, p. 2 (in Russian).
10 Kozyrev, A., Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 Oct. 1993 (in Russian).
11 Some estimates put the price of constructing 1 km of a new border at c. $60 million.
 R US S IA 73

tion became home to some 2 million displaced persons from the for-
mer Soviet Union, a heavy financial burden. Between 3 and 6 million
more ethnic Russians are expected to arrive in Russia from the other
republics of the former Soviet Union in 1995–98. Housing conditions
and the employment situation in Russia are extremely poor and
continue to deteriorate. The government, lacking financial and other
resources, would much prefer to keep these ‘other Russians’ or ‘ex-
fellow Soviets’ in their current places of residence. It knows that, if
too many immigrants arrive in the Russian Federation at the same
time, the situation may explode, paving the way, some liberals fear,
for an ‘overtly nationalistic dictatorship and, through it, to a Yugoslav
scenario’.12 The Chechen crisis of 1994–95 made that scenario appear
more likely.
This legitimate concern is sometimes presented as warranting a
continued Russian military presence in the newly independent states.
The issue of Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic states has thus
been repeatedly linked, in particular by the military, to Russian
minority rights. Russia has also long insisted on acceptable guar-
antees for the Russian-populated Trans-Dniester region of Moldova as
a precondition for the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army. One of
the most powerful arguments for keeping Russian troops in Tajikistan
has been the need to protect the 180 000-strong Slav community there
from the danger of a resumed civil war.
No matter how ‘artificial’ former Soviet administrative boundaries
may appear now that they have been upgraded to international bor-
ders, Russia has another important stake in preventing forcible border
changes, whether in Azerbaijan, Georgia or Moldova: the unity of the
Federation will be called into question unless this cardinal principle is
upheld and reasonable limits are placed on the principle of self-
determination of nations. Armed conflicts within the Russian Federa-
tion are considered almost as dangerous to national security as local
wars just outside Russia’s borders because they threaten Russia’s vital
interests and ‘could be used as a pretext for interference in her internal
affairs by other states’.13 The territorial conflict between the North

12 Kozyrev, A., ‘Russia’s peacemaking: there are no easy solutions’, New Times
International, no. 4 (1994), pp. 16–18 (in Russian).
13 ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ [Basic provisions of
the military doctrine of the Russian Federation], Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 Nov. 1993, p. 11 (in
Russian). A translation into English appeared in Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report,
Jan. 1994.
74 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Ossetians and the Ingush in the northern Caucasus, which broke out in
October 1992, was the first major armed confrontation inside Russia.
The operation in Chechnya, begun in December 1994, turned into the
most intense armed conflict in the former Soviet Union since 1991.
Peacekeeping is a major foreign affairs topic on the national politi-
cal agenda. The range of views is extremely wide, from advocacy of a
‘clean withdrawal’ to promotion of peacekeeping as a vehicle of
imperial restoration. So far, withdrawal has proved impossible. In
1992 and 1993 Russian policy in the territory of the former Soviet
Union, including its peacekeeping aspect, was being shaped against
the background of the power struggle in Moscow between the ruling
moderate reformers and the opposition national patriots. While the
former were represented in the government, the latter formed a major-
ity bloc in the then Supreme Soviet. Paradoxically, but only superfi-
cially so, those openly supporting the restoration of the Soviet Union
looked for allies among the arch-separatists (for example, in the
Trans-Dniester region and in Abkhazia) who were undermining the
newly independent successor states from within. Since each party in
the Russian capital possessed its own instruments of power until the
October showdown in 1993, Russia was in fact pursuing two conflict-
ing policy lines vis-à-vis the Caucasus and Moldova, which was
clearly destroying Russia’s credibility as a peacekeeper.
Since the December 1993 parliamentary elections the State Duma,
the lower house of parliament, has been on the whole supportive of
the idea of peacekeeping, but has insisted on more legislative control
over its conduct. Russian peacekeeping is opposed by some liberals,
who believe that it is too challenging a mission for demoralized
Russian troops, and by the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democrats (the
party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky) who consider Russian soldiers ‘too
good to have their lives wasted in somebody else’s wars’.
Public opinion is not particularly favourable to Russian peacekeep-
ing operations. A poll conducted in the autumn of 1993 showed that
only 17 per cent of respondents supported the use of Russian troops to
stop conflicts; 27 per cent agreed, but only on condition that it be
done for the protection of ethnic Russians; 49 per cent were against
any employment of troops; and 7 per cent were undecided. A uniform
pattern was observed in all age and social groups. The professional
military personnel polled were guided by a desire to help stop con-
flicts, rather than by any ‘patriotism’, while managers showed almost
 R US S IA 75

the opposite attitude. The intelligentsia were against any involvement,

while the managerial élite were most favourably disposed towards it.14

II. The legal and policy framework

Russian officials insist that Russian peacekeeping is firmly based on
the relevant provisions of international law, the UN Charter (espe-
cially Chapters VI, VII and VIII) and the 1992 Helsinki Document. 15
Also cited are the various multilateral agreements signed within the
CIS at its 1992 Kiev and Tashkent summit meetings (on the status,
recruitment procedures and deployment patterns of military observers
and collective peacekeeping forces) and various bilateral agreements.
Because no public law on peacekeeping existed in Russia until June
1995, for several years peacekeeping operations had no status in
Russian law. The 1992 Law on Defence16 declared the repulsion of
external aggression to be the only mission of the Russian armed
forces. The bill on ‘the procedure for provision of military and civil-
ian personnel of the Russian Federation for participation in operations
to maintain or restore international peace and security and other
peacekeeping activities’ was only approved by the Federal Assembly
and signed into law in June 1995.17 The new law only provides a
general framework for the provision of personnel for such operations.
The new Russian military doctrine, adopted in November 1993, 18
lists ‘actual and potential hotbeds of local wars and armed conflicts,
above all in direct proximity to Russian borders’ among the more
serious sources of military threat to Russia. The list also includes
‘suppression of the rights, liberties and lawful interests of the citizens
of the Russian Federation in foreign states’ and ‘attacks against mili-
tary facilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation deployed
in the territory of foreign states’—both very likely occurrences during

14 Segodnya, 14 Sep. 1993 (in Russian).

15 CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change (CSCE: Helsinki, 1992).
Excerpts from the Helsinki Document were published in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Arma-
ments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 190–209.
16 The text of the law was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 9 Oct. 1992 (in Russian).
17 Federalny zakon o poryadke predostavleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsiey voennogo i grazh-
danskogo personala dlya ychastiya v deyatelnosti po podderzhaniyu ili vosstanovleniyu
mezhdunarodnogo mira i bezopasnosti, Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii,
no. 26 (26 June 1995).
18 ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (note 13), pp. 5.
76 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

such conflicts. The same doctrine authorizes the use of armed forces
for ‘internal’ peacekeeping, as in Chechnya.
The military doctrine places emphasis on local wars and conflicts in
which Russian forces might take part. At the same time it explicitly
provides for participation in peacekeeping operations ordered by the
UN Security Council or carried out ‘pursuant to Russia’s international
commitments’. Sometimes, as the example of Tajikistan appears to
show, the difference between the two is blurred. The CIS High Com-
mand, which first developed a general military approach to peace-
keeping, envisaged a peacekeeping force as one of two main compo-
nents of future joint armed forces.19 Another confusing element is the
indiscriminate use of the term peacekeeping with regard to troop
activities based on no international agreement (as, for example, in
Abkhazia in 1992–93).
Consent of all parties and perceived impartiality are the essential
requirements for peacekeeping as traditionally understood by the
United Nations. Russian officials insist that the Russian Federation
acts ‘in all cases with the consent and at the request of the parties to
the conflict’.20 This is true of Moldova and South Ossetia but certainly
not of Tajikistan, where the Russian-led CIS peacekeepers have the
invitation of the government in Dushanbe, but not of the opposition.
When involved in peacekeeping activities, the mission of Russian
forces, in theory, is to separate the conflicting sides, protect humani-
tarian aid convoys and evacuate the civilian population; they should
also isolate the area of conflict to ensure the effectiveness of any
international sanctions that may have been applied to the parties.
In practice, while in South Ossetia and Moldova Russian peace-
keepers arrived following cease-fire agreements, of which Russia was
a guarantor, in Tajikistan no such agreement has so far been reached.
Despite agreements concluded within the CIS, other Commonwealth
countries have been reluctant to join the Russian Federation as part-
ners in keeping the peace. Russia has had to act unilaterally, but in the
most unorthodox way: units of the conflicting sides take part in
peacekeeping operations alongside the Russians. A joint staff, com-
posed of the adversaries and the Russians, is the main operational
authority. Even observation posts, patrol parties and picket teams

19 Burutin, G. (Col-Gen.), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 Aug. 1993 (in Russian).

20 Kozyrev (note 7).
 R US S IA 77

often have a mixed composition.21 The same formula had been envis-
aged for Nagorno-Karabakh22 before it was agreed at the CSCE sum-
mit meeting in Budapest in December 1994 that the CSCE rather than
Russia would be responsible for keeping the peace there. Russian con-
tingents are the dominant element of the joint peacekeeping forces,
sometimes being several times more numerous and always much bet-
ter equipped than those of the other participants. In South Ossetia for
several months in 1992–93 the Russians were the only active element
of the joint peacekeeping force because the Georgian and Ossetian
sides were unable to keep their battalions on duty through the winter.
In internal armed conflicts federal forces are usually expected to be
deployed before, not after, a cease-fire agreement has been reached.
In theory, once a state of emergency has been declared and after they
arrive in the conflict area, Russian forces should physically disengage
the warring sides and create a demilitarized zone. This is considered
to be a job for the military: internal security forces are said to be
unable to separate the conflicting sides. Inside the demilitarized zone
each battalion, company and platoon is assigned its area of responsi-
bility. They proceed to impose and monitor a cease-fire, disarm illegal
armed formations, help enforce law and order, and carry out mine-
clearing. The case of Chechnya demonstrates, however, that what
might originally be conceived as a police action could, under certain
conditions, degenerate into full-scale war.

III. The management of peacekeeping

Training and planning for peacekeeping

It is widely believed in Russia that peacekeeping is essentially a mili-

tary undertaking. Consequently only good soldiers are thought to
make good peacekeepers. Basic military training with an emphasis on
command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) is thus con-
sidered essential, as are an ability to act independently and exercise
initiative, special psychological training and an awareness of legal
issues. The key training exercises include separation of warring
parties, monitoring and patrolling, search and detention of transgres-

21 For example, in Moldova 13 out of 41 posts are jointly manned by Russian and
Moldovan or Russian and Trans-Dniestrian troops. See Izvestia, 5 Apr. 1994 (in Russian).
22 Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 Mar. 1994 (in Russian).
78 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

sors and, if need be, ‘liquidation of bandit formations’.23 Legal issues

such as the use of weapons, rules for detention and search of civilians,
and some basic elements of criminal law are also included in the
curriculum.
The only training base for Russian peacekeepers at present is the
training centre of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) of the
Volga Military District (MD) at Totskoye, in the Orenburg region.
The training lasts at least six months, of which some three and a half
are devoted exclusively to peacekeeping. Since the leading academies
or war colleges in Russia have shown little interest, the MD tasked
with peacekeeping has had to initiate its own training programme.
Officers have had to ‘learn on the job’.24 Suggestions have been made
that a special department should be opened at the Frunze Academy or
at the Vystrel Higher Officers Courses.
The army’s first peacekeeping field training exercise, held in March
1994 in Tajikistan, provides some idea of the reality of Russian
peacekeeping. During the exercise the troops were told to stop the
enemy’s advance by using artillery and airpower and then to counter-
attack and defeat him. Guns and mortars, multiple-launch rocket sys-
tems, helicopters, ground-attack aircraft and fighter aircraft were
used.

Configuration of forces and deployment patterns

Russian peacekeeping forces were created at the end of 1991 as part

of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.25 A proposal to attach
a standing Peacekeeping Force to the Ministry for Emergency Situa-
tions was rejected for the time being. Russian military observers were
posted on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border in 1991 and along the
Gumista River in Abkhazia in 1993, in both cases to very limited
effect. In contrast, Russia’s troop contingents in South Ossetia (one
battalion) and in Trans-Dniester (initially four battalions, now two)
have been successively keeping the peace since mid-1992. In
Tajikistan, a large unit, the 201st MRD, has been involved since 1992,
together with Russian border troops and forces from several Central

23Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 1993 (in Russian).

24Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 1993 (note 23).
25Interview with Major-Gen. Anatoliy Sidyakin, CO, Division of Peacekeeping Forces,
Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 1993 (in Russian).
 R US S IA 79

Asian states, in a low-intensity conflict officially referred to as a

‘peacemaking’ operation.
By mid-1992 some 15 000 soldiers were involved in various peace
operations. Nine battalions were successively deployed to South
Ossetia and the Trans-Dniester region. This necessitated upgrading
regular military units to ‘peacekeepers’, at least formally. Although
Russia still has a military force of just under 2 million,26 which it is
unable to reduce quickly, there is a considerable shortage of officers
and men for peacekeeping. It is envisaged that in future one or two
army divisions (15 000–16 000 troops) will be designated as peace-
keeping forces. The 27th MRD may then be joined by the 45th MRD
(Leningrad MD). Ironically, Russia still has troops deployed through-
out all the conflict areas of the former Soviet Union except Nagorno-
Karabakh, but they often cannot be used because of poor discipline.
There is also a general understanding that, in future, peacekeeping
operations should be civilian–military in nature, involving civilian
personnel, civil police, observers and experts. There is a perceived
need for civilian control over such operations. Placing Russian peace-
keepers under the Ministry for Emergency Situations (to which, at
present, some 100 000 soldiers in civil defence units report) is still a
possibility. The ministry’s forces have had some experience of
humanitarian aid missions in Abkhazia in 1993 and Georgia in early
1994. Any structural change of this kind will, however, require enor-
mous organizational effort.
At present the 27th MRD includes both ‘peacekeeping forces units’
and ‘normal’ units (tanks, self-propelled artillery and air defence). In
the field, the basic unit is a reinforced infantry battalion. Since not all
units of the peacekeeping forces are at full strength, they often have to
be reinforced before being deployed to conflict zones.
Recruitment of peacekeepers has seen some changes. Initially most
private soldiers were conscripts. Sometimes these 18-year-olds were
sent to a conflict zone immediately after basic military training. This
was dangerous and ineffective and aroused popular indignation.
Conscripts were later replaced by contracted volunteers. Hopes were
high, but reports are so far mixed. The number of volunteers is insuf-
ficient and their quality uneven. On the other hand the soldiers com-
plain that their remuneration in conflict zones is not commensurate

26 Total numbers were 1 917 400, as of 1 Jan. 1995. Defence Minister Pavel Grachev,
quoted by Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 June 1995, p. 1 (in Russian).
80 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

with the risks. Continued deprivations lead to demoralization. With

rotation normally every six months, the resources of the armed forces
are stretched thin. As for equipment, Russian peacekeepers have some
800 AIFVs (armoured infantry fighting vehicles), 200 artillery pieces
and 187 tanks, totalling over 1300 vehicles.27

Decision making

In the absence of a law on peacekeeping, the mechanism for taking

decisions and executing them depended on the specific situation. In
South Ossetia, the Trans-Dniester region and Abkhazia operations
were preceded by top-level agreements signed by the president. The
decision on Tajikistan was the product of internal Moscow decision
making, with CIS approval being of symbolic value. In this particular
instance, as in the case of Chechnya, there are parallels with the way
decisions on Afghanistan were made during the Soviet era.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union the top echelon of the Russian
Government has been notorious for constant infighting and occasional
crises. Under these conditions coordinating national security strategy,
including its peacekeeping aspect, has become hostage to the internal
political struggle. Allegations by the president’s political friends and
opponents alike about the paralysis of decision making regarding
peacekeeping are numerous.28
The 1993 constitution, which abolished the system of Soviets, in
theory bolsters the president’s role as the principal maker of foreign
and defence policy. The new law on peacekeeping, however, sought
to define the responsibilities of the executive and the legislature in the
area of peacekeeping and prevent the military from becoming a scape-
goat for the failures of the national leadership. Previously in the event
of Russian participation in UN peacekeeping operations a treaty had
to be signed between the Russian Federation and the UN, subject to
ratification by the parliament.29 The Council of the Federation, the
upper house of the parliament, thereafter decides on the provision of
troops and numbers.30 The ex post facto approval by the Council of

27 Piskunov (note 9), p. 1.

28 See Payin (note 2); and Rutskoy, A., Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 23 June 1993 (in Russian).
29 Russia is currently participating in MINURSO, UNAMIR, UNIKOM, UNOMIG,
UNPROFOR and UNTSO.
30 Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 Mar. 1994 (in Russian).
 R US S IA 81

the 1994 Abkhazia operation serves as an illustration of how things

may proceed in practice.
Within the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
special groups have been established under deputy ministers to deal
with matters pertaining to peacekeeping. In addition, the Ministry for
Emergency Situations deals with humanitarian assistance. In 1992–93
the Foreign Ministry and the MOD took different, sometimes oppos-
ing positions on particular conflicts, for instance in relation to
Abkhazia in September 1993. In an attempt to improve interaction
within the executive branch an inter-agency commission on peace-
keeping was created under the aegis of the Russian Security Council.
Once an agreement between the warring sides has been reached,
mixed commissions are to be established which include represen-
tatives of the parties to the conflict and Russia. Their mission is to
elaborate peace agreements and mechanisms for their implementation.
The commissioners not only negotiate but also, in effect, administer
the area where a peace operation is being carried out.

Command and control and rules of engagement

Russian peacekeeping forces are normally under the command of a

deputy defence minister. Peacekeepers in Tajikistan are, however,
officially part of a coalition force whose Russian commander (a three-
star general) theoretically reports to the heads of state of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan, who created the force. The chain
of command follows the usual Russian Army pattern.
While ‘regular’ Russian peacekeepers are reasonably disciplined,
other Russian forces deployed in conflict areas have had problems.31
Individual commanders, like General Alexander Lebed of the 14th
Army, were allowed to act with unprecedented freedom. In other
cases Russian generals were accused of taking orders from leaders of
warring parties (such as the late Sangak Safarov in Tajikistan). In still
others (for example Abkhazia), a dangerous gap appeared between
official military policy (neutrality) and apparent secret instructions to
help one of the sides. In their September 1993 offensive the Abkhaz
used the AIFVs and artillery pieces which had been placed in the

31 ‘Helsinki Watch—rossiyskim vlastyam’ [A letter from the Executive Director of

Helsinki Watch to the President of the Russian Federation], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 Nov.
1993, p. 5 (in Russian).
82 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

custody of Russian units in Abkhazia. Some members of the Russian

military had presumably concluded profitable deals, including arms
and ammunition transfers. Consequently, proposals were made to
replace the whole Russian military contingent in Abkhazia. There
have been persistent reports, officially denied, about illicit or covert
Russian arms supplies to the warring parties in the Transcaucasus.
Whatever rules of engagement are devised, there is one serious psy-
chological obstacle. As Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev once put it,
‘For some, participation in a peacekeeping operation is still tanta-
mount to combat action on enemy territory from the recent past’.32
Defence Minister General Pavel Grachev publicly stated that his task
in Tajikistan was to take measures ‘to control the enemy and defeat
him’.33 Major-General Sidyakin of the 27th MRD refers to the
‘internal function’ of the peacekeeping forces in the Trans-Dniester
region and in South Ossetia.34 There is talk of a ‘war environment’,
with peacekeepers compared to an ‘assault party separated from the
bulk of friendly forces’. Professionalism, however, is steadily grow-
ing, replacing traditional standards and reducing improvisation.
While there is general understanding that Russia ‘cannot withdraw
its peacekeeping forces yet’ from the areas of tension,35 there is no
desire to keep Russian peacekeepers in the field indefinitely, if only
for budgetary reasons. Peacekeeping is currently financed from the
defence budget, which displeases the military.

IV. Russian peacekeeping and the international

community
While Russian statesmen insist that Russia is ‘fated’ to play the role
of a stabilizing force in the former Soviet Union, especially where
Russian interests are affected, the West is suspicious of an emerging
‘Monroeski doctrine’. Russia’s new assertiveness is interpreted as a
sign that it ‘seeks, as it did in centuries past, to insure its security by
asserting influence over its near neighbours to the west and south’.36
Peacekeeping by Russian troops has therefore come under close
scrutiny. It is feared that such operations, by a country which is
32 Kozyrev, quoted by Segodnya, 6 July 1993 (in Russian).
33 Helsinki Watch (note 31).
34 Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 May 1993 (note 23).
35 Col-Gen. G. Kondratev, quoted by Izvestia, 5 Apr. 1994 (in Russian).
36 Whitney, C., New York Times, 31 Oct. 1993, p. 5.
 R US S IA 83

clearly not disinterested, could lead to political domination. The hard

fact, however, is that until now no other state or international organi-
zation has appeared willing to replace or capable of replacing Russia
as a peacekeeping force in the former Soviet territories.37
Russia would like its special role to be recognized. President Boris
Yeltsin said on 28 February 1993 that the ‘time has come when
authoritative international organizations, including the UN, should
grant Russia special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability in
the territory of the former Soviet Union’. Whatever reservations the
West might have were to be dealt with by drawing on the ‘natural
reserve of mutual trust among democratic states’. This meant Russia
showing understanding of US actions against Iraq and expecting the
same from the West vis-à-vis Russia’s problems in Tajikistan.38
In concrete terms, Russia wants its peacekeeping sanctified and
financed by the UN. The UN Secretary-General made a counter-
proposal in late 1993 that Russian troops should engage in peace-
keeping in Asia and the Americas, while peacekeepers from Asia and
the Americas were sent to parts of the former Soviet Union. This was
immediately called unrealistic by Russia. In the spring of 1994 UN
officials let it be known that they might consider sponsoring a peace-
keeping operation inside the former Soviet Union provided Russian
troops did not make up more than 20–30 per cent of the force.3 9
Russia is sincere when it says that it wishes to enlist the support of
others, but everything does not depend on them.
Besides political support, Russia also wants burden-sharing. It is
heavily engaged in peacekeeping in the CIS, while having to pay a
substantial share of expenses for UN peacekeeping operations else-
where. The CIS itself is of little help: its other members do not send
troops or contribute financially to Russia’s efforts despite invitations
and their commitments under the Tashkent Protocol of 16 July 1992.40
Financial support from the UN and the OSCE has thus been requested
since early 1993 in the name of the new partnership with the West.
The idea of creating a voluntary fund has also been floated. Another
possible solution would be to count Russian expenses for peace-

37 In Abkhazia, for instance, the UN initially authorized sending 8–10 observers, and later
80, but only 22 arrived for duty and were still there in early Mar. 1994.
38 Kozyrev, A., Segodnya, 6 July 1993 (in Russian).
39 Izvestia, 5 Apr. 1994 (in Russian).
40 Sharp, J. M. O., ‘Conventional arms control in Europe’, SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (note 15),
p. 603.
84 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

keeping within the CIS against its contribution to the UN peace-

keeping budget.
Initially very hostile to any foreign military presence in the space of
the former Soviet Union, Russia’s military would now actually
welcome genuinely impartial forces, mandated by the UN and/or the
OSCE, along the Tajik–Afghan border and in the Transcaucasus. The
prospects of that happening remain bleak. In this situation, Russia’s
most realistic options lie with the CIS, perhaps by turning it into the
kind of regional organization mentioned in the UN Charter, like the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS), which could be charged with regional peacekeep-
ing. A CIS–OSCE link is also proposed, but the recent record sug-
gests that this will not be easy. Although in September 1992, pursuant
to the Sochi Agreement of 24 June 1992,41 Belarus, Georgia, Kazakh-
stan, Russia and Ukraine were to have deployed observers to the
Armenian–Azerbaijan border, only Russia did so. In Tajikistan the
Central Asian military presence is largely symbolic. Thus, Russia is
likely to continue its mission single-handedly, without much help, but
with external criticism.

V. Conclusion
Russia’s peacekeeping record within the territory of the former Soviet
Union is mixed. To counter criticism officials in Moscow point out
that even the UN ‘technology of peacekeeping’ remains ‘rather imper-
fect’.42 Classic peacekeeping was a response to a challenge of a par-
ticular time and is now inadequate. Russian peacekeeping, it is
claimed, is fully consistent with the UN Charter and does not require
approval by any outside body once the conflicting sides have agreed
to it. Russian successes in Moldova and South Ossetia, and more
recently in Abkhazia, are sometimes contrasted with UN problems in
Somalia and elsewhere. On the other hand, Russian actions in
Chechnya have damaged the credibility of Russian peacekeeping
everywhere. Chechnya, of course, is in a category of its own. It serves
as a warning that ‘peacemaking’ which is ill-conceived, badly pre-
pared and badly executed might be indistinguishable from war.

41 Reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Research Report, 9 Oct. 1992,
p. 68.
42 Kozyrev (note 12), p. 17.
5. The United States
Donald C. F. Daniel*

I. Introduction
On 3 May 1994, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 25. It laid out his ‘Administration’s Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations’, defined as encompassing
activities from traditional peacekeeping to enforcement. The Directive
was the product of ‘an inter-agency review of our nation’s peacekeep-
ing policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy
framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period’.1 The
document is unusual for its detail on the criteria which the US execu-
tive branch is to apply when making decisions whether and how to
support United Nations peacekeeping missions.
This chapter presents some of its main provisions, but it will help
the reader’s understanding of PDD 25 if the domestic factors which
determined its content are presented first. The document was in gesta-
tion over a period of a year. During that time several predictions that
it was about to be issued proved premature: it was either ‘put on hold’
or redrafted as the administration contended with deep-rooted and
competing foreign policy tendencies, a general US ambivalence
towards the UN, the low priority accorded foreign policy in the
Clinton White House, the impact of Congress and the related impact
of public opinion.2

1 US Department of State, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral

Peace Operations, Department of State Publication 10161 (Department of State, Bureau of
International Organization Affairs: Washington, DC, May 1994), p. ES1.
2 Gellman, B., ‘Wider UN police role supported’, Washington Post, 5 Aug. 1993, p. A1;
Holmes, S., ‘Clinton may let US troops serve under UN chiefs’, New York Times, 18 Aug.
1993, p. A1; Sciolino, E., ‘US narrows terms for its peacekeepers’, New York Times, 23 Sep.
1993, p. A8; Lewis, P., ‘US plans policy on peacekeeping’, New York Times, 18 Nov. 1993,
p. A7; and Schmitt, E., ‘US set to limit role of military in peacekeeping’, New York Times,
29 Jan. 1994, p. A1. The quotation is from Gordon, M. and Friedman, T. L., ‘Disastrous US
raid in Somalia nearly succeeded, review finds’, New York Times, 25 Oct. 1993, p. A10.

* This chapter should not be considered as an official expression of US policy. All

interpretations, conclusions, errors or omissions are the author’s.
86 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

II. Competing foreign policy tendencies

Any nation contemplating a role in peace support operations must
consider how far it is willing to commit itself to a community of
interests transcending national borders and to employ its military to
advance those interests. It is these very considerations which historic-
ally have occasioned sharp and recurring disagreements in the USA.
In his recent review of The Cambridge History of American Foreign
Relations, Professor Ernest May identifies several competing long-
term tendencies in the USA concerning foreign relations. While
cautioning against oversimplification, he singles out those represented
by John Quincy Adams on the one hand and Thomas Jefferson and
Woodrow Wilson on the other. Building on the example set by
George Washington, Adams called for firm commitment to internal
improvements and counselled against foreign entanglements even
when the independence of other nations was in the balance. In con-
trast, Jefferson and Wilson wanted the USA to participate actively in
a community of mutually supportive democratic nations. Wilson went
further when proposing that they organize formally to maintain peace
and advance democracy. May concludes that ‘The aftermath of the
Cold War . . . finds these competing conceptions still alive.’3
May adds that in the context of this historical competition there
were recurring disputes about when the USA should resort to military
force. Such disputes occasioned ‘[s]ome of the fiercest contention’
among Americans with the ‘[n]ext in ferocity [being] contention over
economic coercion’.4
There was, of course, remarkable internal agreement for much of
the cold war that the USA should commit itself to the defence of far-
flung states in Europe and Asia, but that agreement was due to cir-
cumstances which no longer obtain. The period of bipartisan foreign
policy, as it was termed, reflected near-obsession with the perceived
ideological and politico-military threat from the Soviet Union and the
People’s Republic of China. Walter Rostow captured some of that
spirit when he wrote about the impact of the launching of Sputnik in
1957:

3 May, E., ‘“Who are we?”: two centuries of American foreign relations’, Foreign Affairs,
vol. 73, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 1994), p. 136.
4 May (note 3), p. 136.
 THE UNITED S TATES 87
There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by [its]
launching . . . This intrinsically harmless act of science and engineering was
also . . . a powerful act of psychological warfare. It immediately set in
motion forces in American political life which radically reversed the
nation’s ruling conception of its military problem.5

Concerned as well about a Soviet/communist threat to outflank the

West by fomenting instabilities in the ‘Third World’, President John
F. Kennedy in his inaugural address verbalized US determination to
‘pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty’.
The Kennedy and early Johnson eras were perhaps a high point in
the willingness of the public to use or threaten the use of US forces to
support others in distant lands. The experience of the war in Viet Nam
eroded that willingness and laid the foundations for the Nixon and
Weinberger doctrines. Shortly after becoming president, Richard
Nixon effectively called back Kennedy’s pledge to ‘pay any price’ if
it meant deploying military forces, particularly ground elements, to
help defend others. When explaining his policy, he referred not only
to material concerns, but to psychological ones as well: ‘To contribute
our predominant contribution [to the defence of others] might not
have been beyond our physical resources . . . But it certainly would
have exceeded our psychological resources’.6 At the end of 1984
Caspar Weinberger, as Defense Secretary, took issue with Secretary
of State George Shultz’s willingness to advocate the use of force.
Assisted by military officers whose memories had been seared by the
experience of Viet Nam, Weinberger crafted the following guidelines:
1. Do not commit combat forces overseas unless the engagement is
deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies.
2. If combat troops are committed, do so wholeheartedly, with the clear
intention of winning.
3. We should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. We should know precisely how our forces can accomplish the mission,
and the relationship between forces and objectives must be continually
re-assessed.
5. There should be reasonable assurance of public support.

5 Rostow, W. W., The United States in the World Arena (Harper & Row: New York,
1960), p. 366.
6 US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace: A Report to the Congress by
Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 25 Feb. 1971, p. 11.
88 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S
6. The commitment of combat forces abroad should be a last resort.7

A corollary to these principles, associated in particular with General

Colin Powell, is emphasis on the employment of overwhelming or
clearly decisive force—as seen in the US invasion of Grenada and
Panama and in the Persian Gulf War.
This is the broad context of the formulation of PDD 25. Among the
more specific conditioning factors was a general ambivalence which
US policy makers have had and continue to have (perhaps increas-
ingly) about the United Nations.

III. Ambivalence towards the UN

The USA was solidly in the forefront of efforts to establish the
League of Nations as well as the UN, but in both cases it drew back—
so far back in the former instance that it never joined. Cold war East–
West tensions and deadlock in the Security Council—ironically the
result of a veto power which the USA had itself advocated—con-
vinced those responsible for foreign policy to put greater faith in col-
lective defence than in collective security. The changed make-up of
the UN, as more developing countries joined, also gave rise to North–
South disagreements about the distribution of power in the UN and
the priorities to be given to the Third World’s agenda. In the 1970s
and 1980s in particular, administration and congressional spokes-
persons complained that the UN was an unfriendly environment and
that its methods and processes should be significantly reformed.
Possibly because President George Bush had served as US Ambas-
sador to the UN, his administration’s criticism of the organization
seemed more muted than that of President Ronald Reagan’s, but his
spokespersons were no less insistent on the need for structural reform
of the Secretariat and various agencies. Not surprisingly, however, the
aftermath of the Gulf War caused a turn-around in expressed con-
fidence. Bush’s August 1991 National Security Strategy document
referred to a ‘new United Nations’ that was ‘beginning to act as it was
designed’ and needed strengthening to meet its potential.8 His next
and final National Security Strategy described the UN as a ‘central
7 Weinberger, C., ‘The uses of military power’, Speech to the National Press Club,
Washington, DC, 28 Nov. 1984.
8 National Security of the United States (The White House: Washington, DC, Aug. 1991),
p. 13.
 THE UNITED S TATES 89

instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the

preservation of peace’ and stated that the USA would pay its full dues
and take ‘an active role in the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief planning and support’.9 Congressional and other
critics of the UN receded into the background.
As for peacekeeping per se, all concerned had agreed during the
cold war that neither superpower should participate except in a sup-
porting role—such as providing airlift or specialized equipment—or
with a few individuals assigned to small operations such as UNTSO.
Those restrictions were lifted as well after the Gulf War. In particular,
President Bush responded to an internationally felt need to deal with
the starving in Somalia by undertaking the UNITAF mission; this,
however, was a UN-sanctioned but not UN-commanded operation,
involving large numbers of troops under US control and with an exit
date (which was not met) specified at the start.
That date was 20 January 1993, the day President Bill Clinton
assumed office and the responsibility for directing US foreign policy.

IV. President Clinton and foreign policy

The key to understanding what led this particular president to issue
PDD 25 as it finally appeared is that domestic policy is by far his
foremost concern. His rise to the presidency was through the govern-
mental and gubernatorial ranks of a very small state. Imperfect but
nevertheless telling indicators of his priorities are statements by his
foreign policy team that they manage to get the president to dedicate
one hour a week to the subject.10 One Democratic Party foreign policy
scholar provided yet another way of putting it when he stated that the
president’s ‘top foreign policy priority is health care reform’. 11
President Clinton’s domestic focus matches the mood of the nation,
which treats foreign policy as an irritant, as something which gets in
the way of dealing with fundamental concerns about jobs, taxes,
health care, crime and the like:

9 National Security of the United States (The White House: Washington, DC, Jan. 1993),
p. 7.
10 Hunt, A. R., ‘There is no Clinton foreign policy’, Wall Street Journal, 21 Apr. 1994,
p. 17.
11 Kondracke, M., ‘UN speech aside, Clinton foreign policy still murky’, Roll Call,
30 Sep. 1993.
90 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S
Shortly after . . . Clinton took office he held a town meeting in Chillicothee,
Ohio, during which an audience chosen by lottery asked him about every-
thing . . . from health care to Hillary. But in the 90 minutes he did not get a
single question on foreign policy . . . In all the town meetings [he] has held
since . . . you could count on one hand the number of unprompted foreign
policy questions he has received from the public.12

That the president is a devotee of domestic policy does not mean

that he has no foreign policy views. When campaigning he was more
hawkish than President Bush on air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and called for a UN rapid deployment force that ‘could be used for
purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as guarding the
borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing attacks on
civilians, providing humanitarian relief, and combating terrorism and
drug trafficking’.13 In his inaugural address he spoke along the same
lines but on a higher plane: ‘When our vital interests are challenged,
or the will of the international community is defied, we will act
. . . with force if necessary’.14 No doubt with his approval, in June
1993 his Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, advocated
‘assertive multilateralism’ to help ‘failed societies . . . in the interests
of their people and of international peace and security’. 15
Within a few months that sense of assertiveness had waned consid-
erably as the president and his foreign policy team launched a con-
certed effort to lower expectations about peacekeeping in general and
US ground participation in particular. 16 A major event was the presi-
dent’s 27 September 1993 speech to the UN General Assembly when
12 Friedman, T. L., ‘There’s nothing like foreign policy for producing ennui’, New York
Times, 13 June 1993, section 4, p. 3.
13 On Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Klare, M., ‘Know them by their enemies: Clinton and
Bush on foreign policy’, The Nation, vol. 255, no. 13 (26 Oct. 1992); and Cooper, M. et al.,
‘10 key decisions for the next president’, US News and World Report, vol. 113, no. 15
(19 Oct. 1992). On a UN rapid deployment force, see Kramer, M., ‘The political interest:
Clinton’s foreign policy jujitsu’, Time, 30 Mar. 1992.
14 Quoted in Horwitz, P. F., ‘Clinton takes office, calling for renewal’, Inetrnational
Herald Tribune, 21 Jan. 1993. Emphasis added.
15 US Congress, Statement by Madeleine K. Albright, in ‘US participation in United
Nations peacekeeping activities’, Hearings, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-
committee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights (US
Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 24 June 1993).
16 See, for example, items cited in note 2 dating from Sep. 1993 and after; Gellmann, B.,
‘US reconsiders putting GIs under UN’, Washington Post, 22 Sep. 1993, p. 1; and Lake, A.,
‘Yes to an American role in peacekeeping, but with conditions’, International Herald
Tribune, 7 Feb. 1994, p. 4. See also the Reuter report which appeared after the promulgation
of PDD 25: ‘Clinton defends limiting commitments of US troops abroad’, Washington Post,
29 May 1994, p. 15.
 THE UNITED S TATES 91

he advised that the UN would have to learn ‘to say “No”’, that is, be
more selective, when contemplating whether to deploy peacekeeping
forces. Although PDD 25 did not appear until early May 1994, it had
been signalled ahead of time.
Why the transition from a policy of assertiveness to one of caution?
What happened is not difficult to explain: a White House determined
to push its domestic agenda fell prey to the recurring difficulties faced
by the UN and its forces in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and
to sharp domestic disagreements over the assertiveness policy. Some
disagreement came from the Pentagon. Faced with budget cuts and
downsizing, military leaders feared having ground troops bogged
down materially and morally in the midst of belligerents more eager
to kill than to accommodate one another. Some in the military were
also quite sceptical of the effectiveness of air strikes to influence the
belligerents in any lasting way.17
More important, however, was the opposition from Congress and
the sense that public opinion fundamentally would not approve US
involvement in costly missions with little prospect of quick and last-
ing success.

V. Congress and public opinion

The relationship between Congress and the executive branch on
peacekeeping is well summarized in the 1994 report of the Working
Group on Peacekeeping and US National Interest, co-chaired by
Senator Nancy Kassenbaum and Representative Lee Hamilton:
As the members of the United Nations have extended the scope of the
world’s organization peace operations, and the costs of American participa-
tion have risen, the role of UN peace operations in US policy has become a
serious issue between the legislative and executive branches. If the two
branches don’t heal this division . . . efforts to improve the UN’s effective-
ness in peace operations will be derailed by US domestic discord.18

17 Pfaff, W., ‘The civilians overrule the Pentagon’, Baltimore Sun, 14 Apr. 1994, p. 14;
Gordon, M. R., ‘Pentagon is wary of role in Bosnia’, New York Times, 15 Mar. 1994, p. A1;
and Sciolino, E., ‘US military split on using air power against the Serbs’, New York Times,
29 Apr. 1994, p. A1.
18 Peacekeeping and US National Interest: Report of the Working Group (Henry L.
Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 1994), p. 16.
92 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Senior and influential legislators such as Senators Sam Nunn,

Robert Byrd and Robert Dole and Representatives Thomas Foley,
Richard Gephardt, Lee Hamilton, Robert Michel and Newt Gingrich
have publicly warned the White House about the need for caution and
strict limits in committing US ground troops to peace operations.19
Even ‘liberal internationalists’ such as Senators Claiborne Pell and
Joseph Biden have weighed in; for example, although the USA agreed
to provide about 50 per cent of the troops necessary to help imple-
ment a general peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Senator
Pell continued to argue that that percentage was far too high.20
Congress also registered its lack of enthusiasm for peacekeeping by
refusing in separate votes to rid the USA of its arrears to the UN’s
peacekeeping account, to create a special $30 million fund that would
have facilitated US participation in peacekeeping, or to build a com-
mand centre at the UN and train foreign peacekeepers. 21
A number of factors underlie congressional opposition. The
Kassenbaum–Hamilton report finds the disagreements on peacekeep-
ing ‘symptomatic of larger problems—differing opinions between the
executive and legislative branches on the relative importance for
foreign and domestic needs and the direction of foreign policy in
general, as well as specific doubts about the United Nations and its
implications for US security’.22 On the latter, congressmen have
expressed fears of outsiders dictating US policy or commanding US
troops in risky operations.23 They also fear open-ended commitments,
not only when US troops are committed but also when they are not,
since the US assessment for UN peacekeeping calls for it to pay

19 See, for example, Bedard, P. and Gertz, B., ‘Senators seek Bosnia resolution: bipartisan
effort urges vote authorizing military action’, Washington Post (5 May 1993); Ottoway,
D. B., ‘Hill leaders wary of Bosnia plan’, Washington Post, 6 May 1993; Krauss, C., ‘Many
in Congress, citing Vietnam, oppose attacks’, New York Times, 28 Apr. 1993, p. A10; Krauss,
C., ‘White House tries to calm Congress’, New York Times, 6 Oct. 1993, p. A16; and
Friedman, T., ‘Seeking a balance: calls for pullout grow in Congress after losses in
Mogadishu raid’, New York Times, 6 Oct. 1993, p. 1.
20 Binder, D., ‘Senators criticize Bosnia aid plan’, New York Times, 6 Oct. 1993, p. A8.
21 ‘House votes against UN peacekeeping fund’, Washington Times, 14 Sep. 1993, p. 4;
Rogers, E., ‘House strips Pentagon budget of funds for future peacekeeping operations’, Wall
Street Journal, 1 Oct. 1993, p. 4; Strobel, W., ‘UN peacekeeping cries for big bucks’,
Washington Times, 10 Mar. 1994, p. 13; and Devroy, A., ‘Clinton signs new guidelines for
UN peacekeeping’, Washington Post, 6 May 1994, p. A32.
22 Peacekeeping and the US National Interest (note 18), p. 16.
23 See, for example, Williams, D., ‘Joining the pantheon of American missteps’,
Washington Post, 26 Mar. 1994, p. 18; Novak, R., ‘Blue helmets for Americans’, Washington
Post, 25 Apr. 1994, p. 16; and Devroy (note 21), pp. A1 and A32.
 THE UNITED S TATES 93

nearly one-third of the costs. As Senator Robert Byrd put it, ‘Where
will these funds come from? We . . . should not cut domestic spending
to pay for these foreign adventures’.24 His reference to domestic con-
cerns brings to mind the telling observation of former House Speaker
Thomas O’Neill that ‘All politics is local’. At a national level, no
organizations are more sensitive to public opinion than the Congress
and the White House, and both seem to have concluded that the US
public wants a very cautious and deliberate approach.25

VI. Peacekeeping and public opinion

Polling data, which admittedly fluctuate and can be difficult to
interpret, suggest several conclusions. First, most Americans are
generally not well informed about foreign affairs. For example, an
early 1994 Times Mirror poll indicated that only 13 per cent of the
respondents could identify UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali and only 28 per cent could name the Serbs as ‘the ethnic group
which had conquered much of Bosnia’.26 Second, if polling data are
representative, then a majority or near majority generally approves of
the UN, of UN peacekeeping and of US participation in peace-
keeping, including operations where force may have to be used for
humanitarian purposes. A March 1994 New York Times poll of 1107
people indicated that 89 per cent believed that it was somewhat or
extremely important to cooperate with other countries through the
UN, 63 per cent believed the UN should send military troops to
enforce peace plans in trouble spots, and 59 per cent believed that the
USA has a responsibility to contribute troops to such operations.27
These data are not inconsistent with those of a February 1994 Univer-
sity of Maryland poll of 700 people.28 Between 81 and 83 per cent
favoured the idea of UN peacekeeping operations ‘in the event of

24 Byrd, R. C., ‘The perils of peacekeeping’, New York Times, 19 Aug. 1993, p. 23.
25 See, for example, Byrd (note 24); ‘War Powers Act called unlawful, but not apt to go’,
Washington Times, 4 May 1993, p. 6; Hunt (note 10), p. 17; and ‘White House criticized for
reliance on polls’, Providence Journal–Bulletin, 14 Apr. 1994, p. A8.
26 Chart in Time, 28 Mar. 1994, p. 22.
27 Survey data provided to the author by Edward Luck, President of the United Nations
Association of the USA. See also Luck, E., ‘The case for engagement: American interests in
UN peace operations’, eds D. C. F. Daniel and B. C. Hayes, Beyond Traditional Peace-
keeping (Macmillan: London, 1995).
28 Program on International Policy Studies, University of Maryland, News Release,
18 Feb. 1994.
94 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

large-scale atrocities’ or ‘gross human rights violations’ and 67 per

cent favoured them ‘in a civil war when the combatants want help’;
49 per cent favoured the USA contributing troops ‘in most cases’ and
42 per cent ‘in exceptional cases that directly affect US interests’. An
April poll by the same organization, again of 700 people, showed that
66 per cent favoured ‘contributing US troops to the existing UN
peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina to deliver humani-
tarian aid and monitor safe havens’ and 56 per cent favoured ‘sending
a very large force of ground troops, including US troops, to occupy
contested areas and forcibly stop ethnic cleansing’.29 Interestingly,
63 per cent favoured ‘contributing US troops to a UN peacekeeping
force of 8000–10 000 to police the new agreement between the
Bosnian Government and the Croats’, although only 56 per cent
favoured ‘having Congress authorize the money for the USA to pay
its share of the costs’. In addition, respondents exhibited
‘ambivalence about involvement in Bosnia’: 59 per cent did not wish
to ‘risk a repeat of the same mess we got ourselves into in Somalia’
and 41 per cent accepted that the USA ‘might get bogged down in
another Vietnam’.
Policy makers seem to have latched on to public ambivalence.
Noting that polling data supported the deployment of US troops to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Wall Street Journal added that ‘Penta-
gon officials and NATO allies worry that public and Congressional
support would crumble as soon as the US suffered any deaths’.30
Polling and anecdotal evidence give credence to these concerns. For
example, after 18 US Rangers were killed in Mogadishu on 3 October
1993, a University of Maryland poll of 803 citizens showed that
28 per cent favoured immediate withdrawal, 43 per cent favoured
withdrawal by 31 March (the date specified by the president), and
only 27 per cent favoured staying until ‘we have stabilized the
country, even if this takes longer than six months’.31 Even more
important for US policy is what constituents tell their representatives.
A flood of calls made to Senator Bill Bradley’s office after the Ranger
incident was ‘overwhelmingly in favor of withdrawing US forces’

29 Program on International Policy Studies, University of Maryland, News Release,

11 Apr. 1994.
30 ‘US officials fear that public backing for Bosnia peacekeeping is tenuous’, Wall Street
Journal, 11 Mar. 1994, p. 1.
31 Morrison, D. C., ‘Vietnam syndrome survives’, National Journal, vol. 25, no. 4 (30 Oct.
1993).
 THE UNITED S TATES 95

from Somalia; Senator John McCain’s office received 402 calls in one
day, 400 of them favouring immediate withdrawal. 32
In the light of all the above, it should not be surprising that PDD 25
embodies a highly cautious and deliberate approach to UN and US
involvement in peace support operations.

VII. Summary of PDD 25

The unclassified version of the document contains six sections, the
longest of which lays out the factors which the administration says it
will consider when making decisions at three levels: whether or not to
support the establishment of a UN or regionally sponsored operation;
whether US personnel should participate in an approved operation;
and whether they ought to participate significantly in enforcement
missions where combat is likely.
The following are the criteria to be applied at the first level:33
– UN involvement advances US interests and there is an international
community of interests for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
– There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security . . .
defined as one or a combination of the following: international aggression,
or; urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence, [or] sudden interrup-
tion of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled
with violence or the threat of violence.
– There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission
fits . . . between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
– For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping . . . a cease-fire should be in
place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
– For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) . . . the threat to international
peace and security is considered significant.
– The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces,
financing, and mandate appropriate to the mission.
– The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction
. . . are considered unacceptable.
– The operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and real-
istic criteria for ending the mission.

32 Caption under photograph, New York Times, 7 Oct. 1993, p. A10; and Krauss, C.,
‘White House tries to calm Congress’, New York Times, 6 Oct. 1993, p. A16.
33 Quotations taken from US Department of State (note 1), pp. 4–5, 9, 10.
96 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Additional more rigorous standards are identified for deciding on par-

ticipation of US personnel in an operation:
– Participation advances US interests and . . . the . . . risks . . . are
considered acceptable.
– Personnel, funds, and other resources are available.
– US participation is necessary for . . . success.
– The role of US forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for US
participation can be identified.
– Domestic and Congressional support . . . can be marshalled.
– Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Finally, even more rigorous standards are laid out when there is a
possibility of significant US participation in enforcement missions
where combat is likely to occur. Specifically, there must be:
– a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined
objectives;
– a plan to achieve those objectives decisively; [and]
– a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composi-
tion, and disposition of our forces.

Among the second-level criteria is one which calls for acceptable

command and control arrangements. PDD 25 devotes a whole section
to this issue. It makes clear that US troops will always remain under
US command but leaves open the possibility of operational control by
a non-US ‘competent UN commander’. By operational control is
meant the assignment of tasks to US forces for a specific mission or
during a specific time-frame. The foreign commander is proscribed,
however, from ‘chang[ing] the mission or deploy[ing] US forces out-
side the area of responsibility agreed to by the President’ of the USA,
nor is he allowed to ‘separate units, divide their supplies, administer
discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization’.
Two conditions will almost automatically limit the extent to which
the USA will agree to place forces under UN operational control. One
is the extent of participation by US forces: the greater their role, the
less likely it is that the USA will give up control. A second obtains
when US forces participate ‘in a major peace enforcement mission
that is likely to involve combat’. Such a mission ‘should ordinarily be
conducted under US command and operational control or through
competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coali
tions’.
 THE UNITED S TATES 97

The remainder of PDD 25 focuses on the role of regional organiza-

tions, on the need to reduce mission costs and on measures to
strengthen the UN’s ability to manage peace operations and the
USA’s ability to support them. On regional organizations, US policy
accepts the appropriateness of peace operations by regional organiza-
tions while emphasizing that the UN remains the primary body with
the authority to conduct them. On cost reductions, the document calls
for implementation of various measures within the UN including the
establishment of an Inspector-General’s office. It also makes clear US
determination to see a reduction of its share of the UN’s peace opera-
tions budget from 31.7 per cent to 25 per cent, adding that the Con-
gress is ready to force the issue, probably by refusing to fund more
than 25 per cent after fiscal year 1995. Suggestions to strengthen the
UN focus on reconfiguring and expanding the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations in the UN Secretariat, establishing rapid reaction
teams and capabilities (such as a modest airlift capability through pre-
negotiated contracts), establishing a Peace Operations Training
Program, and setting out ways in which the USA can assist in such
endeavours on a reimbursable basis. Finally, suggestions for strength-
ening US support focus particularly on how the Departments of
Defence and State should share responsibilities.

VIII. Conclusion
In sum, PDD 25 contains numerous guidelines for making decisions
about peace operations and US participation in them and recommends
measures for improving the conduct of operations and associated UN
and US capabilities. Fundamentally, it ‘aims to ensure that our use of
peacekeeping is selective and more effective’.34
Its highly cautious and deliberate approach reflects a restrictive
domestic context. Deep-rooted competing tendencies within the body
politic about the USA’s role in foreign policy and contentions about
the use of force are part of the explanatory context. They were evident
not only in the differing views between power centres in Washington,
but also over time in one power centre, the White House. The new
President Clinton was markedly more enthusiastic about the possi-
bilities of peacekeeping than the later Clinton who, committed to his

34 US Department of State (note 1), p. 3. Emphasis in original.

98 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

overriding domestic agenda, found himself beset by peacekeeping

concerns including opposition from influential congressmen.
Public opinion may have been the decisive factor. An Adamsian
concern for domestic improvement and for avoiding foreign entangle-
ments seems to run below the surface of an otherwise generally
supportive Jeffersonian public attitude towards the UN and peace
operations. Sensing that concern, political leaders at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue seem unconvinced that the public would sustain
support for operations which may be costly and protracted. It is now a
cliché to say that Clinton’s is a minimalist foreign policy in tune with
a public which voted for him because he represented domestic
change.35 PDD 25 fits that pattern.

35 Friedman, T. L., ‘Theory vs. practice: Clinton’s stated foreign policy turns into more
modest “self-containment”’, New York Times, 1 Oct. 1993, p. A2.
6. Other new and emerging peacekeepers
Angela Kane*

I. Introduction
This chapter examines the motivations and policies of selected new
and emerging troop contributors. Some are not strictly new peace-
keepers but states which have substantially increased their partici-
pation since the end of the cold war. Of the permanent members of
the UN Security Council, China and France are considered.1 Various
other contributors which are not permanent members of the Security
Council are then examined, grouped by region. Countries have been
selected on the basis of recent or potential troop contributions or
because of expectations on the part of the international community
that they should participate in multilateral efforts to keep the peace.

II. China: strict observance of Charter principles

China has maintained a conspicuously low profile in Security Council
debates on peacekeeping and as a troop contributor. Only in 1988 did
it become a member of the General Assembly’s Special Committee
on Peace-keeping Operations. Its position emerged more clearly
during the 1990–91 Iraq–Kuwait crisis. Following its strong condem-
nation of Iraq’s invasion, China abstained on Resolution 678 which
on 29 November 1990 authorized ‘all necessary measures’ to resolve
the crisis if Iraq failed to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait,
believing that the crisis must be resolved peacefully and that resorting
to military action would have an adverse effect not only on the region
but also on global peace and security. Since then, however, China has

1 Individual studies of Russia and the USA are presented in chapters 4 and 5, respectively,
in this volume.

* The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the United Nations. This chapter incorporates passages from a paper written for the
US Naval War College, Rhode Island, Feb. 1994 and published as ‘Other selected
states: motivations and factors in national choices’, eds D. Daniel and B. C. Hayes,
Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (Macmillan: London, 1995). The author
acknowledges the assistance of Anneli Berntsson, Research Assistant, SIPRI Project
on Peacekeeping and Regional Security, in updating this version of her paper.
100 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

increasingly joined the consensus on resolutions authorizing UN

operations.
China has continued to stress the Charter’s provisions for the peace-
ful settlement of international disputes and has welcomed the streng-
thening of the UN’s role in preventive diplomacy. Vice-Premier Qian
Qichen in his address to the General Assembly on 29 September 1993
urged observance of the basic principles of the Charter, namely
respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of
member states, and underlined the importance of regional organiza-
tions which, he said, should assume greater responsibility for main-
taining peace and security. In the debate on peacekeeping the Chinese
representative reinforced these views: ‘at any time and under any cir-
cumstances, the consent and cooperation from the relevant govern-
ments or parties must be obtained . . . in carrying out these operations,
the UN must adopt a neutral, fair and impartial approach and in no
way get involved in the internal conflict of a country’. He criticized
the ‘indiscriminate use of sanctions or force’ in the name of the UN,
yet considered that the UN operation in Cambodia had provided
‘useful experience’.2 China believes that UN peacekeeping, if used
properly (that is, following the Charter’s principles), ‘will play an
increasingly important role’, and China ‘is ready to make further con-
tributions to the UN peacekeeping activities through its active
involvement’.
The first Chinese peacekeepers were those deployed to UNIKOM in
1992. By 1994, 60 Chinese military observers were serving with
UNTSO in the Middle East, with UNIKOM and in Western Sahara,
Mozambique and Liberia.3 Their numbers were small but they con-
tributed to the multilateral character of the operations and manifested
the Chinese desire to participate. Consistent with China’s belief in
regional efforts, the largest Chinese commitment so far has been to
UNTAC with 400 troops and 46 military observers.
It is unlikely that Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping will
notably increase in the near future unless an operation is mounted in
Asia—to which China would feel compelled to contribute in a more
than symbolic way. Barring a major policy shift China is likely to

2 Statement by Mr Zhang Yan, Representative of China, in the Fourth Committee of the

General Assembly on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects’, New York, 24 Nov. 1993, UN document
A/C.4/48/SR.22.
3 UN, ‘United Nations peace-keeping’, Information Notes Update, Dec. 1994.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 101

continue to contribute a handful of military observers (rather than

troops) and only to those operations which meet its criteria. Neither
domestic public opinion, lack of training and experience nor financial
concerns appears to have any significant impact on China’s decision
to participate or not. If, however, the international community comes
to feel that China should contribute peacekeeping troops in larger
numbers, considerable pressure will have to be applied to convince it
to do so. In view of its rapidly growing economy and military budget,4
it would not be unreasonable to expect China to assume a larger share
of responsibility for carrying out the decisions which it jointly takes
with other Security Council members.5

III. France: strong political engagement

France, which in 1948 had participated in one of the earliest peace-
keeping missions, UNTSO, and then in the 1960s had rejected the
idea of peacekeeping operations and refused to pay its peacekeeping
assessments, became in the early 1990s a committed participant. By
the end of 1994 it was contributing a total of 5023 troops to seven
operations, 90 per cent of them in the former Yugoslavia. 6
France’s first participation after UNTSO was in UNIFIL starting in
1978, followed by UNTAG in Namibia in 1989–90. Following the
conclusion of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia in October 1992,
France became a large-scale troop contributor to UNTAC, having
contributed significantly to the international effort to bring democracy
to Cambodia. France was also the first country to offer a contingent of
stand-by troops to the UN. In the course of 1992 it became the leading
participant in peacekeeping operations. France has paid a heavy price:
45 of its soldiers had been killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone by
August 1995.7
A year later, setbacks prompted the Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé,
to refer to ‘new kinds of uncertainty and disorder’ and to list three
guiding principles on which France’s foreign policy was based: desire
for independence, commitment to its fundamental interests and devo-
tion to law and justice. In the former Yugoslavia France at one point
4 Bergstrand, B.-G. et al., ‘World military expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 1994), pp. 441–48.
5 See also Kristof, N. D., ‘The rise of China’, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1993, pp. 59–74.
6 ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
7 Information provided by the French Embassy, Stockholm.
102 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

had double the number of troops of the next-largest contributor and it

was the only country to send reinforcements for the security of the
safe areas declared by the Security Council in June 1993. In view of
this commitment, France firmly rejects any challenge to its authority
in peacekeeping matters:
The efforts [France] has made entitle it to tell those who have been free with
their advice and lessons that they might be better heard if they were agree-
ing, when they are able to do so, to commit their own troops to the field.
Once in contact with the realities of the situation, they would undoubtedly
better appreciate the fact that between negotiated peace and chaos there is no
middle ground.8

France has taken the high moral ground on a number of questions

ranging from troop contributions to financial matters.9 Its engagement
has been pragmatic and without the dogma that usually surrounds
foreign policy initiatives, as demonstrated in a comprehensive report
on French participation in peacekeeping operations, the Trucy Report,
prepared at the request of Prime Minister Édouard Balladur in
February 1994.10
Part of the reason for France’s strong engagement is undoubtedly its
distrust of US intentions in Europe. With the disappearance of the
Warsaw Pact and the decline of NATO’s foremost security role,
France has stepped up efforts to contribute to a European collective
security policy, while at the same time showing an interest in a trans-
formed transatlantic alliance, which France would help shape and
define as well as fully participate in.11
Another side to France’s motivation is its search for influence, rank
and grandeur. The Trucy Report is sprinkled with recommendations
on how best to exploit France’s high level of engagement (including
not letting the Nordic countries determine peacekeeping ‘dogma’).
Although the report cites the high costs which France incurs for its

8 Address by Foreign Minister Alain Juppé to the UN General Assembly, New York,
29 Sep. 1993.
9 France has had a consistent record of paying its assessed contributions within the speci-
fied time-limit (i.e., before 31 Jan. each year).
10 Trucy, F., Parlementaire en Mission, Rapport au Premier Ministre: Participation de la
France aux opérations maintien de la paix, août 1993–février 1994 [Report to the Prime
Minister: France’s participation in peacekeeping operations, Aug. 1993–Feb. 1994] (in
French. Unpublished).
11 See also Asmus, R. D., Kugler, R. L. and Larrabee, F. S., ‘Building a new NATO’,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4 (Sep./Oct. 1993), pp. 28–40.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 103

troops in addition to the assessments levied by the UN, participation

in peacekeeping operations is never questioned, but rather presented
as a source of pride and accomplishment as well as necessity.12
France’s high profile and the priority it gives to UN peacekeeping
are also the result of its wish to preserve its privileged status as a
permanent member of the Security Council at a time when reform of
the Council and expansion are being hotly debated. Another aspect is
a degree of competition with the UK, also a permanent Security
Council member, which has tried to take the lead in elaborating
peacekeeping doctrine and thus to dominate the peacekeeping debate.
This is resented by France, which is at a further disadvantage when
such discussions take place, as English prevails at international meet-
ings and French interventions are usually heard via interpretation.
France has been tenacious, however, and, given all these considera-
tions, its commitment to the UN and multilateral action can be
expected to continue.

IV. Europe: Spain leads the way

After years of international semi-isolationism during the Franco
regime, European Community membership became an important part
of Spain’s foreign policy, and participation in UN peacekeeping was a
logical extension of this policy.
Spain’s first participation was in UNTAG, quickly followed by
ONUCA and ONUSAL. By the end of 1994 it had 1342 troops
deployed in UN peacekeeping operations in El Salvador (16),
Mozambique (40) and the former Yugoslavia (1286).13 This pattern of
contributions partly reflects Spain’s foreign policy priorities which,
because of historic and linguistic ties, lie with Central America, North
Africa and Europe.14 The Foreign Ministry points out, however, that
future participation in peacekeeping operations may include other
regions, specifically as a result of ‘important interests’ which Spain
retains in Angola and Mozambique.15

12 Trucy (note 10), p. 86.

13 ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
14 ‘España y las OMPs de Naciones Unidas’ [Spain and UN peacekeeping operations],
Paper delivered by the Director-General for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, early 1994 (in Spanish. Unpublished conference paper).
15 Military observers were stationed in Angola as part of UNAVEM I and II from 1989 to
1993 but withdrawn when a political settlement proved elusive.
104 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Spain has played a leading role in Central America in helping to

resolve regional conflicts, both alone and in concert with others. As
one of the Friends of the Secretary-General for El Salvador, it con-
tributed substantially to the settlement of the conflict and the imple-
mentation of the peace accords, the latter primarily by assisting in
police monitoring and the establishment of a new national civil police.
As a result of its positive experience of these operations Spain sent
troops to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, but it has consis-
tently stressed the humanitarian mandate of its forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Voices were heard in early 1994 asking for the with-
drawal of the Spanish forces16 but Foreign Minister Javier Solana, on
a visit to the front lines in February, said that he considered ‘the
possibility of a complete withdrawal very remote. The only aid that
reaches the population is that escorted by the “blue helmets”’. Media
coverage has generally been favourable towards and public opinion
supportive of Spain’s involvement in humanitarian missions. After an
incident in Bosnia and Herzegovina which resulted in heavy casual-
ties (Spain lost 11 soldiers, with others wounded), newspaper articles
rang with patriotic fervour and the number of soldiers volunteering
for UN duty immediately increased to four applications for every
vacancy. A poll conducted in April 1994 found a majority in favour of
sending troops on peacekeeping missions, with a higher percentage
among those aged 18–29 supporting the ‘blue helmets’ enthusiasti-
cally.17
Exasperation at times shows through. In an interview in January
1994 Foreign Minister Solana warned that Spain would have to recon-
sider the deployment of its troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina if no
progress towards an agreement was made: ‘If the parties are still in
conflict, if they don’t want to be helped, there is no sense in continu-
ing’.18 Spain wants peacekeeping operations to be an integral part of
the solution to crises, not a permanent fixture on the landscape. Hence
Spain withdrew from UNAVEM II in December 1993.
Spain has been faced with the increasing cost of participation in UN
missions. In 1991, at a time when peacekeeping costs started to sky-
rocket, it volunteered to move from assessment category C to B,

16 Diario 16, 12 Dec. 1993; and El País, 14 Dec. 1993, p. 24, 22 Jan. 1994, p. 5, and
3 Feb. 1994, p. 14 (in Spanish).
17 El Mundo, 3 Apr. 1994, p. 8 (in Spanish).
18 Interview with radio station ‘Onda Cero’, 20 Dec. 1993.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 105

which resulted in a quintupling of its financial contributions.19 This

was coupled with additional costs of deployment, as the UN rate of
reimbursement only covers about one-third of the actual cost accruing
to a developed country. Because of its severe economic crisis, Spain
in 1993 fell behind in its payments for the first time.
Spain’s armed forces had a poor reputation because of their govern-
ance of Spain under the Franco dictatorship. Today conscription and
the NATO alliance are unpopular. Experience in multilateral missions
is seen as positive. ‘It gives the idea to the armed forces that they are
more humane, and not just for fighting war’, one Spanish military
official explained. Experience is gained in training, language and
cultural exposure, which is further enhanced by participating in vari-
ous peace missions of the OSCE, NATO and the WEU.
Spain has undoubtedly gained prestige and influence in the inter-
national community as a member of the Security Council in 1993–94
and has used its presence in peacekeeping operations to obtain influ-
ence, to have its voice heard and to have an input into all major policy
decisions. Spain challenges the dogma of the traditional peacekeepers,
particularly the Nordic countries, and sees itself as a leader among the
Ibero-American states, for which it recently established a training
facility to prepare police forces for UN service. Given all these con-
siderations Spain’s commitment to UN peacekeeping is likely to
continue.

V. Asia: diversity
Asia has always had several traditional troop contributors like India,
Nepal and Pakistan, but new contributors are starting to emerge.

South Korea

Having joined the UN only in 1991, the Republic of Korea has set its
sights on ‘an opportunity to serve on the Security Council’20 and
demonstrated its commitment to multilateral action by sending, in the
latter part of 1993, an engineering unit of 250 troops to UNOSOM II,

19 Spain is assessed 1.98% of the peacekeeping budget, which amounted to $70 million in
1993. By comparison, in 1989 Spain was assessed $1.2 million.
20 Address by Foreign Minister Sung-Joo Han to the General Assembly, New York,
29 Sep. 1993, UN document A/48/PV.9.
106 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

although the unstable situation there led to withdrawal earlier than

expected. In August 1994 a medical contingent was sent to
MINURSO. South Korea said that it would ‘gradually increase [its]
support’ for peacekeeping operations ‘commensurate with [its] ability
to do so’.21 Its commitment is motivated by its history and current
geopolitical situation: ‘Despite the worldwide trends towards peace
and co-operation, there is still tension in Korea . . . the solution to the
inter-Korean question should thus be sought in the context of the post-
cold war international order of reconciliation and co-operation. This
means active participation by both North and South Korea in the
regional and global order’. It is not surprising therefore that Korea
gives priority to ‘a discussion on the role of the UN in preventive
diplomacy directed towards defusing potential threats to international
peace and security’.22 By participating in UN missions, South Korea
validates its own claim to multilateral assistance and asserts its role as
a growing regional power.
Having survived a succession of authoritarian military governments,
South Korea’s democratic culture is fragile. Public opinion is
untested, but is seen as being generally guarded as increased affluence
has bred conservatism among a growing middle class concerned first
and foremost with stability. While South Korea’s forays into peace-
keeping will most likely remain cautious, they will nevertheless con-
tinue and be increased where politically feasible and expeditious.
South Korea could become a steady contributor to UN operations.

The ASEAN states23

Another promising prospect is offered by the seven ASEAN states.
While ASEAN was established to focus on economic and social
issues rather than security, the Cambodian conflict served as a catalyst
in modifying this approach, and for many years provided the political
glue that held it together. ASEAN’s skilful management of the
Cambodia issue at the UN, leading to the establishment of UNTAC,
showed the efficacy of united efforts, giving it confidence and greater
assertiveness in regional security affairs.
21 Statement by Ambassador Chong-Ha Yoo before the Special Committee on Peace-keep-
ing Operations, 22 Apr. 1993. Unpublished.
22 Address by Foreign Minister Han (note 20).
23 ASEAN was formed in 1968 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984 and Viet Nam in 1995.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 107

Five ASEAN members participated in UNTAC,24 but since then—

with the exception of Malaysia which has increased its forces—
ASEAN’s presence has been negligible. As of 30 November 1994,
Brunei Darussalam was not represented in any UN peacekeeping
missions; the Philippines participated with 1 person, Indonesia with
297, Malaysia with 2844, Singapore with 6 and Thailand with 6. 25
While ASEAN has tried to elaborate a common approach to UN
issues, including peacekeeping, differences in political views, geo-
graphical size and economic strength produce a diversity of
approaches.26 Brunei and Singapore, because of their small size and
population, can never be other than symbolic contributors to UN
operations, but for small countries the UN is an important forum.
Singapore, in addition to sending well-trained and disciplined police
personnel, has been active in the ongoing debate on peacekeeping
philosophy and has been at the forefront of discussions on the
enlargement of the Security Council. The Philippines is the economi-
cally weakest link in the ASEAN chain and continues to suffer from a
foreign debt crisis and slow growth rates. A negative political image
from the Marcos years lingers, and political instability was evident in
several attempted coups against President Corazon Aquino and the
continuing threat of a communist insurgency. While this situation is
improving under President Fidel Ramos, it does not appear to be a
propitious time for the Philippines to send armed forces abroad for
peacekeeping missions.27
Thailand shares a border with Cambodia and has a long history of
association with the Khmer Rouge. It was important to correct this
negative image by participating in UNTAC. However, Thailand’s
assistance in such areas as mine clearance promptly ceased with
UNTAC’s withdrawal. Of the ASEAN countries Thailand has the
largest military28 and one which has dominated politics for decades.

24 Viet Nam had not yet joined ASEAN. Of a total of some 22 000 personnel, ASEAN
contributed 4385 (Brunei Darussalam, 3; Indonesia 2034; Malaysia 1208; the Philippines
351; Singapore 75; and Thailand 714).
25 ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
26 Statement on behalf of ASEAN by Ambassador Pibulsonggram before the Fourth
Committee of the General Assembly on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole
question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects’, 24 Nov. 1993 (note 2).
27 As of 30 Nov. 1994 the Philippines had 1 civilian policeman in UNOSOM. See ‘United
Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
28 Total armed forces (at early 1995) stood at 283 000 for a population of 57.6 million.
This compares to 272 000 for Indonesia, which has a population of 195.7 million, and
108 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Together with Singapore it has initiated and organized a series of

workshops on ASEAN–UN cooperation in peacekeeping and preven-
tive diplomacy, but the emphasis has been on the latter, as Thailand
views with misgiving recent UN forays into peace enforcement and
military intervention in ‘zones of instability and potential crisis’.29
Deputy Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan has declared Thailand’s
willingness to set up a separate peacekeeping unit to respond to UN
requests, 30 but it seems unlikely that Thailand will develop into a
major contributor to UN operations.
Its neighbour Malaysia has shown increasing willingness to deploy
its forces under the UN. A large contingent (1135) served in Somalia.
By November 1994, 1603 troops were involved in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and smaller numbers in five other UN operations.31 In
addition to Malaysia’s often-stated ‘strong and abiding commitment
to a revitalized and strengthened UN in the post-cold war era’, one
motivation for its increased participation may be a wish to help fellow
Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the reasons are undoubtedly
more complex and may be found in Malaysia’s own history, partic-
ularly its experience of fusing a cluster of independent sultanates and
ethnic groups into a multi-ethnic state and its recent rapid economic
growth. All these have given Malaysia the confidence to speak out on
international issues.
Malaysia has played an important role in furthering South–South
cooperation and has stood up to the West in defending its views on
the environment and on human rights. Malaysia considers that it has a
contribution to make and sees itself as a champion of the developing
world, which explains its strong presence in Somalia. It believes that
the developed countries ‘with their resources should assist developing
countries to participate [in peacekeeping operations] by making avail-
able material resources’.32 It has also criticized the developed coun-
tries:

121 300 for Malaysia, which has a population of 18.4 million. See Asian Defence Journal,
vol. 25, no. 1 (1995), pp. 11, 15.
29 UN, Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping: Report of the
Secretary-General, UN document A/48/403/Add.1, 2 Nov. 1993.
30 ‘Thailand ready to set up peacekeeping unit’, The Nation (Bangkok), 20 Nov. 1993,
p. 1.
31 UNIKOM, UNAVEM, MINURSO, ONUMOZ and UNOMIL.
32 Statement by Ambassador Razali Ismail to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, United Nations, New York, 30 Mar. 1994. Unpublished.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 109
Developed countries with their resources should assist developing countries
to participate [in peacekeeping operations] by making available material
resources. We should not indulge in the cynical view that developing coun-
tries seek high-tech weapons through involvement in peacekeeping or that
they participate to make money.33

It has demonstrated its willingness to back its words by action.

When the death of a Malaysian soldier in far-away Somalia trauma-
tized the population, the government was able to contain public emo-
tion by declaring this to be part of its international duty.
Despite Malaysia’s deep commitment to the UN, it would like to
see a number of changes. In a statement on peacekeeping in Novem-
ber 1993 Razali Ismail, Ambassador to the UN, underlined that
‘Malaysian peacekeeping troops were sent to Somalia to keep food-
lines open and thereby help feed the people of Somalia. We did not
acquiesce in any personalized undertaking seeking the arrest of any
principal player’.34 Malaysia considers the current Security Council
composition and the veto undemocratic and demands ‘that troop-
contributing countries are kept closely informed and consulted on all
major developments’.35 It further emphasizes the need
to dispel perceptions that the Western-dominated Council increasingly
resorts to questionable decisions, the implementation of which in the main
are [sic] left to other member states, particularly from the Third World. Such
perceptions draw their basis from peacekeeping operations, approved by the
Council, and from which major countries gradually disassociate themselves
for domestic reasons. Somalia can well be a case in point; a situation there
may arise in the future when virtually troops of Third World countries only
will be left there.36

This is unusually blunt language, but despite its criticism Malaysia

has been steadfast in abiding by its commitment to the UN, increasing
its troop strength in Somalia at a time when Western nations were

33 Statement by Ambassador Razali Ismail (note 32).

34 Statement by Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia in the Fourth Committee of the
General Assembly on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects’, New York, 29 Nov. 1993, UN document
A/C.4/48/SR.23.
35 Malaysia considered this matter important enough to make a formal démarche to the
President of the Security Council, urging the development ‘of a practice or mechanism that
would allow direct and close consultations between the Security Council and the countries
contributing troops’. See UN document S/1994/120, 4 Feb. 1994.
36 See note 35.
110 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

withdrawing en bloc. This commitment is likely to continue, given the

strongly held views of the government and the overwhelming domes-
tic support these policies enjoy.
For Indonesia peacekeeping is not high on the political agenda.
None the less, it committed a large number of troops to UNTAC
(which clashed with the UN command since they took orders from
Jakarta rather than accepting the supremacy of the UN). At the end of
1994 the country had a total of 298 troops, civilian police and military
observers in UNPROFOR, ONUMOZ, UNOSOM, UMOMIG and
UNIKOM.37 Since the Indonesian military is endowed with the dual
functions of custodian of security and of socio-political stability in a
country of 3000 islands and a large number of ethnic groups, not all
of whom support the central government, the government’s priority is
stability at home. At the same time President Suharto, who calls him-
self the ‘father of development’ and has seen his country make great
economic strides since he assumed the presidency in 1968, now feels
more confident in assuming a higher profile in foreign affairs. As
head of the largest Islamic nation and current chairman of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), Suharto has championed the rights of the
Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and tried to increase the NAM’s
relevance by giving it greater economic focus. Within ASEAN,
rivalry between Indonesia and Malaysia has started to develop, with
Indonesia resenting the outspokenness and increasing emancipation of
Malaysian foreign policy. Both peoples being Malay, Indonesia has
long considered itself the ‘elder brother’ and feels overshadowed by
Malaysia’s high profile in international affairs, including its partici-
pation in UN peacekeeping.
The only ASEAN country willing to contribute more than a token
number of troops to UN operations at present is Malaysia. While eco-
nomic prosperity has brought modernization of the armed forces of all
ASEAN countries, the political will to make these forces available to
the UN is lacking. Attempts to set up a regional ASEAN training
centre for peacekeeping forces have not been successful. Some mem-
bers have objected that military doctrines are different and joint train-
ing is thus not practical, although this idea continues to be promoted
at the think-tank level.
The formal decision of the ASEAN summit meeting of January
1992 to give security cooperation high priority was an important shift
37 ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 111

from ASEAN’s previous focus on economic and political cooperation,

although it is too early to expect practical results. Joint military exer-
cises are confined to the bilateral and trilateral level and mechanisms
for ASEAN defence cooperation lack definition, particularly as
ASEAN was never conceived as a defence organization. While the
value of training and experience to be gained through participation in
UN peacekeeping operations is recognized, practical follow-up is
lacking. This situation is unlikely to change in the next few years.

VI. Latin America: prospects for involvement

Latin American states have been members of the UN since its foun–
dation and have thus participated in many UN operations, but except
for Argentina, which has consistently provided troops, and to a lesser
extent Chile they have seemed more reluctant to participate than the
African countries and when they have done so their contingents have
been largely symbolic. Their absence may be explained by preoccupa-
tion with development and social inequity, internal conflict, insur-
gency movements or the drug trade. Today, however, the international
community is clearly looking to Latin American countries, now
largely democratic and more prosperous, to assume their share of the
increasingly heavy burden of peacekeeping.
Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil particularly are coming under closer
scrutiny from other UN members. Apart from their economic power,
they project a high political profile at the UN: Venezuela completed a
two-year term on the Security Council in 1992–93, while Brazil was a
member in 1993–94.

Venezuela

Venezuela’s first ever participation was in UNIKOM, where it pro-

vided a handful of military observers. As of November 1994 only six
Venezuelans were serving as military observers in four operations.38
Considering its high profile in the Security Council, particularly
regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, its efforts to put the issue of Haiti
onto the Council agenda and its highly visible role in the peace pro-
cesses in El Salvador and Haiti as one of the four Friends of the
38 UNIKOM (2), ONUSAL (1), MINURSO (1) and UNPROFOR (2). See ‘United Nations
peace-keeping’ (note 3).
112 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Secretary-General, more might be expected. It is anxious to enhance

its international profile, but it is equally clear that this ambition is
unlikely to be accompanied soon by the dispatch of larger numbers of
troops to UN operations or increased financial contributions.
Venezuela’s military has been weakened by a top-heavy structure,
inter-service rivalries, lack of organizational goals and motivation
during a long period of democratic rule, and a purge of the armed
forces after the attempted military coup of February 1992. Other
domestic woes are also likely to keep Venezuela preoccupied. Social
discontent arising from the inequitable distribution of income and
wealth after economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s and fiscal mis-
management have meant that the current government spends much
effort on maintaining and consolidating its power and trying to con-
tain domestic political unrest. Sending troops abroad would deplete
the military force available for operations at home during a crucial
period. Sending troops to UN operations or making additional finan-
cial contributions to UN efforts to settle conflicts abroad would also
further alienate a population which feels that its government should
concentrate on domestic difficulties. 39
At the UN Venezuela has been critical of the Security Council’s
prerogatives: ‘The large majority of UN Members does not participate
in the decision-making process to authorize an operation, although
they are being asked to participate and to contribute to the operations’
financing’. 40 Taking into consideration this view as well as the
domestic situation, it seems optimistic to expect a larger contribution
from Venezuela to future UN peacekeeping.

Mexico

Mexico is another country that should be in a position to participate in

more UN operations since, notwithstanding recent setbacks, it has
made huge economic strides over the last decade and is very active at
the UN. Even more forcefully than Venezuela, Mexico rejects the
modus operandi of the Security Council and particularly the veto

39 Foreign Minister Ochoa Antich, Address to the UN General Assembly, New York,
1 Oct. 1993, UN document A/48/PV.12.
40 Statement by Ambassador Adolfo R. Taylhardat before the Fourth Committee of the
General Assembly New York on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole
question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects’, 30 Nov. 1993, UN document
A/C4/48/SR.25.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 113

power as being undemocratic. It also argues that instead of acting on

behalf of its constituency the Council has increasingly come to mon-
opolize the power ceded to it voluntarily by the UN membership.41
According to Mexico the Council’s first priority should be the
peaceful settlement of disputes. Its Foreign Minister told the General
Assembly in 1993: ‘The recent frequent recourse to the Security
Council has tended to hide the fact that our first obligation is to
resolve differences by peaceful means’.42 Mexico believes in ‘preven-
tive peacekeeping’, the focusing of UN efforts on economic and
social development: ‘Peacekeeping operations are the final recourse
in the search for peace. We should admit that their proliferation is due
to our failure [at] building a better and more just society’. 43 Mexico
has tartly observed of traditional peacekeeping that ‘we should
recognize that the quantitative and qualitative build-up of such
operations has not proportionally resulted in a more peaceful or more
harmonious world’.44
In view of the Security Council’s exclusive power to establish
peacekeeping operations, Mexico, in consistency with the principle of
‘no taxation without representation’, considers that Council members
have the prime responsibility for implementing its decisions, includ-
ing providing the necessary troops. Yet in cases where Mexico is
actively involved in the search for a peaceful settlement, its level of
commitment is clearly higher. This was so in El Salvador, where the
Mexican Government hosted the negotiations between the govern-
ment of El Salvador and the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional), was one of the four Friends of the Secretary-
General and acted as facilitator. ONUSAL, the subsequent UN opera-
tion, is the only one to which Mexico has deployed military observers;
it has also extended cooperation and facilities for training the new
civilian police of El Salvador. Similar involvement may occur in
Guatemala now that negotiations between the government and the
URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca) have come
to a successful first conclusion. As a neighbour, Mexico has again
41 Address by Mr Fernando Solana, Foreign Minister of Mexico, to UN General
Assembly, New York, 29 Sep. 1993, UN document A/48/PV.9.
42 Address by Mr Fernando Solana (note 41).
43 Statement by Mr Héctor Cárdenas Suárez to the Fourth Committee of the General
Assembly on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keep-
ing operations in all their aspects’, New York, 29 Nov. 1993, UN document A/C.4/48/SR.24.
44 Statement by Ambassador Daniel de la Pedraja to the UN Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations, New York, 30 Mar. 199. Unpublished.
114 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

hosted the negotiations and shown a keen interest in settling this

conflict. It may also be willing to contribute to the implementation of
the agreements, although the involvement of neighbouring countries
in peacekeeping operations is usually kept to a minimum in order to
avoid cross-border friction.

Brazil

Some 30–40 years ago Brazil participated in two UN operations,45 but

it was only recently, following a period of impressive economic
growth, two decades of authoritarian rule and its gradual return to
democratic normalcy, that Brazil again joined the ranks of UN troop
contributors. Brazil’s term as a non-permanent Security Council
member for the 1993–94 period and its claim to one of the permanent
seats should the Council be enlarged might be linked to its renewed
participation, but equally important has been the special responsibility
it feels for UN operations in two Portuguese-speaking countries,
Angola and Mozambique. In November 1994 total Brazilian staff in
peacekeeping operations numbered 156,46 over half of them in Angola
and Mozambique.
From official statements, it is clear that Brazil considers present UN
peacekeeping practices problematic, particularly the growing recourse
to enforcement actions under Chapter VII. To correct this Brazil
advocates principles which should govern UN operations and which
would help confine mandates to traditional peacekeeping. It has also
expressed concern about the blurring of objectives:
While in many cases peacekeeping operations are conducted in support of
humanitarian and development assistance programmes, we should be
cautious to not confuse their respective mandates and objectives. Besides the
conceptual difficulties involved, the integration of the humanitarian compo-
nent in the peacekeeping operations, as important as it might be in some
instances, can multiply the logistics and planning problems of all too often
over-stretched missions.47

45 From 1956 to 1967 a total of 6300 Brazilian troops were deployed in Suez as part of
UNEF I. Brazil also participated during 1960–64 in the UN operation in the Congo.
46 ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
47 Statement by Minister Edgard Telles Ribeiro to the Fourth Committee of the General
Assembly on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-
keeping operations in all their aspects’, New York, 29 Nov. 1993 (note 43).
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 115

Brazil considers peacekeeping operations a ‘valuable conflict man-

agement technique’, but rightly believes that they do not ‘by them-
selves constitute a full-fledged security system’.48 Brazil would like to
see more ‘preventive peacekeeping’ and more emphasis by the UN on
economic and social development. It has often expressed dismay that
a country apparently needs to go through conflict and war before
being considered ripe for ‘peace building’—that is, assistance with
economic and social reconstruction. Despite these doubts Brazil has
affirmed that it is ‘working with a view to increasing substantially’ its
participation in peacekeeping. A major difficulty is the need to obtain
parliamentary approval for troop participation, a process that can take
up to a year. This explains why Brazil’s deployments have until rela-
tively recently been limited to military observers. Efforts to stream-
line the approval process are reportedly under way.
Brazil’s efforts to increase its participation significantly are as yet
untested. Public opinion is more concerned with domestic socio-
economic problems and support for the government to increase its
commitments abroad is only beginning to emerge. A February 1994
article by Brazil’s Permanent Representative to the UN entitled ‘Hard
times for the United Nations’ aimed to raise domestic awareness of
UN issues. While it was critical of aspects of the UN, particularly of
the Security Council, it concluded that:
Brazil has done its part. It has fully performed the multilateral role that is
expected from the semi-continental size of the country, from the talents and
work of its population, from its regional significance, from the tradition of
its foreign policy and from its adherence to the great causes of democracy,
socio-economic development and human rights.49

VII. Africa: a continent in need of peacekeepers

Although African nations have a tradition of providing troops to the
UN, the instability of African countries has recently made this conti-
nent the largest recipient of UN peacekeeping troops. UN forces are at
present deployed in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda

48 Statement by Ambassador Henrique R. Valle to the UN Special Committee on Peace-

keeping Operations, New York, 31 Mar. 199. Unpublished.
49 Sardenberg, R. M., ‘Tempos difíceis para as Nações Unidas’ [Hard times for the United
Nations], O Estado de São Paulo, Caderno 1, Espaço aberto São Paulo, 4 Feb. 1994, p. A2
(in Portuguese).
116 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

and Western Sahara. While Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and

Tunisia have been traditional troop contributors for years, there have
been few newcomers. Egypt, Morocco, Namibia and Zimbabwe have
recently come forward.

Morocco

Morocco’s motivation may be linked to its membership of the

Security Council in 1992–93 and to its desire to improve its standing
in the international community which has been tarnished by its efforts
to obtain control of Western Sahara and to tilt the political and mili-
tary balance there in its favour. Morocco had 1382 troops in Somalia
and civilian police in UNTAC, but, despite Africa’s increasing need
for troops, no major offers have been made.50 One of Morocco’s
problems has been the UN’s handling of peacekeeping operations:
We wish to stress the need for the Security Council and the UN Secretariat
to incorporate in their approach an in-depth analysis of the socio-cultural
component of the intended intervention zone . . . ignorance or misunder-
standing of the human dimension could delay the establishment of a just and
lasting peace, and would thus prove costly to the Organization in human and
financial terms.51

Morocco has welcomed the Secretary-General’s recommendations

about peacemaking and peacekeeping but considers it ‘imperative’ to
clarify these concepts, believing that a consensus genuinely reflecting
the concerns of all members of the international community does not
yet exist. Concerning the human rights component in UN operations,
for example, Morocco has pointed out that ‘the political dimension of
human rights should not prevail over the social and economic one,
which covers the basic needs of man including food, clothing, health
care and shelter’. 52 This does not augur well for future contributions
from Morocco, and UNOSOM II and UNTAC might remain isolated
examples.

50 On 30 Nov. 1994, 2 civilian policemen from Morocco were involved in UNAVEM II.
See ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).
51 Statement by Abdelhakim el Amrani to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly
on agenda item 87, ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping opera-
tions in all their aspects’, New York, 30 Nov. 1993 (note 40).
52 Address by Foreign Minister Abdellatif Filali to the UN General Assembly, New York,
27 Sep. 1993, UN document A/48/PV.4.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 117

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s main contribution has also been to UNOSOM II (994

soldiers),53 but a handful of military observers have also been sent to
three other African UN operations.54 President Robert Mugabe’s
address to the UN General Assembly in 1993 underlined Zimbabwe’s
commitment to the African continent and argued in favour of UN
cooperation with regional organizations, particularly the Organization
of African Unity (OAU). While challenging Western domination of
the Security Council and urging reform of the system to allow for
more participation and transparency, President Mugabe nevertheless
stated:
As equal members of this family of nations, we believe that peacekeeping,
peace-building and peacemaking must not be the preserve of a few econom-
ically or politically powerful countries. We stand ready to cooperate with the
international community in seeking solutions to the many problems facing
the world today, by participating in peacekeeping operations or mediation
efforts, or by providing any facilities or expertise at our disposal. However,
unless all member states commit themselves to timely payments of their
assessed contributions for these efforts, some countries will find continued
participation difficult. 55

Zimbabwe’s contribution must be seen against the background of its

late attainment of statehood, roughly 20 years after most other African
countries. Hence it has focused from the beginning on a strong com-
mitment to the total liberation of the African continent. Zimbabwe
held the chairmanship of the NAM in 1985–88 and has been a posi-
tive, integrating force in the OAU. Its move into the UN arena and
participation in UN peacekeeping operations, albeit with a regional
emphasis, is therefore a logical progression and will probably con-
tinue.

Egypt

The most prominent African country to have recently joined the ranks
of major contributors is Egypt, which in the latter half of 1993 alone

53 ‘United Nations peace-keeping’ (note 3).

54 UNAVEM II, UNAMIR and UNOMUR.
55 Address by President Robert Mugabe to the UN General Assembly, New York, 28 Sep.
1993, UN document A/48/PV.7.
118 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

doubled its participation, mostly in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzego-

vina. As of 31 December 1993, Egypt had 2200 UN personnel in
Somalia (1711), Bosnia and Herzegovina (446), Mozambique (20),
Liberia (15) and Western Sahara (8).
Several factors can account for this change. First, the settlement of
the Arab–Israeli conflict eliminated a major preoccupation and
allowed Egypt to focus on other, external issues. Second, Egypt has a
strong sense of political responsibility, anchored in history, of which
its concern over the situation in Somalia, for example, is proof. It was
a founding member not only of the UN but also of the OAU, the
League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence. Helping other African nations is a matter of obligation, prestige
and pride. Egypt also considers it its duty to come to the assistance of
other Muslim nations, which explains why the majority of its forces
were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia. Its increased par-
ticipation can also be attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s per-
sonal intercession with President Hosni Mubarak to provide Egyptian
troops at short notice. As no parliamentary approval is needed, the
president, in consultation with the minister of defence, can quickly
decide on each deployment.
One reason is undoubtedly financial. The economic situation in
Egypt has deteriorated to such an extent that the government is hard
pressed to provide the armed forces with their accustomed standard of
living. The monthly reimbursement by the UN of some $1000 per
soldier per month is princely in a country with an average annual per
capita income of $610. UN assignments are therefore highly coveted
and officers are known to have volunteered for lower-rank assign-
ments in order to be eligible for UN duty. The actual financial
rewards have been meagre so far, however, since payments from the
UN have been slow and disputes have developed over the reimburse-
ment rate for ‘contingent-owned equipment’. In mid-1994 Egypt was
owed $4.6 million by the UN for troop costs alone and has threatened
to withdraw its forces if the arrears are not paid.56 It has been vocifer-

56 Troop costs are, in fact, the tip of the iceberg and only amounted to a total of $334.8
million which the UN owes to 61 member states (as of 31 Dec. 1993). Reimbursements for
‘contingent-owned equipment’ account for the greater part. Egypt, for example, claims from
the UN $103 million for equipment used by its troops in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.
While a country like Egypt can ill afford such arrears, even relatively prosperous Singapore
has repeatedly complained about the outstanding reimbursement of $1 million for medical
helicopters provided to UNTAC.
 NEW AND EM ER GING P EAC EKEEP ER S 119

ous in criticizing Western countries for not paying their peacekeeping

assessments on time.57
As a heavily militarized country where the government is in control
‘at the sufferance of the army’, as one diplomatic observer put it,
sending troops abroad at a time when there is no external threat helps
Egypt to prevent military unrest and keep its government in power.
Moreover there is general approval of the government’s peacekeeping
policy. The presence of Egyptian troops in Somalia was a matter of
national pride and referred to in the press as ‘a situation that does us
honour’.58 The death of an Egyptian soldier in Somalia was seen as
the necessary price to be paid for such engagements.
The most powerful motivation for Egypt’s involvement may be its
aspiration to be a major international player:
Egypt—which is undertaking an effective role within the international order
in the formulation of regional and international relations and in establishing
the concepts and principles on which we all agree, in addition to its partici-
pation in numerous peacekeeping operations on several continents—has the
right and the potential to contribute to the proposed restructuring of the
United Nations. Egypt has the desire and determination to take part in both
the process itself and in setting the standards and values to be used in the
process. Egypt believes that it has now gained the requisite standing to be
included within the framework of the ongoing discussion and within the new
membership.59

Egypt will undoubtedly use its participation in UN peacekeeping

operations to continue to press its claims for higher standing in the
international community.

VIII. Conclusion
As the above cases show, domestic considerations are the prime factor
motivating a country to contribute or not to contribute troops to UN
peacekeeping operations. While pressure from a major outside power
or within a security alliance may occasionally tilt the balance, this is

57 As of 31 Jan. 1994 the UN was owed $2.7 billion by member states, of which $1.4
billion was for peacekeeping. The total peacekeeping bill for 1993 amounted to $3 billion.
58 al-Ahram, 15 Feb. 1994, p. 1 and 16 Feb. 1994, p. 1.
59 Foreign Minister Amre Moussa, Address to the UN General Assembly, New York,
27 Sep. 1993, UN document A/48/PV.5.
120 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

clearly of less consequence. International ambitions, regional security,

ideological or religious factors and economic interests are paramount.
A rapid increase in the number of casualties suffered by UN troops
has affected troop availability. It is harder for governments to defend
the deaths of their soldiers on distant battlefields. The ‘noble cause’ of
peacekeeping has received some dents in the former Yugoslavia and
Somalia. Moreover, a large number of states do not subscribe to the
current peacekeeping philosophy and practice, as an examination of
the above countries has shown. Some nevertheless contribute troops
while waiting for a new consensus to emerge, while others, out of
principle, do not. The expansion of mandates and new tasks given to
UN operations have added to the difficulties of recruiting new peace-
keepers.
Among the remedies currently being discussed—providing better
training and equipment, encouraging the establishment of additional
national (or regional) peacekeeping training centres—the most prom-
ising is national stand-by arrangements, first proposed by President
François Mitterrand of France and endorsed by the Secretary-General
in his 1992 Agenda for Peace.60 While this would undoubtedly speed
up deployment of UN forces, ultimately the total number of UN
peacekeeping troops in the field will fall. The quagmires of the former
Yugoslavia and Somalia have made the international community cau-
tious. No large-scale UN operations are being considered at present,
although the situation in several countries could qualify for inter-
vention on a massive scale. Which will the international community
take up?

60 UN, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping,

Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/47/277, S/24111, 17 June 1992.
7. The Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Jerzy M. Nowak*

I. A glance at the recent past

Like other international bodies, the CSCE—from January 1995 the
OSCE1 —faced the new post-cold war risks, challenges and unconven-
tional situations unprepared. It had no concepts, instruments or
structures to deal with the post-communist transformation: the disin-
tegration of the bipolar East–West system, the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the explosion of nationalist fervour, large-scale violations of
human rights, local conflicts rooted in ethnic and religious animosi-
ties, regional wars and other dangers.
Before 1989 the CSCE process managed partially to alleviate the
burdens of the East–West divide, open channels of communication,
contribute to military security and establish norms of cooperation
between states. It also developed the important concept that a state’s
internal actions are the legitimate business of other nations if they
affect political freedom and human rights. The historic changes of
1989 exhausted its traditional agenda of the mid-1970s and from then
on the CSCE searched for a new identity. While maintaining its basic
values and procedures, it turned mainly to preventive diplomacy and
crisis and conflict management and resolution.
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 1990 embod-
ied expectations of an increased CSCE role in solving European
problems in the new depolarized system. However, the euphoria that
followed the 1989 ‘autumn of the peoples’ did not favour rational
analysis of the looming threats and risks. Hence the Charter of Paris
and its Supplementary Document did not even refer to peacekeeping.2

1 Here called the CSCE for the period up to the end of 1994 and OSCE from 1 Jan. 1995.
2 Many of the CSCE documents referred to are reproduced in Bloed, A. (ed.), The
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents,
1972–1993 (Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 1993). The Charter of Paris is repro-
duced in SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1991), pp. 603–10.

* This chapter represents the personal views of the author and not those of his
government.
122 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

However, it did formulate a mandate allowing some forms of external

droit de regard over internal affairs in respect of human rights. It also
inaugurated CSCE structures which in time would begin to respond to
the new challenges. This was the first indication that the CSCE was
changing from a forum for dialogue and negotiation to an operational
structure.
Of all the international bodies the CSCE has changed most in the
post-cold war period in response to the pressures of the new era. It has
ceased to be the ‘Helsinki process’, a discussion club or a nascent
international organization and has been transformed into a regional
security arrangement as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
based on well-defined common values and political obligations.3 By
declaring itself a regional arrangement, the CSCE established a link
not only with the UN as an institution but also between the European
and global security systems.
The conflict prevention and peacekeeping ethos of what is now the
OSCE is based on cooperation, persuasion and a painstaking search
for consensus. These characteristics are simultaneously its strength
and its weakness—strength, because consultation and consensus
building allow it to mobilize the whole of the OSCE community,
including the parties in conflict, to cooperate in applying democratic
standards, to focus on the root causes of problems and to seek
common solutions to conflicts; weakness, because the OSCE process
is slow as it tries to persuade parties to cooperate instead of punishing
violations of agreed standards or attempting to enforce the peace. This
distinguishes the OSCE’s approach from that of the UN. The OSCE
is, however, still in search of its own niche in international efforts
aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution, including
peacekeeping. Peacekeeping should be seen as an integral part of its
overall concept of the management of change.4 Traditional UN-style
peacekeeping is at present not at the forefront of OSCE actions but is
in the planning stages and may yet assume significance.

3 Rotfeld, A. D., ‘The CSCE: towards a security organization’, SIPRI Yearbook 1993:
World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), pp. 171–89;
and Szafarz, R., ‘CSCE: an international organization in statu nascendi?’, Legal Aspects of a
New European Infrastructure (Netherlands Helsinki Committee: Utrecht, 1992), pp. 15–21.
4 ‘The CSCE and the management of change’ from the Helsinki Summit Declaration of
July 1992, part of the Helsinki Document 1992. See ‘CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992: The
Challenges of Change’, ed. Bloed (note 2), pp. 18–47; and excerpts published in SIPRI
Yearbook 1993 (note 3), pp. 190–209.
 THE OS C E 123

II. OSCE instruments for conflict prevention,

management and resolution
Early warning and conflict prevention

In accordance with the CSCE Helsinki Document of 10 July 1992,5

the CSCE and now the OSCE have experimented with various instru-
ments for early warning and conflict prevention. Five are identifiable,
and the first three are of particular importance:

1. A system of intensive and regular political consultations and dia-

logue on security challenges and conflict prevention has been created,
centred now on the Permanent Council in Vienna, the OSCE’s first
permanent body for political consultation and decision making. Early
warning instruments also include regular implementation debates (in
particular on human rights), confidence- and security-building meas-
ures (CSBMs) and the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, which has become a real
conflict prevention instrument in the OSCE human dimension.
2. ‘Mechanisms’ have been devised to mobilize concerted action. In
the military field these include the Vienna Mechanism on unusual
military activities and the mechanism for discussion and clarification
of hazardous military incidents.6 In the human dimension they consist
of the Moscow Mechanism with its set of obligatory procedures for
examining human rights violations, including bilateral meetings, the
provision of information and invitation of an OSCE mission of
experts.7 In the political field an example is the Berlin Mechanism,
also obligatory, which provides for requests for clarification, informa-
tion and meetings at short notice in emergency situations.8 Unfor-
tunately they have been little used. In March 1994 the CSCE Perma-
nent Committee began discussions on ways of improving their effec-
tiveness and these initial discussions made some progress towards
consolidating the existing mechanisms, making their use obligatory in
5 See note 4.
6 Established by the Vienna Document 1990 on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures, section II (Risk Reduction), paras 17 and 18. See SIPRI Yearbook 1991 (note 2),
pp. 477–78.
7 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, Moscow, 3 Oct. 1991, para. 2,
8 CSCE, First Meeting of the CSCE Council, 19–20 June 1991, Summary of conclusions,
Annex 2, Mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situation,
CSCE document [CSCE, 20 June 1991].
124 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

a wider range of circumstances and enhancing awareness of the

potential of the mechanisms. By mid-1995, however, concrete steps
had still not been taken.
3. A High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was
appointed as an instrument for conflict prevention at the earliest stage,
to provide early warning and propose early action.9
A successful record has been achieved through the discreet diplo-
macy of Max van der Stoel, in particular in the Baltic states, Albania,
Hungary, Macedonia and Slovakia. His activities in the CIS have con-
centrated on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine (Crimea). In his
work he has gone beyond early warning to an early containment phase
in response to political needs in the field.10
4. Legal instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes have
been developed, including the Convention on Conciliation and Arbit-
ration, signed by 33 states (which had not yet entered into force in
mid-1995)11 and a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The latter, known as the Valletta Procedure or Mechanism, envisages
a third-party function to reconcile differing positions and prevent dis-
putes from escalating.12
None of these instruments has been used so far, since they are prob-
ably considered by the interested parties as excessively intrusive and
likely to formally highlight a conflict instead of allowing resort to
more discreet and subtle action. They are periodically critically
reviewed for their effectiveness and utility.
5. New ‘stabilizing measures’ of a military nature for application in
localized crisis situations were agreed by the CSCE’s Forum for
Security Co-operation (FSC) in November 1993.13 They comprise a
list of voluntary stabilizing measures intended to facilitate decision
making and the search for specific, short-term measures in support of

9 CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992 (note 6), Helsinki Decisions, section 23. On the first
stage of the High Commissioner’s activities, see CSCE, Office of the Secretary General,
Annual Report 1993 on CSCE Activities, 30 Nov. 1993, pp. 10–11.
10 van der Stoel, M., ‘Preventing conflict and building peace: a challenge for the CSCE’,
NATO Review, no. 4 (1994), p. 16.
11 ‘CSCE, Decisions of Stockholm Council Meeting (14–15 Dec. 1992), Convention on
Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE’, ed. Bloed (note 2), pp. 870–99.
12 ‘CSCE, Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,
Valletta, 8 Feb. 1991’, ed. Bloed (note 2), pp. 567–81; and ‘Modification to section V of the
Valletta Procedure in the Stockholm Council Meeting Decisions’, ed. Bloed (note 2), p. 689.
13 CSCE, 49th Plenary Meeting of the Special Committee of the CSCE Forum for Security
Co-operation, Vienna, 24 Nov.–1 Dec. 1993, ‘Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situa-
tions’, FSC Journal, 24 Nov. 1993, no. 49, Annex 2.
 THE OS C E 125

a political reconciliation process. They range from various forms of

military information exchange, through local demilitarization, to on-
site verification and monitoring.

Among the above instruments the most successful and effective to

date have been the consultation system, which permits constructive
‘internationalization’ of a problem, and two institutions—the HCNM
and the ODIHR.

Conflict management

The OSCE conflict management concept has been developed pro-

gressively and pragmatically. The available instruments and modali-
ties have been adjusted to the emerging challenges.
Overall responsibility for applying crisis management instruments
rests with the OSCE’s political bodies, in particular the Chairman-in-
Office (CIO), aided where necessary by the previous and next chair-
men working together as the ‘Troika’ and by the Senior Council and
Permanent Council. They consider possible or actual conflicts, initiate
courses of action and supervise them. The Secretariat has been opera-
tional since September 1993 and has been increasing its role in sup-
port of crisis management. The functions of the Conflict Prevention
Centre (CPC) have never quite corresponded to its name, as it deals
mainly with OSCE peace mission support and the functioning of the
CSBM regime.
To date the OSCE has dealt with conflict situations in Estonia,
Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian Federa-
tion (Chechnya), Tajikistan, Ukraine (Crimea) and the former Yugo-
slavia. Participation of the parties to the conflict in the OSCE efforts
is an important feature. The objective is to establish a permanent
framework for conflict management and resolution and to assist the
parties to conduct a dialogue. Three types of activity have been under-
taken.

1. Ad hoc steering groups have been created to deal with specific

conflicts. The Minsk Group,14 set up to mediate and attempt to settle
the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, is one example.
14 Set up in Mar. 1992 and originally consisting of Armenia and Azerbaijan (the parties to
the conflict), Czechoslovakia, Italy and Sweden (the 3 members of the CSCE Troika at the
time the Group was set up), Belarus, France, Germany, Russia, Turkey and the USA.
126 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

2. Personal representatives of the CIO and OSCE peace missions

have been dispatched to the field to offer their good offices, monitor
situations, help avert political conflicts, mainly of an internal nature,
and assist in democracy-building. By mid-1995 nine such missions
and one ‘Assistance Group’ (in Grozny) had been established.
In the former Yugoslavia the OSCE has taken the lead in defining
humanitarian standards that must apply even in situations of conflict.
The objectives of the missions of long duration to Kosovo, Sanjak and
Vojvodina (August 1992–July 1993) included inter alia monitoring
violations of human rights and providing the local population with a
kind of ombudsman service.15 In June 1994 the mission in Sarajevo
was established. Its main purpose is to support the ombudsmen
appointed by the OSCE after consultation with the President and
Vice-President of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They remain in contact
with international and non-governmental organizations and report to
the OSCE on matters pertaining to the human dimension of the
conflict. An innovative step was taken when the Spillover Monitor
Mission to Skopje was deployed in September 1992 to prevent a spill-
over of the conflict to other parts of the former Yugoslavia. It includes
military observers and cooperates with UNPREDEP, the Macedonia
Command of UNPROFOR. The Sanctions Assistance Missions, with
field support from the WEU, have provided innovative operational
experience approximating to preventive diplomacy.
In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union
missions have been established in Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova
and Tajikistan.
The Mission to Georgia was installed in Tbilisi on 3 December
1992. The mandate envisaged initiation of discussions with the lead-
ership of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, liaison with
local military commanders in support of the existing cease-fire, the
gathering of information on the military situation and the investiga-
tion of violent incidents. It also envisaged that the mission would seek
to work out a negotiating framework for the Abkhazian conflict, but
the lead role in this case was assumed by the UN, which showed no
interest in OSCE involvement. In March 1994 a new mandate for the
Mission to Georgia was established, including monitoring of the joint
Slovakia succeeded Czechoslovakia and was then replaced by Hungary in Dec. 1993; Switz-
erland was added in Dec. 1994 and Finland in Apr. 1995. See also section IV of this chapter.
15 The mission was withdrawn on the insistence of Belgrade in July 1993 but continues to
operate formally from Vienna as an open-ended ad hoc group which shares information.
 THE OS C E 127

peacekeeping forces, composed mainly of Russian contingents, estab-

lished by the Sochi Agreement of 24 June 1992. This created the
precedent of a certain form of cooperation with a third party in a con-
flict, in this case the CIS.
In April 1993 a mission was deployed in Moldova to help achieve a
comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in Trans-Dniester. It
established contacts with the Moldovan Government in Cisinau and
with the Trans-Dniester leadership in Tiraspol. The CSCE mission to
Tajikistan was installed in Dushanbe in February 1994 with the main
task of facilitating dialogue and confidence building between the
government and the Islamic opposition. Two small-scale missions to
Estonia (December 1992) and Latvia (September 1993) were aimed at
helping these nations to rebuild their civil societies and develop a dia-
logue with their Russian-speaking communities. Their activities
embraced inter alia citizenship issues, legislation concerning aliens,
local government elections and round tables as vehicles for national
dialogue.16 In August 1994 the CSCE sent a mission to Ukraine to
facilitate dialogue between the central government and the Crimean
authorities concerning the autonomous status of the Republic of
Crimea within Ukraine. Finally, in April 1995 the OSCE sent an
Assistance Group to Chechnya to ‘promote the peaceful resolution of
the crisis and the stabilization in the Chechen republic’.17
3. The OSCE has legitimized or given support to action undertaken
by other international organizations. It endorsed small but innovative
operations like the deployment of the European Community (EC)
Monitoring Mission to the former Yugoslavia and ‘welcomed’ the
establishment of a military patrol operation on the Danube by the
WEU to monitor sanctions compliance, thereby according the mission
greater legitimacy.
4. The OSCE may establish its own peacekeeping operations. It and
the UN are the only bodies in Europe vested with the power to con-
duct peacekeeping, although in the OSCE’s case without enforcement

16 A round table was established by the President of Estonia in July 1993; the CSCE
mission played an active part in the drafting of its statute and as a legal adviser.
17 On missions and their mandates, see OSCE, Conflict Prevention Centre, Survey of
OSCE long-term missions, local OSCE representatives and Sanctions Assistance Missions,
OSCE document REF.SEC/64/95, 15 May 1995; Rotfeld, A. D., ‘Europe: the multilateral
security process’, SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International
Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), pp. 290–94; and Carlsson, S. (ed.), The
Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: the Experience of the CSCE (Ministry for Foreign
Affairs: Stockholm, 1994).
128 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

action. Chapter III of the 1992 Helsinki Decisions set politically

binding commitments by which participating states declared that
peacekeeping activities are politically possible and legitimate as an
instrument for conflict prevention and crisis management. In the
absence of UN Security Council authorization, the OSCE would need
the consent of the state on whose territory such an operation was to be
conducted.
These diversified activities are the result of a pragmatic approach
by the OSCE to the management of conflicts. The mandates and
modalities of such peace missions are slowly producing OSCE
doctrine in this field, part of which relates to peacekeeping.

III. The OSCE’s peacekeeping doctrine

The intellectual and political origins of OSCE peacekeeping may be
found in the Charter of Paris of 1990 and its idea of ‘common efforts
in the field of military security’. However, the Charter did not develop
this idea. The term ‘peacekeeping’ appeared for the first time in
CSCE vocabulary in the Prague Document on Further Development
of CSCE Institutions and Structures adopted by the Council in Prague
in January 1992. The Council asked the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting
‘to give careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping
or a CSCE role in peacekeeping’.18
The discussions that followed in Vienna revealed that a number of
states were in favour of undertaking traditional peacekeeping missions
based on military participation within the CSCE framework. Others
argued that the CSCE had very limited organizational capacity to
embark on such an endeavour. They were even opposed to the idea of
creating middle-sized monitoring missions of up to 500 members with
a mandate to observe and monitor a cease-fire. Their conclusion was
that larger military operations would require considerable investment
in equipment, logistics, communication and transport, which could be
arranged only through cooperation with NATO or the WEU. They
also argued that the CSCE was unprepared for any major financial or
material commitment in this respect. They preferred small-scale
missions centred on conflict prevention. This view prevailed.
It was interesting that the division of views did not initially run
along the usual line—between NATO members and other states. The
18 Bloed (note 2), p. 834.
 THE OS C E 129

only proposal tabled at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting which had the
term ‘peacekeeping’ in its title was submitted by a group of 14 coun-
tries on 6 April 1992. 19 A second, more cautious, proposal was put
forward as late as 3 June 1992 by Portugal on behalf of the EC.20 It
was also clear that the USA, which sponsored neither proposal, was
sceptical about the CSCE’s capabilities and favoured authorization for
the CSCE to use NATO whenever necessary.
The Helsinki Summit Declaration stated that the participating states
‘have provided for CSCE peacekeeping according to agreed modali-
ties’. This was an overstatement. Not much in fact was provided in
real terms except a set of rules, some of which were to be developed
further in Vienna. Its importance, however, rested in its declaration of
CSCE peacekeeping activities as possible and politically legitimate.
Chapter III of the Helsinki Decisions of 1992 was devoted to ‘Early
warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-
finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peacekeeping), [and]
peaceful settlement of disputes’. The subsection on CSCE peacekeep-
ing began with another overstatement: ‘Peacekeeping constitutes an
important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE
for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to comple-
ment the political process of dispute resolution’.21 This should be seen
as a declaration of intent rather than as a description of reality. There
was and continues to be a limited OSCE capability for conflict pre-
vention, and only a potential for peacekeeping as the term is under-
stood by the UN. However, an important step forward had been taken,
allowing later preparations for a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-
Karabakh to begin.22
The same subsection contained a detailed description of what a
CSCE operation might look like and provided a general mandate for
peacekeeping activities in cases of conflict within or between partici-
pating states. Depending on the political and military situation in the
mission area, such operations may comprise civilian and/or military
components, assuming a variety of forms, from observer and moni-
19 Austria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine. See CSCE,
Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, Peacekeeping under the auspices of the CSCE: an outline,
CSCE document CSCE/HM/WG.1, 6 Apr. 1992 (mimeographed).
20 CSCE, Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, Conflict prevention, crisis management and dis-
pute resolution, CSCE document CSCE/HM/WG.1/9/Rev. 1, 3 June 1992.
21 CSCE, Helsinki Document 1992 (note 4), Helsinki Decisions, sections III, 17–56.
22 See section V below.
130 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

toring missions to a larger deployment of forces, including battalion

size. Possible aims include: (a) supervision and assistance in moni-
toring cease-fires; (b) monitoring of troop withdrawals; (c) support
for the maintainance of law and order; (d) assistance in building civil
society, the settlement of conflicts with national and other minorities
and the establishment of a system of political and military CSBMs;
and (e) provision of humanitarian and medical aid and assistance for
refugees. None of these tasks should entail enforcement action, which
is reserved only for forces authorized by the UN Security Council, but
this restriction might be circumvented through bilateral cooperation
between the two organizations.
The Helsinki Decisions contained a number of self-imposed limita-
tions, for instance on tasks (the exclusion of peace enforcement), the
size of operations and decision-making processes (the prerogatives of
the UN Security Council were acknowledged). They also included
some preconditions such as the consent of ‘all parties concerned’, the
existence of a ‘durable’ cease-fire and a consensus decision by the
CSCE Council or the Committee of Senior Officials (from 1995 the
Senior Council). The Helsinki Decisions also dealt with a number of
detailed questions like chain of command, appointment of head of
mission, financial arrangements and cooperation with regional and
transatlantic organizations. In the latter case the Helsinki Document
authorized the CSCE to request the EC, NATO and the WEU, on a
case-by-case basis, to make their resources available in support of
peacekeeping activities. The CIS was also mentioned explicitly as a
‘mechanism’ to be approached for possible support.
On the basis of these decisions, considerable preparations for peace-
keeping have been made within the OSCE structures, but peace-
keeping operations in the traditional sense of the word have not yet
been initiated. At present what are commonly called OSCE peace-
keeping operations are long-term missions on a smaller or larger
scale, established to maintain favourable conditions for preventing
conflicts from breaking out or spreading as well as for facilitating
negotiations. Some have military officers on their staff. The Helsinki
Decisions regarding peacekeeping have so far mainly been used in
organizing and running these missions. The decisions on peace-
keeping have been made but await implementation. Preparatory work
has continued.
 THE OS C E 131

IV. The OSCE conflict management and peacekeeping

infrastructure
Peacekeeping operations or peace missions may be initiated by the
OSCE following a request by one or more participating states to the
CIO, Senior Council or Permanent Council. The Permanent Council,
a body permanently in session, is the main forum for consultations
concerning conflict management. It finalizes mandates for the mis-
sions, scrutinizes their day-to-day activities, reviews them regularly
and takes the necessary decisions on their conduct.
Decisions on peacekeeping operations require consensus and can be
taken only when all parties concerned have demonstrated their com-
mitment to creating favourable conditions for the operations and their
willingness to cooperate. This cooperative method is more effective as
it involves all interested parties, including the parties to the conflict,
but produces a relatively long decision-making process, especially in
cases of intra-state conflicts. In Nagorno-Karabakh the refusal of the
parties to consent to a peacekeeping operation continues to be the
main stumbling-block.
The CIO is responsible for initiating political consultations with the
parties concerned and does not require a consensus of the participat-
ing states to do this. The CIO may be assisted by the Troika, informal
steering groups established on a case-by-case basis, and personal rep-
resentatives designated by the CIO to provide support, in particular in
the initial phase. Promising experience has been gained with the use
of personal representatives of the CIO who, assisted by political and
military experts, may be sent to the area of conflict to assess the
possibilities for further engagement of the OSCE. The detailed tasks
of the personal representative include negotiations on the necessary
memoranda of understanding with the parties concerned and recon-
naissance of the political and military situation in the area, giving
special attention to the establishment and observance of an effective
and durable cease-fire and the prospects for a comprehensive political
solution. Personal representatives such as Adam Daniel Rotfeld
(Poland) in Moldova, Mathias Mossberg and Jan Eliasson (Sweden)
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Istvan Gyarmati (Hungary) in Georgia and
Chechnya and Olivier Roy (France) in Tajikistan have contributed
substantially to the OSCE conflict prevention and management pro-
cesses. The reports of the personal representatives, together with the
132 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

results of consultations within the Permanent Council, are usually the

main basis for the decision to dispatch a long-term peace mission.
Such a decision includes the adoption of a clear and precise mandate
and modalities.
Operational support to missions in the field is rendered by the
Section for Mission Support of the CPC, which provides logistical
and administrative follow-up to recommendations and keeps open a
24-hour point of contact with the missions. The Head of Mission is
nominated by and responsible to the CIO, to whom he is obliged to
report. In practice, however, day-to-day reporting is to the Permanent
Council. The Head of Mission has operational command in the
mission area and may appoint his own deputy.
The mandate and terms of reference constitute the main basis for
planning by the CPC. OCSE peace missions have so far been planned
with great efficiency and cost-effectiveness and there is some satis-
faction that its peacekeeping activities are not overburdened by
bureaucracy or costly by UN standards, although UN operations are
of course on a vastly greater scale and have not had the luxury of
advance planning such as the OSCE has had.
The costs of the operations are borne by all OSCE participating
states in accordance with the OSCE scale of contributions. Additional
voluntary contributions by participating states are also welcomed. In
some cases considerable financial and material support has been
given, mainly by the USA, the European Union, the Nordic states and
Japan (which has special status at the OSCE).23
The CPC has calculated the start-up costs for a hypothetical small-
scale mission consisting of eight members deployed at one base office
and three field posts for an initial period of three months. It is
assumed that accommodation would be provided by the host govern-
ment, local staff would be hired, and some office equipment would be
available locally. On this basis, estimated costs amount to approxi-
mately $400 000 per year. However, the larger mission of long dura-
tion to Georgia, comprising 20 members, costs $2 million per year.

23 According to the 1992 Helsinki Decisions, part IV, paras 9–11, Japan was invited to
attend CSCE meetings, including those of heads of state and government, the CSCE Council,
the Committee of Senior Officials (Senior Council) and other appropriate bodies which con-
sider specific topics of expanded consultation and cooperation. The latter means in particular
attendance at meetings of the Permanent Council and the FSC. Japan ‘may contribute’ to
such meetings but cannot participate in the preparation and adoption of decisions.
 THE OS C E 133

V. Challenges for the OSCE peacekeepers

Nagorno-Karabakh

In 1994 the CSCE began feasibility studies for deployment of a

multinational peacekeeping mission for the Nagorno-Karabakh con-
flict, which entered its armed phase in 1988 and intensified after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 1992, as a result of two
rapporteur missions to the region in January and March of that year,
the CSCE convened a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh in Minsk,
whose participants became known as the Minsk Group.24 The Minsk
Conference and the Minsk Group set a precedent for the CSCE.
From the very beginning the difficulty was harmonizing CSCE
efforts with those of the Russian Federation. This was solved formally
by establishing co-chairmanships of the Minsk Conference and the
Minsk Group.
On 12 May 1994 the parties reached agreement in Moscow on an
informal cease-fire. This enabled the CSCE to start to explore the
possibility of deploying a multinational peacekeeping force. In the
Budapest Document of the CSCE Review Conference and summit
meeting of December 1994 it was decided to establish a High Level
Planning Group (HLPG) in Vienna to make recommendations on the
size and characteristics of such a force, command and control arrange-
ments, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing
states.25 The decision was based on the assumption that the parties
would request and accept an OSCE peacekeeping mission, establish at
an early date an effective and durable cease-fire and confirm their
willingness to implement an agreement prepared by the Minsk Con-
ference on the cessation of armed conflict. The objectives of the
mission would be: (a) to monitor the implementation by the parties of
the agreement to end the conflict and to support political negotiations;
(b) to support the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities; and (c) to
support withdrawal of troops from occupied areas and create the
conditions for refugees to return.

24 See note 14.

25 CSCE, Budapest Declaration, Budapest Decisions, chapter II [CSCE, Dec. 1994]. The
HLPG, composed mainly of military experts, succeded the Initial Operation Planning Group
(IOPG) formed in May 1993 for the same purpose. It has done extensive planning and
adjusted it to the results of the work done by the Minsk Group.
134 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

The HLPG study outlined specific tasks and organizational aspects

for the mission. It envisaged a force structure of three infantry battal-
ions, two or three independent infantry companies, observers and
support and logistics units, totalling about 3000 personnel at a cost of
roughly $100 million for six months. Five phases were envisaged,
from pre-deployment to conclusion of the mission. While the tasks of
the mission would probably not include the provision of humanitarian
aid, it might be required to assist in the delivery of such aid. This
would not entail enforcement action.26
The HLPG helped establish the scale of the endeavour in terms of
numbers of personnel and requirements relating to safety, equipment,
budget, procurement and short-notice deployment. This led to much
behind-the-scenes criticism among OSCE participating states that the
OSCE was not prepared for such a large-scale operation and that it
would require inter alia the reconstruction and strengthening of the
HLPG and the CPC Mission Support Section and a radical increase in
the OSCE budget.27 Preferences were voiced for NATO logistical,
equipment and communication support, but there was no political
agreement on this either in the OSCE or in NATO. Obtaining pledges
of contributions for the operation was extremely difficult, particularly
for personnel costs.
In spite of these doubts and difficulties preparations proceeded. The
Special Representative of the CIO and field representatives were sent
to the area of conflict in mid-1995. The Minsk Group intensified its
peace efforts. The OSCE was by and large prepared on paper to
launch the operation but it was understood that it would be consider-
ably smaller, in terms of personnel, than initially planned.
The launching of the operation requires the consent of the parties to
the conflict, Russia and other major powers. At the time of writing,
this was still lacking, in particular that of the parties to the conflict.
Deployment may therefore be postponed until the spring of 1996:
severe winter conditions in the region make deployment in winter
very unlikely. The fate of the operation is widely regarded as an
important test for the credibility of the OSCE.

26 OSCE document 341/95, corrected version REF.CIO/23/95 Corr. 1, 27 June 1995,

known as the ‘Mission Statement’.
27 The entire budget of the OSCE in 1995 was only $34 million.
 THE OS C E 135

Possible ‘third party’ participation in OSCE peacekeeping

The CSCE and the OSCE have constantly favoured a coordinated

approach to actions undertaken by other states or regional structures.
The OSCE’s involvement in the settlement of conflicts on the terri-
tory of the former USSR has led to a new specific challenge, namely
whether and how to meet the Russian Federation’s demand for sup-
port for its ‘peacekeeping operations’, sometimes conducted under the
aegis of the CIS but with limited participation by other CIS members,
and conducted near Russia’s borders. Russia has shown in Moldova
and Tajikistan that it is willing to deploy its forces to ensure stability
in its conflict-troubled border areas.28 Some operations have in fact
prevented bloodshed, but have also resulted in the freezing of the
conflicts, as in the cases of Abkhazia, Moldova and Tajikistan.
Russian and/or CIS military operations, which are referred to by the
interested parties as ‘peacekeeping’, differ from UN or possible
OSCE peacekeeping operations. They may include various forms of
enforcement which in practice is decided by only one partner, Russia.
Since they are conducted by one state only or under the CIS umbrella,
they cannot be regarded as fully impartial. Such engagements are not
mandated by any international organization—the CIS has not yet been
recognized by the UN as a regional security arrangement under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter—and imply the maintenance of
Russian influence and control. Other OSCE states understand
Russia’s concerns over stability in its border areas but view them
strictly in terms of OSCE principles and recognize no special role,
rights or status for any territory which could imply that it was partly
exempted from the OSCE’s system of commitments.
Since early 1993 Russia has repeatedly indicated an interest in some
form of OSCE involvement in its peacekeeping operations, and par-
ticularly in some form of political legitimization and financial sup-
port. From the beginning Russia has hinted that the political and
material aspects of support were perhaps more important than legit-
imization. A request along those lines was made in November 1993 in
Vienna.29
28 Shustov, V., ‘Peacekeeping in the CSCE: the Russian view’, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5,
no. 2 (1994), pp. 7–10. This article also includes basic data reflecting the participation of
Russian military personnel in peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones.
29 Informal proposal by the delegation of the Russian Federation, ‘On interaction between
the CSCE and peacekeeping forces of the Russian Federation and CIS (provisions to be
included into the Rome Communiqué)’, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1993 (mimeographed).
136 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Judging from its statements in the OSCE and the UN, Russia may
be considering two approaches: (a) unilateral—peacekeeping within
its own borders and in some former Soviet republics by Russia itself
and at its own discretion; and (b) multilateral—ceding some responsi-
bility to CIS countries or to other states under UN or OSCE authoriza-
tion. It seems that priority is being given to the CIS, where Russia
plays a leading role, and to the UN where Russia has a stronger
position in decision making. This has led to further demands for a UN
or OSCE mandate for Russia to conduct peacekeeping operations on
the territory of the former Soviet Union, for international support for
such operations, and for recognition of the CIS as a partner in peace-
keeping operations on an equal footing with the UN, the OSCE or
NATO. Furthermore, peacekeeping in the ‘post-Soviet’ space has
often been linked to safeguarding the rights of the ‘Russian-speaking
population’, a term which has been used to include not only Russians
but other ethnic groups such as Belarussians and Ukrainians.
For other OSCE participating states, the Central and East European
states in particular, this problem demands a proper balance between
the requirements of stability and the strengthening of the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of the newly independent states. It is in the
interest of the OSCE states that a Russian stabilizing and peacekeep-
ing role should be approved only on the basis of UN and OSCE prin-
ciples, with control being exercised by international institutions and
interventions being based on the freely expressed agreement of inter-
ested states. Acceptance of a Russian role should also be conditional
on democratic domestic developments in Russia, especially the
strengthening of civil control over the military. Some states, in par-
ticular the Baltic countries and Ukraine, view this problem in the
larger context of the globalization of Russia’s national interests and of
possible recognition of a role for Russia as the guarantor of peace and
stability within the post-Soviet space.
On the other hand Russia has demonstrated that it is able to deploy
forces on the ground and that without its participation there is little
prospect of stability on most of the territory of the former USSR. No
other state has shown a willingness to send peacekeeping troops to
these trouble-spots. It has therefore been generally recognized that it
is in the interests of the international community to cooperate with
Russia in this matter, but on specific conditions: (a) that the OSCE
should be used as a forum for consultation before the initiation of any
 THE OS C E 137

Russian or CIS mission; (b) that the premises underlying such

missions should be based on the principles of international law and
OSCE norms of behaviour, in particular respect for the sovereignty of
states; and (c) that the OSCE should take on the political monitoring
or control of Russian and/or CIS missions and their operations.30
The Rome Council Meeting of the CSCE in December 1993
decided that ‘exceptionally, on a case-by-case basis and under
specific conditions, the CSCE may consider setting up a co-operative
arrangement in order, inter alia, to ensure that the role and functions
of the third-party military force in a conflict area are consistent with
CSCE principles and objectives’.31 The same decision also contained
criteria that such a cooperative arrangement would require: respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, the consent of the parties
involved, impartiality, multinational character, a clear mandate, trans-
parency and above all an integral link to a political process and a plan
for orderly withdrawal. The Council called for further work on this
issue.
Further efforts in the form of informal negotiations between the
Russian Federation and the other CSCE states failed to produce agree-
ment, mainly because Russia rejected the need for any international
legitimization of Russian and CIS peacekeeping operations and
insisted on the ‘proportionality’ principle. This meant that the degree
of involvement of OSCE monitoring missions in these Russian or CIS
operations was to be commensurate with their ‘political, financial and
other participation in the conduct of the third-party operations. Those
missions could be invited by parties to the conflict only on a volun-
tary basis and only with the consent of the third party’.32 This idea
was not accepted by most of the other CSCE partners, who empha-
sized that financial commitments could be undertaken only on a vol-
untary basis. Other ideas about a more institutionalized relationship
between the CSCE and Russian peacekeeping forces, such as joint
formulation of mission mandates or deployment of CSCE military
observers to monitor Russian troops’ implementation of their man-
date, did not win consensus. Intensive negotiations at the December
30 Seminar on CSCE Peacekeeping (note 29). These conclusions were later developed into
a negotiating document, initially by the Swedish CIO and in 1994 by the Italian CIO.
31 Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, section II, para. 2, reproduced in SIPRI
Yearbook 1994 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 260.
32 From an informal Russian Federation paper, ‘Further development of the capabilities of
the CSCE in conflict prevention and crisis management’, presented on 14 Mar. 1994 in
Vienna (mimeographed).
138 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

1994 Budapest Review Conference and Summit Meeting also failed

to produce a solution. The Budapest Document requested the Senior
Council and Permanent Council to pursue these efforts.33
The basis for negotiations continued to be an informal paper under
the somewhat euphemistic title ‘Further Development of the CSCE in
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management’, which contained the
results of more than a year of negotiations. 34 In 1995 this document
remained open for work, but negotiations were de facto suspended.
The protracted Chechnya crisis, the absence of a Russian decision on
possible OSCE involvement and a lack of enthusiasm among many of
the partners removed the incentives to continue efforts. Concerns that
the OSCE might be used by Russia as an instrument of its own policy
were not dispelled during the negotiations.

VI. Cooperation and division of labour with other

institutions
According to the 1992 Helsinki Document, OSCE peacekeeping oper-
ations are to be organized in cooperation with ‘regional and trans-
atlantic organizations’. In fact this is the only viable way of organ-
izing effective OSCE peacekeeping. There is therefore a strong trend
in the OSCE towards cooperative peacekeeping, which would reduce
the burden on the UN and its over-extension in Europe.
The objective of effective OSCE cooperation with other institutions
raises a number of questions. How can the overlapping of efforts and
competition between organizations be avoided? How are peacekeep-
ing duties and the use of force to be assigned to NATO, the WEU or
the CIS without excluding some participating states?
The OSCE should be the first organization to initiate preventive
diplomacy and peacemaking in situations involving its participating
states.
NATO and the WEU may function as the instruments authorized to
carry out specific tasks, while retaining their right to undertake their
own actions in line with their statutes (although this would require
new decisions on the future role of NATO in the European security
architecture and an enhancement of its peacekeeping functions). The

33 CSCE, Budapest Declaration, Budapest Decisions, chapter III [CSCE, Dec. 1994].
34 CSCE document no. 300. In Budapest it was revised for the 10th time. It was informal
and had the status of a Chairman’s perception of a possible compromise.
 THE OS C E 139

OSCE’s role should be to mandate and politically supervise the peace-

keeping actions of NATO and the WEU or to subcontract to them.
The OSCE can benefit from their resources and experience by
requesting them, for example, to contribute to its own peacekeeping
operations. Following the June 1992 Oslo ministerial decision, NATO
has opened its door to such cooperation.35 For OSCE peacekeeping
missions NATO could provide logistical, transport and communica-
tions support in the form of both equipment and manpower.
Both NATO and the WEU need to develop more extensive opera-
tional links with OSCE bodies if they are to participate in OSCE
peacekeeping operations. These links could be institutionalized by an
exchange of letters of understanding similar to that between the Chair
of the CSCE Council and the UN Secretary-General in May 1993. 36
To make such cooperation possible in the future, extensive discus-
sion and consultation at the conceptual level are required. An appro-
priate forum might be the NACC work programme for cooperation in
peacekeeping. It could also be used for the exchange of experience
and for promoting common training and the elaboration of common
standards and procedures. Questions, however, remain: will NACC be
able to develop operational capabilities? If it can, how will it interact
with the OSCE? With all its weaknesses the OSCE would appear to
be better equipped to fulfil operational tasks. A possible useful role
for NACC could therefore be that of mobilizing political support for
the goals set by the OSCE and helping to bring NATO into closer
interaction with the latter.
The WEU should continue its task of strengthening its relationship
with the European Union, while preserving NATO links and a US
presence in Europe. This should not prevent functional cooperation
with the OSCE, as exemplified by the enforcement of sanctions
against Serbia and Montenegro on the Danube.
The legitimization of the actions of the CIS is problematic because
it is not internationally recognized and because there is confusion
over its character and structure.
35 ‘Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June
1992’, NATO Review, vol. 40, no. 3 (June 1992), p. 31.
36 Framework for Co-operation and Co-ordination between the United Nations Secretariat
and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, constituting an attachment to
letters exchanged between UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and CSCE CIO
Margaretha af Ugglas on 26 May 1993 (mimeographed document distributed in Vienna on
27 May 1993 by the Swedish delegation); see also UN General Assembly resolution
A/48/L.19 of 12 Nov. 1993 on cooperation between the United Nations and the CSCE.
140 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

The OSCE could increase its peacekeeping effectiveness by estab-

lishing a clear division of labour with the UN. Unlike the UN, the
OSCE has no mandate to conduct enforcement operations. For the
time being, therefore, it must concentrate on preventive measures in
the early stages of intra-state conflicts, while the UN focuses more on
interstate conflicts and enforcement. This requires a further strength-
ening of OSCE–UN cooperation and the elimination of elements of
competition, such as those that have become evident in the OSCE
mission to Georgia. The agreement on cooperation of May 1993 has
not yet become an effective tool and in any case does not deal specifi-
cally with peacekeeping.
OSCE cooperation with other European and transatlantic institu-
tions awaits further exploration and appropriate political decisions.

VII. Conclusion
Three main conclusions may be drawn from the OSCE’s experience.
First, the OSCE approach to conflict prevention and management
and peacekeeping remains uneven. There are a number of political
achievements, such as those of missions in the field; the Assistance
Group in Chechnya has in particular strengthened the credibility of
the OSCE. Some important tasks and challenges, as in the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh, remain to be undertaken but much conceptual and
administrative work has been accomplished. There is a disproportion
between the verbal agreement of states to specific OSCE actions and
the means put at its disposal. Other weaknesses have come to light,
such as inadequate cooperation with NATO and the WEU and the
lack of appropriate operational, administrative and logistic infrastruc-
ture.
However, between 1992 and 1995 the OSCE has slowly built a
potential, which, although hardly noticed, may be used once the pol-
itical will appears.
Second, the OSCE provides a suitable framework for seeking solu-
tions to interstate and intra-state conflicts, being better equipped than
others to deal with the former. Its comprehensive concept of security,
linking human rights and political and military stability, offers a
potentially unique role in preventing and solving conflicts. To date it
has confined itself to politico-diplomatic or ‘soft’ measures of crisis
prevention and management, which it is best able to use effectively
 THE OS C E 141

and flexibly, namely early warning, fact-finding, rapporteur and

monitoring missions, good offices and possibly small-scale peace-
keeping operations, while leaving ‘hard’ measures or large-scale
peacekeeping to organizations better able to undertake such military
operations.37 Criticism of the OSCE for its crisis prevention record is
not always justified. It often reflects, as pointed out by Secretary
General Wilhelm Höynck, the tendency of the parties to a conflict to
hold the international community responsible for resolving their con-
flicts, in an attempt to hide their lack of readiness to compromise.38
The CSCE’s role, like that of other international organizations, is to
assist parties to a conflict to solve their own problems.
Third, OSCE participation in ‘hard’ or large-scale peacekeeping
with military involvement should not be ruled out completely. How-
ever, in such cases two conditions should be fulfilled. First, better use
should be made of cooperation between relevant organizations in
order both to legitimize actions taken and to ensure the provision of
mutual material support. Second, the operational and decision-making
capabilities of the OSCE should be further developed and strength-
ened, although without substantial departure from its cooperative
nature based on consensus about fundamental political issues.
The future role of the OSCE in peacekeeping remains hostage to at
least four political problems: protracted Western discussions on the
future of NATO, Russia’s inconsistent approach to the organization,
the dangers of renationalization of the defence policies of the major
international protagonists, and the OSCE’s unpreparedness to cooper-
ate effectively with other international organizations. However, the
OSCE has great potential which may be realized if and when the
major states decide to use it as an instrument to deal collectively with
the challenges ahead. This condition is more difficult to meet at a time
when multilateralism in the international security field is weakening.

37 Höynck, W., ‘CSCE works to develop its conflict prevention potential’, NATO Review,
no. 2 (Apr. 1994), pp. 16–22.
38 Höynck, W., ‘CSCE capabilities for contributing to conflict prevention and crisis
management’, Speech at the NATO Seminar in Brussels on 7 Mar. 1994 (mimeographed).
8. NATO
Steven R. Rader*

I. Introduction
For NATO peacekeeping is a new task, but it has received a great deal
of attention, both practically and conceptually, since 1992. The new-
ness of NATO’s involvement in peacekeeping may seem difficult to
understand given the extensive experience that many NATO members
have had in UN peacekeeping, military observers having served in the
earliest peacekeeping missions, UNTSO, established in 1948, and
UNMOGIP, established in 1949. When UNEF I was deployed in
Sinai in 1956, there were troops of NATO countries on both sides of
the lines: Canada, Denmark and Norway provided contingents to the
peacekeeping force, while France and the UK were belligerents.1 The
consistent pattern of support by NATO member states for UN peace-
keeping has continued to the present: they provide almost 50 per cent
of UNPF troops in the former Yugoslavia.
For much of its existence, however, NATO as an organization has
been focused almost exclusively on Article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty—collective defence against an armed attack on any member.2
The defence of the member states has been the highest priority and
will probably remain so. In recognition of the dramatic changes in
Europe since 1988, NATO has begun to make significant adjustments
as it prepares to meet future challenges. It is understood that the most
serious risks to alliance members may come from ethnic or religious
conflicts, border disputes or other problems which have the potential
for regional destabilization. 3 This changed environment prompted
NATO to conduct a major review of its strategy, with a resultant new
direction, the Strategic Concept, approved by NATO heads of state
1 UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (UN Department of
Public Information: New York, 1990), pp. 60–61.
2 NATO, NATO Handbook (NATO: Brussels, 1993), p. 144.
3 NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe, NATO doctrine for peace support
operations, 28 Feb. 1994, p. 3 (draft).

* Sections of this paper have appeared in Rader, S. R., ‘New roles for NATO: a
pragmatic approach to Alliance peace operations’, ed. R. Wedgwood, Regional
Organizations in Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (Council on Foreign
Relations: New York, 1995).
 NAT O 143

and government in November 1991. This called for a more flexible

approach in which crisis management and conflict prevention would
have a greater role.4

II. NATO’s formal acknowledgement of a new mission

In response to an initiative within the (then) CSCE5 to accept respons-
ibility for a range of peacekeeping activities, the NATO defence
ministers, meeting in May 1992, acknowledged the role NATO might
play in such CSCE actions.6 In June 1992 in Oslo the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) in ministerial session reinforced that by agreeing ‘to
support, on a case-by-case basis . . . peacekeeping activities under the
responsibility of the CSCE . . . ’.7 Subsequently NATO foreign
ministers extended this commitment to possible support of UN
peacekeeping missions, recognizing that NATO was ready to work
with non-NATO states in the CSCE in supporting such operations.8
In the new security environment of Europe NATO sought to extend
cooperation to its former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) and the newly independent republics of the former Soviet
Union. The principal forum for these contacts was the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC), which first met in December 1992.
Although not created to be a decision-making body, NACC formed a
number of cooperative working groups to develop more practical
measures to bring the participants together. A particularly important
component of the NACC programme was the Ad Hoc Group on
Cooperation in Peacekeeping (AHG). Several subgroups of the AHG
began work on common approaches to areas such as peacekeeping
planning, communications, logistics, training and interoperability.9
After their summit meeting in January 1994 the NATO heads of state
and government offered a new programme, the Partnership for Peace
(PFP), to draw the former communist CEE countries closer to NATO.

4 NATO Handbook (note 2), pp. 153–54.

5 The CSCE became the OSCE on 1 Jan. 1995.
6 NATO, Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial Meeting,
Final communiqué, Brussels, 27 May 1992, p. 2.
7 NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final communiqué, Brussels,
4 June 1992, p. 4.
8 NATO, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final communiqué, 17 Dec.
1992, p. 2.
9 NATO, Progress Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in
Peacekeeping, Brussels, 2 Dec. 1993, pp. 1–4.
144 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Nations not previously identified with the Warsaw Pact, including

traditionally neutral states like Austria, Finland and Sweden and new
nations such as Slovenia, were also welcome to participate. In the PFP
peacekeeping is clearly identified as central to cooperative efforts. 10
The separate programmes of peacekeeping activities of the AHG and
the PFP were merged in late 1994 to make them complementary and
not competitive.
Given the volatile conditions in many parts of CEE and the former
Soviet Union, peacekeeping is very relevant to NATO’s cooperation
partners. In fact it is quite probable that the peacekeeping missions
that NACC countries become involved in will be deployed in situa-
tions of conflict within or between NACC members. Joint work in
improving peacekeeping capabilities has been intended to be seen by
all, and specifically the Russian Federation, as a non-threatening form
of military cooperation. These activities are not meant to be a cover
for the establishment of a new defensive alliance against any nation or
group of nations, despite the scepticism of certain elements in Russia.

III. Alliance strengths

The continuing tragedy in the former Yugoslavia has received close
attention within the alliance. Contrary to the criticisms of its detrac-
tors, NATO has taken concrete action, in addition to lengthy delibera-
tions among its member nations, to support UN operations. NATO
officials have not sought a new mission for their organization, but
rather focused on how the unique characteristics of NATO, developed
over four decades, could make a contribution to international peace
efforts in the former Yugoslavia.
There are several significant strengths that NATO might apply to
the new challenges of peacekeeping. One of the most important is the
existing multinational integrated military command and control struc-
ture. This structure was established to deal with all types of crises and
has proved flexible enough to overcome obstacles in conducting
successful multinational joint operations. The most recent addition to
the military structure is the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction

10 NATO, Declaration of the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of
the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 11 Jan. 1994, Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, 11 Jan.
1994, pp. 2–3; also published in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
1994), pp. 268–72.
 NAT O 145

Corps (ARRC), established in late 1992 and specifically designed to

command multinational forces in a range of contingencies, including
peace support operations. Virtually all NATO’s military forces are
national assets released to NATO for specific purposes only after
agreement by both the NAC and national political authorities.
Common doctrine and operational procedures and other areas of stan-
dardization have been developed over the past 40 years among the
member nations and have been the key to the effectiveness of the
combined NATO–WEU maritime operations in the Adriatic in sup-
port of UN-mandated sanctions against the states of the former Yugo-
slavia. NATO has established a solid network of infrastructure and
communications systems in its member nations, especially in Western
Europe, which could prove a significant advantage in mounting and
supporting peace operations in or near Europe. Its air, land and
maritime forces are readily deployable on short notice once the politi-
cal decision is taken by the NAC. All these strengths could be used to
great benefit in modern peacekeeping, especially at a time when the
resources of the UN are over-committed.

IV. NATO support of the UN in the former Yugoslavia

Only one month after the NAC communiqué supporting CSCE peace-
keeping activities was released,11 the possibility of NATO supporting
the peace efforts of another organization became a reality. At short
notice in July 1992 NATO decided to begin monitoring compliance
with UN sanctions against the republics of the former Yugoslavia,
using one of its standing naval forces in coordination with a pro-
visional WEU naval task force in the Adriatic.12 The NATO standing
naval forces have the unique advantage of being under operational
command of the senior NATO military commanders in peacetime,
which enables them to be employed on new missions soon after the
necessary political decisions are made. As a result of the foresight of
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Standing
Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) was positioned in
the Ionian Sea just prior to the NAC meeting at which a decision on

11 See note 7.
12 NATO, Statement by the Secretary General on monitoring by NATO forces of com-
pliance with the UN Embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, Press Release 92/64, Brussels,
15 July 1992, p. 1.
146 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

the sanctions monitoring mission was to be taken. Within hours of the

political authorities making their decision, STANAVFORMED was
on station in the Strait of Otranto executing its mission. In November
1992 NATO decided, in coordination with the WEU, to commence
enforcing UN sanctions, in particular the embargo on trade (apart
from medical and humanitarian supplies) with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 13 Eventually this embargo was
tightened by the addition of naval patrols in Croatian and Albanian
territorial waters after several merchant vessels made serious attempts
to run the blockade. Finally in June 1993 the NATO and WEU naval
embargo operations were given a single name, Operation Sharp
Guard, and placed under a single chain of command, essentially the
integrated NATO military structure, to achieve a new unity of
command.14
The effectiveness of the maritime operation can be demonstrated by
the fact that the last known attempted violations of the embargo
occurred in April 1993. In November 1993 the US Government,
under congressional pressure, directed that US Navy elements partici-
pating in Operation Sharp Guard should stop reporting violations of
the arms embargo by the Bosnian Government and ended the provi-
sion of US intelligence relevant to violations of the embargo that
might implicate the Bosnian Government. These actions, while not of
overwhelming practical significance, have undermined the solidarity
of NATO members and the credibility of the embargo.
The original maritime mission in July 1992 was soon followed by
consultations on a possible commitment of land assets. A number of
NATO nations had decided to support the UN call for forces to pro-
tect the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but
only if a robust command and control structure, based on an existing
NATO military headquarters, was introduced. The NAC agreed in
September 1992 to the provision of staff personnel and equipment
from the headquarters of NATO’s Northern Army Group
(NORTHAG) to form the core of the headquarters of the newly
formed Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) of UNPROFOR. In
the end NATO provided about one-third of the staff and virtually all
of the equipment and vehicles for HQ BHC staff. Reports were very

13NATO, Press Release 92/97, Brussels, 20 Nov. 1992, p. 1.

14NATO and WEU, Joint Session of the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the
Western European Union held in Brussels, Press Release 93/41, Brussels, 8 June 1993, p. 1.
 NAT O 147

positive about the impact of this arrangement in ensuring the early

effectiveness of HQ BHC. Its NATO character was diminished when,
because of the normal six-month rotation of UN military staff person-
nel, NORTHAG staff were mostly replaced by individuals from a
variety of sources, only occasionally from other NATO military posts.
NATO as an organization is, however, clearly able to make a signifi-
cant difference during the period of great vulnerability when a new
operation is being established in turbulent circumstances.
Even as the NORTHAG elements began deploying in October
1992, the UN Security Council established a no-fly zone to prevent
flights by military aircraft of the warring factions over Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The UN requested NATO support to monitor the air-
space over the country and to assist in setting up UNPROFOR’s
Monitoring Command and Coordination Centre in Zagreb, Croatia.
When the UN request was received, aircraft from the NATO Airborne
Early Warning Force (NAEWF) had for some months been conduct-
ing training flights in the airspace of member nations and providing
early-warning coverage for the maritime monitoring operations, while
keeping note of activity in the former Yugoslavia. After the NAC’s
decision on 14 October 1992 the training flight orbits were moved to
international airspace over the Adriatic in order to monitor air activity
over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two weeks later an additional orbit
was established over Hungary, after a further NATO political
decision and close coordination with that non-NATO country. This
second orbit was essential to obtain the best possible coverage of
Bosnian airspace.
The NATO air operation is an integral part of the UN mission,
enabling UNPROFOR to use reports from its ground observers in
conjunction with the NAEWF reports to gather the most accurate
information on possible violations of the no-fly zone. In April 1993
this mission was expanded significantly to provide for enforcement of
the UN restriction against unauthorized military flights over Bosnia
and Herzegovina.15 In close coordination with UNPROFOR, NATO
regional air command authorities developed a smooth, professional
operation that works on carefully refined and practised procedures.
Apart from the period in early 1995 when the UN requested tempo-
rary cessation of enforcement activities, no request was necessary for

15 NATO, NATO starts operation of no-fly zone enforcement, Press Release 93/27,
Brussels, 12 Apr. 1993, p. 1.
148 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

procedures to begin once an unauthorized flight by combat aircraft on

a military mission was confirmed. Appropriate warnings were given
and, if there was no positive response by the violating aircraft, NATO
fighter aircraft would attack.
In May 1993 the UN Security Council established safe areas around
the Bosnian cities of Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Srebrenica and
Gorazde. Included in the wording of Resolution 836 was the authority
for UNPROFOR to use air power to defend its forces if they were
attacked while performing their duties in the safe areas.16 This close
air support capability is provided by NATO aircraft flying in combat
air patrol stations over Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they are avail-
able to respond at short notice to an UNPROFOR request. Control
over such close air support missions is through a network of specially
trained tactical air control parties (TACPs) and forward air controllers
(FACs), provided largely by the NATO countries which contribute
troops to UNPROFOR. Overall coordination within Bosnia and
Herzegovina is effected by an Air Operations Command Centre pro-
vided by the UK. NATO has also provided special satellite communi-
cations for the UNPROFOR TACPs to enable them to operate effec-
tively with NATO aircraft. The air control operation on the ground in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at present entirely UN, while the aircraft
and support elements for the air missions are entirely NATO.
The no-fly zone has been generally successful in preventing air-to-
ground attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina by any of the warring fac-
tions. Throughout the enforcement of the no-fly zone, however, there
have been unauthorized flights by military helicopters of all three
sides. The flight characteristics of the helicopters make them difficult
to detect by NAEWF aircraft. Investigations of these flights by both
NATO authorities and UNPROFOR assessed their activities as mili-
tarily insignificant. In February 1994 four jet combat aircraft from the
Bosnian Serb side attacked Bosnian Government positions in central
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serb aircraft were immediately warned
and when they failed to respond were shot down by NATO aircraft.
That was the first known violation of the no-fly zone by fixed-wing

16 UN Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, p. 3. It is often overlooked that this
resolution provided for air power to be used to defend UNPROFOR units in the safe areas,
not to defend the safe areas themselves. This changed when the London Conference on
21 July 1995 decided that Gorazde would be protected by NATO air power. This was later
extended to all remaining safe areas (Srebrenica and Zepa had by then fallen to the Bosnian
Serbs).
 NAT O 149

combat aircraft since the monitoring began in October 1992. Later

attacks in the Bihac area by Croatian Serb aircraft in late 1994 were
answered with a coordinated NATO air strike against the runways on
one of the bases in the Krajina area of Croatia used to mount the
attack. When Serb attacks continued against the Bihac pocket, NATO
aircraft struck Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft positions. That action pro-
duced a temporary halt in the Serb attacks, but throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina a number of UN personnel were taken hostage by
Bosnian Serb forces to provide a shield against further NATO air
strikes. Eventually they were released, but the hostage-taking at that
time highlighted the precarious position of the UNPROFOR troops,
caught between their peacekeeping mission and the enforcement
actions of another organization, NATO.
The NATO authorities in August 1993 decided to prepare for air
strikes in the event of warring factions continuing the strangulation of
Sarajevo and other areas.17 The targets would not necessarily be the
forces directly involved in attacks on UNPROFOR forces but might
be artillery positions, ammunition storage areas, command posts or
similar facilities. The preparatory work paid off when on 9 February
1994, after the mortar attack on a market-place in Sarajevo, the NAC
issued an ultimatum to the warring parties to withdraw their heavy
weapons from a 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo or place them
under UNPROFOR control. Violations of the ultimatum would be
met with air strikes, authorization for which would be coordinated
between NATO and UNPROFOR authorities.18 The effect of this ulti-
matum was initially positive, in spite of periodic violations, bringing
Sarajevo a significant respite from the ravages of war until fighting
broke out anew in May 1995. In April 1994 the Bosnian Serb offen-
sive against the safe area of Gorazde was first met with NATO close
air support missions without major impact. Subsequently on 22 April
the NAC established an exclusion zone around Gorazde and was pre-
pared to take immediate action against violators.19
In May 1995 the Bosnian Serbs ended the agreed cease-fire around
Sarajevo by resuming their artillery bombardment of the town. When

17 NATO, Press statement by the Secretary General following the Special Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 2 Aug. 1993, Brussels, 2 Aug. 1993, p. 1.
18 NATO, Decisions taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release
94/15, Brussels, 9 Feb. 1994, pp. 1–2.
19 NATO, Decisions taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release
94/31, Brussels, 22 Apr. 1994, pp. 1–2.
150 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

NATO aircraft sought to enforce the Sarajevo exclusion zone by strik-

ing several Bosnian Serb targets, the Bosnian Serbs immediately
responded by taking several hundred UNPROFOR soldiers hostage.
Eventually the UNPROFOR troops were released, but NATO air
power seemed to have lost its significance.
Concerned about the demonstrated vulnerability of UNPROFOR to
Bosnian Serb military action, France, the UK and the Netherlands
agreed to form and commit to Bosnia and Herzegovina a brigade-size
Rapid Reaction Force, backed up by artillery and attack helicopters,
to respond to any future threats. This force deployed in July and
August. The Bosnian Serbs shifted their attention to the eastern safe
areas, conducting a ground offensive in July, seizing Srebrenica and
Zepa and threatening to take Gorazde. The NAC, meeting in emer-
gency session in London on 21 July, warned the Bosnian Serbs that an
attack on that safe area would not be tolerated by NATO. The warn-
ing was apparently heeded, since they did not attack. On 1 August
NATO extended the same warning and commitment to use air power
to defend the other safe areas from Bosnian Serb attack.
The Bosnian Serbs continued their artillery fire on Sarajevo until
28 August, when a mortar round killed 43 people there. NATO was
galvanized into swift retaliation. Beginning on 30 August and initially
for three days, NATO combat aircraft conducted over 500 missions,
striking a wide range of Bosnian Serb military targets. NATO
demanded that the Bosnian Serbs move all their heavy weapons
outside the Sarajevo exclusion zone. On 5 September, the air strikes
resumed when it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs were not taking
action to meet the NATO ultimatum. In mid-September, after a 14-
day NATO air campaign, which included the first use of US cruise
missiles in the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs pulled their heavy weapons
back from Sarajevo. At the time of writing, it appeared that recent
events—the Croatian seizure of Krajina, the Croatian–Bosnian Gov-
ernment military successes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
NATO-imposed cease-fire and exclusion of heavy weapons from the
Sarajevo area—combined with pressure from the Serbian Government
had pushed the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table.
Throughout the planning for and conduct of NATO air actions in
the former Yugoslavia, NATO military authorities have understood
that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be resolved
through the use of NATO air power. The ultimate resolution of the
 NAT O 151

conflict will be a political settlement agreed by all parties, not

imposed from outside.
During this period and continuing to the present, NATO military
authorities have worked on a wide range of plans for NATO involve-
ment in various contingencies. A high point of activity came in late
1993 with the detailed refinement of plans for possible NATO assis-
tance in the implementation of a comprehensive peace plan in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. If the parties to the conflict agreed to such an settle-
ment, the UN Security Council might invite NATO to assume
responsibility for overseeing implementation of the military aspects of
the settlement and to command all UN military operations in the for-
mer Yugoslavia. The civil aspects would remain the full responsibility
of the UN, although important elements of support for the civil efforts
might be provided by NATO. The NATO implementation force
necessary for such an operation is likely to number 50 000 troops,
including the bulk of a US mechanized or armoured division, and be
deployed for up to two years. In late 1994 and the first half of 1995
much of NATO’s contingency planning focused on the task of forces
assisting in the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR. In the worst-case
scenario that mission might call for up to 60 000 NATO troops,
including 25 000 from the USA, and last six months. At present,
although no details are available, NATO military authorities are
apparently adjusting the plan developed to implement the Vance-
Owen Peace Plan to suit the requirements for the peace settlement that
the Contact Group is promoting. The size of force envisioned is very
similar to that which NATO planned for throughout 1993, although
the duration of the mission is now thought likely to be only one year.
The working relationship between the UN and NATO has matured
and, at the practical level, cooperation and coordination between
UNPROFOR and NATO’s Allied Forces Southern Europe
(AFSOUTH) have been close and continuous. UN–NATO relations
have been built on a number of high-level contacts among the princi-
pal officials and commanders in the course of planning and conduct of
these operations. There are now NATO liaison officers with the UN
Department of Peace-keeping Operations in New York, at
UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb and at HQ BHC in Sarajevo. In
addition UNPROFOR has established a liaison office with the NATO
Combined Air Operations Centre in Vicenza, Italy.
152 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

There have been growing pains during the development of the new
NATO role of enforcer for the UN, but the results have reflected the
conservative nature of NATO decision-making processes, especially
when its most powerful member, the USA, is unwilling to deploy
ground troops but its allies have. The consensus of the 16 member
nations, each with a different perspective on the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, has been to demonstrate their collective will in
measured ways, cognizant of the implications for the future of Europe
and for other key players, such as Russia. In several controversial
decisions of the NAC individual nations supported the consensus on
issues that could have had negative repercussions on their own
domestic political scene. However, NATO has taken military action
for the first time since its establishment and has attempted to make a
difference in a turbulent situation fraught with dangers.

V. NATO’s conceptual approach to peacekeeping

Progress has been dramatic on the conceptual side of peacekeeping,
but the NATO political authorities have yet to agree on broad guid-
ance as to the conditions, procedures and policies for direct or indirect
NATO involvement.
At Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the
major NATO military headquarters for Europe, the requirement for a
NATO peacekeeping doctrine was recognized and pursued beginning
in October 1992. Pressure was felt from a number of nations to follow
the NAC ministerial guidance and ‘develop practical measures to
enhance the alliance’s contribution’ in the peacekeeping area.20 The
areas that were suggested were logistics, training, standing operating
procedures (SOPs) and communications. All these are useful areas of
work, but there was one missing element: doctrine. In military oper-
ations, as in other endeavours, there must be a conceptual foundation
for the practical work, a framework for logistics, training, communi-
cations, SOPs and other measures. A peacekeeping cell was formed at
SHAPE in October 1992 and later expanded into an office within the
formal staff establishment. In parallel with the development of doc-
trine, the SHAPE peacekeeping section designed, coordinated and
conducted the first formal NATO course on peacekeeping at the
NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany.
20 NATO (note 8), p. 2.
 NAT O 153

The process of developing doctrine started with a review of the

existing conceptual work, including various documents produced by
the UN’s Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the Peacekeeper’s
Handbook of the International Peace Academy, and the doctrinal
work of several NATO members. Work was halted when SHAPE was
directed in February 1993 to conduct preliminary planning for imple-
mentation of the Vance–Owen Peace Plan for the former Yugoslavia.
This caused a delay of almost three months, but as a result the purely
conceptual work that had been done was modified to reflect the prac-
tical insight gained in the course of that preliminary, but still detailed
planning effort. In May 1993 SHAPE forwarded to the Military
Committee (MC) its draft doctrine on peace support operations.
Work on operational aspects went partly in parallel. In late 1992,
while national representatives to the NAC were agreeing on air and
maritime operations in support of the UN in the former Yugoslavia,
the French representative, in another forum at NATO headquarters,
disagreed with the concept of NATO supporting UN peacekeeping,
since the foreign ministers’ statement in Oslo that June had only
mentioned support of CSCE peacekeeping. Recognizing this political
impasse, the North Atlantic Military Committee proceeded with the
development of a document to provide high-level strategic guidance
to NATO’s military authorities to allow them to begin preparations
for a timely and effective response to the new mission should the
political authorities so direct.
This document, ‘NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Opera-
tions‘, MC 327, was agreed by the Military Committee in August
1993. However, continuing political differences among member
nations have thus far prevented the NAC from approving MC 327,
leaving the alliance military structure in something of a conceptual
limbo. The essential issue which has prevented progress is the com-
petition that NATO represents to other European institutions, such as
the EU and WEU, which have some claim to address security and
defence matters. Leading the opposition, and occasionally its only
member, has been France, which withdrew from the NATO integrated
military structure almost 20 years ago. France has been consistently
against NATO assuming new roles which might be appropriate, either
now or in the future, for one of the other European organizations.
After MC 327 was agreed individual nations commented on the
draft doctrine on peace support operations and recommended that the
154 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

doctrine be revised to ensure its consistency with MC 327. Those

revisions were completed and the draft resubmitted in February 1994
for final scrutiny at NATO headquarters and among the nations before
adoption as an official NATO publication—if French opposition does
not doom it to remain a draft for years. In July 1995 the SHAPE
peacekeeping section completed a revision to the previous draft doc-
trine and sent it to member nations for comment.

VI. NATO’s experience of the new challenges

Since 1992 NATO has had to define its conceptual position on peace-
keeping while maturing significantly in terms of its contribution in the
field. It has had its first out-of-area operation, its first combat mission
and its first operations in coordination and cooperation with the WEU
and the UN. NATO members have shown that they are ready to a cer-
tain extent to commit their common and national resources on a col-
lective basis to support UN peace efforts. However, as a group of
16 nations operating on the basis of consensus they have their own
prior expectations as to the way NATO should conduct such missions
under the adverse conditions experienced by many peacekeeping
missions today. The four themes that have emerged from the numer-
ous high-level political and military consultations are political control
and guidance, military command and control, tailoring the force to the
mission and rules of engagement (ROEs).

Political control and guidance

NATO is an organization in which political authorities have clear

primacy over the military. NATO members have shown that they
accept the overarching competence of the UN, or as appropriate the
OSCE, to provide the necessary political mandate for and inter-
national legitimacy of any peace operation. The NAC will carefully
consider a request for assistance in the conduct of such an operation
from either of these organizations, but will expect it to define its
objectives clearly, including a definition of the desired end-state of
the operation. If NATO accepts responsibility for the military aspects
of a particular operation, it will be on the basis of partnership with the
UN or OSCE in the process, not merely as a subcontractor as some
have suggested.
 NAT O 155

Ultimately the solution to any conflict is political and the sponsor-

ing organization must ensure that serious negotiations among the par-
ties are pursued towards a comprehensive settlement. The NATO
nations are unlikely to commit a substantial part of their collective or
national assets to a peace operation for an indefinite period.

Military command and control

The UN has managed to operate with a degree of success in peace-

keeping operations through reliance on ad hoc techniques and com-
mand structures. Typically in the past the force headquarters for an
operation were designed by UN military staff personnel in New York
who might have had some peacekeeping experience but were not
responsible for executing the mission in the field. Nations then sent
individual military staff personnel to an unfamiliar location to form
the headquarters from the ground up. The newly arrived personnel
had to learn their new responsibilities and staff procedures during the
first critical weeks of the new operation. In the era of modest-sized
peacekeeping forces and few challenges to their narrowly-defined
authority, such an approach was generally adequate. That is clearly
not the case in many contemporary missions.
NATO authorities stress the need for a robust and flexible com-
mand structure to control large and complex peace operations. It is
important that the staff in control of a newly established operation are
familiar with assigned duties and procedures from the beginning. This
can only be accomplished using an existing headquarters structure, as
in the forming of HQ BHC. The concept of a combined joint task
force (CJTF) approved at the NATO summit meeting in January 1994
would provide separable but not separate headquarters and forces
from within NATO for non-NATO contingency missions, a capability
of significant potential for future UN or OSCE peace operations. 21

Tailoring the force to the mission

Since the deployment of UNEF in Sinai in 1956 the tradition has been
for peacekeeping forces to be primarily light infantry units equipped
only with small arms. They have usually been employed in areas
where two nations had reached a cease-fire agreement and occasional
21 NATO (note 10), pp. 3–4.
156 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

violations were able to be handled without resort to the use of force

by the peacekeepers. Today the conflicts which have seized the atten-
tion of the world are often intra-state, with frequent violations of
cease-fire agreements. Renegade elements are not uncommon within
the warring factions. Experience has shown that peacekeepers on such
operations can find themselves asked to do more than originally
intended. Eventually they may be called upon to implement a quite
different mandate from the one for which they were organized, trained
and equipped.
This volatile environment can be best handled by military forces
sized, armed and ready for the threats they may face and the missions
they may be called on to accomplish. NATO authorities fully
acknowledge the importance of impartiality and the inherent con-
straints on the use of force in peacekeeping missions, but they require
that peacekeepers be physically and mentally prepared for the
challenges they face. This should mean that peacekeepers deploy to
potentially difficult missions only with a numerically strong force
equipped, like many of the contingents in BHC, with armoured
vehicles and the necessary combat assets for responding appropriately
with the minimum force necessary.

Rules of engagement

Traditional guidance on the use of force by peacekeepers has provided

that force be used only for self-defence. However, the UN has gone
beyond this restriction in several operations. Although couched in
terms of self-defence, the broader rules for complex missions include
using force to defend the persons and property of the peacekeeping
force or persons and areas under their protection, to prevent the
incursion of armed elements into designated areas, and to respond to
attempts forcefully to prevent the members of the force from dis-
charging their mandated duties.22 These broad guidelines have pro-
vided the framework within which the NATO military authorities
have developed the rules of engagement they consider appropriate for
peacekeeping.
Out of the extensive contingency planning in early 1993 came a
carefully developed set of ROEs that was formally noted by the NAC
in July of that year. They made no mention of the former Yugoslavia
22 Paraphrased from the ROE of a contemporary UN peacekeeping mission.
 NAT O 157

or Bosnia and Herzegovina, but provided a wide range of options for

military commanders to use varying levels of force to ensure the
safety of their own personnel and to enable them to perform the crit-
ical tasks envisaged in their mandate. NATO political authorities
would coordinate closely with UN officials on such ROEs, including
the rules that would be permitted as implementation of a peace plan
began and the procedures by which further rules would be delegated
to lower authorities, if and when the circumstances warranted.
Flexibility in the application of ROEs is always important in peace
operations, especially as recent history has shown the volatility of
local conditions and the likelihood that renegade elements may violate
agreements that their political and military leaders have supported.
NATO military authorities fully recognize that decisions on ROEs
will be very politically sensitive and often will be taken at the highest
levels in NATO and in the UN. The first priority in a peacekeeping
mission will be to avoid the use of force and only then to use the min-
imum force necessary to resolve the immediate situation.

VII. Summary
Today and for the foreseeable future peacekeepers will be required to
perform demanding missions in difficult circumstances where their
lives may be at risk. NATO members have acknowledged the collec-
tive role that their alliance may play in such operations and have
deployed major air and maritime assets to support the UN in the
former Yugoslavia.
However, within NATO, France and the USA must reach an under-
standing on their roles in an alliance peacekeeping operation. The
USA must provide continued leadership even in the face of domestic
political opposition. The French must avoid playing the ‘spoiler’ to
prevent meaningful NATO action in the presently unrealistic expec-
tation that the WEU will be able to control complex military opera-
tions. Through the process of planning for and consideration of a wide
range of contingency operations the NATO nations have defined their
expectations of the necessary preconditions for such missions. The
political will for a robust execution of the mission, including agree-
ment on clear, attainable objectives, is paramount. From such a politi-
cal commitment by member nations NATO would require high-level
political authorization from the UN or OSCE, a strong, resilient
158 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

command and control structure, a properly tailored and flexible force

and clear guidance on the use of force. The challenges of the new
peacekeeping can probably only be met with such an approach to the
difficult tasks ahead.
About the contributors
Dr Hans-Georg Ehrhart (Germany) is Senior Research Fellow at the
Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik at the University
of Hamburg and leader of its Working Group on the CIS and Euro-
pean Security. His most recent publications are Crisis Management in
the CIS: Whither Russia? co-edited with Anna Kreikemeyer and
Andrei Zagorski (1995), The ‘New Peacekeeping’ and European
Security: German and Canadian Interests and Issues, co-edited with
David G. Haglund, and ‘Peacekeeping im Jugoslavien und die Folgen
für die sicherheitspolitische Kooperation in Europa’, Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, 6/1995.
Dr Donald C. F. Daniel (USA) is at present Milton E. Miles
Professor of International Relations at and Director of the Strategic
Research Department in the US Naval War College and a consultant
to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. His most
recent publication is Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, co-edited
with Bradd C. Hayes (1995).
Dr Trevor Findlay (Australia) is leader of the Project on Peace-
keeping and Regional Security and the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). He is a former Australian diplomat and
has been Senior Research Fellow and Acting Head of the Peace
Research Centre at the Australian National University. His most
recent publications are Cambodia: the Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC
(1995) and ‘South–East Asia’ in The International Dimensions of
Internal Conflicts, edited by Michael E. Brown (1995, forthcoming).
Angela Kane (Germany) has worked for the United Nations since
1977 and is presently Director of the Library and Publications
Division in the Department of Public Information of the UN. Her
previous experience in the UN has been in the Executive Office of the
Secretary-General responsible at various times for political issues in
the European area, human rights and disarmament, in the Office of the
Secretary-General for the Central America Peace Process, and as
Chief of the World Disarmament Campaign in the Department for
Disarmament Affairs.
Dr Jerzy M. Nowak (Poland) is a lawyer and diplomat, presently
Ambassador of Poland to the OCSE in Vienna. He is the author of
160 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

East–West Cultural Relations (in Polish, 1983) and numerous articles

and studies on international relations, in particular on European secur-
ity and the OSCE. His most recent publications are ‘The challenges
and future of conventional arms control in Europe’, Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs, autumn 1994 and ‘CFE Treaty in the post-
Yalta system’, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, spring 1994.
Steven R. Rader (USA) is Senior Policy Analyst at the Science
Applications International Corporation in the USA. He was for 26
years a US Army officer, in which capacity he helped develop NATO
peacekeeping doctrine and training and coordinated NATO planning
for support to UNPROFOR. He recently published Strengthening the
Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Agenda for Reform
(1994) and ‘The US military role in an multinational framework’ in
Peace Support Operations and the US Military, edited by D. J. Quinn
(1994).
Prof. Takao Takahara (Japan) is Associate Professor of International
Politics and Peace Research at the Meiji-Gakuin University in
Yokohama. His recent publications include ‘US–Japanese military
relations: towards a security community via asymmetrical integration’
in The New Europe and the World, edited by Lawrence Ziring (1993),
and ‘Okinawa reversion and the Japanese “non-nuclear policies”’,
International and Regional Studies, no. 9 (1992).
Dr Dmitriy Trenin (Russia), a retired Lieutenant-Colonel of the
Soviet Army, is Programme Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of
Europe in the Russian Academy of Sciences. His recent publications
include ‘Russian peacemaking in Georgia’ in Crisis Management in
the CIS: Whither Russia? edited by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna
Kreikemeyer and Andrei Zagorski (1995), ‘International institutions
and conflict resolution in the former Soviet Union’ in European
Security and International Institutions after the Cold War, edited by
Marco Carnovale (1995) and ‘Non-offensive defence in the USSR
and successor states’ in Non-offensive Defence in the Twentieth
Century, edited by Bjørn Møller (1994).
Index
Abkhazia 70, 72, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, peace plan 151, 153
84, 126, 135 Rapid Reaction Force 29, 40, 41, 150
Adams, John Quincy 86, 98 refugees 19,
Afghanistan 17, 80, 84 safe areas 17, 148, 150
Africa: peacekeeping nations of 115–19 Spain and 104
Agenda for Peace 120 UK and 150
Albania 124 USA and 90, 91, 92, 94, 146, 152
Albright, Madeleine 90 Venezuela and 111
America see United States of America see also UNPROFOR
Angola 21, 103, 114, 115 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 7, 10, 17, 20, 36,
Aquino, Corazon 107 38–39, 50, 64, 83, 93, 116, 118, 120
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) 64 Bradley, Senator Bill 94
Argentina 9, 111 Brandt, Willy 33
Armenia 68, 78, 84 Brazil 8, 111, 114–15
ASEAN (Association of South-East Brunei 11, 107
Asian Nations) 8, 64, 106–11 Budapest Document 1994 133, 138
Australia 2, 10 Bulgaria 11, 16, 23, 29
Austria 2, 144 Bush, President George 88–89, 90
Azerbaijan 68, 78, 84 Byrd, Senator Robert 92, 93

Balladur, Édouard 102 Cambodia 8, 17, 18, 21, 26, 69

Baltic states 8, 72, 73, 124, 136 see also ASEAN and 106
under names of individual countries elections 17
Bangladesh 27, 29 human rights in 18
Belarus 84 see also UNTAC
Belgium 23 Camilión, Oscar 9
‘Berlin Question’ 33 Canada 2, 7, 142
Biden, Senator Joseph 92 Cape Verde 11
Bihac 27, 148, 149 Caribbean states 7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9 Caucasus 71, 72, 74
airlift 35 Charter of Paris 121, 128
complexity 17 Chechnya 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 84,
consent withdrawn 25 125, 127, 131, 138
Egypt and 117–18 Chile 111
France and 101, 150 China:
Germany and 35, 40, 41, 43 Cambodia and 100
humanitarian aid to 17, 146 peacekeeping and 10, 99–101
Indonesia and 110 Persian Gulf War and 99
Malaysia and 108 public opinion 101
NATO air operation 21, 25, 28–29, UN Security Council and 99, 101
35, 40, 41, 90, 147–49, 150 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
no-fly zone 35, 41, 147, 148 States):
OSCE and 126 High Command 76
162 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Kiev summit meeting 75 Eliasson, Jon 131

peacekeeping and 5, 7, 11, 21, 75, 76, El Salvador 9, 17, 21, 52, 103, 104, 111,
80, 83, 84, 127, 136, 140 113
Tashkent summit meeting 75 Estonia 8, 11, 125, 126, 127
UN and 135 European Community: Yugoslavia and
see also under names of member 127, 129 see also following entry
states European Union:
Clinton, President Bill 85, 89–91, 97–98 OSCE and 132
Conciliation and Arbitration, Conven- peacekeeping and 11
tion on 124 WEU and 139
conflict management 115 see also OSCE see also preceding entry
conflict prevention see OSCE
Congo 13 Federal Republic of Germany 33, 34
Costa Rica 11 Fiji 2, 9
Crimea 124, 125, 127 Finland 2, 15, 144
Croatia 11, 17, 19, 41 Foley, Representative Thomas 92
CSCE (Conference on Security and France:
Co-operation in Europe): Bosnia and 101, 150
Budapest summit meeting 77 Cambodia and 29, 100
changes in 122 Namibia and 100
Committee of Senior Officials 130 NATO and 153, 157
European Community and 130 peacekeeping and 10, 13, 27, 101–3,
Forum for Security Co-operation 124 153
Germany and 33 Rwanda and 13
human rights and 121, 122, 123, 126, status of 102, 103
140 UK and 103
NATO and 128, 129, 130 UN Security Council and 103
Permanent Committee 123 USA and 102
Rome meeting 137 Yugoslavia and 101–2
UN and 122, 126, 139
Vienna meeting 128 German Democratic Republic 33, 34
WEU and 130 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 37, 39
see also OSCE Georgia:
Cuba 11 humanitarian aid to 79
Cyprus 13 peacekeeping in 21, 77, 125, 126,
Czech Republic 7 131, 132
Czechoslovakia 7 Russian troops leave 69
Gephardt, Representative Richard 92
Denmark 2, 142 ‘German Question’ 33
Desert Storm, Operation 34 Germany:
Dole, Senator Robert 92 armed forces 39, 41, 45–48
Duncan, Alistair 25 Bosnia and 9, 35, 40, 41, 43, 44
Christian Democratic Union 42, 47
ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Christian Social Union 42, 47
Group) 23 conscription 47, 48
Egypt 6, 9, 27, 69, 116, 117–19 constitution 37, 38, 39–41, 42
 INDEX 163

Croatia and 41 Helsinki Document 1992 75, 123, 128,

Defence Planning Guidelines 45 129–30, 138
Defence White Book 45 Hosokawa, Morihiro 62
division of 33 Höynck, Wilhelm 141
Federal Constitutional Court 35, 39, human rights see peacekeeping, human
40, 43 rights and and CSCE, human rights
Federal Security Council 37 and
Free Democratic Party 42 humanitarian aid 17, 19
Green Party 44 Hungary 124, 131, 147
history 32–39, 44, 45, 48
humanitarian aid 34, 35, 42, 49 India 2, 8, 27, 36 see also Kashmir
military expenditure 46, 47, 49 Indonesia 8, 29, 107, 110
NATO and 35, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, Ingushetia 70, 74
48 Iran 34
OSCE and 51 Iraq 17, 18, 21, 69, 99 see also
Party of Democratic Socialism 44 UNSCOM
peacekeeping and 7, 11, 20, 32, Ireland 2
33–51 Irian Jaya 13
Persian Gulf War and 34, 37 Islamic fundamentalism 71
public opinion 49–50 Ismail, Razali 109
Rapid Reaction Force and 40–41 Israel 7, 9, 11
Social Democratic Party 42, 43, 44 Italy 11, 23, 29
society 48–50
Treaty on Basic Relations 33 Japan:
UN: Cabinet Legislation Bureau 57
membership 33 Cambodia and 15, 23, 52, 54, 56–61
Security Council and 8, 36, 38, 50 Conservatives 53, 54, 61
unification 34, 48 constitution 15, 53–56, 61, 63, 66, 67
USSR border treaty and 33 Defense Agency 63
Yugoslavia and 39 Law on Cooperation in UN Peace
Ghana 2, 116 keeping and Other Operations
Gingrich, Representative Newt 92 (PKO) 52, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62
Goma Camp 62 Liberal Democrats 61, 63
Gorazde 149, 150 military expenditure 55
Grachev, General Pavel 82 National Defense Program Outline 63
Greece 9 neighbouring countries 54, 61, 66
Grenada 88 Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 59
Grozny 126 pacificism 54, 64, 67
Guatemala 113 peacekeeping and 11, 52–66
Guyana 11 political debate 53
Gyarmati, Istvan 131 public opinion 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60,
61, 65, 66
Haiti 7, 11, 13, 15, 17, 21, 24, 34, 111 rearmament 53, 55
Hamilton, Representative Lee 91, 92 reparations 61
Helsinki Decisions see Helsinki Docu- Rwanda and 62
ment Security Council and 8, 64, 65
164 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Self-Defense Forces 15, 52, 55, 56, Mitterrand, President François 120
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 MNF (Multinational Force in Haiti) 7,
Social Democratic Party 61, 63 11, 13, 15
USA and 53, 54, 55, 64 Moldova 73, 74, 76, 84, 125, 126, 127,
Jefferson, Thomas 86, 98 131, 135
Jordan 9 Morocco 116
Juppé, Alain 101 Mossberg, Mathias 131
Mozambique 16, 21, 52, 61, 69, 100,
Kashmir 1, 12 103, 114, 115, 118
Kassenbaum, Senator Nancy 91 Mubarak, President Hosni 118
Kazakhstan 71, 81, 84, 124 Mugabe, President Robert 117
Kennedy, President John F. 87 Murayama, Tomiichi 62
Kenya 116
Khmer Rouge 16, 58, 59, 107 NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation
Kinkel, Klaus 38, 39 Council) 11, 139, 143, 144
Korea, North 64 Nagorno-Karabakh 69, 77, 79, 125, 129,
Korea, South 9, 11, 105–6 131, 133–34, 140
Kosovo 126 Nakata, Takehito 60
Kozyrev, Andrey 82 Namibia 2, 9, 11, 17, 21, 33, 52, 101,
Krajina 149, 150 116
Kuwait 17, 18, 69, 99 NATO:
Kyrgyzstan 11, 81, 124 Baltic states and 8–9
Bosnia and see Bosnia and
Latvia 8, 125, 126, 127 Herzegovina
League of Arab States 118 CSCE and 142
Lebanon 1, 13, 17, 34 military action, first 152
Lebed, General Alexander 81 Military Committee 153
Lezgins 72 military control 155
Liberia 23, 100, 115, 118 North Atlantic Council 143, 152, 153,
Lithuania 8, 11 154, 156
Luxembourg 11 OSCE and 128, 138–39, 140
Oslo decision 139
Macedonia 11, 62, 124, 126 Partnership for Peace 143–44
McCain, Senator John 95 peacekeeping and 11, 142, 143–44,
MacInnes, Major-General John 18 145–54
Malaysia 20, 27, 107–10 peacekeeping doctrine 152–57
May, Professor Ernest 86 political control 154–55
Mexico 112–14 Rapid Reaction Corps 144–45
MFO (Multinational Force and role change 142, 143–44
Observers) 3 rules of engagement 156–57
Michel, Representative Robert 92 Strategic Concept 45, 142
Minsk Conference 133 strengths of 144–45
Minsk Group 125, 133, 134 UN and 142, 143, 144, 145–52
MINURSO (UN Mission for the WEU and 145, 146
Referendum in Western Sahara) 11, Yugoslavia and 28, 35, 40, 41, 142,
34, 106 144, 145–52
 INDEX 165

Nepal 2 High Level Planning Group 133, 134

Netherlands 29, 150 Moscow Mechanism 123
New Zealand 2, 8, 30 NATO and 128, 138–39, 140
Nicaragua 52 Office for Democratic Institutions
Nigeria 8, 116 and Human Rights 123, 125
Nixon, President Richard 87 peace enforcement and 127, 130
Nobel Peace Prize 1 peacekeeping and 11, 21, 122
Non-Aligned Movement 110, 117 peacekeeping doctrine 128–30
North Ossetia 70, 74 peacekeeping structure 131–32
Norway 2, 7, 142 Permanent Council 123, 125, 131,
Nunn, Senator Sam 92 132, 138
personal representatives of the CIO
OAU (Organization for African Unity) 126, 131
117, 118 preventive diplomacy 121, 126
Ogata, Sadako 62 Sanctions Assistance Missions 126
O’Neill, Thomas 93 Senior Council 125, 130, 131, 138
ONUC (United Nations Organization in Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje
the Congo) 6, 13 126
ONUCA (UN Observer Mission in third parties and 135–38
Central America) 34, 103 Troika 125, 131
ONUMOZ (UN Operation in UN and 122, 140
Mozambique) 52, 110 Valletta Procedure 124
ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Vienna Mechanism 123
Salvador) 52, 103, 113 WEU and 126, 128, 138, 139, 140
ONUVEN (UN Verification Mission for see also CSCE
the Nicaraguan Elections) 52 Ossets 72
Organization of the Islamic Conference
118 Pakistan 2, 8, 9, 27 see also Kashmir
OSCE (Organization for Security and Pale 25
Co-operation in Europe) 72 Panama 88
‘Association Groups’ 126, 140 Paris Peace Accords 16, 58, 101
Berlin Mechanism 123 PDD 25 (Presidential Directive 25) see
Chairman-in-Office 125, 126, 131, United States of America
132, 134 peace enforcement 3, 13, 27, 28, 29, 39,
CIS and 84, 138 70, 135, 140
confidence- and security-building see also OSCE, peace enforcement and
measures 123, 125 peacekeepers:
conflict management 121, 122 125– impartiality 12, 26–27
28, 131–32, 140 intra-state wars and 13
conflict prevention 122, 123–25, 128, motivations 7–10, 119
129, 140 peace process, protecting 29
Conflict Prevention Centre 125, 132, self-defence 12, 28, 29
134 see also following entry
cooperation with others 138–40, 141 peacekeepers, new:
High Commissioner on National account of 2–11, 99–120
Minorities 124, 125 categories of 10–11
166 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

challenges for 14–30 preventive diplomacy 100, 106, 113 see

identity of 6 also OSCE
list of 4–5
participation decision 15, 119–20 Qian Qichen 100
peace enforcement and 29
peacekeeping: Ramos, President Fidel 107
casualties and 22, 23, 58, 61, 104, Ratner, Stephen 18
109, 119, 120 Reagan, President Ronald 88
civilian element 3, 16, 21 refugees 18, 19, 62, 68
cold war and 1, 2
command and control 23, 25, 31 Riza, Iqbal 23
complexity 17–22 Romania 11
consent and 12, 13, 15, 24–26 Rostow, Walter 86–87
definition 12 Rotfeld, Adam Daniel 131
electoral activities and 17, 21 Roy, Olivier 131
‘fatigue’ 7 Rühe, Volker 36, 47
force and 12, 13, 27–29 Russia:
heyday passed 31 Army commanders’ activities 69–70,
human rights and 17, 18, 19, 20, 108, 81
115, 116 borders 72, 73
intra-state conflict and 13, 22, 26 CIS and 75, 76, 80, 83, 84, 136
need for increased 2 conflicts in 68, 69, 73
new form 12–13, 17–18 conscripts 79
peace enforcement and 13, 27, 28, 29 constitution 80
planning 18 CSCE and 133
prestige and 8 Defence Ministry 81
profit and 9 democracy in 136
regional organizations and 21, 84, domino theory 71
96–97, 100, 117, 122, 135 Emergency Situations Ministry 78,
rules of engagement 29, 156–57 79, 81
safer missions 7 Foreign Ministry 81
‘Scandinavian model’ 27 former Soviet republics and 71, 72,
second-generation 12 74, 84
training 15–17 Georgia and 69, 77, 79
troop availability 20, 120 Islamic fundamentalism and 71
worth of proved 31 Law on Defence 75
see also United Nations and names of Law on Peacekeeping 70, 75, 80
countries Liberal Democrats 74
Pell, Senator Claiborne 92 military doctrine 75
Persian Gulf: mine clearing 34 ‘Monroeski doctrine’ 82
Persian Gulf War 37, 88, 99 Nagorno-Karabakh and 69, 77
Philippines 107 ‘near abroad’ 71, 72, 74, 84
Pisuwan, Suri 108 OSCE and 72, 135–38
Podkolzin, General Yevgeniy 71 Parliament 70, 74, 75, 80
Powell, General Colin 88 peacekeeping and 10, 20
Prague Document 128 account of 68–84
 INDEX 167

ambiguity of 5, 135–36 Sanjak 126

approaches to 136 Sarajevo 126, 148, 149, 150
burden-sharing 83, 134, 137 Saudi Arabia 11
civilian control 79 Scharping, Rudolf 43–44
command and control 81–82 Senegal 2, 116
consent and 76 Serbia: economic embargo 35, 139, 146
credibility of 74 Sharp Guard, Operation 146
decision making 80–81 Shultz, George 87
definitions 70–71 Sidyakin, Major-General 82
deployment patterns 78–79 Sinai 3
experience of 69 Singapore 11, 107, 108
finance 82, 83 Skopje 126
force and 5, 135 Slovakia 7, 124
forces’ configuration 78 Slovenia 144
impartiality and 76, 135 Sochi Agreement 84, 127
management of 77–82 Solana, Javier 104
opposition to 74 Somalia 8, 13, 18, 21, 27, 29, 84
peacemaking and 70 Egypt and 117
recruitment 79 humanitarian aid 17, 19
rules of engagement 81–82 Malaysia and 108–10
special role wanted by 83, 135 peacekeepers’ home instructions 23
terminology 70 refugees 18
training 77–78 UN troops killed in 18
troops and 78, 79 see also UNITAF; UNOSOM I;
types 70 UNOSOM II
UN Charter and 75, 84 South Ossetia 69, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80,
‘vital interests’ and 71 82, 84, 126
power struggle in 74, 80 Spain 11
public opinion 74–75 Bosnia and 104
Russian Security Council 81 finances and 104, 105
Russians abroad 72–73, 136 national security 8
Russians returning to 72, 73 peacekeeping experience 103–5
Tajikistan and 7, 68, 69, 73, 76–77, public opinion 104
78–79, 80, 81, 93 UN Security Council and 105
threat perception 75 Yugoslavia and 103, 104
troop withdrawals 69, 73 Sputnik 86
unity of 73 Srebrenica 148, 150
UNPROFOR and 10 Stalin, Josef 68
Yugoslavia and 69 Stoel, Max van der 124
Rwanda 13 Suharto, President 110
protection of people 29 Sweden 2, 7, 16, 144
refugees 19, 62 Switzerland 11
UN casualties in 23 Syria 6, 69

Safarov, Sangak 81 Tajikistan:

Sanderson, Lieutenant-General John 25 casualties in 68
168 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

peacekeeping in 7, 70, 76–77, 78–79,

UNIKOM (UN Iraq–Kuwait Observer
80, 81, 82, 84, 125, 126, 127, 131,
Mission) 11, 21, 100, 110
135 UNITAF (United Task Force, Somalia)
refugees 68, 72 7, 11, 21, 89
Russia and 7, 68, 69, 71, 73, 76–77,
United Arab Republic 6
78–79, 80, 81, 93 United Kingdom:
Russians in 72, 73 peacekeeping and 10, 27, 28, 103
Tanzania 23 UN Security Council and 103
Tashkent Protocol 1992 83 United Nations:
Thailand 107–8 Charter:
Tharoor, Sashi 21 ‘enemy state’ clauses 11, 33
Tornado aircraft 40, 41 peacekeeping and 1, 3, 12, 75
Transcaucasus 68, 71, 82, 84 debts of 29, 118
Trans-Dniester region 70, 73, 78, 79, 80,
debts to 30
82, 127 Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
Trucy Report 102 ations 31, 97, 153
Tunisia 30, 116 foundation 32
Turkey 20, 34 missions, numbers of 15–16
Turquoise, Operation 13 NATO and 142, 143, 145–52
Tuzla 148 non-interference in internal affairs 12,
100
Uganda 11, 23, 115 non-UN forces and 13
Ukraine 136 overstretched 15
conflicts in 124, 125, 127 peacekeeping:
peacekeeping and 11, 16, 84 authority and 20
UNAMIC (UN Advance Mission in bias and 20
Cambodia) 19, 35 see also Cambodia conditional contributions 20
UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for contingents, differences between
Rwanda) 29 23–24
UNAVEM I (UN Angola Verification expansion of 18
Mission) 7 experienced personnel 14
UNAVEM II (UN Angola Verification finances and 29–30
Mission) 7, 52, 104 missions, numbers of 2
UNCRO (UN Confidence Restoration Nobel Peace Prize 1
Operation in Croatia) 41 personnel, bad behaviour of 20
UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer personnel, shortage of 20
Force) 17 personnel deployed 3
UN Development Programme 22 reform of 31
UNEF I (UN Emergency Force) 142 reimbursements for 30
UNEF II (UN Emergency Force) 17, 34 repertoire 17–18
UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in see also Peacekeeping
Cyprus) 20, 34 Peace Operations Training Program
UN High Commissioner for Refugees 97
22, 62 rapid reaction force 31
UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) reform 88
13, 16–17, 19–20, 34, 101 Resolution 836 148
 INDEX 169

Resolution 678 99 UNOSOM I (UN Operation in Somalia)

Security Council 2, 9, 13, 20, 27, 36, 21, 35
37, 88, 99, 109, 112–13, 115, UNOSOM II (UN Operation in
117, 147, 148, 151 Somalia):
expansion of 8, 36, 38, 64, 65, 107, contingents’ disagreements 29
114 equipment and 9
members 27, 50, 99, 101, 105, 111, Germany and 36–39, 47, 50
114 Indonesia and 110
permanent membership 8, 10, 20, Korea and and 105
33 peace enforcement and 3, 13, 14
Brazil and 114 USA and 14, 23, 28, 29, 36, 89, 91,
Germany and 36, 38 94–95
Japan and 64, 65 withdrawal 24, 27, 36
reform of 103 UNPF (UN Peace Forces) 142
Standby Forces Arrangement 10, 31 UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deploy-
training and 16, 27 ment Force) 126
United States of America: UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force):
Bosnia and 90, 91, 92, 94, 146, 152 consent and 25, 26, 28
Congress 91–93 Germany and 35, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44
CSCE and 129 hostages taken 26, 149, 150
Democratic Party 89 humanitarian aid 17, 28, 43
foreign policy tendencies 86–88 Indonesia and 110
Haiti and 7, 15 NATO and 28, 146–47, 148–52
Japan and 53, 55, 64 New Zealand and 8
NATO and 157 peace enforcement 3, 13, 26, 28
OSCE and 132 Russia and 10
PDD 25 85, 87–89, 91, 95–98 Spain and 104
peacekeeping and 10, 11, 20, 23, 27, USA and 11
28, 85–98 withdrawal 40, 41, 43
public opinion 89, 91, 93–95, 98 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina
Somalia and 14, 23, 28, 29, 36, 89, UNSCOM (UN Special Commission on
91, 94–95 Iraq) 35
UN: UNSF (UN Security Force) 13
ambivalence towards 88–89, 91, UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in
92 Cambodia):
arrears 92 ASEAN countries and 8, 107
contributions 30, 93, 97 Cambodian people and 25
peacekeeping policy 85, 88, 91, China and 100
95–98 Civilian Police Component 22
troops under 96 civilians and 16, 21
UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti) 7, 11, complexity of 17, 21–22
24, 34 Electoral Component 22, 59
UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer France and 101
Group in India and Pakistan) 12, 142 Germany and 35
UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Human Rights Component 59
Georgia) 110, 111 Indonesia and 110
170 C HALLENGES F OR THE NEW P EAC EKEEP ER S

Japan and 15, 23, 52, 54, 56–61 refugees 18

multinational nature 19 Russia and 20, 69
partiality alleged 26 sanctions and 35
personnel, trained 16 Spain and 20, 103, 104
Police Component 59 USA and 91, 92, 94, 146, 152
Repatriation Component 59 WEU and 39, 126, 127
rules of engagement 29 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Thailand and 107 UNPROFOR
see also Cambodia
UNTAG (UN Transitional Group) 2, 7, Zaire 62
10, 33, 34, 52, 101 Zepa 148, 150
UNTEA (UN Transitional Executive Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 74
Authority) 13 Zimbabwe 9, 27, 116, 117
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organ-
ization) 11, 12, 17, 69, 89, 101, 142
USSR:
dissolution of 68
Germany border treaty 33
peacekeeping 6
perestroika 68
see also under names of independent
states
Uzbekistan 71, 81

Vance–Owen Plan 151, 153

Venezuela 111–12
Viet Nam War 87
Vojvodina 126

Warsaw Pact 8
Washington, George 86
Weinberger, Caspar 87–88
Western Sahara 21, 69, 116, 118
WEU (Western European Union):
CSCE and 130
NATO and 145, 146
OSCE and 126, 128, 138, 139, 140
Yugoslavia and 39, 126, 127
Wilson, Woodrow 86

Yeltsin, President Boris 83

Yugoslavia 13, 21, 28, 40, 41, 142, 144,
145–52
humanitarian aid to 28
OSCE and 125, 126
peacekeeping, bias and 20