G.R. No. 88211, Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al. v. Raul Manglapus, et al.

:
1. Facts (Detailed):
Ferdinand E. Marcos was ousted from the presidency of the Philippines in February 1986 by
a peaceful uprising known as the “People Power Revolution,” which resulted in the
assumption of power by Corazon C. Aquino under a revolutionary government. Marcos and
his family were forced into exile in Hawaii. His regime left the country in political and
economic turmoil, with allegations of massive corruption and human rights abuses.
Following Marcos’ removal, the Philippines continued to face instability, including coup
attempts from Marcos loyalists, military factions, and communist insurgents.
In 1987, a failed coup attempt led by Marcos loyalists and the subsequent plot by the
Marcos family to return to the Philippines with mercenaries further heightened security
concerns. The economy was struggling under the weight of foreign debt accumulated during
the Marcos era, and efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses had yielded
limited success.
In 1989, Marcos, suffering from failing health, expressed his desire to return to the
Philippines to die. President Aquino, however, citing concerns over the potential
destabilization that his return might cause, decided to bar the return of Marcos and his
family. The Marcos family, through a petition for mandamus and prohibition, sought to
compel the government to issue travel documents and to enjoin the implementation of the
executive’s decision to prevent their return.
The petitioners argued that their right to return to the Philippines was guaranteed by:
 Section 6 of the Bill of Rights, which protects the liberty of abode and the right to
travel except in cases of national security, public safety, or public health, as provided
by law.
 International Law, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which state that
individuals have the right to leave any country and to return to their own.
The respondents, led by Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus, contended that the
issue involved was a political question and that the President’s decision to bar the
Marcoses' return was based on national security concerns. They pointed out the potential
for Marcos' return to incite loyalists and other opposition groups, thus endangering public
order.
2. Issue/s:
 Primary Issue: Does the President have the power to bar the return of Ferdinand
Marcos and his family to the Philippines?
 Secondary Issue: Is this a political question that falls outside the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court?
3. Rulings (Legal Basis and Reasoning) (Detailed):
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, dismissing the petition. The Court
held that:
1. Power of the President:
o The President, under the 1987 Constitution, has broad executive powers,
including powers that are not expressly enumerated but are inherent to the
office, such as those relating to foreign affairs, national security, and public
safety. The residual power of the President, which includes the authority to
protect public interest and the general welfare, was deemed sufficient to
justify barring the Marcoses' return.
 o The Court cited the Commander-in-Chief clause (Article VII, Section 18) and
other powers that allow the President to act preemptively to protect the
state from threats. Although no specific law granted the President the power
to ban Marcos, her duty to safeguard national security was paramount.
2. The Right to Return:
o The right to return to one’s country is recognized under international law,
specifically the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, but it
is not an absolute right. It can be restricted for legitimate reasons such as
national security, public safety, and public health. The Philippine
Constitution(Article II, Section 2) incorporates generally accepted principles
of international law, but the Court ruled that such rights could be limited in
situations like this where the return of a former dictator posed a clear and
present danger to the country.
o The Bill of Rights (Section 6) provides for the right to travel, but the right can
be impaired for reasons of national security, public safety, or public health.
The Court found that the President’s decision to bar the return of Marcos
was a valid exercise of executive power in this context.
3. Political Question Doctrine:
o The Court rejected the argument that this was a pure political question,
holding that while the issue involved executive discretion in matters of
national security, the Court had the power to review the actions of the
President to ensure there was no grave abuse of discretion. Under Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes determining
whether any branch of government acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
o However, the Court found that President Aquino had not acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Her decision was based on credible threats to national
security, including the history of destabilization attempts by Marcos loyalists
and the ongoing political and economic instability in the country.
4. Rationale:
 The Court highlighted the unique nature of the case, stating that the situation
involving Marcos was "in a class by itself." Given his history as a dictator and the
lasting impact of his regime on the Philippines, his return was not comparable to that
of an ordinary citizen.
 The Court noted that the protection of national security and public welfare is
a primary duty of the President. Allowing the Marcoses to return at a time when the
country was still recovering from political unrest and economic hardships could
trigger further instability and conflict. The right to return, while recognized under
international law, was not absolute and could be subject to restrictions, particularly
when it conflicted with the state's interest in maintaining order and protecting its
citizens.
 The Court also pointed to the factual basis for the President’s decision, including
intelligence reports on the potential for increased violence and destabilization
should the Marcoses return. These concerns were not speculative, as the country
had already experienced multiple coup attempts by Marcos loyalists and military
factions.
  The ruling also emphasized that executive discretion in matters of national security,
particularly in extraordinary cases, allows the President to act in ways that may not
be explicitly covered by the law but are necessary to protect the country.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of President Aquino to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. The Court found that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the return of Marcos posed a threat to
national security, public safety, and the general welfare of the Filipino people. The petition
was dismissed, and the constitutional authority of the President to protect the country
from potential threats was affirmed.

G.R. No. 237428, Republic of the Philippines represented by Solicitor General Jose C.
Calida vs. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno. I will expand this into a 10-page case digest, as you
requested.
1. Facts (Detailed):
1.1 The Antecedents (2 pages):
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno was appointed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines in 2012. Before her appointment, she served as a law professor at the University
of the Philippines (UP) from 1986 to 2006. During this period, she was mandated by law to
file her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) every year. SALNs are
required to ensure transparency and accountability among public officials. However, records
from the UP Human Resources Development Office (UP-HRDO) showed that Sereno failed to
file some of her SALNs.
When Sereno applied for the position of Chief Justice in 2012, the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), which screens candidates for judicial positions, required the submission of SALNs as
part of the application process. Sereno only submitted SALNs for the years 2009, 2010, and
2011, despite having been a government employee for more than 20 years. Despite the
incomplete submission, the JBC included her in the shortlist of nominees for Chief Justice,
and she was subsequently appointed by President Benigno Aquino III.
Five years later, in 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed against Sereno in the House
of Representatives, accusing her of various offenses, including failure to file SALNs. The
complaint sparked a quo warranto petition filed by the Solicitor General of the Republic of
the Philippines, Jose C. Calida. The petition sought to nullify Sereno’s appointment as Chief
Justice on the grounds that she failed to meet the constitutional requirement of proven
integrity due to her non-compliance with the SALN laws.
1.2 The Case for the Republic:
The Republic, represented by Solicitor General Calida, argued that Sereno’s failure to submit
her SALNs rendered her ineligible for the position of Chief Justice. The Republic claimed that
her lack of proven integrity, as evidenced by her non-compliance with the SALN laws,
violated the Constitution, which mandates that members of the judiciary, particularly the
Chief Justice, must be of proven integrity. The Republic further argued that the petition for
quo warranto, rather than impeachment, was the appropriate remedy to question the
validity of Sereno’s appointment.
1.3 The Case for the Respondent:
Sereno argued that the only constitutionally prescribed method for removing a Chief Justice
is through impeachment, as outlined in Article XI, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. She
contended that the quo warranto petition violated this constitutional provision. Sereno also
maintained that she had substantially complied with the JBC’s SALN requirements and that
any lapses in filing were due to the difficulty of retrieving records from years past. She
further argued that the JBC’s decision to include her in the shortlist for Chief Justice was a
political question beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.
1.4 The Republic’s Reply:
The Republic insisted that quo warranto was the correct remedy to address Sereno’s
ineligibility for the position. It argued that Sereno’s appointment was void from the
beginning due to her failure to meet the integrity requirement under the Constitution. The
Republic also contended that prescription did not apply to the case because the state’s
interest in ensuring that only qualified individuals hold public office is paramount.
1.5 The Republic's Memorandum:
In its memorandum, the Republic reiterated that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs to the
JBC disqualified her from being appointed as Chief Justice. It also emphasized that the
failure to file SALNs demonstrated a lack of integrity, which is a constitutional requirement
for members of the judiciary.
1.6 The Respondent's Memorandum:
Sereno, in her memorandum, argued that the petition for quo warranto was time-barred, as
it was filed more than one year after her appointment. She also maintained that the JBC’s
decision to nominate her was final and conclusive, and the Supreme Court had no authority
to review it. Sereno reiterated her argument that the only method for removing a Chief
Justice is through impeachment.
1.7 The Respondent’s Reply/Supplement to Memorandum:
Sereno continued to argue that she had substantially complied with the SALN requirements
and that any lapses were due to administrative difficulties, not dishonesty. She also
maintained that the impeachment process, not quo warranto, was the correct legal remedy
for removing a sitting Chief Justice.
1.8 The Motions for Intervention:
Various parties filed motions for intervention, seeking to participate in the case either in
support of or opposition to Sereno. These motions were denied by the Supreme Court, as
the Court determined that the intervention of third parties was unnecessary for the
resolution of the case.
1.9 The Motions for Inhibition:
Sereno filed motions for the inhibition of several Justices of the Supreme Court, arguing that
they had shown bias against her in prior proceedings. These motions were also denied, as
the Court found no valid reason to justify the inhibition of the Justices.

2. Issues:
A. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a petition for quo warranto to challenge
the appointment of a sitting Chief Justice who is an impeachable officer;
B. Whether the petition for quo warranto is barred by prescription;
C. Whether Sereno is eligible for the position of Chief Justice, particularly in relation to:
1. The determination of her eligibility by the JBC;
2. Her alleged failure to file SALNs;
3. The JBC’s decision to include her in the shortlist of nominees despite the missing
SALNs; D. Whether Sereno is a de jure or de facto officer.
3. Rulings (Legal Basis and Reasoning) (Expanded):
Preliminary Issues:
A. Intervention:
The Supreme Court denied the motions for intervention. Intervention is considered an
ancillary remedy that must be exercised with restrictions, both in purpose and time. The
Court found no compelling need for third-party interventions as the case was strictly
between the Republic, represented by the Solicitor General, and the respondent, Chief
Justice Sereno. The Court reasoned that allowing third parties to intervene could
unnecessarily complicate and prolong the proceedings. Additionally, the intervenors failed
to show that their participation was crucial for the resolution of the legal issues involved in
the case.
B. Inhibition:
Sereno moved for the inhibition of several Justices, alleging bias due to their involvement in
previous cases related to her. However, the Court denied her motion. The Court ruled that
Sereno’s allegations were not sufficient to disqualify the Justices, emphasizing that the
presumption of regularity applies to the actions of Justices unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of bias or partiality. The Justices in question had no personal interest in
the outcome of the case, and the mere fact that they had previously expressed opinions on
legal matters involving Sereno did not amount to bias. The Court held that public confidence
in the judiciary would be undermined if judges could be easily disqualified based on
subjective perceptions of bias without substantial evidence.

Substantive Issues:
1. Jurisdiction Over the Quo Warranto Petition:
The Supreme Court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto.
Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over quo warranto actions. Quo warranto is the proper remedy to
determine whether a person has the legal right to hold a public office. The petition
questioned the validity of Sereno’s appointment to the position of Chief Justice,
arguing that she was ineligible due to a lack of proven integrity, specifically her
failure to submit complete SALNs during her tenure as a government employee.
Legal Basis: The Court cited Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, which governs quo warranto
petitions. Quo warranto applies to public officers who unlawfully hold or usurp a public
office. The petition was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
Republic of the Philippines, based on the argument that Sereno lacked the constitutional
qualification of integrity. Sereno’s status as an impeachable officer did not preclude the use
of quo warranto as a remedy, as quo warranto and impeachment serve distinct legal
purposes. Quo warranto addresses eligibility at the time of appointment, whereas
impeachment is reserved for offenses committed while in office.
Reasoning:
The Court emphasized that quo warranto and impeachment are distinct legal mechanisms.
Impeachment is a political process intended to address offenses committed while in office,
such as betrayal of public trust or culpable violations of the Constitution. In contrast, quo
warranto is a judicial proceeding aimed at assessing the qualifications of a public officer. The
two remedies are not mutually exclusive, and the availability of impeachment does not
preclude the filing of a quo warranto petition when there are questions about the legality of
the appointment itself.
Political Question Doctrine: The Court rejected Sereno’s argument that the petition
involved a political question beyond the scope of judicial review. It held that the eligibility of
a Chief Justice is not a political question, but a justiciable issue that involves the
interpretation and application of constitutional provisions and laws. The Court stressed that
it is vested with the authority to interpret the Constitution and determine whether public
officials meet the qualifications prescribed by law.
2. Prescription:
The Court ruled that the petition for quo warranto was not barred by prescription.
The one-year prescriptive period under Rule 66, Section 11 of the Rules of Court,
which applies to quo warranto petitions filed by private individuals, does not apply
to the state. The state has a continuous interest in ensuring that only qualified
individuals occupy public office, and this interest cannot be extinguished by the
passage of time.
Legal Basis:
The Court cited the principle of nullum tempus occurrit regi (no time runs against the king),
which means that prescription does not apply to actions filed by the government,
particularly when public interest is at stake. The petition for quo warranto filed by the OSG
represented the interests of the Republic of the Philippines in ensuring that only qualified
individuals hold public office. The Court emphasized that the prescriptive period is meant to
prevent stale claims, but it cannot be invoked to prevent the government from addressing
violations of public office qualifications, especially those that involve constitutional
mandates such as integrity.
Reasoning:
The Court reasoned that Sereno’s ineligibility became evident only during the hearings of
the House of Representatives on her impeachment. The revelations regarding her failure to
file SALNs were discovered during the House proceedings in late 2017, and the petition was
filed within a reasonable time after these facts came to light. Additionally, the Court pointed
out that public office is a public trust, and ensuring the qualifications of public officers is a
matter of public interest that should not be barred by time limitations.
3. Sereno's Eligibility for the Position of Chief Justice: The Court found that Sereno was
ineligible for the position of Chief Justice because she failed to meet the
constitutional requirement of proven integrity. The Court focused on her failure to
file her SALNs during her tenure as a law professor at the University of the
Philippines (UP) and her incomplete submission of SALNs to the JBC during her
application for the position of Chief Justice.
Legal Basis:
Article VIII, Section 7(3) of the 1987 Constitution requires that members of the judiciary,
including the Chief Justice, must be of "proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence." The Court ruled that the filing of SALNs is a legal and constitutional
obligation under the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(Republic Act No. 6713). Failure to comply with the SALN requirement is a violation of these
laws and reflects on the integrity of a public officer.
Reasoning:
o Failure to File SALNs: The Court emphasized that the failure to file SALNs was
not a mere technicality but a substantive violation of the law. The SALN
requirement ensures transparency and accountability, which are essential for
 maintaining public trust in government officials. Sereno’s repeated failure to
comply with this requirement over several years demonstrated a lack of
integrity, which disqualified her from holding the highest position in the
judiciary. The Court ruled that integrity is a continuous requirement for all
members of the judiciary, and any failure to meet this standard is grounds for
disqualification.

o JBC's Role: The Court rejected the argument that the JBC’s inclusion of
Sereno in the shortlist of nominees cured her ineligibility. The Court held that
the JBC’s role is to screen candidates, but its actions are not immune from
judicial review. The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC allows it to
ensure that the JBC adheres to its own rules and the constitutional
requirements for judicial appointments. The fact that the JBC may have
overlooked Sereno’s incomplete submission of SALNs did not negate the
constitutional requirement for proven integrity.

o Ineligibility Not Cured by Appointment: The Court ruled that Sereno’s

appointment by the President did not cure the defect in her qualifications.
The constitutional requirement of proven integrity must be met at the time
of appointment, and any subsequent events, such as nomination by the JBC
or appointment by the President, cannot retroactively validate an otherwise
void appointment. The Court emphasized that an appointment made in
violation of constitutional requirements is void from the beginning and can
be challenged through quo warranto.
4. De Jure vs. De Facto Officer:
The Court ruled that Sereno was not a de jure officer because her appointment was
void from the beginning due to her failure to meet the constitutional requirement of
proven integrity. A de jure officer is one who has been legally appointed and
possesses the qualifications required by law. Since Sereno lacked the necessary
qualification of integrity, her appointment as Chief Justice was invalid.
Legal Basis:
The Court relied on its earlier rulings in cases involving quo warranto, which established that
a public officer who does not meet the qualifications required by law cannot be considered
a de jure officer. Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs and prove her integrity disqualified
her from holding the position of Chief Justice.
Reasoning:
As a result of her ineligibility, Sereno could not claim the rights and protections afforded to a
de jure officer. The Court held that she was, at best, a de facto officer—someone who
exercised the functions of the office without having a legal right to do so. De facto officers
can be removed from office once their ineligibility is established through proper legal
proceedings, such as quo warranto.

4. Rationale (Detailed):
The Court emphasized that integrity is a fundamental constitutional requirement for
members of the judiciary, particularly for the Chief Justice. The SALN requirement is a
concrete measure of a public officer’s integrity, and compliance with this requirement is
essential for maintaining public trust in the judiciary. The Court further clarified that while
impeachment is the appropriate remedy for offenses committed while in office, quo
warranto is the proper remedy for challenging the validity of an appointment.
In Sereno’s case, her repeated failure to file her SALNs demonstrated a lack of integrity,
which disqualified her from being appointed Chief Justice. The Court rejected the argument
that impeachment was the exclusive remedy for removing a Chief Justice, noting that quo
warranto and impeachment serve different purposes. The Court concluded that Sereno’s
appointment was void from the beginning, and she could therefore be removed through
quo warranto.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court, in its decision, granted the petition for quo warranto, declaring
Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice void. The Court emphasized that the constitutional
requirement of integrity is not a mere formality but a substantive requirement for all
members of the judiciary, especially the Chief Justice. The Court held that Sereno’s failure to
file her SALNs and prove her integrity disqualified her from holding office, and her
appointment was void from the beginning.
This expanded section now provides a deeper explanation of the rulings, including the legal
bases and reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision. Let me know if you'd like further
expansion on any other part of the digest.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-
36283, March 31, 1973):
1. Facts (Detailed)
1.1 Background on the 1972 Constitution:
The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines was the governing charter of the country for many
years. In 1971, a Constitutional Convention was convened to amend the 1935 Constitution,
and by November 1972, the Convention had finalized a new Constitution. However, this was
set against the backdrop of increasing political unrest in the country. In September 1972,
President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law through Proclamation No. 1081, citing
the need to suppress lawless violence, rebellion, and the growing communist threat. This
declaration effectively suspended many civil liberties and centralized power in the executive
branch.
After the Constitutional Convention completed its work, the new Constitution was
transmitted to President Marcos. Rather than calling for a formal plebiscite as was
traditionally done under Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 86, creating "Citizens’ Assemblies," which were essentially
gatherings of barangay residents aged 15 years and older. These assemblies were tasked
with voting on key issues, including the ratification of the new Constitution and the question
of whether a plebiscite was necessary at all.
On January 17, 1973, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1102, declaring that the
new Constitution had been ratified by an overwhelming majority of the Citizens’ Assemblies.
The proclamation reported that out of approximately 22 million Filipinos, over 14 million
had approved the Constitution, and the same number had indicated that a plebiscite was
unnecessary.
1.2 Objections and Legal Challenges:
Several petitions were filed with the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the
ratification process and the new Constitution itself. Among the petitioners was Josue
Javellana, a private citizen who filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, asking the
Court to stop the government from enforcing the new Constitution, which he claimed had
not been validly ratified as required under the 1935 Constitution.
Javellana, along with other petitioners, argued that:
 Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution explicitly required amendments to be
submitted to the electorate in a formal plebiscite.
 The Citizens’ Assemblies did not constitute a valid plebiscite, as the process was not
conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which is mandated by law to
conduct national elections and plebiscites.
 The Assemblies allowed minors (individuals aged 15 to 21), who were not qualified
voters, to participate.
 Voting in the assemblies was done by raising hands, which violated the principle of
secrecy in elections as guaranteed by law.
 The declaration of Martial Law had suppressed fundamental freedoms, including
freedom of speech, press, and assembly, thus making any genuine public discussion
or opposition to the new Constitution impossible.
The respondents, which included The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of National
Defense, The Secretary of Justice, and The Secretary of Finance, argued that the new
Constitution had been validly ratified by the people through the Citizens’ Assemblies, which
expressed the popular will in a manner consistent with the extraordinary circumstances of
the time. They contended that the participation of the people in these assemblies
demonstrated their approval of the new Constitution, and that the method of ratification
was a political question beyond the reach of the judiciary.

2. Issues
A. Whether the 1972 Constitution was validly ratified in accordance with the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution.
 Did the method of ratification through Citizens' Assemblies comply with the
requirements set forth in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, which mandated a
formal plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC?
B. Whether the creation of the Citizens’ Assemblies and the process of conducting the
referendum were constitutional.
 Was the inclusion of minors and unqualified voters in the assemblies, and the
absence of secret voting, consistent with election laws?
C. Whether the new 1972 Constitution superseded the 1935 Constitution and whether the
government could now operate under the new Constitution.
 Given the controversies surrounding the ratification process, could the 1972
Constitution be considered the supreme law of the land?
D. Whether the petitions involved political questions that were beyond the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to decide.
 Should the ratification of the new Constitution be considered a political question
outside the purview of judicial review?

3. Rulings (Legal Basis and Reasoning) (Detailed)

A. Validity of the Ratification of the 1972 Constitution
The primary argument presented by the petitioners was that the 1972 Constitution had not
been validly ratified because it was not submitted for approval in a plebiscite, as required
by Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners emphasized that the
Constitution expressly required that any amendments or revisions be submitted to qualified
voters in a free and open election, supervised by the COMELEC.
Ruling: The Supreme Court did not reach a unanimous decision on whether the ratification
process complied with the 1935 Constitution. Six Justices believed that the issue had
become moot and academic because the 1972 Constitution had already been implemented.
They reasoned that since the government was already operating under the new Constitution
and the people had acquiesced, the ratification process could no longer be questioned. The
majority also noted that since there had been no widespread public objection to the new
Constitution, it could be considered validly ratified by the people.
However, Justices Zaldivar, Makasiar, and others dissented, arguing that the 1972
Constitution was not validly ratified in accordance with the procedural requirements of the
1935 Constitution, and therefore, it could not legally replace the existing Constitution.
Legal Basis: The dissenting Justices relied on the strict interpretation of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, which mandated a plebiscite. The majority, however, pointed to the
concept of “acquiescence” or “acceptance by the people” as a justification for the validity of
the 1972 Constitution, considering the extraordinary political circumstances of the time.
B. Constitutionality of the Citizens’ Assemblies
The petitioners challenged the legality of the Citizens' Assemblies, arguing that they did not
meet the legal requirements for a plebiscite. The inclusion of minors (aged 15 to 21), the
lack of secret voting, and the absence of COMELEC supervision were significant deviations
from the norms established under election laws and the 1935 Constitution.
Ruling: The majority of the Justices held that while the Citizens' Assemblies were irregular
and did not strictly conform to the procedural requirements of the 1935 Constitution, the
results of the assemblies reflected the will of the people. Justice Barredo, speaking for the
majority, noted that the assemblies were conducted in a manner consistent with the
political realities of the time, given the declaration of Martial Law and the socio-political
situation. The majority also invoked the political question doctrine, reasoning that the
process by which the people ratify a constitution is inherently a political matter and not a
judicial one.
Legal Basis: The Court acknowledged the procedural defects in the Citizens' Assemblies but
held that the people’s overwhelming approval of the new Constitution rendered the
technical irregularities moot. The political question doctrine, which limits judicial
intervention in matters that are more appropriately addressed by the executive or
legislative branches, was cited as the justification for allowing the ratification process to
stand.
C. Supersession of the 1935 Constitution
The Court was divided on the issue of whether the 1972 Constitution had replaced the 1935
Constitution. The majority held that the new Constitution had already taken effect and that
the government was now operating under it. The Court emphasized that the continuous
operation of the government under the new Constitution, without any major public
objection, effectively superseded the 1935 Constitution.
Justice Zaldivar, in his dissent, argued that since the 1972 Constitution was not validly
ratified, the 1935 Constitution should remain in effect. He asserted that no valid
government action could be based on a constitution that had not been properly ratified by
the people.
Ruling: The majority of the Justices held that the 1972 Constitution was in effect and had
replaced the 1935 Constitution, making the issue of ratification moot and academic.
Legal Basis: The principle of acquiescence or de facto acceptance by the people was cited
by the majority to justify the conclusion that the 1972 Constitution had superseded the
1935 Constitution.
D. Political Question Doctrine
The respondents argued that the question of whether the 1972 Constitution was validly
ratified was a political question that the judiciary had no authority to decide. A political
question is one that involves the exercise of discretionary powers by the executive or
legislative branches, and it is not subject to judicial review.
Ruling: The majority of the Justices agreed with the respondents, holding that the issue of
ratification was a political question. The Court stated that it was beyond its jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the ratification process, as this was a matter that concerned the
people’s political will.
Legal Basis: The political question doctrine was invoked, emphasizing the principle
of separation of powers and the judiciary’s limited role in resolving matters of national
political concern.

4. Rationale
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion was rooted in the principle of political reality and the
doctrine of acquiescence. Despite the procedural irregularities in the ratification process,
the Court emphasized that the new Constitution had already been accepted by the people
and the government. The majority reasoned that since the people had not rejected the new
Constitution and the government was functioning under it, the Constitution had become the
supreme law of the land, effectively superseding the 1935 Constitution.
The dissenting Justices, led by Justice Zaldivar, argued that the 1972 Constitution could not
legally replace the 1935 Constitution because it was not validly ratified in accordance with
the latter’s provisions. They emphasized the need to follow the constitutional process
strictly to maintain the rule of law.
In the end, the majority’s view prevailed, and the 1972 Constitution continued to serve as
the governing document for the country, despite the ongoing controversies surrounding its
ratification.