Letter from the Secretary-General.........................................................................................

3
Letter from the Under Secretary General..............................................................................4
1. Introduction to the Committee............................................................................................5
a. History.............................................................................................................................. 5
b. Members...........................................................................................................................5
c. Scope................................................................................................................................ 6
2. Introduction to the Agenda Item........................................................................................ 6
a. Outlines of the Agenda Item.............................................................................................6
b. Origins of the Conflict......................................................................................................7
3. Explanation of Historical Events........................................................................................ 8
a. First Sudanese Civil War.................................................................................................. 8
b. Second Sudanese Civil War............................................................................................. 9
c. United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS).................................................... 10
d. Private Military and Security Companies...................................................................... 12
4. Conflict in Darfur and the Emergence of the RSF..........................................................14
5. Political Shift.......................................................................................................................15
6. Beginning.............................................................................................................................17
7. Timeline of Events.............................................................................................................. 18
a. April 2023.......................................................................................................................18
b. May 2023........................................................................................................................19
c. June 2023........................................................................................................................20
d. July 2023........................................................................................................................ 21
e. August 2023....................................................................................................................21
8. Foreign Involvement.......................................................................................................... 22
a. United States of America................................................................................................22
b. United Kingdom............................................................................................................. 23
c. Wagner Group.................................................................................................................23

1
 d. Libya...............................................................................................................................24
e. Egypt...............................................................................................................................24
f. United Arab Emirates..................................................................................................... 25
g. Kenya............................................................................................................................. 26
h. Ethiopia.......................................................................................................................... 27
i. Chad................................................................................................................................ 27
9. Previous Actions in International Basis........................................................................... 28
10. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................29
11. Questions to be Considered............................................................................................. 30
Bibliography........................................................................................................................... 30

2
 Letter from the Secretary-General

Esteemed delegates, dear academic members, and anyone reading this letter

I, Aleynanur Yücel, am acting as the Secretary-General of this dear conference, Yuce College

Model United Nations 2023, our school's 8th annual conference. Throughout this journey of

organizing this conference, both academically and organizationally, I had wonderful

experiences working with my amazing team and delegates. I hope this conference brings you

experiences as enjoyable as mine; it has made me wiser and helped me meet such wonderful

people. I wish the same for you.

Enough of the warm words. I wish you all the luck in your committee, dear delegates! As the

Secretary-General, I, your dear Under Secretary-General and Academic Assistant, have

worked really hard and spent sleepless nights just to make this experience wonderful for you.

Study and read well if you are in it for the award. We provided you with everything you need

for your experience, but it is in your hands to make it as memorable as it can be.

I hope to see all of you at the conference!

3
 Letter from the Under Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

It is with immense pleasure and anticipation that I extend my warmest welcome to

each and every one of you to the YCMUN'23 Disarmament and International Security

Committee (DISEC). As the Under Secretary General of this remarkable Model United

Nations conference, I am both honored and excited to embark on this journey of meaningful

discourse and diplomacy alongside you all.

Our committee's focus on the ongoing Sudanese conflict is both timely and critical.

The multifaceted nature of the Sudanese situation demands a careful approach, thoughtful

analysis, and collaborative effort from every participant. I am confident that, with your

dedication, knowledge, and diplomatic skills, we can collectively work towards crafting

comprehensive and innovative solutions that address the root causes of the conflict and pave

the way for lasting peace and stability.

Let us embark on this journey of diplomacy, collaboration, and enlightenment

together. YCMUN'23 promises to be an unforgettable experience, and I am thrilled to have

each of you as an integral part of it.

Yours sincerely,

Ahmet Burak Araz

Under Secretary General,

4
 1. Introduction to the Committee

a. History

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) has its origins in

the aftermath of World War II, when the United Nations was founded in 1945. DISEC was

established as a critical component of the UN with a primary focus on addressing

disarmament and international security issues, marking a pivotal moment in global

diplomacy.

b. Members

DISEC comprises all 193 member states of the United Nations, providing a diverse

and comprehensive representation of nations worldwide. Member states, regardless of their

size or geopolitical influence, share a common goal: to collaborate in addressing global

security challenges and working towards disarmament.

c. Scope

DISEC plays a central role in addressing a wide range of issues, including nuclear

non-proliferation, conventional arms control, the regulation of emerging military

technologies, and conflict prevention. It is dedicated to promoting peaceful dispute

resolution, fostering confidence-building measures, and mitigating threats from weapons of

mass destruction. DISEC embodies the UN's commitment to global peace and security

through diplomacy, dialogue, and international cooperation.

5
 2. Introduction to the Agenda Item

a. Outlines of the Agenda Item

A series of confrontations erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the

paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), both factions vying for influence within Sudan's

military administration. This conflict, which commenced on April 15, 2023, unfolded

primarily within the vicinity of the capital city, Khartoum, and extended to the Darfur region.

As events progressed, another dimension emerged as a splinter faction of the Sudan People's

Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, engaged in clashes with

the SAF along the borders adjacent to South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Remarkably, the toll of this turmoil on human lives has been considerable. Up until

August 15, 2023, estimations have placed the death toll at somewhere between 4,000 and

10,000 individuals, with an additional 6,000 to 8,000 people having suffered injuries. These

statistics bear witness to the scale of suffering inflicted by the conflict. Concurrently, a

staggering 3.4 million people have been internally displaced, forced to leave their homes due

to the conflict's upheaval. The situation has been further exacerbated as over a million others

have sought refuge beyond Sudan's borders.

b. Origins of the Conflict

The origins of this conflict trace back to aggressive actions undertaken by the RSF

against key governmental installations. Explosions from airstrikes, the resonance of artillery

fire, and the echo of gunfire reverberated across the Sudanese landscape. This cataclysmic

clash materialized as a power struggle between two influential figures: Mohamed Hamdan

"Hemedti" Dagalo, the leader of the RSF, and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the de facto leader of

Sudan's armed forces. Khartoum, a symbolic battleground, witnessed intense clashes for

control over strategic locations such as the general military headquarters, the Presidential

6
Palace, Khartoum International Airport, Burhan's official residence, and the SNBC

headquarters.

However, this already complex landscape took on new complexities as rebel groups

with prior grievances joined the fray.

As the conflict progressed into June, the SPLM-N faction led by al-Hilu launched

offensives against army positions in the southern reaches of the nation. Subsequently, July

marked the entry of a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Mustafa Tambour

(SLM-T), into the conflict, pledging its support for the SAF. The conflict's narrative then

took another twist as August saw the alliance between the RSF and the Tamazuj movement, a

rebel group hailing from Darfur and Kordofan. This dynamic evolution underscores the

layers of dynamics, interests, and allegiances at play within this tragic episode.

In conclusion, the unfolding strife within Sudan's borders underscores the complexity

and gravity of the challenges facing the nation. Beyond the headlines, the lives lost, and the

displaced communities, lies a mosaic of rivalries, aspirations, and grievances that have

converged into a volatile crucible. As the conflict continues to evolve, it serves as a stark

reminder of the far-reaching impacts of power struggles and the resilience of communities

struggling to survive amid chaos.

3. Explanation of Historical Events

a. First Sudanese Civil War

The initial Sudanese Civil War was a protracted conflict that ignited in 1955 and

endured for more than two decades, finally concluding in 1972. This strife emerged from

tensions between the central Sudanese government, largely based in the north, and

marginalized southern regions. Rooted in disparities encompassing religion, culture,

7
resources, and governance, the conflict's ignition was marked by grievances and perceived

inequalities. The conflict saw the Sudanese government in Khartoum grapple against the

Sudanese Anya-Nya rebels, largely hailing from the southern parts. The rebels sought greater

autonomy and equitable resource distribution, along with cultural and religious freedoms.

The war was characterized by cycles of violence, displacement, and negotiations, with both

sides engaging in atrocities that claimed countless lives.

In 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was brokered, bringing a semblance of respite.

The pact granted the south a degree of autonomy and recognized its distinct cultural and

religious identities. However, the underlying tensions were far from fully resolved, and the

truce proved fragile. This conflict's legacy is indelible, influencing Sudan's subsequent

history. Its impacts, while complex and multifaceted, laid the groundwork for later struggles

and ultimately contributed to the eventual secession of South Sudan in 2011. The initial civil

war stands as a testament to the enduring repercussions of unresolved grievances and the

complexities of fostering unity in the face of deeply rooted divisions.

b. Second Sudanese Civil War

The Second Sudan Civil War, spanning from 1983 to 2005, was one of Africa's

longest and most devastating conflicts. It erupted as a result of ethnic, religious, and political

tensions between the Sudanese government, led by the Arab-dominated north, and various

rebel groups representing the marginalized southern regions, largely populated by non-Arab

ethnic groups and Christians. The war was characterized by a complex web of factors,

including territorial disputes, economic inequality, and a struggle for autonomy.

The United Nations became involved in the conflict through diplomatic and

peacekeeping efforts, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in

2005 being a significant milestone. This agreement ended the war and established a

8
framework for power-sharing and regional autonomy, with the south gaining the right to

secession through a referendum. As a result, in 2011, South Sudan officially gained

independence, marking the end of the civil war. However, despite the optimism surrounding

the ceasefire agreements and the establishment of South Sudan as an independent nation,

violence and conflict have persisted in the region. Political rivalries, power struggles, ethnic

tensions, and disputes over resources have fueled ongoing clashes between various armed

groups, leading to a cycle of instability. The newly formed nation faced challenges in

establishing effective governance structures, addressing economic issues, and integrating

armed factions into a unified security apparatus.

The United Nations, through its peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS),

has been working to mitigate the violence and promote stability since the country's

independence. However, the mission has faced numerous challenges, including limited

resources, logistical difficulties, and the complex and often unpredictable nature of the

conflict.

The persistence of violence despite ceasefire agreements underscores the deep-seated

issues that need to be addressed to achieve lasting peace in the region, including political

reconciliation, disarmament of armed groups, and the establishment of effective governance

and rule of law.

In conclusion, the Second Sudan Civil War, while officially ending with the signing of

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the subsequent independence of South Sudan, has

left a legacy of ongoing violence and instability. The involvement of the United Nations

through peacekeeping efforts highlights the complexities of addressing the root causes of

conflict and the challenges of maintaining peace in a region plagued by deep-seated

grievances and power struggles.

9
 c. United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS)

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is a pivotal international

effort aimed at promoting peace, stability, and development in the world's youngest nation,

South Sudan. Founded in 2011 following South Sudan's declaration of independence from

Sudan, UNMISS represents a critical response to the complex and protracted challenges

facing the country, ranging from armed conflict and displacement to humanitarian crises and

human rights abuses.

One of UNMISS's primary objectives is to protect civilians, particularly in the midst

of South Sudan's ongoing conflicts. It achieves this through the establishment of Protection of

Civilians (POC) sites, which provide sanctuary for vulnerable populations who are often

subjected to violence and displacement. Within these POC sites, UNMISS ensures the

delivery of essential humanitarian assistance, including food, clean water, shelter, and

medical care, effectively contributing to the well-being of those in dire need. UNMISS plays

a vital role in fostering peace and security by mediating conflicts and supporting political

processes. The mission facilitated the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution

of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018, a significant milestone towards ending

the civil war that has plagued the country. UNMISS's engagement in disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs has also contributed to reducing the

proliferation of small arms and light weapons, a critical step in enhancing overall security.

In its unwavering commitment to upholding human rights, UNMISS has established

itself as a leading authority in the monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses in South

Sudan. Through its Human Rights Division, the mission collects valuable data, conducts

investigations, and produces comprehensive reports that shine a spotlight on violations and

10
abuses. This information, meticulously documented by UNMISS, serves as an essential tool

in holding perpetrators accountable for their actions and advocating for justice.

Gender empowerment is another integral aspect of UNMISS's mandate. The mission

actively promotes gender equality and women's participation in peace and security processes.

By facilitating the inclusion of women in peace negotiations and decision-making roles,

UNMISS ensures that women's voices are heard and their rights are upheld in a society

recovering from conflict.

Furthermore, UNMISS engages in supporting South Sudan's political processes and

the development of a durable peace infrastructure. This includes facilitating national

dialogues and providing technical assistance for constitutional and institutional reforms, all

designed to strengthen governance and promote long-term stability.

In summary, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, through its multifaceted

efforts, continues to play a pivotal role in mitigating conflict, protecting civilians, promoting

human rights, fostering gender equality, and supporting South Sudan's journey towards

lasting peace and development. UNMISS stands as a beacon of hope in a nation facing

formidable challenges, dedicated to building a better future for the people of South Sudan.

d. Private Military and Security Companies

The evolution of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) spans a complex

and multifaceted history, marked by a blend of historical precedents and contemporary

applications. These entities have played an intriguing role in modern conflict zones and

security dynamics, often operating behind the scenes.

The historical roots of PMSCs can be traced back to mercenary armies employed by

ancient civilizations and medieval monarchs. These hired troops were often instrumental in

11
expanding territorial ambitions or bolstering military power. However, the modern

conception of PMSCs began to crystallize in the latter half of the 20th century. Throughout

the Cold War, PMSCs started gaining traction as governments and corporations sought

discreet means of advancing their interests without overt military intervention.

The 1990s marked a turning point, with the end of the Cold War creating a power

vacuum and the privatization trend gaining momentum. PMSCs found lucrative opportunities

in providing logistical support, training, and security personnel to conflict zones, most

notably during the Balkans conflicts and in Africa. The 21st century saw a significant surge

in the usage of PMSCs. The U.S. military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan provided

fertile ground for these companies to flourish.

PMSCs were entrusted with an array of tasks, from guarding installations to

conducting intelligence operations. These roles, however, were not without controversy.

Incidents like the Nisour Square massacre in Iraq highlighted the blurred lines between

accountability, regulation, and oversight that PMSCs operated within.

In recent times, PMSCs have continued to be central players in various conflicts and

security endeavors. They have been deployed in conflict zones across the Middle East,

Africa, and other regions, offering an alternative to traditional military deployments.

While their proponents argue that PMSCs offer flexibility and cost-effectiveness,

critics highlight concerns about transparency, accountability, and the potential for human

rights abuses.

The modern usage of PMSCs extends beyond conventional warfare. Private security

firms have taken on roles in guarding critical infrastructure, providing cybersecurity services,

and offering close protection to high-profile individuals. The application of PMSCs has

12
evolved to encompass a wide spectrum of security-related services beyond traditional armed

combat. As the 21st century progresses, the role of PMSCs continues to evolve and provoke

discussions about their ethical, legal, and strategic implications. Striking the balance between

their contributions to security and the challenges they pose to international norms remains an

ongoing endeavor, with the private military and security industry occupying a unique and

intricate space in the realm of contemporary conflict and security dynamics.

4. Conflict in Darfur and the Emergence of the RSF

As the 21st century dawned, the western region of Sudan, known as Darfur, grappled

with persistent instability and social discord, fueled by a mix of tensions stemming from race,

ethnicity, land disputes, and water access.

In 2003, these underlying issues ignited a widespread rebellion against the

government's authority.

In response, President Omar al-Bashir, a prominent military figure, vowed to quash

the rebellion with force. The ensuing Darfur conflict bore witness to extensive instances of

violence orchestrated by the state, prompting accusations of war crimes and even genocide

against al-Bashir. The initial phase of this conflict led to an estimated death toll of around

300,000 individuals, while 2.7 million people were forcefully displaced. Despite a subsequent

decrease in violence, the region remained far from attaining a state of tranquility.

Omar al-Bashir's strategy to suppress uprisings within the Nuba Mountains area

centered on the deployment of the Janjaweed, a coalition of Arab militias sourced from tribes

with ties to camel trading in both Darfur and parts of Chad.

In 2013, al-Bashir took the step of reorganizing the Janjaweed into a new entity called

the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), placing the reins under the command of Janjaweed leader

13
Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly referred to as Hemedti. The RSF's actions included

egregious acts such as mass killings, sexual violence, pillaging, torture, and the deliberate

destruction of villages. Accusations of ethnic cleansing targeting the Fur, Masalit, and

Zaghawa communities soon followed. While the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted

RSF leaders for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, Hemedti remained

unassociated with the 2003-2004 atrocities. In 2017, a new law endowed the RSF with the

status of an "independent security force," granting them distinct authority.

Hemedti's relationship with al-Bashir resulted in significant personal gains. Al-Bashir

granted Hemedti control over lucrative gold mines in Darfur, bolstering his wealth

considerably. This collaboration led the RSF to be deployed to quell a 2013 uprising in South

Darfur and to participate in military endeavors in Yemen and Libya. During this period, the

RSF forged connections with the Russian private military organization, the Wagner Group.

These associations propelled the RSF's expansion, with troop numbers reaching the tens of

thousands and the acquisition of numerous armed pickup trucks, a ubiquitous sight in the

streets of Khartoum.

The al-Bashir administration's approach allowed the RSF and other armed factions to

proliferate as a safeguard against internal threats within the armed forces. This tactic, referred

to as "coup-proofing," aimed to ensure the regime's security by enabling multiple forces to

coexist within the nation's military landscape..

This intricate history underscores the complex dynamics at play within Darfur's

conflict and the emergence of the RSF. The narrative encapsulates a series of calculated

decisions, alliances, and actions that have not only transformed the region's security

apparatus but also left an indelible mark on Sudan's history.

14
 5. Political Shift

In the later part of 2018, public dissent against the leadership of al-Bashir emerged,

marking the inception of what became known as the Sudanese Revolution's initial phase.

Over a span of eight months, an unwavering campaign of civil disobedience unfolded, though

it encountered brutal suppression. By the outset of 2019, the military, in collaboration with

the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), orchestrated a coup d'état in April, effectively putting an

end to al-Bashir's rule that had spanned thirty years.

The Transitional Military Council, an amalgamation of military figures, took the

reins, thrusting the nation into a junta's governance structure. Although al-Bashir was

detained in Khartoum, the International Criminal Court's warrants for his arrest, citing war

crime allegations, were not heeded. During this tumultuous period, public demonstrations

persisted, urging the installation of civilian governance. Yet, in a tragic incident in June 2019,

the RSF was implicated in what is now known as the Khartoum massacre. This deeply

unsettling event led to the loss of over one hundred lives, and numerous individuals suffered

unspeakable violence. The RSF's leader, Hemedti, disavowed any responsibility for the

assault.

As global pressure amplified and interventions by entities like the African Union and

Ethiopia unfolded, the military conceded to a compromise. In August 2019, an interim joint

government, fusing civilian and military elements—the Transitional Sovereignty

Council—materialized. This unified administration, presided over by a civilian Prime

Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, carried the promise of an eventual democratic transition, with

scheduled elections in 2023. However, the narrative took an unexpected turn in October

2021.

15
 The military, spearheaded by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti of the Sudanese

Armed Forces (SAF), executed a coup. This abrupt seizure of authority culminated in the

reformation of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, now entrenched as a military junta

under the dominance of Al-Burhan. This abrupt reversal thwarted the nation's trajectory

towards democratic governance and marked a significant setback in Sudan's journey through

its complex and challenging transition.

6. Beginning

Tensions that had been brewing between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the

Sudanese junta reached a boiling point in February 2023. The RSF took a significant step by

enlisting individuals from different parts of Sudan, intensifying the friction. The capital city,

Khartoum, witnessed a noticeable escalation as military activities escalated. Amidst this, an

accord was brokered to ease the situation, prompting the RSF to withdraw its units from the

Khartoum vicinity.

Subsequently, the junta made a decision to transfer authority to a government led by

civilians. However, the timeline for this transition faced complications owing to renewed

tensions between the junta's two prominent figures, namely Burhan and Hemedti. These two

individuals hold pivotal positions as chairman and deputy chairman of the Transitional

Sovereignty Council. Their disagreements revolve around several key issues. Chief among

these disputes is the integration of the RSF into the regular military structure. While the RSF

insisted on a gradual 10-year process for assimilation, the regular army advocated for a

quicker integration within two years.

Other contentious matters include the rank of RSF officers within the future hierarchy

and the command structure of RSF forces, whether they should fall under the jurisdiction of

the army chief or Sudan's overall commander-in-chief, who is al-Burhan.

16
 Moreover, these factions have also clashed over control of sectors within Sudan's

economy. As an emblem of their discord, Hemedti publicly expressed regret over the coup

that transpired in October 2021.

The situation escalated on April 11, 2023, when RSF forces were positioned near the

city of Merowe and within Khartoum itself. The government urged them to depart, but they

declined. This defiance led to confrontations, culminating in RSF forces taking over the Soba

military base located to the south of Khartoum. Subsequently, on April 13, the RSF

commenced their mobilization, sparking concerns of a potential uprising against the junta. In

response, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) denounced this mobilization as unlawful,

amplifying the tension between the different factions.

7. Timeline of Events

a. April 2023

April 15, 2023, witnessed RSF assaults on SAF bases across Sudan, notably in

Khartoum and its airport. The Presidential Palace and General al-Burhan's residence became

flashpoints of clashes. In response, SAF shut airports and launched airstrikes on RSF

positions. RSF forces captured Sudan TV's headquarters after battles, and roads and bridges

in Khartoum closed.

By April 16, SAF declared rescues, RSF officer arrests, and taking Merowe Airport.

The nation's airspace and Internet services halted. Khartoum, Omdurman, and Merowe

airport saw renewed fighting on April 17. The SAF reported retaking Sudan TV's HQ while

RSF shared a video.

Hemedti, in an Al Jazeera interview, blamed al-Burhan for confrontations and SAF

for aiming to restore ousted leader al-Bashir. Hemedti urged international intervention against

17
Burhan on Twitter, asserting RSF's fight against radicals. Amid the battles in Khartoum, SAF

accused RSF of harming civilians and looting. SAF reinforcements arrived from Ethiopia's

border. A ceasefire emerged but conflict persisted, including in El-Obeid. SAF regained

Merowe airport. RSF claimed repelling SAF and downing two helicopters. Explosions and

gunfire marked Eid al-Fitr on April 21. Intense fighting extended to Port Sudan highway and

al-Bagair's industrial zone. The Chadian Army disarmed 320 Sudanese soldiers from Darfur

entering Chad.

Kobar Prison and others saw mass escapes on April 23, freeing 25,000 detainees.

Countrywide Internet blackout, linked to grid attacks, followed. RSF claimed seizing military

plants and power plants north of Khartoum.

WHO worried over the National Public Health Laboratory on April 25. Maersk

suspended Sudan bookings, intercommunal strife surged, and battles persisted with a 72-hour

ceasefire from April 27. April 30, SAF initiated air strikes and artillery for an all-out

Khartoum offensive against RSF. Khartoum police arrested 316 "rebels," referring to RSF.

Officials in Khartoum granted open-ended leave for civil servants.

b. May 2023

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) asserted they weakened the RSF's fighting

capabilities and pushed back their advances across various areas, including Omdurman, the

Presidential Palace, Khartoum Bahri, and al-Jerif. Both sides traded allegations, with the RSF

claiming to down a fighter jet during SAF airstrikes, while the government reported injuries.

UN relief head Martin Griffiths voiced frustration at their lack of commitment to halt

fighting.

18
 Tensions escalated when the Turkish embassy in Khartoum was attacked, prompting

its move to Port Sudan. In Jeddah, an agreement was signed to safeguard civilians, aid

workers, and ban civilian shields, omitting a ceasefire. Clashes resumed in Geneina,

intensifying casualties. International focus heightened, leading the UN Human Rights

Council to enhance abuse monitoring.

UNICEF reported the destruction of a malnourished children's food factory. Amid

volatility, blame for attacks on churches, hospitals, and embassies circulated. Hemedti

pledged to persist, aiming to capture and try Burhan. Burhan's public appearance boosted

morale among troops, and he replaced Hemedti with Malik Agar.

Casualties surged, particularly in Geneina, with RSF-backed militias accused of

atrocities. A fleeting ceasefire encountered challenges as Khartoum battles persisted, defying

the agreed cessation timeframe. RSF and Arab militias reportedly killed 28 to 97 in West

Darfur's Misterei on May 28.

The Sudanese defense ministry summoned retired soldiers and capable individuals to

join SAF. Peace talks halted due to ceasefire breaches. The conflict inflicted civilian

casualties, encompassing market strikes and abductions.

c. June 2023

In Khartoum, clashes involving tanks caused casualties and injuries. The RSF gained

control over strategic sites, deepening instability. In regions like Kutum, Tawila, and Geneina,

fatal battles led to loss of life and widespread destruction. Acute food scarcity affected many

in Sudan. In Darfur, militias faced allegations of summary executions, worsening the crisis.

The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed after accusing the

19
RSF of genocide. Arab tribe leaders pledged loyalty to the RSF. Amidst Eid al-Adha truces,

heavy fighting endured in Khartoum.

A faction of the SPLM-N led by al-Hilu broke a ceasefire, attacking SAF units.

Clashes displaced over 35,000. Speculation surrounded an alliance between al-Hilu and the

RSF. Ceasefires faltered, leading to more clashes. Blame was exchanged between the SAF,

RSF, and Sudanese government. The US imposed sanctions on related firms and individuals,

while Sudan faced diplomatic strains. Amid turmoil, the International Committee of the Red

Cross secured personnel's release.

d. July 2023

Amid July, the conflict endured. Sudanese Doctors Union accused RSF of hospital

attack, which RSF denied. Escalating violence led SAF to airstrikes against civilians and

SPLM-N positions. SPLM-N (al-Hilu) gained SAF bases in South Kordofan; RSF fought a

coalition in El-Fashir. Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-T) backed SAF in Darfur. RSF

faced looting accusations in Khartoum and Geneina, with reported ethnic cleansing. 88 sexual

assault cases recorded by UN unit.

UN uncovered mass grave in Darfur, 87 bodies linked to RSF, prompting demands for

investigation. UN warned of civil war risk; 10,000 deaths reported in West Darfur. RSF

actions included killing, robbery, and sexual violence. UK sanctioned firms tied to SAF and

RSF for support and arms supply. Regional mediation faltered as SAF boycott hampered

peace efforts. Internal tribal divisions complicated situation; RSF leader Hemedti called for

negotiations sans SAF leadership.

20
 e. August 2023

Within the framework of this situation, the Third Front, an entity recognized as

Tamazuj, emerged as a prominent participant. Among the array of factions rooted in Darfur

and Kordofan, the Third Front previously entered a reconciliation pact with the Sudanese

government in the year 2020.

Nevertheless, suspicions regarding its associations with Sudanese military intelligence

had marginalized its influence. Against this backdrop, the Third Front made a formal

proclamation of its alignment with the RSF.

This move was notably supported by a number of its commanders who had

previously thrown their weight behind the RSF during the initial phases of the ongoing

conflict. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) confidently asserted their establishment of

complete dominion over the entirety of Central Darfur state.

8. Foreign Involvement

a. United States of America

The recurrence of breaches in the ceasefire accords and the occurrence of other

grievous acts throughout the ongoing conflict prompted a responsive executive action from

U.S. President Joe Biden on the 4th of May, 2023. The presidential directive authorized

punitive measures against individuals believed to be involved in the destabilization of Sudan,

actions that undermine the ongoing democratic transition, and the perpetration of violations

against human rights.

Following suit, on the 1st of June, the United States government implemented its

inaugural set of sanctions that had direct implications for the conflict. These sanctions

specifically targeted two entities associated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and an

21
additional pair tied to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In conjunction with this, the U.S.

government placed restrictions on visa issuances for individuals connected to the violent

activities. It is noteworthy, however, that specific identities subject to these punitive measures

were not disclosed in the official announcements.

b. United Kingdom

In a significant development on the 12th of July, the United Kingdom unveiled a

strategic move by imposing sanctions on corporations that have been identified as having

affiliations with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

These sanctions were attributed to the alleged involvement of these firms in channeling both

financial resources and weaponry into the ongoing conflict.

c. Wagner Group

Before the outbreak of the conflict, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Wagner

Group found themselves embroiled in various business arrangements alongside the Rapid

Support Forces (RSF). In accordance with reports from credible sources, the Wagner Group

was implicated in supplying the RSF with surface-to-air missiles. These munitions were

purportedly sourced from Syria, transported to Haftar-controlled bases in Libya via aircraft,

and then further dispatched to RSF positions in the northwestern region of Sudan.

Furthermore, insights reveal that Wagner was contemplating additional arms

provisions to the RSF, leveraging its pre-existing stockpiles situated within the Central

African Republic.

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 In the midst of these allegations, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, offered

a counterpoint by asserting the legitimate right of Sudan to enlist the services of the Wagner

Group. On a parallel note, the chief of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, repudiated any

notion of the group's support for the RSF, affirming the absence of the company's presence in

Sudan for a span exceeding two years.

Counter to some narratives, the RSF categorically denied any collaboration with the

Wagner Group and instead suggested that it was the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) actively

pursuing such affiliations. Adding another layer to the complexity, Sudan itself refuted the

assertion of Wagner's presence within its borders.

d. Libya

On the 18th of April, a high-ranking official within the SAF raised allegations

concerning the involvement of two unnamed neighboring nations in furnishing assistance to

the RSF. The Wall Street Journal, in its coverage, alluded to activities involving Libyan

figurehead Khalifa Haftar, known to enjoy support from the United Arab Emirates and the

Russian paramilitary Wagner Group. Reportedly, Haftar's network facilitated the conveyance

of military provisions via at least one aircraft to the RSF.

Preceding the outbreak of the ongoing conflict, The Observer conveyed information

asserting Haftar's contribution to the preparatory efforts of the RSF over the course of several

months. The Libyan National Army, under Haftar's leadership, categorically dismissed

assertions of extending support to any factions embroiled in hostilities within Sudan.

e. Egypt

On the 16th of April, the RSF reported that its forces stationed in Port Sudan had

come under attack from unidentified aircraft, prompting a stern warning against foreign

23
involvement. Insights from Cameron Hudson, a former CIA analyst, indicate the involvement

of Egyptian fighter jets in these airstrikes targeting the RSF. Moreover, Egyptian special

forces units are reported to have been deployed, providing both tactical guidance and

intelligence support to the SAF.

Notably, sources from The Wall Street Journal allege that Egypt dispatched fighter

jets and pilots to reinforce the Sudanese armed forces. By the 17th of April, The War Zone

accessed satellite imagery which unveiled the aftermath of these developments. One Egyptian

Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been rendered inoperable, while two additional aircraft

of the same type were either damaged or destroyed at the Merowe Airbase.

Among the wreckage, a Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 also met a similar fate. The

RSF initially grappled with ambiguity, yet eventually acknowledged the explanation that

Egyptian personnel were indeed participating in joint training exercises alongside Sudanese

counterparts prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

f. United Arab Emirates

On August 10, the Wall Street Journal released a report attributing statements to

Ugandan authorities. These officials disclosed that an aircraft originating from the UAE made

a brief stopover at Entebbe Airport before proceeding to Amdjarass International Airport in

Chad's eastern region. What emerged during a subsequent inspection was a revelation: the

cargo hold, initially believed to be laden with food and aid as documented on the aircraft's

manifest, actually contained numerous green plastic crates brimming with ammunition,

assault rifles, and various small arms.

This unexpected cargo starkly contrasted with the officially stated purpose of aiding

Sudanese refugees. What transpired next took an intriguing turn. Despite the incriminating

24
discovery, the aircraft was permitted to depart without impediment. It was alleged that

superior authorities had intervened, issuing directives that effectively suspended further

scrutiny of planes arriving from the UAE.

This incident comes against a backdrop where accusations of UAE's support for the

RSF had persisted over time.

In response to these serious allegations, the UAE Foreign Ministry promptly refuted

the claims. The ministry categorically stated that the UAE maintains a neutral stance in the

ongoing conflict, denying any form of partisan involvement.

This denial raises questions regarding the complexities and nuances entwined within

the realm of international relations, as accusations and counter-statements amplify the

murkiness surrounding the matter.

g. Kenya

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) voiced opposition to Kenya's involvement in

mediation efforts aimed at resolving the ongoing conflict. This resistance surfaced in July

when General Burhan accused President William Ruto of fostering a business connection

with Hemedti and providing shelter to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) within Kenya's

borders. Suggestions for deploying a peacekeeping contingent from African nations in Sudan,

as proposed by an IGAD committee chaired by Ruto, were met with a retort from SAF's

Assistant Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Yasir Alatta.

Alatta labeled Ruto as a mercenary acting on behalf of an unidentified foreign nation,

and he challenged Ruto to deploy both the Kenyan military and the forces of the presumed

supporter.

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 Promptly, Kenyan Foreign Secretary Abraham Korir Sing’oei countered these

allegations, categorizing them as groundless. The nation's Foreign Ministry further affirmed

Kenya's impartiality in the conflict, underlining its commitment to neutrality. In an

unforeseen development, a group identifying itself as Anonymous Sudan initiated

cyberattacks on various Kenyan government and private websites during the final week of

July.

This digital offensive underscored the escalating tension and complexities entwined

in the geopolitical landscape, as cyber warfare emerged as a new facet of this intricate power

play.

h. Ethiopia

On the 19th of April, a notable report surfaced in the Sudanese newspaper Al-Sudani,

indicating that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had effectively thwarted an alleged

intrusion by the Ethiopian Armed Forces into the contentious Al Fushqa District. The report

further suggested that the SAF had managed to inflict considerable losses upon Ethiopian

personnel and military equipment during the purported incident.

However, this narrative was swiftly countered by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy

Ahmed, who categorically denied the occurrence of any clashes. Instead, he attributed the

dissemination of such information to elements seeking to incite unrest. In an interesting turn

of events, Abdul Qadir Al-Haymi, a journalist affiliated with Al-Sudani, expressed his

remorse for the publication of the story concerning the supposed Ethiopian incursion.

He explicitly stated that the narrative presented in the report was devoid of truth,

underscoring that no confrontations had taken place between the armed forces of Sudan and

Ethiopia.

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 i. Chad

On the 7th of June, an individual named Hissein Alamine Tchaw-tchaw, identified as

a Chadian dissenter sharing an ethnic background with Hemedti, surfaced in public view.

Tchaw-tchaw asserted leadership over the Movement for the Fight of the Oppressed in Chad

(MFOC), an entity engaged in opposing the administration of President Mahamat Déby.

A video released by Tchaw-tchaw showcased his alleged involvement in an operation

by the RSF, wherein an assault was conducted on the Yarmouk munitions factory located in

Khartoum.

9. Previous Actions in International Basis

The Sudanese conflicts have been long-standing and complex. Several past solutions

and initiatives have been attempted to address these conflicts. Here are some of the notable

ones,

● Darfur Peace Agreement (2006): This agreement was signed between the

Sudanese government and one of the rebel groups operating in the Darfur

region. However, the agreement was criticized for not being inclusive, as it did

not involve all rebel factions, and the conflict in Darfur continued.

● Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011): This document aimed to address

the Darfur conflict and was signed between the Sudanese government and a

few rebel groups. While it led to some reductions in violence, it did not

achieve a comprehensive resolution of the conflict, and violence persisted in

the region.

● Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan

(2018): This agreement was reached between the government of South Sudan

27
 and various opposition groups. It sought to end the conflict in South Sudan,

which erupted in 2013, and established a power-sharing arrangement among

the parties. While it has helped reduce violence to some extent,

implementation challenges and sporadic violence have persisted.

● Juba Peace Agreement (2020): This agreement was signed between the

Sudanese government and various rebel groups from Darfur, the Blue Nile,

and South Kordofan regions. It aimed to end hostilities and address the root

causes of conflict in these areas through political, economic, and security.

10. Conclusion

In conclusion, the pursuit of improved peacekeeping missions in the Sudanese region

remains an imperative task for the international community. As we deliberate on the

multifaceted challenges faced by these missions, it is evident that the path to lasting peace

and stability necessitates innovative solutions, enhanced coordination, and a steadfast

commitment to the welfare of both the local populations and peacekeepers. The Sudanese

region's complex geopolitical landscape demands unwavering dedication to conflict

prevention, civilian protection, and post-conflict recovery efforts. Our collective

responsibility lies in ensuring that these peacekeeping missions are equipped with the

necessary resources, technology, and support to fulfill their mandates effectively.

Moreover, fostering partnerships with local communities, prioritizing gender equality,

and actively addressing arms proliferation will undoubtedly contribute to achieving the

desired outcomes.

As we move forward, let us remember that the ultimate goal is to alleviate the

suffering of the Sudanese people, provide them with the hope of a better future, and work

28
tirelessly to bring about lasting peace to a region that has endured the burdens of conflict for

far too long.

The road ahead may be challenging, but our determination to improve peacekeeping

missions in the Sudanese region remains unwavering.

11. Questions to be Considered

● How can peacekeeping missions in the Sudanese region be better equipped to respond

swiftly to emerging conflicts and security threats?

● In what ways can peacekeeping missions further assist in the facilitation of

humanitarian aid delivery and access to basic services for conflict-affected

communities in the Sudanese region?

● How can peacekeeping missions support and engage with local communities to build

trust and garner their cooperation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts?

● How can the United Nations work with different non-governmental organizations to

further assist the stabilization efforts in South Sudan?

● What strategies can be employed to engage with local communities and build trust

between peacekeepers and the populations they serve in the Sudanese region?

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