I.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
Complainant: BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA
Respondent: HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.
(Political Law Defined)
Doctrine:
1. Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation
of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its
territory.
 It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges.
 It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the
conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence,
political in essence.
 It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de
Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took
effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
 Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
 Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.
Summary:
This case involves a complaint filed by Bernardita R. Macariola against Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte for “acts unbecoming of a judge.” The complaint alleged the Judge Asuncion violated
laws and ethical standards by purchasing property that previously involved in litigation in his court and by
engaging in private business as a stockholder and officer of a corporation while serving as a judge. After
investigation, the Supreme Court found that Judge Asuncion did not violate any laws but reminded him to be
more discreet in his private and business activities as a member of the judiciary.
Facts:
1. Civil Case No. 3010 (Court of First Instance of Leyte)
 Plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes filed a complaint for partition against defendant Bernardita R. Macariola concerning
properties of their common father, Francisco Reyes Diaz.
 Defendant Macariola claimed (a) Sinforosa was illegitimate, (b) she and the five plaintiffs were the
only legal heirs, and (c) the conjugal properties of Francisco and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, should
be divided equally, reserving one half to Macariola as Espiras’s heir.
2. Trial court decision and partition orders
 On June 8, 1963, Judge Elias B. Asuncion rendered judgment: adjudicating heirs’ shares, declaring
conjugal and separate properties, directing partition, and dismissing other claims. The decision
became final for lack of appeal.
  On October 16, 1963, parties’ counsels submitted a project of partition (Exh. A), which Judge
Asuncion approved on October 23 and amended on November 11, 1963, despite Macariola’s lack of
signature, finding counsel authorized.
3. Subsequent transactions over Lot 1184
 Lot 1184 (one-half of which was estate property) was subdivided into Lots 1184-A to 1184-E. Lot
1184-E was sold by three heiresses to Dr. Arcadio Galapon on July 31, 1964; TCT No. 2338 issued.
 On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife. On August
31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon sold their interests in the remainder to Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. (“Traders”), incorporated January 9, 1967, with Judge
Asuncion as president and his wife as secretary; both withdrew January 31, 1967.
4. Administrative complaint (Adm. Case No. 133-J) and related civil case
 On August 6, 1968, Macariola filed an administrative complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging:
 Violation of Art. 14, Code of Commerce; Sec. 3 (h), RA 3019; Sec. 12, Rele XVIII, Civil Service
Rules; Canon 25, Judicial Ethics, by associating with traders.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said Code of Commerce provision.
Ruling:
1. No. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce (effective August 1888), prohibiting judges from engaging in
commerce was political in nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the
country (Change of Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession, 1898 – Treaty of Paris).
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the
Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible
or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.

G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007

MMDA V VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO INC
Petitioner: MMDA AND BAYANI FERNANDO AS CHAIRMAN OF MMDA
Respondent: VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.
Constitutional Law Defined/Distinguished from Pol Law
Facts:
1. Due to the continuing traffic jams that clog the streets of Metro Manila, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila
Mass Transport System which states that;
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY – The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is
directed to undertake such infrastructure development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage
the project until it may be turned-over to more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient.
Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective
agencies and/or entities owning them;
c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate government
agencies, entities, and/or private persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent
regulations, to facilitate the implementation of the project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/or
implementation of the projects, in accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and
practice in government.
f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including local
 government units, government-owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; and
h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the
objectives and purposes of this Executive Order.
2. The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project. Pursuant to the E.O., the
Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution
No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the
different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the
need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Issue:
1. Whether the E.O. was an unreasonable exercise of police power?
Held:
1. For the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
Section 17: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of
the people. This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex ─ the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact
increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President
and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991.
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
DTI v ENRIQUEZ
Complainant: DTI
Respondent: DANILO B. ENRIQUEZ
Ponente: REYES, J. JR., J.
Constitutional Law Defined/Distinguished from Pol Law
Summary:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) does not have the power to impose imprisonment as a penalty for violations of the Consumer Act of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. 7394). The Court reiterated that the power to impose criminal penalties, including
imprisonment, is exclusively vested in the courts.
FACTS:
1. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) filed a criminal complaint against Danilo B. Enriquez
(respondent) for alleged violations of the Consumer Act of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 7394).
2. The DTI, through its Special Investigation Committee, conducted an investigation and issued a Resolution
finding probable cause to indict Enriquez for violations of Articles 50, 52, 61, and 62 of R.A. No. 7394.
3. The DTI Resolution recommended the filing of an Information for the said violations, which carry penalties
including imprisonment.
4. Enriquez filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the DTI's authority to
determine probable cause and recommend the filing of a criminal information. The CA ruled in favor of
Enriquez, holding that the DTI has no power to impose imprisonment or determine probable cause for
criminal prosecution.
LEGAL ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has the power to impose the penalty of
imprisonment for violations of the Consumer Act of the Philippines (R.A. No. 7394).
2. Whether or not the DTI has the authority to determine probable cause for the filing of criminal informations
for violations of R.A. No. 7394.
RULING:
Holding on Issue 1:
 The DTI does not have the power to impose the penalty of imprisonment. The power to impose criminal
penalties, including imprisonment, is inherently judicial and exclusively vested in the courts.
 While administrative agencies may be granted the power to impose administrative fines or penalties, they
cannot impose penalties that are criminal in nature, such as imprisonment, unless explicitly authorized by
law and within constitutional limits. R.A. No. 7394 does not grant the DTI such power.
 The DTI's role under R.A. No. 7394 is primarily administrative, focusing on enforcement of standards,
consumer education, and resolution of consumer complaints through administrative remedies.
Holding on Issue 2:
 The DTI does not have the authority to determine probable cause for the filing of criminal informations. The
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor, who is under the executive department, or the judge, who is under the
judicial department.
 While the DTI may investigate violations and gather evidence, its finding of probable cause in this context is
merely recommendatory and does not bind the prosecutor or the court. The DTI cannot usurp the functions
of the public prosecutor or the courts in initiating and prosecuting criminal cases.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPАСТ
 This decision reinforces the fundamental principle of separation of powers, particularly the exclusive domain
of the judiciary in imposing criminal penalties and the executive (specifically, the prosecutor) in determining
probable cause for criminal prosecution.
 It clarifies the limits of the DTI's powers under the Consumer Act, emphasizing its administrative nature and
lack of authority over criminal matters, despite being the primary implementing agency.
 The ruling serves as a precedent affirming that administrative agencies, while empowered to enforce laws,
cannot encroach upon the judicial function of imposing imprisonment or the prosecutorial function of
determining probable cause for criminal cases.
 It highlights the importance of due process and the proper allocation of governmental powers in the
enforcement of penal statutes.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
A. The Feb. 1986 Revolution and the Proclamation of the Provisional Constitution
Proclamation No. 1, 2/25/86 [Prov’l Gov’t]
Proclamation No. 1, issued on February 25, 1986, by Corazon Aquino and Salvador Laurel at Club Filipino in San Juan,
was the foundational document of the new government following the EDSA People Power Revolution, which
ousted Ferdinand Marcos. This proclamation declared the Marcos regime illegitimate, citing widespread fraud in
the 1986 Snap Elections, and established Aquino’s presidency based on the sovereign will of the Filipino people, as
demonstrated by the peaceful mass protests at EDSA. Rejecting the 1973 Constitution (which Marcos had
manipulated), the proclamation invoked the doctrine of popular sovereignty, affirming the people’s right to
overthrow an oppressive regime. Aquino assumed dual roles as President and Prime Minister, with Laurel as Vice
President, and abolished the Marcos-era Batasang Pambansa, ruling by decree while preparing a new constitution.
The proclamation emphasized the restoration of democracy, human rights, and accountability, paving the way for
the 1987 Constitution and free elections. It also implicitly nullified Marcos’ authoritarian decrees,
including Proclamation No. 2045 (Martial Law, 1981), marking the end of one-man rule and the return to civilian
governance. Internationally recognized by the U.S. and other nations, Proclamation No. 1 served as a legal and
revolutionary break from Marcos’ dictatorship, asserting direct democratic legitimacy. It became a symbol of People
Power, setting the stage for the Philippines’ transition to democracy and laying the groundwork for constitutional
reforms. As the founding document of the Aquino government, it established a precedent for revolutionary
legitimacy in Philippine history, rooted in the people’s collective will rather than strict legal continuity.
Proclamation No. 3 3/25/86 [Provisional Const]
Proclamation No. 3, issued by President Corazon Aquino on March 25, 1986 and known as the "Freedom
Constitution," served as the Philippines' provisional charter following the EDSA People Power Revolution, replacing
the 1973 Marcos Constitution. This transitional document established Aquino's government as a revolutionary
authority with full executive and legislative powers, enabling her to issue decrees without legislative approval while
restoring civil liberties suspended under martial law, including freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and due process.
It abolished Marcos-era institutions like the Batasang Pambansa and laid the groundwork for democratic restoration
by creating a Constitutional Commission to draft a new charter, which ultimately became the 1987 Constitution. The
Freedom Constitution also authorized crucial reforms such as judicial reorganization, removal of Marcos loyalists
from government, and recovery of ill-gotten wealth from the Marcos family and cronies. As a temporary but vital
legal framework, it successfully bridged the transition from dictatorship to democracy, legitimizing Aquino's
government through popular mandate while maintaining stability until the ratification of the permanent 1987
Constitution that remains in effect today. This historic proclamation marked a critical juncture in Philippine history by
dismantling authoritarian structures and paving the way for the restoration of democratic institutions
No. 73748, 22 May 1986
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINOG.R.
Summary:
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines filed three petitions questioning the legitimacy of the
government of President Aquino. It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, Proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. In a
petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, stated that in the first paragraph of
Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution stating that the six-year term of the incumbent President
and Vice-President elected in the February 7,1986 election is hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1992. The petitioner asks the Court to declare who among the present
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo Tolentino are being referred to under the said Section 7 of
ARTICLE XVIII of the transitory of the proposed 1986 Constitution. As early as April 10,1986, this Court had already
voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.
Issue:
1. Is the government of Corazon Aquino legitimate?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that the legitimacy of the Aquino government isnot a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is ineffective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations
has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. For the
above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no
question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines or the above-quoted reasons,
which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed.
In Re Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160 (1986)
Facts:
Saturnino Bermudez, a lawyer, file a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents and quoted the validity
of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claimed that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers. He then asked the Court to declare the
answer and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to as the “incumbent president
B. Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
Issue: Topics: (History of the Constitution; Immunity from suit)
a.) Whether or not the said provision ambiguous or vague?
b.) Whether or not the Presidency of Cory Aquino and Vice President Salvador H. Laurel
legitimate?
Held:
a.) The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the frequented provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public
record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government
b.) Yes. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. The people have accepted President Cory Aquino as
incumbent President of the Philippines
B. Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
[ Art. V, Provisional Const]
ARTICLE V
B.1 ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President
to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50)
natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and
patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society.
SECTION 2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both
to hasten the return of normal constitutional government to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and
aspirations of the Filipino people.
SECTION 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to ensure that the people will have adequate participation
in the formulation of the New Constitution.
SECTION 4. The plenary session of the Commission shall be public and fully recorded.
SECTION 5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the date for
the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such
plebiscite which shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days following its submission to the President.
[ Sec. 27, Art. XVIII, 1987 Const]
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
[ Proclamation No. 58, February 11, 1987]
PROCLAIMING THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ADOPTED BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF 1986, INCLUDING THE ORDINANCE APPENDED THERETO
WHEREAS, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on
October 15, 1986, together with the Ordinance appended thereto, which shall become valid and effective upon
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose;
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting as the national board of canvassers for the February 2, 1987
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, certified that:
(1) The Commission on Elections canvassed the returns from 83,288 voting precincts throughout the country
involving 21,785,216 votes cast; and
(2) On the basis of the canvass made by the Commission on Elections, the results thereof are as follows:
(a) Affirmative votes: 16,622,111
(b) Negative Votes: 4,953,375
(c) Abstentions: 209,730
A copy of the Certificate of Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Plebiscite Held on February 2, 1987, of the Commission
on Elections dated February 7, 1987 is hereto attached as Annex “A” of this Proclamation.1aшphi1
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
sovereign mandate of the people, do hereby proclaim that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly
ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be
affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of February in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ET AL. VS. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, ET AL.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This case involves a petition for prohibition filed by Alfredo M. De Leon, et al., seeking to prevent their replacement
as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The central legal issue is whether the OIC
Governor of Rizal had the authority to replace the petitioners after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the 1987 Constitution superseded the Provisional
Constitution, thereby invalidating the OIC Governor's memoranda designating respondents as replacements. This
decision affirms the security of tenure for barangay officials and underscores the autonomy of local governments,
limiting the President's power to general supervision.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, Barangay Captain; Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino,
Rogelio J. de la Rosa, and Jose M. Resurreccion, Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
 Respondent: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra, OIC Governor of Rizal; Hon. Romeo C. De Leon, OIC Mayor of Taytay,
Rizal; Florentino G. Magno, Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta, Teodoro V. Medina, Rosendo S. Paz, and
Teresita L. Tolentino, designated replacements.
 Nature of Case: Original action for Prohibition.
 Key Events:
o May 17, 1982: Petitioners elected as Barangay officials under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222.
o February 8, 1987: Respondent OIC Governor Esguerra signed memoranda designating respondents
as replacements, antedated to December 1, 1986.
o February 9, 1987: Petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received the memorandum.
o February 2, 1987: The 1987 Constitution was ratified.
 Lower Court Proceedings: Not applicable, as this is an original action filed directly with the Supreme Court.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: Original action for Prohibition filed directly with the Supreme Court.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Primary Issue: Whether the memoranda issued by the OIC Governor on February 8, 1987, designating
respondents as replacements for the petitioners, are valid and enforceable after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987.
2. Secondary Issues:
o Whether Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which allowed for the replacement of
elective officials within one year from February 25, 1986, remained operative after the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution.
o Whether the term of office of barangay officials, as provided in the Barangay Election Act of 1982, is
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
3. Constitutional Questions:
o Interpretation of Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution regarding the effectivity of the
Constitution upon ratification.
o Interpretation of Article X regarding local autonomy and the President's power of general supervision
over local governments.
4. Procedural Issues: None explicitly mentioned.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal,
are declared to be of no legal force and effect. The Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents
perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions.
  Legal Doctrine Applied: Supremacy of the Constitution; Security of Tenure for Elective Officials; Local
Autonomy.
 Constitutional Analysis: The Court held that Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions," superseded the Provisional
Constitution upon its ratification on February 2, 1987.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked,"
to mean that the Barangay Election Act of 1982, providing for a six-year term for barangay officials, remained
operative as it was not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.
 Precedent Analysis: The Court cited Topacio, Jr. vs. Pimentel, G.R. No. 73770, April 10, 1986, although not
directly applicable, it implicitly supports the principle of security of tenure.
 Policy Considerations: The Court emphasized the policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays, as declared in Section 2, BP Blg. 222, and the 1987 Constitution's assurance of
the autonomy of local governments.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 The 1987 Constitution took effect immediately upon its ratification on February 2, 1987, superseding the
Provisional Constitution. The Court stated, "The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2,
1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners."
 The OIC Governor's memoranda, signed on February 8, 1987, were no longer valid as the Provisional
Constitution, which granted the authority to replace elective officials, had already been superseded.
 The Barangay Election Act of 1982, providing for a six-year term for barangay officials, remained operative as
it was not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. The Court found "nothing inconsistent between the term
of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution."
 Petitioners acquired security of tenure, especially considering the State's policy to guarantee and promote
the autonomy of the barangays. The Court stated, "Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of
tenure especially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it 'a policy of the State to
guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities'."
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions
 Chief Justice Teehankee: Concurred, emphasizing that the intent of the Constitutional Commission was that
the Constitution would take effect on the date of the plebiscite. He cited the Constitutional Commission
deliberations to support this view.
 Justice Cruz: Concurred, stating that the decision affirms his previous dissents in similar cases regarding the
security of tenure of local OICs.
 Justice Sarmiento: Dissented, arguing that the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date
of proclamation, not February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite. He argued that acts performed between
February 2 and February 11, 1987, should be considered valid under the Provisional Constitution.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: The case establishes the precedent that a new constitution takes effect
immediately upon its ratification in a plebiscite, superseding previous constitutions.
 Impact on Philippine Law: This decision clarifies the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and its impact on
existing laws and appointments made under the previous Provisional Constitution.
 Effects on Future Cases: This ruling will influence future cases involving the interpretation of constitutional
provisions and the validity of actions taken during the transition period between constitutions.
 Practical Implications: The decision reinforces the security of tenure for elected barangay officials and limits
the power of appointment by higher authorities after the ratification of a new constitution.
 Doctrinal Significance: The case reaffirms the principle of constitutional supremacy and the importance of
local autonomy in the Philippine legal system.
 International Relevance: Not applicable.
  Legislative Impact: The decision may influence future legislation regarding the terms of office for barangay
officials, as the 1987 Constitution leaves this to be determined by law.
G.R. No. 174340. October 17, 2006
IN RE: SABIO
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Supreme Court declared Section 4(b) of Executive Order No. 1, which exempted PCGG members and staff from
testifying in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding, repealed by the 1987 Constitution. The Court
upheld the Senate's power of inquiry in aid of legislation, emphasizing that no provision of law can limit this broad
power in the absence of a constitutional basis, and ordered the petitioners to comply with the Senate's subpoenae.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Camilo L. Sabio, Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), along
with other PCGG Commissioners, PCGG nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, and Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation itself, including its directors and officers.
 Respondent: The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, its members and
Chairman, Senator Richard Gordon; the Senate Committee on Public Services, its members and Chairman,
Senator Joker P. Arroyo; Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Senate President Manuel Villar, the Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms, and the Senate of the Philippines.
 Key Facts: Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Senate Resolution No. 455 directing an inquiry into
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT, and PHC. Senator Gordon, as Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, invited Chairman Sabio to be a resource
person. Sabio declined, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. The Senate issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,
which Sabio also refused to comply with. The Senate then issued an Order to arrest Sabio for contempt.
 Procedural History: Sabio filed a petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No. 174340). Sabio and other PCGG officials
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 174318). Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its
officers and directors also filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 174177). All cases were
consolidated before the Supreme Court.
LEGAL ISSUES
Holding on Issue 1: Yes, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
 Section 4(b) is directly repugnant to Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the
power of legislative inquiry. The Constitution does not provide any exemption from this power. "Nowhere in
the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption."
 Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states that "Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people..." Section 4(b),
being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability.
 Section 4(b) also runs counter to Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution, which
ensure the people's access to information. It limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure information
from PCGG members and staff in aid of its power to legislate.
Holding on Issue 2: No, the Senate Committees did not violate the petitioners' right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.
 The directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Such matters are of public
concern and over which the people have the right to information. "The right to privacy is not absolute where
there is an overriding compelling state interest."
 The right against self-incrimination may be invoked only when the incriminating question is being asked. The
petitioners have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.
"That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees
their power of inquiry."
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT
 This decision reinforces the broad scope of the legislative power of inquiry in the Philippines, affirming that it
extends to all government agencies and officers, including the PCGG.
 It clarifies that the principle of public accountability, enshrined in the Constitution, overrides any statutory
attempts to shield public officials from legislative scrutiny.
  The decision establishes that the right to privacy is not absolute and can be limited when there is a
compelling state interest, particularly in matters of public concern involving government entities.
 It clarifies the application of the right against self-incrimination in legislative inquiries, emphasizing that it can
only be invoked when a specific incriminating question is asked, not as a blanket refusal to testify.
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
B.1 COMPARE WITH THE EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
G.R. No. L-63915April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, AND MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.[MABINI], VS. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, ET AL.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This case concerns the necessity of publishing presidential decrees, letters of instructions, and other presidential
issuances in the Official Gazette for them to be valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court held that presidential
issuances of general application must be published in the Official Gazette to be binding. The Court reasoned that
publication is a requirement of due process, ensuring that the public is informed of laws that regulate their conduct.
This ruling established that unpublished presidential issuances of general application have no force and effect,
safeguarding the public's right to information and due process.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.[MABINI]
 Respondent: Hon. Juan C. Tuvera (Executive Assistant to the President), Hon. Joaquin Venus (Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. De La Cruz (Director, Malacañang Records Office), and
Florendo S. Pablo (Director, Bureau of Printing)
 Nature of Case: Petition for Mandamus
 Key Events:
o Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondents to publish various presidential
issuances in the Official Gazette.
o Petitioners invoked the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and the principle
that laws must be published to be valid.
o Respondents argued that publication is not required if the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates.
 Lower Court Proceedings: This case originated directly in the Supreme Court as a petition for mandamus.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: Original action for mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Primary Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is a prerequisite for the effectivity of presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, and other presidential issuances of general applicability.
2. Secondary Issues:
o Whether the petitioners have the legal standing to bring the petition for mandamus.
o Whether Article 2 of the Civil Code precludes the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
3. Constitutional Questions: Whether the lack of publication violates the people's right to information on
matters of public concern as recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution.
4. Procedural Issues: Whether a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the publication of the
presidential issuances.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
 Legal Doctrine Applied: Due Process; Right to Information; Publication of Laws
 Constitutional Analysis: The Court invoked Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,
recognizing the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act 638.
  Precedent Analysis:
o Severino vs. Governor General (16 Phil. 366): Recognized a private citizen's legal personality in
mandamus proceedings involving a public right.
o Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371): Addressed the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality on prior acts.
o Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68): Sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, even after
it was declared unconstitutional.
 Policy Considerations: The Court emphasized the importance of informing the public of laws that regulate
their actions and conduct, especially given the President's law-making power.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 Legal Standing: The Court held that the petitioners had the legal standing to bring the petition because it
concerned a public right and the enforcement of a public duty. The Court cited Severino vs. Governor
General, stating that "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest."
 Publication Requirement: The Court ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary for the
effectivity of laws of general applicability, even if the law itself provides for its effectivity date. The Court
emphasized that Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 mandates the publication of all presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general applicability."
 Due Process: The Court stated that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
 Operative Fact Doctrine: The Court applied the "operative fact" doctrine, stating that the
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored."
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions
 Fernando, C.J. (Concurring with Qualification): Concurred that publication is essential to the effectivity of a
legislative or executive act of general application but disagreed that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette.
 Plana, J. (Separate Opinion): Concurred that notice is required before laws become effective but disagreed
that such notice must be by publication in the Official Gazette.
 Teehankee, J. (Concurring): Concurred with the main opinion, emphasizing the importance of official
publication in the Official Gazette for the Rule of Law.
 Melencio-Herrera, J. (Concurring): Agreed that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published, and there should be no retroactivity if it runs counter to constitutional rights or destroys vested
rights.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: Established the principle that publication in the Official Gazette is a mandatory
requirement for the effectivity of laws, particularly presidential issuances of general application.
 Impact on Philippine Law: Clarified the interpretation of Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638, emphasizing the importance of publication for due process and the right to
information.
 Effects on Future Cases: Influences future cases involving the validity and enforceability of laws and
regulations, particularly those issued by the executive branch.
 Practical Implications: Ensures that the public is adequately informed of laws that regulate their conduct,
preventing the enforcement of unpublished laws.
 Doctrinal Significance: Reinforces the principles of due process, transparency, and the rule of law in the
Philippine legal system.
 Legislative Impact: May influence legislative action to ensure that all laws and regulations are properly
published and accessible to the public.
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, ...
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ...." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice
has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No.
63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need
not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to
be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386
AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PRELIMINARY TITLE CHAPTER 1
Effect and Application of Laws
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. VS. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 169777, G.R.NO. 169659, G.R.NO.169660, G.R.NO. 169667, G.R.NO. 169834, G.R.NO. 171246
April 20, 2006
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This consolidated case involves petitions challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464),
which required executive officials to secure presidential consent before appearing before Congress. The Supreme
Court declared Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 void, finding that they unduly infringe upon Congress's power of
inquiry and the people's right to information. The Court reasoned that the implied claim of executive privilege
authorized by these sections lacked the necessary specificity and frustrated Congress's ability to determine the
justification for withholding information. Sections 1 and 2(a) of E.O. 464 were, however, upheld. This ruling clarifies
the scope of executive privilege and reinforces the separation of powers doctrine, ensuring that Congress can
effectively exercise its legislative functions while respecting legitimate executive confidentiality.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Senate of the Philippines, represented by Franklin M. Drilon, et al.; Bayan Muna, represented by
Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., et al.; Francisco I. Chavez; Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALG); PDP-Laban; Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al.
 Respondent: Eduardo R. Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.; Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., in his capacity as Secretary of Defense; and Generoso S. Senga,
in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff.
 Nature of Case: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 464.
 Key Events:
 o The Senate issued invitations to executive officials for hearings on the North Rail Project and alleged
wiretapping.
o President Arroyo issued E.O. 464, requiring executive officials to secure presidential consent before
appearing before Congress.
o Executive officials, citing E.O. 464, declined to attend Senate hearings.
o Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
 Lower Court Proceedings: Not applicable, as the petitions were directly filed with the Supreme Court.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: The petitions were filed directly with the Supreme Court invoking its
power of judicial review over acts of the executive branch alleged to be unconstitutional.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Primary Issue: Does E.O. 464 unconstitutionally contravene the power of inquiry vested in Congress by
requiring executive officials to secure presidential consent before appearing before congressional hearings?
2. Secondary Issues:
o Does E.O. 464 violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern?
o Did the respondents commit grave abuse of discretion by implementing E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation?
3. Constitutional Questions:
o Whether E.O. 464 violates Art. VI, Sec. 21 (power of inquiry), Art. VI, Sec. 22 (question hour), Art. III,
Sec. 7 (right to information), and Art. II, Sec. 28 (full public disclosure) of the Constitution.
4. Procedural Issues:
o Whether the petitioners have standing to challenge the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
o Whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The Supreme Court PARTLY GRANTED the petitions, declaring Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive
Order No. 464 (series of 2005) VOID, and upholding the validity of Sections 1 and 2(a).
 Legal Doctrine Applied: Separation of Powers, Executive Privilege, Power of Inquiry, Right to Information.
 Constitutional Analysis: The Court analyzed the scope of Congress's power of inquiry under Article VI,
Section 21, and the limitations imposed by the doctrine of executive privilege. It also considered the right to
information under Article III, Section 7.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted E.O. 464 in light of the constitutional provisions on
separation of powers and the right to information.
 Precedent Analysis:
o Arnault v. Nazareno (87 Phil. 29 (1950)): Recognized the inherent power of inquiry as essential to the
legislative function.
o Almonte v. Vasquez (314 Phil. 150 (1995)): Recognized the doctrine of executive privilege in the
Philippines.
o Chavez v. PCGG (360 Phil. 133 (1998)): Held that the jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding
that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."
o U.S. v. Nixon (418 U.S. 683 (1974)): Discussed the scope and limitations of executive privilege in the
United States.
 Policy Considerations: The Court balanced the need for executive confidentiality with the importance of
transparency and accountability in government.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 Congress's Power of Inquiry: The Court affirmed Congress's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
stating that this power is "grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process." It emphasized
that the power of inquiry extends to executive officials who possess information relevant to legislative
concerns.
 Invalidity of Sections 2(b) and 3: The Court found Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 invalid because they
authorized an implied claim of executive privilege without requiring a specific allegation of the basis for the
privilege. The Court stated, "Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege,
 there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected."
 Requirement of Specificity: The Court emphasized that a claim of executive privilege must be clearly asserted
and accompanied by a statement of the specific grounds for the claim. It cited U.S. v. Reynolds, stating that
"There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer."
 Unlawful Delegation: The Court also found that Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), involved an unlawful
delegation of authority to the heads of offices, as it allowed them to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence. The Court stated, "In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it
essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege."
 Validity of Section 1: The Court upheld the validity of Section 1, which required department heads to secure
presidential consent before appearing before Congress during the question hour, as this was consistent with
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: This case establishes the principle that claims of executive privilege must be
clearly asserted and accompanied by a specific statement of the grounds for the claim. It also limits the
power to invoke executive privilege to the President.
 Impact on Philippine Law: This decision clarifies the scope of executive privilege and reinforces the
separation of powers doctrine, ensuring that Congress can effectively exercise its legislative functions while
respecting legitimate executive confidentiality.
 Effects on Future Cases: This ruling will influence future cases involving claims of executive privilege,
requiring the executive branch to provide specific justifications for withholding information from Congress.
 Practical Implications: This decision promotes transparency and accountability in government by ensuring
that Congress has access to information necessary for effective legislation and oversight.
 Doctrinal Significance: This case contributes to the development of Philippine jurisprudence on the
separation of powers and the balance between executive confidentiality and legislative oversight.
 Legislative Impact: This decision may prompt legislative action to further define the scope of executive
privilege and establish procedures for resolving disputes between the executive and legislative branches.
G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Supreme Court dismissed G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic, as the House Committees had already
completed their inquiry and submitted their reports. However, the Court granted the petition in G.R. No. 179275,
prohibiting the Senate from continuing its inquiry into the "Hello Garci" tapes because the Senate had not duly
published its rules of procedure for legislative inquiries, violating Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner (G.R. No. 170338): Virgilio O. Garcillano, the COMELEC Commissioner allegedly involved in the
"Hello Garci" tapes.
 Respondent (G.R. No. 170338): The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public
Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms.
 Petitioner (G.R. No. 179275): Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals, and Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge (Petitioner-in-Intervention), a member of the ISAFP.
 Respondent (G.R. No. 179275): The Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Senate
President.
 Key Facts: Wiretapped conversations, known as the "Hello Garci" tapes, surfaced, allegedly containing
instructions from the President to COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano to manipulate the 2004 presidential
elections. The House of Representatives and the Senate separately initiated legislative inquiries into the
matter. Garcillano sought to prohibit the House from using the tapes, while Ranada and Agcaoili sought to
prohibit the Senate from conducting its inquiry.
 Procedural History: Garcillano filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with the Supreme Court (G.R.
No. 170338) to prevent the House from using the tapes. Ranada and Agcaoili filed a Petition for Prohibition
 with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 179275) to prevent the Senate from conducting its inquiry. The cases were
consolidated.
LEGAL ISSUES
1. Is the petition in G.R. No. 170338 moot and academic?
2. Does the Senate's conduct of a legislative inquiry into the "Hello Garci" tapes violate Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution, which requires duly published rules of procedure?
COURT'S RULING & REASONING
Holding on Issue 2: Yes, the Senate's conduct of the legislative inquiry violates Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.
 Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."
 The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
"Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one."
 The Court found that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened
their session.
 The Court rejected the argument that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and are available in
booklet form and on the Senate's website. The absence of amendment cannot justify the Senate's defiance
of the constitutional mandate.
 The Court also rejected the invocation of R.A. No. 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act) to support publication
through the internet, stating that the law merely recognizes electronic documents for evidentiary purposes
and does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT
 This decision reinforces the importance of procedural due process in legislative inquiries, particularly the
requirement for the publication of rules of procedure as mandated by Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.
 It clarifies that the Senate of each Congress must publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because each Senate is distinct.
 It establishes that making rules available in booklet form or on a website does not satisfy the constitutional
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
 It clarifies that the Electronic Commerce Act does not modify the requirements for publication of laws, rules,
and regulations.
G.R. No. 180643March 25, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, PETITIONER, vs. SENATE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Romulo L. Neri against Senate Committees, questioning the show
cause letter and contempt order issued against him for failing to appear and testify regarding the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project. The central legal issue is whether Neri validly invoked executive privilege to justify his non-
appearance and refusal to answer certain questions. The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, nullifying the
contempt order, holding that the communications elicited by the three questions were covered by executive
privilege, specifically the presidential communications privilege, and that the Senate Committees committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. The ruling clarifies the scope of executive privilege in the
Philippines, particularly concerning communications related to quintessential presidential powers, and emphasizes
the importance of procedural due process in legislative inquiries.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), later Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
 Respondent: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Senate
Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security.
 Nature of Case: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
  Key Events:
o April 21, 2007: Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project.
o September 26, 2007: Romulo L. Neri testified before the Senate Committees, disclosing a bribery
attempt by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos but invoking executive privilege on further
questions.
o November 15, 2007: Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to
dispense with Neri's testimony, invoking executive privilege.
o November 22, 2007: Senate Committees issued a show cause letter to Neri for failing to appear.
o January 30, 2008: Senate Committees issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his
arrest.
 Lower Court Proceedings: There were no lower court proceedings as the petition was directly filed with the
Supreme Court.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: The case reached the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, directly challenging the Senate Committees' actions. A Supplemental Petition
for Certiorari was also filed.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Constitutional Questions: Whether the claim of executive privilege violates Section 28, Art. II (Full public
disclosure), Section 7, Art. III (Right to information), Section 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust), and
Section 17, Art. VII (President shall ensure laws are faithfully executed) of the Constitution.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and nullified the Senate Committees' Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt and directing his arrest and detention.
 Legal Doctrine Applied: Presidential Communications Privilege, Executive Privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations, Doctrine of Separation of Powers.
 Constitutional Analysis: The Court balanced the right to public information against the need for
confidentiality in presidential communications and foreign relations, finding that the latter outweighed the
former in this specific context.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) and Section 24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as
limitations on the right to public information.
 Precedent Analysis: The Court heavily relied on Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006]), United States v. Nixon
(418 U.S. 683), Almonte v. Vasquez (433 Phil. 506), and In Re: Sealed Case (No. 96-3124) to define the scope
and application of executive privilege.
 Policy Considerations: The Court emphasized the importance of protecting the confidentiality of presidential
communications to ensure candid advice and effective decision-making, as well as the need to avoid
impairing diplomatic and economic relations with foreign countries.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 Communications Elicited by the Three Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege: The Court found that
the communications related to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e., the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. The communications were "received" by a close
advisor of the President, and there was no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege.
 The Claim of Executive Privilege was Properly Invoked: The Court held that Executive Secretary Ermita's
letter satisfied the requirement of a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which
has control over the matter, and provided a "precise and certain reason" for preserving confidentiality.
 Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order: The Court
cited several reasons for this conclusion, including the legitimate claim of executive privilege, the failure to
comply with the requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita regarding the content of invitations, the lack of a
majority vote in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the violation of Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution requiring "duly published rules of procedure," and the arbitrary and precipitate issuance of the
contempt order.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: The case reaffirms the doctrine of executive privilege in the Philippines,
particularly the presidential communications privilege, and clarifies the procedure for its invocation. It also
emphasizes the limitations on the power of legislative inquiry and the importance of respecting the rights of
individuals appearing before legislative committees.
 Impact on Philippine Law: The decision provides further guidance on the application of executive privilege in
the context of legislative inquiries, balancing the need for transparency and accountability with the need for
confidentiality in presidential decision-making and foreign relations.
 Effects on Future Cases: This ruling will likely be cited in future cases involving claims of executive privilege,
particularly those involving conflicts between the Executive and Legislative branches. It will also influence the
standards for determining whether a legislative inquiry is conducted in accordance with due process.
 Practical Implications: The decision may lead to greater caution on the part of legislative committees in
issuing contempt orders and a greater emphasis on procedural safeguards in legislative inquiries. It may also
encourage more negotiation and accommodation between the Executive and Legislative branches in
resolving disputes over access to information.
 Doctrinal Significance: The case contributes to the development of Philippine constitutional law by further
defining the scope and limitations of executive privilege and the power of legislative inquiry, reinforcing the
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances.
 International Relevance: The Court's reliance on U.S. jurisprudence highlights the influence of American
constitutional law on the development of executive privilege in the Philippines.
 Legislative Impact: The decision may prompt the Senate to review and revise its Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation to ensure compliance with due process requirements.
G.R. No. 187714. March 08, 2011
PIMENTEL V. SENATE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, holding that the referral of the complaint against Senator Villar to
the Senate Committee of the Whole was valid but would only take effect upon publication of the Committee's Rules.
The Court emphasized that while the Constitution does not generally require publication of internal rules, the Senate
Committee of the Whole's own rules mandated publication for effectivity, which must be followed to comply with
due process.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Manuel B. Villar, Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S.
Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano, who questioned the proceedings against Senator Villar.
 Respondent: Senate Committee of the Whole, represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, which was
tasked to investigate Senator Villar.
 Key Facts: Senator Lacson delivered a privilege speech alleging double insertion of P200 million for the C-5
Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, implicating Senator Villar. Senator Madrigal
filed P.S. Resolution 706 directing the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate Senator Villar. The
Minority refused to nominate members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson moved to transfer the
investigation to the Senate Committee of the Whole.
 Procedural History: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the
Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings on the complaint against Senator Villar,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
LEGAL ISSUES
1. Does the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
violate Senator Villar's right to due process and the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section
16(2) of the Constitution?
2. Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?
COURT'S RULING & REASONING
Holding on Issue 4: The adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right to due
process.
 The Court reiterated the Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings, citing
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution.
  The Court stated that the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision, except on a
clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process.
Holding on Issue 5: Publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
 While the Constitution does not require publication of internal rules, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole expressly mandates publication before the Rules can take effect.
 The Court cited Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, 25 March 2008, emphasizing the importance of published rules affecting the rights of individuals.
 The Court emphasized that "to comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own
internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected."
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT
 This decision clarifies the extent of judicial review over internal rules of the Senate, emphasizing deference to
the Senate's power to create its own rules but requiring adherence to due process.
 It reinforces the principle that even internal rules must be followed when they affect the rights of individuals,
particularly when the rules themselves mandate publication.
 The case highlights the importance of procedural regularity in legislative investigations and disciplinary
proceedings.
 It clarifies that while the Constitution does not mandate publication of internal rules, a self-imposed
requirement of publication must be followed.
G.R. No. 211833 April 07, 2015
VILLANUEVA V. JBC/JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This case concerns the constitutionality of the Judicial and Bar Council's (JBC) policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition, holding that the JBC's policy does not violate the equal protection clause as it is based on a reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. The Court also ruled that while the JBC's
failure to publish the assailed policy was a procedural lapse, it did not prejudice the petitioner's private interest. The
decision clarifies the scope of the JBC's authority in setting qualification standards and the importance of
transparency through publication of its policies.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Ferdinand R. Villanueva, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Compostela-New
Bataan, Compostela Valley Province.
 Respondent: Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
 Nature of Case: Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63
of the Rules of Court.
 Key Events:
o September 18, 2012: Petitioner appointed as Presiding Judge of MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan.
o September 27, 2013: Petitioner applied for vacant positions of Presiding Judge in Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) in Tagum City, Davao City, and Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
o December 18, 2013: JBC informed petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates.
o February 3, 2014: JBC upheld its decision not to include petitioner due to its policy requiring five
years of service as a judge of a first-level court.
 Lower Court Proceedings: No lower court proceedings as the petition was directly filed with the Supreme
Court.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: Direct recourse to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Prohibition,
Mandamus, Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Primary Issue: Whether or not the policy of the JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts is constitutional.
2. Secondary Issues:
o Whether the remedies of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief are proper in
assailing the JBC's policy.
o Whether the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution.
 o Whether the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment.
3. Constitutional Questions:
o Whether the JBC can add qualifications for RTC judges beyond those prescribed by the Constitution.
o Whether the JBC's policy violates Article III, Section 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection) of the
Constitution.
o Whether the JBC's policy violates Article XIII, Section 3 (Social Justice and Human Rights) of the
Constitution.
4. Procedural Issues:
o Whether the petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief was the proper
remedy.
o Whether the JBC's policy required publication.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply
with the publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the
Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
 Legal Doctrine Applied: Rational Basis Test for Equal Protection; Requirements for Mandamus, Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Declaratory Relief.
 Constitutional Analysis: The Court held that the JBC's policy does not violate the equal protection clause as it
is based on a reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. The
Court recognized the JBC's authority to set standards in choosing nominees, subject to minimum
constitutional qualifications.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, defining the
powers and functions of the JBC. It also interpreted Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
regarding the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts.
 Precedent Analysis:
o Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., G.R. No. 209287, July
1, 2014: Discussed the expanded jurisdiction of the Court to correct grave abuse of discretion.
o Francis H. Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, the Judicial and Bar Council and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014: Discussed the Court's
power of supervision over the JBC.
o Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535 (1986): Discussed the requirement of publication for
statutes and administrative rules.
 Policy Considerations: The Court recognized the JBC's goal to recommend nominees to promote an effective
and efficient administration of justice. It acknowledged the need for uniform criteria to ascertain whether an
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and
his office.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 Procedural Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: The Court held that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify
the acts of legislative and executive officials, even if they do not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions, due to the Court's expanded jurisdiction.
 Impropriety of Mandamus: The Court ruled that mandamus is not proper because the petitioner has no
clear legal right to be included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts. The function of the JBC to select
and recommend nominees is discretionary, not ministerial.
 Impropriety of Declaratory Relief: The Court held that the petition for declaratory relief is improper because
it sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants, which
is not a judicially enforceable right. Furthermore, the Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition
for declaratory relief.
 Rational Basis for the Five-Year Requirement: The Court found that the classification created by the
challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. Substantial distinctions exist between lower court judges
 with five years of experience and those with less than five years of experience, and the classification is
reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose of gauging proven competence.
 Due Process and Publication: The Court acknowledged that the JBC's policy should have been published, as
it involves a qualification standard. However, the failure to publish did not prejudice the petitioner's private
interest because he has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: Clarifies the scope of the JBC's authority to set qualification standards for
judicial applicants beyond the minimum requirements in the Constitution and statutes.
 Impact on Philippine Law: Reinforces the JBC's discretion in the selection process and the application of the
rational basis test in evaluating equal protection challenges to JBC policies.
 Effects on Future Cases: Provides guidance on the proper remedies for challenging JBC policies and the
importance of publication for transparency.
 Practical Implications: Informs judicial applicants of the JBC's qualification standards and the need to meet
those standards to be considered for nomination.
 Doctrinal Significance: Reinforces the principle that the opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a
mere privilege, not a judicially enforceable right.
 Legislative Impact: May prompt a review of the JBC's rules and procedures to ensure transparency and
fairness in the selection process.
G.R. No. 209452 July 26, 2017
GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (NOW METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY), RESPONDENT.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This case concerns the validity of an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding initiated by Solidbank (now Metrobank)
against Gotesco Properties, Inc. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that Gotesco
defaulted on its loan obligation and that Solidbank complied with the requirements for extrajudicial foreclosure
under Act No. 3135. The Court emphasized that the publication of the Notice of Sale in a newspaper of general
circulation is sufficient, even if the newspaper is not printed in the city where the property is located. This ruling
reinforces the principle that substantial compliance with notice requirements is sufficient to validate foreclosure
proceedings, ensuring the protection of creditors' rights while balancing the interests of debtors.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Gotesco Properties, Inc., represented by its President, Mr. Jose Go.
 Respondent: Solidbank Corporation (now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company).
 Nature of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the
dismissal of Gotesco's complaint for annulment of foreclosure proceedings, specific performance, and
damages.
 Key Events:
o 1995: Gotesco obtained a P300 million term loan from Solidbank, secured by a Mortgage Trust
Indenture (Indenture) covering several parcels of land, including a property in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
o 2000: Gotesco proposed a loan restructuring agreement due to financial difficulties caused by the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
o 2000: Solidbank demanded additional collateral due to a reduction in the appraised value of the
mortgaged properties. Gotesco refused.
o 2000: Solidbank filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Pampanga property.
o 2000: Public auction was held, and Solidbank was declared the winning bidder.
 Lower Court Proceedings: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, dismissed Gotesco's
complaint and granted Solidbank's Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: Gotesco filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA's
decision.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Primary Issue: Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of Gotesco's property was premature and invalid due to
alleged non-compliance with the requirements of Act No. 3135 and the Mortgage Trust Indenture.
 2. Secondary Issues:
o Whether Solidbank agreed to restructure Gotesco's loan.
o Whether Gotesco was notified of the default.
o Whether Mr. Go had the authority to appoint Solidbank as attorney-in-fact.
o Whether the publication of the Notice of Sale in Remate, a newspaper published in Manila, complied
with the publication requirements of Act No. 3135.
o Whether the Notice of Sale was posted for the required 20 days.
3. Constitutional Questions: None explicitly raised.
4. Procedural Issues: Whether certain issues were raised for the first time on appeal.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision, upholding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the issuance of the Writ of Possession.
 Legal Doctrine Applied: Act No. 3135 (Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Law), Article 1319 of the Civil Code (Consent
in Contracts), and jurisprudence on the requirements for valid extrajudicial foreclosure.
 Constitutional Analysis: Not applicable.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Section 3 of Act No. 3135 regarding the publication of the
Notice of Sale.
 Precedent Analysis:
o Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 332 Phil. 844 (1996): The Court cited
this case to support the view that the location of the newspaper's printing is not the crucial factor,
but rather its general circulation in the area where the property is located.
o Olizon v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil. 162 (1994): The Court cited this case regarding the object of a
Notice of Sale and the effect of immaterial errors.
o Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 14 (2001): Cited regarding the requirement of absolute
acceptance for a contract to be perfected.
o Social Security System v. Moonwalk Development & Housing Corp., 293 Phil. 129 (1993): Cited
regarding the elements of default.
 Policy Considerations: The Court emphasized the need to balance the protection of creditors' rights with the
interests of debtors, ensuring that foreclosure proceedings are conducted fairly and transparently.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 Gotesco defaulted on its obligation: The Court found that Gotesco defaulted on its loan by failing to pay
according to the terms of the promissory notes and by failing to provide additional collateral when
demanded by Solidbank. The Court stated, "Petitioner defaulted in its obligation twice. First, when it failed to
pay the loan according to the terms of the promissory note. Second, when it failed to provide the additional
collateral demanded by respondent."
 No perfected restructuring agreement: The Court held that there was no perfected loan restructuring
agreement because Solidbank did not unequivocally accept Gotesco's proposal. Citing Article 1319 of the
Civil Code, the Court emphasized that "Only an absolute and unqualified acceptance of a definite offer
manifests the consent necessary to perfect a contract."
 Valid Notice of Default: The Court ruled that Gotesco was notified of its default, citing the return card
submitted by Solidbank as proof that the demand letter was received. The Court stated, "Documentary
evidence will generally prevail over testimonial evidence."
 Mr. Go's Authority: The Court determined that Mr. Go had the authority to appoint Solidbank-Trust Division
as an attorney-in-fact, as it was an integral part of the Mortgage Trust Indenture.
 Compliance with Act No. 3135: The Court found that Solidbank complied with the requirements of Act No.
3135 regarding the publication of the Notice of Sale. The Court emphasized that the crucial factor is whether
the newspaper is of general circulation in the city where the property is located, not where it is printed. The
Court stated, "The crucial factor is not where the newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is being
circulated in the city where the property is located."
 Posting Requirement: While the Notice of Sale was posted for 16 days instead of the required 20, the Court
deemed this a superficial defect that did not invalidate the foreclosure proceeding, as it did not impede the
objective of informing the public about the sale.
  Ministerial Duty to Issue Writ of Possession: The Court reiterated that the issuance of a Writ of Possession is
a ministerial duty upon the trial court, especially when the property is occupied by the mortgagor and not a
third party with adverse interest.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: This case reinforces the precedent that publication of a Notice of Sale in a
newspaper of general circulation is sufficient for extrajudicial foreclosure, even if the newspaper is not
printed in the city where the property is located.
 Impact on Philippine Law: The decision clarifies the interpretation of Section 3 of Act No. 3135, providing
guidance on the publication requirements for extrajudicial foreclosure.
 Effects on Future Cases: This ruling will likely be cited in future cases involving challenges to the validity of
extrajudicial foreclosures based on alleged defects in publication.
 Practical Implications: The decision provides greater certainty for creditors seeking to enforce their rights
through extrajudicial foreclosure, while also emphasizing the importance of substantial compliance with
notice requirements to protect the interests of debtors.
 Doctrinal Significance: The case reaffirms the principle that courts should look to the substance of
compliance with legal requirements, rather than focusing on minor technical defects that do not prejudice
the parties involved.
 International Relevance: Not applicable.
 Legislative Impact: Not applicable.
G.R. No. 231896August 20, 2019
MUNICIPALITY OF TUPI, REPRESENTED BY ITS MUNICIPAL MAYOR REYNALDO S. TAMAYO, JR., PETITIONER, V.
HERMINIO B. FAUSTINO, RESPONDENT.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Supreme Court addressed the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, enacted by the
Municipality of Tupi, which prescribed speed limits on a national highway. The Court ruled that the petition for
declaratory relief was not the proper remedy to challenge the ordinance's validity, as the ordinance had already been
enforced against the respondent. Furthermore, the Court found that the ordinance did not comply with the
publication requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991 and contravened Sections 35, 36, and 38 of RA
No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code). The Court affirmed the trial court's decision declaring the ordinance
void but modified the order to refund only the fine paid by the respondent, not all fines collected from other
motorists, clarifying the application of incidental relief and the operative fact doctrine.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: Municipality of Tupi, represented by its Municipal Mayor Reynaldo S. Tamayo, Jr.
 Respondent: Herminio B. Faustino, an attorney.
 Nature of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Omnibus Order of the Regional
Trial Court.
 Key Events:
o March 3, 2014: The Sangguniang Bayan of Tupi enacted Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014,
prescribing speed limits on a stretch of the national highway.
o October 6, 2014: Respondent Atty. Herminio B. Faustino was flagged down for over speeding and
fined Php1,000.00, which he paid under protest.
o October 8, 2014: Respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief, annulment of the Speed Limit
Ordinance, and damages before the Regional Trial Court.
o January 20, 2016: The trial court declared the Ordinance void ab initio and ordered the refund of all
fines collected.
o May 15, 2017: The trial court denied the motions for reconsideration and granted respondent's
motion for execution.
 Lower Court Proceedings: The Regional Trial Court-Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato, declared
Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, invalid and void ab initio. It further ordered the Municipality of
Tupi to refund all the accrued-collected fines imposed in the implementation thereof. Both petitioner and
respondent filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied.
 How Case Reached Supreme Court: The Municipality of Tupi filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the Supreme Court, urging the Court to exercise its power of judicial review on a pure question of law.
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Primary Issue: Is a petition for declaratory relief the proper remedy at the first instance to assail the validity
of Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014?
2. Secondary Issues:
o Did Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014 comply with the publication requirement under the
Local Government Code of 1991?
o Does Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014 violate RA No. 4136?
o Is the trial court's directive for refund of all fines thus far collected pursuant to Municipal Ordinance
No. 688, Series of 2014 proper?
3. Constitutional Questions: The case touches upon the due process clause of the Constitution, particularly in
relation to the publication requirements for ordinances with penal sanctions.
4. Procedural Issues: The propriety of the remedy of declaratory relief was a central procedural issue.
COURT'S RULING & DETAILED REASONING
Primary Holding: The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, void, but modified the order to refund only the
fine paid by respondent Herminio B. Faustino.
 Legal Doctrine Applied: The Court applied the principle that declaratory relief is not the proper remedy
when a breach or violation of the instrument in question has already occurred. It also considered the
publication requirements for ordinances under the Local Government Code and the limitations imposed by
RA No. 4136 on local government units regarding speed limits. The operative fact doctrine was discussed but
deemed inapplicable.
 Constitutional Analysis: The Court indirectly touched upon constitutional due process by emphasizing the
importance of publication to inform the public of ordinances with penal sanctions.
 Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Sections 35, 36, and 38 of RA No. 4136, as well as Section 59
of the Local Government Code of 1991, regarding the requirements for validly enacting and enforcing
ordinances related to traffic regulations.
 Precedent Analysis: The Court cited Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, et al., 744 Phil. 497 (2014),
regarding the impropriety of declaratory relief after a breach. It also cited Primicias v. the Municipality of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, et al., 182 Phil. 42 (1979), regarding the prerequisites for valid traffic ordinances.
 Policy Considerations: The Court recognized the good intentions of the Municipality in enacting the
ordinance to reduce accidents but emphasized the importance of adhering to legal procedures and
respecting the hierarchy of laws.
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning)
 Impropriety of Declaratory Relief: The Court reasoned that since the respondent had already been
apprehended and fined under the ordinance, a petition for declaratory relief was no longer the proper
remedy. The appropriate remedy would have been certiorari and prohibition. The Court stated, "An action
for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the
rights arising thereunder."
 Non-Compliance with Publication Requirement: The Court found that the ordinance did not comply with
the publication requirement under Section 59 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court noted that
there was no evidence indicating the unavailability of a newspaper of general circulation within the Province
of South Cotabato and that the petitioner did not refute that the ordinance had never been published. The
Court cited Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, et al., 526 Phil. 249 (2006), emphasizing that
"the essence of publication is to inform the people and the entities which may likely be affected of the
existence of the tax measure."
 Violation of RA No. 4136: The Court held that Ordinance No. 688 contravened Sections 35, 36, and 38 of RA
No. 4136. It emphasized that to be valid and enforceable, an ordinance regulating land transportation and
traffic rules should comply with the prerequisites under Section 38 of RA No. 4136, including the
classification of highways, proper markings, certification to the LTO, and approval by the LTO. The Court
cited Primicias v. the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, et al., 182 Phil. 42 (1979), affirming the nullity of
an ordinance due to failure to comply with these prerequisites.
 Limited Refund Order: The Court modified the trial court's order to refund only the fine paid by the
respondent, not all fines collected from other motorists. The Court reasoned that the respondent never
 made any representation that he was acting on behalf of all the other persons who were similarly penalized
and that these other persons were not joined as parties in the instant petition. The Court stated, "Since the
other persons mentioned by respondent and the trial court were not properly joined as parties here, then
they could not be entitled to the benefits or avails of this specific suit."
 Inapplicability of Operative Fact Doctrine: The Court held that the operative fact doctrine did not apply
because it was not raised by any party, there was no reliance by the public in good faith upon the Municipal
Ordinance, and there was no inequity or injustice that would arise from the refund of the fines to the
respondent. The Court cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 719 Phil. 137
(2013), and Araullo v. Aquino, 752 Phil. 716 (2015), in discussing the metes and bounds of the operative fact
doctrine.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
 Legal Precedent Established: The case reinforces the principle that declaratory relief is not the proper
remedy when a breach has already occurred and clarifies the requirements for validly enacting and enforcing
traffic ordinances by local government units.
 Impact on Philippine Law: This decision serves as a reminder to local government units to strictly adhere to
the procedural requirements of publication and the substantive limitations imposed by national laws when
enacting ordinances.
 Effects on Future Cases: This ruling will influence future cases involving challenges to local ordinances,
particularly those related to traffic regulations, by emphasizing the importance of compliance with
publication requirements and national laws.
 Practical Implications: The decision underscores the need for local government units to ensure that their
ordinances are properly published and do not conflict with national laws to avoid legal challenges and
potential liability for refunds.
 Doctrinal Significance: The case clarifies the application of the doctrine of incidental relief in certiorari and
prohibition proceedings and reinforces the limitations on the application of the operative fact doctrine.
 Legislative Impact: While not directly calling for legislative action, the decision highlights the importance of
clear and consistent enforcement of traffic laws and regulations at both the national and local levels.
G.R. No. 204152. January 19, 2021
DENR EMPLOYEES’ UNION (DENREU) AND KALIPUNAN NG MGA KAWANI SA KAGAWARAN NG KALIKASAN (K4),
PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, annulling the COA's disallowance of CNA incentives paid to DENR
employees. While the DBM has the authority to set a ceiling on CNA incentives, Budget Circular No. 2011-5 could not
be applied retroactively because it was not published before the incentives were granted, violating due process.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
 Petitioner: DENR Employees Union (DENREU) and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan (K4),
representing DENR employees.
 Respondent: Secretary Florencio B. Abad of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Commission on Audit (COA).
 Key Facts: The DBM issued Budget Circular No. 2011-5 on December 26, 2011, placing a P25,000.00 ceiling
on the Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) Incentive for 2011. The DENR had already granted CNA
incentives exceeding this limit. The COA disallowed the excess amount. The DBM circular was published in
the Philippine Star only on February 25, 2012, and was not filed with the U.P. Law Center-ONAR.
 Procedural History: Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the constitutionality of Budget Circular No. 2011-5. The COA dismissed the DENREU's appeal
for being filed out of time and issued a Notice of Finality of Decision. The case was brought to the Supreme
Court.
LEGAL ISSUES
1. Is DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5 unconstitutional for lack of prior publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation, rendering it invalid and not binding for Calendar Year 2011?
2. Are DENR employees liable for the refund of the excess CNA Incentives received, given the circumstances
surrounding the issuance and publication of DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5?
COURT'S RULING & REASONING
Holding on Issue 1: The DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5 is valid in setting a P25,000.00 CNA Incentive ceiling, but
cannot be applied retroactively due to lack of prior publication.
 The DBM has the authority to prescribe rules regarding CNA Incentives, as highlighted by EO No. 180, AO No.
135, and relevant jurisprudence. Government Appropriations Acts have consistently limited CNA Incentives
to rates determined by the DBM.
 Publication is a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law or administrative regulation to fully inform the
public of its contents before their rights are affected, as established in Tañada v. Tuvera.
 While the circular was published in the Philippine Star, it was done so after the DENR had already granted the
CNA incentive and after the circular's effectivity date. A belated publication cannot cure the infirmity of the
administrative regulation.
Holding on Issue 2: DENR employees are not liable for the refund of the excess CNA Incentives received.
 The retroactive application of Budget Circular No. 2011-5 to incentives already released violates due process.
 Prior to the circular, there was no maximum allowable amount for CNA incentives, and the employees had a
vested right to the incentive based on the savings generated by the agency.
 The Court cited COURAGE v. Abad, where it held that Budget Circular No. 2011-5 could not be applied
retroactively to CNA incentives already released to employees.
JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT
 This decision reinforces the importance of prior publication of administrative regulations, especially those
affecting substantive rights, as a requirement of due process.
 It clarifies that while the DBM has the authority to regulate CNA incentives, such regulations cannot be
applied retroactively if they were not properly published before the incentives were granted.
 The case reaffirms the principle that employees have a vested right to benefits already granted, and they
cannot be compelled to refund amounts received in good faith based on subsequently issued regulations.
 It reinforces the ruling in COURAGE v. Abad regarding the non-retroactive application of Budget Circular No.
2011-5.