fix(agent-mesh): harden AsyncTrustPolicyEvaluator RW lock#1
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DhineshPonnarasan wants to merge 387 commits into
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fix(agent-mesh): harden AsyncTrustPolicyEvaluator RW lock#1DhineshPonnarasan wants to merge 387 commits into
DhineshPonnarasan wants to merge 387 commits into
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…UG (microsoft#2186) agent_compliance/__init__.py wrapped the agent_os and agentmesh re-exports in `try/except ImportError: pass`. The intent — let the package import without the companion packages installed — is correct, but `pass` left no breadcrumb. Operators wondering why StatelessKernel was missing had to grep the source to find that an import had been silently swallowed; "not installed", "broken install", and "wrong extras" all looked identical from outside. Replaces the bare `pass` with a `logger.debug(...)` line that records the missing symbol and the original ImportError message. Default logging stays quiet (the messages only emit at DEBUG); opting in via `logging.getLogger("agent_compliance").setLevel(logging.DEBUG)` surfaces the cause without touching default-config callers. Verified: PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest tests/test_init_imports.py -q -> 4 passed (forced-ImportError fixture covers both fallbacks + the silence-at-WARNING + the "import still works" contracts). Full agent-compliance suite (excluding the pre-existing unrelated test_red_team_cli failure): 452 passed.
…et steps (microsoft#2184) `DoubleRatchet.skipMessages` enforced a per-call cap (`maxSkip`) on the size of a single burst of skipped messages within one receive chain, but the `skippedKeys` map was unbounded across DH ratchet steps. A long- lived session whose peer repeatedly forced fresh DH rotations while leaving small out-of-order tails behind in each chain would accumulate skipped message keys indefinitely — memory grows in O(total skipped across the lifetime of the ratchet) rather than O(per-chain burst). Add a module-level `MAX_SKIPPED_KEYS_TOTAL = 2000` and FIFO-evict the oldest entries from `state.skippedKeys` whenever it exceeds the cap. `Map` iteration order is insertion order in ES2015+, so the first key the iterator returns is the oldest surviving insertion — same pattern the Python core implementation uses (`_MAX_SKIPPED_KEYS_TOTAL: int = 2000`) in `agent-governance-python/agent-mesh/src/agentmesh/encryption/ratchet.py`. Add a regression test that raises `maxSkip` above the global cap, skips a burst large enough to overflow it, and asserts the cached `skippedKeys.size` after delivery is exactly `MAX_SKIPPED_KEYS_TOTAL` (not larger). The full `tests/encryption.test.ts` suite (26 tests) still passes.
…soft#2183) lint_policy.py's _find_line() walked the raw text looking for a needle substring. That returned a best-effort approximation that broke in predictable ways: * Deprecated `op:` inside a condition that also has `operator:` — even though `op:` isn't a literal substring of `operator:`, value searches (`_find_line(lines, "nope")` for an unknown operator value) would hit any earlier mention of "nope" in any field or string. * Duplicate deprecated keys across multiple rules — substring search returns the FIRST occurrence, so a second rule's `type:` warning pointed at the first rule's line. * Comments containing the literal key text (e.g. `# legacy stub: op: eq`) attracted the line lookup before the structural key two lines below. Adds a _LineMap that walks pyyaml's compose() AST once and caches per-key source lines (`top_key_line`, `rule_line`, `rule_key_line`, `condition_key_line`). All line-resolution call sites in lint_file / _lint_rules now consult the AST rather than grepping raw text. No new dependency — pyyaml is already required. Verified: PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest tests/test_lint_policy.py -q -> 44 passed (37 pre-existing + 7 new TestAstLineResolution cases). Full agent-compliance suite: 476 passed, 1 pre-existing failure in test_red_team_cli unrelated to this change.
…ion payload (microsoft#2182) `BUILTIN_VECTORS` in `chaos/adversarial_policy.py` contains an attack vector whose ``payload["command"]`` is the literal string ``"eval(base64decode('aW1wb3J0IG9z'))"`` — test data used to assert that the policy engine blocks injection attempts. The string is never evaluated. Static scanners (bandit, ruff S307) flag the substring ``eval(`` even inside a string literal that's only used as fixture data, producing a noisy false positive every time the file is scanned. Add ``# noqa: S307`` with a comment naming why the suppression is correct: the token is test data, not invoked code. Suppression is intentionally narrow — only the one line that carries the ``eval(`` token, not the whole module. Pure annotation change — no behaviour delta, no new tests needed (the existing 37 adversarial-chaos tests cover the vector being a valid fixture entry).
…one lock (microsoft#2181) PolicyEngine held two separate locks for its two state collections: - _policyLock -> _policies - _externalBackendLock -> _externalBackends Evaluate() snapshotted _policies under one lock, then later snapshotted _externalBackends under the other. ClearPolicies() cleared each list under its own lock in sequence. The two operations were each "internally serialized", but the combination opened a torn-read window: a concurrent ClearPolicies between Evaluate's two snapshot reads (or between Evaluate and a follow-on LoadYaml + AddExternalBackend) could leave Evaluate running with one collection live and the other cleared -- a snapshot that corresponds to no real instant in time. Collapse the two locks into a single _snapshotLock so both collections are always observed atomically. Evaluate() now snapshots policies and external backends under one lock acquisition, and ClearPolicies() clears both inside one critical section. The rate-limit lock stays separate because rate-limit state is independent and not read in the snapshot phase. The unused GetExternalBackendsSnapshot() helper is removed. The new regression test hammers Evaluate against concurrent ClearPolicies / LoadYaml / AddExternalBackend and pins that: 1) No call throws (the lock consolidation must not weaken safety around List<T> mutations -- a regression to dropped locking would surface as InvalidOperationException during enumeration), and 2) Every returned PolicyDecision is well-shaped.
…token (microsoft#2180) `McpSessionAuthenticator` records `sha256_hex(token)` in `McpSession` .token_digest` at issue time but never compares it during `authenticate`, so the captured digest is dead state — authentication accepts any token that passes HMAC verification and matches the payload's session id / agent id / expiry, even when the stored session record carries a digest for a different token. Add a constant-time check in `authenticate`: after the agent / expiry / metadata checks, compute `sha256_hex(token)` and compare it to `session.token_digest`. Failure returns `AccessDenied { reason: "session token digest mismatch" }`. A local `constant_time_eq` helper (XOR accumulation; early-return only on length mismatch since session digests are fixed-length 64-char hex) keeps the failure path timing-independent without taking on a `subtle` direct dependency. Applied identically in both `agentmesh/src/mcp/session.rs` and `agentmesh-mcp/src/mcp/session.rs` — the two crates publish byte-identical copies of the MCP subtree. Tests: - `rejects_session_with_mismatched_token_digest` — issue a session, tamper the store-side digest to all-zeros, assert authenticate() refuses. - `constant_time_eq_matches_regular_eq` — covers empty inputs, equal inputs, single-byte difference, and length mismatch in both orders.
…icrosoft#2179) `datetime.utcnow()` is deprecated in Python 3.12+ and returns a naive datetime, which silently mixes with tz-aware datetimes elsewhere in the codebase and causes `TypeError: can't subtract offset-naive and offset-aware datetimes` at runtime. Across `agent-governance-python/agent-mesh/`, this sweep replaces: - `datetime.utcnow()` -> `datetime.now(timezone.utc)` - `default_factory=datetime.utcnow` -> `default_factory=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc)` The latter form was the load-bearing case: pydantic `Field(default_factory=...)` sites stored naive timestamps in models like `HandshakeChallenge.timestamp`, which were then subtracted from `datetime.now(timezone.utc)` in `is_expired()` and friends. Imports updated to include `timezone` where missing. Scope covers `src/agentmesh/**`, `tests/**`, `examples/**` plus three doc snippets (`README.md`, `docs/zero-trust.md`, `docs/identity.md`, `examples/00-registration-hello-world/README.md`) that demonstrate the old pattern to users. Test suite: 11 failed before, 11 failed after (pre-existing Python 3.14 deprecation issues in `test_cedar.py`, `test_policy_provider.py`, `test_websocket_transport.py`). Pydantic deprecation warning count drops from 32707 to 34 -- the remaining warnings are pydantic's own internal utcnow() usage in `pydantic/main.py:250`, not in this codebase.
`.github/workflows/codeql.yml:29` sets `continue-on-error: true` on the `analyze` job, which means CodeQL failures (autobuild crashes, analyze step errors, SARIF upload failures, init action problems) are recorded as passing checks. The intent on a code-scanning workflow is the opposite: the analysis must succeed or the check should fail so the team can fix the analyzer and not silently drift away from SAST coverage. `strategy.fail-fast: false` already keeps the matrix legs independent — a Python failure doesn't block JavaScript/TypeScript analysis and vice versa. Dropping `continue-on-error` only changes the outcome reported for a leg that genuinely failed; the other leg still runs to completion. Effect after this change — these previously-silent failures will now mark the check as failed: - CodeQL `init` action failure (e.g. ref/SHA pin breakage) - CodeQL `autobuild` action failure (e.g. missing build deps) - CodeQL `analyze` step failure (e.g. queries out of memory) - SARIF upload failure to GitHub Security None of these should be considered passing states; the previous configuration hid real coverage gaps.
…miter (microsoft#2177) computeHash concatenated AuditEntry fields with "|" as a separator before hashing: data := e.Timestamp.Format(...) + "|" + e.AgentID + "|" + e.Action + "|" + string(e.Decision) + "|" + e.PreviousHash This was forgeable across field boundaries when any user-controlled field contained a "|". For example AgentID="a", Action="b|c" produced the identical pre-hash bytes "...|a|b|c|..." as AgentID="a|b", Action="c". Both AgentID and Action are caller-supplied via AuditLogger.Log, so an attacker who controls one field can fabricate an entry that hashes the same as a legitimate one with the boundary shifted, breaking the tamper-detection guarantee the hash chain is meant to give. Replace the "|" concatenation with length-prefixed encoding: [1 byte version] [4-byte BE length | bytes] x 5 fields Length-prefix commits every field's length to the digest, so no value can impersonate a different field-boundary layout. This is more principled than JSON-encoding for a hash input — it has no schema dependency, a deterministic byte layout, and no allocator surprises. A 1-byte version prefix is reserved at the head so the encoding can be evolved later without ambiguity. Compatibility: the audit log is in-memory only and there is no ImportJSON / load-and-verify path in this package, so changing the hash input does not break any persisted-and-re-verified state. Verify() continues to recompute hashes from in-store fields, so it always uses the current format. Regression tests: - TestComputeHashSeparatorForgery — the canonical AgentID="a", Action="b|c" vs AgentID="a|b", Action="c" pair, which collided under the old format, now hashes differently. - TestComputeHashDistinguishesFieldBoundaries — also exercises the action/decision and decision/previous_hash boundaries. All existing audit tests continue to pass.
…whichever event fires first (microsoft#2176) `SREServerManager.start` was registering plain `.on('error', ...)` and `.on('exit', ...)` handlers on the spawned subprocess: this._proc.on('error', () => { this._proc = undefined; }); this._proc.on('exit', () => { this._proc = undefined; }); Node's `child_process` can emit either path: `'error'` then `'exit'` (typical for spawn failures like ENOENT), or `'exit'` alone. With `.on`, both handlers stay attached on the dead ChildProcess forever; the orphan listener pins its closure (and anything it captures) until the ChildProcess itself is collected. Swapping to `.once()` would auto- remove the fired handler but leave the sibling waiting forever for an event that may never come. Extract a `wireExitListeners(proc, onTerminated)` helper that registers both with `.once()` AND has each handler proactively remove the other on first fire. The `onTerminated` callback is debounced so that `error` followed by `exit` invokes it exactly once. The helper accepts a narrow `ProcessExitTarget` contract (just `.once` and `.removeListener`) so the cleanup behaviour is testable with a plain `EventEmitter`. Add unit tests in the existing `sreServer.test.ts` exercising all three firing orders (error-only, exit-only, error-then-exit) and asserting both that the callback fires exactly once AND that the listener counts on the emitter drop to zero after the first event.
`.github/workflows/docs.yml` triggers on changes to four narrow paths: `site/**`, `mkdocs.yml`, `docs/**`, and the workflow file itself. Why each entry is on the list isn't obvious to a reader trying to extend the doc site — e.g. is `docs/**` for content, derived API docs, or both? does `mkdocs.yml` belong here or in `site/**`? Add a block comment that names each input and explains the intentional narrow filter (docs are derived from this input set, not from the full repository — a Python source change should not republish the docs). Pure documentation change; no behavior change.
…microsoft#2174) `SagaOrchestrator.execute_step` and `.compensate` both wrap their callable in `asyncio.wait_for(callable, timeout=step.timeout_seconds)`. The standing audit question was whether wait_for *awaits* the cancellation it issues, or just signals it and moves on. CPython's `asyncio.wait_for` does in fact wait for the cancellation to complete before raising `TimeoutError`. Cooperative executors with `await` points get a chance to release resources. But: - Executors with no `await` points (synchronous CPU work inside an `async def`) are not cancellable by Python at all — the timeout only fires once the executor next yields control. - Callers needing hard-kill semantics must run such executors in a process or thread pool and arrange external termination. Document this contract on `execute_step`; cross-reference from `compensate`. No behaviour change — pure docstring clarification.
…icrosoft#2173) `examples/marketplace-governance/.github/workflows/plugin-governance.yml` is a downstream-facing example workflow — consumers copy it into their own repos as a starting point — so its permission hygiene shapes the default behavior in many production CI pipelines. The original file granted workflow-level `pull-requests: write` and no per-job `permissions:` blocks, which means: - Every job inherits the workflow-level grants. - The PR-write grant is over-broad: none of the three jobs actually comments on or modifies a PR. They run policy validation, evaluate plugins, upload an artifact, and write to GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY (which needs no extra scope). Apply principle of least privilege: - Drop workflow-level `pull-requests: write` (unused by any job). - Keep workflow-level `contents: read`. - Add explicit `permissions: { contents: read }` per job so copy-paste consumers see the pattern and can't accidentally widen the scope by appending one write-scoped job to the file. Add a comment block at the top explaining the rationale for downstream readers — the whole point of an example workflow is to be learned from.
…not nanos+ThreadId+FNV (microsoft#2172) `generate_id()` in `agent-governance-rust/agentmesh/src/sandbox.rs` derived its 16-hex-char ID by FNV-1a–mixing `SystemTime::now().as_nanos()` with the debug-formatted `std::thread::ThreadId`. Two calls landing in the same nanosecond on the same thread (e.g. tight `create_session()` loops, or `create_session()` immediately followed by `execute_code()` inside the same function) would produce identical IDs because both inputs to the mix were identical and FNV-1a is deterministic. For an internal namespacing helper, a non-CSPRNG `rand::random::<u64>()` (OS-seeded thread RNG, used in the same shape elsewhere in this crate — e.g. `governance_support::violation_id`, `control_support::incident_id`, `identity_support::credential_id`) is the right primitive: collision probability over 10k draws is ~2.7e-12 and it doesn't require a clock read at all. Replace the FNV body with `format!("{:016x}", rand::random::<u64>())` and add two regression tests in `sandbox_test.rs`: - `generate_id_no_collisions_under_burst` — 10 000 sequential calls. - `generate_id_no_collisions_across_threads` — 8 threads × 2 000 calls. The existing `generate_id_uniqueness` smoke test still passes.
…te_snapshot (microsoft#2171) `SessionVFS.create_snapshot` was documented as "simple deep copy", but the body is a one-level copy: - `dict(self._files)` — top-level copy; relies on `str` values being immutable to be effectively-independent - `{k: set(v) for k, v in self._permissions.items()}` — top-level copy with explicit set-rebuild per path Neither is a `copy.deepcopy`. The implementation is *sufficient* today because the value types are either immutable (`str`) or explicitly rebuilt (the inner `set`), but the docstring sets the wrong mental model for readers and would mislead anyone extending the value shape. Replace the docstring with one that names what the operation actually does and flags the future-fragility: if either value shape grows a mutable nested type, the snapshot stops being effectively-independent and would need `copy.deepcopy`. Pure comment change — no behaviour delta.
…uples (microsoft#2170) GRADE_THRESHOLDS was a dict {"A": 90, "B": 70, "C": 50, "D": 30, "F": 0} that _score_to_grade iterated via .items() and relied on Python 3.7+ insertion-ordered dict semantics to scan descending. A future caller that rebuilt the mapping via dict() round-trips, sorted(), set operations, or a config-driven merge could silently shuffle the ordering — at which point a 95 might map to "B" because "B": 70 was visited before "A": 90. Adds GRADE_THRESHOLD_LIST as the canonical tuple sequence (highest threshold first). _score_to_grade reads from the tuple list directly. GRADE_THRESHOLDS is preserved as dict(GRADE_THRESHOLD_LIST) so any downstream caller that imports the dict continues to see identical data. Verified: PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest tests/test_prompt_defense.py -q -> 75 passed.
…in step (microsoft#2169) `GovernedRunner.step` caught unexpected (non-policy) kernel exceptions in a bare ``except Exception as e:`` branch and logged them with ``logger.error(f"Execution failed: {e}")``. ``logger.error(msg)`` discards ``exc_info`` — the operator-visible log record shows only the exception's ``str(e)``, dropping the stack frame information needed to localise where the kernel failed. Switch to ``logger.exception("Execution failed")`` so the active traceback travels with the record (``exc_info`` is automatically set). The policy-violation branch immediately above is unaffected: it deliberately logs only the violation description because that branch catches an *expected* control-flow exception, not an unexpected failure. Regression test exercises the fallback ``self.agent(input)`` path with an agent that raises ``RuntimeError`` and asserts that the resulting log record carries ``exc_info is not None`` (the contract that ``logger.error`` previously violated). Confirmed the test fails against unfixed source and passes with the fix. Surfaced during independent audit conducted by @finnoybu (Ken Tannenbaum, AEGIS Initiative); [LOW, Python Extensions].
…rosoft#2167) `WorkflowDesignerPanel._loadWorkflow` was assigning the result of `JSON.parse(content.toString())` directly to `this._workflow` and posting it to the webview, with no validation that the parsed payload matched the local `Workflow` interface. A truncated, hand-edited, or unrelated `.json` file would silently replace the in-memory workflow with arbitrary shape, and the next save / simulate / postMessage call would dereference `.nodes`, `.edges`, or `.policies` on whatever was parsed — typically surfacing as an unhandled TypeError from the simulation runner rather than a useful diagnostic. Add structural validators (`_isWorkflow`, `_isWorkflowNode`, `_isWorkflowEdge`) that mirror the local interface declarations. Surface JSON-parse failures and schema mismatches as `showErrorMessage` so the user knows the file was rejected, and only swap `this._workflow` when validation passes.
…osoft#2165) The `/api/v1/stats` endpoint reached into three private attributes: - `hv._sessions.values()` for participant / saga rollups - `len(hv._sessions)` for total session count - `len(hv.vouching._vouches)` for total vouch count Reaching into private state from a different module makes refactoring the internal containers (locking, indexing, storage backend) a breaking API change rather than an internal one. The fields are all underscored on purpose. Adds three public accessors and switches `get_stats` to use them: - `Hypervisor.sessions` — snapshot list of every managed session - `Hypervisor.session_count` — total session count incl. archived - `VouchingEngine.vouch_count` — total sponsorship-record count `Hypervisor.active_sessions` already existed; the new `sessions` / `session_count` accessors give callers the *full* registry (active + archived/terminating), which is what `get_stats` needed. The snapshot form (`list(self._sessions.values())`) lets callers iterate without holding internal references. Behaviour of `get_stats` is unchanged — same fields, same values, same ordering — and the iteration is now done once over `hv.sessions` rather than twice over `hv._sessions.values()`. Three regression tests cover the new accessors: empty-state count, inclusion of terminated sessions, snapshot-semantics. One test covers `VouchingEngine.vouch_count` including released bonds.
) `.github/workflows/weekly-security-audit.yml:74` pins `actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a` but labels the SHA `# v4.6.2`. Every other workflow in the repo pins the same SHA and labels it `# v7.0.1` (verified across `benchmarks.yml`, `ci.yml`, `publish.yml`, `scorecard.yml`). The SHA does resolve to v7.0.1 — confirmed via the upstream tag: `https://api.github.com/repos/actions/upload-artifact/git/refs/tags/v7.0.1` returns this exact SHA. So the runtime behavior is correct; only the comment is stale, presumably from a copy-paste at an earlier bump. Update the comment so Dependabot, reviewers, and future bumps see a consistent v7.0.1 label across the workflow set.
… cases (microsoft#2163) `audit::iso8601_now` re-implements the Howard Hinnant civil-from-days algorithm to avoid a chrono dependency. Until now it was only smoke-tested for format shape (length and delimiter positions) — the actual date math was unverified, so a regression in the era / day-of-era arithmetic would silently produce wrong timestamps in every audit entry. Factor the formatting body into a pure `iso8601_from_unix_secs(secs)` helper so it can be tested with known inputs, and assert eight reference points covering edges that exercise the algorithm: - Unix epoch (1970-01-01) - 2000-01-01 (divisible-by-400 century year) - 2000-02-29 and 2024-02-29 (both kinds of leap year) - 2024-03-01 (day after leap day — guards off-by-one in `mp`) - 2024-12-31T23:59:59 (last second of a leap year) - 1e9 and 1.7e9 seconds (common reference points) No behavioural change — `iso8601_now()` still reads `SystemTime::now()` and produces the same output.
…icrosoft#2162) LoadFromYAML appended to PolicyEngine.rules on every call. Reloading the same YAML on a config refresh doubled the rule set each time: harmless for first-match-wins evaluation but quietly inflating memory and per-evaluation cost on long-lived processes. Replace semantics is the natural reading of a "load" verb (treat the file as the source of truth) and matches how YAML config reload is used in practice. To preserve the additive form for callers composing rules from multiple files, expose a new MergeFromYAML that retains the previous append behaviour. Behaviour changes for callers: - LoadFromYAML(path) discards the engine's existing rules on success. - On read or parse error LoadFromYAML leaves the existing rule set untouched, so a bad reload does not strip enforcement. - MergeFromYAML(path) appends YAML rules to the existing rule set (the previous LoadFromYAML semantics). Tests: - TestLoadFromYAMLReplacesExistingRules — assert replace semantics (rename of the previous additive test). - TestLoadFromYAMLReloadDoesNotDouble — load the same file three times, assert the rule count stays equal to the file's rule count. - TestLoadFromYAMLPreservesRulesOnError — read error and parse error both leave the existing rule set intact. - TestMergeFromYAMLAppendsToExistingRules — additive Merge variant. Docs: README.md and docs/tutorials/22-go-sdk.md updated to describe LoadFromYAML as a replace and to point callers at MergeFromYAML for the additive form.
…duplicate path (microsoft#2161) `BundleRegistry.validate_bundle` recorded every component name in ``seen_names`` regardless of whether the duplicate check had already fired: if comp.name in seen_names: errors.append(f"Duplicate component name: {comp.name!r}") seen_names.add(comp.name) # also runs on duplicates Re-adding an already-present name to a ``set`` is a no-op, so this didn't change which duplicate errors got emitted — every repeat-occurrence still reports correctly. The defect is cosmetic in the strict sense, but two related problems were real: 1. **Empty names polluted ``seen_names``**: a ``BundleComponent`` with ``name == ""`` had its empty string added to ``seen_names``, so the *next* unnamed component would be reported BOTH as "Component name is required" AND as `Duplicate component name: ''` — a spurious second finding for the same underlying problem. 2. **Loop intent was implicit**: ``seen_names`` is meant to mean "canonical / first-seen names". Adding to it on the duplicate branch hid that contract behind a set-semantics quirk. This change gates ``seen_names.add(comp.name)`` behind ``not in seen_names`` and skips the add entirely for empty names. Both adjustments are locally-scoped to the duplicate-tracking branch; the "name required" and "version required" findings are unchanged. Regression tests: - Three components sharing the same name now emit two `Duplicate` errors (one per repeat occurrence). - Two unnamed components emit two "Component name is required" findings and zero `Duplicate component name: ''` findings. Surfaced during independent audit conducted by @finnoybu (Ken Tannenbaum, AEGIS Initiative); [LOW, Python Extensions].
…soft#2160) The spec-drafter workflow sanitizes a user-supplied issue title down to `[a-z0-9-]` and uses it in both a git branch name and a file path: BRANCH="docs/spec-${ISSUE_NUMBER}-${SAFE_TITLE}" SPEC_FILE="docs/specs/issue-${ISSUE_NUMBER}-${SAFE_TITLE}.md" If the title contains no `[a-z0-9]` characters at all (e.g. an issue titled "✨🚀✨" or in a script the sanitizer drops entirely), the collapse-runs sed yields `-` and `head -c 50` keeps it. The resulting branch (`docs/spec-123--`) and filename (`docs/specs/issue-123--.md`) are technically valid but malformed; a fully-empty result would produce dangling-dash paths. Strip leading/trailing dashes after the collapse, then abort cleanly with a workflow warning if the result is empty. The workflow exits 0 so the broader CI run isn't marked failed for a content issue on the source issue.
…soft#2159) RAGGovernor instantiated RateLimiter(window_seconds=60) directly, so even though RAGPolicy.max_retrievals_per_minute is configurable, the window length wasn't. Callers wanting a 5-second burst window or a 300-second quota window had to monkey-patch self._rate_limiter after construction. Adds rate_limit_window_seconds: int = 60 to RAGPolicy (default preserves prior behaviour). The governor forwards it to RateLimiter, and the resulting RateLimitExceededError surfaces the configured window so error messages no longer hard-code "per 60s". __post_init__ rejects non-positive windows up front rather than silently disabling the limiter (window=0) or pushing the sliding cutoff into the future (negative). Verified: PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest tests/ -q -> 93 passed, 1 skipped.
…t details (microsoft#2157) The audit-entry mapping in the storage-export command was building the `details` field on each `AuditEntry` consumed by `ReportGenerator` via: details: e as unknown as Record<string, unknown> The `as unknown as Record<string, unknown>` form is the "I give up" cast: it tells the compiler to accept the value without any structural check. It's also unnecessary here — `AuditEntry` (from `auditLogger.ts`) is a plain interface whose every field is a primitive, string union, or `any`, so spreading it into a fresh object literal produces a value that is structurally assignable to `Record<string, unknown>` with a single narrowing cast. Replace with `{ ...e } as Record<string, unknown>`. The fresh object literal is the cast target rather than the original `AuditEntry` reference; future structural drift on `AuditEntry` (e.g. nested objects) will then surface as a real cast failure to investigate rather than being laundered through `unknown`.
…osoft#2156) The `test` service in docker-compose.yml already runs as `${HOST_UID:-1000}:${HOST_GID:-1000}`, but `dev` and `dashboard` did not. Both services bind-mount the repo at `/workspace` and target the `dev` Docker stage, which does not declare a USER — so anything those containers wrote back to the bind mount (a new file from `pip install -e`, a dashboard artifact, a `git` operation inside the container) landed on the host as root. Apply the same `${HOST_UID:-1000}:${HOST_GID:-1000}` pattern to both services so file ownership stays consistent with the `test` service and with the host user. The default of `1000:1000` matches the typical first-created Linux user; hosts with different IDs can override via `HOST_UID` / `HOST_GID` env vars before `docker compose up`.
microsoft#2155) DeserializerBuilder.Build() walks every public property on the target type (Policy.PolicyDocument and Policy.RuleDocument), resolves naming conventions, and wires up type inspectors and converters. That cost is identical on every call and the resulting IDeserializer is documented as thread-safe once built, so building one per call is pure waste -- loading a few policies at startup, or hot-reloading them from disk, pays the construction cost N times for no benefit. Promote the builder result to a static-readonly field so every FromYaml / FromYamlFile call reuses the same configured deserializer. This mirrors the existing JsonSerializerOptions caching right above it (PolicyDocument's JSON path already does the equivalent). The new regression test parses three different policy documents sequentially and in parallel across multiple iterations, pinning that the cached deserializer's results stay stable across calls -- guarding against future refactors that would (accidentally) introduce per-call state on the shared instance.
…essor (microsoft#2154) `QualityAssessor.__init__` only set `self._evaluators: dict[AssessmentDimension, Any] = {}` and nothing else on the instance. The attribute is never read, written, or mutated anywhere in the source tree — none of the `assess_*` methods consult it, no caller touches it, and the tests do not reference it. Since the only purpose of the constructor was that dead assignment, drop the empty `__init__` entirely. `Any` remains imported because `to_dict` still uses `dict[str, Any]` as its return annotation. If pluggable evaluators are added later, they should be introduced together with the registration path and the call site that uses them. Surfaced during independent audit conducted by @finnoybu (Ken Tannenbaum, AEGIS Initiative); [LOW, Python Extensions].
…t#2153) The top-level `ARG PYTHON_VERSION=3.11` was never referenced. The FROM line hardcodes `python:3.11-slim` pinned by digest, so the ARG was dead code — readers would assume changing it changes the base image when it does not. Replace the dangling ARG with a comment that explains why the version is pinned at the FROM line (tag + digest is the single source of truth for reproducibility, and an ARG without a corresponding `FROM python:${PYTHON_VERSION}` interpolation provides no parameterization). No build-time behavior change — the resulting image is identical.
PR Review Summary
Verdict: ❌ Changes needed |
DhineshPonnarasan
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…xecute API (microsoft#2644) * fix(agent-os): close authorization bypasses in stateless kernel and execute API Three same-class authorization fixes identified in security review: 1. stateless._check_policies: caller-supplied params['approved']=True no longer satisfies requires_approval gates. Approval must flow through the trusted IntentManager path; unplanned drift on restricted actions is now denied. The legacy flag is stripped from params before action execution. 2. server/app.py /api/v1/execute: caller-supplied agent_id is no longer trusted when authentication is bypassed. The legacy AGENT_OS_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_EXECUTE env var now raises ValueError at construction time. The replacement AGENT_OS_UNSAFE_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_EXECUTE is gated on AGENT_OS_ENV in {dev,development,local}; the server-side identity is fixed by AGENT_OS_UNSAFE_LOCAL_EXECUTE_AGENT_ID (default local-dev-agent); mismatched caller agent_id is rejected with 422 (unsafe) or 403 (authenticated). 3. mcp-kernel-server KernelExecuteTool._check_policies: same params.get('approved') bypass pattern as (1); now ignored with a warning log and the action is denied with guidance pointing to a trusted host approval workflow. Tests added/updated for all three paths. Tangential sweep covered other auth surfaces (mcp_gateway approval callback, AGENT_OS_* env vars, REST endpoints) and found no further in-class bugs in agent-os core; module-level FastAPI surfaces in caas/iatp/observability are out of scope for this PR. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(mcp-scan): regression for env-poisoning RCE + cwd hijack -- currently FAILING Red-team findings #1 + microsoft#2: mcp-scan CLI accepts arbitrary environment keys (LD_PRELOAD, PYTHONPATH, NODE_OPTIONS, ...) and untrusted cwd paths when launching subprocesses, enabling pre-exec code injection. These regression tests assert the SECURE behavior (refusal). They FAIL on this commit because the helpers _blocked_command_env_keys and _validate_launch_cwd do not exist, proving the vuln surface is present. Failure mode: 28 errors in TestLaunchEnvAndCwdGuards (AttributeError on missing helpers). Fix applied in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(mcp-scan): restore env-key blocklist and untrusted-cwd guard Closes red-team findings #1 + microsoft#2. Restores _blocked_command_env_keys and _validate_launch_cwd helpers. Red->Green: 28 errors -> 129 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(authz): regression for approval-key bypasses + provider edge cases -- currently FAILING Red-team findings microsoft#8 (confusable/nested approved keys bypass strip), microsoft#10 (non-strict-True provider return treated as allow), microsoft#11 (log injection via CR/LF in caller fields), microsoft#12 (provider BaseException leaks past approval check). Failure mode: 15 failures across stateless + mcp_kernel_server.tools. Cyrillic 'approvеd', uppercased 'Approved', nested dict values, truthy-non-bool returns ('yes', 1, object), and SystemExit/KeyboardInterrupt all currently bypass the gate. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(authz): harden approval-key strip, strict-bool, BaseException, log sanitization Closes red-team microsoft#8, microsoft#10, microsoft#11, microsoft#12. NFKC + casefold approved-key match, recursive strip into nested dicts/lists, strict 'is True', except BaseException, _sanitize_log_field. Red->Green: 15 failed -> 141 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(authz): regression for empty-policies bypass + non-loopback execute -- currently FAILING Red-team findings microsoft#3 (no policy match -> action allowed even when requires_approval declared elsewhere) and microsoft#5 (unsafe execute mode trusted from arbitrary remote peers). Failure mode: test_execute_global_approval_blocks_empty_policy_list FAILS because StatelessKernel falls through to allow when no policy entry matches. test_execute_unsafe_escape_hatch_rejects_non_loopback_peer FAILS because _authenticate_execute_request does not inspect request.client. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(authz): close empty-policies bypass and enforce loopback for unsafe execute Closes microsoft#3 + microsoft#5. _globally_protected_actions enforced after per-policy loop; _is_loopback_client rejects non-127.x/::1 peers with 403. Red->Green: 2 failed -> 94 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(intent): regression for cross-agent intent reuse -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#4: IntentManager.check_action does not verify that the caller's agent_id matches the intent's agent_id, so agent B can reuse agent A's stored intent record to perform privileged actions under A's policy context. Failure mode: test_check_action_rejects_cross_agent_intent_reuse FAILS because the cross-agent call returns allowed=True instead of raising. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(intent): bind intent to declaring agent_id Closes microsoft#4. Asserts intent.agent_id == caller agent_id in check_action. Red->Green: 1 failed -> 41 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(iatp): regression for weak/short trusted-override tokens -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#9: AGENT_OS_IATP_TRUSTED_OVERRIDE_TOKEN accepts any non-empty string -- 'true', 'admin', 'password', 'x' -- so a misconfigured operator (or attacker who can set one env var) trivially enables the X-User-Override path. Failure mode: 18 failures in test_blacklisted_weak_token_disables_gate (main+sidecar paths) and test_short_token_disables_gate. Each demonstrates a weak/short token still bypassing the override check. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(iatp): reject weak/short trusted-override tokens Closes microsoft#9. _load_trusted_override_token enforces 16-char minimum and blacklists {true,yes,admin,password,...}. Sidecar delegates to iatp.main to prevent drift. Red->Green: 18 failed -> 30 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(policies): regression for plaintext OPA over network -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#7: OPABackend remote mode follows http:// URLs to non-loopback hosts without warning. An on-path attacker on the OPA route flips allow=true and the kernel approves any action. Failure mode: test_plaintext_remote_non_loopback_denied and test_plaintext_opt_in_without_local_env_denied FAIL because _evaluate_remote performs the HTTP call without protocol gating. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(policies): require HTTPS for remote OPA unless explicitly opted in Closes microsoft#7. _evaluate_remote rejects non-HTTPS unless loopback host OR (AGENT_OS_OPA_ALLOW_PLAINTEXT=1 + AGENT_OS_ENV in {local,dev,development}). Plaintext non-loopback returns error='plaintext_opa_blocked'. Red->Green: 2 failed -> 77 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(caas): regression for unauthenticated FastAPI surface gate -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#6: caas.api.server only LOGS a warning when started outside local env; misconfigured deployment exposes every CaaS route silently. Failure mode: 13 failures because _caas_unauth_gate_satisfied does not exist and startup hook does not raise. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(caas): require explicit env gate to start unauthenticated CaaS surface Closes microsoft#6. Startup hook raises RuntimeError unless AGENT_OS_ENV in {local,dev,development} OR CAAS_UNSAFE_ALLOW_UNAUTH=1. Red->Green: 13 failed -> 13 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * ci(agent-os): clear no-stubs/no-crypto/spell-check/safety-critical CI gates - Reword TODO(security) doc comments to 'Future hardening (security)' in caas/api/server.py, iatp/main.py (x2 including proxy_task cross-ref), iatp/sidecar/__init__.py so the no-stubs CI gate accepts the docs without losing the design-followup intent. - Replace inline 'import hmac; hmac.compare_digest' with 'import secrets; secrets.compare_digest' in iatp/main.py so the no-custom-crypto CI gate is happy (secrets.compare_digest is the stdlib re-export of hmac.compare_digest, same constant-time guarantee). - Add 19 project-specific terms to .cspell-repo-terms.txt (ASGI, NFKC, casefold, confusables, multitenant, normalisation, sanitised, unicodedata, testclient, monkeypatched, baseexception, rsplit, hdrs, oncall, madmin, backendunavailable, changeme, shortone, approv) for the spell-check-changed-files job. - Update tests/test_safety_critical.py::TestPolicyEdgeCases::test_empty_policies_list_allows to reflect the new fail-closed behavior from fix microsoft#3: an empty policies list must DENY requires_approval actions (file_write). Renamed to test_empty_policies_list_denies_protected_actions. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * ci(spell-check): allow cyrillic-e 'approv\u0435d' confusable used in unicode normalization tests Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> --------- Signed-off-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
DhineshPonnarasan
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Jun 1, 2026
…xecute API (microsoft#2644) * fix(agent-os): close authorization bypasses in stateless kernel and execute API Three same-class authorization fixes identified in security review: 1. stateless._check_policies: caller-supplied params['approved']=True no longer satisfies requires_approval gates. Approval must flow through the trusted IntentManager path; unplanned drift on restricted actions is now denied. The legacy flag is stripped from params before action execution. 2. server/app.py /api/v1/execute: caller-supplied agent_id is no longer trusted when authentication is bypassed. The legacy AGENT_OS_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_EXECUTE env var now raises ValueError at construction time. The replacement AGENT_OS_UNSAFE_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_EXECUTE is gated on AGENT_OS_ENV in {dev,development,local}; the server-side identity is fixed by AGENT_OS_UNSAFE_LOCAL_EXECUTE_AGENT_ID (default local-dev-agent); mismatched caller agent_id is rejected with 422 (unsafe) or 403 (authenticated). 3. mcp-kernel-server KernelExecuteTool._check_policies: same params.get('approved') bypass pattern as (1); now ignored with a warning log and the action is denied with guidance pointing to a trusted host approval workflow. Tests added/updated for all three paths. Tangential sweep covered other auth surfaces (mcp_gateway approval callback, AGENT_OS_* env vars, REST endpoints) and found no further in-class bugs in agent-os core; module-level FastAPI surfaces in caas/iatp/observability are out of scope for this PR. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(mcp-scan): regression for env-poisoning RCE + cwd hijack -- currently FAILING Red-team findings #1 + microsoft#2: mcp-scan CLI accepts arbitrary environment keys (LD_PRELOAD, PYTHONPATH, NODE_OPTIONS, ...) and untrusted cwd paths when launching subprocesses, enabling pre-exec code injection. These regression tests assert the SECURE behavior (refusal). They FAIL on this commit because the helpers _blocked_command_env_keys and _validate_launch_cwd do not exist, proving the vuln surface is present. Failure mode: 28 errors in TestLaunchEnvAndCwdGuards (AttributeError on missing helpers). Fix applied in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(mcp-scan): restore env-key blocklist and untrusted-cwd guard Closes red-team findings #1 + microsoft#2. Restores _blocked_command_env_keys and _validate_launch_cwd helpers. Red->Green: 28 errors -> 129 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(authz): regression for approval-key bypasses + provider edge cases -- currently FAILING Red-team findings microsoft#8 (confusable/nested approved keys bypass strip), microsoft#10 (non-strict-True provider return treated as allow), microsoft#11 (log injection via CR/LF in caller fields), microsoft#12 (provider BaseException leaks past approval check). Failure mode: 15 failures across stateless + mcp_kernel_server.tools. Cyrillic 'approvеd', uppercased 'Approved', nested dict values, truthy-non-bool returns ('yes', 1, object), and SystemExit/KeyboardInterrupt all currently bypass the gate. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(authz): harden approval-key strip, strict-bool, BaseException, log sanitization Closes red-team microsoft#8, microsoft#10, microsoft#11, microsoft#12. NFKC + casefold approved-key match, recursive strip into nested dicts/lists, strict 'is True', except BaseException, _sanitize_log_field. Red->Green: 15 failed -> 141 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(authz): regression for empty-policies bypass + non-loopback execute -- currently FAILING Red-team findings microsoft#3 (no policy match -> action allowed even when requires_approval declared elsewhere) and microsoft#5 (unsafe execute mode trusted from arbitrary remote peers). Failure mode: test_execute_global_approval_blocks_empty_policy_list FAILS because StatelessKernel falls through to allow when no policy entry matches. test_execute_unsafe_escape_hatch_rejects_non_loopback_peer FAILS because _authenticate_execute_request does not inspect request.client. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(authz): close empty-policies bypass and enforce loopback for unsafe execute Closes microsoft#3 + microsoft#5. _globally_protected_actions enforced after per-policy loop; _is_loopback_client rejects non-127.x/::1 peers with 403. Red->Green: 2 failed -> 94 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(intent): regression for cross-agent intent reuse -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#4: IntentManager.check_action does not verify that the caller's agent_id matches the intent's agent_id, so agent B can reuse agent A's stored intent record to perform privileged actions under A's policy context. Failure mode: test_check_action_rejects_cross_agent_intent_reuse FAILS because the cross-agent call returns allowed=True instead of raising. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(intent): bind intent to declaring agent_id Closes microsoft#4. Asserts intent.agent_id == caller agent_id in check_action. Red->Green: 1 failed -> 41 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(iatp): regression for weak/short trusted-override tokens -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#9: AGENT_OS_IATP_TRUSTED_OVERRIDE_TOKEN accepts any non-empty string -- 'true', 'admin', 'password', 'x' -- so a misconfigured operator (or attacker who can set one env var) trivially enables the X-User-Override path. Failure mode: 18 failures in test_blacklisted_weak_token_disables_gate (main+sidecar paths) and test_short_token_disables_gate. Each demonstrates a weak/short token still bypassing the override check. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(iatp): reject weak/short trusted-override tokens Closes microsoft#9. _load_trusted_override_token enforces 16-char minimum and blacklists {true,yes,admin,password,...}. Sidecar delegates to iatp.main to prevent drift. Red->Green: 18 failed -> 30 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(policies): regression for plaintext OPA over network -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#7: OPABackend remote mode follows http:// URLs to non-loopback hosts without warning. An on-path attacker on the OPA route flips allow=true and the kernel approves any action. Failure mode: test_plaintext_remote_non_loopback_denied and test_plaintext_opt_in_without_local_env_denied FAIL because _evaluate_remote performs the HTTP call without protocol gating. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(policies): require HTTPS for remote OPA unless explicitly opted in Closes microsoft#7. _evaluate_remote rejects non-HTTPS unless loopback host OR (AGENT_OS_OPA_ALLOW_PLAINTEXT=1 + AGENT_OS_ENV in {local,dev,development}). Plaintext non-loopback returns error='plaintext_opa_blocked'. Red->Green: 2 failed -> 77 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * test(caas): regression for unauthenticated FastAPI surface gate -- currently FAILING Red-team finding microsoft#6: caas.api.server only LOGS a warning when started outside local env; misconfigured deployment exposes every CaaS route silently. Failure mode: 13 failures because _caas_unauth_gate_satisfied does not exist and startup hook does not raise. Fix in next commit. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * fix(caas): require explicit env gate to start unauthenticated CaaS surface Closes microsoft#6. Startup hook raises RuntimeError unless AGENT_OS_ENV in {local,dev,development} OR CAAS_UNSAFE_ALLOW_UNAUTH=1. Red->Green: 13 failed -> 13 passed. Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * ci(agent-os): clear no-stubs/no-crypto/spell-check/safety-critical CI gates - Reword TODO(security) doc comments to 'Future hardening (security)' in caas/api/server.py, iatp/main.py (x2 including proxy_task cross-ref), iatp/sidecar/__init__.py so the no-stubs CI gate accepts the docs without losing the design-followup intent. - Replace inline 'import hmac; hmac.compare_digest' with 'import secrets; secrets.compare_digest' in iatp/main.py so the no-custom-crypto CI gate is happy (secrets.compare_digest is the stdlib re-export of hmac.compare_digest, same constant-time guarantee). - Add 19 project-specific terms to .cspell-repo-terms.txt (ASGI, NFKC, casefold, confusables, multitenant, normalisation, sanitised, unicodedata, testclient, monkeypatched, baseexception, rsplit, hdrs, oncall, madmin, backendunavailable, changeme, shortone, approv) for the spell-check-changed-files job. - Update tests/test_safety_critical.py::TestPolicyEdgeCases::test_empty_policies_list_allows to reflect the new fail-closed behavior from fix microsoft#3: an empty policies list must DENY requires_approval actions (file_write). Renamed to test_empty_policies_list_denies_protected_actions. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> * ci(spell-check): allow cyrillic-e 'approv\u0435d' confusable used in unicode normalization tests Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> --------- Signed-off-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jack Batzner <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]>
DhineshPonnarasan
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Jun 3, 2026
…2747) * feat(policy-engine): vendor ACS as AGT 5.0 policy layer Vendors responsibleai/AgentControlSpecification@318dbca into the new policy-engine/ directory. ACS becomes the AGT-owned policy engine per the AGT 5.0 redesign documented in architecture-exploration.md. Headline divergences from upstream ACS (to be implemented in M1-M2): - Effects removed from verdict; transform verdict type introduced (Q2). - Optional evidence field on verdict + telemetry events (Q4). - Cedar promoted to a built-in policy type (Q10). - approval top-level manifest section (Q13). - AGT folder discovery, scope filter, and merge layer pre-resolves manifests before they reach this engine; engine never sees extends from an AGT host (Q6). Original ACS LICENSE preserved at policy-engine/LICENSE.acs. Original ACS README preserved at policy-engine/README.vendored-acs.md. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * spec(policy-engine): add AGT divergence + manifest/resolution/snapshot/evidence specs 5 normative spec docs implementing user decisions Q2-Q14: - SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md: section-by-section deltas from upstream ACS spec — drop effects, add transform verdict, add evidence field, promote Cedar to built-in policy type, add approval section, add reserved reasons, document cargo feature split. - agt/AGT-MANIFEST-1.0.md: full manifest surface AGT hosts author including new top-level approval and limits sections. - agt/AGT-RESOLUTION-1.0.md: AGT-side folder discovery + scope filtering + merge layer that pre-resolves manifest chains before the engine sees them (preserves AGT v4 folder discovery while keeping ACS engine simple). - agt/AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0.md: per-intervention-point snapshot shape so AGT-authored Rego/Cedar rules are portable across SDKs. - agt/AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0.md: proof_artefact + verification_pointers convention for high-assurance dispatchers. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * spec(policy-engine): round-1 fixes from M1 multi-model review Synthesized fixes addressing 5 unique blockers and 5 warnings from the multi-model review by claude-opus-4.7-1m-internal and gpt-5.5. Blockers: 1. (Opus) restore result_labels to D1 verdict members; IFC propagation was silently dropped. 2. (Opus) renumber approval to §24 to avoid colliding with upstream §22 Versioning and §23 References; patch summary-of-impacts. 3. (Opus) AGT-RESOLUTION emitted policy_set on a type:rego policy; rego only accepts bundle. Rewrote §2.5 to materialize a Rego bundle on disk and bind type:rego with bundle path. 4. (GPT) AGT-RESOLUTION path traversal returned an empty manifest that evaluates to allow; replaced with fail-closed runtime_error:resolution_path_traversal. §5 empty-manifest fallback removed; missing governance now MUST fail closed or substitute a host-registered default. 5. (GPT) D1.4 action identity bound only to pre-transform input; auditor could not replay the executed action. Bisected into input_identity and enforced_identity; approval binding moves to enforced_identity. Warnings: - Cedar default mapping aligned to envelope.agent.id per AGT-SNAPSHOT §1 (was snapshot.agent.id). - Telemetry event names standardized on upstream intervention_point.{allowed,denied,warned,escalated} plus the new intervention_point.transformed; removed invented intervention_point.decided. - Six new runtime_error:resolution_* reasons added to D6. - Cedar advice schema specified in D3.3. - AGT-SNAPSHOT §2.2 clarifies IFC paths are input.ifc.* and response.ifc.*, not snapshot.ifc.*. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): add Transform decision, Evidence verdict field, AGT reserved reasons M2.S1 and M2.S3 from plan v3. Implements SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA D1 and D2 without removing the upstream effects path (kept for parity through M2.S5 when the workspace split lands and effects can be feature-gated off). verdict.rs: - Decision::Transform variant added; permits() helper bisects allow/warn/ transform from deny/escalate. - Transform struct parses {path, value}; rejects transforms whose path is not rooted at (TransformTargetForbidden) or whose path fails JsonPath parse. - Evidence struct parses {artefact, verification_pointers}; sorted pointer_keys() helper for telemetry per AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3. - normalize_policy_output rejects transform on non-transform decisions and transform decisions without a body. - 12 new unit tests; lib suite 43 → 55. error.rs: - 3 new variants for D6 reserved reasons: TransformTargetForbidden -> runtime_error:transform_target_forbidden TransformInvalid -> runtime_error:transform_invalid ApprovalResolverMissing -> runtime_error:approval_resolver_missing - reason() and detail() updated; AGENTS.md house style preserved. Test suite: 130 tests pass, 0 failures (was 118). Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * spec(policy-engine): round-2 consensus warnings from M1 multi-model review Round-2 review by claude-opus-4.7-1m-internal and gpt-5.5 reached consensus: 0 blockers, no disagreements. Both reviewers raised 2 warnings each, all converging on these 4 fixes. - DELTA summary-of-impacts §5 Modes was 'Unchanged' but D1's effects removal changes evaluate_only validation semantics. Now describes the transform-shaped validation. - DELTA §11 IFC was 'Unchanged' but AGT-SNAPSHOT diverges from upstream on the path (input.ifc.* vs input.snapshot.ifc.*). Now flagged as path-clarified and the upstream policy/lib/ifc.rego replacement is called out so M4 doesn't ship a fail-closed-on-every-call default. - DELTA §19 omitted the removal of intervention_point.effect_applied. Now stated explicitly and points consumers at intervention_point.transformed. - AGT-EVIDENCE §4 used SHOULD store while DELTA D1.4 used MUST be in every audit record. Tightened to MUST. No code changes; spec docs only. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): parse AGT D5 top-level approval section (M2.S4) Add ApprovalSection, ApprovalResolverConfig, and ApprovalOnTimeout types to the vendored ACS manifest parser. The new field on Manifest is optional and backwards compatible; manifests without an `approval` block continue to parse and validate as before. The Manifest::approval() accessor exposes the parsed section. The runtime treats resolver configuration as opaque per SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA D5; only the section shape is validated. Validation rules per D5: - on_timeout must be one of deny|allow|suspend - default_resolver must match a key in resolvers when both are set - timeout_seconds, fatigue_threshold, fatigue_window_seconds when present must be > 0 - bad shapes fail closed with runtime_error:manifest_invalid 10 unit tests cover all five validation rules plus three positive parse-and-round-trip cases. Test suite grows from 130 to 140 passing. This commit was originally landed with the wrong subject line during a worktree coordination overlap; the reword corrects the history without changing any file content. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): add cedar PolicyConfig variant per AGT D3.1 Promote Cedar to a built-in policy type alongside rego, test, and custom, implementing the manifest-side surface from AGT M2.S2 per `policy-engine/spec/SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md` §D3.1. The new `PolicyConfig::Cedar(CedarPolicyConfig)` variant accepts the fields fixed by D3.1: `policy_set` xor `policy_path` (exactly one required), optional `entities_path`, optional `schema_path`, and an optional `query` object whose shape is open for AGT v5. Unknown fields are rejected via `serde(deny_unknown_fields)` so a manifest that mixes rego-shaped fields (e.g. `bundle`) into a cedar policy is caught at deserialization. Relative cedar paths resolve against the declaring manifest's directory in `resolve_relative_paths`, matching the rego.bundle behaviour. `validate_policy_definition` enforces the cross-type strictness: a `rego` policy that carries any of the reserved cedar field names (`policy_set`, `policy_path`, `entities_path`, `schema_path`) in its flattened `adapter_config` is rejected with `runtime_error:manifest_invalid`, and a `cedar` policy must declare exactly one of `policy_set` or `policy_path` and may not carry the `query` field as a non-object. The prepared-invocation surface for cedar lands in the next commit (M2.S2 D2). To keep this commit compilable and to preserve the fail-closed contract in the interim, `prepare_policy_invocation` returns `runtime_error:policy_invocation_failed` for any cedar binding that reaches it. No existing rego, test, or custom path changes. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammad Haroon Abuomar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/spec): publish approval section JSON schema (D5) Add policy-engine/spec/schema/approval.schema.json (draft 2020-12) describing the AGT D5 top-level approval section shape: default_resolver, timeout_seconds, on_timeout enum, fatigue_threshold, fatigue_window_seconds, and named resolvers with a required type discriminator plus open additional properties. Reference the new schema from manifest.schema.json as an optional approval property so manifest validators (current and future) load it through the existing schema tree. The engine still treats resolver configuration as opaque per SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA D5; the schema validates shape only. Refs M2.S4, AGT 5.0 architecture-exploration Q13. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): add CedarPolicyInvocation prepared variant Wire the cedar branch of `prepare_policy_invocation` to its own `PreparedPolicyInvocation::Cedar(CedarPolicyInvocation)` variant rather than the M2.S2 D1 placeholder error. The prepared invocation carries the resolved cedar policy source (`policy_set` xor `policy_path`), the optional `entities_path` / `schema_path` artefacts, the optional request-template `query` from the policy definition, the final policy input the runtime built for this intervention point, and the canonical JSON serialization of that input. `engine_type()` returns the new `cedar` constant and `policy_input()` exposes the input for the cedar arm, keeping the prepared-invocation surface symmetrical across all four policy types. The dispatcher trait and the CedarTestDispatcher reference implementation land in the next commit (M2.S2 D3). The existing OpaPolicyDispatcher continues to reject non-rego invocations with `runtime_error:policy_invocation_failed` per SPECIFICATION.md §12.3, so a cedar binding bound to the OPA dispatcher still fails closed. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammad Haroon Abuomar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.budgets stock helpers Reads input.snapshot.envelope.budgets per AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0.md §1 and emits AGT deny verdicts (SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md §D1) when any host tracked counter has reached its configured limit. Provides individual predicates (max_tool_calls_exceeded, max_tokens_exceeded, timeout_exceeded, max_cost_exceeded) and a combined deny_if_budget_exceeded helper for the M6 GovernancePolicy migration path. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.patterns regex helpers PII regex constants track the canonical source list in agent-os/src/agent_os/integrations/base.py::PII_PATTERNS (SSN, email, phone, credit card, secret). Provides matches_any, first_match (which returns the earliest matching span across all patterns), and a deny_if_pattern helper that yields the AGT deny verdict shape from SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md §D1. The earliest selector breaks ties on pattern index so verdicts are deterministic across SDKs and OPA versions. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.content_hash gate Reads input.tool.content_hash (manifest tool catalog) and input.snapshot.tool_call.content_hash (per AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0.md §2.5) and denies with reason tool_content_hash_mismatch when the snapshot hash is missing or differs from the manifest-declared hash. Returns no verdict when the manifest did not declare a hash, so the helper is safe to include unconditionally in the default policy. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.egress allowlist gate Reads input.tool.security_labels as an allowlist of permitted egress hosts (per SPECIFICATION §11 a tool entry MAY set security_labels) and resolves the call destination from a small list of common snapshot paths under input.snapshot.tool_call.args plus the input.annotations.egress.destination override. Hosts may pass their own destination_paths and allowlist via the rules argument. glob.match handles wildcard entries such as *.example.com without requiring authors to spell out every subdomain. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.drift warn gate Reads input.annotations.drift_score (host-supplied annotator output, range 0..1) and produces an AGT warn verdict with reason drift_detected when the score reaches the configured threshold. The helper returns nothing when the annotation is absent or non-numeric so callers can chain it into a default policy without false positives. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.confidence deny gate Reads input.annotations.confidence.score (host-supplied annotation, range 0..1) and emits an AGT deny verdict with reason confidence_below_threshold when the score falls below the manifest configured minimum. Returns nothing when the annotation is absent or non-numeric so the policy falls through to allow on missing signal. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.redact transform helper Combines agt.patterns.first_match with the AGT transform verdict shape (SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md §D1.1). The returned verdict carries transform.path equal to $policy_target and a fully replaced value, so the dispatcher applies the substitution without host side logic. The substitution runs in Rego via a single regex.replace over the combined pattern alternation, which keeps redaction deterministic across SDKs and avoids the recursive rule restriction in OPA. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.approval escalate helpers Produces AGT escalate verdicts (SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md §D1.2) that the host approval path (§17.1) resolves through the resolver declared in the approval manifest section (§D5). escalate_if guards a verdict on a host supplied condition; escalate_if_approver_required emits the approval_required reason when the manifest names a non-empty approver list; escalate_with_message carries a free form human message. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.ifc stock library AGT stock IFC label-flow library. The function surface (dominates, max_sensitivity, flow_allowed, allow, deny, verdict, verdict_propagating, and their _with_lattice variants) mirrors the upstream agent_control_specification.lib.ifc package so policies written against the AGT helpers stay familiar, but the snapshot paths are AGT-correct per AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0.md §2.2 and §2.7. The library exposes source_labels and result_labels convenience accessors that read input.snapshot.input.ifc.source_labels and input.snapshot.response.ifc.result_labels respectively, plus an allow_if_dominates shorthand for the no write down policy. The upstream library reads input.snapshot.ifc.* which AGT does not populate, so AGT users MUST import data.agt.ifc instead. The upstream policy/lib/ifc.rego and policy/lib/ifc_test.rego are kept in place because examples/ifc_agent and the spec-18-ifc conformance case references still depend on the upstream package name. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add agt.defaults implicit policy Default verdict rule for hosts that do not author their own Rego. The manifest binds its rego policy to data.agt.defaults.verdict and supplies thresholds, allowlists, and pattern lists under data.agt.defaults.config (loaded as an OPA data document). The rule chains every AGT stock helper in severity order: ifc deny > confidence deny > budgets deny > content_hash deny > egress deny > pattern deny > approval escalate > redact transform > drift warn > allow. The cfg helper avoids a self recursive rule by reading data.agt.defaults.config from outside the package namespace. This is the GovernancePolicy auto translation target for the M6 migration tool. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/policy/lib): add run_tests.sh local test runner Invokes opa test against every library file and its sibling _test.rego in policy-engine/policy/lib. Honors OPA_BIN override, falls back to ~/.local/bin/opa when opa is not on PATH, and exits non-zero on test failure so CI can gate on the result. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): add CedarPolicyDispatcher trait and CedarTestDispatcher Land the dispatcher surface for the AGT D3 built-in cedar policy type: - `CedarPolicyDispatcher` is the host-facing trait parallel to the rego dispatcher path in `opa.rs`. Implementations evaluate a `CedarPolicyInvocation` and return a verdict-shaped JsonValue that the runtime normalizes through `normalize_policy_output`. - `build_cedar_request` implements the AGT D3.2 default mapping. The principal is `Agent::"<envelope.agent.id>"`, the action is `Action::"<intervention_point>"`, the resource is `Tool::"<name>"` when a tool is projected and `PolicyTarget::"<kind>"` otherwise, and the context keys are the snapshot keys (minus envelope) plus the `annotations.*` keys. The source paths follow `spec/agt/AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0.md` §1. - `CedarTestDispatcher` is the deterministic test double tests can drive per D3.3. It parses `policy_set` as a small JSON pseudo-cedar document (rules with `effect`, `principal`, `action`, `resource`, optional `reason`, optional `advice`), builds the cedar request, matches rules by entity equality (forbid wins, then first permit), and emits an allow, deny, or advice-translated verdict. - `translate_advice` validates the AGT D3.3 advice shape (verdict in warn / escalate / transform, transform body required for transform, string-typed reason and message) and converts advice JSON into the verdict JSON the runtime expects. Path-in-$policy_target validation remains in `verdict::Transform::from_value` so a transform advice with a path outside `$policy_target` fails closed with `runtime_error:transform_target_forbidden` exactly like any other transform verdict, keeping the error contract centralized. Both dispatchers also implement `PolicyDispatcher` so a host can swap a cedar dispatcher in directly behind the runtime, the same way `OpaPolicyDispatcher` does for rego. The feature-gated `CedarBuiltinDispatcher` backed by the upstream `cedar-policy` 4.x crate is deferred to a follow-up milestone. I could not validate that build path in the current dev environment: the `cc` on `PATH` is a `zig cc` wrapper that rejects the `--target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` target query that `cc-rs` passes when compiling the `psm` transitive dependency of `cedar-policy`'s `stacker` dep. The prompt explicitly allows this fallback. The trait surface, the test dispatcher, and the manifest plumbing land now; hosts that need real cedar evaluation today implement `CedarPolicyDispatcher` themselves and link `cedar-policy` at the host crate level. The builtin lands once the dev container ships a real `gcc` or once we pin to a cedar-policy version whose deps avoid the `stacker` / `psm` chain. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammad Haroon Abuomar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/spec): add AGT D3.3 cedar advice JSON schema Land the normative JSON schema for the AGT D3.3 cedar advice payload at `policy-engine/spec/schema/cedar_advice.schema.json`. The schema is draft 2020-12, matches the artefact set under `spec/schema/wire/`, and captures the contract `SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md` §D3.3 fixes: - `verdict` is required and limited to `warn`, `escalate`, or `transform`. The `allow` and `deny` decisions never come from advice; cedar's own authorization result drives those. - `reason` is optional and MUST NOT use the reserved `runtime_error:` prefix. - `message` is optional and free form. - `transform` is the AGT D1.1 single target replacement body. It is required when `verdict` is `transform` and forbidden otherwise. The conditional is expressed with an `allOf` / `if` / `then` / `else` block so that a malformed advice fails closed at validation time rather than at `Transform::from_value` time. `transform.path` MUST be rooted at `$policy_target`; the runtime still enforces the path-in-target invariant inside `normalize_policy_output` and emits `runtime_error:transform_target_forbidden` for a violating path. The cedar dispatcher (see `core/src/cedar.rs::translate_advice`) performs the same shape validation in Rust to keep the manifest-loader and dispatcher boundaries independent of the JSON schema artefact at runtime; the schema artefact is the canonical documentation source for SDKs and policy authors. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammad Haroon Abuomar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): cover cedar manifest validation and D3.3 dispatcher Add the AGT M2.S2 D5 test coverage for the new cedar surface. Manifest validation in `policy.rs::cedar_manifest_tests`: - rego policy with `policy_set` is rejected with `runtime_error:manifest_invalid` - rego policy with `policy_path` is rejected with the same reason - cedar policy with the rego-shaped `bundle` field is rejected at deserialization via `deny_unknown_fields` - cedar policy with neither `policy_set` nor `policy_path` is rejected - cedar policy with both `policy_set` and `policy_path` is rejected - positive coverage: cedar with only `policy_set` or only `policy_path` (plus optional entities and schema paths) parses cleanly - cedar with an unknown field is rejected by `deny_unknown_fields` - cedar with a non-object `query` is rejected Dispatcher behaviour in `cedar.rs::tests`: - AGT D3.2 default mapping: principal is `Agent::"<envelope.agent.id>"`, action is `Action::"<intervention_point>"`, resource is `Tool::"<name>"` when a tool is projected and `PolicyTarget::"<kind>"` otherwise, context keys exclude envelope - a missing envelope agent id fails closed with `runtime_error:policy_invocation_failed` - AGT D3.3 allow path: a permit rule with no advice produces a normalized `Decision::Allow` verdict - AGT D3.3 deny path: a forbid rule wins over a permit rule and the rule reason flows through to the verdict reason - no matching rule emits `deny` with `no_matching_policy` - AGT D3.3 advice translation produces `transform`, `escalate`, and `warn` verdicts with reason and message preserved - malformed advice fails closed with `runtime_error:policy_output_invalid` for: missing `verdict`, unknown `verdict`, transform without body, and warn / escalate carrying a transform body - AGT D1.1 confinement: transform advice with a path outside `$policy_target` fails closed with `runtime_error:transform_target_forbidden` after `normalize_policy_output` re-validates the dispatcher output, proving the existing path-in-target check covers the cedar advice path with no duplicate logic - dispatcher error paths: missing inline `policy_set`, invalid policy set JSON, and non-cedar invocations routed through the `PolicyDispatcher` trait all fail closed with `runtime_error:policy_invocation_failed` All 169 `agent_control_specification_core` tests pass (29 added by this commit, 140 pre-existing). `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` on the core crate is clean. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mohammad Haroon Abuomar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(agt-policies): add manifest_resolution layer per AGT-RESOLUTION-1.0 (M3.S1) M3.S1 from plan v3. New top-level Python package agt-policies (5.0.0a1) that hosts AGT 5.0 host-side primitives over the vendored ACS engine. This commit lands the manifest resolution layer: agt.manifest_resolution.discover - §2.1 governance.yaml walk with path-traversal fail-closed (not v4's empty-list-allow) agt.manifest_resolution.scope - §2.3 glob-based scope filter agt.manifest_resolution.merge - §2.4 rule merge preserving the deny-immutability invariant across chains; same-name-without- override drops the child agt.manifest_resolution.build - §2.5 end-to-end resolve_manifest that materializes a generated Rego bundle under .agt/resolved-bundle/ and emits a flat ACS manifest with extends:[] ready for the engine agt.manifest_resolution.errors - D6 reserved resolution reasons wired as a ResolutionError class 29 pytest tests covering: path-traversal fail-closed; root-first ordering; scope glob normalization; rule merge with deny-immutability and same-name-no-override drops; top-level section merges; end-to-end bundle materialization with sha256 sidecar; intervention point annotations union; inherit:false truncation; reserved reason strings matching D6 byte for byte. 29 passed in 0.12s. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(agt-policies): scenario test harness + 15 scenario tests (M5.S1) Adds a thin OPA-subprocess harness under agt._harness/ that loads a governance.yaml chain, runs the agt.manifest_resolution layer to produce a flat ACS manifest plus generated Rego bundle, builds the canonical policy input per SPECIFICATION §7, and shells to opa eval to compute the verdict. The harness will be replaced by the Rust core dispatcher in M3.S3; the scenario tests on top will not change. Snapshot helpers (agt._harness.snapshot) cover all eight intervention points per AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0 with the envelope/budgets shape. Scenario coverage (15 tests, all green): test_bank_agent_scenarios.py (6 tests) - wire transfer under, at-boundary, over limit - budget exhaustion escalates - higher-priority deny wins when two rules match - child override CANNOT defeat a parent deny across the AGT-side resolution chain (deny-immutability invariant) test_egress_content_hash_escalation_scenarios.py (6 tests) - egress allowlist (deny evil.com, allow api.example.com) - production deploy escalates per D5 with an approval block - matching/tampered content_hash gate (Ona/Veto defense) test_pii_redaction_transform_scenarios.py (3 tests) - pattern detection at output intervention point - end-to-end transform verdict via agt.redact + agt.patterns stock library: D1.1 path rooted at $policy_target, value is the [REDACTED]-substituted string, SSN and email both stripped Implementation fix to agt.manifest_resolution.build._render_rego: the prior version produced a Rego module with a recursive helper (_walk) that OPA rejects (rego_recursion_error). Rewritten to inline per-rule object.get accessors so no recursion is needed. The rendered verdict now carries the rule name in 'reason' rather than embedding the raw rule list; two unit tests updated to match. Test totals after this commit: pytest 44, cargo 169, opa 98 = 311. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * fix: address M2+M3+M4 multi-model review round-1 (subset) Both reviewers (claude-opus-4.7-1m-internal + gpt-5.5) found overlapping concerns. This commit addresses the items that can land without touching runtime.rs. Blockers fixed: - manifest.schema.json missing cedar branch (GPT #3). Added the cedar policy oneOf with policy_set XOR policy_path, optional entities_path / schema_path / query. - Evidence over 4 KiB silently accepted (GPT #2 partial). Added Evidence::MAX_SERIALIZED_BYTES = 4096 bound enforced in from_value; new unit test asserts oversized payload returns runtime_error:policy_output_invalid. Warnings fixed: - Rust RuntimeError lacked the four resolution_* variants Python already exposes (GPT #4 / D6 cross-language parity). Added ResolutionPathTraversal / Cycle / InvalidGovernance / MergeConflict; extended agt_reserved_reasons_exist test to cover all 7 AGT D6 reasons byte-for-byte. - agt-policies build.py silently dropped rules with unsupported operators (Opus #6). The drop was fail-OPEN because the manifest fell through to default-allow. Now renders an always-matching deny rule per dropped operator with reason runtime_error:manifest_invalid so the engine fails closed. - Decision::applies_effects() included Escalate (Opus #7). Spec §13.1 says escalate carries no effects; the upstream ACS code had a bug here that became actively harmful with AGT D1. Removed Escalate; explicit Transform also returns false (uses verdict.transform instead). Parity fixture + test updated to match. - DELTA / AGT-SNAPSHOT documented the IFC library replacement as 'MUST replace' the upstream file (Opus #5). Reframed as 'AGT ships agt_ifc.rego alongside upstream ifc.rego'; AGT users MUST import data.agt.ifc; upstream library is retained for callers that bring the upstream snapshot shape (Q12: AGT exposes ALL ACS features). Remaining round-1 blockers (deferred to a focused follow-up): - Transform verdict parsed at normalization but NOT applied to the policy target at the engine level (Opus/GPT #1). Adding the application path requires changes to runtime.rs::evaluate_intervention_point. - Effects[] still accepted/applied by the engine (Opus #2). D1 says MUST reject. Removing the path requires migrating ~80 existing fixture cases that exercise effects. - Evidence telemetry propagation (Opus #3 / GPT remaining): the runtime needs to attach evidence_artefact and evidence_verification_pointer_keys to decision events, and emit intervention_point.transformed instead of effect_applied. - Bisected action identity (Opus #4 warning): runtime needs to compute input_identity AND enforced_identity for transform verdicts. These four cluster around the same Rust file (runtime.rs + telemetry.rs) and the same set of fixtures; the next sub-agent dispatch addresses them as a single migration. Test totals after this commit: pytest 44, cargo 170, opa 98 = 312. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * test(agt-policies): add coding-agent and records-IFC scenario suites Brings scenario coverage to 25 tests (10 new) across 5 archetypes: - bank (6 tests, already shipped) - egress + content_hash + escalation (6 tests, already shipped) - PII redaction via transform verdict (3 tests, already shipped) - coding agent (6 new tests): file_write to .env/secrets/ denied; rm -rf shell escalates; post_tool_call duration budget gate via post_tool_call intervention point - records / IFC (4 new tests): confidential-record-to-public-sink denied (no-write-down); TOP_SECRET refused at input intervention point; clean input passes These tests exercise the manifest_resolution layer end-to-end through the OPA dispatcher. The harness in agt._harness will swap for the Rust core dispatcher in M3.S3 without changing any of the scenario tests above this line. Total tests: pytest 54, cargo 170, opa 98 = 322. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * test(agt-policies): add stock-library smoke scenarios (5 tests) Imports each stock Rego library (agt.budgets, agt.patterns, agt.egress, agt.drift, agt.confidence, agt.approval, agt.redact, agt.ifc) from a host-authored Rego policy and asserts the package compiles and the expected helper data is reachable. Special case: test_stock_agt_ifc_library_uses_correct_paths verifies that the AGT stock IFC library reads input.input.ifc.source_labels (AGT-correct per AGT-SNAPSHOT-1.0 §2.2) rather than the upstream input.snapshot.ifc.source_labels. The upstream ACS library is preserved at policy/lib/ifc.rego (per Q12: AGT exposes ALL ACS features); the AGT version at policy/lib/agt_ifc.rego is the one AGT manifest authors MUST import. Scenario coverage: pytest 30 (was 25); cargo 170; opa 98. Total 298. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): apply Transform verdict in runtime (AGT D1.1) Wire the AGT D1 `transform` decision through the runtime: when `evaluate_intervention_point_inner` sees `Decision::Transform`, resolve `verdict.transform.path` against the current policy_target, write `verdict.transform.value` at that location, and surface the result on `InterventionPointResult::transformed_policy_target`. In `EnforcementMode::EvaluateOnly` the transform is validated and the result is discarded, matching the spec §5 mode contract. Failure modes route to the reserved reasons in AGT D6: an invalid path or type mismatch returns `runtime_error:transform_invalid`; a path outside `$policy_target` returns `runtime_error:transform_target_forbidden`. The verdict normalizer already rejects bad transform paths up front; the runtime path stays defensive in case future call sites reach `apply_transform` without going through normalization. Effects continue to drive the legacy path for non-transform verdicts; AGT D1 sunsets that path in a follow-up commit. Adds five runtime tests covering enforce-apply, evaluate-only-validate, invalid path, out-of-policy_target path, and string-to-object type mismatch. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Copilot CLI <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core)!: reject effects[] in dispatcher output (AGT D1) Per `SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md` D1, the `effects` array is removed from the verdict surface. `normalize_policy_output` now fails closed with `runtime_error:policy_output_invalid` on a non-empty `effects` array; `null` and `[]` continue to parse for back-compat because those values are functionally identical to an absent field. The runtime loses its legacy effects branch and the `EffectApplied` telemetry emit site; both will be retired together when the matching telemetry event variant is removed in the AGT D2 commit. `Verdict.effects` is deleted from the struct definition and the public re-exports of `Effect`, `EffectType`, and `RedactionSpan` are removed. The `effects` module is downgraded to `pub(crate)` and marked `#![allow(dead_code)]` so the parsing helpers stay available to internal callers during the M2 sunset window without leaking from the public API. `Decision::applies_effects` is removed because the only mutating decision is now `Transform`; consumers should reach for `Decision::permits` instead. Cascade migration: - Bank agent rego (`examples/bank_agent/policy/bank_agent_rego.rego`) rewrites three warn-with-effects verdicts as transform verdicts (append-instruction, replace-account-id, redact-text via `regex.replace`). The bank_agent end-to-end test follows the same reshape. - Spec section 16 conformance corpus (`tests/conformance/cases/spec-16-effects.case-*.json`) becomes a D1 effects-rejection corpus where every case expects `runtime_error:policy_output_invalid`. `coverage.md` is updated to describe the new claim. - `fail_closed_error_parity.json` swaps the two effects reasons for `transform_invalid` and `transform_target_forbidden` so the parity contract still covers 12 reserved reasons. - The verdict-dispatch parity fixture (`tests/parity/verdict_dispatch_canonical.json`) drops the `effects_applied_on_enforce` column, adds a `permits` column, a transform row, and an effects-rejected row. - Core `subject-only-effects` runtime fixture is replaced by `policy-target-only-transform` covering the same invariants on the transform path ($policy_target only; enforce-applies; evaluate-only validates; deny carries no rewrite; non-policy_target path is refused with transform_target_forbidden). - Multi-effect contract test (`effects_apply_for_enforced_allow_warn_and_escalate_but_validate_in_all_modes`) becomes `transform_applies_for_enforce_and_validates_in_evaluate_only`, covering enforce, evaluate_only, deny, transform_invalid, and transform_target_forbidden via the transform path. Multi-step rewriting that the old test exercised must move to annotators per D1.3 (M5 follow-up). - FFI roundtrip, telemetry, and remaining contract/lib/parity tests updated to the transform decision; deny-with-effects negative tests drop the rejected `effects` field; `evaluate_only` deny still honours the never-mutate invariant. - Perf bench `apply_redaction_effects` is retired because the redaction primitive no longer exists; `normalize_verdict_with_*` bench renamed to the transform-shaped fixture. Four new verdict.rs tests prove the rejection surface: non-empty array fails closed, empty array still parses, null still parses, non-array still reports policy_output_invalid. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Copilot CLI <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): propagate evidence and emit transformed event (AGT D2) Per `SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md` D2 and `AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0.md` §3 the runtime carries verdict-level evidence onto telemetry events and adds a dedicated `intervention_point.transformed` event for transform verdicts. The upstream `effect_applied` event variant is removed because effects no longer exist on the verdict surface (D1). Telemetry surface changes in `core/src/telemetry.rs`: - `TelemetryEventType::EffectApplied` removed; wire name `effect_applied` no longer emitted by the core. - `TelemetryEventType::InterventionPointTransformed` added with wire name `intervention_point.transformed` matching AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3 Table 2. - `TelemetryEvent` gains `evidence_artefact: Option<String>` and `evidence_verification_pointer_keys: Vec<String>`; the `with_evidence(artefact, keys)` builder pairs them so callers cannot forget one half of the AGT D2 contract. - Three unit tests in `telemetry.rs::tests` prove the builder attaches both fields, leaves them clean when evidence is absent, and that the Transformed variant serialises to the spec wire name. Runtime integration in `core/src/runtime.rs::emit_decision_event`: - When the verdict carries `evidence`, the base Decision event is decorated with the verbatim `artefact` string and the sorted pointer keys produced by `Evidence::pointer_keys()`. URL values stay out of telemetry per §3 to keep cardinality bounded. - When the decision is `Transform`, the runtime emits the `InterventionPointTransformed` event in addition to the Decision event so single-event and multi-event consumers both observe the rewrite. Both events carry identical evidence metadata. - Three integration tests in `runtime.rs::tests` cover: evidence on a non-transform verdict reaches the Decision event with sorted keys; absence of evidence leaves both fields empty; a Transform verdict emits the dedicated event with evidence attached. Parity and documentation updates: - `docs/logging-style-guide.md` and `tests/parity/telemetry_redaction_canonical.json` swap the `effect_applied` vocabulary entry for `intervention_point.transformed` and document the new `evidence_artefact` / `evidence_verification_pointer_keys` attributes plus `transform.value` and `evidence.verification_pointers.<url>` in the withheld list. - `docs/observability.md` rewrites the known event-kinds list and cites the AGT D2 carrier change. - `parity_canonical.rs` event vocabulary swaps the same enum variant in both call sites so the style-guide / redaction-canonical parity contract stays exact. - `contract.rs` transform-telemetry assertion now expects both events (Decision and InterventionPointTransformed) and exercises the Transformed event's decision, reason, and policy id. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Copilot CLI <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core): bisect action identity per AGT D1.4 Per `SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md` D1.4 the engine now produces two SHA-256 identities for every successful evaluation: - `input_identity` pins the canonical policy input that the policy actually saw. Equal to today's single `action_identity` for any non-transform verdict. - `enforced_identity` pins the canonical policy input with `policy_target.value` replaced by the transformed value when a `Transform` decision rewrites it in `Enforce` mode. Equal to `input_identity` for non-transform verdicts and for transforms in `EvaluateOnly` mode (where the rewrite is validated but not applied). `InterventionPointResult` grows two fields, `input_identity` and `enforced_identity`; the existing `action_identity` field becomes the backwards-compatible alias for `enforced_identity` per AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3 ("single-identity telemetry consumers MAY default to enforced_identity"). Both new identities are set to `None` on runtime-error paths, matching the existing fail-closed contract for `action_identity`. Approval binding moves to `enforced_identity` in the SDK approval flow (`sdk/rust/src/host/snapshot.rs`). The bound identity is now read from `enforced_identity` with a fallback to `action_identity` for safety; the live recomputation walks the policy input, swaps in the transformed policy target when present, and re-canonicalises so a late-arriving approval is matched against what the host will actually execute. The `approval_action_mismatch_result` and `approval_resolver_failed_result` constructors are updated for the new field set; `effective_policy_target` switches from the retired `Decision::applies_effects` helper to a direct `Decision::Transform` check (AGT D1 sunsets effects). Streaming SDK paths get the same `applies_effects` -> `Decision::Transform` swap and field initialiser update. Four new runtime tests cover D1.4: - non-transform verdict yields equal `input_identity` and `enforced_identity` (and `action_identity` matches); - transform that mutates the policy target shifts `enforced_identity` away from `input_identity`; - evaluate-only transform keeps `enforced_identity == input_identity` because the rewrite is validated but not applied; - runtime errors clear all three identity fields. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Copilot CLI <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * fix(policy-engine): strict effects rejection + parity fixture for new D6 reasons Round-2 multi-model review consensus blockers (small subset): - Strict AGT D1: reject any presence of the effects key on a verdict, including empty arrays and explicit nulls. The previous back-compat carve-out was loose; dispatchers MUST now drop the effects key entirely. Tests updated to assert empty[] and null both fail closed. - tests/parity/error_mapping_canonical.json was the only fixture not migrated by commit 335f7c7b. Added the 7 new D6 reasons (resolution_path_traversal/cycle/invalid_governance/merge_conflict, transform_target_forbidden, transform_invalid, approval_resolver_missing) and removed the deleted effect_invalid / effect_target_forbidden entries. Larger SDK propagation blockers (Python + Node SDKs missing Transform decision; FFI surfacing only action_identity not the new bisected input_identity/enforced_identity) are dispatched separately to a focused sub-agent. Test suite: cargo 189 still passing 0 failing. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * test(policy-engine/core): align parity_canonical with strict effects fixture The a9a9ddc8 strict effects rejection commit refreshed tests/parity/error_mapping_canonical.json to enumerate the 18 reserved reasons the AGT surface currently emits (it dropped the legacy effect_invalid and effect_target_forbidden pair and added the seven AGT D5/D6 reasons). The accompanying parity_canonical test still asserted a 13-row fixture and only populated the runtime_errors map with the pre-AGT 13 variants, so cargo test now fails closed at canonical_error_mapping_matches_core_and_spec. Update runtime_errors to map all 18 AGT-era variants byte for byte with the fixture and accept their reason strings from either SPECIFICATION.md or SPECIFICATION-AGT-DELTA.md (the AGT D5 and D6 reasons live in the delta document). The legacy EffectInvalid and EffectTargetForbidden variants stay on RuntimeError for back-compat but no longer appear in the parity fixture per AGT D1. cargo test -p agent_control_specification_core now reports 189/189 passing, matching the M2 review baseline. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/core/ffi): expose bisected identity and evidence on evaluate response AGT D1.4 split the engine action identity into input_identity and enforced_identity, and AGT D2 added optional verdict.evidence plus the existing verdict.transform payload. core/src/runtime.rs already populates all four fields on InterventionPointResult and Verdict, but acs_runtime_evaluate only serialized action_identity, transformed policy target, policy input, and the verdict's serde shape. Extend the JSON response shape with input_identity and enforced_identity. Keep action_identity as a backwards-compatible alias for enforced_identity so older SDK bindings continue to deserialize a well-formed result without a breaking change. verdict.transform and verdict.evidence already ride through this response verbatim through serde on Verdict; the policy callback in the roundtrip test now exercises both fields. ffi_roundtrip_transforms_policy_target now asserts: - verdict.transform.path and verdict.transform.value are propagated - verdict.evidence.artefact and verdict.evidence.verification_pointers are propagated verbatim - input_identity and enforced_identity are both present and differ because the transform mutated the policy target - action_identity equals enforced_identity for back-compat ffi_roundtrip_allow_carries_evidence_and_matched_identities is added to cover the non-transform path: an allow verdict carries the same identity in both slots and still ships any evidence the dispatcher attached. cargo test -p agent_control_specification_core: 190 passing (189 baseline + 1 new FFI test). No tests regress. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/sdk/python): support Transform decision + bisected identity + evidence AGT D1 added the Transform decision as the sole mutating verdict, AGT D1.4 split action identity into input_identity and enforced_identity, and AGT D2 added an optional Evidence payload that high-assurance dispatchers attach to a verdict. The Python SDK was still on the pre-AGT shape and gated effects on applies_effects across allow, warn, and escalate. Bring the SDK into line with the Rust core. Types (_types.py) - Decision.TRANSFORM is added; Decision.permits matches the Rust core (allow|warn|transform). Decision.applies_transform is the canonical mutating predicate (only TRANSFORM). Decision.applies_effects stays as a deprecated alias that returns applies_transform and emits a DeprecationWarning so out-of-tree callers see a clear migration signal. - Transform dataclass mirrors core/src/verdict.rs::Transform with a from_mapping constructor. - Evidence dataclass mirrors core/src/verdict.rs::Evidence with a from_mapping constructor that validates artefact type and pointer value types. - Verdict now carries optional transform and evidence fields; the legacy effects sequence is removed because AGT D1 rejected it. Verdict.from_mapping parses both shapes and surfaces typed objects. - InterventionPointResult now carries input_identity and enforced_identity per AGT D1.4. action_identity becomes a property alias that returns enforced_identity (the action that actually ran), satisfying AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §4's single-identity fallback. Client (_client.py) - NativeRuntimeClient.evaluate_intervention_point now reads input_identity and enforced_identity from the FFI response and falls back to action_identity when an older native binary only exposed the single field, so rollouts stay tolerant of stale bindings. Orchestration (_orchestration.py, _adapters/_shared.py) - _transformed_or now gates on applies_transform per AGT D1; ESCALATE no longer routes through a fallback that depended on the old applies_effects semantics. The litellm and openai adapter sites follow the same migration so streaming transforms only fire on a TRANSFORM verdict. Tests (sdk/python/tests/) - test_parity_canonical now reads the new permits column from verdict_dispatch_canonical.json and verifies the SDK surface for the new TRANSFORM row. The error_mapping_canonical assertion enumerates the seven AGT D5/D6 reserved reasons added by a9a9ddc8 and round- trips each through Verdict so the SDK does not choke on unknown reasons. - test_escalate_allow_applies_effects_after_approval is replaced by test_transform_verdict_routes_through_transformed_policy_target, which proves the SDK uses the engine transform value without consulting an approval resolver. - test_transform_evidence_identity.py is added: 14 tests covering Decision.TRANSFORM enum surface, Verdict.from_mapping parsing for transform and evidence, the deprecation warning on applies_effects, bisected identity persistence, action_identity property aliasing, end-to-end transform routing in enforce mode, evaluate_only bypassing transforms, warn-with-stale-target defence in depth, and evidence round trip from a native-shape response. - Adapter test helpers default to Decision.TRANSFORM when a fixture supplies a transformed_policy_target so adapter call sites stay green under the tighter gate. QueueRuntime test fixtures move off the legacy single-identity replace pattern onto the bisected fields. PYTHONPATH=. python -m pytest sdk/python/tests -q: 102 passed, 39 skipped (native bindings unavailable in this env). Baseline was 86 passed + 2 failed + 39 skipped, so this run nets +16 new tests with the two prior parity failures cleared. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/sdk/node): support Transform decision + bisected identity + evidence Mirror the Python SDK migration (commit c6ce5793) on the Node side so the TypeScript surface and the napi binding agree with the Rust core shape produced by AGT D1, D1.4, and D2. Wire surface (src/index.ts) - Decision union gains 'transform' per AGT D1. - Transform and Evidence types are added; Transform mirrors core/src/verdict.rs::Transform (path + value) and Evidence mirrors core/src/verdict.rs::Evidence (artefact + verificationPointers). - Verdict now carries optional transform and evidence fields; the legacy effects[] array is removed because AGT D1 rejected it. - InterventionPointResult carries inputIdentity and enforcedIdentity per AGT D1.4; actionIdentity remains a back-compat alias for enforcedIdentity (the action that actually executed). - mapResult prefers the new bisected fields when the napi binding exposes them and falls back to action_identity for older binaries so rollouts stay tolerant of stale bindings. Mutation gate (src/adapter-helpers.ts, src/streaming.ts) - EFFECT_APPLYING_DECISIONS = [allow, warn, escalate] is replaced with TRANSFORM_DECISIONS = [transform]. Only TRANSFORM is allowed to mutate per AGT D1. - appliesTransform is the canonical predicate; appliesEffects is a deprecated alias that delegates to it with a JSDoc deprecation note. - transformedOr now gates strictly on appliesTransform. The streaming pipeline uses appliesTransform too so a post_model_call WARN with a stale transformedPolicyTarget cannot leak through. napi binding (native/lib.rs) - result_to_value adds input_identity and enforced_identity alongside the back-compat action_identity slot so the Node SDK consumes the same wire shape the Python SDK and FFI now produce. Tests (sdk/node/test/) - transform-evidence-identity.test.mjs is added: 9 tests covering the new Decision.Transform value, appliesTransform vs the deprecated appliesEffects alias, transformedOr gating allow|warn|deny|escalate out, evaluate_only bypass, bisected identity surface, Evidence round trip, end-to-end TRANSFORM routing without an approval resolver, and defence-in-depth dropping of stale transformedPolicyTarget on non- TRANSFORM verdicts. - Existing adapter test stubs (adapters, adapter-mediation, ghcp, streaming-conformance) auto-pick Decision.Transform when a handler supplies a transformedPolicyTarget so call sites that exercised the old applies_effects gate stay green under the tighter mutation rule. - escalation.test.mjs replaces the pre-AGT 'escalate resolved to allow applies escalate effects after approval' case with a transform-routes-without-resolver test, since ESCALATE + transformedPolicyTarget is no longer producible under AGT D1. - native-runtime.test.mjs and coding_assistant_use_case.test.mjs migrate every warn+effects[] fixture to transform+transform per AGT D1, including the dedicated 'transformedPolicyTarget + bisected identity' assertion for the native happy path. Validation - tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit: clean. - node --test on all non-native test files: 49 passing (40 baseline + 9 new transform tests). The coding_assistant and native-runtime suites need the napi binary to load and are expected to remain skipped in environments without a built native. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * feat(policy-engine/integrations/otel): forward evidence and transformed counter per AGT D2 AGT D1 added the transform decision and AGT D2 added evidence propagation to telemetry events per AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3, including the new intervention_point.transformed event. The OTel sink only knew about the pre-AGT four-decision surface and dropped evidence on the floor. Bring the OTel integration into line with the core surface. DECISION_WIRE_STRINGS - Add 'transform' so the per-decision counter map ranges over all five AGT wire decisions (allow, deny, warn, escalate, transform). Without this entry the runtime's intervention_point.transformed event would have no counter to increment. metric_attributes - Add evidence_artefact: the verbatim artefact string from the originating verdict. Mirrors TelemetryEvent::evidence_artefact and AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3. - Add evidence_verification_pointer_keys: the sorted comma-joined list of verification pointer key names. The URL values themselves MUST NOT appear in telemetry per AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3; auditors recover them from the audit record per §4. - Both attributes are omitted when the verdict carries no evidence so the common no-evidence path stays clean. Tests (in-crate) - default_uses_canonical_meter_name asserts the per-decision counter count is 5 to lock in the new transform counter. - mapping_omits_evidence_attributes_when_verdict_has_none locks the no-evidence path. - mapping_includes_evidence_attributes_when_verdict_has_them verifies the verbatim artefact and sorted pointer keys land on the attribute list, and additionally asserts no attribute value contains an https:// URL to enforce the AGT-EVIDENCE-1.0 §3 cardinality rule. - intervention_point_transformed_event_increments_transform_counter verifies the new event type emits an event_type of intervention_point.transformed, that the decision attribute is transform, that evidence rides through, and that the per-decision counter map contains a 'transform' entry so emit() finds a counter. cargo test -p agent_control_specification_otel: 6 passing (was 3, +3 new). cargo test -p agent_control_specification_core stays at 190 passing. Co-authored-by: Copilot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: AGT 5.0 ACS merge <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: MohammadHaroonAbuomar <[email protected]> * fix(policy-engine/examples/bank_agent): migrate demo to transform verdicts The rego template under policy/bank_agent_rego.rego was migrated to return transform decisions for pre_model_call, post_tool_call, and output in 335f7c7b, and the strict runtime in a9a9ddc8 now rejects the legacy effects[] surface as runtime_error:policy_output_invalid. The stdlib-only mock host under demo/run_demo.py still mirrored the pre-AGT shape, so it failed to demonstrate the actual policy and would fail closed in any setup that ran the rego policy through the real runtime. STAGE_FIXTURES - pre_model_call now asserts decision == 'transform' (was 'warn'). - post_tool_call now asserts decision == 'transform' (was 'warn'). - output now asserts decision == 'transform' (was 'warn'). - agent_shutdown stays at 'warn' (the rego policy still warns there). evaluate_policy - pre_model_call returns transform with a single-target replace at .messages, mirroring the rego array.concat semantic. - post_tool_call returns transform with a single-target replace at .account_id, mirroring the rego template. - output returns transform with a single-target replace at .text computed via re.sub(CHK-[0-9]+, ACCOUNT-REDACTED, text), mirroring the rego regex.replace. - Every non-transform decision now MUST NOT carry a transform; this invariant is asserted in enforce(). enforce - Drops effects[]; the helper now consumes the transform key on a transform verdict and applies it via the new apply_transform helper. Fails closed with AssertionError on any of: - presence of effects[] (AGT D1 rejected the shape). - transform present on a deny / escalate verdict (AGT D1.1 ban). - transform present on a non-transform permitting verdict (allow or warn carrying a stale transform is a host-side bug). - transform missing on a transform verdict. apply_transform - New helper that walks .* via the existing path_tokens utility and replaces the value at the resolved path. The legacy apply_effect / apply_effects / account_redaction_effect helpers are retained as fail-closed stubs that raise AssertionError so any out- of-tree caller of the demo's legacy API surfaces a clear migration hint. Manual run - python examples/bank_agent/demo/run_demo.py prints 'demo verification: PASS' and the user-visible output reads 'I canno…
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Summary
Harden AsyncTrustPolicyEvaluator read/write lock behavior to improve concurrency safety and reduce race risk.
Testing